View source for L-2015-182, License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, Change in Technical Specifications End States (CENPSD-1186), Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement.

{{Adams
| number = ML15254A180
| issue date = 08/31/2015
| title = License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, Change in Technical Specifications End States (CENPSD-1186), Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement.
| author name = Costanzo C
| author affiliation = Florida Power &amp; Light Co
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000335, 05000389
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| case reference number = L-2015-182
| document type = Letter type:L, License-Application for Facility Operating License (Amend/Renewal) DKT 50
| page count = 131
| project = 
| stage = Request
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:0                FPL August 31, 2015 L-2015-182
                            *FIPL'*10                                                    CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Re:        St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, "Change in Technical Specifications End States, (CE NPSD-1 186)," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR)
Section 50.90, Florida Power & Light Company.(FPL) is submitting a request for an amendment to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) to incorporate the NRC-approved TSTF-422, Revision 2, "Change in Technical Specifications End States (CE NPSD-1186)."
The proposed amendment would modify TS to risk-inform requirements regarding selected Required Action End States. Attachment 1 provides a description and assessment of the proposed change, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications. summarizes the regulatory commitments made in this submittal. Attachment 3 provides markup pages of existing TS and TS Bases for St. Lucie Unit 1 to show the proposed change. Attachment 4 provides markup pages of existing TS and TS Bases for St. Lucie Unit 2 to show the proposed change. Attachment 5 provides revised (clean) TS pages for St. Lucie Unit
: 1. Attachment 6 provides revised (clean) TS pages for St. Lucie Unit 2.
Although this request is neither outage related nor required by any specific date, your prompt review is requested. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 60 days of its receipt by FPL. This license amendment proposed by FPL has been reviewed by the St. Lucie Plant Onsite Review Group.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1), "Notice for public comment," the analysis about the issue of no significant hazards consideration using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 is being provided to the Commission in accordance with the distribution requirements in 10 CFR 50.4.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1), "State consultation," a copy of this application and the reasoned analysis about No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC) is being provided to the designated Florida State Official.
Please contact Mr. Eric Katzman, Licensing Manager at 772-467-7734 if there are any questions about this submittal.
Florida Power & Light Company                                                                    'L/1 6501 s. Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957

L-2015-182 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on Ra*.sA-          3A~              2015 Sincerely, Christopher R. Costanzo Site Vice President St. Lucie Plant Attachments: 1. Description and Assessment
: 2. Regulatory Commitments
: 3. Proposed St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specification Changes and Bases Changes
: 4. Proposed St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specification Changes and Bases Changes
: 5. Revised (clean) St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specification Pages
: 6. Revised (clean) St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specification Pages cc:     Ms. Cynthia Becker, Florida Department of Health

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                        Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                               Page 1 of 7 ATTACHMENT 1 DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT

==1.0     DESCRIPTION==

The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specifications (TS) to risk-inform requirements regarding selected Required Action End States. The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, "Change in Technical Specifications End States (CE NPSD-1186)," dated December 22, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Number ML093570241) (Reference 1).
The FederalRegister notice published on April 7, 2011 (76 FR 19510) (Reference 2), announced the availability of this TS improvement as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).
2.0     ASSESSMENT 2.1     Applicability of Topical Report, TSTF-422, and Model Safety Evaluation Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) has reviewed Combustion Engineering (CE) Topical Report (TR) NPSD-1 186 (Reference 3), TSTF-422, Revision 2, and the NRC staff's model safety evaluation (SE) (Reference 4) as part of the CLIIP. FPL has concluded that the information in TR NPSD-1 186, TSTF-422, Revision 2, and the NRC staff's model SE are applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 and justify this license amendment request (LAR) for incorporation of the changes to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
2.2      Optional Changes and Variations FPL is proposing variations or deviations from TR NPSD-1 186, TSTF-422, Revision 2, and the NRC staff's model SE referenced in the FederalRegister on April 7, 2011 (76 FR 19510), as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability.
FPL has reviewed TSTF-422, Revision 2, and the model SE referenced in the Federal Register Notice of Availability published on April 7, 2011 (76 FR 19510), as part of the CLIIP. The model SE refers to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants," and to the guidance in Revision 2 of NUMARC 93-0 1. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 are taking a deviation from the model SE because RG 1.182 has been withdrawn since it was redundant due to the inclusion of its subject matter in Revision 3 of RG 1.160, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," dated May 2012. RG 1.160 endorsed Revision 4A of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,"
dated April 2011. Topical Report CE NPSD-1 186-A, "Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG Member PWRs,"

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                          Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                                Page 2 of 7 references RG 1.182 with regard to its endorsement of NUMARC 93-01. Both Revision 2 and 3 of NUMARC 93-01 are mentioned in CE NPSD-1 186-A. The FPL review concluded verification of compliance with Section 11 of NUMNARC 93-0 1, Nuclear Management and Resource Council, Revision 4A, April 2011, as well as the supporting WCAP-16364-NP, Revision 2, "Implementation Guidance for Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States at Combustion Engineering NSSS Plants (TSTF-422)," dated May 2010. FPL fleet procedure EN-AA-1 00-2002, "Maintenance Rule Program Administration," references RG 1.160 and NUMARC 93-01 as the governing guidance for determination of the risk significance of structures, systems and components within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. Application of RG 1.160, Revision 3, and NUJMARC 93-01, Revision 4A, does not result in inconsistencies with the intent of CE NPSD-1 186-A, WCAP-16364-NP, Revision 2, TSTF-422, Revision 2, and the model SE.
Because the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS have not been converted to the standard TS (STS) ofNUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications         - Combustion Engineering Plants,"
(on which TSTF-422, Revision 2 is based), the layout of the TS when compared to TSTF-422, Revision 2 may differ significantly in format; however, the technical differences are minor. In addition, St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 are "analog" plants; therefore, only "analog" instrumentation STS are applicable. Additional differences between St. Lucie Unit 1 and St.
Lucie Unit 2 TS and STS are as follows.
: 1. The STS use terms such as "Required Action" and "Completion Time" where the St.
Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS use equivalent terms of "Action" and "Allowed Outage Time." While the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 terms are maintained in the TS for consistency, the STS and equivalent St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS terms may be used interchangeably throughout this letter. These differences do not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 2. Changes may have required the movement of information from one TS page to another.
This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 3. In general, the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS use the MODE noun names (i.e.,
          "HOT SHUTDOWN" in lieu of "MODE 4"). The use of noun names does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 4. St. Lucie Unit 1 TS 3.3.2.1, Table 3.3-3, ACTION 11 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3, ACTION 15 currently state that under certain conditions, action must be taken to "exit the mode of applicability." ACTION 11 and ACTION 15 are associated with Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Manual Trip and Automatic Actuation Logic. Consistent with TSTF-422, Revision 2, ACTION 11 and ACTION 15 already refer to HOT SHUTDOWN; therefore, only the prohibition from

St. Lucie Units l and 2                                                                  L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                          Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                                Page 3 of 7 using Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4.a when entering HOT SHUTDOWN is added. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 5. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS do not contain a separate TS for the Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) function (STS 3.3.8). St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 control rooms are isolated upon receipt of a high radiation signal. The associated radiation monitors are included in St. Lucie Unit 1 TS 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3-6 ACTION 17 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3-6 ACTION 27. St. Lucie Unit 1 TS 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3-6 ACTION 17 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3.3.3.1 Table 3.3-6 ACTION 27 have been modified consistent with TSTF-422, Revision 2. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 6. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS do not have a Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Isolation Signal TS (STS 3.3.9), which isolate separate letdown isolation valves in response to a high pressure condition. Therefore, no TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes related to CVCS are incorporated into the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 7. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS do not have a Shield Building Filtration Actuation Signal (SBFAS) TS (STS 3.3.10). Therefore, no TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes related to CVCS are incorporated into the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 8. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS do not contain a separate ACTION for not meeting Refueling Water Tank (RWT) boron concentration and/or temperature limits.
Adopting these ACTIONs is beyond the scope of TSTF-422, Revision 2. Because the TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes are related only to these ACTIONs, no TSTF-422, Revision 2 related changes are adopted for St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3.5.4, "Refueling Water Tank." This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 9. STS 3.6.6.A, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (Atmospheric and Dual) contains requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3.6.2.1 contains requirements for containment spray trains and containment cooling trains in MODES 1, 2, and 3 with pressurizer pressure > 1750 psia and separate requirements for containment spray trains and containment cooling trains in MODE 3 with pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia. The TSTF-422, Revision 2 ACTIONs are comparable to the existing St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 ACTIONs.
Furthermore, the TSTF-422, Revision 2 prohibition from using LCO 3.0.4.a when entering HOT SHUTDOWN is not required because HOT SHUTDOWN (MODE 4) is

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-3 35 and 50-3 89                                                        Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                               Page 4 of 7 not a St. Lucie Unit 1 or St. Lucie Unit 2 Mode of Applicability. As a result, the TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes were not adopted for St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3.6.2.1. This deviation does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 10. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 Ultimate Heat Sink design does not use cooling towers; therefore, TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes to Ultimate Heat Sink (STS 3.7.9) are not applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 11. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 designs do not have an Essential Chilled Water (ESW) System. Therefore, TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes to STS 3.7.10 are not applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 12. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACS) (STS 3.7.11) and the Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) (STS 3.7.12) requirements are contained in a single TS 3.7.7.1 for St. Lucie Unit 1 and a single TS 3.7.7 for St. Lucie Unit 2. Therefore, the TSTF-422, Revision 2 related changes are incorporated into the single St. Lucie Unit 1 TS and single St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 13. St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 do not have TS requirements associated with a Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (STS 3.7.15). Therefore, TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes to STS 3.7.15 are not applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 14. St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 3/4.8.3, "Onsite Power Distribution Operating," contains requirements associated with inverters. St. Lucie Unit 1 TS 3/4.8.2, "Onsite Power Distribution Systems A.C. Distribution - Operating," does not contain requirements associated with inverters. Therefore, TSTF-422, Revision 2 changes to STS 3.8.7 are not applicable to St. Lucie Unit 1ITS and oniy applicable to St. Lucie Unit 2 TS. This difference does not invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.
: 15. Because the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS have not been converted to the STS version, the associated TS Bases for each TSTF-422, Revision 2 change is modified as necessary to be consistent with both the current St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS Bases and that presented in TSTF-422, Revision 2. This difference does not

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                       L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                                      Page 5 of 7 invalidate the applicability of TSTF-422, Revision 2 and the model SE to St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS.

==3.0      REGULATORY ANALYSIS==

3.1      No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) has evaluated the proposed changes to the TS using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
Description of Amendment Request: A change is proposed to the TS of St. Lucie Unit 1 and St.
Lucie Unit 2, consistent with TSTF-422, Revision 2, to allow, for some systems, entry into hot shutdown rather than cold shutdown to repair equipment, if risk is assessed and managed consistent with the program in place for complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
Changes proposed in TSTF-422 will be made to the St. Lucie Unit 1 and St. Lucie Unit 2 TS for selected Required Action end states providing this allowance.
Basis for no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.9 1(a),
FPL analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
: 1.       Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows a change to certain required end states when the Technical Specification (TS) Completion Times (CTs) for remaining in power operation are exceeded. Most of the requested TS changes are to permit an end state of hot shutdown (Mode 4) rather than an end state of cold shutdown (Mode 5) contained in the current TS.
The request was limited to: (1) those end states where entry into the shutdown mode is for a short interval, (2) entry is initiated by inoperability of a single train of equipment or a restriction on a plant operational parameter, unless otherwise stated in the applicable TS, and (3) the primary purpose is to correct the initiating condition and return to power operation a soon as is practical. Risk insights from both the qualitative and quantitative risk assessments were used in specific TS assessments. Such assessments are documented in Section 5.5 of CE NIPSD-1 186, Rev 0, "Technical Justification for the Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG Member PWRs." They provide an integrated discussion of deterministic and probabilistic issues, focusing on specific TSs, which are used to support the proposed TS end state and associated restrictions. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident after adopting proposed TSTF-422 are no different than the consequences of an accident prior to adopting TSTF-422. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                          Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                                Page 6 of 7 not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
: 2.      Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Allowing a change to certain required end states when the TS CTs for remaining in power operation are exceeded, i.e., entry into hot shutdown rather than cold shutdown to repair equipment, if risk is assessed and managed, will not introduce new, failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change and the commitment by the licensee to adhere to the guidance in WCAP-16364-NP, Revision 2, "Implementation Guidance for Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States at Combustion Engineering NSSS Plants (TSTF-422)," will further minimize possible concerns.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.
: 3.      Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change allows, for some systems, entry into hot shutdown rather than cold shutdown to repair equipment, if risk is assessed and managed. The CEOG's risk assessment approach is comprehensive and follows NRC staff guidance as documented in Regulatory Guides (RGs) 1.174 and 1.177. In addition, the analyses show that the criteria of the three-tiered approach for allowing TS changes are met. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG 1.177. A risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based upon the reasoning presented above, FPL concludes that the requested change involves no significant hazards consideration, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), "Issuance of Amendment."

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                   L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                           Attachment 1 License Amendment Request                                                                  Page 7 of 7 3.2     Verification, Commitments, and Additional Information Needed FPL commits to the regulatory commitments in Attachment 2. In addition, FPL has proposed TS Bases consistent with TSTF-422, Revision 2, which provides guidance and details on how to implement the new requirements. Implementation of TSTF-422 requires that risk be managed and assessed, and the configuration risk management program is adequate to satisfy this requirement. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative assessment of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more systems are not able to perform their associated function. Finally, FPL has a Bases Control Program consistent with Section 5.5 of the Standard TSs (STS).

==4.0     ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION==

The proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, and would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51 .22(c)(9).
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.

==5.0     REFERENCES==
: 1. TSTF-422, Revision 2, "Change in Technical Specifications End States (CE NPSD-1 186)," dated December 22, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093570241).
: 2.      FederalRegister [Vol. 76, No. 67, p. 19510], "Nqotice of Availability of the Models for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, 'Change in Technical Specifications End States (CE NPSD-1 186)' for Combustion Engineering Plants Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process," April 7, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103270159).
: 3.      CE NPSD- 1186, Rev 0, "Technical Justification for the Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG Member PWRs,"
April 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010540231).
: 4.      NRC Model Safety Evaluation of TSTF-422, Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103270197).

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                     Attachment 2 License Amendment Request                                                            Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT 2 LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by FPL in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.
REGULATORY COMMITMENTS                                  DUE DATE/EVENT FPL will modify the Technical Specification     Upon implementation of the approved TS Bases for the revised specifications as adopted amendment with the applicable license amendment.
FPL will follow the guidance established in     Ongoing Section 11 of NUMARC 93-0 1, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,"
Nuclear Management and Resource Council, Revision 4A, April 2011.
FPL will follow the guidance established in     Upon implementation of the approved TS WCAP-16364-NP, Revision 2,                      amendment, when TS Required Action End "Implementation Guidance for Risk Informed      State remains within the Applicability of the Modification to Selected Required Action End    TS States at Combustion Engineering NSSS Plants (TSTF-422)," dated May 2010, with the exception that Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 4A, will be utilized to meet 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements in lieu of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                         Page 1 of 42 ATTACHMENT 3 St. Lucie Unit 1 Proposed Technical Specifications and Bases Markup Pages This coversheet plus 41 pages LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST PROPOSED CHANGE FOR ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE (TSTF) TRAVELER TSTF-422, REVISION 2, "CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS END STATES, (CE NPSD-1186)," USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                           Page 2 of 42 TABLE 3.3-3 (continued)
TABLE NOTATION ACTION 10      -  With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation .may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
: a.      The inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped contrition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour. If the inoperable channel :can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, then place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition.
: b.      Within 1 hour, all functional units receivng an input from the inoperable channel are also bypassed or tripped.
c*    :With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum.
Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel has been placed in the tripped condition within 1 hoiur. Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status Within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
ACTION 11      -  With the number of.OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
* ACTION 12       -  With the number oif OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance
* of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the .-
* inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within !.-
1 hour.;
                                                         ~ applicable When' entering :HOT SHUTDOWN
[LCO 3.*4:A *Snot                                                    h               :
or. LUCtE - UNIT 1                                  34 3-13             Amendment No. 40 *- *, 7*, 488,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                   Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                         Page 3 of 42 TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION                                                       i ACTION 12      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.9.12.
ACTION 13      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours.
ACTION 14      -  With the'number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.
ACTION 15      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, either restore the inoperable Channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or:
: 1)  Initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate pararneter(s),and
: 2)   Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION 16      - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by thei Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, comply With the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.9.9.
ACTION 17 -      With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation.,
4ICis not applicable when enterin~g HOTr SHUTOOWNJi
                                              .o4a ST, LUCIE - UNIT 1                               3/4 3-23               Sr. NIT3143~No, SQ. 205 icic Amendmnent

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                    L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                            Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                  Page 4 of 42 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN LIIIGCNDITION FOR OPERAkTLON_
              ,3.4.1.3     At least two of the loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one reactor coolant or shutdown cooling loop shall be in operation.*
: a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,
: b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,
: c. Shutdown Cooling Loop A,
: d. Shutdown Cooling Loop B,             land           action tofor initiateavailable Igenerator                 make   at least decay   h~eat one    steam removal APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.                                 Ivia natural circulation. LCO 3.0,4.a iS not lapplicable when entering        H~oT  SHUTDOWN.
ACTION:
: a. With less than the above required reactor coolant or shutdown                .
cooling loops OPERA*BLE, within one (1) hour initiate correctiveS action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status*-tl-the remaining ..........      loe is .ashutdw        cr      ice~p, be in COLD
                                      *lJ T -ONwithn30hur-s.
b,   With no reactor coolant or shutdown cooling loop in operation, suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 and within one (1) hour initiate corrective action to retumn the required reactor coolant loop to operation.
* All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specification 3,1.1.1 and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at 0
least t0 F below saturation temperature.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT !                                3/4 4-1b                   ST.u~r 1 34 Aendment UCE      4-bNo. as, 1445,-tia

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                  Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                       Page 5 of 42 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAiNM'ENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.3      Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
: a.      Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and: exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and Ib. An overall air look leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
: a.      With one containment air lock door inoperable*:
                                      !. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE statUS within 24 hours: Or lock the OPERABLE air lock, door closed.
: 2. Operation may then continueprovided until performance  of the next airrequired overall air lock leakage test             that the OPERABLE          lock door is verified to be closed at least once per 31 days.
HOT SHUTDOWN within thi following             3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a iS not:          \b. With the containment airlock inoperable, except as the result of an applicable- when             \ inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore entering HOT                 \the    inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least sHuTDowN.                    : HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in o.                                    ti:
                 *LIVEILNCE REOUIREMENTS                                                                               _____
4.6.1.3       Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
* If the inner air lock door is inoperable, passage through the OPERABLE outer air lock door is permitted to effect repairs to the inoperable inner air lock door. No more than one airlock door shall be open at any time.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                   314 6-10                 ST.
UC~E-UITi3/4-10Amendiment Nc, S, 44S, *2*

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                  L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                          Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 6 of 42 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS INTERNAL PRESSURE I IIIIMI'f* ('MJF~lhTlrM  ~fI~h: AOIDA:::*TIflIM maintained 3.61.4      *Primaiy containment internal pressure shall be fHo--OT-HT)OW '
between --0.7 and +0.5 psig.                                                        tv~ithin the fol owing 6 hours. LO0G APPLICABILITY:: MODES 1,2, 3 and 4.
applicable w~hen ACTION:                                                                              ente ing HoT With :the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above,                SHUTOCWN.
restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD;SH,UTDOWN witith~f~lwi           0hour.
SIIRVEILLANCE REOUIRF*MINTS 4.6.1.4     The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
ST, LUCIE- UNIT 1                                314 642              Sr.L.UIE NIT1 346~12Amendment Nn. 24*3, :2-2*

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                           Page 7 of 42 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE LIMTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.5      Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120&deg;F.        HOT SHUTDOWN wi hin the following APPUICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:                                                                           z     3.O.4.a is no*
applicable: when Wrth'the containment average air temperature > 12O&deg;F, reduce the average-               e.ntering HOT air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least                   SHUTDOWN.
HOT STANDBY within the next.6 hours and in .GOL-SH                 QOWNwithi*r4he SUR VElILANCE :REQUIREMENTS 4,6.1t.5    The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average of the temperatures at three of the following locations and shall be determined in Location accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control program:
I
: a. Containment fan cooler No. lA air intake, 'elevation 45 feet.
b,     Containment fan cooler No, 1B air intake, elevation 45 feet.
c;     Containment fan cooler No. IC air intake, elevation 62 feet.
: d. Containment fan cooler No. 1D air intake, elevation 45 feet, ST, LUCJE - UNIT 1                               314 6-13               ST.LUIE    ~3Amendment UIT1 34 No *-

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                                                         2-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                                               At[tachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                                                     Page 8 of 42 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 314.8.3     CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES L!IM IT N G C_ ON DITIOQ N.FPRO.PERA TJO         ....... ..............................................  ...    . ..........................
3.6.3.1     The containment isolation Valves shall be OPERABLE:
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, either:
: a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or'
: b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one HOT SHUTDOWN                      deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or within the following:
6hours. LCQ               c. Isolate each affected penetration withini 4 hours by use of at least one closed
       .OA,4a is not                   manual valve or blind flange; or
      .pplicable when ent ling HOT              d.      Be in at least HOT STANDBY w.ithin the next 6 hours and in SL SHUTDOWN.                         SHUTDOWNwthnth zlcin 0 or.
IJ..ANCE REQUIREEN                T&......       .                  .                 .
4,6,3,1.1    The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacemenit work is performed on the~valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the
                                *cycling test, and verification of isolation time.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                     3/46-18                                 ST. LUC~E-UNIT I314 5-Amend.ment No. Q-4

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                         Page 9 of 42 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY LIMI[ING CONDITION FOR PEATO 3.6.6.2      SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
APPLICABILITY:' MODES 1,2, 3 and 4.
HOT SH UTDOWN within the following ACTION:
6 hours; L-CO Wilthout SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY, restore SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY                 3.O.4.a is not within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours                 applicable when and in COLD SHUTDOWN-wIthin4 4e-feew'n*3-hef               (                          entering HOT SHUTDOWN, I AIIIV=I tI=".F 1; IIltflMI=hTr*
4.6.6.2      SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                             3!4 6-30               ST.tu~s UIT 3263~Amendmen~t No,2 St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                        Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                             Page 10 of 42 COMPITONEN        COOLINGRATIO      SYTE LIM4T7.3 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OP~RATI0N M OT     SHUTDOO'@    '
3.7.3.1     At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be        i ithin the -following OPERABLE.w 6 hours. LCO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.                                                3; O0.4,a is not pplicable when ACTION:                                                                             e ntering HoT SiHUTDOWN, With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least                ,
two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in GO            4 *TO Nwthntzfolwn SUR VEILLANC.E REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3,1     At least two component cooling waterloops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection ActUation Signal.
ST. LUGIE - UNIT 1                              3/4 7-14               ST.        -14Amencimerd UIT1314 U~rE-        No, 8O, *2"2

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                          Page 11 of 42 PLANT SYSTEMS 3i4.7.4     INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 3.7.4.1     At least two independent intake cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.
APPUiCABIUiTY: MODES 1,2, 3 and 4.
HOT SHUTDOWN ACTION:                                                                              within :the ollowing With only one intake cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two                6 :hours. LCO loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY                3.0:.4a is not within the next 6 hours and in                                    l4iB-*.:F*tewifig-S appli ble when entering HOT SHNUTDOWN.
SUJRVEIL LANCE REOURREMENTS 4.7.4.1     At least two intake cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In acoordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation signal.
ST, LUCiE - UNIT I                               3/4 7-16                sr.UCR
                                                                                              - urr 3M
                                                                                                     -16Amendmrent No. 50, *2*

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                  Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                      Page 12 of 42 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7      CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITINO CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1t     The control room emergency ventilation system shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. Two booster fans,
: b. Two isolation valves in each outside air intake duct,
: c. Two isolation valves in the toilet area air exhaust duct,
: d. One filter train,
: e. At least two air conditioning units, and
: f. Two isolation valves in the kitchen area exhaust duct.
NOTE                                                    1 The control room envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTION:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
: a. With one booster fan inoperable, restore the inoperable fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours an"n ODSHTOW                       ihir*4he-follswig-hear *
: b. With one isolation valve per air duct inoperable, operation may continue HOT SHUTDOWN                     provided the other isolation valve in the same duct is maintained closed; within the following             otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in ~ObL 6 ho u rs . L OC                  SHU DO W wi hi th c fol o n g 3 0 h o ' re.
3.0,4.a is not            c. With the filter train inoperable for reasons otherihan an inoperable Control applicable when enter ing :HOT Room Envelope boundary, restore the filter train to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in I
SHUTDOWN'.                       C"L SHTD                 wihi
                                                                 . t_ etlwi4O3hes
                  **            d. With only oneunits conditioning     air conditioning to OPERABLE   unitstatus OPERABLE, within 7 restore days oratbeleast in attwo  air leastHOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDO.....                  withi-r n*M
                                                                                                                ,,th.o.....*'
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                   3/4 7-20                   ST.
ucIEuNI~3/47.20Amendment No, 460, 4-gO,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                      L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                              Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                  Page 13 of 42 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTION: (continued)
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4: (continued)
: e. With the filter train inoperable due to an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary:
1.. Immediately initiate actions to implement mitigating actions, and
: 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions to ensure Control Room Envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits, and
: 3. Restore Control Room Envelope boundary to OPERABLE status within 90 days.
With the, above requirements not met, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in CL       S            ,UDON-withn~    wtole3-hu HOT SHUTDOWN within *he following 6 hours. LCO applicable When SHUTDOW N; ST;. LUCLE- UNIT I3472aA'.d{tN.2O                3f4 7-20a                Amendment No. -2*

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                       L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                   Page 14 of 42 PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.8     ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPE*RATION 3.7.8.1      TWO independent ECCS area exhaust air filter trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1.,2, 3 and 4.                                                              HOT SHUTDOWN within the folloing ACTION:                                                                                          6 hours.is LCO 3.O.4.a    not With one ECCS area exhaust air filter train inoperable, restore the                              applicable when inoperable train~to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUT',DOWN within th flown                           entering HOT
                *O-hce-re                                                                                        SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE RPEO U fRE*ME.,NTrSJ 4.7,8.1      Each ECOS area exhaust air filter train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance from with  the Surveillance initiating,       the control  room, flowFrequency through theControl HEPA Program filter and by charcoal adsorber train and verifying that the train operates for at least 15 minutes.
: b. By performing required ECCS area ventilation system filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program.
: c. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program:
: 1.      Verifying that the air flow distribution is uniform within 20% across HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1 989.
: 2.       Verifying that the filter train starts on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
ST. LUCIE - uNIT 1                                    3!47-24                  ST.
LOIE                 26*
                                                                                                     -UNITI 3I4.~24Amendmenit No. L,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                     Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                        Page 15 of 42 314,8            ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 314.8.1          A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.81.1~         As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
: a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and.
: b. Two separate and independent diesel generator sets each with:
: 1. Engine-mounted fuel tanks containing a minimum of 152 gallons of fuel,
: 2. A separate fuel storage system containing a *minimum of 19,000 gallons of fuel, and
: 3. A separate fuel :transfer pump.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1l.a inoperable, except as provided in Action f.
below, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1 .1,1 .a *within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be :in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and LULU ~t1U       LU~'PJ wainn mc iiIuw~rm        -*~W~-
                -- *f*b.
HOT SHUTDOWN=                       With one diesel of OPERABILITY       generator the A.C. of 3.8.1l~b sources      inoperable, Surveillance by performing  demonstrate Requirement the within :the following:              4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the S hours, !LCO                        EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support 3.0,4,a is not                      system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative applicable :when                     maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining entering HOT*                        OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1 .2,a.4 within SHUTDOWN,
                              ~8              hours, unless it can be confirmed that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG*; restore the diesel generator'to OPERABLE
                    ' *---------s---           tu. within 14 daysor be inat least HOT STANDBY within the next 6hours Sand--ain COL-       HUDON iti           th falwn 0huc Additionally, within 4 hours from the discovery of Concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s) (including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3),
declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
If the absence of any common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this :test shall be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUClE - UNITr                                     3/4 a-1               Amenidment No 40,3, -4.1., 433, 430,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                     L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                            Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                Page 16 of 42 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (continued)
: c. With one offsite A.C. circuit    and one diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance 1
Requirement 4,8.1..*. la within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDO by performing Surveillance HOT SHUTDOWN                Requirement 4 8 1 1.2,a,4 within 8 hours unless it can be confirmed that the withi thefollwing          cause of the inoperable EDO does not exist on the remaining EDG*. Restore wtith       loi           at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or 6 hours. LCO                be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in Q 3.0.Aoa is not:               HUTDOWN wihi th efollowing 30 ouro Restore the other A.C. power applicable When            source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance entering HOT                with the provisions of Section 3.8.1.1 ACTION Statement a or b, as SHUTDOWN.                   appropriate, with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the
______________       time of the initial toss of the remaining inoperable AC. power source.
Additionally,. within 4 hours from the discovery of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s) (including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3), declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
: d. With to of the required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be :in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. Following restoration of one offsite source, follow ACTION Statement a. with the time reqUirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite A.C. circuit.
                     *'if the absence of an~y common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this test shall be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDO is restored-to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT1                                   314 8-2                 UITI ST.LUI~   34-2Amendment No..40a-, *.2- 4a8, 45*

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                 Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                    Page 17 of 42 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION__(continued)
: e. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two off'site A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance HOT SHUTDOWN Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; within the following             restore one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 6 hours, LCO                     2 hours or be in the at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in GL 3.0.4.a is not                     HTDW                 te-oltewin&sect;-30-heurs. Following restoration of one diesel
                                                          " "ihi applicable when                  generator unit, follow ACTION Statement b. with the time requirement of that entering HOT                     ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable SHUTDOWN.                        diesel generator.
: f. With one Unit 1 startup transformer (1A or 1B) inoperable and with a Unit 2 startup transformer (2A or 2B) connected to the same A or B offsite power circuit and administratively available to both units, then should Unit 2 require the use of the startup transformer administratively available to both units, Unit 1 shall demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C, sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1i.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the inoperable startup transformer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
: g. LCO 3.0.4,b is not applicable to diesel generators.
4.8.1.1.1    Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:
a,     Determined OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability; and
: b. Demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by transferring (manually and automatically) unit power supply from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer.
4.8.1.1.2   Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:
: 1. Verifying fuel level in the engine-mounted fuel tank,
: 2. Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank,
: 3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the engine-mounted tank, ST. LUCIE - UNIT 13/83                              3/4 8-3                Amendment No. 4,03, --12, -t-5, 223,22

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                                    Page 18 of 42 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS D.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING LIIIN        ONIIN..O             OQRQEATION 3.8.2,3     As a minimum the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
: a. 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1A, 125-volt Battery bank No. IA and a full capacity charger.
full capacity charger.                                                        HOT v.ithinSHUTDOWN the follovwing APPLICABIUTY': MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.                                                             8 hours LCO 3,0,4.a is riot ACTION:                                                                                         applicable w~hen.
entering HOT
: a. With one of the required battery banks or busses inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank or bus to OPERABLE status                 SHUTDOWN.
within 2 hours or be in at least H-OT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in CQ;(; SI-IUH*TD;OV' N-wthin-t, fle             wi-4e
: b. With    one of the demonstrate     :therequired full capacity OPERABILITY       of its chargers  inoperable, associated  battery banks.
by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.82.23.2.a.1 within 1 hour, and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in Table 4,8-2 is not met, declare the battery inoperable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4,.82.3.1   Each D.C. bus train shall be determined OPERABLE and energized in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying indicated power availability.
t 4.8.2.3.2   Each 125-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that:
: 1. The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the .Category A limits, and
: 2.      The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129-volts On float charge, ST. LUCIE. UNIT 1                                    314 8-!0                   ST.
L~lE NIT I314  No, 84, 22
                                                                                                          .~tJAmendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                        Page 19 of 42 iSECTiON NO..             *fThE:    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                          PAGE ..... ::
3/4.3                  BASES ATTACHMENT 5 OF ADM-~25,04                   I       4 of 5 R*EVISIONNO'                            INSTRUMENTATION                                           ,
3                              ST. LUCIE UNIT .1                        I 314.3         INSTRUMENTATION (continued)                                                .......     * -
BASES (continued) 314.3.1 and 314.3.2 (continued)
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, provided that suczh tests demonstrate total channel response time as defined.
CEOG Topical Report CE.NPSD-1167, and FPL No Significant Hazards Evaluation PSL-ENG-SEIS-03-043 provide the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in these documents. The allocated sensor response time must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and re-verified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time (e.g., replacement of a transmitter DP cell or variable damping circuits). Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or
: 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
The CEOG topical report and FPL evaluation only cover certain sensor model numbers. If sensors are replaced with types not previously evaluated, then periodic response time testing (RTT) for the new sensor must. either be performed and the appropriate changes made to plant procedures, or an additional request for RTT elimination must be submitted and approved by the NRC, If, however, the replacement sensor is one for.which RTT elimination has been approved, then FPL may modify the plant procedures, using an allocated response time based upon a vendor-supplied response time value, or upon statistical analysis of historical data for that transmitter type and model.
The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) provides direct actuation, of the Containment Isolation Signal (018) to ensure containment isolation in the event of a small break LOCA.
IINSER.T 1

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 20 of 42 INSERT 1 For channels not restored to an OPERABLE status in accordance with ACTION 11, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized.
To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to Or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE -
NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs,. October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reachthe required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. ACTION 11 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if
            *applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment' addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the accePtability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a.shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units l and 2                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                    Page 21 of 42 SECTION NO."             TITLE:     TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAc-E.
3/4.3                  BASES ATTACHMENT 5 OF ADM-25.04                          5 o......
R*EVISION NO:                             INSTRUMENTATION 3                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 314.3.3       MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION,                                                          ...
314.3,3,1     RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels; and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, 'Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident,'
December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.
INSERT 3I 3/4.3.3.2     Deleted 3/4.3.3.3     Deleted 3/4.3.3.4      Deleted 13/4.3.3.5     REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the facility from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.3.6      Deleted 3/4.3.3.7      Deleted 314.3.3.8     ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistentwith the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG 0578, "TMI-2 .Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                        Page 22 of 42 INSERT 3 For channels not restored to an OPERABLE status in accordance with ACTION 17, the control room emergency ventilation system must be initiated and maintained in the recirculation mode of operation within 1 hour. ACTION 17 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to~enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                         L-2015-1 82 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                    Page 23 of 42 SECTION NO.:            TITLE:      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAGE:
3/4.4                  BASES ATTACHMENT 6 OF ADM-~25.04                       3 o~f 36 REVISI0N NO.:                       REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, 7                               ST. LUCIE UNIT I BASES FOR SECTION 314.4 314.4         REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1       REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION                                                i The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above the DNBR limit during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation, this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.
In MODE 3, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE.
In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either shutdown cooling or RCS) be OPERABLE, In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two shutdown cooling loops be OPERABLE.
The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.
If no coolant loops are in operation during shutdown operations, suspending the introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2 is required to assure continued safe operation.
Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than what would be required in the RCS for minimum 5DM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                      Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 24 of 42 INS ERT 5 If only one required shutdown cooling train is OPERABLE and in operation and no required RCS loops are OPERABLE, redundancy for heat removal is lost and the plant must be placed in a configuration that minimizes overall plant risk. Thiis redundancy is obtained bY making at least one steam generator available for decay heat removal via natural circulation because:
1.. MODE 4 operation poses overall lower risk of core damage and large early radiation release than does MODE 5 (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the FI~sk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). This is particularly true with shutdown cooling impaired.
: 2. In MODE 4, RCS and steam generator conditions may be maintained such that failure of the operating shutdown cooling train may be mitigated by natural circulation heat removal through one or more steam generators.
Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                       L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                               Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                   Page 25 of 42 SECTIO No.               "nTLEs TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSPAE-3/4.6                   BASES ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                       3 of 10 V*IS*ONNO.                           CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 9                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 1                                             !
BASES FOR SECTION 3/4.6 3/4.6         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1       CONTAINMENT VESSEL 3/4.6.1.1     CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY CONTA1NMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates ,assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.
In accordance with Generic Letter 91-08, "Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications," the opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.
r314.6.1.2     CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure, Pa (42.77 psig) which results from the limiting design basis loss of coolant accident.
The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program and is consistent with the requirements of Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50, Option B and Regulatory Guide 1.163 Rev. 0, as modified by approved exemptions.
3t4.6.1.3     CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.
INET 7

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                     Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 26 of 42 INSERT 7 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in accordance with the ACTIONs, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized.. To achieve this status, t~he plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001i). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                          Page 27 of 42 SECTION NO.:              TITLE:       TECHN ICAL sPEcIFICATIONS                      PAGE: ..
3/4.6                  BASES ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                           4t o10 NEvIS,.oN NO.:                           CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 9                                 ST. LUCIE UNIT I 3t4.6          CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)                                              ........  *,i BASES (continued) 3/4.6.1        CONTAINMENT VESSEL (continued) 314.6.1.4      INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the containment structural is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.70 psi and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 44 psig during loss of coolant accident conditionS.
The maximum peak pressure obtained from a loss of coolant accident is 42.77 psig. The limit of 0.5 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the maximum peak pressure to less than 44.0 psig which is the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.
                                                            ]INSERT 9!
3!4.6.1.5      AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment air temperature ensures that the peak containmentvessel temperature does not exceed the containment vessel design temperature of 264&deg;F during steam line break and LOCA conditions. The containment temperature limit is consistent with the accident analyses.        [INSERT 1-1 3/4,6.1.6      CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 42.77 psig in the event of the limiting design basis loss of coolant accident. A visual inspection in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                   Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                        Page 28 of 42 INSERT 9 If containment pressure cannot be restored to within limits, the plant must be                 .
brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable. low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3o0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                   Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 29 of 42 INSERT 11 If containment average air temperature cannot be restored to within its limit, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is niot applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                 Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                     Page 30 of 42 SECTION NO.             TITLE:      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAGE.,,I:, =: ;/
314.6                BASES ATTACHM ENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                       6 of10 REVISION NO,:                          CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 9                               ST. LUCIE UNIT i                                   :,
314.6         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued),
BASES (continued) 314.6.2        DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS (continued) 314.6.2.1      CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS (continued)
Ensuring that the containment :spray pump discharge pressure is met satisfies the periodic surveillance requirement to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems. Along with this requirement.. Section Xl of the ASME Code verifies the pump developed head at one point on the pump characteristic curve to verify both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than*
or equal to the performance assumed in the unit safety analysis:. Surveillance Requirements are specified in the Inservice Testing Program, which encompasses Section Xl of the ASME Code. Section Xl of the ASME Code provides the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.
314.6.2.2      SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaCH volume and concentration ensure a Containment sump pH value of between 7.0 and 9.66 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.
3/4.6.2.3     DELETED 3/4.6.3.      CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be =isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive, material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
IINSERT 1

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 31 of 42 INSERT 13 With ACTION a. or b. or c. not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HoT SHUTDOWN is similar to or .lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In Hot SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.
These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met.
However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                        Page 32 of 42 SECTION NO.:             lThTE:        TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                       PAGE: ....
314.6                    BASES ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                         1[0 of 10 R~EViSI'ON NO.:                            :CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS:,
9                                 STLUCIE UNIT 1 314.6         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)                                              ..         -,
BASES (continued) 3t4.6.6       SECONDARY CONTAINMENT 314.6.6.1     SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the shield building ventilation systems ensures that containment vessel leakage occurring during LOCA conditions into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions.
With respect to Surveillance 4.6,6.1.b, this SR verifies that the required Shield Building Ventilation System filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).
314.6,6.2     SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. ,Thisrectricti*n,-in conjunction with cpcraticn of t hie-l4*
buidi         entilaton ystem, w,"ill limite sthoct boundarl radaio        o          .ct within" the limntz of 10 CFR 100 during acci"n c            ""iioc *INSERT 15 314.6.6.3      SHIELD BUILDING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment shield building will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to provide 1) protection for the steel vessel from the external missiles,
: 2) radiation shielding in the event of a LOCA, and 3) an annulus surrounding the steel vessel that~can be maintained at a negative pressure within two minutes after a LOCA.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 33 of 42 INSERT 15 With ACTION a. or b. or c. not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. *To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN
              *within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.
These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met.
However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                        L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                               Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                   Page 34 of 42 SETQ O:            TITLE:      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAGE:...      i 3/4.7                  BASES ATTACHMENT 9 OF ADM-25.04                        i6 of 1:3':
                *EVISON NO.:                               PLANT SYSTEM S                                 :
5                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 314.7        PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)...                                                   .., ......
BASES (continued) 3/4.7.2      STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70&deg;F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT.NOT of 500 F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
314.7.3      COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident !INSERT 17-3/4.7.4       INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the intake cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. piNSET 19j 314.7.5       ULTIMATE HEAT SINK The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either 1) provide normal cooldown of the facility, or
: 2) to mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.
The limitation on minimum water level is based on providing an adequate cooling water supply to safety related equipment until cooling water can be supplied from Big Mud Creek.
Cooling capacity calculations are based on an ultimate heat sink temperature of 950 F. It has been demonstrated by a temperature survey conducted from March 1976 to May 1981 that the Atlantic Ocean has never risen higher than 86&deg;F. Based on this conservatism, no ultimate heat sink temperature limitation is specified.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 35 of 42 INSERT 17 If the inoperable component cooling water loop cannot be restored to a~n OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk InfOrmed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. HOwever, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits.
the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO-not met. However,there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable; because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                      Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 36 of 42 INSERT 19 If the inoperable component cooling water loop cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in wlhich overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or*
              *lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note*
does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a*
shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                   L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-389                                                                          Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                               Page 37 of 42 SECrTONNO.:3t,        TrLE:        TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                    PAE 347BASES                  ATTACHMENT 9 OF ADM-25.04                   9of 13 REVISION NO.:                              PLANT SYSTEMS 5                               ST. LUCIE UNIT'!
314.7         PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)                                             ..     :,:
BASES (continued) 3/4.7.7       CONTROL ROOM EMVERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (continued)
During the period that the CRE boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological event or a challenge from smoke. Actions must be taken within 24 hours to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from smoke. These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRE boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour allowable outage time (ACT) is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions.
The 90 day ACT is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day ACT is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRE boundary.
In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS or the CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated required ACT, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes th*e-accidt--r-isk.
r  *[NS*R 21
* zurs. and in MoDE 5 withbin 30 hour-s. The ACT are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
The Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.7.1 .e verifies the OPERABILITY of the CRE boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary and into the CRE. The details of the testing are specified in the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                    Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                        Page 38 of 42 INSERT 21 overall plant risk. To achieve this status, the plant- must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hour~s. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems
              *available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance, of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk manlagement actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to; and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                        L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                    Page 39 of 42 ECONN.TTL                 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                       PAE*
314.7                 BASES ATTACHMENT 9 OF ADM-25.04                          11  f f13 REVISION NO.:                               PLANT SYSTEMS 5                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 1                               *i, 314.7         PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)...                                                       --
BASES, (continued) 314.7.8       ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEMi The OPERABILITY of the ECCS area ventilation system ensures that radio-active materials leaking from the ECOS equipment following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses. INSERT 23J With respect to Surveillance 4.7.8.1 .b, this SR verifies that the required ECCS Area Ventilation System filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).
:314.7.9       SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION                                                                '
The limitations on sealed source removable contamination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits in the event of ingestion or inhalation of the probable leakage from the source material. The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70,39(c) limits for plutonium. Quantities of interest to this specification which are exempt from the leakage testing are consistent with the criteria of 10 CFR Part 30.11-20 and 70.19. Leakage from sources excluded from the requirements of this specification is not likely to represent more than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source material is inhaled or ingested.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 40 of 42 INSERT 23 If the inoperable ECCS area exhaust air filter train, cannot'be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this Status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar: to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. . This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met: However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk.
management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                 Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                                       Page 41 of 42
:3ECIONNO:     TILE:       TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAGE:. .. ,*'
314.8                BASES ATTACHMENT 10 OF ADM-25.04                        '4 of 7 REVISION N0.;                      ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 5                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 314.8         ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)                                      :
BASES (continued)
TS 3.8.1.1, ACTION "b" provides an allowed outage/action completion time (AOT) of up to 14 days toto restore a single inoperable diesel generator to operable status. This AOT is based on the findings of a deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis and is referred to as a "risk-informed" ACT.
Entry into this action requires that a risk assessment be performed in accordance with the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP),
which is described in the Administrative Procedure that implements the Maintenance Rule pursuant to 10 CFR 50.65.
All EDG inoperabilities must be investigated for common-cause failures regardless of how long the EDG inoperability persists. When one diesel generator is inoperable, required ACTIONS 3.8.1,1 .b and 3.8.1.1 .c provide an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of EDGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining OPERABLE EDG, then SR 4.8.1,1 .2.a.4 does not have to be performed.
Eight (8) hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE EDG is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG. If it cannot otherwise be determined that the cause of the initial inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG, then satisfactory performance of SR 4.8.1.1 .2.a.4 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that EDG.
If the cause of the initial inoperability exists on the remaining OPERABLE EDG, that EDG would also be declared inoperable upon discovery, and ACTION 3.8.1.1 .e would be entered. Once the failure is repaired (on either EDG), the common-cause failure no longer exists..
Action g prohibits the application of LCO 3.0,4.b to an inoperable diesel generator. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable diesel generator and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.
Ambient conditions are the normal standby conditions for the diesel engines. Any normally running warmnup systems should be in service and operating, and manufacturer's recommendations for engine oil and water temperatures and other parameters .should be followed.
The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.
[INSERT 25]

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                       Attachment 3 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 42 of 42 INSERT 25.
if the inoperable A.C. power source or D.C. power source cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6. hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT "SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Sejected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). .In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use .of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.O.4.b requires""
performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and' components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2          L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89 Attachment 3 License Amendment Request      Page 43 of 42

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                         Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                              Page 1 of 41 ATTACHMENT 4 St. Lucie Unit 2 Specifications and Bases Markup Pages Proposed Technical This coversheet plus 40 pages LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST PROPOSED CHANGE FOR ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE (TSTF) TRAVELER TSTF-422, REVISION 2, "CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS END STATES, (CE NPSD-1186)," USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                          Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 2 of 41 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION ACTION 14      -    With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:
: a. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour.
: b. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition as listed below.
Process Measurement Circuit                         Functional Unit Bypassed/Tripped
: 1. Containment Pressure          -           Containment Pressure    - High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)
Containment Pressure - High (RPS)
: 2. Steam Generator Pressure           -      Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)
AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)
: 3. Steam Generator Level           -         Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)
If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)
If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)
: 4. Pressurizer Pressure        -             Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure - Low (SIAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
ACTION 15       -   With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
ACTION 16       -   With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total
                            ;     Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable
* and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5."*
ACTION 17       -With     the nlumber of OPERABLE Channels one less .than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE                     .
status within 48 hours or place the inoperable channel in the
* tripped condition and verify that the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour; one additional channel/
may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.                                        J..
LCO 3.0,4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                   314 3-16               ST.LUCE 2 14-16Amendment
                                                                                              -UNI     No. 28, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                         Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                              Page 3 of 4l TALE3C-o(Cntinued)
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 22     -   With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE :requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours.
ACTION 23     -   With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.
ACTION 24     -   With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel within the spent fuel storage pool or crane operations with loads over recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool.
ACTION 25-        With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.9.9, ACTiON 26      -. With  the number of Channels OPERABLE less than required by the MinimUm Channels OPERABLE requirements, withinl 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation.         -.... __
ACTION 27 -With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, either restore the                              /
inoperable Channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or:n,
: 1)    Initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the/
appropriate parameter(s), and                                        .
2):   Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission              /
pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following         /
the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the         /
inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the/
system to OPERABLE status.
                                             /LCO: 3.O.4.a
                                                      .... iS not applicable
                                                                           ... :when*entering HOT S:HUTDOWN         .
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                 3/4 3-27                 51.LUCE-u'JI2 34 327Amendment No. *.3.,45&

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                     L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                             Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                  Page 4 of 41 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4. 1.3     At least two of the loop(s)Itrain(s) listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one Reactor Coolant and/or shutdown cooling loops shall be in operation,*
: a. Reactor Coolant Loop 2A and its associated steam generator and at least one associated Reactor Coolant pump,**
: b. Reactor Coolant Loop 2B and its associated steam generator and at
* least one associated Reactor Coolant pump,**                                                          *
: c. Shutdown Cooling Train 2A,
: d. Shutdown Cooling Train 29.                and initiate action to make at least one steam generator available for decay heat removaI APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.                                      via natural circulation. LOC 3.0,4,a is not ACTION:                                                     apiaewhne               rngHOSUT                   WN
: a. With less than the above required Reactor Coolant and/or shutdown               //
cooling ioops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to&#xa2; return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible*
if    reann "h ,O, tRBL-E Ica, i...... shutdoengee CODSUDW                  ithin 30 houra.
: b. With no Reactor Coolant or shutdown cooling ioop in operation, suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1 and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.
All Reactor Coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the P0S, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 100 F below saturation temperatu re.
A Reactor Coolant pump shall not be started with two idle loops and one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.4-3 unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 40&deg;F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                  3/4 4-3                  ST.LuCE-urr23/44.3Amendment No. 46, 34-, 4S, 4-0

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                    L-2015-1 82 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                             Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                 Page 5 of 41 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITIOFR OPERAT                           ___
3.6.1.3        Each containment air lock Shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at *least one air lock door shall be closed, and
: b. An overall air lock leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
a,    With one containment air lock door inoperable*:
: 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
: 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air look door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
HOT SHUTDOWVN within the followving            3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN w&#xa2;ithin th cllciP&#xa2;ng 30 hc',rs:.
6 hours, LCO 3.0.,4a :is not                  With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an b.
applicable When                  inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore entering HOT                     the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least SHUTDOWN.                        HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
* If the inner air lock door is inoperable, passage through the OPERABLE outer air lock door is permitted to effect repairs to the inoperable inner air look door. No more than one airlock door shall be open at any time.
ST. LUGIE - UNIT 2                                 3;4 6-9                 ST.
UCI- UIT      ~O, 3146-2Amendment No. 88, 4-74

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                     L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                             Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                   Page 6 of 41 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS INTERNAL PRESSURE LIM3ITING CONDITON FOR OPERATION Iwra* rSHUTDOWN 3.6.1.4 andPrimary
                 -0.368        +0.400containment psig.       internal pressure shall be maintained between          wih in the folio iMng 6h
                                                                                                                 )urs. LCO APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,                                                    /3,0.' 4.a iS .not ACTION:                                                                                 :appitlicable 'when
                                                                                                                 .ring HOT With the containment intemnal pressure outside of the limits above, restore              SHI. JTODOWN.
the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD-HTON                      "~ti th         iolotg 4.6.1.4      The primary containment intemnal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                               3!4 641                  ST.
LCIE   2146-11Amendment
                                                                                                 -UNIT2   Nc*..I

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                        Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                              Page 7 of 41 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AiR TEMPERATURE LIM[ITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION HOT SHUTDOWN 3,6.1.5       Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120&deg;F.       withinl the foliow ing APPLICABILITY: MODES 1.2, 3, and 4.                                                     6"hours. LCO ACTION:                                                                         */      3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT With the containment average air temperature greater than 120&deg;F, reduce SHUTDOWvN.
the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COD                          ,TDWNwthiRthe S*URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5       The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average" of the temperatures at the following locations and shall be determined in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program:
Location a.-     TE-07-3A NW RCB Elevation 70'
: b.      TE-07-3B SW RCB Elevation 70'
                  *   "With one temperature detector inoperable, use the air intake temperature detectors of the operating containment fan coolers.
ST, LUCIE i UN&#xa3;r 2                            3/4 B-12                 ST.
UCI UNT2    ~12Amendment
                                                                                                    )4 Na, :*-73

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                           Page 8 of 41 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 314.6.3     CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAJIO_
3.6.3       The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY': MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of containment isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:
: a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
: b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one HOT SHUTDOWN                  deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or within the following 6 hours. LCO            c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed 3.O.4.a is not                manual valve or blind flange; or applicable when         d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in ~G'LD entering HOT          ----       IUTDOWN       4thifhe-utewi-h*           .
SHUTDOWN.
_SURVEILLANCE         EQIEMNS 4.6.3.1     The containment isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.
ST. LUCIE- UNIT2                                 314 1 6-19
                                                                        -oAemntN.5           Amendment No. 68

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                           Page 9 of 41 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITy HOT SHUTDOWN*
wvithin the following LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION S hours. LCO 3.6.6.2     SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall be maintained.                        3.0,,&ais not applicable when APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4.                                              entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
ACTION:
Without SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY, restore SHIELD BUILDING INTEG                    itin 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in CgLb SHU          N-twithI~ h f~~wnc 30 hcurz.
SUVELANE              EUIEENTS 4.6.6.2     SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit 1
entry and exit.
ST. LUCIE.- UNIT 2                            3(4 6-30                Amendment No.  ~

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                    L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                          Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                              Page 10 of 41 PLANT SYSTEMS 3t4.7.3       COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM L[IMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION                        _
3.7.3         At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.*
BILIrY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.                                                 HOT SHUTDOWN APPLICA[                                                                               /wit in the following ACTION:                                                                                   6 :hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is rnot With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two                 applicale, when loops to C)PERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in CODSUDW wihi                      flcig3hur.
                                                                                         *h                entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURV.EILLN CE ,REOUI REMENTS                 ....
4.7.3         At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.
When CCW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves shall be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours.
Upon receipt of annunciation for improper alignment of the pump 2C motor power in relation to any of its motor-operated discharge valves positions, restore proper system alignment within 2 hours.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                               3/4 7-13                ST.
LCIE UN~ 3/47-13Am~endtment No.,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                    L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                            Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                Page 11 of 41 PLANT SYSTEMS
                 .31/4.7.4      INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM LJGflIhLGQ.M*JTLLR FO20R            .OPERATION 3.7.4           At least two independent intake cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE!'
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.                                                        HOT SHUTDOWN ACTION:                                                                                     within the following B hours. LCO With only one intake cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to 3.0.4.a is not OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next applicable when 6 hours and in CODSUDW within thte-follewiag-,,9-heu*, <-
entering HOT SHUTDOWN, C1 IDilII:l I ANIPI': Ol~tfIID*:I*LIT*r 4,7.4           At least two intake cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE;
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not looked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on a SIAS test signal.
When ICW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specifica-tion, the alignment of the discharge valves must be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                3/4 7-14               ST.
LCRE       No.,~
                                                                                                 -u~iT2 3147-14Amendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                        L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                              Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                    Page 12 of 41 PLANT SYSTEMS 314,7.7           CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (CREACS)
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERTO 3,7,7             Two independent control room emergency air cleanup systems shall be OPERABLE with:
a,    A filter train and its associated fan per system, and
: b. At least one air conditioning unit per system, and
: c. Two isolation valves in the kitchen area exhaust duct, and
: d. Two isolation valves in the toilet area exhaust duct, and
: e. Two isolation valves in each (North and South) air intake duct.
                                      ~NOTE The control room envelope boundar ma                 eoened intermittentiy under administrative control.
APPLlCABlIUTY; MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, ACTION:
MODES I1,2, 3, and 4:
: a. With one control room emergency air cleanup system inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary,I restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in CODSUDW                       'ihn
: b. With one or more control room emergency air cleanup systems inoperable
                                       /due to an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary:
: 1.      Immediately initiate actions to implement mitigating actions, and
* _                 /       2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions to ensure Control Room Envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke HOT SHUTDOWN                                hazards will not exceed limits, and within the following 6 hor.LCO                           3.      Restore Control Room Envelope bou'ndary to OPERABLE status ho* !urs                                 within 90 days.
applicable when                     With the above requirements not met, be in at least HOT STANDBY within entering HOT                        the next 6 hours and COLD*:-HTD .......     .'withi ..tho ll..i.. 30ecvro SHUTDOWN,                     c. Wt n isolation valve in an air intake duct or air exhaust duct
                    *'---*..*...    .*   Inopera~ble, operation may continue provided the other isolation valve in the same air intake or air exhaust duct is maintained closed; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours and in GL
                                         * -UT-DWNH within. theo followig 30heurs.
: d. With two control room emergency air cleanup systems inoperable for reasons.
other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary, immediately enter LCO 3.0.3.
ST. LUOIE - UNt3F 2                                      3/4 7-17               Amendment NO. *12* 4,8g, &SS-

St. Lucie Units l and 2                                                                                                   L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                          Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 13 of 41 PLANT SYSTEMS 3(4.7.8      ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM LIITN       CO      ITO     FR OPERA.T"ON 3.7.8       Two independent ECCS area ventilation systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:                                                                                                             i With one ECCS area ventilation system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6hours and in CL          HTON'.
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by initiating from the control room and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes,
: b. By performing required EGOS area ventilation system filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program.
: c. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the system starts on a safety injection actuation test signal.
ST, LUCIE - UNIT 2                               3f4 7-20                 ST.LUIE UIT      No. 45,,,2*"3 34720Amendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                 Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                    Page 14 of 41 314.8          ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1        A.C. SOURCES:
OPERATING LIMITING CONDION              O     PERATION 3.81.1         As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
: a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 E distribution system, and
: b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:
: 1. Two separate engine-mounted fuel tanks containing a minimum volume of 200 gallons of fuel each,
: 2. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 42,500 gallons of fuel, and
: 3. A separate fuel transfer pump, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION;
: a. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1,.a inoperable, e cept as provided in Action f.
below, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and. at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and
               *.--'*          "'b.      With one diesel generator of 3.8.1.1 .b inoperable, demonstrate the HOT SHUTDOWN                       OPERABILITY of the A.C. sources by performing Surveillance :Requirement wrthin :the follow~ing            4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the
               ........                   EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support 6 hours:. LCO                      system, an independently testable component; or preplanned preventative 3.0.4.a is not:                    maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining applicable wr en                   OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8l.1.1.2a.4 within entering HOT                      8 hours, unless it can be confirmed that the cause of the inoperable EDG does SHUTDOWN.                          not exist on the remaining EDO*; restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE staun within 14 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours an     CL SUDWN wthinth-fcllcwing 3hm.urz. Additionally, within 4 hours from the discovery of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s) (including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3),
declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDO inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
* If the absence of any common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this test Shall be completed regardless of when the :inoperable EDO is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUC{E - UNIT 2                                 3/4 8-1              Amendment No. 2-&,39, 7g, *4-5, 428, 458

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                  L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                         Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                            Page 15 of 41 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION: (Continued) c.With one off'site A.C. circuit and one diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance HOT SHUTDOWN                Requirement 4.8.1.1.2a.4 within 8 hours, unless it can be confirmed that the within the followi**ng      cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG*. Restore 6 hour.
LCOat                least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or 6 hours.
LOGbe                 in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in Q&
3.04.4a is not              SHTDWNwih"~                4*e       *ei4-hu    Restore the other A.C, power applicable when             source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance entering HOT                with the provisions of Section 3.8.1.1 ACTION Statement a or b, as SHUTDOWN.                   appropriate, with the time requirement of that ACTiON Statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source. Additionally, within 4 hours from the discovery of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s) (including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3),
declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
II
                    **If the absence of any common-cause failure Cannot be confirmed, this~ test shall be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST, LUC[E - UNIT 2                                 3/4 8-2                ST.LucE 2
                                                                                                 -UNI   /4-2Ame~ndmnent No. 25, 29, 7-, 42-5

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                    Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                       Page 16 of 4l ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION: (Continued) d.With two of the required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore one of the inoperable oftsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. Following restoration of one offsite source, follow ACTION Statement a. with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite A.C. circuit.
e:     With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the HOT SHUTDOWN                      OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance within the following              Requirement 4.8.1,1 .1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter.
restore one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 6 ihours. LCO                     2 hours or be in the at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in GOLQ 3,0.4,a is not          ->            UTDOWN-wihhte"e' ei"Qhe                  ,s Following restoration of one diesel applicable When                   generator'unit, follow ACTiON Statement b. with the time requirement of that entering HOT                      ACTION Statement based on the tme of initial loss of the remaining inoperable SHUTDOWN.                         diesel generator.
: f. With one Unit 2 startup transformer (2A or 2B) inoperable and with a Unit1 startup transformer (1A or I B) connected to the same A or B offsite power circuit and administratively available to both units, then should Unit 1 require the use of the startup transformer administratively available to both units, Unit 2 shall demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4,8.1 .1.1a. within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the inoperable startup transformer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
: g. LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to diesel generators.
4.8.1.1.1     Each of the above required independent circuits between the otfsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:
: a. Determined OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability; and
: b. Demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by transferring (manually and automatically) unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.
4.8.1.1.2     Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:
ST, LUCIE - UNIT 2                                   3/4 8-3                            No, 3,*. 43, 3., 4,7O, "
ST.L~cE-U1T23148-3Amendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                   L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                          Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 17 of 41 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2     D.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.1     As a minimum the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
a,    125-volt Battery bank No. 2A and a full capacity charger.
: b. 125-volt Battery bank No. 28 and a full capacity charger.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
HOT SHUTDOWN              a. With one of the required battery banks inoperable, restore the within the following            inoperable battery bank to OPERABLE status within 2 hlours or be in 6 hours. LCO                    at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWf-N 3.0,4.a is not          -- >with 4e-ftlw                -3heurs
        ~applicable when          b. With one of the required full capacity chargers inoperable,
:entering HOT                   demonstrate the OPERABILITY of its associated battery banks by SHUTDOWN.                       performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8,2.1a.1 within 1 hour, and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in                              i Table 4.8-2 is not met, declare the battery inoperable.                                       :
SURVILLNCE                             EQUREMETS 4.8.2.1      Each 125-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that:
: 1. The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and
: 2. The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129-volts on float charge.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                               3/4 8-'10               ST.LucE      No. {--3 1/IT 34810Amendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                        L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                                Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                                    Page 18 of 41 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION:
: a. With one of the required trains of A.C. Emergency busses not fully energized, re-energize the train within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
b.With one A.C. Instrument Bus either not energized from its HOT SHUTDOWN
                                    /AC.
within the following          associated D.C. Bus: (1) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus within 6 hours. LCO                  2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in associated inverter,' or"S4O4-wthi with the the fellozw-g404,es inverter not connected and to (2) itsre-energize the 3,.04.a is not Instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its applicable when               associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY entering :HOT                 within the next 6 hours and in -COLD-SHUOl[;WN-w~it~hite-ellewirig SHUTDOWN.
: c. With oneD.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize the D.C. Bus from its associated Battery Bank within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, U1RVtEILLANCEF REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1      The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner in accordance with .the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.
ST, LUCIE - UNIT 2                                  314 8-15                ST.
LCIE
                                                                                                      -UNIT23148.15Amendment No. -17*

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                       L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                              Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                   Page 19 of 41 SETOO.             TITLE:    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                        PAGEt 314.3                  BASES ATTACHMENT 5 OF ADM-25.04                      ' .4 of 6i REVISION NO.:                           INSTRUMENTATION 3                              ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 314.3         INSTRUMENTATION (continued)
EASES (continued) 314.3,1 and 3t4.3.2 (continued)
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, provided that such tests demonstrate total channel response time as defined.
CEOG Topical Report CE NPSD-1 167, and FPL No Significant Hazards Evaluation PSL-ENG-SEIS-03-043 provide the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in these documents.
The allocated sensor response time must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and re-verified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time (e.g., replacement of a transmitter DP cell or variable damping circuits). Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or
: 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
The CEOG topical report and FPL evaluation only cover certain sensor model numbers. If sensors are replaced with types not previously evaluated, then periodic response time testing (RTT) for the new sensor must either be performed and the appropriate changes made to plant procedures, or an additional request for RTT elimination must be submitted and approved by the NRC. lf, however, the replacement sensor is one for which RTT elimination has been approved, then FPL may modify the plant procedures, using an allocated response time based upon a vendor-supplied response time value, or upon statistical analysis of historical data for that transmitter type and model.
The Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) provides direct actuation of the Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) to ensure containment isolation in the event of a small break LOCA.
INERT2I

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                           L-2015-1 82 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                    Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                        Page 20 of 41 INSERT 2 For channels not restored to an OPERABLE status in accordance with ACTION 15, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which Overall plant risk is minimized.
To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN, However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. ACTION 11 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if                  t applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment*
addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note.does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                        L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                              Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                    Page 21 of 41 SECTION NO,              TITLE:      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAGE:                   i 3/4.3                   BASES ATTACHMENT 5 OF ADM-25.04                         5 of 6.
REVISION NO:                               INSTRUMENTATION                         i:
3                                 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2"....
3(4.3         INSTRUMENTATION (continued).                                               :       ...
BASES (continued)
                ;3/4.3.3      RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that: (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels; and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an ACcident," December 1980 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.
Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.2 ensures that the channel actuation response times are less than the maximum times assumed in the analyses.
Testing of the final actuating devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the surveillance testing. NSER.T 4 3/4.3.5        REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is requir'ed in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.
The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown system instrumentation ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown. The remote shutdown system instrumentation, control circuits, and transfer switches are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor. This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 22 of 41 INSERT 4 For channels not restored to an OPERABLE status in accordance with ACTION 26, the contr-ol room emergency ventilation system must be initiated and maintained in the recirculation mode of operation within 1 hour. ACTION 26 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.O.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. [CO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                               Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                    Page 23 of 41 SETO O:             TiTLE;    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                       PAGE:         :
3f4.4                  BASES ATTACHMENT 6 .OF ADM-25.04                        3 of 37
                .REvIIoN NO.:                      REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM                            .
10                               ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 BASES FOR SECTION 314.4                           *            ..
3/4.4         REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 314.4.1       REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above the DNBR limit during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation, this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.
In MODE 3, a single reactor coolant ioop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE.
In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant ioops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either shutdown cooling or RCS) be OPERABLE.
In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; :but single failure considerations and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two shutdown cooling loops be OPERABLE.
The operation of one reactor coolant pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce.
gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.
If no coolant loops are in operation during shutdown operations, suspending the introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3,1.1 .1 or 3.1 .1.2 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than what would be required in the ROS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                     Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 24 of 41 INSERT 6 If only one required shutdown cooling train is OPERABLE and in operation and no required RCS loops are OPERABLE, redundancy for heat removal is lost and-the plant must be 'placed in a configuration that minimizes overall plant risk. This redundancy is obtained by making at least one steam generator available for decay heat removal via natural circulation because:
: 1. MODE 4 operation poses overall lower risk of core d~amage and large early radiation release than does MODE 5 (reference CE NPSD*1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). This is particularly true with shutdown cooling impaired.
: 2. In MODE 4, RCS and steam generator conditions may be maintained such that failure of the operating shutdown cooling train may be mitigated by natural circulation heat removal through one or more steam generators.
Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 4 is similar to or lower than MODE 5 (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the [CO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. [CO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are.
required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                 Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                      Page 25 of 41 SECTION NO.              TITLE::      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                        PAGE:         ;
3/4.6                    BASES ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                          4 of1 REVISION NO.:                            CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 11                                 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2                                ,i, 314,6         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)
[PRIMARY BASES (continued)             COTQ i MNT 314.6.1       COTIMNTVSE                      (continued) 314.6 .1,3    CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests. IlNSERT 8t 314.6.1.4     INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that (1) the containment structure, is prevented from exceeding its design negati*.~
pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of8,7 psi and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 44 psig during loss of coolant accident conditions.
The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a loss of coolant accident is 43.48 psig. The limit of 0.4 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the maximum peak pressure to less than the design pressure of 44 psig and is consistent with the safety analyses.
[INSERT 10J 3/4.6.1.5     AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment average air temperature ensures that the peak containment vessel temperature does not exceed the containment vessel design temperature of 264&deg;F during steam line break and loss of coolant accident conditions and is consistent with the safety analyses. *NET 2 3t4.6.1.6     CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 43.48 psig in the event of the limiting design basis loss of coolant accident. A visual inspection in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 26 of 41 INSERT 8 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in accordance with the ACTIONs, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be broughtt to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCD 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCD 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                   Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 27 of 41 INSERT 10 If containment pressure cannot be restored to within limits, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in CO.LD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a Shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 28 of 41 INSERT 12 If containment average air temperature cannot be restored to within its limit, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within.*
the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (referentce CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Ju~stification for the Risk Informed Mod ification to                    "
Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units l and 2                                                                                          L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                               Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                     Page 29 of 41 S~ECTON NO,:              TITLE:     TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                       rAGE:         ::
3/14.6                  BASES ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                         7 of 11 REvisioN NO.:                           CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 11                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 2                                  :
314.6          CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)                                        '     .     ....
BASES (continued)                                                                            !
314.6,2        DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS (continued) 3/4,6.2.1      CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS (continued)                                            }
Ensuring that the containment spray pump discharge preSsure iS met satisfies the periodic surveillance requirement to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems. Along with this requirement, Section XI of the ASME Code verifies the pump developed head at one point on the pump characteristic curve to verify both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the unit safety analysis. Surveillance Requirements are specified in the Inservice Testing Program, which encompasses Section XI of the ASME Code. Section Xl of the ASME Code provides the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.
314.6.2.2      IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Iodine Removal System ensures that sufficient N2 H4 is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on N2 H4 volume and concentration ensure a minimum of 50 ppm of N2H4 concentration available in the spray for a minimum of 6.5 hours per pump for a total of 13 hours to provide assumed iodine decontamination factors on the containment atmosphere during spray function and ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 8.1 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical. systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.
3/4.6.2.3       DELETED 314.6.,i        CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. IISRT 14I

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                   Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 30 of 41 INSERT 14 With ACTION a. or b. or c. not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.
These ACTIONs are modified by a N6te that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met.
However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACT1ONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                   Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                       Page 31 of 41 SECTION NO.:            TITLE:       TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                        PAGE::,      "*
314.6 ,,BASES                   ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04                        11 of i REVISION NO.:                           CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS....
11                                 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 314.6         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)                                          i ......  ::,
BASES (continued)
With respect to Surveillance 4.6.6,1 .b, this SR verifies that the required Shield Building Ventilation System filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).
314.6.6.2     SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. Ti rcco, ztc,           n nur
                                         .v.il-      thtte siteoperanoen ojncnw':n         bcundaq'  oT radiation sn~amn m cnthe  do    r '.cni:autcn
_eo h gudfnzetbihd o einbce                             NSERT 16.1 314.6.6.3     SHIELD BUILDING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment shield building will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to provide (1) protection for the steel vessel from the external missiles, (2) radiation shielding in the event of a LOCA, and (3) an annulus surrounding the steel vessel that can be maintained at a negative pressure during accident conditions. A visual inspection is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                   Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                        Page 32 of 41 INSERT 16 If SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRTTY cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO .3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions,, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                     L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                           Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                 Page 33 of 41 SECTION NO.:            TITLE:     TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                      PAGE.        *:..
314j7                  BASES ATTACHMENT 9 OF ADM-25.04                      i0 of 17 REISION N'O.:                               PLANT SYSTEMS 7                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 2...                              :i 314.7         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)'                                       "::           :
BASES (continued) 3/4.7.1       TURBINE CYCLE (continued) 314.7.1.7     ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES The limitation on maintaining the atmospheric dump valves in the manual mode of operation is to ensure the atmospheric dump valves will be closed in the event of a steam line break. For the steam line break with atmospheric dump valve control failure event, the failure of the atmospheric dump valves to close would be a valid concern were the system to be in the automatic mode during power operations.
3/4.7.2       STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEM~PERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations to 100&deg;F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator        RTNDT of 20*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
314.7.3.      COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. INSERT 181 1314.7.4       INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Intake Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
IINSERT 201

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                     Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 34 of 41 INSERT 18 If the inoperable component cooling water loop cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, theplant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN, within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 310.4:a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCD not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCD 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCD 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                     Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                         Page 35 of 41 INSERT 20 If the inoperable intake cooli.ng water loop cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. *To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.
These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met.
However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systemsand components; consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk
              *management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a
              *shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                               Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                     Page 36 of 41 3/4.7                 BASES ATTACHMENT 9 OF ADM-25.04                          *,of 1 REVISION NO.:                               PLANT SYSTEMS 7                                ST. LUCIE UNIT 2                                      ,.!
3)4.7         CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued),:                                                 _*,.      i BASES (continued) 3)4.7.7       CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (continued)
During the period that the CRE boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological event or a challenge from smoke. Actions must be taken within 24 hours to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from smoke.
These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRE boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour allowable outage time (AOT) is reasonable based on the low probability of a D8A occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 80 day AOT is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day AOT is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the ORE boundary.
In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREACS or the CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required AOT, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes th                  ric. T
                                                                                          -cidn          "      "sicti INSRT 2          MDE wthin 0hor.The AOT are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
When in MODES 5 and or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with both CREACS trains inoperable or with one or more CREACS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the ORE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                   Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                       Page 37 of 41 INSERT 22 overall plant risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available, and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by .a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                        L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                               Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                   Page 38 of 41 SECTIO NO.:             ITLE:      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONSPGE                               ...-
314.7                  BASES ATTACHMENT 9 OF ADM-25.04                        5"of 17":
rEv.slSoN No,:                              PLANT SYSTEMS                                     ,:..
7                               ST. LUCIE UNIT 2                               =.
314.7          CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)                                             . :*
BASES (continued) 314.7.7        CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (continued)
The Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.7.e verifies the OPERABILITY of the GRE boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary and into the GRE. The details of the testing are specified in the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.
The CRE is considered habitable when the radiological dose to GRE occupants calculated in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences is no more than 5 rem TEDE and the GRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. This SR verifies that the unfiltered air infleakage into the GRE is no greater than the flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of OBA consequences. When unfiltered air inleakage is greater than the assumed flow rate in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, ACTION b must be taken. Required ACTION b.3 allows time to restore the GRE boundary to OPERABLE status provided mitigating actions can ensure that the GRE remains within the licensing basis habitability limits for the occupants following an accident. Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3, which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99-03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F. These compensatory measures may also be used as mitigating actions as required by Required Action b.2.
Temporary analytical methods may also be used as compensatory measures to restore OPERABILITY, as discussed in letter from Eric J. Leeds (NRC) to James W. Davis (NEI) dated January 30, 2004, "NEI Draft White Paper, Use of Generic Letter 91-18 Process and Alternative Source Terms in the Context of Control Room Habitability:" Options for restoring the GRE boundary to OPERABLE status include changing the licensing basis DBA consequence analysis, repairing the GRE boundary, or a combination of these actions.
Depending upon the nature of the problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test may not be necessary to establish that the GRE boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.
3/4.7.8         ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the EGGS Area Ventilation System ensures that cooling air is provided for EGGS equipment. !INSERT 24 With respect to Surveillance 4.7.8.b, this SR verifies that the required EGGS Area Ventilation System filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                    Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 39 of 41 INSERT 24 If the inoperable ECCS area ventilation system cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk .is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable.
low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                              Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                                   Page 40 of 41 SECTION NO.:            TITLE-      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS                     PAGE-*        : :
3/4.8                 BASES ATTACHMENT 10 OF ADM-25.04                         5 of 9*
VISION NO.:                      ELECTRICAL P'OWER SYSTEMS                       ....          .
6                               ST. LUCIE UNIT 2                                .:
314.8         ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)'"                                          :.........
BASES (continued) 3/4,8.1, 314.8.2 and 314.8.3       A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES arid ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (continued)
Action g prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable diesel generator. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable diesel generator and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.
The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumenjtation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.
ItSETd2 The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILTY of the DC system battery cell interconnection resistances are based on criteria recommended by the manufacturer. The table contained in TSSR 4.8.2.3.2.c.3 is provided to define the maximum individual and maximum average allowable values for battery cell interconnection resistances.
The maximum individual battery cell interconnection resistance values .are based on the negligible impact of voltage drop and connection heating, during peak DC system load conditions. A maximum individual battery interconnection resistance, value of
* 150 x 10-6 ohms is~used for connections, which! use inter-cell (bus-bar type) connections and for the battery set output terminal connections. The maximum individual battery interconnection resistance value of--- 200 x 10-6 ohms is used for the inter-tier and inter-rack connections, whicth are subject to additional resistance of the cables used :to extend between, the different level tiers of each battery rack and of the adjacent battery rack.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                    Attachment 4 License Amendment Request                                                                          Page 41 of 41 INSERT 26 If the inoperable A.C. power source and associated distribution system or D.C.
power source and associated distribution system cannot be restored to an OPERABLE status within the allowable outage time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. Remaining within the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in HOT SHUTDOWN is similar to or lower than COLD SHUTDOWN (reference CE NPSD-1 186-A, Technical Justification for the Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for CEOG PWRs, October 2001). In HOT SHUTDOWN there are more accident mitigation systems available and there is more redundancy and diversity in core heat removal mechanisms than in COLD SHUTDOWN. However, voluntary entry into COLD SHUTDOWN may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. These ACTIONs are modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. This Note prohibits" the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter HOT SHUTDOWN during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering HOT SHUTDOWN, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note.
does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a.
shutdown of the unit.

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-389 Attachment 4 License Amendment Request      Page 42 of 41

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                      Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                           Page 1 of 18 ATTACHMENT 5 St. Lucie Unit 1 Revised (clean) Technical Specifications Pages This coversheet plus 17 pages LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST PROPOSED CHANGE FOR ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE (TSTF) TRAVELER TSTF-422, REVISION 2, "CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS END STATES, (CE NPSD-1186)," USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                  L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                        Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 2 of 18 TABLE 3.3-3 (continued)
TABLE NOTATION ACTION 10     -  With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
: a. The inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour. If the inoperable channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours, then place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition.
: b. Within 1 hour, all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel are also bypassed or tripped.
: c. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel has been placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour. Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
ACTION 11 -With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
ACTION 12      - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                 3/4 3-13               ~cI-UN~i ST.        /4-13Amendment No. 4S, *7, *8, g2, 488,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                    Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                         Page 3 of 18 TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION ACTION 12     -   With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.9.12.
ACTION 13      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area With portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours.
ACTION 14      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.                                                        I ACTION 15      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, either restore the inoperable Channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or:
: 1)   Initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), and
: 2)    Prepare and Submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION 16      -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.9.9.
ACTION 17       -  With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                 3/4 3-23               ST.
UCIE-UIT 13/4
                                                                                                  -23Amendment No. ,*O, 206

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                          Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 4 of 18 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.3     At least two of the loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one reactor coolant or shutdown cooling loop shall be in operation.*
: a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,
: b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,
: c. Shutdown Cooling L~oop A,
: d. Shutdown Cooling Loop B.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.
ACTION:
: a. With less than the above required reactor coolant or shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE, within one (1) hour initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status and initiate action to make at least one steam generator available for decay heat removal via natural circulation. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With no reactor coolant or shutdown cooling loop in operation, suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 and within one (1) hour initiate corrective action to return the required reactor coolant loop to oPeration.
All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least I10"F below saturation temperature.
ST. LUClE - UNIT 1                               3/4 4-1 b               ST.
LJCE  I
                                                                                             -UNI /4-lbAmendment No. *8, 44-8, 4 St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                  L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                          Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 5 ofl18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.3        Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
: b. An overall air lock leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one containment air lock door inoperable*:
: 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
: 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be closed at least once per 31 days.
: 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.3        Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
* If the inner air lock door is inoperable, passage through the OPERABLE outer air lock door is permitted to effect repairs to the inoperable inner air lock door. No more than one airlock door shall be open at any time.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                  3/4 6-10               ST.LUCE    No. 44, 449, 2                                                                                                   1 /4-10Amendment
                                                                                               -UNI

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                          L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                  Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                        Page 6 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS INTERNAL PRESSURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.4     Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -0.7 and +0.5 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE RIEOUIREMENTS 4.6.1.4      The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
ST. LUClE - UNIT 1                                3/4 6-12         ST.
LclE
                                                                                       -UNIT1 3/46-12Amendment No. 24-3,22

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                       Page 7 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.5      Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120&deg;F.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION~:
With the containment average air temperature > 120&deg;F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5      The primary containment average air temperature shall'be the arithmetical average of the temperatures at three of the following locations and shall be determined in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program:
Location
: a. Containment fan cooler No. 1A air intake, elevation 45 feet.
: b. Containment fan cooler No. 1B air intake, elevation 45 feet.
: c. Containment fan cooler No. 1C air intake, elevation 62 feet.I
: d. Containment fan cooler No. 1D air intake, elevation 45 feet.
ST. I'UCIE - UNIT 1                               3/4 6-13               ST.
ucie-UIT 13/4
                                                                                                  -13Amendment No. 222,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                          Page 8 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3     CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3.1     The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE:
               *APPLICABILITY:        MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, either:
: a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to oPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
: b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deacti!vated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or*
: c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
: d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1.1   Thle isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to retumning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the cycling test, and verification of isolation time.
STI LUCIE - UNiT I                                 3/4 6-18              ST.
UCIE-UIT I3/4-18Amendment No. 80, 449

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                         L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                  Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                       Page 9 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.6.2     SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
Without SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY, restore SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.6.2     SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY sh*lI be demonstrated in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                           3/4 6-30                             No. 2 3/46-30Amendment ST.LCIE-UNIT

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                      Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                          Page 10 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.3      COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3.1      At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the ne~xt 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS" 4.7.3.1i     At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERA~BLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifyting that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation-Signal.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                              3/4 7-14                ST.
UCIE-UIT 13/4
                                                                                                   -14Amendment No. gO,'*,;

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                     Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                         Page 11I of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4      INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1   "At least two independent intake cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With only one intake cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1      At least two intake cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power Operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation signal.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                               3/4 7-16                UCIE-ST. UIT I3/4-16Amendment No. 90, 22,a

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                   L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                          Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 12 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.7     CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATiON SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-3.7.7.1     The control room emergency ventilation system shall be OPERABLE with:
: a.      Two booster fanS,
: b. Two isolation valves in each outside air intake duct,
: c.      Two isolation valves in the toilet area air exhaust duct,
: d.       One tilter traini,
: e.      At least two air conditioning units, and
: f.      Two isolation valves in the kitchen area exhaust duct.
NOTE The control room envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTION:
MoDEs 1, 2, 3 and 4:
: a.       With one booster fan inoperable, restore the inoperable fan to OPERABLE status~within 7 days or be in at least-HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b.      With one isolation valve per air duct inoperable, operation may continue provided the other isolation valve in the same duct-is maintained closed;
                                 *otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: c.       With the filter train inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary, restore the filter train to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in
                                *HOT SHUTDOWyN within the following. 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN..
: d.       With only one air conditioning unit OPERABLE, restore at least two air conditioning units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within "the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT*
SHUTDOWN; ST. LUCIE - UNI'I: I                                 3/4.7-20               ST.
UCIE-UIT 13/4.-20Amendment No. -460,1-QT-,20

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                     Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                          Page 13 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTIO.N: (continued)
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4: (continued)
: e. With the filter train inoperable due to an inoperable Control Room Envelope bound~ary:
: 1. Immediately initiate actions to implement mitigating actions, and
: 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions to ensure Control Room Envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical; and smoke, hazards will not exceed limits, and"
: 3. Restore Control Room Envelope boundary to OPERABLE status within 90 days.
With the above requirements not met, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT1                                  3/4 7-20a              ST.
UCIE-UITI /472caAmendment No. 206

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                     L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                            Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 14 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.8   ."ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8.1      Two independent ECCS area exhaust air filter trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one ECCS area exhaust air filter train inoperable, restore the~inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.8.1     "Each ECCS area exhaust air filter train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Sur'veillance Frequency Control Program by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that the train operates for at least 15 minutes.
: b. By performing required ECCS area ventilation system filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program.
: c. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program:
: 1.      Verifying that the air flow distribution is uniform within 20% across HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers when tested in accordance with ASME N510-1 989.
: 2.       Verifying that the filter train starts on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                    3/4 7-24                 ST.
LCIE
                                                                                                    -UNITI 3/47-24Amendment No. 206, 2

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                       L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                              Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                                  Page 15 of 18 3/4.8          ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 314.8.1        A.C. SOURCES
              *OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1        As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:.
: a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and
: b. Two separate and independent diesel generator sets each with:
: 1. Engine-mounted fuel tanks cOntaining a minimum of 152 gallons of fuel,
: 2. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimum of 19,000 gallons of fuel, and
: 3. A separate fuel transfer pump..
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1 .a inoperable, except as provided in Action f.
below, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. [CO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With one diesel generator of 3.8.1.1 .b inoperable; demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within I hour and at least once per 8hours thereafter; and if the
* EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1 .2.a.4 within 8 hours, unless it can be confirmed that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG*; restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. Additionally, within 4 hours from.
the discovery of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s)
(including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3), declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
* If the absence of any common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this test shall be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                 3/4 8-1              Amendment No. -40,, -42=, 4,38, 4-t7, 4l8g, 0-45

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                         Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                            Page 16 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION (continued)
: c. With one offsite A.C. circuit and one diesel gener'ator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testaible component,, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.l.2.a.4 within 6 hours unless it can be confirmed that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG*. Restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12. hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. Restore the other A.C. power source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status .in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.8.1.1 ACTION Statement a or b, as appropriate, with the time requirement of that ACTION statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source. Additionally, within 4 hours from the discovery.
of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s) (including the*
steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3), declare required featuire(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
: d. With two of the required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. Following restoration of one offa...ite source, follow ACTION Statement a. with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite A.C. circuit.
* If the absence of any common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this test shall be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                 3/4 8-2             ST.LcIE UNI I   No. 40, 442, -I-38,48 345-2-Amendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                      L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                          Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                                Page 17 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS*
ACTION (continued)
: e. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8-hours thereafter; restore one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in the at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the-following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. Following restoration of one diesel generator unit, follow ACTION Statement b. with the time requiremerit of that ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable diesel generator.
: f. With one Unit 1 startup transformer (1A or 1 B) inoperable and with a Unit 2 startup transformer (2A or 2B) connected to the same A or B offsite power circuit and administratively available to both units, then should Unit 2 require the use of
                 .:..             the startup transformer administratively available to both units, Unit 1 shall
                                 -demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the rer~aining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the inoperable startup transformer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.-
: g. LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to diesel generators.
SURVEILLANCE RFOUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1   Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:
: a. Determined OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability; and-
: b. Demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by transferring (manually and automatically) unit power supply from the auxiliary transformer to the startup -transformer.
4.8.1.1.2   Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:            -
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:
: 1. Verifying fuel level in the engine-mounted fuel tank,
: 2. Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank,         -
: 3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the engine-mounted-tank,                     -
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                - 3/4 8-3                  Amnendmnent No. -43,-4-12,43-8,
                                                                                           -220,323  ,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                        Attachment 5 License Amendment Request                                                                                            Page 18 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS~
D.C. DISTRIBUTION          -  OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2.3      As a minimum the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
: a. 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1A, 125-volt B3attery bank No. 1A and a full capacity charger.
: b. 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1iB, 125-volt Battery bank No. lB3 and a full capacity charger.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one of the required battery banks or busses inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank or bus to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
b.With one~of the required full capacity chargers inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of its associated battery banks by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.3.2.a.1 within 1 hour, and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in Table 4.8-2 is not met, declare the battery
* inoperable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.3.1    Each D.C. bus train shall be determined OPERABLE and energized in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying indicated power availability.
4.6.2.3.2    Each 125-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
* a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifYing that:
: 1.       The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and
: 2.       The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equai
* to 129-volts on float charge.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1                                   3/4 8-10                ST.
UCIE-UIT I3/4-10Amendment No. 8-1,2

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                             L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                      Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                           Page 1 of 18 ATTACHMENT 6 St. Lucie Unit 2 Revised (clean) Technical Specifications Pages This coversheet plus 17 pages LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST PROPOSED CHANGE FOR ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE (TSTF) TRAVELER TSTF-422, REVISION 2, "CHANGE IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS END STATES, (CE NPSD-1186)," USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                       Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                           Page 2 of 18 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION.
ACTION 14     -  With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:
: a. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour.
: b. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition as listed below.
Process Measurement Circuit                      Functional Unit Bypassed/Tripped
: 1. Containment Pressure        -            Containment Pressure     -  High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)
Containment Pressure - High (RPS)
: 2. Steam Generator Pressure        -       Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)
AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)
: 3. Steam Generator Level         -          Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)
If SG-2A, then APAS-1 (AFAS)
If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)
: 4. Pressurizer Pressure      -              Pressurizer Pressure   -   High (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure   -   Low (SIAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
ACTION 15      -  With Numberthe of number   of OPERABLE Channels,  restore thechannels  onechannels inoperable     less thanto the Total OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
ACTION 16      -  With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.
ACTION 17      -  Wi'th the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total.
Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition and verify that the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                 3/4 3-16                    Amendment No. 28, 7-

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                           L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                  Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                         Page 3 of 18 TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENT'S ACTION 22     -   With the number of channels OPERABLE l~ess than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, perform area surveys of the monitored area .with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours.
ACTION 23     -. With the~number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.
ACTION 24 -With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations" involving movement of recently irradiated fuel within the spent fuel storage pooi or crane operations with loads over recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pooi.
ACTION 25         With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.9.9.
ACTION 26     -   With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the~
Mihimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode of operation. LCO 3.O.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
               *ACTION 27    -   With the number of oPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, either restore the inoperable Channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or:
                                *1)   Initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), and
: 2)   Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring .the system to OPERABLE status.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                3/4 3-27               ST. UIT UCIE-23/4
                                                                                                   -27Amendment No. 7-*3,43

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                         Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                               Page 4 of 18 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION~
3.4.1.3       At least two of the l0op(s)/train(s) listed below shall be OPERABLE.
and at least one Reactor Coolant and/or shutdown cooling loops shall be in operation.*
: a. Reactor Coolant Loop 2A and its associated steam generator and at
                                   *least one associated Reactor Coolant pump,**
K    b. Reactor Coolant Loop 2B and its associated steam generator and at least one associated Reactor Coolant pump,**.
: c. Shutdown Cooling Train 2A,
: d. Shutdown Cooling Train 2B.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.
ACTION.:
: a. With less than the above required Reactor Coolant and/or shutdown cooling ioops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required ioops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible and initiate action to make at least one steam generator available for decay heat removal via natural circulation. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
b.. With no Reactor Coolant or shutdown cooling ioop in operation, suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron.
concentration less than required to meet SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1 and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.
                 *All   Reactor Coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be .de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the SHUTDOWN MARGIN of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least I10&deg;F below saturation temperature."
A Reactor Coolant pump shall not be started with two idle loops and one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to that specified in Table 3.4-3 unless the secondary water temperature of Sytmcl                    is less than 400 F above each of the Reactor Coolant e eprtrseach steam generator ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                   3/4 4-3               Amendment No. -$6, *-, 46,42

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                   L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                            Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                                 Page 5 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.
CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.3       Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being Used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
: b. An overall air lock leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one containment air lock door inoperable*:
: 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPER.A.BLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
: 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
: 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
                 *If   the inner air lock door is inoperable, passage through the OPERABLE outer air lock door iS permitted to effect repairs to the inoperable inner air lock door. No more than one airlock door shall be open at any time.
ST. LUCIE- uNrr2                                    3/4 6-9                ST.
UCI-      No. *6, 88, -I7-0 LNIT23f46-9Amendment

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                       Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                            Page 6 of 18 CONTAINMENT. SYSTEMS INTERNAL PRESSURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.4    Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -0.368 and.
                          +/-0.400 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
LCO 3.0L4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.4     The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                3* *11                  ST.
LCIE
                                                                                              -UNIT23/46-11Amendment No. 7

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                          L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                  Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                       Page 7 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING. CONDJITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.5      Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed ! 20&deg;Fo APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With the containment average air temperature greater than 1200 F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY withinl the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5      The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average*
of the temperatures at thefollowing locations and shall be determined in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program:
Location
: a. TE-07-3A NW RO'B Elevation 70'
: b. TE-07-3B SW RCB Elevation 70'
* With one temperature detector inoperable, use the air intake temperature detectors of the operating containment fan coolers.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT2                              3/4 6-12               ST.
LCIE
                                                                                           -UNIT2 3/46-12Amendment No. -

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                          L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                   Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                       Page 8 of 18
               .CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3     CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3       The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of containment isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:
: a.      Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status Within 4 hours, or
: b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least One deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
: c.   .Isolate each affected penetration within 4hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
: d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SUIRVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1      The containment isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.
ST. LUClE - UNIT 2                                3N46-9AemntN.8 6-19                 Amendment No. 88

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                        L-2015-1 82 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-3 89                                                                                Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                      Page 9 of 18 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY 3.6.6.2      SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
Without SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY, restore SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY within 24
              'hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN..
SURVEILL ANCF REOUIREMFNTS 4.6.6.2      SHIELD BULILDING INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated in accordance withi the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the door in each access opening is closed except when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit.
ST. LUCIE -  UNIT 2  "3/4                        6-30                  Amendment No. 4--,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                     Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                        Page 10 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3       COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3         At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.*
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
AcTIoN:
With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable wh~en entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SUIRVEILL ANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3         At least two component cooling water ioops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
: b. "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.
                  *When     COW PUmP 20 is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves shall be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours.
Upon receipt of annunciation for improper alignment of the pump 2C motor power in relation to any of its motor-operated discharge valves positions, restore proper system alignment within 2 hours.
ST. LUCIE -UNJT 2                                 3/4.7-13                Amendment No. -I--W

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                              L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                    Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                          Page 11 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 314.7.4      IN'TAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4        At least two independe~nt intake cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.*
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With only one intake cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the nek't 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6.hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4      "At least two intake cooling water ioops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.                                    -
: b.    ]n accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on a SIAS test signal.
                 *When     1GW pump 20 is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specifica-tion, the alignment of the discharge valves must~be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours.
ST. LUClE - UNIT2                                3/4 7-14                ST.
LCIE
                                                                                             -UNIT2 3/47-14Amendment No. 7

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                  L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                        Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                              Page 12 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4-.7.7    CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP sYSTEM (CREACS)
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7       Two independent control room emergency air cleanup systems shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. A filter train and its associated fan per system, and
: b. At least one air conditioning unit per system,. and.
: c. Two isolation valves in the kitchen area exhaust duct, and
: d. Two isolation valves in the toilet area exhaust duct, and
: e. *Two isolation valves in each (North and South) air intake duct.
i         . :. "NOTE The control room envelope boundar may be opened intermittently under administrative control.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTION:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4:.
: a. With one control room emergency air cleanup system inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the followinig 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With one or more control room emergency air cleanup systems inoperable due to an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary:
: 1.      Immediately initiate actions to implement mitigating actions, and
: 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions to ensure Control Room Envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits, and
: 3. Restore Control Room Envelope boundary to OPERABLE status within 90 days.
With the above requirements notmet, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4*a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.I
: c.    '.ith an isolation valve in an air intake duct or air exhaust duct inoperable, operation may continue provided the other isolation valve in the same air intake or air exhaust duct is maintained closed; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.I
: d.   *With two control room emergency air cleanup systems inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary, immediately enter LCO 3.0.3.
ST. LUClE - UNIT 2                                  3/4 7-17                 ucjEuNIT3/47-17Amendment ST.         No. -t2-, 4~, 4-,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                               L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                       Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                           Page 13 of 18 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.8      ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPE=RATION 3.7.8        Two independent EGCS area ventilation systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With one ECCS area ventilation system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE
               .status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in.H-OT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 320.4.a is not applicable when entering HLOT SHUTDOWN.
SIJRVEI=I LANCE= RE=OUIRI=ME=NTS 4.7.8        Each EGOS area ventilation system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by initiating from the control room and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.
: b. By performing required EGCS area ventilation system filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program.
: c. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that the system starts oni a safety injection actuation test signal.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT2                                 3/4 7-20                 ST.LUIE UIT 34720Amendment No. 4#*,-1,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                      L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-33 5 and 50-3 89                                                                                            Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                                  Page 14 of 18 314.8          ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 314.8,.1      *A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FoR OPERATION 3.8.1.1        As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERAELE:
: a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and
* b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:
1.. Two separate engine-meunted fuel tanks containing a minimum volume of
                                         *200 gallons of fuel each,
: 2. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 42,500 gallons of fuel, and
: 3. A separate fuel transfer pump.
APPLICABILITY': MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1 .a inoperable, except as provided in Action f.
below, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72*
hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering. HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With one diesel generator of 3.8.1.1 .b inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the
                            -EDG          became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1 ;1 .2a.4 within 8 hours, unless it can be confirmed that the cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG*; restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. Additionally, within 4 hours from the discovery of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s)
(including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3), declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
* If the absence of any common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this test shall be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                  3/4 8-1              Amendment No. 2=5,89, 7-8, 4-46, 423, 443

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                 L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                        Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                            Page 15 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC_*TION: (Continued) c.With one offsite A.C. circuit a.hd one diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 .a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than an inoperable support system, an independently testable component, or preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG by performing. Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1 .2a.4 within 8 hours, unless it can be confirmed that the.
cause of the inoperable EDG does not exist on the remaining EDG*. Restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. Restore~the other A.C. power source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance with the provisions of Section" 3.8.1.1 ACTION Statement a or b, as appropriate, with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source. Additionally, within 4 hours from the discovery of concurrent inoperability of required redundant feature(s) (including the steam driven auxiliary feed pump in MODE 1, 2, and 3), declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable if its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.
                 *If   the absence of any common-cause failure cannot be confirmed, this test shall be:
completed regardless of when the inop)erable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                               3/4 8-2                ST.
UCIUIT
                                                                                             -      3/48-2Amendment No. 2-5 2,9, :78,42

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                                   L-2015-1 82 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                           Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                              Page 16 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION: (Continued)
: d. Wi'th two of the required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. Following restoration of one offsite source, follow ACTION Statement a. with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of the initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite A.C. circuit.
: e. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demoristrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and .at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in the at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN. Following restoration of one diesel generator unit, follow ACTION Statement b. with the time requirement of that ACTION Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable diesel generator.
: f. With one Unit 2 startup transformer (2A or 2B) inoperable and with a Unit 1
                                *startup transformer (1A or 1B) connected to the same A or B offsite power circuit and administratively available to both units, then should Unit I require the use of the startup transformer administratively available to both units, Unit 2 shall demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 a. within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore the inoperable startup transformer to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
: g. LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to diesel generators.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.1.1   Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:
: a. Determined OPERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignments, indicated power availability; and
: b. Demonstrated O*PERABLE in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by transferring (manually and automatically) unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.
4.8.1.1.2   Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                  3/4 8-3                 Amendment No. 39, 43, -7, 4-70,

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                          L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                  Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                      Page 17 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2. D.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPIERATION 3.8.2.1      As a minimum the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
: a. 125-volt Battery bank No. 2A and a full capacity charger.
: b. 125-volt Battery bank No. 2B and a full capacity charger.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1.,2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
: a. With one of the required battery banks inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank toOPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and hnHOT SHUTDOWNN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: b. With one of the required full capacity chargers inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of its associated battery banks by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1a.1 within 1 hour, and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If any Category A limit in Table 4.8-2 is not met, declare the battery inoperable.-
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS-4.8.2.1      Each 125-volt battery bank and charger"shall be demonstrated.
OPERABLE:
: a. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying that:
1:    The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and
: 2. "The    total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129-volts on float charge.*.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2                                3/4 8-10                 Amendment No. 4-T3

St. Lucie Units 1 and 2                                                                                            L-2015-182 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389                                                                                     Attachment 6 License Amendment Request                                                                                         Page 18 of 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION:
: a. With one of the required trains of A.C. Emergency busses not fully energized, re-energize the train within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY withinthe next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
: b. With one A.C. Instrument Bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus: (1) re~.energize the A.C. Instrument Bus within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours (LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN) and (2) re-energize
                                  *the A.C. instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in .HOTSHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
: c. With one D.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize the D.C. Bus from its associated Battery Bank within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
suRvEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 "The      specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.
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ST. LUClE - UNIT 2                               3/4'8-15                 ST.LucE 2 /4-15Amendment
                                                                                             -UNI    No. 4-I--}}