View source for HL-1542, Special Rept:On 910301,battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H.Caused by Personnel Error.Units Restored to Operable Status on 910302 & Surveillance Procedure 42SV-FPX-003-0S Revised

{{Adams
| number = ML20070Q335
| issue date = 03/25/1991
| title = Special Rept:On 910301,battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H.Caused by Personnel Error.Units Restored to Operable Status on 910302 & Surveillance Procedure 42SV-FPX-003-0S Revised
| author name = Beckham J
| author affiliation = GEORGIA POWER CO.
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000321
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = HL-1542, NUDOCS 9103290048
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 5
}}

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HL-1542 0001392 March 25, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN:           Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-321 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57 SPECIAL REPORT l-91-002 BATTERY-POWERED EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD
{!REATER THAN 72 HOURS Gentlemen:
In accordance with Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2 and Apaendix B of the fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting tio enclosed Special Report concerning battery-powered emergency l
lighting units which were inoperable for a period greater than 72 hours.
Sincerely, d /d< b i
                                                                            . T. Beckham, Jr.
OCV/cr

==Enclosure:==
Special Report 1-91-002 cc: Georaia Power Company Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch NORMS U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commusion. Washinaton. D.C.                                   , ;
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch Ll.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Reaion 11 Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch
    *f 9
9103290043 910320 PDR          ADOCK 05000321                                                                   h-).7
              $                              PDR

    .                                         ENCLOSURE PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET $0-321 OPERATING LICENSE OPR-57 SPECIAL REPORT l-91-002 BATTERY-POWERED EMERGENCY L10HTING UN11S IN0PERABLE FOR A PERIOD GREATER 1HAN 72 HOURS A. fLtquirement for Report This special report       is required by Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS)   section  6.9.2 and Appendix B of the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).
TS section 6.9.2 states "Special Reports for fire protection equipment operating     and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required,     by     the   Fire Hazards Analysis and        its Appendix B requirements."        FHA Appendix     0, section    1.9.1, states,                "All self-contained, battery-powered emergency lighting units required to support unit shutdown in the event of a fire.and coincident loss of of fsite power shall be OPERABLE."        The ACTION statement requires that in the event a battery-powered emergency lighting unit                             is inoperable for greater than 72 hours,           a special report must be submitted to the Commission within 30 days.
In the event described herein, 10 Unit I battery-powered emergency lighting units were inoperable for a period exceeding 72 hours.
B. Unit (s) Status at Time of Event On 3/1/91, at approximately 1130 CST, Unit I was in the Run mode at an approximate power level of 1218 CMWT (approximately 50 percent of rated thermal power) and was ascending in power toward normal full-power operation.-
C. Description of Event The 8-hour discharge test         is normally   sei nmed per surveillance i
procedure 42SV-fPX-003-05, " Emergency Ligitig Surveillance." This procedure is performed approximately every 120 days on about one-third of the plant's battery-powered emergency lighting units. The specific lighting units to be tested at designated times are shown on a computer-generated Surveillance Task printout which, along with a copy of the surveillance procedure, is given to Maintenance personnel for execution.
On 3/1/91, personnel from the site Safety Audit and Engineering Review l             (SAER) Department were conducting a routine audit of compliance with l
fire protection requirements.         During the audit,     SAER personnel discovered the 8-hour battery discharge tests had been missed on 10 battery-powered       emergency   lighting units.       FHA    Appendix                 B, Surveillance Requirement 2.9.1, requires the discharge tests to be i
performed at least once per 12 months. The subject tests should have been performed on the 10 units in October 1990.
HL-1542 001392                                   E-1

ENCLOSURE (Continued)
SFECIAL REPORT l-91-002                                                   ,
BATTERY-POWERED EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS
                             .WQfGMLE FOR_ A PERIOD GREATER THAN 72 HOURS                                           ,
in this event,       Surveillance Task Sheet 1-3000-022, dated 9/23/90, indicated the 81 battery-powered emergency lighting units to be tested for the trimester. Seventy-one units were tested as required; however, surveillance testing on 10 units was inissed.
D. Cause of Event The cause of the event is personnel error. Surveillance Task Sheet 1-3000-022 correctly identified the battery-powered emergency lighting units to be tested; however, the                    individuals responsible for performing the tests overlooked 10 of the indicated units.                             The oversight can be partially attributed to the fact the specific 1
battery-powered lighting units to be tested were designated on a Surveillance Task printout rather than                     in surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-003-05.
E. enitlnis of Eveat.
The battery-powered emergency lighting units are designed to provide illumination for certain areas and/or pieces of equipment in the event of a fire concurrent with a loss of offsite power (LOSP).                         During a LOSP,   the automatic load shedding function of the emergency diesel generators will disconnect power to various areas of normal plant lighting, thereby triggering the emergency lights. Relative to this event, a. tabulation of the 10 affected battery-powered emergency lighting units and the areas the lights were intended to illuminate is shown on page E-4.of this enclosure, in the event the normal building lights located in the areas shown on page    E-4 are extinguished, flashlights are available in the Maintenance       Tool        Storage    area,           in            addition, Procedure 34GO-0PS-030-IS, "Inside Daily Rounds,"               requires plant operators to carry flashlights during daily rounds.
On 3/2/91,- 8-hour discharge surveillance testing was performed on the 10 battery-powered emergency lighting units which had been previously overlooked.       The testing was performed                   in accordance with FHA Appendix B,-    section         2.9.1, item        b.           Seven units performed satisfactorily during the testing. Three units ( IR42-E0ll, 1R42-E008, and   IR42-E004) failed to perform satisfactorily, and as a result, the batteries for these units were replaced the same day. Therefore, even though 10 units were declared inoperable due to missed surveillances, seven units were capable of performing their intended emergency function.
HL-1542 001392                                       E-2

ENCLOSURE (Continued)
SPECIAL REPORT l-91-002 BATTERY-POWERED EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 72 HOURS Lighting unit      IR42-E004,    which failed the 8-hour discharge
;                                                    surveillance testing conducted on 3/2/91, is located in the RPS MG set room, an area where equipment may need to be manipulated under                                           l
 ,                                                   emergency conditions. Emergency lighting unit IR42-E083, which is                                        l also located in the RPS MG set room, was operable at the time the                                        ;
event    occurred. The other two lighting                   units (IR42-E0ll and IR42-E008) that    failed  the testing illuminate hallway or walkway areas which are free of equipment that may need to be manipulated under emergency conditions.
Based on the above analysis, it is concluded this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety.
F. Corrective Actions
: 1. The    affected battery-powered emergency lighting                          units were restored to operable status on 3/2/91.
2,  Surveillance procedur      ,2SV-fPX-003-0S will                 be revised. The specific battery-powered emergency lighting units to be tested during each trimester will be designated in the procedure rather than on the Surveillance Task printout. This action will                                    be complete by 4/30/91,
: 3. The involved Maintenance personnel have been counseled on the need for attention to detail.
l HL-1542 001392                                E-3

     .                                      ENCLOSURE (Continued) l SPECIAL REPORT l-91-002                           l I
BATTERY-POWERED EMERGENCY LIGHTING VNITS l
INOPERABLE FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 72 HOURS INOPERABLE EMERGENCY                  COMPONENT NUMBER OR AREA LIGHT NUMBER                         TO BE ILLVMINATED 1R42-E001                          Control BuTlTing, el 138 ft, IR42-E001, Remote no. 1             inside west stairwell, with remote head at stair landing in same stairwell, el 155 ft.
ControT TuTiding, el 164 ft,
                '~~ ITRFEDB6 west stairwell.
IR42-E0ll                          Control Building, el 164 ft, accees to Control Room through kitchen, northwest corner.
                                                                    ~
IR42-E014                          Battery unit with remote heads in IR42-E014, Remote no. 1            Turbine Building, el 164 ft, iR42-E014, Remote no. 2            "B" Reactor Feedpump Turbine area.
IR42-E014, Remote no. 3 1R42-E014, Remote no. 4 1R42-E015                          Control Building, el 164 ft, area light in hallway outside Control Room.
IR42-E004                          Control Building, el 130 ft, Unit 1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor-generator (MG) set room.
IR42-EDBl                          Control BuiTding, eTT3'07t, switchgear room 10.
                                                   ~
IR42-E080                          ConFoTTullding, el 130 f t, switchgear room 1D.
IR42-E007                          Turbine Building, el 130 ft, door C22 from cableway into Control _ Building.
IR4FE008                           BaU cry unit with remote heads in IR42-E008, Remote no. 1            Turbine Building, el 130 ft, IR42-E008, Remote no. 2            along_ portions of the c3st IR42-E008, Remote no. 3            cableway.
HL-1542 001392                                  E-4 l                                                    .                     . .  -}}