View source for GO2-83-463, Final Deficiency Repts 229 & 254 Re Hangers Not Installed in Turned Over HPCS Sys 7.1 & Improper Installation of Lubrite Assemblies,Respectively.Interim Rept 251 Re Limitorque Motor Operators W/Motors Supplied by Baldor Encl

{{Adams
| number = ML20076E649
| issue date = 05/23/1983
| title = Final Deficiency Repts 229 & 254 Re Hangers Not Installed in Turned Over HPCS Sys 7.1 & Improper Installation of Lubrite Assemblies,Respectively.Interim Rept 251 Re Limitorque Motor Operators W/Motors Supplied by Baldor Encl
| author name = Carlisle C
| author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
| addressee name = Martin J
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
| docket = 05000397
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 229, 251, 254, GO2-83-463, NUDOCS 8306010220
| document type = DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E &amp; PART 21), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 4
}}

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                                                                          #$ff*,%o Washington Public Power Suppl             stem P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washing ore 993      (509)372-5000 Docket No. 50-397                                                 g May 23, 1983 G02-83-463
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Mr. J. B. Martin                                                                          I Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596

==Subject:==
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 10CFR50.55(e) REPORTA3LE CONDITIONS #229, HANGERS NOT INSTALLED IN TURNED OVER SYSTEM 7.1 (HPCS); #251, LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS WITH MOTORS SUPPLIED BY BALD 0R ELECTRIC; AND #254, IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF LUBRITE ASSEMBLIES

==References:==
: 1) Telecon QA2-83-029, dated February 1, 1983, L.C. Floyd to R. Dodds.
: 2) Telecon QA2-83-089, dated April 22, 1983, L.C. Floyd to R. Dodds.
: 3) Telecon QA2-83-090, dated April 26, 1983, L.C. Floyd to D. Willett.
l          In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR30.55(e), your office was informed, by telephone, of the above subject conditions.
Attachments 1 and 3 provide the Projects final reports on Conditions
           #229, Hangers Not Installed in Turned Over System 7.1 (HPCS), and #254, Improper Installation of Lubrite Assemblies. Attachment 2 provides our interim report on Condition #251, Limitorque Motor Operators With Motors From Baldor Electric Company. We will continue to provide your office with quarterly updates on Condition #251. The next report will l
be submitted on or before July 25, 1983.
I          If you have any questions or desire further information, please contact             .
Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project QA Manager, at (409) 377-2501, extension 2712.
bm a    EW C@       Program Director, WNP-2
* Attachments:     (3) As stated o
o y        cc:   W.S. Chin, BPA - Site A. Forrest, Burns and Roe - HAPO oo
  $@             N.D. Lewis, EFSEC gg             A. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector no             Document Control Desk, NRC mam            WNP-2 Files /917B/917Y                                                          l l f]d7

ATTACHMENT 1 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #229 HANGERS NOT INSTALLED IN TURNED OVER SYSTEM 7.1 (HPCS)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency i-                           System 7.1 (High Pressure Core Spray - HPCS) was turned over to Supply
;                            System Test and Startup with 2 snubber hangers not installed as required
  ;                          'y Engineering direction.
u                             The 2 missing hangers are HPCS-924H and HPCS-925N.
Safety Implication The project has established criteria for the acceptable configuration of hangers and snubbers for provisional acceptance of the system to allow initiation of system functional testing. Seismic snubbers / sway braces are, by this criteria, not required for initial testing and normal systera operations. The absence of the 2 snubbers during current activities, therefore, does not create a condition that has a potential to damage or preclude the system frou functioning as intended. Based on a conser-
;                            vative evaluation that the snubbers are necessary to maintain design conditions within the piping system during an earthquake, the absence of the two snubbers could result in conditions which could damage and/or preclude the HPCS system from performing its safety-related function.
This is considered to be a reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e).
l Corrective Action Snubber hangers HPCS-924N and HPCS-925N were identified on the Master Work List (MWL) as an outstanding discrepancy, and have been installed.
The Architect / Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc., has reviewed and updated
;                            the Hanger Drawing Control List (HDCL) to ensure that the HDCL reflects l                            all current design. Bechtel Power Corporation, the Construction Manager,
!                            is in the process of reviewing the updated HDCL against.other construc-tion documents, such as the latest isometric drawings, Master Control List (MCL) and the Turnover Package System Component Control List (SCCL) to assure they are up-to-date. This action will prevent future reoccur-l rence of this problem.
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i ATTACHMENT 2
 !                                                                WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #251                   .
LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS WITH MOTORS FROM BALD 0R ELECTRIC COMPANY INTERIM REPORT                .
nescription of Deficiency 1
Motor operated valves were received from the manufacturer with unquali-
                                           .fied motors by Baldor Electric Company. - Cordition was discovered after
,                                            valves were installed during equipment qualification group walkdown to obtain nameplate data on March 24, 1983. The valves involved are SW6M0-187A, -1878, -188A, end -188B.
i                                            Safety Significance Valves SW-M0-187A and B and SW-MO-188A and B are Service Water System (SU) isolation valves at the interface with the Reactor Closed Cooling Water System (RCC) to provide an alternate cooling water source for the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers FPC-HX-1A and 1B. The valves will allow utilization of the Seismic Class I service water system for FPC cooling in the event of an earthquake. Operation of the valves is not
(                                            required for normal plant operations,. but only under emergency conditions.               1 i                                           The unqualified motors would have the potential for jeopardizing correc-tive action to meet emergency conditions and the deficiency is, therefore, considered reportable.
Corrective Action The manufacturer, Limitorque, has been made aware that the motors were improperly supplied and is to replace the existing motors with units qualified to IEEE-382-1972 neeting requirements of NUREG-OS88 Category II.

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ATTACHMENT 3                                                                ,
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397
 .                                                           LICENSE N0. CPPR-93 l
10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #254 IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF LUBRITE ASSEMBLIES FINAL REPORT Description of Potential Defect or Noncompliance Improper installation of Lubrite assemblies has resulted in assemblies that do not have full contact or warped assemblies also not having full contact.
Analysis of Safety Implication The deficiencies in Lubrite plate installations identified are of such a nature that the normal thermal expansion of a piping system could be constrained in such a manner as to increase the secondary stress range in the piping as well as to increase support and equipment nozzle loadings. Due to the secondary nature of these stresses and loadings,.
,                       pressure boundary failures would not be predicted, as local deformations in the components or component supports would self relieve the overstress
;                       condition. Equipment and support operability could be impaired, there-
;                       fore, the condition is considered to be reportable.
Corrective Action The Construction Manager has taken steps to correct the cause of the improper installation and has implemented an inspection program (QCI-211)
)                       to ensure all Lubrite plates are properly installed.
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