View source for B13340, Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis

{{Adams
| number = ML20246F176
| issue date = 08/24/1989
| title = Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis
| author name = Mroczka E
| author affiliation = CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05000213
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = B13340, NUDOCS 8908300183
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE, UTILITY TO NRC
| page count = 2
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:y                                                                                                                  __      __ _ _ _ _
4 N UTILrrIES                                                      '
cenerai ottices seiden street. Beriin. connecticut
                               <      a H RTFOR CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 L      L TJ "J' 'f*",'C'%"J                                           (203) 665-5000 August 24, 1989 Docket No. 50-213 B13340 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                 ' Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Results of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Sinale Failure Analysis By {{letter dated|date=April 28, 1989|text=letter dated April 28, 1989}},(I) Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) provided the results - of the ECCS single failure analysis. The purpose of this letter is to provide the results of the service water and primary auxiliary building' (PAB) equipment operability analyses which were incomplete and not provided in the Apri       28, 1989, submittal.
ECCS Suncort System:     Service Water E.3 1ssue The service water system should be analyzed to verify that it is capable of supplying adequate flow during the injection phase of a loss-of-coolant    accident   (1.0CA)   with   Valves SW-A0V-9, SW-A0V-738A                   and      B, SW-FCV-1421E,    SW-PCV-606,     SW-FCV-Il2, SW-A0V-8, SW-TV-781A                     and      B, SW-TV-2210, and SW-TV-2365A and B open.
Resolution As discussed in the {{letter dated|date=April 28, 1989|text=April 28, 1989, letter}}, CYAPC0 contracted Westing-house (W) to perform a service water system reanalysis. This report was submitted separately on August 21, 1989, as part of the service water system Plant.gesign   basis The. temperature report             increase verifies that         to 90'F the service     waterfor the systemHaddam        Neck is capable of supplying adequate flow, assuming these valves are open, except for (1)  E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Haddam Neck Plant, Results of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Single Failure Analysis," dated April 28, 1989.
(2)  E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "lladdam Neck Plant Service Water System Design Basis Temperature Increase to 90*F,"
dated August 21, 1989.
0 89083002B3 890824 PDR       ADOCK 05000213
                                                                                                                  ' i\g j
P                       PNV y

  '*r   _ .,
     *'      U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B13340/Page 2 August 23, 1989 SW-TV-2365A and B which were modified to close upon receipt of a safety -
injection actuation signal.
ECCS Support System:     Heatina. Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC)
F.1   Issue Neither.the PAB exhaust nor supply ventilation systems are single failure proof. A loss of plant air (nonsafety-related) or the failure of numer-ous components could render these systems ineffective in providing PAB ventilation after a LOCA coincident with a loss of off-site power.
Operator access is required and may not be allowed if the failures occur after recirculation initiation.
Resolution As stated in the {{letter dated|date=April 28, 1989|text=April 28, 1989, letter}}, the PAB ventilation is not single failure proof and, therefore, CYAPC0 has performed an evaluation to determine what effect, if any, loss of HVAC has on ECCS equipment operability. Calculations indicate that the peak ambient air temperature during a LOCA coincident with loss of HVAC will be approximately 145'F in the PAB and 130*F in the RHR pump cubicle.        CYAPC0 has determined that these temperatures .will not impact the operability of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI), low-pressure safety injection (LPSI), charging pump, or RHR equipment located in these areas.
Based on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,(3) operators will be able to enter the PAB at a temperature of 145'F to perform the required operations.
If you have any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY E'J h%
Sen/Kroczka/
ior Vice President L            cc:  W. T. Russell, Region I Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. T. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant (3)   " Criteria for a Recommended Standard--Occupational Exposure to Hot Environments," National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, USGP0-HSM72-10269, 1972.
L}}