View source for B12544, Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Guarantee That New motor-operated Valves Scheduled for Installation During 1987 Refueling Outage Remain in Respective Positions,Causing No Adverse Effects to ECCS

{{Adams
| number = ML20214S311
| issue date = 06/01/1987
| title = Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Guarantee That New motor-operated Valves Scheduled for Installation During 1987 Refueling Outage Remain in Respective Positions,Causing No Adverse Effects to ECCS
| author name = 
| author affiliation = CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = 
| docket = 05000213
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = B12544, NUDOCS 8706090224
| package number = ML20214S299
| document type = TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS &amp; TEST REPORTS
| page count = 8
}}

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Docket No. 50-213 B12544 Attachment 1 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications June,1937
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8706090224 870601 PDR  ADOCK 05000213 P              PDR

3.6  CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
          - Applicability:      Applies. to the operating status of the core cooling systems.
Objective:           To define those limiting conditions for operation that are necessary to insure operability of the core cooling system.
Specification:       A) The reactor shall not be critical unless the following conditions are met:
: 1)   Pumps All of the pumps associated with at least one of the two trains of emergency core cooling equipment must be operable.           The pumps associated with each train of emergency core cooling equipment are the following:
: a. One high pressure safety injection pump rated at 1750 gpm at a head of 2250 feet.
: b. One charging pump rated at 360 gpm at a pressure of 2300 psig,
: c. One low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pump rated at 5500 gpm at a head of 590 feet.
: d. One residual heat removal (RHR) pump rated at 2200 gpm at a total head of 300 feet.
: 2)   At least one of two residual heat exchangers operable.
: 3)   System valves and interlocks required for proper operation of core cooling systems operable.
B) The following valves and their operators will be positioned and verified as stated below:
: 1) Once per 12 hours VALVE NO.         LOCATION      ACTION RH-FCV-602        RHR heat      Valve locked in closed exchanger     position, Air supply bypass line   isolated whenever reactor critical and i
coolant temperature is above 3500F.            l RH-FCV-796        RHR heat      Valve blocked in the       l exchanger     throttled position, Air discharge     supply isolated when-line          ever reactor critical and coolant temperature 3-10               is above 3500F.            l l
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VALVE NO.        LOCATION       ACTION RH-MOV-22        Containment Valve locked in open Sump            position, circuit Suction        breaker locked open      l during post-LOCA long-term cooling phase.
SI-MOV-24        RWST line      Valve locked in open position, circuit breaker locked open whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.
SI-FCV-875       HPSI mini-     Valve blocked and locked flow line       in open position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.
RH-MOV-874      RHR recirc- Valve locked in closed ulation        position and circuit breaker locked open whenever reactor is critical and reactor coolant temperature is above 350oF.*
SI-MOV-854A      HPSI Pump      Valve locked in open Suction Line position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.
SI-MOV-854B      HPSI Pump     Valve locked in open Suction Line position whenever i
reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.
       ~ SI-MOV-901      RHR/HPSI      Valve locked in closed Crosstle      position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.
SI-MOV-902      RHR/HPSI       Valve locked in closed Crosstle       position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.
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: 2)           Prior to startup from cold shutdown (Mode' 5)
VALVE NO.                                       LOCATION                 ACTION SI-V-907                                         HPSI loop 1             Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position.
SI-V-903                                         HPSI loop 2             Valve blocked and locked       <
injection line in throttled position.
SI-V-906                                         HPSI loop 3             Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position.
SI-V-905                                         HPSI loop 4             Valve blocked and locked injection line in throttled position.
SI-MOV-873                                       Core deluge              Valve is locked open line                     and electrically dis-connected.                   ,
              *Except as permitted by Technical Specification 4.3.
C.         The following actions shall be taken to disable the High _ Pressure Safety injection Pumps whenever the RCS temperature is below 3400F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.
: 1.              De-energize the HPSI pumps by racking out the breakers and locking the cabinets.
: 2.              Close and lock the HPSI pump discharge valves (SI-V-855A & B).
D.         The following actions shall be taken to disable one centrifugal charging pump .
whenever the RCS temperature is below 3400F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.
: 1.             Place the control switch in the trip pullout position.                                                                                           ;
: 2.              Red tag the switch "DO NOT OPERATE."
BASIS This specification assures that adequate emergency core cooling capacity is                                                                                                 +
available whenever the reactor is critical. Based on the loss of coolant accident                                                                                       l analysis, melting of the cladding is prevented with only one high pressure safety injection pump and one low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pump in operation. Additionally, during the post-LOCA recirculation phase, sufficient cooling exists with only one charging, one HPSI, and one RHR available. Each of the two trains of emergency core cooling equipment includes these three pumps.
;            With the pumps associated with both trains of emergency core cooling equipment operable, 3-10b i
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substantial margin exists whenever normal power supplies or both diesel generators are available. With only one diesel generator operating and the pumps associated with that diesel operable as required in Item (2) of Specification 3.12, the high pressure safety injection pump and the low pressure safety injection pump would be started automatically. When the safety injection pumps are operating on off-site power, the charging pump would be started automatically. The RHR and charging pumps would be available for manual start for long-term recirculation cooling.
As described in Reference 3, the RCS OPS, in conjunction with administrative controls, prevents exceeding the temperature and pressure limits in Specification 3.4 while RCS temperature is under 3400F or the RCS is not vented. Part C establishing limiting condition for operation regarding the disabling of the HPSI pumps to further assure that a pressure transient is not initiated.              Part D establishes requirements regarding the disabling of a charging pump to assure that a pressure transient is not initiated while retaining the flexibility to establish, under strict administrative controls, a redundant emergency boration path should such action be necessary.
FCV-796 is required to be throttled open within the range specified in and for the reasons sited within References (6) and (7). That throttled position has been determined by separate analyses to insure acceptable core performance during post-LOCA recirculation.
In order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation following a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a single active failure, the following modifications to the emergency core cooling system have been made.
A piping crosstic between each HPSI pump suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, SI-MOV-901 and SI-MOV-902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPSI pump suction valves have been replaced with motor-operated valves, SI-MOV-354A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPSI pumps to provide flow to the core during recirculation. These values will not be energized until 1939 and no credit will be taken for their use until this time and they will be locked in their safe position.
The manual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized motor-operated valve, SI-MOV-373. This valve will be locked open to ensure that adequate flow is available to the core deluge system.

==REFERENCE:==
(3)  D.C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to D.L. Ziemann (NRC),
dated May 22,1973.
(4)  D.C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to D.L. Ziemann (NRC),
dated May 24, 1973.
(5)  D.C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to A. Schwencer (NRC),
dated September 7,1977.
(6)  E.3. Mroczka (CYAPCO) letter to C.I. Grimes (NRC), dated December 17,1986.
(7)  E.J. Mroczka (CYAPCO) letter to C.I. Grimes (NRC), dated December 19, 1936.
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F) Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valve listed in Table 4.3.1 shall be accomplished prior to entering operational mode 1:
: 1)    Af ter every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.
: 2)    Af ter every time the plant has been placed in the cold shutdown condition for 72 hours if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.
: 3)     Prior to returning the valve to service af ter maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.
Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicators, if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance with the leakage criteria of section 3.14.A.6. The minimum differential pressure across these check valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.
Table 4.3.1 - ECCS Check Valve SI-CV-862A SI-CV-862B SI-CV-862C SI-CV-862D SI-CV-872A SI-CV-872B G) The correct position of each ECCS throttle valve listed below shall be verified within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.
ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Number                          Valve Number SI-V-905                              SI-V-907 SI-V-906                              SI-V-908 RH-FCV-796 H) A flow balance test shall be performed, during Mode 5 or 6, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics, to verify that:
: 1)    For the High Pressure Safety injection pump injection lines, with a single pump running and two lines isolated, the flow rate through each line is equal to 1000 + 100 gpm.
i 4-4a
: 2)     For RHR pump discharge lines, with a single pump running, the.
flow rate through the discharge line is equal to 15003,280 gpm.
Basis:        The core cooling systems are the principal plant safeguard. They provide the means to insert negative reactivity and limit core damage in the event of a loss-of-coolant incident.
Pre-operational performance tests of the components are performed in the manufacturer's shop. An initial system flow test demonstrates proper dynamic functioning of the system. Thereaf ter, periodic tests demonstrate that all components are functioning properly.
Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
In order to assure that a pressure transient occurring during the testing of the HPSI pumps will not exceed the pressure and temperature limits of specification 3.4, there must be appropriate relief paths available; this is provided for in specification 4.3.A.4.
The separation of emergency power systems and associated core cooling equipment into two independent groupings permits complete function testing of the individual systems and equipment.
The containment spray water is provided,if required, by the low pressure safety injection pumps, which are also part of the core deluge system. It is not desirable to test the valve at monthly intervals since it requires closure of a -
manual valve in the spray header. This valve must be closed to prevent initiation of spray when the moter-operated spray valve is open since the residual heat removal system will always be pressurized. Closure of the manual valve is not desirable at power and, therefore, dictates that the motor-operated spray valve be tested at refueling intervals only.
The surveillance in Specification E) assures that the limiting conditions for operation required for low temperature overpressurization protection have been met.
i The surveillance in Specification F) tests the operability of check valves which l
act a primary coolant system pressure isolation valves and thereby reduces the potential for an intersystem loss of coolant accident.
In order to use the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps to perform high pressure recirculation (HPR) following a small break loss of coolant accident i
(LOCA), successful operation of SI-MOV-24 and RH-MOV-874 is required. The monthly surveillance to be performed on these two valves willincrease the
;              probability that the valves are available to perform their function during the small break LOCA. Since SI-MOV-24 will not be closed to any measurable extent during the surveillance, there will be no effect on safety injection availability.
j Surveillance on RH-MOV-874, will only last for a short time and the probability r
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(                                                         4-4b i
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9 of a small break loss of coolant accident concurrent with the surveillance is extremely low. If the valve becomes inoperable during this time, RH-V-783 in series with RH-MOV-874 can be closed. Therefore, there will be no measurable impact o,n HPSI system availability as a result of the surveillance.

==Reference:==
(1)         FSAR - Section 6.3 b
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