View source for 3F1183-15, Ro:On 830817,inadvertent ECCS Actuation Injected Water Into Rcs.Caused by Personnel Error.Actuation Relays Reset.Channel 2 of Engineered Safeguards Train B Tripped.Relays Reset

{{Adams
| number = ML20082R248
| issue date = 11/15/1983
| title = Ro:On 830817,inadvertent ECCS Actuation Injected Water Into Rcs.Caused by Personnel Error.Actuation Relays Reset.Channel 2 of Engineered Safeguards Train B Tripped.Relays Reset
| author name = Baynard P
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER CORP.
| addressee name = Oreilly J
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| docket = 05000302
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = 3F1183-15, NUDOCS 8312130105
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 3
}}

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l                Mr. 3. P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, G A 30303                                                                                               i

==Subject:==
Crystal River Unit Docket No. 50-30           [
Operating License o. DPR-72 Inadvertent Actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System

==Dear Sir:==

On August 17,1983 at 0724, Crystal River Unit 3 experienced an inadvertent actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System that injected water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Below is a description of the circumstances of the actuation. The attached table provides the total accumulated actuation cycles to date as required by Specification 3.5.2.
On August 17, 1983, Channel "2" of Engineered Safeguards (ES) Train "B" was scheduled to be tested. ES t ains are generally tested one channel at a time to avoid actuation (two tripped channels in one train actuate that train). Test personnel, however, mistakenly began the required test on Channel "1" of Train "B" instead of Channel "2". Prior to completion of the test, the test personnel noticed the error, reset the channel to the normal position and began the test on Channel "2". Personnel failed, however, to reset Channel "1" from the main control board as well as from the test panel. Therefore, when Channel "2" was tripped as a part of the test, there was an ES actuation of Train "B".
8312130105 831115 PDR ADOCK 05000302 S                          pop                                                                  gpc;,
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General Office 3201 Thirty-sourth street soutn . P.o Box 14o42. st. Petersburg, Fiorda 33733 e 813-866-5151

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November 15,1983-
            -3Fil83-15 Page 2 High Pressure Injection (llPI) into the RCS occurred for less than one minute. As a result of the ES actuation,there was no reactor trip. The actuation relays we.*e reset and equipment returned to normal operation within ten minutes of the actuation.
Sincerely, sy %w P.Y. Baynard Assistant to Vice President Nuclear Operations Attachment                                                                           -l DPC:Jcf cc:   Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 I
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L-ACCUMULATED ACTUATION CYCLES November 15,1983 Transient                              MUV-42           MUV-43 M UV-36   MUV-37 ES Actuation (Expected)                  2                2      2           2 ES Actuation (Inadvertent)               3                3      3           3 ES Actuation (Test)                     15               15      15          15 i
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