View source for 0CAN121601, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima...

{{Adams
| number = ML16356A319
| issue date = 12/20/2016
| title = Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima...
| author name = Anderson R
| author affiliation = Entergy Operations, Inc
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000313, 05000368
| license number = DPR-051, NPF-006
| contact person = 
| case reference number = 0CAN121601
| document type = Letter type:, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
| page count = 9
| project = 
| stage = Supplement
}}

=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Tel 479-858-3110 Rich L. Anderson ANO Site Vice President 0CAN121601 December 20, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

==SUBJECT:==
Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

==REFERENCES:==
: 1. NRC Letter to Entergy, Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (0CNA031208) (ML12053A340)
: 2. NRC Letter to Entergy, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 Seismic of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (0CNA101505)
(ML15194A015)
: 3. NEI Letter to NRC, transmits EPRI Report 3002007148 for NRC endorsement, dated February 23, 2016 (ML16055A017)
: 4. EPRI Report 3002007148, Seismic Evaluation Guidance Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Evaluation, February 2016
: 5. NRC Letter to NEI, provides endorsement of EPRI Report 3002007148, dated March 17, 2016 (ML15350A158)
: 6. EPRI Report 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization, and Implementation Details for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, February 2013

0CAN121601 Page 2 of 3

==Dear Sir or Madam:==

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a Request for Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f)
(Reference1) to all power reactor licensees. Enclosure 1, Item 9 requested addressees to provide limited scope spent fuel pool (SFP) evaluations. By Reference 2, the NRC transmitted the final seismic information request tables which identified that Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) is to conduct a limited scope SFP evaluation. By Reference 3, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report 3002007148 entitled, Seismic Evaluation Guidance SFP Integrity Evaluation (Reference 4) for NRC review and endorsement.
NRC endorsement was provided by Reference 5.
Reference 4 provides criteria for evaluating the seismic adequacy of a SFP to the reevaluated ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) hazard levels. This report supplements the guidance in the Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization, and Implementation Details (Reference 6), for plants where the GMRS peak spectral acceleration is less than or equal to 0.8g. Section 3.3 of Reference 4 lists the parameters to be verified to confirm that the results of the report are applicable to ANO, and that the SFPs are seismically adequate in accordance with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.1 seismic evaluation criteria.
The attachment to this letter provides the data for ANO-1 and ANO-2 that confirms applicability of the EPRI Report 3002007148 criteria, confirms that the SFPs are seismically adequate, and provides the requested information in response to Item 9 of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter associated with NTTF Recommendation 2.1 seismic evaluation criteria.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Stephenie Pyle at 479.858.4704.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct; executed on December 20, 2016.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY RICHARD L. ANDERSON RLA/nbm

==Attachment:==
Site-Specific Spent Fuel Pool Criteria for Arkansas Nuclear One

0CAN121601 Page 3 of 3 cc:   Mr. Kriss Kennedy Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P.O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Thomas J. Wengert MS O8 B1A One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Attachment to 0CAN121601 Site-Specific Spent Fuel Pool Criteria for Arkansas Nuclear One

Attachment to 0CAN121601 Page 1 of 5 Site-Specific Spent Fuel Pool Criteria for Arkansas Nuclear One The 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter requested that, in conjunction with the response to Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1, a seismic evaluation be completed for the spent fuel pool (SFP). More specifically, plants were asked to consider all seismically induced failures that can lead to draining of the SFP. Such an evaluation would be needed for any plant in which the ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) exceeds the safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) in the one-to-ten Hz frequency range. The staff confirmed through References 1 and 2 that the GMRS exceeds the SSE and concluded that a SFP evaluation is merited for the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO). By Reference 3 the staff determined that EPRI Report 3002007148 was an acceptable approach for performing SFP evaluations for plants where the peak spectral acceleration is less than or equal to 0.8g.
The table below lists the criteria from Section 3.3 of EPRI Report 3002007148 along with data for ANO, Unit 1 (ANO-1) that confirms applicability of the EPRI 3002007148 criteria and confirms that the ANO-1 SFP is seismically adequate and can retain adequate water inventory for 72 hours in accordance with NTTF 2.1 seismic evaluation criteria.
SFP Criteria from EPRI 3002007148                      Site-Specific Data (ANO-1)
Site Parameters
: 1. The site-specific GMRS peak               The GMRS peak spectral acceleration in spectral acceleration at any             Reference 4, as accepted by the NRC in frequency should be less than or         Reference 2, is 0.51g which is  0.8g; equal to 0.8g.                           therefore, this criterion is met for ANO-1.
Structural Parameters
: 2. The structure housing the SFP             The ANO-1 SFP is housed in the Auxiliary should be designed using an SSE          Building which is seismically designed to the with a peak ground acceleration          site SSE with a PGA of 0.2g. The ANO-1 PGA (PGA) of at least 0.1g.                  is greater than 0.1g; therefore, this criterion is met.
: 3. The structural load path to the SFP       The structural load path from the foundation to should consist of some combination       the ANO-1 SFP consists of reinforced concrete of reinforced concrete shear wall        slabs and walls within the Auxiliary Building.
elements, reinforced concrete frame      The Seismic Class 1 portions of the Auxiliary elements, post-tensioned concrete        Building are founded on rock (ANO-1 Safety elements and/or structural steel         Analysis Report (SAR) Section 5.3.2);
frame elements.                          therefore, this criterion is met.
: 4. The SFP structure should be               The SFP structure is included in the ANO-1 included in the Civil Inspection         Civil Inspection Program (reference Entergy Program performed in accordance          procedure EN-DC-150) in accordance with with Maintenance Rule.                   10 CFR 50.65 which monitors the performance or conditions of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions; therefore, this criterion is met.

Attachment to 0CAN121601 Page 2 of 5 SFP Criteria from EPRI 3002007148                      Site-Specific Data (ANO-1)
Non-Structural Parameters
: 5. To confirm applicability of the piping The piping attached to the ANO-1 SFP that is evaluation in Section 3.2 of EPRI      susceptible to draining the SFP is class HCC 3002007148, piping attached to the     line class (or better) as shown on drawing SFP up to the first valve should       M-235, sheet 1. HCC line class is Seismic have been evaluated for the SSE.       Class 1 and evaluated to SSE loads; therefore, this criterion is met for ANO-1.
: 6. Anti-siphoning devices should be       The ANO-1 SFP supply/discharge piping lines installed on any piping that could     have siphon breaker holes below water level.
lead to siphoning water from the       This prevents inadvertent emptying of the SFP. In addition, for any cases        ANO-1 SFP (reference drawing M-235, where active anti-siphoning devices    Sheet 1). Anti-siphoning devices are installed are attached to two-inch or smaller    on the ANO-1 SFP supply/discharge piping piping and have extremely large        that could lead to siphoning; therefore, this extended operators, the valves         criterion is met.
should be walked down to confirm The ANO-1 SFP suction piping does not have adequate lateral support.
anti-siphon devices. The suction nozzles are located three feet below the normal water level to prevent inadvertent drainage (ULD-0-SYS-03).
There are no cases where anti-siphoning devices are attached to two-inch or smaller piping with extremely large extended operators; therefore, this criterion is met for ANO-1.
: 7. To confirm applicability of the        The ANO-1 SFP has a length of 44 ft, a width sloshing evaluation in Section 3.2 of  of 23 ft, and a depth of 42 ft based on ANO-1 EPRI 3002007148, the maximum           drawing C-206; therefore, this criterion is met.
SFP horizontal dimension (length or The ANO-1 GMRS maximum spectral width) should be less than 125 ft, acceleration in the frequency range less than the SFP depth should be greater 0.3 Hz is 0.06g (Reference 2), which is less than 36 ft, and the GMRS peak than 0.1g, therefore, this criterion is met.
spectral acceleration should be
       < 0.1g at frequencies equal to or less than 0.3 Hz.
: 8. To confirm applicability of the        The surface area of the ANO-1 SFP is 1012 ft2, evaporation loss evaluation in         which is greater than 500 ft2, and the licensed Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002007148,        reactor thermal power for ANO-1 is 2,568 MWt, the SFP surface area should be         which is less than 4,000 MWt; therefore, this greater than 500 ft2, and the          criterion is met.
licensed reactor core thermal power should be less than 4,000 MWt per unit.

Attachment to 0CAN121601 Page 3 of 5 The table below lists the criteria from Section 3.3 of EPRI Report 3002007148 along with data for ANO, Unit 2 (ANO-2), that confirms applicability of the EPRI Report 3002007148 criteria and confirms that the ANO-2 SFP is seismically adequate and can retain adequate water inventory for 72 hours in accordance with NTTF 2.1 seismic evaluation criteria.
SFP Criteria from EPRI 3002007148                         Site-Specific Data (ANO-2)
Site Parameters
: 1. The site-specific GMRS peak               The GMRS peak spectral acceleration in spectral acceleration at any             Reference 4, as accepted by the NRC in frequency should be less than or         Reference 2, is 0.51g which is  0.8g; equal to 0.8g.                           therefore, this criterion is met for ANO-2.
Structural Parameters
: 2. The structure housing the SFP             The ANO-2 SFP is housed in the Auxiliary should be designed using an SSE          Building, which is seismically designed to the with a PGA of at least 0.1g.             site SSE with a PGA of 0.2g. The ANO-2 PGA is greater than 0.1g; therefore, this criterion is met.
: 3. The structural load path to the SFP       The structural load path from the foundation to should consist of some combination       the SFP consists of reinforced concrete slab of reinforced concrete shear wall        and fixed connections with walls and columns.
elements, reinforced concrete frame      The Auxiliary Building is founded on rock elements, post-tensioned concrete        (ANO-2 SAR Sections 3.8.4.1.1, 3.8.5.1.3.1, elements and/or structural steel         and 1.2.2.6); therefore, this criterion is met.
frame elements.
: 4. The SFP structure should be               The SFP structure is included in the ANO-2 included in the Civil Inspection         Civil Inspection Program (reference Entergy Program performed in accordance          procedure EN-DC-150) in accordance with with Maintenance Rule.                   10 CFR 50.65, which monitors the performance or conditions of SSCs in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions; therefore, this criterion is met.

Attachment to 0CAN121601 Page 4 of 5 SFP Criteria from EPRI 3002007148                     Site-Specific Data (ANO-2)
Non-Structural Parameters
: 5. To confirm applicability of the piping Piping attached to the ANO-2 SFP is evaluated evaluation in Section 3.2 of EPRI      to the SSE as discussed in ULD-0-SYS-03, 3002007148, piping attached to the     Sections 4.7 and 4.8; therefore, this criterion is SFP up to the first valve should       met.
have been evaluated for the SSE.
: 6. Anti-siphoning devices should be       Siphon breaker holes are installed in ANO-2 installed on any piping that could     SFP pipe lines. The fuel tilt pit suction and lead to siphoning water from the       discharge lines also have siphon breaker holes SFP. In addition, for any cases        installed. The cask loading pit discharge line where active anti-siphoning devices    has a siphon breaker hole installed. The cask are attached to two-inch or smaller    loading pit suction line has an anti-siphon valve piping and have extremely large        installed which does not have a large extended extended operators, the valves         operator. Anti-siphoning devices are installed should be walked down to confirm       on the ANO-2 SFP piping that could lead to adequate lateral support.              siphoning; therefore, this criterion is met.
There are no cases where anti-siphoning devices are attached to two-inch or smaller piping with extremely large extended operators; therefore, this criterion is met for ANO-2.
: 7. To confirm applicability of the        The ANO-2 SFP has a length of 32.75 ft, a sloshing evaluation in Section 3.2 of  width of 23 ft, and a depth of 42 ft based on EPRI 3002007148, the maximum           ANO-2 drawing C-2203; therefore, this criterion SFP horizontal dimension (length or    is met.
width) should be less than 125 ft, The ANO-2 GMRS maximum spectral the SFP depth should be greater acceleration in the frequency range less than than 36 ft, and the GMRS peak 0.3 Hz is 0.06 g from Reference 2, which is spectral acceleration should be less than 0.1g; therefore, this criterion is met.
       < 0.1g at frequencies equal to or less than 0.3 Hz.
: 8. To confirm applicability of the        The surface area of the ANO-2 SFP is 753 ft2, evaporation loss evaluation in         which is greater than 500 ft2, and licensed Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002007148,        reactor thermal power for ANO-2 is 3,026 MWt, the SFP surface area should be         which is less than 4,000 MWt; therefore, this greater than 500 ft2 and the licensed  criterion is met.
reactor core thermal power should be less than 4,000 MWt per unit.

Attachment to 0CAN121601 Page 5 of 5

==References:==
: 1. NRC Letter to Entergy, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 Seismic of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (0CNA101505) (ML15194A015)
: 2. NRC Letter to Entergy, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Staff Assessment of Information provided Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 15, 2015 (0CNA121502) (ML15344A109)
: 3. NRC Letter to NEI, provides endorsement of EPRI 3002007148, dated March 17, 2016, (ML15350A158)
: 4. Entergy Letter to NRC, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Central Eastern United States Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 28, 2014 (0CAN031404) (ML14092A021)}}