View source for 05000333/FIN-2009005-02

{{finding
| title = Standby Liquid Control Performance Demonstration Not in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2).

| docket = 05000333
| inspection report = IR 05000333/2009005
| finding integer = 02
| quarter = 2009Q4
| IR section = 1R12
| finding type = NCV
| significance = Green
| cornerstone = Mitigating Systems
| violation of = None
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12
| Inspector = S Rutenkroger, G Hunegs, M Gray, S Mccarver, J Commiskey
| CCA = P.3
| INPO aspect = PI.3
| description = The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, because Entergy staff did not demonstrate that the performance of the standby liquid control (SLC) system had been effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance and did not monitor against licensee-established goals in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1). Entergy initiated CR-JAF-2009-03994 and CR-JAF-2009-04017 to address the issues and classified the SLC system as (a)(1) due to the repetitive maintenance preventable failures and the incomplete corrective actions related to increasing the PM frequency from every two months to once a month. The inspectors determined the finding is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (Le., core damage). Specifically, plant operators rely on the SLC tank level indication in the control room for performing actions required by emergency operating procedures and the availability of this indication was affected. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; did not represent a loss of system safety function; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to external initiating events. Specifically, the loss of control indication did not render the SLC system incapable of injecting borated water into the reactor coolant system, and operators remained capable of measuring the level of the SLC tank locally using manual dipping. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution within the CAP component because Entergy personnel did not address an adverse trend in the SLC tank level indication in a timely manner. (P.1(d)

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