View source for 05000259/LER-1982-039, Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal

{{Adams
| number = ML20055B868
| issue date = 07/06/1982
| title = Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal
| author name = Carter S
| author affiliation = TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| docket = 05000259
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = LER-82-039-03L-02, LER-82-39-3L-2, NUDOCS 8207230402
| package number = ML20055B865
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 2
}}
{{LER
| Title = Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal
| Plant = 
| Reporting criterion = 
| Power level = 
| Mode = 
| Docket = 05000259
| LER year = 2082
| LER number = 39
| LER revision = 
| Event date = 
| Report date = 
| ENS = 
| abstract = 
}}

=text=
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT                                       O CONTROL BL OCK: l i
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   #        5                  60          El                  DOCKET NUMBER                 GS     69                              74      75        REPORT DATE            80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CON',EQUENCES h 10121 l During normal operation. fisse 16A-F19 blev due to the failure of the coil for relay l IO l3l l 16A-K66B, resulting in an inboard primary containment isolation. The isolation                                                                                            !
I o l 4 l l resulted in the closure of the inboard and outboard isolation valves for "A"                                                                                and  "B"   I o s l H analyzers (T.S. 3.7.H.3).                                       There was no effect on public health and safety in                                                    1 7
0 6 l that T.S. 3.7.H.3 allows ooeration for 24 hours with the hydrocen annivcer out of                                                                                        l 10171 I service. The valves were closed for about 2-1/2 hours.                                                                                                                     I 101H 1 l                                                                                                                                                                           I DE                  CODE        SU80 E                     COMPONENT CODE                   SU8 COO'E         S       E 10191 7       8 l sl Ol@ Lt.1@ Laj@ la I e I t i A Iy I S l@ U@ 12J @
9         to               11             12              13 18           19               20 SEQUENTI AL                         OCCURRENCE            REFORT                       REVi$lON LER       EVENT YEAR                                   R EPORT NO.                             CODE                 TYPE                           N O.
               @,agg/RO            18l2l                    L--J           1013191                  c l'l          10 13 I               I LI            l--J           LOJ
_ 21        22              23             24              26         27           28        29          30               31            32 K N AC O                ON PL NT               MET                       HOURS             S8 IT D          FOR       8.      SUPPLIE              MANUFACTURER lBj@lZl@
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40                     42                 43 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h I 810 l l The coil for relay 16A-K66B. CE type CR120A. Model #5500000lG002. shorted causins-                                                                                        I
        ' i     l fuse 16A-F19 to blow.                            The fuse and the reinv coil were renlaced and the IL                                                                I e
i 2     l analyzers and other systems affected by the inboard primary containment isolation werel
                                                           ^
i 3     l returned to normal.                          This is a random failure.                         No further recurrence control is                                      I c
I i I 4 I I reonired.                                                                                                                                                               I 7       8 9                                                                  g 80 STA S            % POWER                           OTHE R ST ATUS                15 0 RY                              DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION l t l s l [Ej@ ' l gl gl glhl                                     NA                    I     l''Al@l"                       Operator observation                                  I A!ns,Tv                       "          "                                 "                                                                                          "
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l j       g 9               tl     12 LOSS of OR D AMAGE TO FACluTY                                                                                                                                        80 t
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: 9 d 9 W hl        10 NA                                                                                                   I 80 1 2 t o 1 issyg LN       @l DESCRIPTION                                           NA                                                              l      l l l l ! l l I I I I I ! ,2 7       8 9            to 68 69                               80 S NAVE OF PREPAREH                        . an Carter                                                   png.1E J>nn 790-079R                                     E, 8207230402 820715                                                                                                                                                                  '
PDR ADOCK 05000259 S                                PDR

         ; <     Tennessee Valley Authority
* Form BF 17 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant                                               BF 15.2 2/1?/82
     ;                                 LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
   ~
BFRO 259 / 8239          Technical Specification Involved   3.7.n.3 i
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b. (2)
* Date Due NRC 7/8/82 i'             Event Narrative:
     ;           Unit 2 was operating at 77-percent power; unit 3 was operating at 95-percent power. These units were not affected by this event. During normal operation with unit 1 operating at 98-percent power, an operator observed panel 9-42 fuse failure annunciation. Investigation revealed that fuse i             16A-F19 failed due to the failure of the coil for relay 16A-K66B. The blown fuse resulted in an inboard primary containment isolation which g              closed the H2 analyzer isolation valves, thereby preventing sampling of
[              the torus and drywell atmospheric conditions (Technical Specification 3.7.H.3). The isolation caused the following valves to close: 1-FCV    p 18, 1-FCV-64-19, 1-FCV-64-29,1-FCV-64-31, 1-FCV-64-32, 1-FCV-64-34, 1-FCV-76-17, 1-FCV-90-254A, 1-FCV-90-254B,1-FCV-90-257B, 1-FCV-74-102, 1-FCV              j   103, and 1-FCV-32-62. This placed the valves in the isolated condition as allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.D.2. The isolation started the
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standby gas treatment system and resulted in the isolation of the unit 1 e           reactor building and the refueling floor ventilation system. Load was reduced for about two hours from 1040 We to 718 We to slow the rise in 1           main steam tunnel temperature. Fuse 16A-F19 and the coil for relay 16A-K66B were replaced and all systems were returned to normal within 2-1/2 hours. Technical Specification 3.7.H.3 allows operation for 24 hours with the hydrogen analyzer out of service. The failure of the coil for relay 16A-K66B is considered a random failure. No further recurrence control is planned.
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* Previous Similar Events:
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BFRO-50-259/8034, 8163 Y 260/7918 296/8009
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(                Retention:   ?criod - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor
* Revision:   h((
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