View source for 05000254/FIN-2012004-01

{{finding
| title = Unit 1 HPCI Steam Line Drain Valve THROUGH-BODY Leak 
| docket = 05000254, 05000265
| inspection report = IR 05000254/2012004
| finding integer = 01
| quarter = 2012Q3
| IR section = 1R19
| finding type = NCV
| significance = Green
| cornerstone = Mitigating Systems
| violation of = None
| identified by = Self-Revealing
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.19
| Inspector = M Ring, D Jones, L Haeg, J Mcghee, B Cushman, J Draper, L Jones, C Mathews
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect = 
| description =  A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified for the failure to develop a preventative maintenance schedule appropriate to the environmental conditions and potential failure mechanisms for the 1-2301-29 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system steam line drain valve. After a through-body leak was identified on the 1-2301-29 valve on July 15, 2012, inspectors determined that although the preventative maintenance template for this valve was supposed to be condition based, the frequency for internal inspection was designated as required when the valve was exposed to an erosive environment. Inspectors reviewed the work history for the valve, operating experience, and issue timeline to determine that the performance deficiency was a legacy issue, and no cross-cutting aspect was identified. Based on the licensees reaction to more recent operating experience, inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was not indicative of current performance. When presented with operating experience from another facility earlier this year, the licensee recognized the vulnerability and scheduled internal inspections for valves at the next opportunity. Given that the licensee had no indication of degradation at the time and the replacement would require cold shutdown conditions, since both HPCI and reactor core isolation cooling would be unavailable during the repair, the 2013 schedule was reasonable. The licensee replaced the degraded valve and performed limited inspections of associated piping. Additional inspections for similar valves were scheduled.  The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In this instance, the licensee later determined through calculation that the HPCI system could have performed its safety mission for a loss of coolant accident. However, inspectors determined that HPCI reliability could be impacted, in that, HPCI would not be available for other risk significant operating events that the system could be utilized to mitigate if the steam leak were not present. The inspectors performed an SDP Phase 1 screening for the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 04,  Initial Characterization of Findings,  and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2,  Mitigating Systems Screening Questions,  and answered the first four questions  No.  Therefore, the finding screened as very low safety significance, or Green.
}}