View source for 05000247/FIN-2016002-04

{{finding
| title = Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler  Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program
| docket = 05000247
| inspection report = IR 05000247/2016002
| finding integer = 04
| quarter = 2016Q2
| IR section = 4OA3
| finding type = NCV
| significance = Green
| cornerstone = Barrier Integrity
| violation of = 10 CFR 50.65, 10 CFR 50.65(b)
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153
| Inspector = B Haagensen, G Dentel, G Newman, J Furia, J Poehler, K Mangan, N Floyd, S Galbreath, S Richb,  Haagenseng Dentel, G Newman, J Furia, K Mangan, N Floyd, S Galbreath, S Rich, J Poehler
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect = 
| description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the maintenance rule program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation function performed by the main boiler feedwater pumps (MBFPs) discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating valves, which are required to remain functional during and following a design basis event to mitigate the consequence of the accident within the scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program. Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963.  This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and, as a result, is not indicative of current licensee performance. 
}}