View source for 05000244/LER-2023-002, Overtemperature Delta Temperature Reactor Protection System and Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuations on Due to 100% Load Rejection Caused by Turbine Overspeed Circuit Card Failure

{{Adams
| number = ML23312A176
| issue date = 11/08/2023
| title = Overtemperature Delta Temperature Reactor Protection System and Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuations on Due to 100% Load Rejection Caused by Turbine Overspeed Circuit Card Failure.
| author name = Blankenship J
| author affiliation = Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR, NRC/Document Control Desk
| docket = 05000244
| license number = DPR-018
| contact person = 
| document report number = LER 2023-002-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 1
}}
{{LER
| Title = Overtemperature Delta Temperature Reactor Protection System and Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuations on Due to 100% Load Rejection Caused by Turbine Overspeed Circuit Card Failure.
| Plant = 
| Reporting criterion = 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
| Power level = 
| Mode = 
| Docket = 05000244
| LER year = 2023
| LER number = 2
| LER revision = 0
| Event date = 
| Report date = 
| ENS = 
| abstract = 
}}

=text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Constellation November 8, 2023 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 RE. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant James 0. Blankenship Sile Vice President R E G1nna Nuclear Power Plant 1503 Lake Rd Ontario. NY 14519 315* 791-5200 Office 1ames blankensh1p,a constellat,on com www constellat,on.com Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 NRC Docket No. 50-244 

==Subject:==
LER 2023-002, Overtemperature Delta Temperature reactor protection system and auxiliary feedwater system actuations on due to 100% load rejection caused by turbine overspeed circuit card failure (parts quality initiative inspection bypassed).
The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2023-002 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 under the provisions of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. There are no new commitments contained in this submittal. This submittal is for Revision O of the LER.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Justin Knowles at (315) 791-3393.
Sincerely, Attachment: LER 2023-002, Revision 0 cc:
NRC Regional Administrator, Region 1 NRC Project Manager, Ginna NRC Resident Inspector, Ginna (e-mail) 

Attachment LER 2023-002, Revision 0 

=Abstract=
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

00244 4
Overtemperature Delta Temperature reactor protection system and auxiliary feedwater system actuations on due to 100% load rejection caused by turbine overspeed circuit card failure (parts quality initiative inspection bypassed).
09 09 2023 2023 002 00 11 08 2023 1
100

Justin Knowles, Regulatory Assurance Manager 315-791-3393 D
JJ 12 W0120 Y

On 9/9/2023 at 1143, Ginna Unit 1 tripped from a 100% power steadystate condition. No plant evolutions were in progress at the time. Operators initially noticed vibration coming from the turbine building, indication of open steam dump valves, and control rods inserting. All turbine control and intercept valves had closed causing a 100% load rejection transient. The reactor tripped approximately 7 seconds into the transient on Overtemperature Delta Temperature (protection from departure from nucleate boiling). Closure of both the control and intercept valves indicates that the auxiliary governor solenoids on the governor pedestal actuated upon a signal from the Overspeed Protection Circuit (OPC). Troubleshooting revealed that OPC circuitry was actuating while at / below rated input speed (1,800 RPM). Two Root Causes were identified: RC1: failure of Analog Comparator 8, EHCC1/1A08R, and subcomponent R2C (Resistor), and RC2: failure by personnel to implement the Parts Quality Initiative process which allowed material not from inventory to be installed in the plant. The failed card was replaced with a stock spare, and system tests were then satisfactory. Corrective actions for RC2 have been identified and are ongoing.
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: 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
052 050 Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event was reportable as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)
(3)(iv)(A) for a valid specified system actuation (AFW). The event is 60-day reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for actuation of both the RPS and the AFW system. There was no violation of Technical Specifications.
As such, this event is not considered to have had any significant effect on the health and safety of the public. 

==V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS==
For the equipment root cause, the Analog Comparator 8 card at 1A08R was replaced with a stock spare and the system was tested satisfactory.
An extent of condition was performed, limited to the failed resistor (R2C 10k) on the EHCC1/1A08R card. The resistor that failed was a precision wire wound resistor (model SX158D manufactured by Precision Resistor Company (PRC)) and is utilized on multiple SPV card locations within the EH control cabinet. These other card locations are susceptible to the same condition and failure mode. Additionally, precision wire wound resistors may be utilized in other electronic systems within the plant which contain SPV circuit cards. Actions were created to address locations within the EHC cabinet and other systems which may be susceptible to the same condition.
For the human performance root cause, proper procedural guidance exists but was not implemented before this event.
Corrective actions focus on compliance / extent of condition and include:
* Completing PQI for all stock and uncontrolled (not from inventory) EH cards.
* In G1R45 (next RFO), performing PQI on all installed cards and replacing all degraded resistors.
* Adding PQI to all card refurbishment strategies, both site-and vendor-performed.
* Ensuring that per SM-AA-4003 critical spares are properly identified, as this identification drives inspections per the PQI. 

==VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION==
This failure was documented in Corrective Action Program Issue Report (IR) 04701420.
A. FAILED COMPONENTS:
Analog Comparator 8 card in the 1A08R location (EHCC1/1A08R) in the turbine Overspeed Protection Circuit.
B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A search of all Ginna LERs submitted to the NRC determined that no similar event has occurred.
C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) COMPONENT FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:
COMPONENT - Device, Overspeed IEEE 803 FUNCTION NUMBER - 12 IEEE 805 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION - JJ 4
4 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 00244 2023 002 00

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