View source for NSD-NRC-97-5014, Forwards Draft Seismic Margin Analysis (PRA Chapter 55) & Responses to Requests for Addl Info.Nrc Expected to Review Draft PRA Chapter 55 & Responses Provided in Encl 2 Preparation for Meeting Between Westinghouse & NRC

{{Adams
| number = ML20137B828
| issue date = 03/18/1997
| title = Forwards Draft Seismic Margin Analysis (PRA Chapter 55) & Responses to Requests for Addl Info.Nrc Expected to Review Draft PRA Chapter 55 & Responses Provided in Encl 2 Preparation for Meeting Between Westinghouse & NRC
| author name = Mcintyre B
| author affiliation = WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
| addressee name = Quay T
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| docket = 05200003
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = NSD-NRC-97-5014, NUDOCS 9703240074
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 300
}}

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Westinghouse               Energy Systems                                        sa 355 Pmsburgh Pennsylvania 15233 0355 Electric Corporation NSD-NRC-97-5014
    .                                                                      DCP/NRC0774 Docket No.: STN-52-003 March 18,1997 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C., 20555 A'ITENTION:              T.R. QUAY

==SUBJECT:==
DRAFT SEISMIC MARGIN ANALYSIS (PRA CHAPTER 55) AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

==Dear Mr. Quay:==

Enclosure 1 of this letter provides a copy of draft AP600 PRA Chapter 55, Seismic Margin Analysis.
Chapter 55 will be included in Revision 9 to the PRA, which is scheduled for early April 1997. No changes are expected between the draft copy enclosed with this letter and the Chapter 55 that will be included in the next PRA revision, except that a change bar will be added in the margin since this is a new chapter to the PRA. If there are any changes, they will be clearly identified to the staff.
Enclosure 2 provides Westinghouse responses to NRC requests for additional information, follow-on questions, and meeting open items pertaining to seismic margin analysis and the high-confidence, low probability of failure (HCLPF) calculations.
The NRC is expected to review draft PRA hapter 55 and the responses provided in Enclosure 2 as preparation for a meeting between Westinpouse and NRC. The purpose of the meeting will be for the NRC to perform their review of the final AP600 HCLPF calculations. To maintain the schedule outlined in SECY-97-051, Westinghouse believes the HCLPF review meeting with the NRC must occur no later than April 11. Westinghouse also requests that the meeting occur in our Monroeville                {
office to allow the support engineering staff to be available to answer potential questions the NRC may have during their review of the HCLPF calculations. Cindy Haag will contact Diane Jackson to                    ,
set the meeting dates.
Enclosure 3 provides Westinghouse responses to seven NRC requests for additional information                     V pertaining to the AP600 internal fire analysis which is documented in Chapter 57 of the AP600 PRA, and one RAI on the shutdown PRA.
A !! sting of the NRC requests for additional information and open items responded to in this letter is 9703240074 970318 PDR       ADOCK 05200003 A                       PDR
               'i 1 U U ( 0 5.QNpp,gJgggg     ,,

v-contained in Attachment A.
The Westinghouse status of the OITS for six of the internal fire analysis RAls will be changed to "Confrm-W" while the Westinghouse status for the other responses provided in this letter will be changed to " Closed." The NRC should review these responses and inform Westinghouse of the status to be designated in the "NRC Status" column of the OITS.
Enclosure 4 provides markup page changes to the AP600 PRA. Specifically, there are changes to PRA pages 11-10,11-13,14-2, 37-5, 38-5, 41-5, 49-8, and 49-11. These changes will be included in the next revision to the PRA. The staff reviewers should include these markup pages with their PRA report.
Please contact Cynthia L. Haag on (412) 374-4277 if you have any questions concerning this transmittal.
ex//P Brian A. McIntyre, h anag                                                                         '
Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing Enclosures cc:     J. Sebrosky, NRC (Attat hment and Enclosures 1,2,3 and 4)                                 i D. Jackson, NRC (Attachment and Enclosures 1 and 2)
N. J. Liparulo, Westinghouse (w/o attachment / enclosures)
I 1
l l
owe i

1 i
i Attachment A to NSD-NRC-97-5014                            !
Enclosed Responses to NRC Requests for AdditionalInformation            j RAI #           OITS #        W Status              RAI #         OITS #        W Status   j i
Seismic Margin Analysis RAls & Open Items                                                  ,
230.106         3431          Closed                  -
2536          Closed' 230.107         3432          Closed                  -           2537          Closed     :
230.108         3433          Closed                  -
2538          Closed     !
230.109         3434          Closed                  -           2539          Closed     !
230.110         3435          Closed                  -           2540          Closed     i 230.111         3436          Closed'                 -           2541          Closed     i 230.113         3485          Closed                  -
2542          Closed     i 230.114         3486          Closed                  -
5034          Closed     !
230.115         3487          Closed                      -
5035          Closed     '
230.116         3488          Closed                  -
5036          Closed     ;
230.117         3489          Closed                  -
5037          Closed 230.118         3490          Closed                  -
5038          Closed     l 230.119         3491          Closed                  --
5039          Closed 230.120         3492          Closed                  --
2792          Closed     !
230.121         3493          Closed                  -
2793          Closed    !'
230.122         3494          Closed                  -
2794          Closed 230.123         3495          Closed                  -
2795          Closed 230.124         34 %          Closed                  -
27 %          Closed 230.125         3497          Closed                  --
2797          Closed     !
230.126 -       3498          Closed                  -
2798          Closed     l 230.127-        3499          Closed                  -
2799          Closed     i 230.128         3500          Closed                  -
2800          Closed     !
230.129         3501          Closed                  -
2801          Closed     ;
230.130         3502          Closed                  -
2802          Closed     ;
230.131         3503          Closed                  -
2803          Closed 230.132         3504          Closed
{'
Internal Fire Analysis RAls:                                                                ;
                                                                                         'i Confrm-W                            4211          Confrm-W    ;
720.357(Rev.1) 4206                                  720.362 720.358         4207          Confrm-W               720.363      4212          Confrm-W 720.359         4208          Confrm-W               720.364      4213          Closed       i 720.361         4210          Confrm-W
                                                                                             \
Shutdown PRA RAI l
720.305 (Rev 3) 3009          Closed 1
I I
i

Enclosure I to Westinghouse Ixtter NSD-NRC-97-5014     '
March 18,1997 0064H

55, Seismic M rgin An*. lysis V
CIIAPTER 55 SEISMIC MARGIN ANALYSIS 55.1        Introduction in accordance with Section II.N. Site-Specific Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Analysis of External Events, of SECY-93-087 (Reference 55-1), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved the following staff recommendation:
                        "PRA insights will be used to support a margins-type assessment of seismic events. A PRA-based seismic margin analysis will consider sequence-level High Confidence, Low Probability of Failures (HCLPFs) and fragilities for all sequences leading to core damage or containment failures up to approximately one and two-thiids the ground motion acceleration of the Design Basis SSE."
The risk-based seismic margin analysis (SMA) and the methodology described in this chapter satisfy this recommendation of SECY-93-087.
Since the AP600 nonsafety-related components are not Seismic Category 1,it is conservatively n               assumed for the risk-based seismic margin analysis that no credit is taken for the mitigation
('               functions of the nonsafety-related components and systems. The focused PRA sensitivity study is an analysis based on the AP600 baseline PRA that does net credit the mitigation functions of the nonsafety-related systems. The focused PRA sensitivity study is presented in Chapter 52. The focused PRA event tree and fault tree models are modified as necessary for the seismic margin analysis.
For this risk-based seismic margin analysis, HCLPFs are calculated and reported for systems at the sequence level. This is accomplished by calculating HCLPFs for each seismic event tree top event that represents a safety-related system or function. Once HCLPFs for the necessary systems are calculated. HCLPF values are calculated for each event tree core damage sequence. In addition, insights related to random and/or human failures are reported, as deemed appropriate, for each sequence.
The seismic margin analysis is made based on established criteria, design specifications, existing qualification test reports, established basic design characteristics and configurations, and public domain generic data.
Seismic margins methodology is employed to identify potential vulnerabilities and demonstrate seismic margin beyond the design-level safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The capacity of those components required to bring the plant to a safe, stable condition is assessed. The structures, systems, and components identified as important to seismic risk are addressed.
   \
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: 55. Seismic Mergin Anilysis 55.2          Calculation of HCLPF Values O
55.2.1        Seismic Margin HCLPF Methodology The seismic margin analysis is made based on established criteria, design specifications, existing qualification test repons, established designs, and public domain generic data.
A review level earthquake equal to 0.5g has been established for the seismic margin assessment, and is used to demonstrate margin over the safe shutdown earthquake of 0.3g.
This review level earthquake was chosen to be consistent with the upper (0.5g) bin level established by the U.S. NRC (Reference 55-1).
The seismic margin eanhquake that is used is based on the AP600 design response spectra anchored to 0.5g peak ground acceleration 'pga). Since the evaluation is performed for a generic site, both rock and soil foundation conditions are considered. There will be no necessity to perform a new site-specific risk-based seismic analysis by an applicant for a combined operating license as long as the site-specific parameters are enveloped by the site interface requirements defined in Section 2.5 of the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR). If characteristics are outside the range discussed in Section 2.5, then a site-specific risk-based seismic analysis may be necessary. Funher, it will be necessary for the COL applicant to evaluate the potential for soil liquefaction using site-specific conditions (see SSAR Section 2.5).                                                                                  l 55.2.2        Calculation of HCLPF Values A scismic margin analysis is made up of two major tasks:
: 1.      A risk. based model to determine the plant HCLPF
: 2.       Determination of the plant structure and component HCLPFs The second task, determination of HCLPF seismic acceleration values for plant structures and components is discussed in this section; the risk-based model is discussed in Section 55.3.
The HCLPFs are summarized in Table 55-1.
55.2.2.1       Review of Plant Information The assessment uses the following plant information:
               =
Structural and seismic design criteria and procedures
               =       Structural design calculations
               =       Layout and design drawings a       Test reports
               =       Piping and instrument diagrams
               =       Equipment design specifications
               =       Generic fragility data f arch 17,1997                                                             .        W Westirighouse m:\praisec55 wpf ltr031597                             55-2 i

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: 55. Seismic MIrgin An: lysis
                                                                                                            ~
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* AP600 plant response spectra                                                                      !
55.2.2.2   System Analysis Section 7.4 of the AP600 SSAR provides a discussion of the systems required for safe shutdown. The structures and components associated with the.,e systems are considered in the seismic margin assessment. It is noted that the same success criterion as in the AP600 focused PRA, where no credit is taken for nonsafety-related systems, is used as the staning point for the risk-based seismic margin analysis. This success criterion is not necessarily defined in terms of reaching specific plant modes, but rather on reaching a sustainable safe plant state. The bases for this success criterion are given in the AP600 PRA report.
Paragraph 3.2.1.2 of the AP600 SSAR explains that, in most cases, safety-related items are also Seismic Category I items. The paragraph also states that when ponions of systems are identified as Seismic Category I, the boundaries of Seismic Ca" gory I portions of the system are shown on the piping and instrumentation drawing of that system.
Table 3.2-3 of the SSAR, AP600 Classification of Components, Equipment and Systems, provides the seismic categories of the non-piping items in the plant (valves, pumps, etc.). The design code shown in the table includes the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section Ill Class, along with the NRC Quality Group. Paragraphs 3.2.2.3,3.2.2.4, and 3.2.2.5 of the AP600 SSAR correlates AP600 Equipment Classes, ASME Section III Classes, NRC Quality Groups, and Seismic Categories with one another. This comparison is (O)              shown in the following table.
AP600 Equipment             ASME Section III Classes                      Classes            NRC Quality Groups          Seismic Categories A                           1                          A                            I B                           2                          B                            1 C                           3                          C                            1 55.2.2.3     Analysis of Structure Response The purpose of a seismic fragility analysis is to defme the maximum limit, seismic capacity, functional capability or operability with the associated uncertainty for plant components and structures that could have an effect on safe shutdown of the plant following a seismic event.
Capacity in the seismic margin assessment, expressed in terms of the free-field peak ground level acceleration, is the maximum level of the seismic event that results in failure of a given component or structure to perform its safety-related function. Failures leading to loss of safety function could result from such things as loss of a pressure boundary, significant inelastic deformation, panial collapse, loss of safety functions, or a combination of failure p)
(/                                                                                                               Draft
[ W85tingh0US8              hhw                     55-3 March 17,1997 m:sprassec55 wpr:ib 03:597 l
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: 55. S11smic M:rgin Analyzis 1
modes. In the calculation of the HCLPF value for a system, structure, or component, the 9 :
governing failure mode is established by examining the different potential failure modes possible. Each failure mode has a different reserve margin. As an example, ductility may be very large for tension failure, whereas ductility generally does not contribute to reserve margin for buckling.
A fragility evaluation is made for the key structures and components (subsection 55.2.2.2)          !
using information as discussed in subsection 55.2.2.1. The HCLPF for the equipment and              (
structures is established using one of the following:                                               )
l
* Probabilistic fragility analysis                                                           !
* Conservative deterministic failure margin method                                           l
* Test resulte
* Deterministic approach                                                                     J
* Generic fragility data I
These methods are discussed below.
Probabilistic Fracility Analysis This method is used to define HCLPF values for the following structures:
* Steam generator supports                                                                   ]
* Reactor pressure vessel supports                                                           1
* Pressurizer supports                                                                       4
* Inner containment structure and in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST)        l modules a       Containment vessel There are many sources of conservatism and variability in the estimation of seismic peak ground acceleration capacity for seismic margin assessment. HCLPF values reflective of the seismic capacity are derived from median seismic capacity using formulas based on the log-normal distribution. The HCLPF values reflect a 95-percent confidence (probability) of not exceeding a 5-percent probability of failure (Reference 55-2).
The HCLPF is defined by a log-normal probability distribution that is a function of median seismic capacity and composite standard deviation, ,:
HCLPF = Median Capacity x ei23 m The median seismic capacity is related to the mean seismic capacity by the expression:
Median Capacity = Mean Capacity xl e */**
h1 arch 17,1997                                                                         W WO5fingh0USB mVra\sec55 wpf Ib 031597                              55-4

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: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis                                                                                 ~
t The mean peak seismic ground capacity, A., is related to the stress and strength design margin factors by the following expression:
A, = (fi, [X,] )A, where, A,     =     Mean peak seismic ground capacity X,     =      ith design mean margin factor TI,    =     Product notation A,     =     Nominal seismic peak ground capacity It is noted that the composite standard deviation is equal to the root mean square of the composite standard deviation associated with each of the margin factors. That is:
0, " fi[(@,)[]
The conservatisms and variability identified and considered in this assessment are associated with stress and strength margin factors. The basic grouping of margin factors is: deterministic strength factor; variable strength factors; material; damping; inelastic energy absorption,
   ,s ductility; analysis; modeling error; and soil structure interaction. These margin factors are (b                discussed below.
      \
Deterministic Strength Factors Margin factors that have no variability exist in designs. They must be considered in the seismic fragility analysis so that the median capacity can be properly established. Two types of factors are considered:
* Margin to code allowable
* Factors of safety applied to code allowable The factors of safety that are reflected in the margin analysis are dependent on the controlling    l load combinations and associated allowables. Examples of these types of factors of safety are:      ;
* Margin to yield stress, or ultimate strength
* Margin to critical buckling
* Minimum factors of safety as given in design criteria documents Variable Strength Factors Variability exists in the reserve strength of a structural component, and is a function of the l
failure mode. Variability exists due to actual strength versus theoretical or code strength.
O V                                                                                                              Draft T Westinghouse               FEf=
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EHi EE W                                                                       55, S:ismic Mrrgin Anilysis Different margin factors are given for the different failure modes, and are given below with O
the variability, composite standard deviation associated with strength,( y),(Referencer 55-3 and 55-4):
* Buckling: margin factor = 1.5; ( ,), = 0.11 (material variability is excluded and is discussed below)
* Shear strength of high-strength bolts: mean shear strength = 0.625c;(p,), = 0.05 (note:
o,, = tensile strength)
* Shear strength of weld; mean shear strength of weld = 0.84c; (p,), = 0.10 Material The strength margin factor is based on the minimum material allowable by the governing code. Actual material propenies will be higher. Properties of steel as well as the compressive strength of concrete have variability. The statistical estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the material properties are available in the public domain. References 55-3,55-4, and 55-5 provide statistical material data for steel and reinforced concrete. This information was used to define the log-normal distribution parameters (mean and standard deviation associated with material needed to define the HCLPF value). No increase in material propenies due to the application of dynamic loads was considered in the seismic margin assessment.
Damping Conservative damping values were used in design. The safe shutdown earthquake damping values associated with the components whose HCLPF values were determined using probabilistic fragility analysis methods are:
Primary Component Supports Primary coolant loop (uniform envelope response spectra analysis)      5%
Primary coolant loop (time history analysis)                           4%
Inner Containment Structure and IP.WST Modules Concrete-filled steel plate structues                                  5%
Containment Vessel Welded steel structures                                                4%
Damping values of 7 percent and higher for these components are realistic. The margin factor and variability associated with damping are determined considering the 7 percent damping tar h 17,1997                                                                         W W65tlngh0USB m Vra\sec55 wpf;ltr031597                              55-6

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: 55. S;ismic Mrrgin Analysis g
value as mean-centered, with the design damping values representing the 84 percentile damping value. Therefore, the margin factor, MF,, is defined as:
MF, = koSa, where, Sao = spectral acceleration value asscciated with the design damping value Sa, = spectral acceleration value associated with mean-centered damping Variability. ( ,)o, for damping is defined by:
(  ,), = In paAa ]
Inelastic Energy Absorption, Ductility A large amount of energy is absorbed by inelastic structural response. The structure or system is capable of performing its function even though it is responding in an inelastic range. The following statements are made in Reference 55-6, page 34, concerning this phenomenon:
                   " Numerous observations of the actual performance of structures subjected to seismic motions have demonstrated the capacity of structures to absorb and dissipate much energy when strained in inelastic response. The energy absorption obtained from a linear elastic analysis           ;
1 perfonned to the design or yield level is only a fraction of the total energy absorption
(                 capability of a stmeture. Unless corrected for inelastic-response capability, a linear elastic-
'v)                response analysis can not account for the inelastic energy absorption capacity of a structure."
For those stmetures whose HCLPF values were determined by probabilistic fragility methods, only the inner containment structures and IRWST modules considered ductility. These structures are of shear-wall-type construction. The associated ductility margin factor and variability used are given in Reference 55-7: median margin factor equal to 2.25, composite standard deviation equal to 0.25. Local inelastic energy absorption was not considered.
Analysis and Modeling Error Reference 55-7, pages 143 to 145, discusses modeling errors and how they relate to analysis results. It is stated, " assuming that the analyst does his best job of modeling, modeling accuracy could be median-centered, with variability in each of the modeling parameters amounting to variability in calculated mode shapes and frequencies." The recommendations given in this reference are used to reflect modeling errors.
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                                                                                                                        )
T Westinghouse               hh6                   55-7 March 17,199 m spressec55 wpr.ib.03i s97

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          "                                                                        55. Seismic Mrrgin An: lysis Mode Shapes O
To reflect modeling errors in the dynamic model where mode shapes are used in the analytical method to calculate seismic loads, the following standard deviations are used:
Multi-degree of freedom system model:                                     ( ,), = 0.15 System that responds predominantly in one mode:                           ( ,), = 0.10        1 Modal Frequency Variability Shifts in the frequency affect spectral acceleration levels and introduce error. This is reflected in the seismic margin analysis by using a log-normal standard deviation calculated as the ratio of the spectral acceleration value associated with a one-sigma variation in frequency, and the spectral acceleration value at the median-centered frequency.
(@c)r = In(S,/S,)                     -
where,                                                                                                I l
S,      =     spectral acceleration value at the 84 percent exceedance probability frequency          )
estimate, f,                                                                            i S,      =     spectral acceleration value at median-centered frequency                                j f       =     median-centered frequency                                                               j f,      =     84-percent exceedance probability frequency estimate = f xbe "1 l
Imperfection i
Imperfections in the containment vessel affect buckling capacity. This is discussed in                !
Reference 55-8. The critical buckling load is a function of the square of the wavelength. The         i standard deviation associated with the wavelength is equal to 0.32 per Reference 55-8.                ;
Therefore, the standard deviation for imperfection as it relates to critical buckling load is equal to 0.64.
Soil Structure Interaction In the design of the AP600 plant, envelope spectra are used of the different soil conditions.
No credit is taken in the development of the HCLPF values that recognizes that the specific site seismic requirements can be much smaller. Variability, ( y),,,, is estimated to be 0.1.
Conservative Deterministic Failure Marcin Method The HCLPF value for the Shield Building roof was calculated using the conservative deterministic failure margin approach. A finite-element analysis performed on this structure considered cracking of the concrete and redistribution of the loads. Det rministic margin tar h 17,1997                                                              ,             W Westingt10USB myra\sec55 wpf.Ib:031597                              55-8

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: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis A
factors were defined for three items: strength, inelastic energy absorption, and damping.
They are discussed below.
Strength This margin factor is defined from the finite-element analysis based on the increase in seismic acceleration to failure based on ultimate stress criteria. American Concrete Institute (ACI)
ACI-349 provisions have been used to define ultimate strength for axial and flexure loads.
For shear loads, the concrete and rebar capacities have been evaluated. If the design shear load is greater than the concrete shear strength, the shear modulus has been increased to account for the shear strength in the reinforcement.
Inelastic Energy Absorption The increased capacity due to inelastic energy absorption is defined using recognized deterministic methods. It is only applied to the column structural elements that act as shear walls in the Shield Building roof. The formulation defining ductility margin follows the effective frequency / effective damping approach given in Reference 55-9. The formulation is summarized below.
SA( I' P)
F" = [ f*/f*]2 S ( f,, p )
/m                                         4 The ratio of secant to elastic frequency is given in terms of ductility factor, p.
LI f Tp The effective frequency, f, is:
f                 f j =[1 - A] + A[j]
where l
f A = 2.3 [1 - (j)] s 0.85 The effective damping p,is estimated by the formula:                                                  l p, = [f/f,]2 [p + pn]
A
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E                                                                        55. Seismic Mirgin Analysis The symbol p represents the elastic damping, and pn is the pinched hysteretic damping that is approximated by:
pn = 1l'7c (1 -(f/f)]
Damping A margin factor associated with damping is defined recognizing that damping of reinforced concrete can increase from 7 percent to 10 percent when cracking is present. This margin factor is equal to the ratio of the spectral accelerations at 7-percent and 10-percent damping for the dominant building structure frequency.
Test Results For the electrical equipment for which documented test results are available, the HCLPF value is defined from comparison of required response spectra (RRS) and test response spectra (TRS). The method employed follows a deterministic approach using existing test data for similar types of equipment.
The existing test data were reviewed to determine a lower-bound seismic capacity.
When the natural frequency of the equipment was not known,it was assumed that the natural frequency coincided with the required response spectra peak acceleration so that the lowest      '
HCLPF value was calculated. It is noted that where equipment frequencies are known, and are used for comparing the RRS and TRS, these frequencies will be included in the design specification for the equipment to assure that the dynamic characteristics are the same as those expected.
Relay Chatter Solid-state switching devices and electromechanical relays will be used in the AP600 protection and control systems. Solid-state switching devices are inherently immune to mechanical switching discontinuities such as contact chatter. Robust electromechanical relays are selected for AP600 applications such that inherent mechanical contact chatter is within the required system performance criteria. Therefore, contact chatter has no effect on system operation and was not included in the seismic margin analysis.
Moreover, the loss-of-offsite-power event has ; very low HCLPF value (0.09g). The control rod motor generator sets are powered by ac load centers that are de-energized on loss of offsite power sources. When the control rod motor generator sets are de-energized, current to the magnetic jack mechanisms stops and the gripper coils open, allowing the rods to drop i.ito the core. Therefore, relay chatter is not an issue for reactor trip, i
far h 17,1997                                                              '           W W85tingh0Use myrawc55 wpf.Itv031597                               55-10 l
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: 55. S:ismic M rgin Analysis t''N Finally, passive residual heat removal (PRHR) and core makeup tank (CMT) system valves automatically fail open upon loss of instrument air due to seismically induced loss of offsite power. Thus, relay chatter is not an issue for PRHR and CMT system functions.
Deterministic Approach A lower-bound estimate of the HCLPF is obtained for selected structures or equipment based on margin to design limit for the appropriate load combination defined by the fault tree logic.
This approach was used for the primary components to verify that their supports would control the HCLPF value. It was also used for a few cases to defm' e the HCLPF when it was apparent that seismic capacity would not control the plant HCLPF value. This approa b was used for the polar crane, baffle plate supports, heat exchanger (PRHR), CMT, and valves.
Generic Franility Datn Generic fragility data were used when insufficient information was available to define the HCLPF value using one of the methods described above. Those cases where this approach was used were:
1
* Reactor internals and core assembly that includes fuel
                     =       Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) and hydraulic drive units
* Reactor coolant pump i
I   's
* Accumulator tank O                   e      Piping                                                                                   l
                      .      Cable trays
* Valves a      Battery racks
* Main control room operation and switch stations
* Ceramic insulators The Utility Requirements Document for Advanced Light Water Reactor, Reference 55-10, was        ,
used for all of the components listed above except ceramic insulators, for which recognized industry low-fragility data were available.
55.2.2.4    Evaluation of Seismic Capacities of Components and Plant Table 55-1 provides the HCLPF values for the equipment, structures, and systems considered in the seismic margin evaluation. Also shown in this table is the approach, as described in subsection 55.2.2.3, used to define the HCLPF value. All of the 'rtCLPF values are above the review level earthquake (0.50g).
In the design of the AP600, careful consideration is given to those areas that are recognized l                      as important to plant seismic risk. In addition to paying special ettention to those critical components that have HCLPF values close to the review level earthquake, the design process considers potential interaction with both safety-related and nonsafety-related systems or (3 f i
f
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                                                                                                *Wa*c55 *Tr.ib:03:597 1

1 5F EE 5                                                                        55. Siismic Mirgin Analyzis structures, as well as adequate anchorage load transfer and structural ductility. The seismic margin evaluation provides a means of identifying specific equipment or structures that are vulnerable beyond design basis seismic events.
55.2.2.5    Verification of Equipment Fragility Data The AP600 safety-related equipment is designed to meet the safe shutdown earthquake requirements defined in Chapter 3 of the AP600 SSAR. This seismic margin evaluation has focused on demonstrating that the design of the nuclear island structures, safety-related equipment, and equipment suppons can carry the loads induced by the review level earthquake discussed here. This evaluation incorporates as-specified equipment data. After the plant has been built, it will be necessary to perform a verification of the seismic margin assessment for the installed conditions.
55.2.2.6    Turbine Building Seismic Interaction As part of the seismic margin assessment, the seismic interaction between the Turbine Building and the Nuclear Island was evaluated (subsection 55.5.8). It was determined that:
* The adjacent Auxiliary Building structural integrity will not be lost with the failure of the Turbine Building.
* It is not likely that the size and energy of debris from the Turbine Building will be large enough to result in penetration through the Auxiliary Building roof structure.
Even though it is not likely that Turbine Building debris could be large enough or have sufficient energy for penetration through the Auxiliary Building roof structure, this event was evaluated. The consequences of damage to the safety-related equipment in the Auxiliary Building was investigated, it was determined from this investigation that, should an event occur that causes the failure of equipment in the upper elevations of the Auxiliary Building, the results of the seismic margin assessment analysis, the plant HCLPF value, and the insights derived from the seismic margin assessment would not be affected. Moreover, according to the AP600 focused PRA results, steam line break events that would result from damage to equipment in the upper elevations are not dominant contributors to the core damage frequency.
i Further, any loss of equipment in the upper elevations would not affect the passive safety systems used to put the plant in a safe shutdown condition should an event occur.
55.3         Seismic Margin Model This section provides the AP600 risk-based seismic margin model. Based on this model, the cutset, system, and plant HCLPFs are calculated in Section 55.4. The risk-based seismic margin model meets the PRA-based seismic margin requirement as specified in SECY-93-087         l (Reference 55-1).
i W W85tingh0USB far h 17,1997 mTrabec55 wpf.lb:031597                               55-12 l
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55, Siismic M:rgin Analysis                                                                        E       =
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The result of the risk-based seismic margin analysis is:
                . The plant HCLPF for core damage and for large release
                =      A listing of the seismic sequences leading to a core damage end state for each seismic event tree
* A containment performance evaluation following core damage The steps involved in performing the risk-based seismic margin analysis include:
* Evaluate seismic initiating events
                =      Develop seismic event tree models
* Perform systems analysis
                .      Identify cutsets for core damage
                .      Calculate plant HCLPF for core damage
                .      Evaluate the large release HCLPF HCLPFs are calculated for the Seismic Category I safety-related systems which are called upon via the seismic eveni trees to mitigate an accident caused by the initiating seismic event.
To do this, the AP600 focused PRA models, in which credit is taken for only safety-related systems for accident mitigation, are used as the starting point. This model does not include mitigation from nonsafety-related systems.
J The initiating events are evaluated at the review level earthquake of 0.5g. In addition, the loss of offsite power event is evaluated at 0.09g to provide further insights. For each initiating event, an event tree is developed. The event trees for the focused PRA are used to model the system responses to the SMA initiating events. System fault trees are created for each top event in the event trees. The fault tree models include a seismically induced failure model,       l with each basic event assigned a HCLPF. The fault trees also include the random failure           i models from the focused PRA.                                                                      l l
The models are quantified and cutsets are developed. Seismic cutsets and mixed cutsets are        l obtained. The seismic cutsets contain only seismic failures. The mixed cutsets contain both seismic failures and random failures. The seismic cutsets are evaluated using the min-mu method. This is defined as follows:                                                               i l
For events under an AND gate, all basic events must occur in order to progress up a        I l
level in the fault tree. Thus, the highest HCLPF value for the events under an AND gate represents the cutset or top event HCLPF.
1 I
For events under an OR gate, any one of the basic events occurring will cause progression up the fault tree. Thus, the lowest HCLPF value represents the top event HCLPF.
O.
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        "                                                                           55. Siismic Mrrgin Analysis To illustrate this process, assume a top eve it Q with four cutsets:
O
: 1. X
: 2. Y
: 3. Z
: 4. A*B*C The HCLPF value that represents the event "A and B and C occurs" is calculated, with the HCLPF values shown below:
HCLPF for event A 0.53g HCLPF for event B 0.62g HCLPF for event C 0.91g HCLPF for event X 0.62g HCLPF for event Y 0.91g HCLPF for event Z 0.86g Since the A, B, and C events are connected under an AND gate, the maximum (highest)
HCLPF value for the events is selected to represent the HCLPF for event "A and B and C." Thus, the HCLPF for this event is 0.91g.
Now the HCLPF for system Q is calculated:
HCLPF for event A*B*C 0.91g HCLPF for event X             0.62g HCLPF for event Y             0.91g HCLPF for event Z             0.86g For the system calculation, the four cutsets are combined under an OR gate. Using the min-max approach, the minimum (lowest) HCLPF value under the OR gate is selected.
Thus, the HCLPF for top event " System Q" is 0.62g.
55.3.1        SMA Model and Assumptions The SMA model and major assumptions are presented in this section.
: 1.      The seismic event is assumed to occur while the plant is operating at full power.
: 2.      It is assumed that the seismic event would result in loss of offsite power, since the ac power equipment is not Seismic Category 1. (The insulators on the offsite power feed lines can fail in a seismic event such that a loss of offsite power occurs.) In addition, no credit is taken for the onsite diesel generators to provide ac power.
: 3.      No credit is taken for nonsafety-related systems. They are assumed in the model to have failed or to be non-functional due to the seismic event.
tarch 17,1997                                                                '            W Westiligh0USB m:Wra\sec55 wpf:Ib:031$97                               55-14

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: 55. S;ismic M rgia Analysis                                                                            =         =
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: 4. Since the PRA models are used for SMA, the implied time frame for the modelmg is 24 hours following a seismic event. A 72-hour time frame is discussed in Section 55.5.            :
l 4
: 5. In the SM A system fault trees, for initiating events evaluated at a 0.5g level earthquake, l
the operator actions appearing in the random failure cutsets taken from the focused PRA are assigned a failure probability of 1.0. Thus, no credit is taken for the operator actions. For the study of loss of offsite power events evaluated at less than 0.5g, credit is taken for operator actions.
: 6. A conservative assumption used is that if one component fails due to the seismic event,
,                         then all components of that same type for that system fail as well; thus creating a common cause failure event. For example, if a system contains two parallel motor-
,                         operated valves, and one fails due to the seismic event, it is assumed that the second valve fails as well. Because the components may experience different seismic excitation due to their location, orientation, or support condition, it is not necessarily true that both components would fail. However, this analysis assumes that the components do fail.
: 7. The control rod motor generator sets are powered by ac load centers that are de-energized with the loss of offsite power sources (as occurs with a seismic event). When the control rod motor generator sets are de-energized, current to the magnetic jack mechanisms stops and the gripper coils open, allowing the rods to drop into the core.
Therefore, failure of the reactor trip signal is not modeled.
p
  'G)               8. It is assumed that piping will fail prior to failure of associated pressure boundary valves.
Therefore, valves that are not required to change position are not included. Orifices and flow elements are also not included since it is assumed that the piping will fail before these elements. Valves that do change position, such as motor-operated valves or check valves, are assumed to fail at the HCLPF value for the valve in this analysis. Thus, at accelerations below the HCLPF value, there is a "high confidence of a low probability of failure," that the components will perform their function as needed.
: 9. Failure of the normal residual heat removal isolation valves is not included in the analysis, because the pipe sections are assumed to fail before the valves could fail.
These valves are normally closed.
: 10. Identical pipe segments are modeled as failing at the same acceleration level and at the same time.
I 1. If the safeguards signals should fail, safety-related air-operated valves will still perform their function on a loss of air, since they fail in the " safe" position. For example, the main steam isolation valves and steam generator power-operated valves close, air-operated valves in the pasrive heat removal and core makeup tank subsystems open, and air-operated containment isolation valves close with a loss of compressed air.
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9                                                                       55. Seismic MIrgin Analysis        l 1
: 12. The criteria established for containment integrity for the AP600 Level 1 PRA is applied O I to the seismic margin analysis.
: 13. If the containment air path remains functional, passive containment air cooling is sufficient to remove post-accident containment heat.
: 14. The HCLPF value for a component or a structure includes all seismic failure modes of that item; no failure mode is left out. Thus, failures such as bending, tilting, or lifting of structures / components (such as pipes, tanks) are already accounted for, as well as gross breaks and collapse of these items.
55.3.2        Seismic Initiating Events To evaluate which initiating events could occur as a result of a seismic event, a seismic initiating event hierarchy tree is constructed. This event tree is given in Figure 55-1. This hierarchy event tree forms the basis for the seismic initiating event categories and their event tree models (discussed in subsection 55.3.3).
Given a seismic event occurs, the hierarchy event tree is constructed such that the seismically-induced initiating event with the most challenge to the plant safety systems is considered first, i.e., gross structure collapse. This category is labeled as EQ-STRUC and is the first initiating event category to be modeled and quantified. This event includes seismically induced failures         ;
of AP600 structures that may result in core damage and large fission product release.
If gross structure collapse does not occur, a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in excess of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity category is considered. This category is labeled as EQ-RVFA. It considers a reactor vessel failure, failure of the steam generators, and seismically induced failures of other reactor coolant system (RCS) components.
If vessel failure does not occur, then a large LOCA is considered. This category is labeled as EQ-LLOCA. The event category contains RCS breaks with break sizes greater than 9 inches in diameter.
If EQ-LLOCA does not occur, then a small LOCA is considered. This category is labeled as EQ-SLOCA. It contains RCS breaks with break sizes of 9 inches in diameter or less. It also includes steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and large secondary line break events, as discussed in subsection 55.3.3.
Next considered is the seismically induced anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event.
This event is labeled as EQ-ATWS. This category considers the seismically induced failure of the core assembly, guide tubes, or the control rod drive systems to remain functional, preventing the rods from falling into the core.
All other transients are considered in the category EQ-LOSP. The loss of offsite power event (LOSP) is considered at the review level earthquake. As discussed later, this event does not f arch 17,1997                                                                        W Westiligh00SB m vraisec55 wpr.ib.031597                              55-16
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis
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\v) affect the plant HCLPF. To provide insights to the event, the LOSP is also considered at the acceleration level at which a LOSP occurs,0.09g. The cutsets for this event are all " mixed cutsets", containing the seismically induced initiating event coupled with the random failures that could lead to core damage. These cutsets are also discussed.
The risk-based seismic margin analysis does not consider seismic hazard curves; therefore, initiating event frequencies are not calculated for each seismically generated initiating event category. Although seismically-generated initiating event frequencies are not calculated, it is imponant to evaluate the seismic vulnerability of the components and systems that contribute to the initiating event categories. This is done by estimating a HCLPF for each seismic initiating event category, as discussed in subsection 55.3.3.
55.3.3      Initiating Event Category IICLPFs The HCLPF for each of the six seismically induced initiating event categories defined by the hierarchy event tree model is discussed in this subsection. The six categories considered are:
: 1.      EQ-STRUC                                  Gross Structural Collapse
: 2.       EQ-RVFA                                   LOCA in Excess of ECCS Capacity
: 3.      EQ-LLOCA                                  Large LOCA
: 4.       EQ-SLOCA                                  Small LOCA
: 5.      EQ-ATWS                                   ATWS
: 6.      EQ-LOSP                                   Loss of Power V
The small LOCA category also covers SGTR and steam line break (SLB) events. As discussed later, the SLOCA success path is also conservatively applicable to the SGTR and unisolated SLB events.
The first five events listed above are evaluated at a 0.5g level.
The last event, loss of offsite power, is evaluated at 0.09g. This event also represents a larger family of transients associated with loss of main feedwater, loss of compressed air, turbine trip, reactor trip, loss of service water / component cooling water, etc, following a seismic event as well as LOSP, since no credit is taken for the nonsafety systems in the SMA models.
Moreover, a seismically induced transient containing LOSP becomes a station blackout (SBO) event because no credit is assumed for the nonsafety-related diesel generators.
: 1. EQ STRUC (Gross Structural Collapse)
The AP600 structures are classified in 5 groups:
A. Nuclear Island This consists of tne Containment, Shield Building, and Auxiliary Building. The Nuclear Island is structurally designed to meet Seismic Category L W Westinghouse                 MW                     55-17 March 17,1 m sprassec55 wpr:ib 03:597

I                                                                             55. S;ismic M rgin Analysis B. Turbine Building The Turbine Building is designed to meet the uniform building code. For the SMA model, it is assumed to have failed. Thus, no credit is taken for systems in this building.
C. Annex Building The Annex Building is designed to meet Seismic Category II. For the SMA model, it is assumed to have failed. Thus, no credit is taken for systems in this building.
D. Diesel Generator Building The Diesel Generator Building is designed to meet the uniform building code.
For the SMA model, it is assumed to have failed. Thus, no credit is taken for systems in this building.
E. Radwaste Building The Radwaste Building is designed to meet the uniform building code. For the SMA model, it is assumed to have failed. Thus, no credit is taken for systems in this building.
Thus, only the Nuclear Island is considered for the SMA model. The interaction between the other buildings and the Nuclear Island is assumed to have no detrimental effect on the Nuclear Island structures.
1 The failures of the Nuclear Island structures are modeled in terms of the driving structures of the Containment Building, the Shield Building, and the Auxiliary Building. i A fault tree is constmeted to model these failures. This fault tree is given by Figure 55-2.                                                                               l The HCLPF value for EQ-STRUC is calculated in Section 55.4.
: 2. EQ RVFA (LOCA in Excess of ECCS Capacity)
This event represents the " vessel failure." The event is assumed to lead to a loss of the RCS inventory that exceeds the ECCS capacity to provide makeup. The following types of structural and component failures are considered in this category:
* Seismically induced failures of the reactor vessel
                   =      Seismically induced failures of the steam generators
                   .      Seismically induced failures of both the direct vessel injection (DVI) lines
                   .      Seismically induced failures of the other RCS components far h 17,1997                                                             '          W WeStirighouse mwaecss wpr: b o31597                               55-18

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* Seismically induced failures of the fuel                                                  l The seismic failures for the vessel failure event are shown in the fault tree model for           l EQ-RVFA, in Figure 55-3. This event is assumed to lead to a large fission product release, because the containment building is assumed to fail when the vessel fails.               l The HCLPF value for EQ-RVFA is calculated in Section 55.4.
: 3. EQ LLOCA (Large LOCA)
The seismically induced large LOCA initiating event category, EQ-LLOCA, contains                  l RCS breaks with break sizes greater than 9 inches in diameter. Since the seismic event           !
failures assume that if one pipe breaks by a seismic event, all redundant similar pipes will break at the same time. All major RCS pipe breaks are conservatively included in            I this category.
The seismic failures for a large LOCA event are shown in the fault tree model for                j EQ-LLOCA, in Figure 55-4.                                                                        l The HCLPF value for EQ-LLOCA is calculated in Section 55.4.
: 4. EQ-SLOCA (Small LOCA)                                                                            i O
V                      The seismically induced small LOCA initiating event category, EQ-SLOCA, contains I
RCS breaks with break sizes less than 9 inches of equivalent diameter. Since the seismic event failures assume that if one pipe breaks by a seismic event, all redundant similar pipes will break at the same time, all major RCS pipe breaks are conservatively included in the large LOCA category. For the small LOCA category, RCS leaks from instrument lines is used as the representative event. The small LOCA category also includes and bounds events such as steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and large steam line break (SLB).
For SGTR events, breaks of one or more (up to 5) tubes have been considered for AP600 design. An event with 5 steam generator tubes rupturing has an equivalent LOCA diameter of approximately 1.46 inches. The rupture of more than 5 tubes by a seismic event is conservatively bounded by the structural failure of the steam generator, which is included in the EQ-RVFA initiating event.
The focused PRA event trees for SGTR and SLB events show that the success criteria that requires CMT, automatic depressurization system (ADS), IRWST injection, and sump recirculation to be available avoid core damage in all of these events.
The seismic failures for a small LOCA event are shown in the fault tree model for EQ-SLOCA, in Figure 55-5.
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          "                                                                           55. Seismic Mxrgin Analysis The HCLPF value for EQ-SLOCA is calculated in Section 55.4.
O
: 5.      EQ ATWS (Anticipated Transients without Scram)
The EQ-ATWS event addresses the seismically induced ATWS initiating event related to the failure of the core assembly or guide tubes or the control rod drive systems to remain functional so that the rods cannot fall into the core. The fuel is still intact and can be cooled for this event. The failure mode associated with seismically induced fuel failure is addressed in EQ-RVFA event.                                                         l Because offsite power is assumed to be lost, the control rod motor generator sets would be de-energized even if the reactor trip function failed. Only if the core assembly or         ,
the control rod system fails can the rods fail to insen into the core.
l The seismically induced failures for an ATWS event are shown in the fault tree model           i for EQ-ATWS, in Figure 55-6.                                                                   j I
The HCLPF value for EQ-ATWS is calculated in Section 55.4.                                     j l
: 6.       EQ LOSP (Loss of Offsite Power)
The EQ-LOSP event addresses the seismically induced loss of offsite power. This event          j occurs at relatively low intensity eanhquakes. The driving failure for loss of offsite         l power is the failure of ceramic insulators in the switchyard. The HCLPF value for              !
these insulators is 0.09g, which is lower than the review level eanhquake of 0.5g, and the plant SSE of 0.3g. Such an earthquake does not challenge the safety-related                i systems which are designed to withstand the SSE and have margin for higher                    4 acceleration levels. Thus, this event does not lead to any solely seismic failures that lead to a core damage sequence at the initiating event HCLPF, At 0.09g, this event only contains " mixed cutsets" for core damage, combinations of a. seismically driven initiating event coupled with random failures of safety-related systems. In the seismic margins evaluation of this event at 0.09g, credit is taken only foc safety-related systems, and the focused PRA LOSP event tree model is used.
The event is also evaluated at the review level eanhquake,0.5g. The HCLPF value for EQ-LOSP at 0.5g is calculated in Section 55.4. The mixed cutsets for EQ-LOSP at 0.09g are also discussed there.
55.3.4         Event Tree Models For each initiating event category defined in subsection 55.3.3, an event tree model is constructed. These event trees model the response of the plant safety-related systems and functions to the seismically induced initiating events, leading to success or core damage. This success criteria is not necessarily defined in terms of reaching specific plant modes, but rather far h 17,1997                                                          N                   W Westirigh0USB mTra\sec55 wpf Ib 031597                               55-20

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: 55. S:ismic M:rgin Antlysis                                                                                  ~
/3 U              on reaching a sustainable safe plant state. The event trees are based on the focused PRA event trees. The seismic event trees are shown in Figures 55-7 through 55-12.
l The engineered safety systems are designed to establish and maintain safe shutdown                   i conditions for the plant. The nonsafety-related systems are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. The same success criteria as in the AP600 focused PRA is used as the starting point for the risk-based seismic margin analysis. This success criteria is defined in terms of providing the following capabilities for maintaining a safe shutdown:
1
* Reactivity control
* Decay heat removal
* Reactor coolant system inventory control
* Reactor coolant system pressure control For ATWS events, RCS pressure control, and for containment integrity, containment isolation and containment heat removal are also included in the success paths.
The success paths are summarized in Table 55-2.
: 1. EQ STRUC (Gross Structural Collapse)                                                          )
This esent tree is given by Figure 55-7. It addresses the seismically induced initiating
()
V events where a failure occurs in one part of a Nuclear Island structure. It is postulated that such a failure would lead to core damage and a large release. Thus, the event tree consists of two event tree nodes and one core damage sequence:
EQ-STRUC               This event tree node is for the initiating event of seismically induced gross structure failure in the Nuclear Island.
NO-CD                  This node asks if con damage is avoided. It is postulated that core damage cannot be avoided.
                      "'he seismic margins event sequence for this event is:
EQSTR-02                EQ-STRUC occurs and NO-CD fails. Core damage occurs. A large release is also assumed to occur.
: 2. EQ RVFA (LOCA in Excess of ECCS Capacity)
This event tree is given by Figure 55-8 and it addresses the seismically induced initiating events where a failure occurs that creates a large LOCA event that is beyond the capacity of ECCS. It is assumed that such a failure would lead to core damage and
/ \
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l . . . . . . . . . .
: 55. S:ismic Mirgin Analysis a large release. Thus the event tree consists of two event tree nodes and one core damage sequence:
EQ-RVFA              This event tree node is for the initiating event of seismically induced large LOCA beyond ECCS capacity.
NO-CD                This node asks if core damage is avoided. It is postulated that core damage can not be avoided.
The seismic margins event sequence for this event is:
EQRVF-02              EQ-RFVA occurs and NO-CD fails. Core damage occurs. A large release is also assumed to occur.
: 3. EQ LLOCA (Large LOCA)
The event tree model for EQ-LLOCA is taken from the corresponding LLOCA event tree of the focused PRA. It has seven top events, as shown in Figure 55-9. These top events address the following:
EQ-LLOCA              Seismically induced LLOCA event occurs EQ-ACCUM              Success of accumulator injection, following a LLOCA event. If the accumulators fail, core damage is postulated (core damage sequence EQLLO-11).
BSIZE                  BSIZE and BSIZE-LARGE represent the same scalar quantities as in the focused PRA, namely the large LOCA break size is on the lower or upper end ofits range. If BSIZE is in the lower end of the large LOCA break size, then containment isolation or ADS is required for effective IRWST injection.
EQ-IRWST              Success of automatic IRWST injection, following a LLOCA event and successful injection of accumulators. If IRWST injection fails, core damage is assumed (sequences 3,6, and 9.)
EQ-RECIR              Success of automatic sump recirculation, following success of IRWST injection. If sump recirculation fails, core damage is assumed (sequences 2,5, and 8).
EQ-CIS                Containment isolation is successful, following BSIZE in the lower end of the large LOCA spectrum. If containment isolation fails, then full ADS is needed for effective IRWST injection.
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EQ-ADS                   Automatic full ADS actuation is successful. If ADS fails, following BSIZE and failure of containment isolation, then core damage is assumed (sequence 10.)
The system fault trees are F -ussed in subsection 55.3.5. The core damage sequences are quantified in Section 55.4.
: 4. EQ-SLOCA (Small LOCA)
The event tree model for EQ-SLOCA is taken from the SLOCA event tree of the focused PRA, with the following assumptions appropriate for the seismic margins model:
                          -      No credit is taken for manual actuation of safety-related systems.
                          =      If the CMTs fail, core damage is assumed since the ADS and IRWST injection cannot be actuated automatically (automatic actuation requires a CMT level signal).
                          =      No credit is taken for PRHR depressurization. The success criteria for ADS actuation in this analysis is as it would be if the PRHR did not depressurize the RCS.
D'                      =      For SGTR events, no credit is taken for isolation of the faulted steam generator.
                          =      For SLB events, no credit is taken for isolation of the faulted steam line.
The EQ-SLOCA event tree is given by Figure 55-10. The event tree top events are as        j follows:                                                                                  l
{
EQ-SLOCA                Seismically induced small LOCA event occurs (also included are SGTR and large SLB events).
EQ-CMT                  Success of core the makeup tank injection following a SLOCA event. If this fails, core damage is assumed (core damage        ,
sequence EQSLO-05).                                               l EQ-ADS                  Automatic full ADS actuation is successful, following CMT injection, and no credit for PRHR. If ADS fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQSLO-04).
l EQ-IRWST               Success of automatic IRWST injection following a SLOCA event successful CMT injection, and automatic full ADS actuation. If IRWST injection fails, core damage is. assumed (core damage sequence EQSLO-03).
f%
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55-23                             mwess wpt:ib:03i797

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* 55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis EQ-RECIR                  Success of automatic sump recirculation, following saccess of IRWST injection. If sump recirculation fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQSLO-02).
The system fault trees are presented in subsection 55.3.5. The sequences are quantified in Section 55.4.
: 5.      EQ-ATWS (Anticipated Transients Without Scram)
De event tree model for EQ-ATWS is taken from the ATWS event tree of the focused PRA, with the following assumptions appropriate for the seismic margins model:
* No credit is taken for manual actuation of safety-related systems.
* Automatic actuation of ADS is credited. In the focused PRA, only manual actuation of the ADS was credited. This was done to be conservative and simplify the fault tree. (It is conceivable that automatic PMS failures could cause the ATWS event as well as fail ADS actuation.) In the seismic model, PMS failures are not the cause of the ATWS event. Thus, the PMS is capable of actuating ADS if it does not fail due to seismic or random events. PMS seismic and random failures are modeled in the EQ-ADA fault tree for full ADS depressurization.
If the conservative ADS success criteria assumption of only manual actuation is retained in the EQ-ATWS model, then there would be no success path associated with ATWS with no credit taken for operator actions. In that case, the event HCLPF is the same as the initiating event HCLPF. This case is discussed in the sensitivity analysis presented in Section 55.5.
* Since the PRHR air operated valves fail safe (e.g., open) with the loss of compressed air after a loss of power, instrumentation and control (l&C) actuation failure is not included in the system failure. Thus, the fault tree model PRW from the focused PRA is used.
The EQ-ATWS event tree is given by Figure 55-11. The event tree top events are as follows:
EQ-ATWS                  Seismically induced ATWS event occurs.
EQ-PRHR                  Success of the PRHR. If this fails, core damage is postulated (core damage sequence EQATW-07).
EQ-PRES                  Success of RCS pressure relief. This includes both the success of pressurizer safety valves, and the plant not being in tar h 17,1997                                                                          W Westinghouse myrassec552rt:id:03:597                                   55-24
: 55. Seismic Mirgin Analysis
                                                                                                         ?
\
v  i unfavorable exposure time (UET) period. If this node fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQATW-06).
EQ-CMT                  Success of core makeup tank injection. If this fails, core damage is postulated (core damage sequence EQATW-05).
EQ-ADS                  Automatic full ADS actuation is successful, following CMT injection. If ADS fails, then core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQATW-04).
EQ-IRWST                Success of automatic IRWST injection. IfIRWST injection fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQATW-03).
EQ-RECIR                Success of automatic sump recirculation, following success of IRWST injection. If sump recirculation fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQATW-02).
The system fault trees are presented in subsection 55.3.5. The sequences are quantified in Section 55.4.
: 6. EQ LOSP (Loss of Offsite Power)
O (b                     This event occurs at an acceleration level of 0.09g, which is much less than the review level earthquake. As is discussed in Section 55.4, a seismic margin analysis of this event at the review level earthquake,0.50g, does not change the plant HCLPF. The event is also reviewed at the 0.09g level to find potential insights from the event which would not be evident at the higher level earthquake.
Because the 0.09g event is less than the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), there are no seismic failures at the 0.09g level, only random failures. The consequential events are intermediate LOCA (NLOCA) and steam line break (SLB-V). These are defined and evaluated in the focused PRA, as are the other random failure events in this tree.
For the 0.50g event, the seismic margin analysis of the consequential intermediate LOCA and the consequential steam line break events are bounded by the SLOCA event.
In fact, the entire seismic margin analysis of the event is the same as the seismic margins SLOCA event with the addition of the EQ-PRHR event. This is evident from an inspection of the event trees for the LOSP event at 0.09g.
The event tree model for EQ-LOSP is taken from the LOSP event tree of the focused PRA. The following assumptions are made for the LOSP event at the 0.09g level:
                        =     The initiating event is replaced with EQ-LEV-LOSP and has a HCLPF value of 0.09g.
q 3 Westingh0use             hhk,,,m                                                       March 17,1 55-25                               mTraisec55.wpr.ib:03:597
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis
                      . The remaining mitigating systems in the event tree are left as in the focused PRA.
e
                      =     Since the operator actions in the focused PRA are conservatively modeled, often with a high stress model, the human error probabilities are left as is.
* The dominant LOSP core damage sequences from the focused PRA are identified, and their mixed cutsets are reported.
* Due to the LOSP event causing the loss of air, the PRHR and CMT systems are automatically actuated without signals, since the air-operated valves fail safe (e.g.,
fail in the open position).
* Due to the LOSP event, the control rods are dropped without the need for an actuation signal.
The EQ-LOSP event tree for a 0.09g seismic event is shown in Figure 55-12. For the 0.50g review level seismic event, the event tree is Figure 55-13.
The top events for the LOSP event at 0.09g are as follows:
EQ-LOSP                Seismically induced loss of offsite power event occurs.
SLSOV                  Consequential secondary side stuck open valve does not occur.
This would lead to an unisolable steam line break (SLB) event if it did occur. (This event is a scalar probability, as discussed in the focused PRA model.)
EQ-PRHR                Success of the PRHR.
PRSOV                 Consequential pressurizer pressure relieve valve stuck open does not occur. This would lead to a consequential intermediate LOCA if it were to occur, as discussed in the focused PRA.
EQ-CMT                Success of core makeup tank injection.
EQ-ADS                Automatic full ADS actuation is successful. If ADS fails, then core damage is a sumed (core damage sequences EQLSP-05 and EQLSP-10).
EQ-ACCUM               Accumulator injection following CMT failure and ADS success.
If EQ-ACCUM fails, then core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQLSP-09).
lar h 17,1997                                                                 6          3 W85tingh00S6 m:\pra\sec55 wpf.1b 031597                              55 26

ME EEE
: 55. Seismic M rgin Analysis
(    )
V EQ-IRWST                Success of automatic IRWST injection. IfIRWST injection fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequences EQLSP-04 and EQLSP-08).
EQ-RECIR                Success of automatic sump recirculation, following success of IRWST injection. If sump recirculation fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequences EQLSP-03 and EQLSP-07).
The system fault trees are presented in subsection 55.3.5.
The following assumptions are made for the LOSP event at the review level earthquake, 0.50g:
                         =     The initiating event is replaced with EQ-LEV-LOSP and has a HCLPF value of 0.09g.
* No credit is taken for manual actuation of safety-related systems.
* If the CMTs fail, core damage is assumed, since the ADS and IRWST injection cannot be actuated automatically (automatic actuation requires a CMT level signal).
(                       =     Due to the LOSP event causing the loss of compn:ssed air, the PRHR and CMT U                            systems are automatically actuated without signals, since their air-operated valves fail in the open position.
* Due to the LOSP event, the control rods are dropped wie.at the need for an automatic actuation signal.
The top events for the LOSP event at 0.50g are as follows:
EQ-LOSP                 Seismically induced loss of offsite power occurs.
SLSOV                   Consequential secondary side stuck open valve does not occur.
This would lead to an unisolable steam line break if it did occur.
(This event is a scalar probability, as discussed in the focused PRA model.)
EQ-PRHR                Success of the PRHR.
PRSOV                  Consequential pressurizer pressure relief valve stuck open does not occur. This would lead to a consequential small LOCA if it were to occur.
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=          =
         ~
: 55. S;ismic Margin Analysis EQ CMT                Success of core makeup tank injection. If this fails then core O
damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQLSP-10), because the automatic actuation of the ADS will not occur (no credit for the operator action is taken).
EQ-ADS                Success of automatic full ADS actuation. If ADS fails then core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQLSP-05).
EQ-IRWST              Success of automatic IRWST injection, following successful CMT injection and automatic full ADS actuation. If IRWST injection fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQLSP-04).
EQ-RECIR              Success of automatic sump recirculation, following success of IRWST injection. If automatic sump recirculation fails, core damage is assumed (core damage sequence EQLSP-03).
55.3.5       Fault Tree Modeling and Quantification The seismic event tree models of subsection 55.3.4 define plant systems as top events, depicting the systems responding to the initiating event to prevent core damage. In this section, fault tree models for these top events are provided.
Each fau'.t tree is quantified to identify the system HCLPF. This process also yields the
              " mixed cutsets" for the system, if any exist.
In order to calculate the system HCLPF, a seismic fault tree is developed for each top event.
The seismic fault tree illustrates how the system may fail due to a seismic event. For example, a cooling system may seismically fail due to failure of any of the following structures or components:
* Heat exchangers a       Valves
              =       Piping                                                                                     j
              =       Structure housing the system
              .       Support system failures Ultimate heat sink (tank)
Since any one of these structure ~omponent groups can cause system failure, the events are combined under an OR gate. Th            itsets of this seismic fault tree are combined with the random failure cutsets of the same system from the focused PRA. The " mixed cutsets" (containing seismically induced and random failures) are reviewed for insights into the plant      l response. The remaining " pure cutsets" (containing only the seismically induced failures) are     i used for system HCLPF calculation. For this purpose, a HCLPF is assigned to each f ar h 17,1997                                                          -               W W65tingl100S8 mTpra\sec55.wpf.lb:031597                              55-28

W Ej
: 55. Sei:mic Mrrgin Analysis i3 component or stmeture in the cutsets, and the min-max method is used to calculate the system HCLPF.
The following process is used for fault tree modeling and quantification:
Step 1         For each top event, a seismic fault tree containing seismically induced failures of the stmetures and components associated with the system is constructed. TI,is fault tree is then quantified to obtain its cutsets. For this quantification a probability of 1.0 is assigned to seismic failure basic events. Each seismic failure basic event is assigned a basic event ID starting with "EQ ."
Step 2         The random failure cutsets of the system from the focused PRA are retrieved.
Operator actions appearing in these cutsets are assigned a failure probability of 1.0.
Step 3         The random and seismic cutsets obtained in steps 1 and 2 are then combined (with an OR gate logic) to obtain the seismically induced failure cutsets plus mixed cutsets for the system. Mixed cutsets contain failures that are seismically and randomly induced.
Step 1 is discussed in this section. Steps 2 and 3 are discussed with the quantification process in Section 55.4.
O U                SYSTEM FAULT TREE MODELS The system fault tree models are pven below by each initiating event category. They include the front line systems that show up as event tree top events and their support systems. The following fault tree modeling assumptions are used for the fluid systems:
: a. RCS pipe failures leading to system failure are not included in the fault trees since the effects of RCS pipe failures are already conservatively bounded by the "two DVI lines breaking" failure mode in the EQ-RVFA event.
: b. The IRWST tank failure is modeled in the PRHR and IRWST injection fault trees, despite the fact that its failure is already accounted for in the gross structural failure initiating event.
: 1. EQ STRUC (Gross Structural Collapse)
For EQ-STRUC event tree, there are no system top events, and no fault trees are defined.
: 2. EQ RVFA (LOCA in Excess of ECCS Capacity)
For EQ-RVFA event tree, there are no system top events, and no fault trees are defined.
'd                                                                                                               Draft
[ W85tingh0USB               h,h, w                                                         March 17,1997 55-29                               mvrawc55 we r.ib:03is97

5    9E
        -::~                                                                     55. S:ismic M rgin Analysis
: 3.      EQ LLOCA (Large LOCA)                                                                       >
l l
For EQ-LLOCA event tree, the following system fault trees are defined:
EQ-AC2AB               This is the failure of accumulators. The success criteria are the    i same as in the focused PRA model. The top event is represented       l by the EQ-AC2AB fault tree, given in Figure 55-14.
During normal operation, the accumulators are isolated from the reactor coolant system by two isolation check valves, in series. These valves maintain the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. When the reactor coolant system falls below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open, and borated water is forced into the reactor coolant system by gas pressure. The motor-operated isolation valve in the discharge line from each accumulator to the reactor vessel is normally open (PXS-027A and PXS-027B). The accumulators provide sufficient inventory for short-term core cooling. The components associoted with the accumulators are:
* Tanks PXS-MT-01 A and PXS-MT-OlB
                      =      CV PXS-028A and PXS-028B
                      =      CV PXS-029A and PXS-029B
                      =      PXS-027A and PXS-027B EQ-XCIC                This node addresses the containment isolation if BSIZE is on the smaller end of the large LOCA. The success criteria are the same as in the focused PRA model. The top event is represented by the EQ-XCIC fault tree, given in Figure 55-15.
This top event in the fault tree is the closure of the isolation valves to maintain containment integrity. Automatic actuation of the containment isolation signal is generated by the protection and safety momtoring system (PMS) and also uses safety-related de power. Various safeguards actuation signals are used to close containment isolation valves. These actuation signals include:
* High containment pressure
                       .      Low pressurizer pressure
* Low-3 reactor coolant system T,,,
                        =     Low steam line pressure Containment penetrations were screened out of the Level i PRA analysis and not considered for containment isolation if they met one of the following screening criteria:
* The penetration is connected to a closed system inside containment.
* The penetration has isolation valves plus closed system outside of containment.
tar h 17,1997                                                                         W W85tiflgh00S8 m4rawc55 wpf.lb:031797                              55-30

Mii Eii
                                                                                                          =
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Anlysis                                                                                      5 1   . ..
r3 km)
                     .       The penetration has additional system valves inside containment that are normally closed or close automatically.
* The penetration has at least one blind flange.
The following valves in the containment penetration did not meet the above screening criteria and must be closed for containment isolation to succeed:                                  l
* CAS-V014
                     =        CAS-VOIS
                     =        WLS-V055
* WLS-V057
                     .        VFS-V003
                     .        VFS-V004
                     =        VFS-V009                                                                                  .
* VFS-V010 (The containment isolation valves WLS-V004 and WLS-V006 are no longer part of the current design and the containment penetrations have been deleted. These valves are conservatively retained in this analysis for consistency with the focused PRA models.)
The PMS system Class IE de power, containment pressure sensors and transmitters, main steam line pressure transmitters, and pressurizer sensors and transmitters are also
[]
'w/                   included in the model.
EQ-XADMA                This node addresses the full ADS depressurization,if containment isolation fails. The success criteria is the same as in the focused PRA model. It is represented by the EQ-XADMA fault tree, given in Figure 55-16.
The automatic depressurization system is used to fully depressurize the reactor coolant system. Signals to actuate the automatic depressurization system occur with a low core makeup tank water level signal. There are four depressurization stages in the automatic depressurization system. Safety-related de power is required to actuate the valves.
The valves in the ADS system are:
* RCS-V001 A, RCS-V001B, RCS-V001C, RCS-V00lD
                       =      RCS-V002A, RCS-V002B, RCS-V002C, RCS-V002D
                       =      RCS-V003A, RCS-V003B, RCS-V003C, RCS-V003D
                       =      RCS-V004A, RCS-V004B, RCS-V004C, RCS-V004D The success criterion used for the seismic margins fault tree for large LOCA is that two out of four stage four lines must open. Thus, only the fourth stage valves are modeled for this ADS case.
 ~
T Westingh00S8              b6                     55-31 March 17,199 m:sprassec55 wpr ib 031597

#5 EE E                                                                              55. S:ismic Mirgin Analysis EQ-XIW2A                 This node addresses IRWST injection from the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The success criteria is the same as in the focused PRA model. It is represented by the EQ-XIW2A fault tree, given in Figure 55-17.
The CMT level signal actuates the IRWST squib valves for IRWST injection. The components required are:
* PXS-122A and PXS-122B (check valves)
* PXS-124A and PXS-124B (check valves)
* PXS-123A and PXS-123B (squib valves)
* PXS-125A and PXS-125B (squib valves)
* IRWST tank Also included in this system success criteria are the successful draining of the CMT and the signal that actuates the squib valves for IRWST injection.
Injection from the core makeup tanks occurs when the air-operated valves open on the loss of compressed air caused by the loss of offsite power (HCLPF 0.09g). The check valves in the system must also open. The required components are:
* PXS-V014A and V014B                                                                  :
* PXS-V015A and V015B                                                                  '
* CV PXS-016A and 016B
* CV PXS-017A and Ol7B This node addresses sump recirculation, after successful IRWST     l EQ-RECIR injection. The success criteria is the same as in the focused PRA model, it is represented by the EQ-RECIR fault tree, given in Figure 55-18.
In the long-term cooling mode, the core is covered and the steam produced in the core is vented to the containment via the ADS valves. The water in the containment sump provides recirculation flow to the core through the direct vessel injection lines. The steam produced condenses on the containment shell, which is cooled by the passive containment cooling system. The actuation signal to open the motor-operated valves in the recirculation lines is a low IRWST water level coincident with an S-signal. The components required are:
* CV PXS-Il9A and CV PXS-Il9B
                         =     PXS-Il7A and PXS-Il7B
* PXS-118A and PXS-118B
                         =     PXS-120A and PXS-120B The IRWST level transmitter is included in the model for actuation faileres.
tar h 17,1997                                                                     '           W Westirighouse m \pra\sec55 wpf:Ib 031597                                  55-32

EE     4 E
: 55. Seismic Mirgin Analysis
(~N) i V
: 4. EQ SLOCA (Small LOCA)
For EQ-SLOCA event tree, the following system fault trees are defined:
EQ-CM2SL               This models the failure of the core makeup tanks. The success criteria is the same as in the focused PRA model.              It is represented by the EQ-CM2SL fault tree, given in Figure 55-19.
Injection from the core makeup tanks occurs when the air-operated valves open on the loss of compressed air caused by the less of offsite power (HCLPF 0.09g). The check valves in the system must also open. The required components are:
* Tanks PXS-02A and 02B
* PXS-V014A and V014B
* PXS-V015A and V015B e        CV PXS-016A and 016B
* CV PXS-017A and Ol7B EQ-ADA                  This node addresses the automatic actuation of full ADS              l depressurization. The success at the node requires CMTs to be successful. No credit is taken for the PRHR system's ability to depressurize the RCS to the ADS fourth stage actuation pressure.
The success criteria are the same as in the focused PRA model.
Cs]                                             it is represented by the EQ-ADA fault tree, given in Figure 55-20.
The automatic depressurization system is used to fully depressurize the reactor coolant system. Signals to actuate the automatic depressurization system occur with a low core makeup tank water level. There are four depressurization stages in the automatic depressurization system. Safety-related de power is required to actuate the valves.
t' 1
The success criterion used for the seismic margins fault tree for small LOCA is that the 1
first three stages must first automatically actuate to reduce the RCS pressure to the ADS fourth stage permissive, and two out of four stage four ADS lines must open. Thus, all ADS stage valves are modeled for this ADS case.
l                           EQ-IW2AB                This node addresses automatic actuation of the IRWS.T injection via the signal that occurs with the low CMT level. The success criteria are the same as in the focused PRA model. It is represented by the EQ-IW2AB fault tree, given in Figure 55-21.
The CMT level signal opens the IRWST squib valves. The components required are:
1
* CV PXS-122A and PXS-122B                                                           !
* CV PXS-124A and PXS-124B 3 Westifigtl0tlS8                  6                                                     March 17,1 l
55-33                              m*asussypr;ib:03:597 i

:p       =4.
              ~                                                                       55. Seismic M!rgin Analysis
* PXS-123A and PXS-123B O
* PXS-125A and PXS-125B
* IRWST tank EQ RECIR              This is the same EQ-RECIR fault tree discussed with the EQ-LLOCA event.
: 5.      EQ-ATWS (Anticipated Transients Without Scram)
For the EQ-ATWS event tree, four of the already modeled system fault trees are used.
These are:
For CMT                                EQ-CM2SL For IRWST injection                    EQ-IW2AB For sump recirculation                 EQ-RECIR For ADS                                EQ-ADA For the other two event tree nodes, the following new system models are introduced:
EQ-PRHR              This is the failure of the PRHR. The success criteria are the same as in the focused PRA model fault tree PRW. This tree models the automatic opening of PRHR air-operated valves (AOVs) with the loss of power and compressed air. The seismic fault tree model is represented by the EQ-PRHR fault tree, given in Figure 55-22.
The PRHR is actuated upon receipt any one of a multiple set of PMS signals, which include low steam generator (SG) level (wide range), CMT actuation, and high pressurizer level.
The air-operated valves also open upon loss of compressed air, or loss of de power.
The air-operated valves open to align the core makeup tanh to the reactor coolant system. The PRHR system components are:
* 1RWST tank
* PXS-V108A and V108B (AOVs).
t
* PXS-V101 (motor-operated valve (MOV), normally open)
* PXS-V109 (manual valve, normally open)
* PRHR heat exchanger The normally open valves are included in the model as a conservatism.
EQ-PRESU             This node addresses the automatic RCS pressure relief after ATWS. It includes opening of the pressurizer safety valves and far h 17,1997 W Westirighouse m \pra\sec55 wpf.1b:031797                             55-34

                                                                                                                  .s=               =E;-
* E
: 55. Seismic Margin Analysis m
the plant not being in the UET period. The relief valves are RCS-V005A and V005B.
The success criteria are the same as the focused PRA model. It is represented by the EQ-IW2AB fault tree, given in Figure 55-23.
: 6.      EQ-LOSP (Loss of Offsite Power)
Bece.ase the LOSP occurs at a very low level earthquake (the HCLPF is 0.09g), it is evaluated at the review level earthquake and the 0.09g earthquake. Since there are no seismic failures other than the initiating event at the 0.09g level (it is less than the safe shutdown earthquake), the fault trees for the event evaluation at 0.09 are the same as those presented in the focused PRA. For the evaluation of the LOSP at the review level earthquake, the fault trees previously discussed are used. The two top events, SLSOV and PRSOV, are represented by scalars, as in the focused PRA. The scalars do not require a fault tree, nor do they affect the system HCLPF value.
The fault trees used in the LOSP event tree are:
For PRHR                                    EQ-PRHR For CMT                                     EQ-CM2SL For ADS                                     EQ-ADA For IRWST injection                         EQ-IW2AB l\                          For sump recirculation                      EQ-RECIR SUPPORT SYSTEM MODELS In defining the above system failures, the following support system failure fault trees are also introduced:
EQ-PMS                Failure of automatic protection and ;afety monitoring system (PMS) actuation signals to a system due to a seismic event. Figure 55-24 shows the fault tree EQ-PMS for this failure. The random failure of individual signals is already accounted for in each system fault tree as needed.
The PMS requires the following cabinets:
* Engineered safety features actuation cabinet (ESFAC) cabinets
* Protection logic cabinets
* Integrated protection cabinets The actuation circuitry, boards, cards and software are not evaluated separately for the seismic margin analysis. These components are modeled as being part of the cabinets. The field signals are wired directly from the sensor, transmitter, switch, to the input / output termination boards. The reactor trip switchgear and reactor trip breakers are not required for the seismic n         [ W 85tifigt10 US8             h6                                                              March 17,1 55-35                             mvrawec55.wpr:ib 03:597

#      .y
: 55. S:ismic Mirgin Analysis margin analysis because failure of ac power is assumed, and the loss of power will allow the             i rods to drop.
EQ-DC                          Failure of the Class lE 125Vdc control power and the 120Vac uninterruptible power supply (UPS) due to a seismic event.
Figure 55-25 shows the fault tree EQ-DC for this failure. The random failure of de power is accounted for in each of the                i system fault trees.                                                       l A block diagram for the Class IE de system that is relevant for the seismic margin analysis is shown in Figure 55-26.
EQ-DC for power to the instrumentation and control circuits is needed as a support system                ,
for PMS. EQ-DC is not shown in the EQ-PMS fault tree since it is modeled in the system                   i fault trees with EQ-PMS when it is needed.                                                               i l
The switchgear for the four safety-related 125Vdc switchgear buses (in the Auxiliary Building) supply the integrated protection and control system and plant protection equipment. The 125Vdc Class 1E switchboards supply power for the 120Vac distribution system,125 de main                ,
distribution system (for reactor trip switchgear, air-operated solenoid valves, and reactor              I coolant pump trip switchgear), and the motor control centers which supply the de motor-                  i operated valve loads. For the seismic evaluation, it is assumed that ac power is not available.
Therefore, the battery chargers are modeled as being unavailable so that de power is only                l supplied by the batteries. 125Vdc requires:
l
             =       Batteries a        125Vdc switchboards                                                                            I a        125Vdc distribution panels                                                                     l
             =       Motor control centers
* Inverters (120Vac)
* 120Vac distribution panels The de power system is modeled as also requiring:
* Cables (and cable trays)
             -       Transfer switches
             -       Battery racks 55.3.6       Seismic Event Core Damage Sequence Evaluation Once the seismic event trees are created and a HCLPF is estimated for each event tree top event, the event tree core damage sequences can be evaluated.
tar h 17,1997                                                          '           W Westinghouse mvrassec55 wpt:ib 03:597                             55-36

E=     x:i        ;
                                                                                                               =
: 55. Seismic M rgin Analysis                                                                                         5 (mm)           The seismic event trees are quantified using the min-rnax approach (discussed in subsection 55.3.1). Each event tree sequence leading to a core damage end state is evaluated.
The results are given in subsection 55.4.4.
The list of scismically induced core damage sequences modeled by event trees is summarized below. SYS-XXX refers to failure of system XXX; DEL-YYY refers to success of system YYY.
I    EQIEV STRUC 2    EQlEV-R VF A 3    EQ E V.110CA  DEL EQ AC2AB  BSIZE-LARGE  DEL-EQXIW2A  SYS EQRECIR 4    EQlEV-110CA   DEL-EQAC2AB   B51ZE-LARGE  SYS EQXIW2A 5    EQlEV LLOCA   DEL-EQAC2AB   B5tZE        DEL-EQXCIC   DEL EQX:W2A SYS EQRECIR 6    EQ-LEV 110CA  DEL-EQAC2AB   BS!ZE        DEL-EQXCIC   SYS-EQXtW24 1    EQ IEV-LLOCA  DEL EQAC2AB   B SIZE       SY5EQXCic    DEL EQX ADMA DEL-EQXfw2A      SYS-EQRECIR 8    EQ-IE V-LLOCA DEL-EQAC2AB   B 5tZE       SYS EQXCIC   DEL-EQ XADMA 5YS-EQXiW2A 9    EQIEV LLOCA   DEL-EQAC2AB   BSIZE        SYS EQ XCIC  5YS-EQXADMA lo  EQIEV LLOCA    SY5-EQAC2AB 11  EQ IEV-5LOCA  DEL-EQCM25L   DEL-EQ ADA   DEL-EQIW2AB  SYS EQREClR 12  EQlEV-5LOCA    DEL EQCM25L  DEL-EQADA    SYS EQlW2AB
(                  13  EQ LEV.5LOCA   DEL-EQ-CM25L SYS EQADA
 %/
14  EQIEV SLOCA    SYS EQCM25L 15  EQIEV-ATW5     DELEQPRHR    DEL-EQPRESU  del EQ-CMOSL DEL EQADA     DEL-EQIW 2AB     SYS-EQRECIR 16  EQIEV ATWS     DEL-EQPRHR   DEL-EQPRESU  DEL-EQCM25L  DEL-EQADA     5YS-EQlW2AB 17  EQ IEV-ATW5    DEL EQPRHS   DEL-EQPRESU  DEL EQCM25L SYS EQADA IS  EQ-LEV-ATW5    DEL EQPRHR   DEL-EQPRESU  SY5-EQCM2SL 19 EQ TEV ATW5    DEL E.QPRHR  SYS FQPRESU 20  EQIEV ATW5     SYS EQPRHR in addition, the LOSP core damage sequences for the 0.09g level earthquake are evaluated in the focused PRA. The LOSP event is also evaluated at the review level earthquake,0.50g.
55.3.7     Containment Performance Model The event tree models of subsection 55.3.4 identify core damage sequences. In this subsection, a containment response model evaluates the large fission product release.
(-
[ Westingh00Se                      6                                                          March 17,199 55-37                                m:\ Pra\sec55 wpf.lb-031597

l W
  =-
        =W
\        =3-
: 55. Seismic Mirgin Analysis For containment performance evaluation the following model is considered (refer to the event O
tree in Figure 55-27):
: 1. Failure of Containment Structure (CONT-STRUC):
The structural failures associated with containment are already modeled in seismically induced initiating event EQ-STRUC and are assigned to a large release category. This failure mode is associated with the initiating event category EQ-STRUC, where the containment structure failures are addressed.
: 2. Containment Isolation (EQ-XCIC):
A HCLPF for containment isolation failure is generated and each core damage sequence is further examined with respect to large release due to failure of containment isolation.
: 3. Containment Heat Removal (EQ-PCC):                                                                l A HCLPF for containment heat removal by passive containment cooling is generated                  1 and each core damage sequence is further examined with respect to large release due               '
to failure of containment heat removal.
: 4. Other Containment Issues (EQ-OTHER):
For other containment safeguards requiring either operator action, such as post-core-damage ADS actuation, and nonsafety-related systems, such as hydrogen ignitors, the sequence is examined to determine if the nr.ture of the sequence already leads to a large release due to vessel failure or hydrogen detonations. If not, it is still possible to obtain mixed cutsets with combinations of random failures; but these kind of failures are not further pursued since they do not contribute to the plant HCLPF.
The event tree depicting the containment evaluation model is shown in Figure 55-27.
The top events are evaluated in subsection 55.4.6.
55.4        Calculation of Sequence and Plant HCLPF This section presents the seismic margin analysis calculations based on the model developed in Section 55.3.
The HCLPFs for structures and components modeled in the seismic fault trees are reponed in subsection 55.4.1. The initiating event HCLPFs are calculated in subsection 55.4.2. The system HCLPFs are calculated in subsection 55.4.3. The sequence HCLPS and the plant HCLPF are calculated in subsections 55.4.4 and 55.4.5, respectively. Finally, the containment response evaluation and the large fission product release HCLPF are given in subsection 55.4.6.
far h 17,1997                                                             '            W WestlIlgh0US8 mww 55 wpr.ib:031597                                55-38
: 55. Seismic Mirgin Analysis
                                                                                                             ?         ~
O N.}
The analysis demonstrates that all components required to maintain the plant in a safe stable state are expected to function following a seismic event of 0.5g acceleration.
55.4.1     HCLPFs for Basic Events The HCLPF values for various AP600 structures and components are calculated and are given in Table 55-1. The basic events defined in the SMA model for seismic failures are assigned their own HCLPF values, as shown in Table 55-3. These HCLPF values are taken from Table 55-1.
55.4.2      Calculation of Initiating Event HCLPFs initiating event HCLPFs are calculated by assigning the fragility values from Table 55-3 to the seismically induced failures modeled in subsection 55.3.3 for initiating events. The results of these calculations are given in Tables 55-4 through 55-8. EQ-LEV-LOSP is already assigned a HCLPF 0.09g, representing the failure of ceramic insulators. The initiating event HCLPFs are summarized below:
Initiating Event                        HCLPF                   Dominated by EQ-IEV-STRUC                            0.58g                   Shield Building roof co!! apse EQ-LEV-RVFA                             0.50g                   Fuel in the reactor vessel EQ-IEV-LLOCA                            0.81g                   Multiple RCS piping failures
/\_)\             EQ-IEV-SLOCA                            0.81 g                  RCS instrumentation \ piping (EQ-SGTR                          0.64g                   SG tube failure)
(EQ-SLB                           0.81g                   Feed or steam line piping)
EQ-IEV-ATWS                             0.50g                   Core assembly failure EQ-LEV-LOSP                             0.09g                   Ceramic insulator failure When the min-max method is used, the HCLPF of seismic sequences resulting from an initiating event cannot be less than the initiating event HCLPF since it appears in every cutset.
Thus, the plant HCLPF will be determined by the lowest of the HCLPFs listed above. Since the EQ-RVFA event is postulated to lead to core damage and large release, the plant HCLPF can be determined at this point to be 0.50g.
Essentially, the plant HCLPF is determined at this point, because the plant HCLPF cannot be smaller than the initiating event HCLP' However, the other mitigatible events, such as LLOCA, SLOCA,(which includes SGTR and SLB), and ATWS are further analyzed to seek further SMA insights.
55.4.3      Calculation of System Fault Tree HCLPFs System HCLPFs are calculated by assigning the component fragility values from Table 55-3 to each seismically induced failure modeled for the systems. The results are summarized in Table 55-9. This table shows system HCLPF values in two columns: one excluding support p
V                                    ENEL Draft T Westinghouse               =h                                                            March 17,1997 55-39                              m:sprassec55 wpr.id:03: 597

u-     "5 l
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin Antlysis    l
   ^
l system (such as PMS actuation and de power) contributions; and the second one including 9:i support system contributions.
The HCLPF calculation for each system is shown in Attachment 55A.
55.4.4       Calculation of Sequence HCLPFs The sequence HCLPFs and the mixed cutset results are provided in this subsection.              l 55.4.4.1     Sequence HCLPFs The sequence HCLPFs are calculated for each of the core damage sequences defined by the event tree models in subsection 55.3.4. The core damage sequence HCLPFs are given in Table 55-10. The calculations are given in Attachment 55B.
Note that SGTR sequences are assigned their own sequence names, as discussed in                l Table 55-7. This is done because:                                                              ;
: 1. The SGTR initiating event HCLPF is 0.65g, which is smaller than the SLOCA and SLB initiating event HCLPFs                                                                4 1
: 2.      Core damage from an SGTR potentially may result in large fission product release because the containment may be bypassed through the break.
SLB event sequences are also shown separately, although they are conservatively assigned the same HCLPFs as SLOCA sequences.
The seismic sequence HCLPFs are shown on their event tree pictures in Figures 55-28 through 55-35. The event tree node HCLPFs (system HCLPFs) are also shown. The event tree evaluation of the LOSP at the 0.09g level is not shown because it has no purely seismic cutsets as discussed earlier. The mixed cutsets for the LOSP evaluation at 0.09g are shown in Attachment 55B.
The LOSP evaluation at 0.50g produces cutsets which are essentially the same as the SLOCA cutsets with the addition of the PRHR. The evaluation of the LOSP at the 0.50 level provides no new insights, or cutsets as is obvious from the inspection of the SLOCA cutsets.
The dominant seismic sequences and their dominant contributors are listed below:
: 1.      egrvf-02      0.50g A seismically induced LOCA beyond ECCS capacity event occurs; core damage and large fission product release are assumed.
tar h 17,1997                                                                     W W85tiligh00S8 mTrn\sec55 wpf:Ib 031597                            55-40

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: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin An:. lysis
                                                                                                            ~
I N.)
The dominant contributors to the egrvf-02 sequence are:
1      EQ-RV-FUEL                      0.50g 2      EQ-SG-FAILS                     0.65g 3      EQ-PRZR-FAILS                   0.67g
: 2. eqatw-04     0.51g A seismically induced ATWS event occurs; PRHR, RCS pressure relief, CMT system > are successful; ADS fails; core damage is assumed.
The dominant contributors to the eqatw-04 sequence are:
1     HCLPF d 0.51g:
EQ-IEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-TRSFSWITCH           0.51g EQ-LEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-DCDISPANEL           0.51g EQ-IEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-DC-SWBRD             0.51g EQ-LEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-ACDISPANEL           0.51g 2      HCLPF of 0.54g:
EQ-LEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-CABLETRAY            0.54g k)                   3      HCLPF of 0.65g:
EQ-IEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-INVERTER             0.65g
: 3. eqstr-02     0.58g A seismically induced gross structural collapse event occurs:
core damage and large fission product release are assumed:
The dominant contributors to the eqstr-02 sequence are:
1    EQ-AUX-BUILDING                                         0.58g 2     EQ-SHDBLD-ROOF /PCC-TANK                                0.58g 3     CONT-INTER-STRUC/IRWST-TANK                             0.60g
: 4. egatw-07     0.60g A seismically induced ATWS event occurs: PRHR system fails; core damage is assumed.
The dominant contributors to the eqatw-07 sequence are:
1     HCLPF of 0.60g:
EQ-IEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]     EQ-IRWST-TANK          0.60g n
3 Westingh00Se                  6                                                    March 17,1 7 55-41                            mVrasec55 wpr::b:031597

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         "                                                                       55. Siismic Mrrgin Analysis Note this is conservative since IRWST failure is already accounted for in sequence O
eqstr-02.
: 5.       eqisp-04       0.60g A seismically induced LOSP occurs: IRWST injection fails; core damage is assumed.
(This is for the LOSP event evaluated at the 0.50g level.)                              !
I The dorninant contributors to the eglsp-04 sequence are:                                i 1      HCLPF of 0.60g:
EQ-IRWST-TANK 0.60g [AND] EQ-TRSFSWITCH                        0.51g EQ-IRWST-TANK 0.60g [AND] EQ-DCDISPANEL                        0.51g                    l EQ-IRWST-TANK 0.60g [AND] EQ-DC-SWBRD                          0.51g EQ-IRWST-TANK 0.60g [AND] EQ-ACDISPANEL                        0.51 g Note this is conservative since IRWST failure is already accounted for in sequence eqstr-02.
: 6.      eqatw-05        0.63g A seismically induced ATWS event occurs; PRHR and RCS             l pressure relief are successful; CMT fails; core damage is assumed.
The dominant contributors to the egatw-05 sequence is:
1     HCLPF of 0.63g:
EQ-IEV-ATWS 0.50g            [AND]    EQ-CMT-TANKS            0.63g 55.4.4.2       Mixed Cutsets An examination of the mixed cutsets for the seismic sequences given in Attachment 55B shows that only a handful of mixed cutsets with a probability of 1.0E-03 or larger exist for events evaluated at the review level earthquake. This is a favorable conclusion for the AP600 design. The cutsets with a probability of 1.0E-03 or larger are presented in Table 55-11.
These cutsets are caused by the following random failures (basic events):
Probability Sequence Basic Event 0.327          eqatw-% Plant is in unfavorable exposure time (UET) 1.35E-03 eqatw-06 No UET: pressurizer safety valves fail to open 1.lE-03        eqslo-04    Common cause failure of 4 out of 4 ADS Stage 2 and 3 MOVs far h 17,1997                                                            '           W W65tingh0USB m:\pra\sec55.wpf.lb:031597                             55-42

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: 55. Seismic hl:rgin Analysis                                                                                   ~
p 1.lE-03       eqatw-04 Common cause failure of 4 out of 4 ADS Stage 2 and 3 MOVs There is no credit for operator actions in the mixed cutsets. As discussed earlier, the seismic margins models are based upon the focused PRA models. The operator actions are set to 1.0 (100% failure) in the focused PRA models, which are used in the seismic margin analysis.
The operator actions (at a failure probability of 1.0) do not appear in the seismic margin mixed cutsets for events evaluated at the 0.50g level, because they have been removed to              j simplify the presentation. This is obvious from inspection of the focused PRA models and the seismic margin analysis models.
The cutsets are presented in Table 55-11. Since the LOSP event is evaluated at 0.09g level, it contains only mixed cutsets, and credit is taken for operator actions. The mixed cutsets for dominant LOSP sequences are given in Attachment SSB. The dominant LOSP sequences for the 0.09g level are discussed in the focused PRA.
The total probability of mixed cutsets for LOSP event is 9.0E-08. This is the conditional probability that core damage will occur given that a seismically induced LOSP event occurs at or below the SSE (0.30g). During this event, all nonsafety systems are also assumed to be unavailable which implies that a station blackout event occurs.              Table 55B-43 in Attachment SSB contains the dominant mixed cutsets for the LOSP event. The mixed cutset with the highest probability includes the common cause failure of the PRHR AOVs and common cause failure of the Class IE batteries. This cutset probability is 4.51E-09.
i 55.4.5       Calculation of Plant IICLPF The plant HCLPF for internal events leading to core damage is calculated as the minimum of the sequence HCLPFs given in Table 55-10.
The plant HCLPF is 0.50g and is caused by the EQ-RVFA event, which is postulated to lead to a large release. This HCLPF value is caused by the sequence EQRVF-02 in the seismically induced reactor vessel failure event tree. The failure mode for this event is the failure of the fuel, with a HCLPF value of 0.50g.
The second dominant sequence HCLPF, with a HCLPF of 0.58g,is the failure of the shield building roof, leading to a gross structural failure event with postulated core damage.
55.4.6      Large Release IICLPF In this subsection, the HCLPF values for the containment nodes in Figure 55-27 are calculated, and the core damage sequences are examined to assign large release HCLPF values.
Oi O                                                                                                             Draft T Westinghouse hw                   55-43 March 17,1997 m\ Pra\sec55xpf:lb.031597

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: 55. Szismic Mzrgin Analysis 55.4.6.1         Containment Safeguards HCLPFs O
CONT-STRUC - Structural Containment Failure                                                      i The failure modes for this event are already modeled in the EQ-STRUC initiating event. The       )
structural containment failure modes are:
1 EQ-SHDBLD-WALL                Shield Building Wall            0.52g                            !
EQ-SHDBLD-ROOF                Shield Building Roof            0.58g EQ-CV-OVERT                   Containment Vessel              0.98g Overtuming EQ-CV-BUCKLE                 Containment Vessel              0.70g                            l Buckling                                                         l EQ-CV-INTER                  Interior Containment            0.60g                            i 1
EQ-BAF-SUPP                  Containment Baffle               1.50g Support Failure l
Thus the HCLPF for containment failure CONT-STRUC is 0.58g. This failure would lead to           l a large fission product release, following a core damage event. The failure is driven by the     l Shield Building wall or roof that is assumed to fail the containment structure.
,                  EQ-XCIC - Containment Isolation Failure Containment isolation failure is already modeled and its HCLPF is calculated in subsection 55.4.3 as 0.81g. Containment isolation failure coupled with seismically induced core damage is assigned a large release consequence. If the core damage sequence involves the failure of de power, then the HCLPF of containment isolation failure is also determined by the de power failure, with a HCLPF of 0.51g. The containment isolation is discussed further in the sensitivity analysis section, subsection 55.5.
EQ-PCC - Containment Cooling Failure The containment coohng system is a passive, safety-related system designed to the Seismic Category I criteria; it has water inventory to last for a 72-hour period. The system consists of the following components:
PCCWST                Water storage tank PCS-PL-V001 A PCS-PL-V001 B        Redundant set of AOVs in Room 12701 larch 17,1997                                                             .             W Westinghouse m:\pra\sec55 wpf Ib 031597                             55-44

MEMEE
: 55. Siismic Mrrain Analysis n_
PCS-PL-V002A PCS-PL-V002B          Normally open MOVs in Room 12701.
In the 0.50g seismic event, the AOVs fail open upon loss of air following the loss of offsite power, allowing the containment cooling function to start immediately. The HCLPF for the valves listed above is 0.81g.
The seismic failure of the containment cooling is dominated by the passive containment                      !
cooling tank frhe, which is assigned the Shield Building roof failure HCLPF value of 0.58g.                 j If this failure occurs following a core damage event, the decay heat deposited into the                     l containment is assumed to remain there and not be removed by the passive containment                       l cooling system. This failure is coupled with seismically induced core damage and is assigned               i to a large release category.                                                                                ;
The above success criteria is conservative, and can be relaxed further, since the PRA success fi criteria indicate that air cooling alone is sufficient for containment cooling. Since the conservative success criteria do not affect the plant HCLPF and the results, they are retained              l in the SMA.
                                                                                                                        ]
EQ-OTHER - Other Containment Issues                                                                         f i
Hydrogen Ignitor Failure                                                                           i i                                                                                                                         i Since the hydrogen ignitors are nonsafety-related, no credit from the baseline PRA is               !
taken for them in seismic events. The remaining hydrogen-related containment event                  l tree nodes are phenomena-related and only have probabilities, without any equipment failure. These event tree nodes do not affect the plant HCLPF value and are not                      I considered further in the SMA containment evaluation.
Post-Core Depressunzation j
1 The possibility of manual depressurization by ADS in high pressure RCS core damage                  i scenarios is not credited in the SMA model.                                                          I i
55.4.6.2    Evaluation of Sequences The core damage sequences, for which the HCLPFs are calculated in subsection 55.4.4..are evaluated with containment failure modes to calculate large release frequency HCLPFs. This evaluation is summarized in Table 55-12. In this table, the g values in columns 2,3, and 4 for each core damage sequence, give the large release frequency HCLPF for that sequence.
These HCLPFs are the larger of the two fragility values corresponding to the sequence core damage HCLPF, and the HCLPF for the containment failure mode in question. For example, for the low pressure core damage sequence EQLLO-02 (where sump recirculation has failed following a large LOCA event), the two large release paths with containment isolation failure and containment cooling failure are possible. These sequences have the HCLPF values of YO                                   6                                                  March 17,1997 mvawc55.wpr.ib:03:597 55-45

E'      "j
         ~
: 55. S'ismic M:rgin Analysis max (0.96g,0.81g) = 0.96g (for containment isolation failure AND core damage),
and max (0.96g,0.53g) = 0.96g (for containment cooling failure AND core damage).
Note that ibc HCLPF for either mode of seismically induced containment failure in this example is actually lower than the HCLPF for the core damage leading to large LOCA and loss of sump recirculation.
Plant Large Release HCLPF The last two rows of Table 55-12 provide the plant large release HCLPF for containment failure categories, and the overall plant large release HCLPF. The HCLPF for containment failure categories is calculated by taking the minimum HCLPF in each category (minimum of sequence HCLPFs in each of the columns 2,3, and 4). Then the minimum value of these category HCLPFs is taken as the overall plant large release HCLPF value.
The plant core damage and large release HCLPFs are the same, namely 0.50g. They come from the same sequence, EQRVF-02, seismically induced reactor vessel failure, which is assigned to a large fission product release category. This HCLPF value is driven by the failure of the fuel at 0.50g.
For the SGTR event, EQSGT-NN (NN=02,03,04,05, like in the corresponding SLOCA core damage sequences) sequences are shown explicitly in the table to indicate that the SGTR event treated in the EQ-SLOCA category can lead to containment bypass due to the nature of the event. The SGTR with core damage leads to a potential containment bypass through a failed steam generator tube and the secondary safety / relief valves.
55.5          Sensitivity Analyses Sensitivity analyses are performed to examine various aspects of the SMA model inputs and assumptions. These sensitivity analyses are presented in the following sections.
55.5.1       Robust fuel and core assembly 55.5.2       Credit for operator actions 55.5.3       Less credit for operator actions in LOSP event 55.5.4       72-hour mission time 55.5.5       Containment isolation - smaller size valves 55.5.6       Steam generator tube rupture success criteria 55.5.7       Steam line break success criteria 55.5.8       Seismic interaction between Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings far h 17,1997                                                           '           W Westirighotise m Vra\sec55.wpf.Ib:031597                            55-46
: 55. Seismic Mirgin Analysis v
Each of these cases are analyzed or discussed in the following subsections. A summary of the results of each sensitivity analysis is given below.
Sensitivity Case                                    Summary of Results 1    Robust fuel and core assembly        If the fuel and core assembly HCLPFs are more robust (1.0g), then the EQ-RVFA and EQ-ATWS events are affected. The plant HCLPF becomes 0.58g, from the eqstr-02 sequence, caused by the failure of the Shield Building roof.
2 Credit for operator actions             If credit is taken for operator actions, the plant HCLPF is not affected. Only some mixed cutsets are affected. The HCLPF associated with operator actions is 0.51g, dominated by the failure of Class lE de power.
3    Less credit for operator actions     if the operator failure probabilities for the seismically in LOSP event                         induced LOSP event evaluated at 0.09g are increased by a factor of 10, the conditional probability of core damage increases by a factor of 2.6, from 8.8E-08 to 2.3E-07.
Both the resulting conditional probability and the magnitude of the increase are small.
rx
(')             4    72-hour mission time                  An evaluation of a 72-hour mission time following a seismic event shows that neither the success criteria, nor the plant HCLPF results and insights are affected by a change from 24- to 72-hour mission time.
5     Containment isolation - smaller      The containment isolation valves are systematically size valves                          considered and the containment isolation HCLPF is shown to be the same as that calculated for the base case (0.81g) where the PRA model is used.
6     Steam generator tube rupture          A less conservative SGTR success path including isolation, success t .iteria                     PRHR, and CMT success is investigated. This success path did not affect the SGTR event HCLPF.
7    Steam line break success              A less conservative SLB success path including isolation, criteria                              PRHR, and CMT success is investigated. This success path did not affect the SLB event HCLPF.
8    Seismic interaction between           impact of Turbine Building collapse on the Auxiliary Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings       Building is investigated. No new failure sequence has been found. The plant HCLPF is not affected.
f~s f    )
V                                                                                                              Draft T Westinghouse               MW                   55-47 March 17,1997 mvrawc55 wpr.ib 031797

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         '                                                                       55. Simic M1rgin An lysis 55.5.1         Robust Fuel and Core Assembly O
The plant HCLPF is determined by the failure of fuel in the reactor vessel. with a HCLPF value of 0.50g. The vessel failure is assumed to lead to an uncoolable core geometry, followed by core damage. A large fission product release is also assumed to occur. This sensitivity analysis is performed to determine what the dominant component / structure for plant HCLPF would be if the fuel HCLPF were larger. For this sensitivity, the fuel HCLPF is set equal to 1.0g (larger than most of the other components and structures).
Since the fuel and core assembly failures originally have the same HCLPF value of 0.50g and may have related failure modes, the core assembly HCLPF is also assumed to be more robust in this case, i.e.,1.0g. This assumption affects only the ATWS event.
The HCLPF of two initiating events are changed to account for the assumption of more robust fuel:
EQ-IEV-RVFA = 0.65g and EQ-IEV-ATWS = 0.70g With these changes, the plant HCLPF is recalculated.
Sequence         Seq. HCLPF eqstr-02         0.58g egrvf-02         0.65g eglio-02         0.96g eqilo-03         0.81g eqilo-05         0.96g eqilo-06         0.81g eqilo-08         0.96g eqilo-09         0.81g eqilo-10         0.81g eqilo-ll         0.81g eqslo-02         0.96g eqslo-03         0.81g eqslo-04         0.81g eqslo-05         0.81g eqsgt-02          0.96g far h 17,1997                                                              '          W W85tingh00S8 m:\pra\sec55 wpf Ib:031597                             55-48

g=      m5
: 55. Seismic M;rgin Analysis t
(. i V
eqsgt-03       0.65g eqsgt-04       0.65g eqsgt-05       0.65g eqatw-02       0.96g eqatw-03       0.96g eqatw-G4       0.70g eqatw-05       0.70g egatw-06       0.81g egatw-07       0.70g The sequences egrvf-02, egatw-04, eqatw-05, and eqatw-07 marked by an asterisk are affected by this change.
With this change the plant HCLPF is 0.58g from the eqstr-02 sequence. This failure is dominated by the Shield Building failure, in the gross structural failure event. The Shield Building HCLPF was also assigned to the Auxiliary Building, the PCS tank, and the Shield Building walls.
The second contributor in the above sequences is the LOCA beyond ECCS capacity event, the egrvf-02 sequence with 0.65g. This failure is dominated by failure of the steam generators.
O 4
55.5.2      Credit for Operator Actions in the SMA model, no credit is taken for operator actions in the events evaluated at the 0.50g review level. Also no credit is taken for operator actions for the containment response.
However, operator actions are considered for the LOSP event evaluated at less than the 0.50g level (e.g., the ceramic insulators fail and cause the LOSP event at 0.09g).
If credit were to be taken for operator actions, the plant HCLPF would not be affected, but the mixed cutset frequencies would be lowered. This is discussed below for each initiating event modeled.
EQ-STRUC Due to the nature of this event, no credit could be taken for the operators in the core damage frequency and containment response models.
EQ-RVFA Due to the nature of this event, no credit could be taken for the operators in the core damage frequency model. However, it is possible for the operator to flood the reactor cavity to keep the reactor vessel covered in water. If the vessel failure did not occur in the lower pan of the reactor vessel and the core debris is not relocated to the reactor cavity, the success of this O                                   ENEL                                                                      Draft  '
T Westinghouse               uh                                                           March 17,1997 55 49                             m@ratsec55 wpt:1b:03i597 l
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: 55. S:ismic Mirgin Analysis
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5 l
operator action, coupled with the success of passive containment cooling heat removal, would O '
prevent containment failure and large release. This action is already defined in the AP600          )
PRA model and is proceduralized. The failure probability for this event is calculated in the         l AP600 PRA as 3.4E-03, including a high stress factor. Thus, if a seismic event were to occur        I I
that failed the reactor vessel, and the valves for containment sump flooding did not fail, the operators would be able to avert core damage with the probability of 3.4E-03. This would reduce the core damage frequency by several orders of magnitude if the operator action were to be considered in the seismic analysis model.
EQ-LLOCA This event is assumed to occur such that operator actions are not likely to succeed.                l l
EQ-SLOCA (includes SGTR and SLB)                                                                    ;
Currently the SMA model for SLOCA (egslo-05 sequence) assumes that the failure of the CMT results in core damage, because the failure of the CMT prevents the automatic actuation of the ADS. This is conservative since, if the CMTs fail to inject due to CMT component failures, but PMS and de power are available, an operator action to manually actuate ADS            l may be credited. The operator action for this is already modeled as LPM-MAN 01 +
ADN-MAN 01 (diagnosis and action for manual ADS actuation) with a total failure probability of 4.3E-03 (a high stress level is assumed).
Since the dominant mixed cutsets of sequence eqslo-05 contain exclusively CMT component failures, this credit for a manual ADS actuation would significantly (by several orders of magnitude) reduce the mixed cutset frequency total. However, this would not affect the plant HCLPF.
1 Similarly, no credit is taken for manual operator actuation of the sump recirculation, if the IRWST level indicator fails (sequence eqlsp-02). An operator action to open the recirculation valves by procedure is already modeled in AP600 PRA (REN-MAN 02) with a conservative failure probability of 0.01, if credit is taken for this action, the first dominant mixed cutset for the sequence eqslo-02 (probability of 4.SE-04) will be reduced by a factor of 0.01.
However, the next cutsets (with probability of E-05) will not be affected since they contain common cause failures of recirculation valves. Thus, the failure to achieve containment sump recirculation would be approximately a factor of 10 smaller if the operator action were to be considered.
EQ-ATWS in ATWS event, the same operator actions discussed for SLOCA can be credited for egatw 05 (CMT failure), and eqatw-02 (sump recirculation failure). These will affect the mixed cutsets, but not the plant HCLPF.
tar h 17,1997                                                                <            W Westinghouse m:Vra\sec55 wpf Ib.031597                              55-50

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,                                                                                                        = ==
l        55. S;ismic M::rgin Analysis                                                                            E l                                                                                                                   \
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  'V The ATWS success criteria defined for SMA only takes credit for the automatic actuation of the ADS (fault tree ADA). The AP600 PRA success criteria assume only manual actuation (fault tree ADW), although the actuation and depletion of the CMTs would actuate the ADS automatically. However, if the more conservative success criteria from the PRA were to be used, and no operator actions are credited in the SMA, then there would be no success path for ATWS in the SMA. In that case, the EQ-ATWS initiating event HCLPF becomes the core damage frequency sequence HCLPF. This is 0.50g from core assembly failure with intact fuel.
This does not affect the plant HCLPF value. It is the same as the failure that determines the plant HCLPF in the baseline analysis.
If the core assemblies are more robust (for example with a HCLPF of 1.0g), then the next contributor to the EQ-LEV-ATWS HCLPF would be the control drive mechanism failure with a HCLPF of 0.68g.
Seismic Failures Associated with Operator Action Success i                    The operator actions discussed above would be viable, if no seismic failures or random         ,
failures occur to render the equipment needed to diagnose and implement an operator action.
In this section, a seismic failure model is constmeted and the HCLPF associated with the equipment needed to diagnose and implement operator actions is briefly discussed.
O                The following seismic failures are modeled:
: 1. Seismically induced failure of control room components:
EQ-MCR-STATION (HCLPF = 0.97g)                      MCR Operator Station Fails        ;
EQ-QDPS-DISPLAY (HCLPF = 1.98g)                     QDPS or MCR Displays Fail         )
EQ-MCR-SWITCH (HCLPF = 0.97g)                       MCR Switch Station Fails EQ-QDPS-CAB (HCLPF = 1.94g)                         QDPS Cabinet Fails EQ-MPLEX-CAB (HCLPF = 0.74g)                        Multiplex Cabinets Fail i
HCLPF = 0.74g (minimum of the above HCLPFs).                                          !
l
: 2.      PMS (HCLPF= 0.74g)                                                                    l l
: 3.      de power (HCLPF = 0.51g).
Thus, the HCLPF associated with equipment to suppon an operator action is 0.51g, driven by    j l
the failure of the de power.
l                                                                                                                   ,
If the de power is not considered, the HCLPF becomes 0.74g, driven by the failure of the     I multiplex cabinets.
1 f
q I
3 W85tiligh00S8                      6                                                 March 17,1 l                                                             55-51                           mwssec55-pr.ib:03:597 l

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: 55. Siismic M rgin Analysis     l i
1 Conclusion O
From this sensitivity it is concluded that the plant HCLPF is still 0.50g when operator actions are considered. The HCLPF of the fuel determines the plant HCLPF in this sensitivity also.
The effect of the inclusion of operator actions into the seismic margins models would be to make the mixed cutsets probabilities lower than they are in the base case analysis. That is, if the ability of the operators to provide backups to the automatic mitigations functions is not     i ignored in the models, as is done for the baseline analysis, the probability of core damage and     l a large release due to a seismic event will be smaller.
1 55.5.3     Less Credit for Operator Actions in LOSP Event at R09g The LOSP event evaluated at 0.09g in the model consists of only mixed cutsets, each one containing a seismically initiated LOSP event (EQ-IEV-LOSP) with a HCLPF value of 0.09g.
No credit is taken for nonsafety-related systems. Operator actions are considered at the 0.09g level. The conditional core damage probability given a seismically induced LOSP is the sum of the probabilities of all mixed cutsets, namely 8.8E-08. This is a very low probability, indicating that the plant is robust against the seismically induced LOSP event, even with all nonsafety related systems assumed to be inoperable.
For this sensitivity analysis, the operator action failure probabilities for the LOSP are increased by a factor of 10 to calculate the corresponding conditional core damage probability.    '
Thus, the sensitivity of the core damage probability to operator actions is examined for the LOSP event.
The operator actions that are changed and their new probabilities are given below. All operator actions are performed in the control room and they are assigned high stress factors.
ADN-MAN 01                    3.0E-02 ALL-IND-FAIL                  1.0E-02         (This basic event is NOT an operator action, but it represents a lower limit for the operator actions which require its success.)
LPM-MAN 01                     1.3E-02 LPM-MAN 02                    3.3E-02 REN-MAN 02                    2.0E-02 REN-MAN 04                     1.0E-01 REN-MAN 04C                    1.0.
The result of the conditional core damage probability quantification is 2.3E-07. Thus, the core damage probability increases by a factor of 2.6.         Both this increase and the resulting probability are small. Thus, the LOSP model is not very sensitive to an increase of a factor of 10 in operator action failure probabilities.
The dominant mixed cutsets for this sensitivity case are given in Table 55-13.
                                                                           '           W Westinghouse far h 17,1997 mynssus5.wptib:03:597                               55-52

:== ==           :
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis                                                                                   ~
O 55.5.4     72-Hour Mission Time l
The mission time for the focused PRA is used for the SMA models. Thus the SMA models                       -
have a 24-hour mission time, f
As suggested in EPRI document NP-6041 (Reference 55-11), the impact of a 72-hour mission                   i time on SMA success paths should be examined.                                                              :
The following aspects of a change from a 24-hour to a 72-hour mission time are examined:
: l. Does the mitigating system success still hold for 72 hours (e.g., running out of                   ;
inventory, power, etc.)?
: 2. Does the 72-hour time frame introduce new component actuations?                                      l
: 3. Does the 72-hour time frame introduce new operator actions 7
: 4.      Does the 72-hour time frame require new mitigating systems?
l
: 5. Does the 72-hour time frame increase the system or component failure probabihties appreciably to affect the mixed cutset probabilities?                                               ;
1 The first 4 items mentioned above may potentially impact the plant HCLPF. Item 5 would potentially affect only the mixed cutset probabilities, but not the plant HCLPF.                            i First, item 5 will be discussed in general terms.
In the AP600 PRA, there are threc 9 pes of basic event probabilities, which can be differentiated by the way they are calculated:
: 1. If a basic event probability is calculated as (A
* At), where At is the mission time (i.e.,
24 hours in the SMA model), then to change from 24 to 72 hours would increase the basic event probability by a factor of 3.
: 2.      If the At is a dormant time period (such as for quarterly tested components) plus the mission time, then the increase in the basic event probability will be small. This is because the dormant time period is usually much larger than the mission time (e.g.,                j 1080 hrs + 72 hrs versus 1080 hrs + 24 hrs). The change to 72 hours would result in an increase in the basic event probability by a factor of 1.04.
l
: 3.      Finally, the basic event probabilities for demand failures (such as valves opening or              i closing) would not be affected by the change in the mission time.                                   l A general property of the dominant core damage frequency and large release frequency cutsets               i is that they are driven by common cause failures. Thus, in a core damage frequency cutset
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: 55. Siismic M:rgin Analysis with three elements, the initiating event frequency and two common cause failures of different systems, the maximum increase in the cutset probability for a change to a 72-hour mission time would be a factor of 3
* 3, or 9. In general, the total increase in the core damage frequency or large release frequency is expected to be less than a factor of 9. This is supported by the calculations shown in Table 55-14.                                               l l
l             Thus, item #5 above would not introduce a large increase in the SMA mixed cutset                  ,
l probabilities by itself (less than one order of magnitude).
Each seismically induced initiating event will be evaluated for the 72-hour mission time.
Ecch of the three items above will be considered.
EQ-STRUCT l
This event is assumed to lead to core damage and large fission product release; thus it is not affected by the 72-hour mission time.
EQ-RVFA                                                                                           j This event is assumed to lead to core damage and large fission product release; thus it is not affected by the 72-hour mission time.
tiQ-LLOCA A large LOCA event progresses quickly and all the mitigating systems are expected to actuate within the first hour or two. Also, the following factors are relevant to the large LOCA event:
               =     The passive containraent cooling is designed to last at least 72 hours.
* The IRWST and sump recirculation are effective for 72 hours and more.
* Component actuations occur within the first hours of the event.
* No operator actions or new mitigation systems are needed in the 24- to 72-hour time interval.
* The Class IE de and UPS system (IDS) provides unintermptible power from the Class 1E batteries for a period of 72 hours to the required safety-related loads. IDS consists of four independent divisions, each division having one 24-hour battery bank. In addition, divisions B and C each have one 72-hour battery bank. Thus, the 72-hour mission time power support is already designed into IDS.
                =     The numerical increase in the system failure probabilities due to the additional 48 hours is insignificant, since component actuations and common cause failures refer mostly to i
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: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis                                                                                 '
T J
the events occurring at the beginning of the mission time; this only leaves residual failure modes that are truly passive failures.                                              .
Thus, increasing the mission time to 72 hours in the SMA model would have no significant effect on the results of the EQ-LLOCA model.
EQ-SLOCA                                                                                            .
In seismically induced small LOCA events, credit is taken for CMT, ADS, IRWST injection, and recirculation functions. If the SLOCA event progressed quickly (e.g., reaching                  ,
recirculation within 24 hours), the same reasoning presented for the large LOCA event would apply. If the break flow is very small and the automatic ADS actuation is not reached by the low CMT level signal, the ADS is designed to actuate at approximately 22 hours into the             (
event, by a timer set upon LOSP. This would allow RCS depressurization and the IRWST                !
injection valves to open. At that point, a second 40-minute timer would start. Before the 23rd hour, the second timer will actuate two of the four squib valves on the containment            ,
recirculation paths (in the two paths with the check valves in series with the explosive valves).   ;
Thus, with a margin of 1+ hours before the 24-hour mission time, all mitigation functions modeled in SMA would be actuated and functional. The indicators would allow the operators to see the valve positions so that they may perform manual actuations, if the auto actuation fails. For example, in the case of the recirculation squib valves, if the automatic actuation       ,
fails, the operators have 1+ hours to manually actuate the same valves, or open the other two       l l
recirculation path explosive valves and MOVs.
Thus, in the SLOCA event, only in the cases where the RCS leak is very small, the additional failure modes of ADS actuation by a timer in 22 hours and recirculation path opening by the 23rd hour by a secur.d timer may be introduced. These failure modes do not contain a HCLPF not already considered in the SMA model (i.e., PMS and de power support systems are already included in the SMA). Moreover, the baseline 22 hours after the event allow for        ]
credible operator actions to be taken into account.                                                j I
Thus, the change to a 72-hour mission time will not make a significant impact on the results        I of the SMA EQ-SLOCA model.
The above discussion also applies to the SGTR and SLB events, which were bounded by the             I same success criteria as SLOCA.
EQ-ATWS in the seismically induced ATWS event, the same mitigating functions as in SLOCA are used.
Moreover, two additional functions are introduced: PRHR and RCS depressurization. PRHR actuation occurs immediately after the event and PRHR cooling is designed to last for              ;
72 hours. However, after the CMT injection, ADS actuation, and IRWST injection in the              i ATWS success path, PRHR is no longer needed for RCS cooling. Thus, the PRHR node in E MD388                            k,,,                                                   March 17,1 7 m3,mwc55 wpr.:b:03:597 55-55

5       k                                                                         55. S:ismic M rgin Analysis the EQ-ATWS event is not affected by the 72-hour mission time, since the PRHR is not O
needed after the ADS fourth stage actuation.
The RCS depressurization occurs within minutes after the ATWS initiating event; and it is not affected by an increase to the 72-hour mission time.
Thus, the ATWS event does not require any new success criteria, component actuations, operator actions, or new mitigating systems beyond the 24-hour mission time. A change to a mission time to 72 hours will not have any effect on the plant IICLPF for the SMA EQ-ATWS event.
EQ-LOSP This event contains the PRHR system as its first success path. If this path is not available, a secondary success path with the same success criteria as in the SLOCA exists.
The PRHR system actuates immediately after the LOSP event and is designed to provide RCS decay heat removal for 72 hours.
If the PRHR fails, the SLOCA success path with CMTs, ADS, IRWST injection, and recirculation is used. This success path is the same as SLOCA and was discussed earlier.
If the PRHR is successful, and no RCS leak exists, the operators will evaluate the plant conditions and the RCS ar.d IRWST inventories to decide whether to stop the ADS actuation           i timer before it occurs. If the operators do this, several hours of battery capacity are conserved to allow the actuation of the ADS later if needed. (Of course, the ADS actuation also allows        ,
IRWST injection and sump recirculation to occur.) PRHR would continue to provide RCS                I cooling if the ADS actuation timer was stopped.
If the PRiiR is successful, and the operators do not take action, the ADS actuates by a timer approximately 22 hours after the event occurs, followed by the opening of two recirculation paths in 40 minutes. This has been previously discussed.
Since the LOSP event occurs at 0.09g and contains mixed cutsets only, it does not affect the plant HCLPF. The effect of a 72-hour mission time on the probability of dominant cutsets is discussed in Table 55-14. This table shows that the expected increase in dominant mixed cutset probabilities for EQ-LOSP event is 12 percent when a 72-hour mission time is used.
55.5.5       Containment Isolation - Smaller Size Valves The PRA model of containment isolation screens out smaller size valves (less than 2 inches),
and also valves in closed systems (systems that do not communicate with the containment atmosphere) from further consideration for random failures. This screening reduces the number of valves to be modeled for containment isolation fault tree analysis. In the SMA far h 17,1997                                                                         W Westinghouse mvrawec55 wpr ib 031597                               55-56

E       =g
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis                                                                                  E model of contaMment isolation, the valves from the PRA model are used and a system HCLPF value of 0.81g (0.51g actuation failures are included) is obtained.
A seismic event, on the other hand, can fail multiple smaller containment isolation valves whos.:. HCLPF values are below the severity level of the seismic event. Such multiple valve failures together may be more imponant to the failure of the containment isolation than a l
larger isolation valve already modeled. This issue is investigated to see if the containment isolation system HCLPF already calculated using the larger size valves is valid when the seismically induced failure of multiple smaller valves and other closed system penetrations are also considered.
An examination of Table 55-1 for valves shows that the HCLPF range for the valve rooms is 0.96g to 0.81g. Thus,0.81g bounds the HCLPF that would be associated with containment penetration valve failures. This HCLPF turns out to be the same as the containment isolation HCLPF already calculated by the system analysis in Sections 55.3 and 55.4.
55.5.6       Steam Generator Tube Rupture Success Criteria in the focused PRA, the SGTR event tree model presents a success path for which no credit was taken in SMA models. This success path is:
* An SGTR event occurs Reactor is tnpped lV
   )
                   =      PRHR cooling is successful
                   =      CMT injection is successful
                   =      Faulted SG is automatically isolated in this success path, the break flow is terminated and initial RCS inventory loss is made up.
The decay heat would be removed via PRHR for at least a 72-hour period. Note that the offsite power and the other nonsafety systems are assumed to be unavailable.                         ,
The HCLPF values for the SGTR event, PRHR and CMTs have been shown to be 0.65g, I
0.60g, and 0.63g, respectively. For SG isolation, the following valves need to be closed:
* Steam generator power-operated relief valve (PORV) block valves SGS V027A and V027B
                    =      Main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) SGS V040A and V040B and bypass valves SGS V240A and SGS V240B
* Main feedwater (MFW) isolation valves SGS V057A and V057B
                    =      Steam generator blowdown isolation valves SGS V074A and V074B
                    .      Startup feedwater isolation valves SGS V067A and V067B n
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Er K_i
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin An . lysis The SG isolation HCLPF is calculated as:
MFW lsolation Fails SGS-PL-V057A/B                                0.81 g Startup FW Isolation Fails SGS-PL-V067A/B                         0.81g (normally closed)
SG Blowdown isolation Fails:
SGS-PL-V074A /B 12306                                    0.86g MSIV lsolation Fails:
Calculated in subsection 55.5.7                          0.81g Support Systems PMS and de power                                         0.51g Thus, the SG isolation HCLPF is 0.51g.
Combining the above system HCLPFs for failure of the success path, the result is 0.65g, driven by the initiating event, coupled with the failure of de power. The initiating event, coupled with the failure of de power, has already been discussed and does not affect the plant HCLPF, and does not provide a new insight.
SS.S.7       Steam L.ine Break Success Criteria The steam line break (SLB) event uses a conservative success path within the SMA EQ-SLOCA model. Some more realistic aspects of the SLB events are presented in this sensitivity along with their SMA implications.
: 1.      Some seismically induced SLB events may be automatically isolable. No credit is taken for SLB isolation in the SMA model. For the automatic isolation to be feasible the following must occur:
: a. The SLB must occur downstream of the MSIVs.
: b. No seismic failure of the MSIVs or their support systems occurs.
: c. No random failure of the MSIVs or their support systems occurs.
Condition (a) will occur in some of the seismically induced SLB events. The random failures. (condition b) are modeled in the focused PRA by system fault tree CIA. The failure probability calculated by this fault tree is 2.2E-03.
The valves that must close to isolate the steam line (since no credit is taken for the turbine isolation valves) include:
                      =     Main steam isolation valves SGS V(M0A and V040B
                      =     Main feedwater isolation valves SGS V057A and V057B
                      =     Steam generator PORV block valves SGS V027A and V027B tar h 17,1997                                                               '           W Westinghouse mDrabec55 wpf Ilv031597                              55-58

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: 55. Simic M:rgin Analysis 5         ::
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Also, the secondary side safety relief valves should not fail open by the seismic event.
The main steam line isolation, feedwater isolation, PORV block and relief valves are located in Rooms 12406 and 12404. These rooms have a HCLPF value of 0.81g.
A seismic failure of any one of these valves is assumed to fail the SLB isolatioi , with a HCLPF of 0.81g. Moreover, the failure cf the main steam line pressure transmitters also fails the closure of MSIVs, with a HCLFP value of 0.88g. Finally, failure of PMS or Class IE de power also fails the automatic actuation, with HCLPF values of 0.74g and 0.51g respectively.
Thus, the HCLPF value for SLB isolation is 0.81g, without the support systems; it becomes 0.51g if support systems are considered.
A successful SLB isolation reduces the possibility of a consequential SGTR event, following a large SLB.
: 2.      For an unisolated SLB, a success path with the PRHR system and the CMTs operational is def'med in the focused PRA, although this success path is not used in the SMA. If this path is used, then the HCLPF for the failure of this path would be:
Seismically induced SLB occurs:         HCLPF = 0.81g 7.s PRHR fails:                             HCLPF = 0.60g V)
(
CMTs fail:                              HCLPF = 0.63g I
The failure of this success path has a HCLPF value of 0.81g. Thus, the HCLPF is the same as the one calculated for the more conservative success path used for SLB event in the SMA model.
55.5.8    Seismic Interaction Between Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings Introduction The AP600 seismic margin analysis shows the plant HCLPF is 0.50g. One of the model assumptions is:
                  " . only the Nuclear Island is considered for the SM A model; the interaction between the other buildings and the Nuclear Island is assumed to have no detrimental effect on the Nuclear Island structures."
The Turbine Building is designed to the Uniform Building Code requirements. It is taller than the Auxiliary Building, which is a Seismic Category I structure. The Auxiliary Building                j contains important safety-related equipment. The Turbine Building is adjacent to the north-end wing of the Auxiliary Building, the wing containing the main control room (MCR) and the shutdown panel, as well as 1&C rooms and I&C penetration rooms. The main structure
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        '                                                                            55. S:ismic Mrrgin Annlysis         l l
of the Turbine Building is separated from the Nuclear Island by an access bay, which is approximately 19 feet wide. The consequences of the potential Turbine Building collapse onto and falling debris penetrating the Auxiliary Building is evaluated here.
l The conclusions of the assessment of structural integrity consequences of the Turbine Building potential collapse are as follows:
: 1.      The horizontal impact of the Turbine Building on the Auxiliary Building will not result in the loss of structural integrity of the Auxiliary Building.
: 2.       It is not likely that the size and the energy of the debris would be large enough to result in a vertical impact on the roof of the Auxiliary Building to cause penetration.
Even though it is not likely that penetration of Turbine Building debris could be large and energetic enough for penetration into the roof of the north end of the Auxiliary Building, this            .
event was evaluated and the consequences of damage to the safety-related equipment in the                  I Auxiliary Building investigated.
Evaluation The rooms at different levels of the north end of the Auxiliary Building are listed below.
These rooms are labeled by 123NN,124NN, and 125NN, where NN are integers (for example,                     ,
the MCR is 12401). The integers 3,4, and 5 in the room numbers are indicators of various levels,3 being a lower level than 4 etc. Some of the rooms located at lower levels contain equipment important to the plant control functions.                                                        ;
The roof and upper floors of the Auxiliary Building include a 15-inch concrete slab at elevation 153' for the roof, a 24-inch concrete slab at elevation 135'3'' over the main control room, and a 24-inch concrete slab at elevation 117'6'' on the floor of the main control room and MSIV areas. The 24-inch thick concrete floors would not allow penetration of debris into the other rooms in lower levels of the same building because the debris would not have sufficient energy to do so. Thus the damage from the impacting debris is confined to upper levels of the structure, namely rooms with numbers 124NN (except the MCR) and 125NN.
These rooms are:
12404          Lower MSIV compartment B                      SGS containment isolation valves, instrumentation and controls 12405          Lower VBS B and D equipment room              VWS/PXS/CAS containment isolation valves 124 %          Lower MSIV compartment A                      SGS containment isolation valves, instrumentation and controls far h 17,1997                                                                    .           W Westinghouse m \pra\sec55 wpf Ib:031597                                  55-60

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: 55. Seismic M:rgia An11ysis                                                                                ~
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v 12504         Lower MSIV compartment B                      SGS containment isolation valves, instrumentation and controls 12505         Upper VBS B and D equipment room              VWS/PXS/CAS containment isolation valves 1
125 %         Lower MSIV compartment A                      SGS containment isolation valves, instrumentation and controls The other rooms at lower levels contain MCR, I&C penetration rooms, I&C rooms, valve and piping penetration rooms, and the remote shutdown panel. It is important that these rooms         ,
(labeled with room numbers 123NN, plus the MCR) would not be penetrated, since their              l penetration may potentially fail plant control through either failure of MCR and shutdown panel; or failure of multiple I&C division connections.
Given that the only credible failures may occur in the 124NN and 125NN rooms (except the MCR), the most credible event to occur is a steam line break (SLB) transient; this event would be coupled with a loss of offsite power (LOSP) event expected to occur at low acceleration levels. During such a seismically induced LOSP event, nonsafety-related systems are assumed to fail (they are not credited in the SMA model in plant HCLPF calculations),
leading to a station blackout event.
[                   Upon penetration of the Turbine Building debris through the Auxiliary Building roof, damage V                   to some containment isolation valves outside of the containment (in the rooms listed above) is possible; but each containment penetration has a second isolation valve inside the containment, unaffected by the Turbine Building collapse. Thus, containment isolation failures are not credible.
The following SLB event scenarios are discussed:
: 1. SLB-TURB-LOWG (seismic event less than 0.50g)
: 2. SLB-TURB-HIGHG (seismic event greater than 0.5Gg)
SLB-TURB LOWG (seismic event less than 0.50g)
This scenario is described as follows:
: i. A low-level seismic event occurs; the plant safety systerns r not seismically affected (e.g., the effect of the seismic event on the plant structures a components is less than the 0.50g plant HCLPF).
ii. A loss of offsite power event occurs and the control rods are inserted due to loss of power; nonsafety-related systems (including diesel generators) are assumed to have failed due to the event.
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: 55. SIismic Mergin Analysis iii. The Turbine Building fails by the seismic event and large, energetic debris from this failure falls over the nonh end of the Auxiliary Building, penetrating the roof. A steam line break event occurs due to the damage to pipes or valves. This break is conservatively assumed to be unisolable.
This event is very similar to the SLB-V event modeled and quantified in the focused PRA.
The event mitigation and success paths are the same; the only difference is the cause of the initiating event. This event would not affect the plant HCLPF calculated in the SMA since it only has mixed cutsets, and has no seismically induced failures of safety-related systems.
However, it is discussed below for a better understanding of its consequences.
The success path for the above scenario is that the PRHR and CMT systems automatically actuate and perform their functions. Since both systems have air-operated valves that open and actuate the systems upon loss of power, air, or signal, the system actuation does not require any support systems, such as PMS signal, or de power. Thus, the event mitigation is truly passive and highly reliable.
In the highly unlikely case that the PRHR or the CMTs fail, a second success path is considered in the focused PRA. This path takes credit for successful actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and recirculation.
The SLB-V event has an initiating event frequency of 1.21E-03/ year (from the focused PRA) and has a core damage frequency of 3.66E-09/ year. This is about 0.5-percent contribution to the core damage frequency from internal events. The conditional probability of core damage for this event (given that the .SLB occurred) is 3.0E-06. This conditional probability is also applicable to the seismically induced SLB scenario described above, since it considers only safety-related systems for the event mitigation.
The low probability of core damage given that an unisolable SLB occurs in scenario SLB-TURB-LOWG, coupled with the fact that the frequency of such seismically initiated events would be small, indicates that this scenario is not a significant risk contributor.
SLB-TURB HIGHG (seismic event greater than 0.50g)
This scenario is described as follows:
: i. A high level seismic event occurs; the plant safety. systems may be seismically affected (e.g., the effect of the seismic event on the plant structures and components is greater than the 0.50g plant HCLPF).
ii. A loss of offsite power event occurs and the control rods are inserted due to loss of power; nonsafety-related systems (including the diesel generators) are assumed to have failed due to the event.
lar h 17,1997                                                                            W WeStilighouse mvrassecss wpr.ib.03 597                                55-62

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: 55. S:ismic M:rgin Analysts                                                                                    ~
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iii. The Turbine Building fails by the seismic event and large, energetic debris from this failure falls over the nonh end of the Auxiliary Building, penetrating the roof. A steam line break event occurs due to the damage to pipes or valves. This break is conservatively assumed to be unisolable.
This SLB event is considered in the SMA model. The current scenario is very similar to it except the initiating event HCLPF is much lower than the one used in the SMA model. Thus, the success path described earlier is valid.
Since the HCLPF value of the Turbine Building collapse event for this scenario is less than 0.50g, the seismic core damage sequence HCLPFs would be determined by the failure of the PRHR or CMT system failures (success path 1) discussed in the previous scenario. As discussed before, both systems have air-operated valves that open without the need for PMS or de power. Both systems have high HCLPF values (much higher than the plant HCLPF value of 0.50g), as demonstrated in the SMA model. Thus, the result:, of the SMA and its insights are not affected by this scenario.
Conclusions Although the north end of the Auxiliary Building contains important safety-related control and I&C equipment, the main control room, and the remote shutdown panel, a design feature prevents the damage to this imponant equipment from a seismically induced Turbine Building b}                failure. This design feature, a two-foot concrete floor (barrier) over this equipment and control rooms, is an imponant factor in excluding control failures. This limits the potential failures from the Turbine Building debris to steam lines and some containraen: isolation valves.
The potential event scenarios from the seismic interaction of the turbine and the north end of the Auxiliary Building are studied. Two remotely credible, but highly unlikely scenarios involving unisolable steam line breaks below and above 0.50g level are identified and are examined from their impact on SMA. The conclusion is that the SMA results and insights would not be affected by the seismic interaction between the Turbine Building and the north end of the Auxiliary Building.
55.9         SMA Results and Insights 55.9.1       AP600 SMA Results The AP600 seismic margin analysis has demonstrated that for structures, systems, and                 l components required for safe shutdown the high confidence, low probability of failures               j (HCLPF) magnitudes are equal to or greater than 0.50g. This HCLPF is de: ermined by the              )
seismically induced failure of the fuel in the reactor vessel.                                      l l
l
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       '                                                                       55. Siismic Mrrgin An: lysis Thus, the AP600 design meets the requirement set forth in the AP600 SSAR that the plant O
meet or exceed a review level earthquake of 0.5g.
The success paths used for the SMA are taken conservatively in many cases, and no credit for operator actions for events at 0.50g review level earthquake have been included. Thus, the results are valid without operator intervention, which indicates a strong point of the AP600 design ability to mitigate seismically induced core damage and large release sequences.
All the SMA sequences are evaluated with loss of offsite power and loss of onsite ac power leading to a station blackout event. The plant design is shown to be robust against seismic event sequences each of which contain station blackout coupled with other seismic or random failures.
The dominant seismic sequences for plant HCLPF are the same for core damage and the large fission product release. These sequences, and their dominant contributors are as follows:
O l
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O                                                                                                                                                           O                                                                                  O N
y seguence IICLPF                                                                                                                                                                                       HCLPF Value of               T-      -I g
e Sequence             Value                             Description                                                                                                               Dominant Contributors            Contributors               (
o E. 1. eqrvf.02        0.50g       A seismically induced LOCA beyond                                                                                                             I. Fuel failure                   0.50g                           g         '
the ECCS capacity event occurs; core                                                                                                          2. SG failure                   0.65g                          j fo                                     damage and large fission product release                                                                                                      3. Pressuriier failure          0.67g                           gi-k                                     are assumed.
e
: 2. eqatw-04        0.5 l g     A seismically induced ATWS event                                                                                                              1. EQ-ATWS occurs (0.50g)       0.51g                          iF occurs; PRilR, RCS pressure relief,                                                                                                                and also transfer switch, de
    ,3 I                                       and CMT systems are successful; ADS                                                                                                                display panel, ac display fails and core damage is assumed.                                                                                                                  panel, or de bus failure ll                                                                                                                                                                                         occurs (0.5 f g)
{%
5
: 2. EQ-ATWS occurs (0.50g and    0.54g cable tray failure (0.54g)
: 3. EQ-ATWS occurs (0.50g)       0.65g and inverter failure (0.65g)
LA
?           3. eqstr-02        0.58g       A seismically induced gross structural                                                                                                        1. Shield building roof or      0.58g
@                                           collapse occurs; core damage and large                                                                                                             passive containment cooling                                            ,
fission product release are assumed.                                                                                                               tank failure
: 2. Auxiliary building failure   0.58g
: 3. Containment interior         0.60g                                     +
structure or IRWST tank                                                ,
failure
: 4. eqatw-07       0.60g       A seismically induced ATWS occurs;                                                                                                            i. EQ-ATWS occurs (0.50g)         0.60g                                     !
PRHR fails; core damage is assumed.                                                                                                                and the IRWST tank fails I
(0.60g)
(This is conservative since the                                             ,
IRWST tank failure is accounted                                             ;
for in the eqstr-02 sequence.)
kE
: c. M                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 .
m n E ,*a s-P                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            m
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,m        t G3
 $qP    .mi
                    . - - - - _        .- -       . . . _ - . - - _ - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - . _ _ . - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - _                                           r           -- - -

37C                                                                                                                               ''
4EE                    Sequence lii h #                 IICLPF                                                                           IICLPF Value of          ..
I;!:
Dominant Contributors            Contributors g        Sequence     Value                Description I.                                 0.60g
$g ay
: 5. eqlsp-(M eqisp-05 0.60g     A seismically induced LOSP occurs; the CMTs are successful; the PRilR EQ-LOSP occurs and the 1RWST tank fails (0.60g)
[a                              fails.                             (This is conservative since the IRWST tank failure is accounted for in the eqstr-02 sequence.)
: 6. eqatw-05 0.63g     A seismically induced ATWS occurs:  1. EQ-ATWS occurs (0.50g) and     0.63g PRilR and RCS pressure relief are       the CMT tank fails successful; the CMT fails; core damage is assumed.
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                                                                                                             ;z     Eg 55, S:ismic M:rgin An11ysis
  ^
/   i e   s G'
The dominant mixed cutsets leading to core damage for the seismically induced initiating events are as follows:
Seismically     Initiating induced         Event initiating      IICLPF           Cutset                                                       Cutset Event          Value         Elements                      Description                   Probability ATWS                0.50g    EQ-LEV-ATWS       Seismically induced ATWS occurs,               3.27E-01 UET-OCCURS        plant is in the UET ATWS                0.50g    EQ-LEV-ATWS       Seismically induced ATWS occurs,                1.35E-03 NO-UET           plant is not in the UET ATWS                0.50g     EQ-IEV-ATWS      Seismically induced ATWS occurs,                1.10E-03 ADX-MV-GO        common cause failure of 4 out of 4 ADS stage 2&3 MOVs SLOCA               0.81g     EQ-IEV-          Seismically induced small LOCA occurs,          1.10E-03 SLOCA            common cause failure of 4 out of 4 ADS stage 2&3 MOVs ADX-MV-GO There are two sequences with single element cutsets that lead to core damage. These are the EQRVF-02, (q'") the seismically induced vessel failure, and the EQSTR-02, the seismically gross structural collapse, sequences. The fuel failure and core assembly failure events which make up the plant HCLPF are assumed to occur with the vessel failure. In this sequence, a containment failure is assumed to occur without further analysis (although there is not 100-percent certainty that the containment will fail). The gross structural collapse event is assumed to cause the fuel failure event as well as the containment failure, again without further analysis.
The HCLPF for components in the de power system,0.51g, is the next lowest HCLPF in the analysis.
If the fuel were to remain intact in a seismic event of 0.51g, the dc power is assumed to fail. This failure does not necessarily lead to core damage, because many of the valves in systems that would mitigate the event go to their " safe" position when the de power is lost. Thus, there are no single element cutsets containing the failure of the de power, The HCPLF for the cable trays,0.54g, is the next HCLPF in the analysis. If the fuel and de power were to remain intact in a seismic event of 0.54g, the cable trays are assumed to fail. These failures do not        j necessarily lead to core damage, because many of the valves in systems which would mitigate the event go to their " safe" position when the power is lost. Thus, there are no single element cutsets containing the failure of the cable trays.
Various sensitivities concerning the fuel HCLPF, operator actions, the mission time, containment isolation, steam generator, and main steam line break success criteria, and the interaction of the Turbine and             l l
O
[ W85tiflgh00S8                    w                                                      March 17,199       l 55-67                                "*auec55 wpr ib 031597 l

l i HE: uiE l        3                                                                        55. S:ismic Mrrgin Analysis i
Auxiliary Buildings have been done. These analyses show that variations in the parameters O
discussed do not significantly change the results or conclusions of the seismic margin analysis.
55.9.2      AP600 SMA Insights                                                                                    l The SMA results point out the following insights:                                                     1 1
: 1.      Design Features The AP600 design provides features that make the plant more robust against the review level earthquakes.
* Reactor trip is assured without the actuation signal due to the loss of offsite power occurring with the seismic event. The rods then are inserted by gravity.
* The PRHR valves fail open without an actuation signal following a loss of power or air. Thus, PRHR cooling is immediately available.                                  l
                       -      The CMT valves fail open without actuation signal following a loss of power or        i air. Thus, CMT injection is immediately available.
Thus, three key mitigating functions - reactor trip, PRHR cooling, and CMT injection -
are available with high confidence and low probability of failure, without dependence on actuation signals immediately after a review level seismic event.
Moreover, the passive containment cooling system air-operated valves also fail open in   ,
a review level earthquake, due to loss of offsite power or air. As a result, the containment cooling system is automatically actuated and has enough inventory to last for at least 72 hours.
: 2.      Importance of Valve Room Fragilities The fragility of certain valve rooms where the passive core cooling system valves are concentrated is an important factor. The SMA model depends on the successful functioning of these valves tc mitigate LOCA accidents. These rooms are labeled as 11206/11207 and contain the CMTs, accumulators, the IRWST injection valves, and the recirculation valves. Since the HCLPF of these rooms is relatively high, compared to the plant HCLPF value, the seismic failure of many passive core cooling system valves does not become a contributor to plant HCLPF.
: 3.      Operator Actions Operator actions are not credited in the SMA model for the 0.50g review level events.
Inclusion of operator actions in the models would provide additional success paths, such as manual actuation of ADS after failure of the CMTs to inject. However, this far h 17,1997                                                                         W Westingh0US8 mvrawc55.wpr.ib:031797                                55-68

I i
1
                                                                                                            = =
: 55. Seismic M:rgin An:.lys's f-):                                                                                                                      :
:V                                                                                                                        l inclusion would not affect the plant HCLPF or the major conclusions of the SMA.
Thus, the AP600 design is robust with respect to its response to seismic events, even without taking credit for operator actions.
l
: 4. Mission Time The SMA model is performed with a 24-hour mission time. A 72-hour mission time is also evaluated. It is shown that neither the success criteria nor the mitigating system failure probabilities are appreciably affected by the 72-hour mission time. Thus, the SMA results are valid for the 72-hour mission time.
: 5. Station Blackout Event A loss of offsite power transient following a seismic event, where no other concurrent more consequential seismic failures occur, is studied. This condition will exist between 0.09g and 0.50g level eanhquakes. Such an event is also assumed to cause a loss of all of the nonsafety-related systems, resulting in a station blackout. The conditional probability of core damage in such a scenario is shown to be very small,8.8E-08 given that the LOSP event occurs. In this analysis, credit is taken for operator actions. Even with operator action probabilities of 10 times higher, this conditional probability is 2.3E-07, which is still small. Thus, the AP600 plant design is robust against a seismically induced station blackout event.
(   )
 'V                      A LOSP event is also evaluated at the review level eachquake. The LOSP event is not a dominant contributor to the plant HCLPF.
: 6. IRWST Failure The IRWST HCLPF is 0.60g. This failure is modeled to render PRHR, IRWST injection, and recirculation functions inoperable. Thus, it becomes a single-point failure that affects both the transient (e.g., LOSP events) and LOCA success paths. The failure of the IRWST is modeled as a part of. gross structural failure, as well re in the PRHR and IRWST injection system fault trees.
An argument can be made that when the IRWST fails, its invantory would fall to the containment cavity and can be used to recirculate water back it to the RCS, leading to successful core cooling. Although this scenario is plausible and credible, no credit for such a success path is taken in the SMA model.
: 7. Mixed Cutsets An examination of the mixed cutsets for the seismic sequer.ces shows a few with a probability of 1.0E-03 or larger. This shows that the ccnditional random failure probability of core damage, given a review level earthquake and subsequent component failures is driven by only a few random failures, and not by operator actions.
O i   I V                                                                                                                 Draft T Westinghouse               b6                    55-69 March 17,1997 m:sprassec55 wpr:ib 03:597

 = :;g i~     - =J
         ~                                                                    55. Seismic M rgin Analysis
: 8. Large Fission Product Release O
The large fission product release is driven by the same seismic sequences that dominate the plant core damage. This is due to either the nature of the initiating event (such as gross structural failure initiating event, EQ-STRUC), or an assumption of containment failure following a reactor vessel failure. The failure of containment isolation or the containment cooling system due to their system components or system actuation failures does not dominate the plant large release HCLPF.
55.10       References 5'-l         "SECY-93-087 - Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs," USNRC Memorandum, July 21,1993, Chilk to Taylor.
55-2         Budnitz, R.J., et al., "An Approach to the Quantification of Seismic Margins in Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-4334, UCID-20444, August 1985.
55-3         Bjorhovde, Reidar, T.V. Galambos, and M.K. Ravindra, "LRFD Criteria for S: eel Beam-Columns," Journal of the Structural Division, ASCE No. ST9, Paper 14016, Sept 1978, pp.1371-1387.
55-4         Galambos, T.V., " Load and Resistance Factor Design," Engineering Journal, American Institute of Steel Construction. Third Quarter,1981.
55-5        Greimann, Lowell, and Fouad Fanous, " Reliability of Containments Under Overpressure " Pressure Vessel and Piping Technology, A Decade of Progress, 1985, pp. 835-856.
55-6        Coats, D.W., " Recommended Revisions to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Design Criteria," NUREG/CR-1161, May 1980.
55-7        Uncertainty and Conservatism in the Seismic Analysis and Design of Nuclear Facilities, Working Group on Quantification of Uncertainties, American Society of Civil Engineers, ISBN 0-87262-547-8, 1986.
55-8        Griemann, L., et al., Probabilistic Seismic Resistance of Steel Containments, NUREG/CR-3127, IS-4822, Ames Laboratory, January 1984.
55-9        R.P. Kennedy, et al., Engineerine Characterization of Ground Motion - Task 1.
Effects of Characteristics of Free-Field Motion on Structural Response Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-3805, May,1984.
1ar h 17,1997                                                          '          W We5dflgh0tlSe mva*chpf:Ib:031597                                    55-70

E=     F=2
: 55. Seismic Mirgin An: lysis o
b 55-10        Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document, Volume III, ALWR Passive Plant, Chapter 1 Appendix A, PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules, Revisions 5 & 6, Issued December 1993.
55-11       "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin,"
Electric Power Research Institute EPRI NP-6041, October,1988.
O T Westinghouse            h$$1_                                                 March 17,199 55-71                          myraws5 wpr.ib:03:59'

EF     91!
: 55. Siismie Mrrgin Anitysis I
l l
O l                                                  Table 55-1 1
SEISMIC MARGIN HCLPF VALUES Description               Median pga [8]  p,      llCLPF Value      Basis
[8]
Buildings / Structures 3hield Building Roof - Tension Ring                     -       -          1.34 g         [5]
Sh.cid Building Roof- at PCS Tank                       -       -          2.45g          15]
Shield Building Roof - PCS Tank Wall                    -       -          3.26g          [5]
Shield Building Roof- Columns                           -       -          0.58g          [5]
Containment Vessel - Buckling                        3.29g    0.67         0.70g          [3]
Containment Vessel - Overturning                     4.07g    0.62         0.98g          [3]
Containment BafDe Support Failure                                     -      -            1.5g         [4]
Interior Containment Structure & IRWST                1.47g   0.39         0.60g          [3]
Primary Components Reactor Pressure Vessel and Support                   1.44g   0.27         0.77g       [3]&[7]
Reactor Internals and Core Assembly (includes          1.5g   0.51          0.5g          [1]
Fuel)
CRDM and Hydraulic Drive Units                        2.2g    0.51          0.7g           [Il Pressurizer and Support                               1.63g   0.39         0.67g       [3] & [7]
Steam Generator and Support                          1.25g   0.29          0.65g      [3]&[7]
Reactor Coolant Pump                                  2.2g   0.51           0.7g          [1]
Mechanical Equipment Polar Crane                                              -       -         0.89g          [4]
Piping Support Controlled                               3.3g   0.61          0.81g          [1]
Cable Trays Support Controlled                               2.2g    0.61         0.54g          [1]
Heat Exchanger (PRHR)                                     -      -         0.81g          [4]
tar h 17,1997                                                       '          W W85tingt10USB m:\pra\sec55-l.wpf Ib 031597                       55-72

                                                                                              ..uu
                                                                                              .        ==.
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis n
Table 55-1 (cont.)
SEISMIC MARGIN llCLPF VALUES Description                Median pga [8]      , llCLPF Value         Basis
[8]
Tank PXS-MT 1 A/B                                2.2g     0.46       0.76g              [1]
(Accumulator)
Tank PXS 2A/B                                      -        -        0.63g              [4]      )
(CMT)
Valves Room Number 11202                                  -        -
0.96g              [4]
Room Number 11206                                  -
0.96g              [4]
Room Number 11207                                  -        -        0.96g              [4]
Room Number 11208                                  -        -        0.96g              [4]
Room Number 11300                                  -        -
0.96g              [4]
Room Number 11301                                  -        -        0.83g              [4]
Room Number 11302                                  -        -        0.96g              [4]
Room Number 11304                                  -        -
0.83g              [4]
Room Number i1400                                3.3g     0.61       0.81 g             [4]
Room Number 11403                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g              [1]
Room Number 11500                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g              [1]
Room Number 11601                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g              [1]
Room Number i1603                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g              [1]
Room Number 11703                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g              [1]
Room Number 12244                                  -         -       0.92g              [4]      1 Room Number 12254                                   -        -       0.92g              [4]
Room Number 12255                                   -        -       0.92g              [4]
Room Number 12256                                   -        -       0.92g               [4]
Room Number 12306                                   -        -
0.86g               [4]
Room Number 12362                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g               [1]
\._ ./'                                                                                              Draft 3 Westinghouse             ht,,,,,,                                         March 17,1997 55-73                      mvatsec55.i.wpr.ib 03:597 l
l 1

.jsa    :Hg
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin Anilysis
            ~
O Table 55-1 (cont.)
SEISMIC MARGIN llCLPF VALUES Description              Median pga [8]     ,  llCLPF Value      Basis
[8]
Room Number 12401                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g          [1]
Room Number 12404                                3.3g     0.61       0.81 g         [1]
Room Number 12405                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g          [1]
Room Number 12406                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g          [11 Room Number 12452                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g          [1]
Room Number 12454                                3.3g     0.61       0.81 g         [1]
Room Number 12555                                3.3g     0.61       0.81 g         [1]
Room Number 12701                                3.3g     0.61       0.81g          [1]
Electrical Equipment                               -        -
Battery                                            -        -        1.04g          [6]
Battery Racks                                    3.3g     0.46        1.14g         [1]
l Battery Chargers                                   -        -        0.98g          [6]
l 125 VDC Distribution Panel                        .        -
0.51g          [6]
120 VAC Distribution Panel                        -        -
0.51g          [6]
Transfer Switches                                  -        -        0.51g          [6]
125 VDC MCC                                       -        -        0.93g          [6]
125 VDC Switchboard                               -        -         0.51g         [6]
Regulating Transformer                              -       -         1.03g          [6]
Inverter                                           -        -       0.65g           [6]
4.16 kV Switchgear                                  -        -       0.86g           [6]
Reactor Trip Switchgear                            -        -
0.81 g          [6]
Hydrogen Monitor                                   -        -        1.19g          [6]
CMT Level Switch                                   -        -        1.09g          [6]
Neutron Detector                                   -        -        0.51g          [6]
Radiation Monitor                                   -        -       0.64g          [6]
W85tingt10USB far h 17,1997 myrawessa wpr;ib:03:597                      55-74

l I                                                                                                . . . . . . _ . .
: 55. S;ismic M:rgin Analysis (n)
  \ J Table $5-1 (cont.)
SEISMIC MARGIN IICLPF VALUES Description                  Median pga [8]     , IICLPF Value       Basis
[8]
RTD                                                      -       -
3.75g              [6]
Speed Sensors                                            -       -        2.17g              [6]
Incore Thermocouple                                      -       -        3.94g              [6]           l l
RCP Bearing Water Temp Thermocouple                      -       -        3.94g              [6]
PCS Water Flow Transmitter (el.135.3')                   -       -
0.93g              [6]           l PCS Water Flow Transmitter (el. 261')                     -       -       0.61g              [6]
PRHR HX Flow Transmitter                                 -        -        1.55g             [6]
RCS Flow Transmitter                                      -       -
1.55g             [6]
SG Feed Transmitter                                       -       -        1.16g              [6]
1RWST Level Transmitter                                   -       -        1.27g              [6]
rn PZR Level Transmitter                                                     1.27g              [6]
(v )
SG Narrow-Range Transmitter                              -       -       0.85g               [6]
SG Wide-Range Transmitter                                 -       -      0.85g               [6]
Air Storage Tank Pressurizer Transmitter                 -        -       0.99g              [6]
Containment Pressurizer Sensor & Transmitter              -       -      1.27g               [6]
RCS Wide-Range Pressure Transmitter                       -       -      1.27g               [6]
PRZ Pressure Sensor                                       -       -       1.27g              [6]
Main Steam Line Pressure Transmitter                       -      -       0.99g              [6]
ESFAC Cabinet                                             -      -       0.74g              [6]
          . Protection Logic Cabinet                                 -       -      0.74g              [6]
Integrated Protection Cabinet SWGR                        -       -      0.74g               [6]
Mustiplex Cabinet                                         -       -      0.74g               [6]
Qualified Data Processing System (QDPS)                   -       -
1.94g              [6]
;          Cabinet L
MCR SUPR OPER Station                                 2.8g    0.46       0.97g               [1]
  \
p) v                                                                                                          Draft
[ Westirlgh0tlSe              h,h, w                                            March 17,1997 55-75                     mwuss-ispr.ib-03:597

:EE 5:-
         ~
: 55. Siismic Mrrgin An-lysis 2.
Table 55-1 (cont.)
SEISMIC MARGIN HCLPF VALUES Description                     Median pga [8]             ,     HCLPF Value                                     11 asis
[8]
MCR Switch Station                                         2.8g            0.46          0.97g                                        [1]
QDPS and MCR Display                                         -               -
1.98g                                      [6]
MCR Switch Station                                           -               -           0.80g                                        [6]
Power and Control Panels                                     -               -
1.14g                                        [6]
Ceramic Insulators                                         0.2g            0.35          0.09g                                        [2]
Table Notes:
[1]     HCLPF based on Utility Requirements Document recommended generic fragility data
[2]     HCLPF based on recognized generic fragility data
[3]     HCLPF based probabilistic fragility analysis
[4]     HCLPF based on deterministic approach
[5]     HCLPF based on conservative deterministic fragility margin approach
[6]     HCLPF based on design margin as defined from test data
[7]    Component support will control HCLPF value
[8]     pga is the free-field peak ground acceleration level for the seismic event far h 17,1997                                                                                 W W85tingh0USB m:\pra\sec55 tmpf.lb:031597                             $$.76

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: 55. Seismic M:rgin Anitysis                                                                                   5
  \v /
Table $5-2 SMA EVENT TREE SUCCESS PATilS Did the Sequence   Does the SMA Contain Manual   Model Take Credit Event Tree                                          Actions         for Manual Path Name          Sequence Description            Originally?        Action?        Comments EQ STRUC (Gross Structural Collapse) eqstr 01    No success path is modeled for this event.
EW TA (LOCA in Excess of ECL        ipacity) eqrvf-01    No su., ns path is modeled for this esent EQ-LLOCA (Large LOCA)
Ik>-ok i    Seismically induced large LOCA      No.              No.
occurs; Accumulator injection u successful; Break size !s m the large end of
[
(y the range; IRWST mjection is successful, Sump recirculation is successful                                                                   J llo-oL2      Seismically mduced large LOCA      No.              No.
occurs; 3                     Accumulator injection is successful; Break site is in the lower end of the range.
Contamment isolation is successful.
IRWST mjection is successful.
Sump recirculation is successful llo-oL3     Seismically induced larFe LOCA     No.              No.
occurs; Accumulator injection is successful.
Break size is in the lower end of the range; Contamment isolation fails; Automatic depretsunzation is successful.
IRWST injection is successful; Sump recirculation is successful.
EQ-SLOCA (Small LOCA)
Also includes SGTR and SLB cvents.
T Westinghouse                   M._                     55-77 March 17,1 m sprassec55-i wpf:ie:03:597

Es si:
         !                                                                             55. Seismic M!rgin Analysis Table 55-2 (cont.)
e SMA EVENT TREE SUCCESS PATHS D'd the Sequence    Does the SMA Contain Manual   Model Take Credit Event Tree                                            Actions          for Manual Path Name          Sequence Descriptian             Originally?          Action?                   Comments slo-oL2       Seismically mduced small LOCA       Yes.              No.                PRHR status is not asked; no occurs;                                                                  credit is taken for PRHR.
CMT injection is successful;                                             This success path is also used for ADS is successful;                                                       SGTR and SLB cvents, as IRWST mjection is successful,                                            discussed below.
Sump recirculation is successful.
Other success sequences from the                                         Not crediting PRHR success, and focused PRA SLOCA , sequences                                            manual ADC actuation after such as CMTs fail and manual                                             CMT failure are conservative ADS actuation are not credited in                                        assumptions.
the SMA.
(SGTR)        Seismically induced SGTR event                                           Same as small LOCA success occurs;                                                                  path.
CMT injection is successful; ADS is successful;                                                                                            ,
IRWST mjection is successful;                                                                                 )
Sump recirculation is successful.
(SGTR)        Seismically induced SGTR event                                           This success path is not credited occurs;                                                                  in the SMA. Not creditmg this Faulted SG isolation is successful;                                      path is conservative.
CMT mjection is successful; PRHR is successful.
(SGTR)        Other success sequences from the                                         Not crediting PRHR success, and       j focused PRA SGTR, sequences                                             manual ADS actuation after            .
such as CMTs fail and manual                                             CMT failure are conservative ADS actuation are not credited in                                       assumpoons.                          I the SMA.
(SLB)          Seismically induced SLB cvent                                            Same as small LOCA success occurs;                                                                 path.
CMT ingetion is successful.                                                                                  j ADS is successful-                                                                                            l 1RWST injection is successful.
Sump recirculation is successful.
(SLB)         Seismically induced SLB event                                            This success path is not credited occurs;                                                                  in the SMA. Not creditmg this Faulted SG is not isolated or is                                         path is conservative.
unisolable; CMT injection is successful; PRHR is successful.
lar h 17,1997                                                                      6                     WOStingh00S8 mDrabec55-1.wpf:lb 03l597                                   55-78

l E2
                                                                                                                     =
WE
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin Analysis                                                                                            5
 ,.                                                                                                                                   j l    i                                                                                                                                i U                                                                                                                                     l 1
1 Table 55-2 (cont.)                                                          l I
SMA EVENT TREE SUCCESS PATIIS Did the Sequence     Does the SMA                                            l Contain Manual    Model Take Credit Event Tree                                         Actions           for Manual Path Name         Sequence Description           Originally?            Action?                Comments (SLB)       Other success sequences from the                                        Not crediting PRHR success, and         l focused PRA SLBs. sequences                                             manual ADS actuation after              !
such as CMTs fail and manual                                            CMT failure are conservative            .
ADS actuation are not credited in                                       assumptions.
the SMA.                                                                                                        j 1
EQ-ATWS (Anticipated                                                                                            )
Transients Without Scram)                                                                                       l l
atw ok6     Seisnscally induced ATWS           Yes.               No.                                                       I occurs; PRHR is successful;                                                                                             I RCS pressure rehef is successful-CMT injection is successful;                                                                                    l Autonatic depressunzation is successful;                                                                                                     i IRWST injection is successful; Sump recirculation is successful.                                                                              l n
[    \                 EQ-LOSP (Loss of Offsite
 'w./
Power)                                                                                                         l sbo-oki     Seismically induced LOSP occurs   Yes.               No. (at 0.50g)    Not crediting manual ADS                )
at 0.09g;                                                              actuation after CMT failure is a        l No stuck-open secondary side                         Yes. (at 0 09g)   conservative assumption.
valve;                                                                                                         j PRHR is successful.                                                                                            l sbo-ok3     Seismically mouced LOSP occurs    Yes.               No. (at 0.50g)    Not crediting manual ADS at 0 09g;                                                              actuation after CMT failure ts a No stuck open secondary side                          Yes. (at 0 09g)  conservative assumption.                ;
valve; PRHR fails; No stuck-open pressunzer safety valve; CMT injection is successful; Automatic depressunzation is successful; IRWST mjection is successful; Sump recirculation is successful fh
(
      )
T Westinghouse                  Mw                     55-79 March 17,1 m:sprassec55-i.wpf:id:03 797
: 55. Seismic MIrgin Analysis Table 55-3 e
BASIC EVENT IICLPF VALUES                                              l IICLPF Basic Event ID                          Description                  Value           Source (1)
EQ-AB EXTWALL               Auxiliary Building exterior wall               0.58g       (same as Shield Building rooO EQ-AB-FLOOR                 Auxiliary Building floor                       0.58g       (same as Shield Building rooO      l l
EQ-AB-INTWALL               Auxiliary Building interior wall               0.58g       (same as Shield     j Building rooO EQ-ACC-CV28                 PXS 28A/B                                      0.96g         i1206/11207       l EQ-ACC-CV29                 PXS 29A/B                                      0.96g         11206/11207 EQ-ACC-MOV27                PXS 27A/B                                      0.96g         11206/11207 EQ-ACC-TANKS                Tank PXS-MT I A/B (accumulator)                0.76g EQ-ACDISPANEL               120Vac distribution panel                      0.51g EQ-ADS-S I MOVS             RCS V001 A/B/C/D                               0.81 g        11603/11703 EQ-ADS-S2MOVS               RCS V002A/B/C/D                                0.81 g        11603/11703 EQ-ADS-S3MOVS               RCS V003A/B/C/D                                0.81g         11603/11703 EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES            RCS V004A/B/C/D                                0.96g         11301/11302 EQ-BAF-SUPP                 Containment baffle support failure              1.50g EQ-BAT-RACK                 Battery rack                                    1.14g EQ-BATTERY                  Battery                                         1.04g EQ-CABLETRAY                Cable trays - support controlled               0.54g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15            CAS AOV14 and CAS CV 15                        0.81g          12405/11400 EQ-CER-INSULATOR           Failure of ceramic insulators                  0.09g EQ-CMT-AOV                 PXS 14A/B, PXS15A/B                            0.96g          11206/11207 EQ-CMT-CV                  PXS 16A/B, PXS17A/B                            0.96g          i1206/11207 EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT            CMT level switch                                1.09g EQ-CMT-TANKS               Tank PXS 2A/B (core makeup tank)                0.63g           (Note 2)
EQ-CONTPR-SENSOR            Containment pressure sensor and transmitter    1.27g far h 17,1997                                                                       W W85tilighouse m-\pra\sec55-1.wpf:lb:031597                          55-80

5E EE
: 55. Seismic M:rgia Anilysis n
  \_
Table 55-3 (cont.)
BASIC EVENT IICLPF VALUES IICLPF Basic Event ID                         Description               Value        Source (1)
EQ-CORE-ASSEMBLY         Core assembly failure (not fuel)            0.50g EQ-CRDM                  Control rod drive mechanism                 0.70g EQ-CV-BUCKLE             Containment vessel buckling                 0.70g EQ-CV-INTER              Interior containment                        0.60g     (same as IRWST)
EQ-CV-OVERT              Containment vessel ovenurning               0.98g EQ-DC-SWBRD               125Vdc switchboard                         0.51g EQ-DCDISPANEL             125Vdc distribution panel                  0.51g EQ-DCMCC                  125Vdc MCC                                 0.93g EQ-DVI-PIPES              Both DVI lines fail                        0.81g       same as RCS piping ESFAC cabinet                              0.74g r^   EQ-ESFAC-CAB
(
L   EQ-INSTR-PIPES            Small pipes for RCS instrumentation        0.81g       same as RCS (leading to small LOCA)                                    piping EQ-INTEG-CAB              Integrated protection cabinet switchgear   0.74g Inverter                                   0.65g                             I EQ-INVERTER EQ-IRW-INJCV              PXS 122A/B, PXS124A/B                      0.96g        11206/11207 EQ-IRW-INJSQ              PXS 123A/B, PXS125A/B                      0.96g        i1206/11207          I EQ-IRW-LVTRANS            1RWST level transmitter                     1.27g EQ-IRW-RECCV              PXS I19A/B                                 0.96g        i1206/11207 EQ IRW-RECMOV             PXS 117A/B                                 0.96g        11206/11207 EQ-IRW-RECSQ             PXS 118A/B, PXS 120A/B                      0.96g       11206/11207 EQ-IRWST-TANK             1RWST failure                              0.60g EQ-LOGIC-CAB              Protection logic cabinet                   0.74g EQ-MCR-STATION            MCR supervisory operator station           0.97g EQ-MCR-SWITCil            MCR switch station                         0.97g 3 Westingh00Se                     w                                             March 17,199 55-81                   myrassec55 i.wpr: b:03:597

i f... 3=                                                                  55. S:ismic Margin An-lysis G:
Table 55-3 (cont.)
BASIC EVENT HCLPF VALUES HCLPF Basic Event ID                          Description              Value          Source (1)
EQ-MPLEX-CAB               Multiplexer cabinet                        0.74g EQ-MSL-SENSOR              MSL pressure transmitter                   0.99g EQ-PCC-TANK                PCS tank failure                           0.58g        (same as Shield Building roof)
EQ-POL-CRANE               Polar crane failure                        0.89g EQ-PRHR-AOV                PXS-PL-V 108A/B                            0.96g             i1300 EQ-PRHR HX                 Heat exchanger (PRHR)                      0.81g EQ-PRHR-MOV                PXS-PL-V101                                0.81g             11500 EQ-PRHR-XV                 PXS-PL-V109                                0.96g             11300 EQ PRZR-FAILS              Pressurizer fails                          0.67g                            l I
EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS            PZR level transmitter                       1.27g                           l EQ-PRZR-SENSOR             PRZ pressure sensor                         1.27g EQ-PRZR-SV                 Pressurizer safety valves RCS-PL-V005A     0.81g          11603/11703 and V005B                                                                  i EQ-QDPS-CAB               QDPS cabinet fails                          1.94g EQ-QDPS-DISPLAY           QDPS and MCR d; splay                       1.98g EQ-RCP-FAILS              Reactor coolant pump fails                  0.67g EQ-RCS-PIPES              RCS piping support controlled               0.81g EQ-RV-FAILS               Reactor pressure vessel failure             0.77g                           l EQ-RV-FUEL                Fuel failure                                0.50g EQ RV-HDPK                RPV integrated head package failure         0.67g        hydraulic drive units EQ-SG-FAILS               Steam generator fails                       0.65g EQ-SG-NRLEVEL              SG narrow-range transmitter                0.85g EQ-SG-WRLEVEL             SG wide-range level transmitter            0.85g i r h 17,1997                                                     E.            W Westingt10tise m:\praisec55-1 wpf.lb 031797                           55-82
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin Analysis
[5 i A
Table 55-3 (cont.)
BASIC EVENT IICLPF VALUES HCLPF Basic Event ID                         Description                    Value             Source (1)
EQ-SGTR                   Steam generator piping (one or a few)           0.65g          same as steam generator EQ SHDBLD-ROOF           Shield Building roof                            0.58g EQ-SHDBLD-WALL           Shield Building wall                            0.58g           (taken as the same as roof)
EQ-SLB                   Feed and steam line piping (leading to steam    0.81g           same as RCS line break event)                                                   piping EQ-TRSFSWITCH            Transfer switch                                 0.51g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04          VFS AOVs 03 and 04                               0.81 g         12452/11400 EQ VFS-AOV09/10          VFS-AOVs 09 and 10                               0.81g          11400/12454 EQ-WLS-AOV04/06          WLS 4/6                                          2.00g       This containment s                                                                                             penetration is no longer in the
  's /
      )                                                                                                 design.
EQ-WLS-AOV55/57           WLS 55/57                                       0.92g           i1300/12244 Notes:
(1) When the source column is left blank, the HCLPF value is taken from the corresponding item ir Table 55-1.
The numbers such as 12306/11300 refer to the room numbers where the valves are located.
HCLPFs for the rooms are taken from Table 55-1. When more than one valve is involved and they have different HCLPs, the lowest HCLPF is quoted.
(2) The CMT tank HCLPF is driven by failures in the nozzle area leading to water leakage out of the tank. The HCLPF for the stmetural failure of the tank is much higher, at least as good as the piping j support and valves which have HCLPF values equal to 0.81g.
                                                                                                                    )
l i
4                                                                                                                   l l
  ,O 3 Westingh0USB                    w                                                     March 17,199 55-83                            m vec55-i*pr.iro3 597 l l
I l

Er     =9                                                                   j
        "-                                    55. S ismic Mrrgin Anilysis   l l
O Table 55-4 EQ-LEV-STRUC HCLPF Basic Event          HCLPF Value 1            EQ-AB-FLOOR                   0.58g 2            EQ-AB-EXTWALL                 0.58g 3            EQ-AB-INTWALL                 0.58g 4            EQ-BAF-SUPP                   1.50g 5            EQ-PCC-TANK                   0.58g 6            EQ-SHDBLD-ROOF                0.58g
                                                                            )
7            EQ-SHDBLD-WALL                0.58g
     <        8            EQ-CV-INTER                   0.60g 9            EQ-CV-BUCKLE                  0.70g 10            EQ-CV-OVERT                   0.98g 11           EQ-IRWST-TANK                 0.60g 12           EQ-POL-CRANE                  0.89g HCLPF = 0.58g l
l l
l l
I far h 17,1997                                       W WeStingt100S8 mVraisec55-1.wpf.lb 031597          55-84

g=       ==
: 55. S i:mic Mrrgin Analysis                                                                    5 Table 55-5 EQ-LEV RVFA HCLPF Basic Event                        HCLPF Value 1                 EQ-DVI PIPES                            0.81g 2                  EQ-SG-FAILS                             0.65g 3                  EQ-RCP-FAILS                             0.70g 4                  EQ-PRZR-FAILS                            0.67g 5                 EQ-RV-FUEL                               0.50g 6                 EQ-RV-HDPK                               0.70g 7                 EQ-RV-FAILS                              0.77g HCLPF = 0.50g O                                                                                                     l
[ W85tilighouse          @f_          55-85 March 17,1 m:spraisec55-i wpr.ib 03is97

EE
     =
tis
: 55. Seismic Margin Anifysis t
Table 55-6 EQ-IEV LLOCA IICLPF Basic Event                 ilCLPF Value 1                EQ-PRHR-HX                                0.81 g 2                EQ-RCS-PIPES                              0.81g liCLPF = 0.81g O
Draft March 17,1997 ENEL               w m:\pra\sec55.I.wpf:Ib 031597                $$,gg

gir     =s
: 55. Sci mie Mrrgin Analysis
(~h
(
Table 55-7 EQ-IEV SLOCA HCLPF Basic Event                          HCLPF Value 1                             EQ-INSTR-PIPES                             0.81g 2                              EQ-SLB                                     0.81g 3                              EQ-SGTR                                    0.65g HCLPF for .SLOCA = 0.81g HCLPF for SLB          = 0.81g HCLPF for SGTR        = 0.65g All three of these contributions are covered by the EQ-SLOCA event tree depicting the plant safety-related systems response. Since the SGTR event HCLPF value is smaller than the others, and its core damage sequences result in potential containment bypass, SGTR core damage sequences are assigned their own sequence names.
I
\ f                                                                                                                      l
(                                                                                                                      l 1  %                                                                                                                     l l
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3 Westinghouse                                                                           March 17,1 55-87                           m:spressec55.i.wpr::b:03is97

1 5:? EE:
5                                        55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis O
Table 55-8 EQ IEV-ATWS IICLPF Basic Event              IICLPF Values 1           EQ-CORE-ASSEMBLY                0.50g 2            EQ-CRDM                         0.70g HCLPF = 0.50g 1
l 9 !
1 l
Draft March 17,1997 m:Vra\sec55-l.wpf:lb 031597          55-88 di_        3 Westinghouse

95       u_;
: 55. Siismic Strrgin Analysts                                                                             :
:-3 j v
Table 55-9 I
SYSTEh1 IICLPFs IICLPF           IICLPF System              Exc. Supp.       Inc.Supp.                    IICLPF Driven By                           ,
l EQ-AC2AB                      0.76g            0.76g        Accumulator tanks EQ-ADA                        0.81g            0.51g EQ-CM2SL                      0.63g            0.63g        CMT tanks EQ-DC                         0.51 g           0.51g EQ-IW2AB                      0.60g            0.51g*
EQ-PMS                        0.74g            0.74g        Cabinets (de power not included)
EQ-PRESU                      0.81g            0.81 g       Pressurizer safety valves EQ-PRHR                       0.60g            0.60g*       IRWST EQ-RECIR                      0.96g            0.51 g*
EQ-XADMA                      0.96g            0.51g
/m    EQ-XCIC                       0.81g            0.51g
* EQ-X1W2A                      0.60g            0.51g*
Notes:
Exc.Supp    =      Excluding support systems Inc.Supp    =      Including suppon systems
   *           =      Driven by de power failures
   "'          =      If seismically induced IRWST (tank) failure is excluded, the HCLPFs of the three                    I mitigating functions, PRHR, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation, become:
EQ-PRHR                              0.96g    (Driven by AOVs; excluding passive MOVs, and HX failure which is accounted for in EQ-LLOCA)
EQ-IW2AB and EQ-XIW2A                0.96g    (Driven by valve HCLPFs)
EQ-RECIR                             0.96g    (Driven by valve HCLPFs)
(D
[ W65tingh0USe              hhw                    55-89 March 17,199 m:sprassec55-i.wpf:lb.031597

 @ Ed                                                          55. S:ismic Mxrgin Anitysis I
Table 55-10 Ol SEQUENCE IICLPFs                               ;
1 Seauence Name                HCLPF Value EQSTR-02                     0.58g EQRVF-02                     0.50g EQLLO-02                     0.96g EQLLO-03                     0.81g EQLLO-05                    0.96g EQLLO-06                     0.81g EQLLO-08                    0.96g EQLLO-09                    0.81g EQLLO-10                    0.81g EQLLO-11                    0.81g EQSLO-02                    0.96g EQSLO-03                    0.81g EQSLO-04                    0.81g EQSLO-05                    0.81g EQSGT-02                    0.96g EQSGT-03                    0.65g EQSGT-04                    0.65g EQSGT-05                    0.65g EQSLB-02                    0.96g EQSLB-03                    0.81g EQSLB-04                    0.81g EQSLB-05                    0.81 g EQATW-02                    OS6g EQATW-03                    0.96g EQATW-04                     0.51g EQATW-05                     0.63g
' EQATW-06                    0.81g                                                          !
EQATW-07                    0.60g                                                          i EQLSP-03                    0.96g EQLSP44                     0.60g EQLSP-05                    0.60g EQLSP-10                    0.63g EQLSP-ll                    0.60g (goes to SLOCA)
EQLSP-12                    (goes to SLOCA) tarch 17,1997                                                       W Westinghouse mVraisec55-1 wpf:lb:031597                          55-90 l

_ _ _ . _ _ _ .           . _ _ . = . _ . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . _        .      _ . . . . . _ _ _ _    .       ._ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .
$                                                                                                                                 == ==;
                                                                                                                                  ~
: 55. Sekmie Mirgin Analysis                                                                                                    E f                                                                                                                                   A 1
1 Notes:
: 1.         The EQ-LOSP event sequences for the 0.09g evaluation have mixed cutsets only. These cutsets are given in Attachment SSB. The EQ-LOSP event sequences for the 0.50g evaluation are the same as the SLOCA cutsets ANDed with the EQ-PRHR event.
l
;                  2.         The EQ-SGTR sequence HCLPF is obtained by replacing the EQ-SLOCA HCLPF value of 0.81g with the EQ-SGTR HCLPF value of 0.65g in the corresponding SMA sequences.
<                  3.          The EQ-SLB sequence HCLPF is obtained by replacing the EQ-SLOCA HCLPF value of 0.81g with the EQ-SLB HCLPF value of 0.81g in the corresponding SMA sequences. Since both events j                              have the same HCLPF, their corresponding sequence HCLPFs are also identical.
l
{                                                                                                                                                   l l
'                                                                                                                                                   \
I
                                                                                                                                                    )
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l O             T MinghouS8                            S6                                                 March 17,1 55-9]                             m:\Pra\seC55-1 WP          f :lb:031597 l

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::      m~
: 55. Siismic M!rgin Anr_ lysis Table 55-11 O
SMA MIXED CUTSETS Event No. Cutset              Basic Event Name                                          Prob. (or !"'' 8"C) 1       0.50g
* 3.27E-01 EQ-LEV-ATWS (seismically induced ATWS occurs)                0.5g UET-OCCURS (plant in UET)                                 0.327 2       0.50g
* 1.35E-03 EQ LEV-ATWS (seismically induced ATWS occurs)                0.5g NO-UET (No UET)                                           0.673 PRZR-SV-FAIL (Pressurizer safety v-Ives fail to open)     2.0E-03 1
3       0.50g
* 1.10E-03 EQ-LEV-ATWS (seismically induced ATWS occurs)                0.5g                        l ADX-MV-GO (common cause failure of 4 out of 4 ADS Stage 2 & 3 MOVs)                                      1.10E-03                   j l
4        0.81g
* 1.10E-03 EQ-LEV-SLOCA (seismically induced small LOCA)               0.81g                       ;
ADX-MV-GO (common catise failure of 4 out of 4                                        l ADS Stage 2 & 3 MOVs)                                      1.00E-03                   j i
Y ste:
  * = Boolean logic "AND"                                                                                         9l l
l 1
Draft                                                                ENEL March 17,1997                                                        mw~                       Westirighouse l  m:yrassec551.wpf:1b:03t?97

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               ,m p                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ,-
en Table 55-12                                                                                                   !^
m 1$                                                                                                                                                                                                    LARGE RELEASE IICLPFS                                                                                                                                                                    B-CO\l% TENTS I
Core Damage ICD) Sequenn                                     CD amt Cent.
Structure CD ami Ceed.
teolation CD and Cent.
Coeling CD and Cent. Othee Failure                                                               Failure 10.85g)                                                                                             Failure        issues                                                                                         3 2
3-                                                                                            1858cl                                                                                                                                                                            (8.SRgl M
0 SRg                                                                                                                                                                               -           -    All coettainmesit structural failures, leading so large relesw. are accounted for I.QSilt 42             0 58p                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            3 o                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      in this sequear c
This sequence is assumed to tie a larFe release after failure of the reactor g
       "D                          0 50g                                                                             -                                                                                                                                                                                050g C    EQRVF-02                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         vessel                                                                                 so EQIIIF02               0 %g                                                                              -                                                                              0 %g                                                                                  0 %g a
0 Rig                                                                                                                                      0 Rig (Newe 3p                                                                                              0 Rig g
EQtLO 03 E      I:Ql10-05              0 %g                                                                              -                                                                              0 %g                                                                                  0 %g
!    A O Rig                                                                                                                                                            O Rig                                                                                 O Rig
{      FQl .lD-06                                                                                               -
0 %g                                                                                                     Cone Isolatwn alrrmfy has f.nled in CD sequence i           I.QllD-08              0 %g 0 Rip                                                                                                    Cons isolation alremtv has taaled en O) sequence g      1:Ql.l A k04           0 Alg 0 Fig                                                                                                                                                             0 Rip                                                                                                   Cone Isolanon already has failed in CD sequence 001.11b10                                                            _
O Rig                                                                                O Rig I Ql.lD-Il             O Rig                                                                              -
l           EQSt 0-02              0 %g                                                                               -                                                                              0 %g                                                                                 0 %g O Rig                                                                              -                                                                              08tg                                                                                 O Nig l           I QSI O-01 O Rig Y          EQSt.O-04             0 81g                                                                                                                                                             O Rig h          EQSLO O5              O Rig                                                                              -                                                                              O Rig                                                                                O Rig 0 %g    Nwe i EQSGT42               0 %g 0 65g                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              0 65g   N<we i EQSGT-03 0 65g                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              0 65g   Mwe i I:QSGT-04 0 65p                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              0 65p   Note i EQsGT-05 FOATW-02              0 %g                                                                                                                                                               0 %g                                                                                0 %g EQAlW-03              0 %g                                                                                -                                                                              0 %g                                                                                0 %g 0 5tg                                                                                                                                                       t%we 3h                                                                                               0 513   Nwe 2 EQAlW-04 EQATW-05               0 6tg                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0 6tg   Mwe 2 E QATW-06              0 Alg                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0 Alg   Swe 2 0 Nhr                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             0 60g   Note 2 I QA1W47 I'.Q IEV LOSP          0 60g                                                                                                                                                             0 Rig                                                                               O N)g               (fiw the evaluation as 0 50Fl g
0 58g                                                                                      0 Rig                                                                              0 60g       050g d           Plant HCLPF for I.arge Releae by Category Overall Plant Ild.PF for Impe Release                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    0 50g L  A
   , =r eC                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   :li 3$E S q ;p
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      !H!!n

1
                                                                                                                  \
: 55. Seismie Margin Analysis Notes:
Gl 1       The SGTR with core damage is assumed to result in containment bypass through the failed SG tube and secondary safety / relief valves.
2       The vessel failure is assumed to result in containment bypass because containment failure is assumed to occur with the reactor vessel failure,                                                                    j
                                                                                                                  )
3       The containment isolation failure HCLPF is 0.51g for events where Class IE de power has already failed    1 in the core damage sequence.                                                                              !
O Draft March 17,1997                                                         hhe_               T Westingh0USB myraisec55 I.wpr:Ib:031797                              55-94

Table 55-13                                                                           y k                                       MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACTION SENSITIVITY m
B-
:E                                                                                                                                                              !.
n a                                                                                                                 EVENT PROB.        IDENTIFIER g._. NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                             7 1    3.87E-08       16.9) SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSiTE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E+00            EQ-IEV-IDSP O                                       FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1               E C                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                     6.10E-05            CCX-AV-LA
      $                                       OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                     3.02E-02            ADN-MAN 01               f 2    3.23E-08       14.13 SEISMICALLY INDUCE 9 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)             1.00E+00            EQ-IEV-LOSP 2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1               re FAILURE OF A S*'.CONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PCRVI                                                           G' COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                         5.10E-05            CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                     3.02E-02            ADN-MAN 01
(
n A             3    1.72E-08        7.52   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWEh EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)            1.00E*00            EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CIASE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1
{                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPDI                                     6.10E-05            CCX-AV-LA p
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA/ TRANSIENT)          1.34E-02            LPM-MAN 01 4    1.44E-08        6.30   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)            1.00E+00            EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CIASE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                         5.10E-05            LMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO PECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA/ TRANSIENT)          1.34E-02            LPM-MAN 01 5    1.28E-08        5.60 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g1              1.00E*00            EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1 u                                                                                                                        6.10E -05           CCX-AV-LA u                                             COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 ACVS TO OPEN 1.00E-02            ALL-IND-FAIL h
u FAILURE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS 6    1.07E-08        4.68   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)            1.00E+00            EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                         5.10E-05            CMX-CV-OO FAILURE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                1.00E-02            ALL-IND-FAIL 7    1.00E-04        4.37 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                    1.00E-02            OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)            1.00E+00            EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT)               4.78E-04            IWX-XMTR OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)           1.00E-01            REN-MAN 04 8    9.87E-09        4.32   CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                  1.00E-02            OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)            1.00E+00            EQ-!EV-14SP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1 COMMO*i CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                4.70E-05            CCX-BY-PN 9    6.30E-09        2.76 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                    1.00E-02            OTH-SCTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)            1.00E*00            EQ-IEV-LOSP g                                                                                                                       2.10E-02            OTH-SLSOV1 FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE              3.00E-05            ADX-EV-SA ww aF t,                                                                                                                   ,
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3 E t::!                                                                            Table 55-13 (Cont.)                                                                 i m]
4m'
*AN
* MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACTION SENSITIVITY                                                                           g.jg (3
g.
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER Om         HUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME h              10     6.30E-09           2.76   CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS SEISMICALLY INDL*CED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVE'fT (HCLPF = 0.09g) 1.00E-02 1.00E+00 OTH-SGTR EO-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/POPV)                                   2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1
-J                                              COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES                                        3,00E-05    IWX-CV-AO 11     5.46E-09           2.39 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                       1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEIS19ICALLY INDUCED I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.t39)                              1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                   2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES                                        2.60E-05    IWX-EV-SA 12     5.46E-09           2.39 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                       1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INOUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                               1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/POPV)                                   2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIRC LINES                                        2.60E-05    IWX-EV4-SA 13     5.04E-09           2.20 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                       1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED INSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                               1.00E+00    EQ-1EV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDAPY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                   2.10E-02    OTM-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                                                    2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR 14     4.59E-09           2.01 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP u                                               COMMON CAUSE FAILL'PE OF PRHR AOVs                                                            9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA M                                               COMMON CAUSE FAILORE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IPWST. BAT)                                  4.78E-04    IWX-XMTR h                                               OPERitTOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)                             1.00E-01    REN-MAN 04 Ch
               ?"     4.51E-09           1.97   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWFR EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                               1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                             9.60E-05    PKX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATT2 RIES                                                   4,70E-05    CCX-BY-PN 16     3.48E-09           1.52 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR ADVs                                                             9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MUVs TO OPEN                                     1.10E-03    ADX-MV-GO
{
e                                           OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCA)                                        3.30E-02    LPM-MAN 02 1.40 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.04 ;)                                1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP
(*         17     3.19E-09 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR ACVs                                                             9.60E-05    PKX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN                                     I.10E-03    ADX-MV-C3 OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                        3.02E-02    ADN-MAN 01 12e le     2.88E-C9           1.26   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                               1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LSP      7 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                                             9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IRWST If&IECTION CHECK VALVES                                       3.00E-05    IWX-CV-AO       Ch a
19      2.88E-09           1.26   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HOLPF = 0.09g)                               1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LOSP 1                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE 9.60E-05 3.00E-05 PXX-AV-LA ADX-EV-SA k
6 7
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v l                                                                                                                                Table 55-13 (cont.)                                                     y m
MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACTION SENSITIVITY                                                    B-
:E                                                                                                                                                                                                             E.
n a                                                                                                                                                                            EVENT PROS. IDDEIFIER             y g        NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME
               --.... ........... ....... ................... -.......... -......... -....-- ......-- ............ .........-- .................                                                                     g y
bQ            20                           2.52E-09                                                  1.10 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                             1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR             $
SE!SMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E*00    EQ*IEV-LOSP          E C                                                                                                         FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1
      $                                                                                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING    1.20E-05    REX-FL-GP 21                           2.52E-09                                                  1.10 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                             1.00E-02 1.00E+00 OTH-SGTR EQ-IEV-LOSP h
wi SEISMICALLY INDUCED IASS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.090)                                      I FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OP' STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                    1.20E-05    IWX-FL-CP
(
E 4             22                           2.50E-09                                                  1.09 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)       1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA
(                                                                                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQU!B VALVES IN PECIRC LINES 2.60E-05    IWX-EV4-SA g             23                           2.50E-09                                                  1.09   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES              2.60E-05    IWX-E*>-SA 24                            2.31E-09                                                 1.01   CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                           1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)     1.00E+00    EO-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-t2    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE               1.10E-05    CCX-FMXMOD1-SW tA tb SEISMICALLY INDUCED ISSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP h
Q 25                            2.30E-09                                                 1.01 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                          2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR 26                             1.81E-09                                                  .79  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                           1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)     1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CIASE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-02    OTM-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                              8.62E-06    CCX-EP-SAM 27                             1.15E-09                                                  .50  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLFF = 0.09g)     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                     1.20E-05    IWK-FL-GP l    28                             1.15E-09                                                  .50  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)     1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREDI PLUGGING    1.20E-05    P EX - FL-G P 29                              1.06E-09                                                 .46  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (f*LPF = 0.09g)     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWAPE               1.10E-05    CCX-FMXMODI-SW g
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Table 55-13 (cont.)                                                            ms.:
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* 5                              MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACrlON SENSITIVITY                                                          :idy.h aa b.*                                                                                                               EVDIT PROB. IDENTIFIER NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME h., e a E
6 4           30       1.06E-09    46 SEISMICALLY INDUCr'D LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.09g)           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                         9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA
                     $                                                                                                                  1.10E-03     ADX-MV-CO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN
                     -J                                       FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS               1.00E-02     ALL-IND-FAIL
                                                         .44                                                                            1.00E-02     OTH-SGTR 31       1.00E-09        CONSFOUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS SEISMICALLY INDUCED IASS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E+00     EQ - 1 EV-IDS P FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT)              4.78E-04     IWX-XMTR FAILURE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS               1.00E-02     ALL-IND-FAIL 32       R.2BE-10   .36  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                         9.60E-05     FXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                                    9.62E-06     CCX-EP-SAM
                                                         .29                                                                            1 00E-02     OTH-SGTR 33       6.53E-10        CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT IDGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)             1.03E-04     CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                    3.02E-02     ADN-MM101
                                                         .20  SEISMICALLY INDUCED IaSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP u               34       4.59E-10 9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA W                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs 4.78E-04      IWX-XMTR h                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT) 00                                       FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS               1.00E-02     ALL-IND-FAIL CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                 1.00E-02     OTH-SCTR 35       4.30E-10   .19 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gh           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF FMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)             1.03E-04     CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL WORKS)          1.99E-02     REN-MAN 02 1.00E+00     REN-MAN 04C g
36       3.35E-10   .15  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT EHCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E+C0     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1
{                                     CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                             7.27E-04     CMA-PLUG CMT FLOW 1VNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                             7.27E-04     CMB-PLUG OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                    3.02E-02     ADN-MAN 01 un 1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-I4SP        Vs 37       3.26E-10   .14  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.099)
* COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF FRHR AOVs                                         9.60E-05      PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)             1.03E-04     CCX-INPUT-t4GIC     C#1 OPEPATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCA)                    3.30E-02      LPM-MAN 02         2.
I                                                                                                                                                !.
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Table 55-13 (Cont.)                                                  T m
MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACTION SENSITIVITY                                                                                                                                                                                                        @-
E.
E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              IDDfTIFIER n
EVENT PROB.                                      p NUMRER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME g.-.       ...... ........... ....... ...................... ................... ............................. ........... .................                                                                                                                                                                                                         g 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-14SP                         N hO             38     2.99E-10                                                        .13          SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)
COMPON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs 9.60E-L     PXX-AV-LA CCX-INPUT-LOGIC F
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                                                                                                      1.03E-04 3.02E-02    ADN-MANO!
: h.                                                                                                OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS 2.9CE-10                                                        .13          CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR 39                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     1.90E+00    EQ-IEV-lhSP                          in SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                                                     E' 2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
COMMON cat;SE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                                                                                                     1.03E-04    CCX-INPUT-LOGIC y                                                                                                   OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA/ TRANSIENT)                                                                                                                                  1.34E-02    LPM-MAN 01
    ;;k A
40     2.52E-10                                                         .11         CONSEQUENTIAL 9GTR OCCURS 1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR ha                                                                                                  SEISMICALLY INI?JCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                   1.00E+00    EQ-!EV-LOSP 2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
COMMON CAUSE FATLURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE 1.20E-06    CCX-SFTW g
41     2.44E-10                                                         .11         CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                                                                                          1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                    1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                                                                                       2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                                                                                                                                         3.84E-05    CMX-VS-FA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                             3.02E-02    AIM-MAN 01 t>i t>t                 42     2.16E-10                                                          .09        CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                                                                                          1.00E-02    OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.0991                                                                                                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP h
c                                                                                                        FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                                                                                       2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE) 1,03E-04    CCX-INPUT-LOGIC FAILURE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                                                                                                                                       1.00E-02    ALL-INU-FAIL 43    1.97E-10                                                           .09        SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                   1.00E+C0    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                 9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                                                                                                      1.03E-04   CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS.TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP FECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL WORKS)                                                                                                                                   1.99E-02   REN-MAN 02 1.00E+00   REN-MAN 04C 44     1.93E-10                                                          .08        SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                    1.00E+00   EQ-!EV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                 9.602-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                             6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCA)                                                                                                                                             3.30E-02   LPM-MAN 02 45     1.77E-10                                                          .08         SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                   1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                  9.60E-05    PKX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                            6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                            3.02E-02
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .        ADN-MAN 01 g
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m MEC 6my Table 55-13 (Cont.)                                                                                                              i:
E 2 ::P                                                                                                                                                                                                    ni R#                                        MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACTION SENSITIVITY                                                                                                           mHih 0:
bP                                                                                                                     EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER
[&me       NUMBER CUTSET PROB PEPCENT PASIC EVENT NAME
                                          ==J 46             1.62E-10  .07   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)              1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LOSP o                                                                                                                       9.60E-05        PXX-AV-LA f                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                           5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO 4                                          OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR PCS DEPR. (MLOCA)                       1.30E-02        LPM-MAN 02 47            1.49E-10  .07   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.0991              1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                  2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1 CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                                7.27E-04        CMA-PLUG CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                                7.27E-04        CMB-PLUG OPERATOR FAILS TO PECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA/TPANSIENT)             1.34E-02        LFM-MAN 01 48            1.48E-10  .06   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E+00        EQ.IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                            9.60E-05        PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                           5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                       3.02E-02        ADN-MAN 01 49            1.22E-10  .05   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF CFFS)TE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVJ                                            9.60E-05        PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                   3.84E-05        CMX-VS-FA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCA)                       3.30E-02        LPM-MAN 02
* 50            1.15E-10  .05   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LOSP 9.60E-05         PXX-AV-LA Y                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE                                 1.20E-06        CCX-SFTW "8           51            1.15E-10  .05   SEISMICALLT INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E+00         EO-!EV-IMSP FAILUPE OF P-RHR DUE TO 1RWS TANK FAILUPE                                    2.40E-06         IWNTK001AF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TPANSMITTERS (IPWST. BAT)                 4.79E-04         IWX-XMTP OPEPATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR . (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)            1.00E-01        PEN-MAN 04 52            1.15E-10 . 05 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LOSP PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                           2.40E-06         PCNHROOIML
                                          ]
5                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IPWST. BAT)                 4.78E-04 1.00E-01 IWX-KMTR R D4-MAN 04 N                                       OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILSI 6=        $3            1.13E-10   .05  SEISMICAT,LY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.09g)             1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILURE                                    2.40E-06         IWNTK001AF CCX-BY-PN COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                   4.70E-05 tn SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LOSP                                                   W 54            1.13E-10   .05
* PLUG / LEAK OF PPHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                           2.40E-06         PCNHR001ML COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                   4.70E-05         CCX-BY-PN                                                     (#1 2.
55            1.11E-10   .05  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)              1.00E*00         EQ-!EV-LOSP PXX-AV-IA                                                     h.
I                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HFATED RTD SENSORS 9.60E-05 3.84E-05         CMX-VS-FA                                                     M 7
OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                       3.02E-02         ADN-MAN 01 Y
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m J                                                                                                                                           J                                                                                                                       U Table 55-13 (cont.)                                                                                                                               y m
MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP OPERATOR ACTION SENSITIVITY                                                                                                                                                           E.
E rY NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVDIT NAME                                                                                                                                 EVDfT PROB.              IDENTIFIER                                                            p
                        -   ...... ....- ....- ..-.... ---.....-..--......-...........- ----...--....... --..........- -------. ---- ... -.                                                                                        ....-..-.......                                                     m 56    1.11E-10                                         .05  SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                 1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LOSP O                                                                  FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                     2.10E-02               OTH-SLSOV1                                                           3'""
CMA-PLUG h
g CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS CMT F14W TUNING ORIFICE PLtMS 7.27E-04 7.27E-04               CMB-PLUG FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                                                     1.00E-02               ALL-IND-FAIL                                                         l 1.00E-02               OTH-SGTR                                                             wi 57    1.00E-10                                         .05  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                                                                                                   E' SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.0999                                                 1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                     2.10E-02               OTH-SLSOV1 M
l;                                                                    COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CNT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                                                      3.94E-05               CMX-VS-FA A                                                                     OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA/ TRANSIENT)                                               1.34E-02               LPM-MAN 01 I  a      58    9.89E-11                                         .04  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITF. POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                1.00E+00               EQ-1EV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                               9.60E-05               PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                   1.03E-04               CCX-INPUT-IMGIC FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                                                     1.00E-02               ALL-IND-FAIL th Y
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: 7. p-MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP 72-IlOUR MISSION TIME SENSITIVITY
     "                                                             *****  DOMINANT uUTSETS *****
L

==Title:==
AP600 S?tA IDSP EVENT MIXED CITTSETS 4       Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.97 E-CB g          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                         EVENT FROB. IDENTIFIER g3         ....._ ___.______. ...____ ............._____.___.___.________...____..______..__.........__....... _.____..... ___.....___......
  -4 1    4.51E-09         11.65 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDl? (HCLPF = 0.09g)                    1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAdSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                                 9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                        4.70E-05    CCX-BY-PN PXX-AV-IA         occurs initially when the CMT is actuated: it is not affected by 72-hour mission time.
CCX BY-PN         occurring in 24-72 hours does not affect the 24-hour batt eries. since they have already per formed their actuation f unct ions and are already depleted by that time.

== Conclusion:==
The cutset probability is not af f ect ed by 72-hour mission t ime.
2    3.87E-09         10.00 SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITI: POWER EVENT IHCLFF = 0.09g)                   1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-IDSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                       2.10E-02    OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                            6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                            3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 31 g         OTH-SLSOV!        secondary side valves are possibly challenged at the beginning of t he event, after failure of MFW and EFW.        They are not expected u                           to be challenged later in the event. Thus, the probability is not af f ected by the 72-hour mission t ime, o        CCI-AV-LA         occur s initially when the CMT is actuated it is not af f ected by 72-hour mission time.
* occurs within the 24-hours; can not be effected by the 72-hour mission time. Actually. a longer mission time would have allowed ADN-MAN 01 h        

== Conclusion:==

more diagnosis and success likelihood. it it were applicable.
The cutset probability is not af f ected try 72-hour mission time.
3   3.23E-09          9.34  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                   1.00E*0C    EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/POpVI                       2.10E-02    CTTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 Off CHECK VALVES TO OFEN                                5.10E-05    CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                            3.02E-0)    ADN-MAN 01 secondary side valves are possibly challenged at the beginning of the event, af ter f ailure of MFW ard SFW.
f
     =
OTH-SLSOV1 to be challenged later in the event. Thus, the probability is not af fected by the 72-hour mission time.
They are not expected I*     CMX-CV-00 ADN-MAN 01 occurs initially when the CNT is actuated: it is not af f ected by 72-hour mission time.
occurs within the 24-hours: can not be affected by the 72-hour mission time. Act ually, a longer mission time would have a!! owed more diagnosis and success likelihood. if it were applicable.

== Conclusion:==
The cutset probability is not affected by 72-hour mission time.
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Table 55-14 (cont.)                                                l I                                 z g                                    MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP 72-IIOUR MISSION TIME SENSITIVITY E
3

==Title:==
AP600 SMA LOSP EVENT MIKED CUTSETS
                                                                    ..... _ NAN, _ SE,S .....                                                                                           3 3D Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.87 E-08                                                                                                                                        g h
gpp NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                            EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER
               ...... __....___.. ... ... ... ._____............................__.......................__....... ..... __... ......--.. ......                                        p 3
83 4   2.88E-09         7.44   SEISMICALLY INDUCED I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g1      1.00E.00    EQ-IEV-LOSP                                          T COfMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PWHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05    PKK-AV-LA                                            5.
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECE VALVES               3.00E-05    IWX-CV-AO E
5       PKI-AV-LA        occurs initially when the CMT is actuated it is not af f acted by 72-hour mission time A       IWK -CV- AO      occurs within t he 24-hour period; not affected by 72-hour mission time.
The cutset probability is not affected by 72-hout mission time.
{       conclusion:
5    2.88E-09        7.44   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)      1.00E+00    EQ -I EV -IDS P COPMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AGVs                                    9.60E-05    FIK-AV-LA COPMON CAUSE FAIIERE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE        3.00E-05    ADI-EV-SA 6    2.50E-09         6.46  SETSMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT lHCLPF = 0.099)      I.00E.00    EQ-IEV-LOSP CODMON CAUSE FAILUBE OF PRHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05    Fxx-AV-LA CODMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIRC LINES               2.60E-05    IW1-EV4-SA
                      ?    2.50E-09         6.46  SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT {HCLPF = 0.099)      1.00E.00    EQ-IEV-ICSP e                                               COMMON CAtJSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05    FXI-AV-IA COF90N CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST !!LTECTION SQUIB VALVES              2.60E-05    IWK-EV-SA
  ]
B    2.30E-09         5.94  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.099 1     1.0CE.00    EQ-IEV-IDSP CODMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRNR AOVs                                    9.60E-05    PME-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS IE INVERTERS                           2.40E-05    CCK-IV-xp E
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&n4 ;v                                                                                                                                                                  p R 2"                                                                                                                                                         - :itiid yp                                        MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP 72.IIOUR MISSION TIME SENSITIVITY w#
Y                                                                 ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****
L

==Title:==
AP600 SMA EDSP MVENT MIXED CU* SETS
    ''J      Reduced Susa of Cut sets: 3.87 E-08 NUMBER CUTSET PPOB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                 EVErrF PROB. IDENTIFIER 3
9    1.72E-09       4.44 SEISMICALLY INDUCED EDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT {HCt.PF = 0.099)             1.00E+00      EQ- I EV-thSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SVIPORVI                2.10E-02      OTH-ELSCV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                     6.10E-05      CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO PECOGN!ZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SIDCA/ TRANSIENT)           1.34E-03     LPM-MANOR 10     1.44E-09       3.72 SEISMICALLY INDUCED EDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (MCLPF = 0.09g)               1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORVi                2.1CE-02      OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 Cifr CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                        5.10E-05      CMX -CV -GO OPERATOR FAILS TO PECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SIDCAITR ANSIENT)           1.34E-03     LFM-MAN 01 11     1.2ME-09       3.31 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gt                1.COE*00    EQ'IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PGPV)                 2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                      6.10E-05     CCX-AV-ta FAILUPE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR CPERATOR ACTIONS                 1.CCE-03     ALL-IND-FAIL

== Conclusion:==
The cutset probability is not affected by 72-hour mission time, for t he same reasons as mentioned in cutset s 1 through 4.
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MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP 72.IIOUR MISSION TIME SENSITIVITY                                                                                                                                           g, g                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               e
                                                                                                                                            *"" DOMINANT CUTSETS "*'                                                                                                                                3 92 "3__      Tit le t AP600 SMA LOSF EVENT MIXED CUTSETS Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.87 E-08                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     g 2
hg NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVEffT MAME EVDIT PRCB. IDENTIFIER y
a 2.97                  SEISMICALLY INIMJCED EDSS OF OFF3ITE POWEP EVENT tHCLFF = 0.09g'    1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP                                                                                     k 12    1.15E-09 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHP AOVs                                    9.60E-05     FXK-AV-LA                                                                                       ".
E COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCPEEN PLUGGIN3     1.20E-05     PEK-FL-GP is         FKX-AV-LA             occurs initially when the CMT is actuated; it is not af f ected by 72-hour mission time.
5                                 if plugging does not exist initially, but is a function of gradual buildup when water flows through the screens, then the basic A          PEX-FL-CP event probability may go up by a f actor of 3 (72124).
{-        

== Conclusion:==
If sump plugging is a function of water flow, then the cutset probability may go up by a factor of 3.
The increase = 2*1.15E-09 = 2.3 E-09.
13    1.15E-09                                          2.97                  SEISMICALLY INDUCED 1 DSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF e 0.09gt    1.00E*00     EQ - I EV-LDSP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05     FXK-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                     1.20E-05     IWX-FL-GP g                 FKX-AV-LA              occurs initially when the CMT is actuated; it is not affected by 72-hour mission time.
u*                IWX-FL-GP              if plugging does not exist initially, but is a function of gradual buildup when water flows through the screens, then the basic event probability may go up by a f actor of 3 (72/241 If supp pluqqing is a function of water flow, thrn the cutset probability may go up by a f actor of 3.
           ]
u

== Conclusion:==

The increase = 2*1.15E-09 = 2.3 E-09.
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     "                                                         ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****
Titlet AP600 SMA EDSP EVENT MIKED CUTSETS
     %I     Reduced Suse of Cutsets: 3.87 E-08 EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                       --- -.----- .---- ---....-- -
14     1.07E-09      2.76   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDfT (HCLPF = 0.09gl   1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDAPY SICE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)       2.10E-02          OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO CPEN                 5.10E-05          CMK-CV-GO FAILURE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS       1.00E-03          ALL-IND-FAIL 15     1.06E-09      2.74   SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-IDSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs                                  9.60E-05          PKX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT IDGIC SOFTWARE               1.10E-05         CCK-FMXMOD1-SW 16     8.28E-10      2.14 SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gt      1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRMR AOVs                                 9.60E-G5           PKK- AV-IJL COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                             8.62E-06         CCX-EP-SAM 17     4.59E-10      1.19 SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)      1.00E+00          EQ -I EV - LOS P COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs                                  9.60E-05          PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTEPS (IPWST. BAT)       4.78E-04          Iwx-xMTP OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGMAL FAILSI   1.00E-02          REN-MAN 04 M                18     3.46E-10        .90  SEISMICALLY IN00CED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLFF = 0.099)    1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LOSP 9.60E-05          PKX-AV-LA Y
*==*
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR ADVs CUP 940N CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN        I.10E-03          ADX-MV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCAD             3.30E-03          LPM-MAN 02 ai s
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1                                                                                                                                                                                                               2.
g                                                                          MIXED CUTSETS FOR LOSP 72-IIOUR MISSION TIME SENSITIVITY                                                                           [
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* DCMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* 3 ta 3       Title AP600 SMA LOSP EVENT MINED CtfrSETS                                                                                                                                                            y h        Reduced Stem of Cutset s: 3.87 E-08 IDENTIFIER           2 h
gpg NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROS.
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83 19    3.19E-10                                                 .82                             St.ISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF . 0.099)  1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSF        T**
COMMON CAUSE FA11MRE OF PRHR AOVs                                  9.60E-05    FIX-AV-LA           E COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 /4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN         1.10E-03    ADK-HV-CO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                             3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01 k
r.
20    1.15E-10                                                 .30                             SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP
     #                                                                                                                                                                               9.60E-05    PIX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs
{=                                                                                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE                       1.20E-06    CCI-SFTW

== Conclusion:==
The cutset probability is not affected by 72-hour mission time, for the same reasons as mentioned in cutset s 1 through 4.
The total increase in the dominant cut sets examined: 4.6 E-09.
This is a 12% increase over t he base probability of 3.B7 E-08.
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ATTACIIMENT 55A SYSTEM IICLPF CALCULATIONS This attachment contains two sets of HCLPF calculation files for systems. The first set is without suppon systems; the second set is with suppon systems.
The calculations are labeled as:
Table 55A-1 EQ-AC2AB. CMP Table 55A-2 EQ-ADA. CMP Table 55A-3 EQ-CM2SL. CMP Table 55A-4 EQ-DC. CMP Table 55A-5 EQ-lW2AB. CMP Table 55A-6 EQ-PMS. CMP Table 55A-7 EQ-PRESU. CMP Table 55A-8 EQ-PRHR. CMP Table 55A-9 EQ-RECIR. CMP Table 55A-10 EQ-XADMA. CMP Table 55A-Il EQ-XCIC. CMP Table 55A-12 EQ-XIW2A. CMP
(   )       Table 55A-13 EQ-AC2AB.WLK V           Table 55A-14 EQ-ADA.WLK Table 55A-15 EQ-CM2SL.WLK Table 55A-16 EQ-DC.WLK Table 55A-17 EQ-lW2AB.WLK Table 55A-18 EQ-PMS.WLK Table 55A-19 EQ-PRESU.WLK Table 55A-20 EQ-PRHR.WLK Table 55A-21 EQ-RECIR.WLK Table 55A-22 EQ-XADMA.WLK Table 55A-23 EQ-XCIC.WLK Table 55A-24 EQ-XIW2A.WLK
 ,r3 W-W85tirighouse          Ed
                                    --                                                          March 17,1997 55A-1                         msp60&prauecssa wpr-ib:031597

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: 55. Seismic Margin Analysis 1
I Table 55A-1 EQ AC2AB. CMP 1
1 i
Cutset IICLPF   Basic Events in Cutset           Bane Event ilCLPF 1                            EQ-ACC-CV29                              0.96g i
1                 0.96g 2                            EQ-ACC-CV28                              0.96g 2                 0.96g 3                            EQ-ACC-MOV27                             0.96g 3                 0.96g                                                                                 -
4                            EQ-ACC-TANKS                             0.76g 4                 0.76g HCLPF = 0.76g O
4 4
1 1
1ar h 17,1997                                                                 W Westinghouse m:\ap600\pra\sec55a wpf;lb 031397                55A-2

:n:: ' mi.
: 55. Siismic Mirgin Analysis                                                              E        lE i
iO Table 55A 2
 ,                                           EQ ADA. CMP Cutset HCLPF         Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event HCLPF 1                                  EQ-ADS-S3MOVS                     0.81g 1             0.81g
.                 2                                  EQ-ADS-S2MOVS                     0.81g 2             0.81g 3                                  EQ-ADS-SiMOVS                     0.81g 3             0.81g 4                                  EQ-ADS S4 VALVES                  0.96g 4             0.96g 5                                  EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                    1.09g 4
5              1.09g 3                 6                                  EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                    1.27g 6              1.27g j
(}
V              7                                  EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                     I.27g 7              1.27g 8                                  EQ-CMT-AOV                        0.96g 8             0.96g 9                                  EQ-CMT-CV                         0.96g 4
4 9             0.96g HCLPF = 0.81g 4
)
4
[ Westingh00Se                  'a                                             Mad 17 99 55A-3                      msp600sprassec55a wpt:1b:03:397

iii" 'iiii m                                                                         55. Seismic Margin Analysis O
Table 55A-3 EQ-CM2SL. CMP Cutset IICLPF              Basic Events in Cutset      Basic Event in IICLPF 1                                            EQ-CMT-TANKS                        0.63g 1                          0.63g 2                                            EQ-CMT-AOV                          0.96g 2                          0.96g 3                                            EQ-CMT-CV                           0.96g 3                          0.96g HCLPF = 0.63g 9
l tar h 17,1997                                                        Y                 W Westinghouse m:\ap60mpra\sec55a wpf.lb:031597                       55A-4
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin An lysis Table 55A-4
,                                                     EQ-DC. CMP 4
Cutset ilCLPF          Basic Events in Cutset Basic Event IICLPF 1                                     EQ-TRSFSWITCH                    0.51g 1                      0.51g 2                                     EQ-DCMCC                         0.93g 2                       0.93g i                      3                                                                      0.54g EQ-CABLETRAY
;                      3                       0.54g 4                                     EQ-DCDISPANEL                    0.51g 4                       0.51g 5                                     EQ-DC-SWBRD                      0.51g 5                       0.51g 6                                     EQ-ACDISPANEL                    0.51g i
   ,                    6                      0.51g 7                                    EQ-INVERTER                      0.65g 7                      0.65g 4
8                                    EQ-BAT-RACK                       1.14g 8                       1.14g 9                                    EQ-BATTERY                        1.04g 9                       1.04g a
HCLPF = 0.51g (3
             .W  Westinghouse          EE                                                                    '*"
               -                       ma- -                                                  March 17,1997 55A-5                      mupunprassec55a.wpr.ib.03:397

  '         I                                                                         55. Seismic Margin Analysis Table 55A-5 e
EQ IW2AB. CMP Cutset IICLPF           Basic Esents in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 1                                            EQ-IRWST-TANK                         0.60g 1                             0.60g 2                                            EQ-IRW-INJSQ                          0.96g 2                             0.96g 3                                            EQ-IRW-INJCV                          0.96g 3                             0.96g 4                                            EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                       1.09g 4                             1.09g 5                                            EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                       1.27g 5                             1.27g 6                                            EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                        1.27g 6                             1.27g 7                                            EQ-CMT-AOV                            0.96g 7                             0.96g 8                                            EQ-CMT-CV                             0.96g 8                             0.96g HCLPF = 0.60g O
1ar h 17,1997                                                           '     '          W W85tingh0USB m:\ap600\pra\sec55a wpf;l b:03 I 397                     55A-6

Hi"     :=
: 55. Siismic M1rgin An: lysis                                                                i
(                                                                                                              i Table 55A-6 l                                                 EQ PMS. CMP Cutset ilCLPF           Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF i                                     EQ-INTEG. CAB                     0.74g
)
1                       0.74g 2                                      EQ-LOGIC-CAB                      0.74g 2                        0.74g 3                                      EQ-ESFAC-CAB                      0.74g i
i                  3                        0.74g HCLPF = 0.74g i                                                                                                                 <
J O
                                                                                                                  \
1 i
l I
i l
l W=
Westinghouse           EES
                                    " " ~ * " "                                             March 17,1997 55A-7                      mbp8XA Prtuc55a.wpf.lb-031397

4
:'/
   .   "li
         ~
: 55. Seismic Margin Analysis O
i                                                             Table 55A-7
+
EQ-PRESU. CMP j
4 Cutset IICLPF                        Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF I             I                                                      EQ-PRZR-SV                         0.81g 1                          0.81g HCLPF = 0.81g l
l l
l l
l 1
I i
e i
Draft March 17,1997                                                                 h        i_        [ Westingh00Se mtpux3prawc55a.wpf.lb:031397                                   55A-8
: 55. S:Ismic Mrrgin Analysis o                                                                                        Table 55A-8 EQ PRHR. CMP 4
Cutset HCLPF                                                  Basic Events in Cutset                     Basic Event HCLPF 1                                                                                             EQ-PRHR-XV                                             0.96g 1                                                    0.96g 2                                                                                             EQ-PRHR-MOV                                            0.81g 2                                                    0.81g 3                                                                                             EQ-IRWST-TANK                                          0.60g 3                                                    0.60g 4                                                                                             EQ-PRHR-HX                                             0.81g 4                                                    0.81 g 5                                                                                             EQ-PRHR-AOV                                            0.96g 5                                                    0.96g HCLPF = 0.60g i
I
                                                                  ""*                                                                                             March 17, I 55A.9                                               m: sap 600sprassecssawpr. b.03:397 j

_ .. -.          .       . ._ =       .    ..       . . . . _ _ -..-_ .- .. .. ....                      -     .    .-
ss +gl:
* E                                                                                     55. Seismic Mtrgin Anilysis O
Table 55A-9 EQ RECIR. CMP Cutset IICLPF           Basic Events in Cutset                  Basic Event IICLPF 1                                         EQ-IRW-RECSQ                                    0.96g 0.96g                                                                               I 1
2                                         EQ-IRW-RECCV                                    0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                                   0.96g 2                          0.96g                                                                               )
3                                         EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                                  1.27g 3                          1.27g HCLPF = 0.96g                                                                                                                 I l
l O
  !ar h 17,1997                                                                            :        W Wedb@0058 m sapanpraisec55a wpr;ib:031397                      55A-10

k E          =5
                                                                                                               *           =i
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin Anilysis p                                                                                                                         <
Table 55A-10 EQ-XADMA. CMP i
Cutset IICLPF            Basic Events in Cutset      Basic Event IICLPF 1                                      EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                        0.96g
]                      1                      0.96g
,                      2                                      EQ-CMT-LEVELS %T                        1.09g 2                      1.09g
.                      3                                      EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                         1.27g 3                      1.27g l                      4                                      EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                          1.27g 4                      1.27g 5                                      EQ-CMT-AOV                              0.96g 5                      0.96g 6                                      EQ-CMT-CV                               0.96g 6                      0.96g liCLPF = 0.96g l
a s
3 J
j 4
      .f3 W Westinghouse           EE,                                                                             '"
              -                        = = = ' =                                                     March 17,1997 55 A-11                         m: sap 600sprassec5sa wpt:ib.03:397

uu .
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin An11ysis O
Table 55A-ll EQ-XCIC. CMP Cutset IICLPF           Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event ilCLPF
                                                ~
1                                         EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                     1.27g EQ-MSL-SENSOR                      0.99g EQ-CONTPR-SENSOR                   1.27g 1                          1.27g 2                                         EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                    0.81g 2                          0.81g 3                                         EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                    0.81 g 3                          0.81g 4                                         EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                    0.81g 4                          0.81g 5                                         EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                    0.92g 5                          0.92g 6                                         EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                    2.00g 6                          2.00g HCLPF = 0.81g tar h 17,1997                                                           .           W Westinghouse m:wpunprassec55a.wpf:Ib:031397                     55A-12

                                                                                                      ==        :q
: 55. Siismic M1rgin Analysis                                                                            E O
U) t Table 55A-12 EQ XIW2A. CMP Cutset IICLPF            Basic Esents in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 1                                      EQ-IRWST-TANK                      0.60g 1                       0.60g 2                                      EQ-IRW-INJSQ                       0.96g 2                       0.96g 3                                      EQ-IRW-INJCV                       0.96g 3                       0.96g 4                                      EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                    1.09g 4                       1.09g 5                                      EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                    1.27g 5                       1.27g 6                                      EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                     1.27g
[#) ~
6                       1.27g 7                                      EQ-CMT-AOV                         0.96g 7                       0.96g 8                                      EQ-CMT-CV                          0.96g 8                       0.96g HCLPF = 0.60g
   "')     W-Westinghouse           E5fd
                                      = = ~ -
March 17,1997 55A-13                      m:wpaxwprasecssa wpr.ib:03:397

E +;ni E                                                                            55. Seismic Altrgin Anilysis O i lable 55A-13 EQ AC2AB.WLK l
Cutset IICLPF              Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 1                                              EQ-ACC-CV29                        0.96g               !
l                             0.96g 2                                              EQ-ACC-CV28                        0.96g 2                             0.96g                                                                   j 3                                              EQ-ACC-MOV27                       0.96g 3                             0.96g                                                                   j 4                                              EQ-ACC-TANKS                       0.76g 4                             0.76g HCLPF = 0.76g O
l I
1 h1ar h 17,1997                                                                  :           W W8Stingh0USB m:\ap600Npra\sec55a wpf:1 bf)31397                        55A-14

gu . . . . . .
* F
: 55. S;ismic M rgin Analysis                                                                                ;
1 m                                                                                                              I l
Table 55A-14                                                    l EQ-ADA.WLK                                                       ]
l Cutset IICLPF            Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF              l 1                                     EQ-ADS-S3MOVS                    0.81g 1                     0.81g 2                                     EQ-ADS-S2MOVS                    0.81g 2                     0.81g 3                                     EQ-ADS-SIMOVS                    0.81g 3                     0.81g 4                                     EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                 0.96g 4                     0.96g 5                                     EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                   1.09g 5                      1.09g 6                                     EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                   1.27g
(                 6                      1.27g 7                                     EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                    1.27g 7                      1.27g 8                                     EQ-CMT-AOV                       0.96g 8                     0.96g 9                                     EQ-CMT-CV                        0.96g 9                     0.96g 10                                     EQ-TRSFSWITCH                    0.51g 10                     0.51g 1I                                     EQ-DCMCC                         0.93g 11                     0.93g 12                                     EQ-CABLETRAY                      0.54g 12                      0.54g 13                                     EQ-DCDISPANEL                     0.51 g 13                      0.51g f~)
W=
Westinghouse          gg
                                    = = " " " "                                             March 17,1997 Dran J,
55A-15                      mtrMx^pravec55a wpr ib:03:397

l l
: 55. Seismic .Wrgin Anilysis Table 55A-14 (cont.)
e EQ ADA.WLK Cutset IICLPF           Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 14                                             EQ-DC-SWBRD                   0.51g 14                           0.51g 15                                             EQ-ACDISPANEL                 0.51g 15                           0.51g 16                                             EQ-INVERTER                   0.65g 16                           0.65g 17                                             EQ-BAT-RACK                   1.14g 17                            1.14g 18                                             EQ-BATTERY                    1.04g 18                            1.04g 19                                             EQ-INTEG-CAB                  0.74g 19                           0.74g 20                                               EQ-LOGIC-CAB                 0.74g 20                            0.74g 21                                              EQ-ESFAC-CAB                 0.74g 21                           0.74g HCLPF = 0.51g h1 arch 17,1997 T6,            W Westinghouse mtp60(Apra\sec55a wpf.1b.031397                        55 A-16

                                                                                                      =w       =.m~
: 55. Srismic Mrrgin Analysis O
Y Table 55A-15 EQ CM2SL.WLK j                                Cutset HCLPF             Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF                ,
1                                      EQ-CMT-TANKS                       0.63g
.                  1                       0.63g 2                                      EQ-CMT-AOV                         0.96g 2                       0.96g 3                                      EQ-CMT-CV                          0.96g 3                       0.96g HCLPF = 0.63g I
1 e
r (Q/
1 J
j i
l l
l l
W  Westinghouse           ESES
         ==                        = = = =                                                   March 17,1997 55A-17                      m:wp6coiprassec55a.wpr. i b:031397

Enn ' E@
*      {                                                                      55. Seismic Mirgin Anslysis O
Table 55A-16 EQ DC.WLK Cutset IICLPF           liasic Events in Cutset       Basic Event IICLPF 1                                        EQ-TRSFSWITCH                             0.51g 1                          0.51g 2                                         EQ-DCMCC                                 0.93g 2                          0.93g 3                                         EQ-CABLETRAY                             0.54g 3                          0.54g 4                                         EQ-DCDISPANEL                            0.51g 4                          0.51g 5                                         EQ-DC-SWBRD                              0.51 g 5                          0.51g 6                                         EQ-ACDISPANEL                            0.51g 6                          0.51g 7                                         EQ-INVERTER                              0.65g 7                          0.65g 8                                  -
EQ-BAT-RACK                              1.14g 8                           1.14g 9                                          EQ-BATTERY                               1.04g 9                           1.(Mg flCLPF = 0.51g tarch 17,1997                                                           e                 W W85tingh0USB m%p60mprasecssa wpr-ib:031397 55A-18

d5      EI5   '
: 55. Siismic MIrgin Analysis I
O N.)
Table 55A-17 EQ.IW2AB.WLK Cutset IICLPF            Basic Events in Cutset 11asic Event ilCLPF 1                                      EQ-lRWST-TANK                      0.60g 1                      0.60g 2                                       EQ-IRW-INJSQ                        0.96g 2                       0.96g 3                                      EQ-IRW-INJCV                        0.96g 3                      0.96g 4                                      EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                     1.09g 4                       1.09g 5                                      EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                     1.27g 5                       1.27g 6                                      EQ.PRZR-SENSOR                      1.27g 6                       1.27g 7                                      EQ-CMT-AOV                          0.96g 7                      0.96g 8                                      EQ-CMT-CV                           0.96g 8                       0.96g 9                                      EQ-TRSFSWITCH                       0.51g 9                       0.51g 10                                      EQ-DCMCC                            0.93g 10                       0.93g ii                                      EQ-CABLETRAY                        0.54g i1                       0.54g 12                                       EQ-DCDISPANEL                      0.51g 12                       0.51g                                                                    I 13                                       EQ-DC-SWBRD                         0.51g                 l 13                       0.51g W-Westinghouse         Er
                                ""~~ ra"=                                                   March 17,1997 55A-19                     m: sap 600sprassec55a wptib.031397

py    -t.
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin An: lysis O
Table 55A-17 (cont.)
EQ IW2AB.WLK Cutset IICLPF             Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 14                                             EQ-ACDISPANEL                  0.51g 14                         0.51g 15                                             EQ-INVERTER                    0.65g 15                         0.65g 16                                             EQ-BAT-RACK                    1.14g 16                          1.14g 17                                             EQ-BATTERY                     1.04g 17                          1.04g 18                                             EQ-INTEG-CAB                   0.74g 18                         0.74g 19                                             EQ-LOGIC-CAB                   0.74g 19                         0.74g 20                                             EQ-ESFAC-CAB                   0.74g 20                         0.74g HCLPF = 0.51g I
W Westinghouse O1 51ar h 17,1997                                                            '
m:up60mprasec55a wpf.ib:031397                      55A-20 I
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Anitysis                                                                                               5 o                                                    Table 55A-18 EQ.PMS.WLK Cutset ilCLPF              Basic Events in Cutset                           Basic Event IICLPF         l 1                                            EQ-INTEG CAB                                              0.74g 1                          0.74g 2                                            EQ-LOGIC-CAB                                              0.74g 2                          0.74g 3                                            EQ-ESFAC-CAB                                              0.74g 3                          0.74g HCLPF = 0.74g O
I W Westinghouse                fd'-                                                                               March 17,199 55A-21                                               mV*Pra\sec55a.wpf:Ib:031397 ,
t 1

d
: 55. Seismic Margin Anilysis e
Table 55A-19 EQ-PRESU.WLK Cutset ilCLPF                      liasic Events in Cutset            Ilasic Event liCLPF 3                                                       EQ-PRZR-SV                                  o. gig 1                             0.81g liCLPF = 0.8Ig i
e t
l Draft March 17,1997                                                                    E(Efr
                                                                                        ~"~
W~
Westfrighouse mtpuuprassec552wpr.Itro31397                                    55A-22
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin Anilysis o                                         Table 55A-20 EQ-PRilR.WLK Cutset IICLPF         Basic Events in Cutset    Basic Event IICLPF 1                                    EQ-PRHR-XV                         0.96g 1                    0.96g 2                                    EQ-PRHR-MOV                        0.81g 2                    0.81g 3                                    EQ-IRWST-TANK                      0.60g 3                    0.60g 4                                    EQ-PRHR-HX                         0.81 g 4                    0.81g 5                                    EQ-PRHR-AOV                        0.96g 5                    0.96g
, HCLPF = 0.60g d   W westinghouse            ("S.__
u,,c3 37, i,9$
55A-23                      'n b P"*P'assecs5. wpr.ib:03: 397

                                                                                                                          )
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Anr. lysis O
Table 55A-21 EQ RECIR.WLK Catset IICLPF           llasic Events in Cutset     liasic Event IICLPF 1                                        EQ-IRW-RECSQ                         0.96g 1                         0.96g 2                                        EQ-IRW-RECCV                         0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                        0.96g 2                         0.96g 3                                        EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                        1.27g 3                         1.27g 4                                        EQ-TRSFSWITCH                        0.51 g 4                         0.51g 5                                        EQ-DCMCC                             0.93g 5                         0.93g 6                                        EQ-CABLETRAY                         0.54g 6                         0.54g 7                                        EQ-DCDISPANEL                        0.51 g 7                         0.51g 8                                        EQ-DC-SWBRD                          0.51g 8                         0.51g 9                                        EQ-ACDISPANEL                        0.51 g 9                         0.51g 10                                        EQ-INVERTER                          0.65g 10                         0.65g 11                                        EQ-BAT-RACK                           1.14g 11                         1.14g 12                                        EQ-BATTERY                            1.04g 12                         1.04g 13                                        EQ-INTEG-CAB                         0.74g i3                         0.74g h1ar h 17,1997                                                          .            W W65tiligh0USB m%ranpraweessa wpr ib 031397                    55A-24
: 55. Seismic M:rgin An lysis o                                               Table 55A-21 (cont.)                  .
EQ RECIR.WLK l
Lutset ilCLPF          Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 14                                       EQ-LOGIC-CAB                   0.74g 14                      0.74g 15                                       EQ-ESFAC-CAB                   0.74g
{                     15                      0.74g
]            HCLPF = 0.51g                                                                                         i I
i l
O o
d           W==
Westinghouse         #88k m 'a- a''=
March 17,1997 55A-25                     mMP"Pr*\$ec55a wpr:ib:03:397

i iir     :
i-                                                                       55. Schmic M rgin Anzlysis I
Table 55A-22 EQ XADMA.WLK Cutset ilCLPF             Basic Events in Cutset    liasic Event ilCLPF 1                                           EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                   0.96g l
1                          0.96g                                                              '
I 2                                           EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                    1.09g 2                          1.09g 3                                           EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                    1.27g 3                          1.27g 4                                           EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                      1.27g 4                          1.27g 5                                           EQ-CMT-AOV                         0.96g 5                          0.96g 1
6                                           EQ-CMT-CV                          0.96g          ;
6                          0.96g 7                                           EQ-TRSFSWITCH                      0.51g 7                          0.51 g 8                                           EQ-DCMCC                           0.93g          ,
8                          0.93g 9                                           EQ-CABLETRAY                       0.54g 9                          0.54g 10                                           EQ-DCDISPANEL                      0.51g 10                          0.51g 1I                                           EQ-DC-SWBRD                        0.51 g 11                          0.51g 12                                           EQ-ACDISPANEL                      0.51g 12                          0.51g 13                                           EQ-INVERTER                        0.65g 13                          0.65g h1ar h 17,1997                                                         5                W Westinghouse m:hp60mprakec55a wpf- th:031397                      55A-26

1 as
                                                                                             ~
m;;
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin An-lysis                                                                      J O
\g Table 55A-22 (cont.)
EQ XADMA.WLK                                                i l
Cutset IICLPF           Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event HCLPF 14                                      EQ-BAT-RACK                   1.14g 14                     1.14g 15                                      EQ-BATTERY                    1.04g l
15                     1.04g 16                                      EQ-INTEG-CAB                  0.74g 16                     0.74g 17                                      EQ-LOGIC-CAB                  0.74g 17                     0.74g                                                              I l
18                                      EQ-ESFAC-CAB                  0.74g 18                     0.74g P    HCLPF = 0.51g Q                                                                                                       j 1
l
                                                                                                        )
i l
l l
[                                                                                                D'"
* W -
Westinghouse        MS
                                " " " ~ =
* March 17,1997 55A-27                     mWmprawc55a wpr.:b:03:397

ar      L
         '"                                                                    55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis O
Table 55A-23 EQ-XCIC.WLK Cutset ilCLPF             Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event ilCLPF i
1                                        EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                     1.27g             l EQ-MSL-SENSOR                      0.99g             l EQ-CONTPR-SENSOR                   1.27g i                       1.27g 2                                         EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                    0.81g 2                        0.81g                                                                 j 3                                         EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                    0.81g 3                        0.81g                                                                 i 4                                         EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                    0.81g             i 4                        0.81g 5                                        EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                    0.92g 5                       0.92g 6                                        EQ.WLS-AOV04/06                    2.00g 6                       2.00g 7                                        EQ-TRSFSWITCII                     0.51g 7                       0.51g 8                                        EQ-DCMCC                           0.93g 8                        0.93g 9                                        EQ-CABLETRAY                       0.54g 9                        0.54g 10                                         EQ-DCDISPANEL                      0.51 g 10                         0.51g ii                                         EQ DC-SWBRD                        0.51g 11                        0.51 g 12                                        EQ-ACDISPANEL                      0.51g 12                        0.51 g O
lar h 17,1997                                                                     W W85tingh0USB mAap60mprawc55a wpf Ib 031397                      55A-28

::= :==
i                                      55. Seismic Mrrgin An lysis                                                                                                   b                        ,
4 3
4                                                                                                                                                                                             !
i j                                                                               Table 55A-23 (cont.)
l                                                                                     EQ XCIC.WLK l                                                                Cutset HCLPF                               Basic Events in Cutset                    Basic Event HCLPF 13                                                  EQ-INVERTER                                    0.65g
,]
13             0.65g i                                                       14                                                  EQ-BAT-RACK                                     1.14g i                                                       14              1.14g                                                                                                                  !
i                                                       15                                                  EQ-BATTERY                                      1.04g i                                                                                                                                                                                              :
4 15              1.04g
}
j 16                                                  EQ-INTEG-CAB                                    0.74g
}                                                       16             0.74g 17                                                  EQ-LOGIC-CAB                                    0.74g i                                                       17             0.74g                                                                                                                   i i
j                                                       18                                                  EQ-ESFAC-CAB                                    0.74g j                                                       18             0.74g
                  ,                    HCLPF = 0.51g Y"        *W-                                                                                     March 17,1 55A-29                                      msp6(xxprassec55a.wpr:ib:03:397

I Em 4Ei  =
: 55. S:ismic Margin Anilysis O
Table 55A-24 EQ.XIW2A.WLK Cutset IICLPF           Basic Events in Cutset    Basic Event IICLPF 1                                         EQ IRWST-TANK                      0.60g 1                          0.60g 2                                         EQ-IRW-INJSQ                       0.96g 2                          0.96g 3                                         EQ-IRW-INJCV                       0.96g 3                          0.96g 4                                         EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                    1.09g 4                          1.09g 5                                         EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                    1.27g 5                          1.27g 6                                         EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                     1.27g 6                          1.27g 7                                         EQ-CMT-AOV                         0.96g 7                          0.96g 8                                         EQ-CMT-CV                          0.96g 8                          0.96g 9                                         EQ-TRSFSWITCH                      0.51g 9                          0.51g 10                                         EQ-DCMCC                           0.93g 10                          0.93g 1I                                         EQ-CABLETRAY                       0.54g i1                          0.54g 12                                         EQ-DCDISPANEL                      0.51g 12                          0.51g 13                                         EQ-DC-SWBRD                        0.51g                                         l 13                          0.51g l
l 1
h1ar h 17,1997                                                            i           W W85tingh0USB m3ap(anprassec55a wpr:itto31397                    55A-30 j

                                                                                               =a.  =m 55 Seismic Mzrgin An. lysis                                                                  =      y
                                                                                                      ~
O Table 55A 24 (cont.)
EQ-XIW2A.WLK Cutset HCLPF            Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 14                                       EQ-ACDISPANEL                       0.51g 14                     0.51g 15                                       EQ-INVERTER                         0.65g 15                     0.65g 16                                       EQ-BAT-RACK                         1.14g 16                      1.14g 17                                       EQ-BATTERY                          1.04g 17                      1.04g 18                                       EQ-INTEG-CAB                        0.74g 18                     0.74g g          19                                       EQ-LOGIC-CAB                        0.74g h          19                     0.74g 20                                        EQ-ESFAC-CAB                        0.74g 20                      0.74g HCLPF = 0.51g
[ Westingh00S8             hh'a                                                       March 17,199 55A-31                      mwpenprassec55a wpr.id:03 397 i
_       _ _ _ _       . _ _ . __ ._ __ A

    '"'""'**'E"sa
    "             asa. 4. m _ as m
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l.
I O
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: 55. S;ismic M:rgin Anilysis
[ [          ~
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O I       ATTACHMENT 55B SEQUENCE HCLPF CALCULATIONS In this attachment, the cutsets (failure combinations) leading to calculation of seismic sequence HCLPFs are given. Also given ar- the mixed cutsets for the sequences, if they exist.
The following table summarizes the table names of the sequence cutsets given in this appendix.
Seismic Sequence                   Cutsets for IICLPF                     Mixed Cutset (table name/ number)                (table name/ number) eqstr-02                             eqstr-02.sma     55B-20            none eqrvf-02                            egrvf-02.sma     55B-15            none eqllo-02                            eqilo-02.sma     55B-7             eglio-02. des         55B-27 eqilo-03                            eqilo-03.sma     55B-8             eqilo-03. des         55B-28 rn, i   j    eqilo-05                            eqllo-05.sma     55B-9              eqllo-05. des        55B-29 egl!o-06                            eqilo-06.sma     55B-10             eqilo-06. des        55B 30 eqilo-08                            eqilo-08.sma     55B-11             eqilo-08. des        55B-31 eqllo-09                            eqilo-09.sma     55B-12             eqilo-09. des        55B-32 eqllo-10                            eqllo-10.sma     55B-13             eqllo-10. des        55B-33 eqilo-11                            eqilo-11.sma     55B-14             eqilo-11. des         55B-34 eqslo-02                            eqslo-02.sma     55B-16             eqslo-02. des         55B-39 eqslo-03                             eqslo-03.sma    55B-17             eqslo-03. des         55B-40 eqslo-04                             eqslo-04.sma     55B-18            eqslo-04. des         55B-41 O
V                                                                                                                     Draft l          3 Westinghouse             M,_                                                                March 17,1997 m: sap 600sprassec55b wpr. l b:03 : 397 55B-1

.gu    . - .:
          ~
: 55. S:istnic Mirgin Andysis O
Seismic Sequence              Cutsets for llCLPF                     Mixed Cutset (table name/ number)               (table name/ number)           ,
1 eqslo-05                          eqslo-05.sma     55B-19           eqslo-05. des       55B-42           l l
eqatw-02                          eqatw-02.sma     55B-1             eqatw-02. des      55B-21 egatw-03                          eqatw-03.sma     55B-2             eqatw-03. des      55B-22 eqatw-04                          eqatw-04.sma     55B-3             egatw-04. des      55B-23 eqatw-05                         egatw-05.sma     55B-4             eqatw-05. des      55B-24           l eqatw-06                         eqatw-06 sma     55B-5             egatw-06. des      55B-25           )
eqatw-07                         eqatw-07.sma     55B-6             eqatw-07. des      55B-26 eglsp-03                         none                               eqlsp-03. des      55B-35 eglsp-04                         none                               eglsp-04. des      55B-36 eglsp-05                         none                               eglsp-05. des      55B-37 eglsp-10                         none                               eglsp-10. des      55B-38 lsp-sibv                         none                               lsp-sibv. des      55B-45 lsp-sgtr                         none                               isp-sgtr. des      55B-44 eglsp-12                         none                               sum of 1sp-sgtr and Isp-sibv losp                             none                               losp. des (sum of all EQ-LOSP CDF sequences)         55B-43 The eqslo-nn sequences also apply to the SGTR event with the same HCLPF values.
The mixed cutsets for the EQ-LOSP sequences are also given          Note that eglsp-12 is the sum of consequential SLB-V and SGTR events, whose identities are retained to allow tracing back to the focused PRA. The file LOSP. DES contains the dominant mixed cutsets for all eglsp-nn core damage frequency sequences.
In reporting dominant mixed cutsets, seismically induced failures (whose basic event symbols have the prefix EQ-) are assigned a probability of 1. Thus, a mixed cutset probability represents the random failures. On the other hand, a " pure cutset" (one with only seismically caused failures) has a cutset frequency of 1.0.
fa h 17,1997                                                         1            W W85tiligh0USB O
mMp600\prabec$$b.wpf Ib:031$97                   55B-2

                                                                                                      = =
m      s
: 55. S:ismic Mrrgin An lysis
                                                                                                              ~
(~r L]  For the break size (BSIZE) node in the LLOCA event, the basic event probability of 0.5 is left as is, even when the cutset containing it is a " pure cutset" with only seismically driven failures. In that case, the BSIZE basic event is assigned the same HCLPF value as the EQ-IEV-LLOCA to obtain the cutset HCLPF.
For EQ-LLOCA " pure cutsets" containing BSIZE basic event, the reported cutset frequency is 0.5, not 1.0.
L Draft    i W W05tingh0USS                    ,
March 17,1997        I
                                                                                     'n%@Pra\sec55b wpf.1b:031397 55B-3
                                                                                                                  -)
:EEi ' .is l                                                            55. S:ismic Mirgin Anilysis Table 55B-1 EQATW 02.SMA Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset         Basic Event IICLPF 1                                  EQ-IEV-ATWS                          0.50g EQ-IRW-RECSQ                         0.96g 1                    0.96g 2                                  EQ-LEV-ATWS                          0.50g EQ-IRW-RECCV                         0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                        0.96g 2                    0.96g 3                                  EQ-IEV-ATWS                          0.50g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                       1.27g 3                    1.27g Sequence HCLPF = 0.96g O
h1ar h 17,1997                                                   ,          W Westinghouse mtp600\pra\sec55b wpf.lb:031397            55B-4

                                                                                                 -g=      ==
                                                                                                 =
: 55. Seismic M: rein An: lysis                                                                 =
Table 55B-2 EQATW-03.SMA l
Cutset HCLPF       Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF
!                   1                              EQ-LEV-ATWS                       0.50g EQ-!RW-INJSQ                      0.96g l               0.96g
{
2                               EQ-IEV-ATWS                       0.50g EQ-IRW-INJCV                      0.96g i                  2               0.96g Sequence HCLPF = 0.96g l
.                                                                                                                   I i
O Draft
[ W6tingh00S8             he_                                          March 17,1997 m sap 600sprassec55b wpr ib:031397 55B-5

EE      _.
* 4                                                   55. Siismic Mrrgin Anitysis Table 55B-3 O'
EQATW-04.SMA Cutset HCLPF     Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 1                              EQ-LEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-ADS-S3MOVS                    0.81 g 1                  0.81g 2                               EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-ADS-S2MOVS                    0.81g 2                   0.81g 1
3                              EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g                l EQ-ADS-SIMOVS                    0.81g                l 3                  0.81 g                                                            l l
4                              EQ LEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                 0.96g                i 4                  0.96g 5                              EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                   1.09g l
5                   1.09g                                                            l 6                             EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                   1.27g 6                  1.27g 7                             EQ-LEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                    1.27g 7                  1.27g 8                              EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-TRSFSWITCH                    0.51g 8                 0.51g 9                             EQ-LEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-DCMCC                         0.93g 9                 0.93g 51ar h 17,1997                                                    W WB5tingh0USB mvmprassec55b wpr.ib 031397          55B-6
: 55. S:Ismic Ahrgin Analysis
!o                                     Table 55B-3 (cont.)
EQATW-04.SMA Cutset HCLPF        Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 10                                EQ-!EV-ATWS                    0.50g EQ-CABLETRAY                   0.54g 10               0.54g 11                                EQ-IEV-ATWS                    0.50g EQ-DCDISPANEL                  0.51g 11               0.51g 12                                EQ-IEV ATWS                    0.50g EQ-DC-SWBRD                    0.51g 12               0.51g 13                                EQ-IEV-ATWS                    0.50g EQ-ACDISPANEL                  0.51g 13               0.51g
,(9       14                                 EQ-IEV-ATWS             0.50g kJ                                        EQ-INVERTER              0.65g 14               0.65g 15                                 EQ-IEV-ATWS             0.50g EQ-BAT-RACK             1.14g 15                1.14g i         16                                 EQ-IEV-ATWS             0.50g EQ-BATTERY              1.04g 16                1.04g 17                                 EQ-IEV-ATWS             0.50g
,                                            EQ-INTEG-CAB            0.74g I
17               0.74g 18                                 EQ-IEV-ATWS             0.50g EQ-LOGIC-CAB            0.74g j         18               0.74g ID C/                                                                                       Draft
[ Westingt100S6               <
_                                        March 17,1997 55B-7                mtp600spraisec55b wpr ib 03:397 .
l l

Eiii Wy
: 55. Seismic Margin Antlysis Table 55B-3 (cont.)
EQATW-04.SMA Cutset IICLPF                Basic Events in Cutset               Basic Event IICLPF
                                                                                                                 \
i 19                                           EQ-IEV-ATWS                                0.50g EQ-ESFAC-CAB                               0.74g 19                   0.74g Sequence HCLPF = 0.51g O
Dran W  Westingh00Se h
March 17,1997                                                                              ~
mMpMXApra\sec55b wpf:1b:031397                     55B-8 I
: 55. Siismic M:rgin Anilysis                                                     ;
O                                        Table 55B-4 EQATW.05.SMA Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF i            1                               EQ-1EV-ATWS                    0.50g i                                            EQ-CMT-TANKS                   0.63g 1               0.63g 2                                EQ-IEV-ATWS                    0.50g EQ-CMT-AOV                     0.96g 2                0.96g 3                                EQ-LEV-ATWS                     0.50g EQ-CMT-CV                       0.96g 3                0.96g Sequence HCLPF = 0.63g i
    \J l
Draft
[ Westingh00S8                _                                        March 17,1997 55B-9                 m:\nP600\prahec55b wpf.lb:031397

$E ih ~                                                  55. S:ismic Mirgin Anilysis Table 55B-5 EQATW-06.SMA Cutset IICLPF     Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 1                             EQ-IEV-ATWS                         0.50g EQ-PRZR-SV                          0.81g Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g O
Draft March 17,1997 kNd,          W Westinghouse m%mmwessb. pr.ib 031397             55B-10

l
                                                                                           ?E
                                                                                           =
WE       ,
: 55. Siismic M:rgin Anilysis                                                                       5
                                                                                                              )
O L.)                                          Table 55B-6 EQATW-07.SMA l
Cutset HCLPF             Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF                     l 1                                    EQ-LEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-PRHR-XV                       0.96g                         l 1               0.96g l
2                                    EQ-LEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-PRHR-MOV                      0.81g 2               0.8);
3                                    EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-IRWST-TANK                    0.60g 3               0.60g 4                                    EQ-IEV-ATWS                      0.50g EQ-PRHR-HX                       0.81 g 4               0.81g 0
5 5               0.96g EQ-LEV-ATWS EQ-PRHR-AOV 0.50g 0.96g Sequence HCLPF = 0.60g Draft
[ Westinghouse           Mr_             55B-11 March 17,1997 m: sap 600sprassec55b wpr ib 03:397

l g     .==                                                                                      l 5                                                        55. S:ismic M:rgin Analysis   I J
Table 55B-7 EQLLO-02.SMA Cutset IICLPF     Basic Events in Cutset      Basic Event ilCLPF 1                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                 0.81g EQ-IRW-RECSQ                0.96g 1                      0.96g 2                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                 0.81g EQ-IRW-RECCV                0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV               0.96g 2                      0.96g 3                                  EQ-LEV-LLOCA                0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                 0.81g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS              1.27g 3                      1.27g Sequence HCLPF = 0.96g O
                                                                                               )
l l
1 l
l l
1 W W6Stinghouse O
hia h 17,1997                                                  '
m:\ap600\pra\sec55b wpf Ib:031397         55B-12

1 n=      i.=:g
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis                                                                E 1
   '')
(G Table 55B-8 l                                           EQLLO 03.SMA                                                )
f i
l Cutset IICLPF     Psic Events in Cutset  Basic Event liCLPF l
1                              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g l                                              BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81g EQ-IRWST-TANK                  0.60g i
1               0.81 g I
!               ?                              EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g i                                              BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81g EQ-IRW-INJSQ                   0.96g l               2               0.96g l               3                              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81 g EQ-IRW-INJCV                   0.96g 3               0.96g l
4                              EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g i                                      BSIZE-LARGE                     0.81g
[V                                           EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                 1.09g 4                1.09g
!               5                              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                    0.81 g
!                                              BSIZE-LARGE                     0.81 g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                 1.27g 5                1.27g 6                              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                    0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                     0.81g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                  1.27g 6               1.27g 1
7                             EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81g EQ-CMT-AOV                     0.96g 7               0.96g Draft 3 Westingh00Se            hhr_                                      March 17,1997 m: sap 600sprassecssb wptib:03:397 55B-13 l
l

l
.,u:q   ==.
5                                                        55. Seismic M:rgin An lysis Table 55B-8 (cont.)
O EQLLO 03.SMA Cutset IICLPF      Basic Events in Cutset       Basic Event IICLPF 8                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                      0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                      0.81 g EQ-CMT-CV                         0.96g                 j 8                     0.96g                                                                j l
9                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g                 l BSIZE-LARGE                      0.81g 0.51g EQ-TRSFSWITCH                                          )
9                    0.81g                                                                1 10                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                      0.81g EQ-DCMCC                         0.93g                 l 10                     0.93g                                                               l 11                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g                 l I
BSIZE-LARGE                      0.81 g EQ-CABLETRAY                     0.54g 11                     0.81g 12                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                      0.81 g EQ-DCDISPANEL                    0.51g 12                     0.81 g 13                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g                 l BSIZE-LARGE                       0.81 g EQ-DC-SWBRD                       0.51g 13                    0.81g 14                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                      0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                      0.81g EQ-ACDISPANEL                    0.51g 14                    0.81g far h 17,1997                                                '         W Westingh00Se m:\ap60thprabec55b wpf:1b:031397          55B-14

g.= i   si    )
: 55. Siismic Mrrgin Anilysis                                                       -
j l
A Table 55B-8 (cont.)
EQLLO-03.SMA Cutset IICLPF        Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 15                                EQ-IEV LLOCA                    0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81g EQ-INVERTER                     0.65g 15               0.81g 16                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81 g EQ-BAT-RACK                     1.14g                   1 16                1.14g 17                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                    0.81g EQ-BATTERY                      1.04g 17                1.04g
,_s       18                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE-LARGE                     0.81 g
(' )                                                                         0.74g EQ-INTEG-CAB 18               0.81g 19                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                     0.81g EQ-LOGIC-CAB                    0.74g 19               0.81g 20                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81 g BSIZE-LARGE                     0.81g EQ-ESFAC-CAB                    0.74g 20               0.81g Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g
\                                                                                            Draft
[ W85tingh0US8                %                                         March 17,1997 55B-15               m: sap 6oosprawc55b wpr:ib 03:397
: 55. Seismic Margin Antlysis Table 55B-9 e
EQLLO 05.SMA Cutset IICLPF     Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 1                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-IRW-RECSQ                    0.96g 1                   0.96g 2                                EQ-1EV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-IRW-RECCV                    0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                   0.96g 2                   0.96g 3                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                   1.27g 3                   1.27g Sequence HCLPF = 0.96g e
l l
l tarch 17,1997                                                      W W85tingh0USB mspanprassecssb wpr:1b:031397          55B-16

5'
                                                                                     =
                                                                                            "i
: 55. Seismic Mirgin An: lysis -                                                          f
                                                                                      ^
b' Table 55B-10 EQLLO-06.SMA Cutset HCLPF       Basic Events in Cutset    Basic Event IICLPF 1                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81 g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-IRWST-TANK                   0.60g i           1               0.81g 2                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ IRW-INJSQ                    0.96g 2                 0.96g 3                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                    0.81g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-IRW-INJCV                    0.96g i
4                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g
[                                        BSIZE                          . 0.81 g               !
G                                        EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                  1.09g               l 4                 1.09g 5                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                  1.27g 5                1.27g 6                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81g l
EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                   1.27g               '
6                 1.27g 7                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ.CMT-AOV                       0.96g 7                0.96g Draft
[ W85tingh0US6              h '_                                       March 17,1997 55B-17                  mwp6&wssec5sb wpt.ib:03:397

F     *E
             '+                                                                   55. Seismic Mtrgin An-lysis
     ~
4 Table 55B-10 (cont.)
O EQLLO.06.SMA i
Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset               Basic Event IICLPF 8                                     EQ-LEV-LLOCA                              0.81g BSI72                                     0.81g EQ-CMT-CV                                 0.96g 8                    0.96g S
Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g d
k 1
O
~
1 arch 17,1997                                                           .        W Westinghouse m%puuprasecssb wpf Ib:031397                55B-18

gu     ==
: 55. Seismic hi rgin Analysis
(.)
Table 55B-11 EQLLO-08.SMA Cutset IICLPF     Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 1
EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15               0.81g EQ-IRW-RECSQ                  0.96g 1               0.96g 2                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15               0.81g EQ-IRW-RECCV                  0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                 0.96g 2                0.96g 3                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15               0.81 g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                 1.27g
   /3
   'y/
3                 1.27g 4                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81 g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10               0.81g EQ-IRW-RECSQ                  0.96g 4                0.96g 5                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-VFS AOV09/10               0.81g EQ-IRW.RECCV                  0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                 0.96g 5                0.96g O
d    [ W65tingil00S8                                                     March 17,1997 Draft 55B-19                 mwanpassecssb wpr ib 031397

i
: 55. Siismic Mrrgin Analysis Table 55B-11 (cont.)
e EQLLO-08.SMA l
Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF        l l
6              EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                   0.81g BSIZE                      0.81g                     i EQ-VFS-AOV09/10            0.81g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS             1.27g                     j 6              1.27g 7              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                                   0.81 g 0.81g                     i BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04            0.81g EQ-IRW-RECSQ               0.96g 7              0.96g 8              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                                   0.81g BSIZE                      0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04            0.81g EQ-IRW-RECCV               0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV              0.96g 9              EQ-LEV-LLOCA                                   0.81g BSIZE                      0.81 g EQ.VFS-AOV03/04            0.81g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS             1.27g 9             1.27g 10             EQ-LEV-LLOCA                                   0.81g BSIZE                                          0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57            0.92g EQ-IRW-RECSQ               0.96g 10             0.96g i!             EQ-IEV-LLOCA.                                  0.81 g BSIZE                     0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57           0.92g EQ-IRW-RECCV              0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV             0.96g i1             0.96g Star h 17,1997                                                       W W85tingh0USB m upco%c55b wpr.:b:031397              55B-20

g=      ==g
                                                                                         "        =
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis n
V Table 55B-11 (cont.)
EQLLO-08.SMA Cutset IICLPF         Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 12                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA            0.81g BSIZE                   0.8 i g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57         0.92g EQ-IRW LVTRANS          1.27g 12             1.27g 13                                   EQ-IEV-LLOCA            0.81g BSIZE                   0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06         2.00g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS          1.27g 13             2.00g 14                                    EQ-IEV-LLOCA           0.81g BSIZE                  0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06        2.00g EQ-IRW-RECCV           0.96g i                                               EQ-IRW-RECMOV          0.96g
  '        I4            2.00g 15                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA           0.81g BSIZE                  0.81g EQ-WLS-AOVG4/06        2.00g EQ-lRW-RECSQ           0.96g 15            2.00g                                                                         j I
l Sequence HCLPF = 0.96g i
i i
l 1
l
  <^.
I T Westirigh0US8              %                                          March 17,1 55B-21               maaP 600\Prabec55b wpf Ib.031597

k[      $ ~
: 55. Siismic Mzrgin Analysis   !
Table 55B-12 O
EQLLO 09.SMA Cutset IICLPF    Basic Events in Cutset       Basic Event HCLPF 1                                EQ-LEV-LLOCA                          0.81g BSIZE                                 0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                       0.81g EQ-IRWST-TANK                         0.60g 1                     0.81g 2                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                          0.81g BSIZE                                 0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                       0.81g EQ-IRW-INJSQ                          0.96g 2                      0.96g 3                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                          0.81g BSIZE                                 0.81 g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                       0.81g EQ-IRW-INJCV                          0.96g 3                     0.96g 4                                 EQ-LEV-LLOCA                         0.81g BSlZE                                0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                      0.81g EQ-IRWST-TANK                        0.60g 4                     0.81 g 5                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                         0.81 g BSIZE                                0.81 g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                      0.81g EQ-IRW-INJSQ                         0.96g 5                     0.96g 6                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                         0.81g BSIZE                                0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                      0.81g EQ-IRW-INJCV                         0.96g 6                    0.96g tarch 17,1997                                          '     '         W Westinghouse m bp600\pra\sec55b wpf.lb.031397         55B-22

g--     =gi
: 55. Seismic MIrgin Analysis O                                  Table 55B-12 (cont.)
EQLLO-09.SMA Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 7                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81 g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                0.81g EQ-IRWST-TANK                  0.60g 7               0.81 g 8                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                0.81 g EQ-IRW-INJSQ                   0.96g 8               0.96g 9                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81 g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                0.81 g EQ-IRW-INJCV                   0.96g i;       9               0.96g
'u 10                               EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57               0.92g EQ-IRWST-TANK                 0.60g 10               0.92g ii                                EQ-1EV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57               0.92g EQ-IRW-INJSQ                  0.96g i1              0.96g 12                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57               0.92g EQ-IRW-INJCV                  0.96g                         ,
12               0.96g Ch
\                                                                                       Draft T Westinghouse            Nw         55B-23 March 17,1997 msp600sprassec55b wpt:ib:03:397

  ==   uz;
: 55. SIismic MIrgin Anr. lysis l
Table 55B-12 (cont.)
O '
EQLLO 09.SMA t
Cutset ilCLPF       Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 13                                 EQ-LEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                  2.00g EQ-IRWST-TANK                    0.60g 13                 2.00g 14                                 EQ-LEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                  2.00g                 ,
EQ-IRW-INJSQ                     0.96g                 !
l4                 2.00g l
15                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g                 l BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                  2.00g EQ-IRW.INJCV                     0.96g                 l 15                 2.00g Sequence liCLPF = 0.81g l
l l
l Draft                                                  ENEL March 17,1997                                                                          #
m W m reac5.*d e       wprib 03:397             558-24
: 55. S;ismic M:rgin Analysis o
V Table 55B-13 EQLLO 10.SMA Cutset IICLPF      Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 1                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                  1.27g EQ-MSL-SENSOR                  0.99g EQ-CONTPR-SENSOR                1.27g 1               1.27g 2                               EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                0.81g EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES               0.96g 2               0.96g 3                               EQ-!EV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                0.81g EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                 1.09g
[*_)
b          3               1.09g 4                               EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                0.81g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                 1.27g 4                1.27g 5                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                0.81 g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                  1.27g 5                1.27g 6                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                0.81g                             1 EQ-CMT-AOV                     0.96g                             l l
On
()                                                                                        Draft
[ W85tingh00S8                 <
_                                      March 17,1997                   l 55B-25                m \8P60mpraVec55b wpf:1b:031397

f     "!_!.                                                    55. S:ismic M:rgin Analysis Table 55B-13 (cont.)
O EQLLO-10.SMA Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 6                   0.96g 7                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BEIZE                            0.81g EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                  0.81g EQ-CMT-CV                        0.96g 7                   0.96g 8                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                  0.81g EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                 0.96g 8                  0.96g 9                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                  0.81g EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                  1.09g 9                   1.09g 10                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                  0.81g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                  1.27g 10                   1.27g i!                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                  0.81g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                   1.27g 11                   1.27g l
12                                 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g               i EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                  0.81g EQ-CMT-AOV                       0.96g tar h 17,1997                                                        W Westingt10USB msp600+mssec55b wpr.:b 03 397            55B-26
: 55. Seismic M:rgin Analysis                                                         Y N       -
b Table 55B-13 (cont.)
EQLLO-10.SMA Cutset IICLPF            Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 12              0.96g 13                                    EQ-LEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV09/10               0.81g EQ-CMT-CV                     0.96g 13              0.96g 14                                    EQ-LEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04               0.81 g EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES              0.96g I4              0.96g 15                                    EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g
 ,.s                                              BSIZE                         0.81g
/    \                                                                          0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04
't                                                EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                1.09g 15               1.09g 16                                    EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81 g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04               0.81g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                1.27g 16               1.27g 17                                    EQ-LEV-LLOCA                  0.81 g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04               0.81 g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                 1.27g 17               1.27g
()N
(                                                                                                Draft
[ W85tingh00SB                i_                                          March 17,1997 55B-27                m%p60caprasrec5sb wpr.ib 03:397 I
l
                                                                                                         )

                                                      ~
l
* 55. Siismic Mrrgin An lysis Table 55B-13 (cont.)
e EQLLO 10.SMA                                              (
l Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 18                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA                    0.81g                1 BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                 0.81g EQ-CMT-AOV                      0.96g 18                     0.96g 19                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA                    0.81 g BSIZE                           0.81g EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                 0.81g EQ-CMT-CV                       0.96g 19                     0.96g 20                                    EQ-LEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                  0.92g EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                 0.96g 21                                   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                  0.92g EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                  1.09g 21                      1.09g 22                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                  0.92g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                  1.27g 22                      1.27g 23                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                  0.92g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                   1.27g 23                      1.277 b
far h 17,1997                                                           W Westingh0USB m \ap600\pra\sec55b wpf.Itr031397           55B-28
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis
                                                                                        ?
                                                                                        ~
T$
,- g Table 55B-13 (cont.)
EQLLO-10.SMA Cutset IICLPF          Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 24                <
EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                0.92g                       ,
EQ-CMT-AOV                     0.96g l
24               0.96g                                                                         ,
                                                                                                         )
25                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                0.92g EQ-CMT-CV                      0.96g 25               0.96g 26                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE                          0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                2.00g                       !
EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES               0.96g 26               2.00g 27                                  EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.8ig BSIZE                          0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOV04/%                 2.00g EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                 1.09g                       l 27               2.00g 28                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV(M/M                2.00g EQ-PRZR LVTRANS                1.27g 28               2.00g
   )
U                                                                                             Draft
[ W85tiligt100Se              ,
_                                         March 17,1997 55B-29                m:\8P60mpra\sec55b.wpf:Ib:031397

jn:: ag
: 55. Seismic M rgin An lysis Table 55B-13 (cont.)
O EQLLO 10.SMA Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset      Basic Event IICLPF 29                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                  2.00g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                   1.27g 29                      2.00g 30                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-WLS-AOVM/06                   2.00g EQ-CMT-AOV                       0.96g 30                      2.00g 31                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-WLS-AOVN/06                   2.00g EQ-CMT-CV                        0.96g 32                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-TRSFSWITCH                    0.51g 32                      0.81 g 33                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81g BSIZE                            0.81g EQ-DCMCC                         0.93g 33                      0.93g 34                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     0.81 g BSIZE                            0.81 g EQ-CABLETRAY                     0.54g 34                      0.81g h1 rch 17,1997                                                  '
Westingh0USB m%p600\pra\sec55b wpI:t b:031397            55B-30
: 55. S;ismic Mirgin Analysis o) v Table 55B-13 (cont.)
EQLLO-10.SMA Cutset IICLPF         Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event ilCLPF 35                                  EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE                          0.81g                   ;
EQ-DCDISPANEL                  0.5 Ig 35               0.81g 36                                  EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g                   )
BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-DC-SWBRD                    0.51g 36               0.81 g                                                                    I 37                                   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81 g BSIZE                         0.81g                   )
EQ-ACDISPANEL                 0.51g 37               0.81g 7         38                                   EQ-LEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81 g (U;                                             EQ-INVERTER                   0.65g
,             38               0.81g 39                                  EQ-LEV-LLOCA                  0.81g BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-BAT-RACK                    1.14g                  l 39               1.14g                                                                    !
40                                  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  0.81g                   I BSIZE                         0.81g EQ-BATTERY                     1.04g 40                1.04g 41                                  EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g BSIZE                          0.81g EQ-INTEG-CAB                   0.74g 41               0.81g
      )
  'k /                                                                                          Draft
[ W85tingh0USB               f6                                         March 17,1997 m:\ap60&pressec55b3pr.ib 03:397 55B-31
: 55. Siismic Margin An_ lysis Table 55B-13 (cont.)
EQLLO-10.SMA Cutset IICLPF         Basic Events in Cutset             Basic Event IICLPF 42                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                 0.81g BSIZE                                       0.81g EQ-LOGIC-CAB                                 0.74g 42              0.81g 43                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                 0.81g BSIZE                                        0.81g EQ-ESFAC-CAB                                 0.74g 43              0.81g i  Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g 9
i Draft                                                   ENg March 17,1997                                                                 W Westinghouse l
    'n:bNwc55b wpt:1b 03:397               55B-32
                                                                                                                     ]
: 55. Siismic M:rgin Analysis o                                   Table 55B-14 EQLLO 11.SMA Cutset IICLPF    Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 1                             EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81g EQ-ACC-CV29                    0.96g 1                0.96g 2                             EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g EQ-ACC-CV28                    0.96g 2               0.96g 3                             EQ-LEV-LLOCA                   0.81 g EQ-ACC-MOV27                   0.96g 3               0.96g 4                             EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   0.81g EQ-ACC-TANKS                    0.76g 4               0.81 g O Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g 1
I E Westinghouse             M._     55B-33 March 17,1 fut 6Merawc55b P          wpf.lb:031397

l
<  g=      sa
   =        9;i                                                           55. Seismic Mergin Analysis Table 55B-15 EQRVF-02.SMA Cutset IICLPF            Basic Events in Cutset        Basic Event IICLPF 4         I                                     EQ-IEV-RVFA                             0.50g 1                 0.50g i
2  Sequence HCLPF = 0.50g i                                                                                                             !
e O
I
                                                                                                              \
a Draft March 17,1997                                             E(El
                                                                ~ ' ' ~ ~
W ~
Westinghouse m:b@praWc55b wpf:tb:031397                 55B-34

m=     mE
: 55. Seismic Afirgin An: lysis                                                           '
o                                         Table 55B-16                                           I EQSLO-02.SMA Cutset IICLPF      Basic Events in Cutset   Basic Event IICLPF 1                               EQ-LEV-SLOCA                    0.81g EQ-IRW-RECSQ                    0.96g 1                 0.96g
    .2                                      EQ-IEV-SLOCA                    0.81g EQ-IRW-RECCV                    0.96g EQ-IRW-RECMOV                   0.96g 2                 0.96g 3                                EQ-LEV-SLOCA                    0.81g EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                  1.27g 3                 1.27g                                                               l l
Sequence HCLPF = 0.96g
('N O
Draft W Westinghouse               fd._                                      March 17,1997
                                                                   ***Pr*\'ec55b wpr.i b 03: 397 55B-35

l e    um                                                                                                                                    l 3i
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Anitysis Table 55B-17 O
EQSLO-03.SMA                                                                                          l Cutset IICLPF                      Basic Events in Cutset                                    Basic Event liCLPF 1                                                 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                   0.81g EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                  0.60g 1                    0.81g 2                                                 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                   0.81g EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                   0.96g 2                    0.96g 3                                                 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                   0.81g EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                   0.96g 3                    0.96g Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g O
Draft March 17,1997                                                                                            bYd        W Westingh0US8 mbp60mpra\sec55b wpf.Ib.031397                          55B-36

3
: 55. Seismic Mrrgin Analysis
('h
%)
Table 55B-18 EQSLO-04.SMA                                               ;
Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset  Basic Event IICLPF 0.81 g                   i 1                               EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-ADS-S3MOVS                  0.81g                    j 1               0.81g                                                                   j 2                               EQ-IEV-SLOCA                   0.81g EQ-ADS-S2MOVS                  0.81g                    l 2               0.81g 3                               EQ-IEV-SLOCA                   0.81g EQ-ADS-SIMOVS                  0.81g 3               0.81g 4                                EQ-IEV-SLOCA                  0.81g EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES              0.96g 4               0.96g 5                                EQ-IEV-SLOCt.                 0.81 g EQ-CMT-LEVEISWT                1.09g                   l 5                1.09g 6                                EQ-IEV-SLOCA                  0.81g EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                1.27g 6                1.27g 7                                EQ-IEV-SLOCA                  0.81g EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                 1.27g 7               1.27g 8                               EQ-IEV-SLOCA                  0.81g EQ-TRSFSWITCH                 0.51g 8               0.81 g 9                               EQ-IEV-SLOCA                   0.81 g EQ-DCMCC                       0.93g 9               0.93g L                                                                                        Draft
[ W85tilighouse            h$._      55B-37 March 17,1997 map 600sprissec5sb.wpr:id:03:397

l
: 55. Siismic Mirgin Analysis Table 55B-18 (cont.)
e EQSLO-04.SMA Cutset IICLPF       Basic Events in Cutset      Basic Event HCLPF 10                             EQ-LEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-CABLETRAY                      0.54g 10               0.81g 11                             EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-DCDISPANEL                     0.51g 11               0.81g 12                             EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g               ,
EQ-DC-SWBRD                       0.51g               i 12               0.81g 13                             EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-ACDISPANEL                     0.51g 13               0.81g 14                             EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-INVERTER                       0.65g 14               0.81g 15                            EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-BAT-RACK                       1.14g 15              1.14g 16                            EQ-!EV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-BATTERY                        1.04g 16               1.04g 17                            EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81 g EQ-INTEG-CAB                      0.74g 17              0.81g I8                             EQ-LEV-SLOCA                     0.81g EQ-LOGIC-CAB                     0.74g 18              0.81g f arch 17,1997                                               :         W Westingh00Se mAap600\pra\sec55b wpf.lb O31397           55B-38

innLEi
: 55. Siismic MIrgin An: lysis 4
o O
Table 55B-18 (cont.)
;                                               EQSLO-04.SMA Cutset IICLPF             Basic Events in Cutset        Basic Event IICLPF 19                                     EQ-IEV-SLOCA                        0.81 g EQ-ESFAC-CAB                        0.74g 19              0.81g i
Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g a
O Draft T Westinghouse             fdr_             55B-39 March 17,1997 msp600sprassec55b wpr.ib.031397

i Lm     Ji:.
E                                                         55. Siismic Mirgin Anslysis    l Table 55B-19 O
EQSLO 05.SMA Cutset liCLPF      Basic Events in Cutset      Basic Event IICLPF 1                                   EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-CMT-TANKS                      0.63g 1                      0.81g 2                                   EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81g EQ-CMT-AOV                        0.96g 2                      0.96g 3                                   EQ-IEV-SLOCA                      0.81 g EQ-CMT-CV                         0.96g 3                      0.96g Sequence HCLPF = 0.81g O.
I i
l 1
I Draft March 17,1997                                                   -         W Westinghouse m:\ap600\pra\sec55b wpf.Ib.031397          55B-40
: 55. Siismic Mrrgin An: lysis
;o Table 55B-20 EQSTR-02.SMA Cutset IICLPF     Basic Events in Cutset     Basic Event IICLPF 1                              EQ-IEV-STRUC                     0.58g 1               0.58g Sequence HCLPF = 0.58g O
Draft W Westinghouse            M_        55B-41 March 17,1997
                                                                  **N''''ssb wpr.ib.03:397

I Table 55B-21                                                                  im B 5, C e       "
n 6 2                                                               EQATW-02. DES 3'                                                                                                                                                 ::
  @.                                                          ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS * " *
* Page:     1 R$
Ow

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y$          File: eqatw-02. mix ( File created by linking eqatw-02.in    WLINK2 ' Ver . 4.02  **)
q        Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00
  ."          NUMBER CUTSET PRCB PERCENT BASIC EvDIT NAME                                                        EVENT PPOB. IDDITIFIER cr          __.... .__........ .__.... ._.__..___.__....._____..._____________...______..._......__.__.._..__. __.______.. ._____.....__
8                    1.00E+00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                           1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-ATWS g               1 1.00E+00     EQ-IPW-PECSQ EQ-IPW-RECSQ 3
2    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATwS EQ-IPW-PECCV                                                         1.00E+00     EQ-IPW-RECCV EQ-IPW-PECMOV                                                        1.00E*00     EQ-IRW-RECMOV 3    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-AtwS EQ-I RW-LVTPANS                                                      1.00E+00     EQ-IRW-LVTPANS 4    4.78E-04         .05  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATWS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BATI         4.78E-04     IWR-XMTR 5    2.60E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-!EV-ATWS COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE CF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIPC LINES               2.60E-05     IWX-EV4-SA 6     1.20E-05         .00 EQ-IEV-AIwS                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-ATWS u                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREDI PLUGGING     1.20E-05     PEX-FL-GP u
W                                                                                                               1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATWS g               7     1.43E-07         .00 EQ-IEV-ATWS LOW IRWST LEVEL TR7NSMITTER FAILUDE                                  5.23E-03     IW2TLO46UF y                                                                                                               5.23E-03     IW3TLO47UF LOW IPWST LEVEL TPANSMITTER FAILURE LOW IPWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILUPE                                  5.23E-03     IW4TLO48UF b
A m
e T
I                                                                                                                                          a,.
                                                                                                                                                'l7'
        =                                                                                                                                       "
O                                                                                                                                       a Er o                                                                                                                                       W g                                                                                                                                       =
        .                                                                                                                                       v 9                                                                    O                                                            O

f'y                                                                                                                                                ,-y
                                                                                                                                                                                                        / ,. \
t       i                                                                                                                                          6 4
         \w/                                                                                                                                               \u.,/                                        \    l vs Ta* ole 55B.22                                                   g EQATW-03. DES                                                      h et 7
     $                                                                                                                                 ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****           Page:      1                        3 CD                                                                                                                                                                                                           M*

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: eqatw-03. mix ( File created by linking eqatw-03.in                                                    WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02  **)
y
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ==
3                                 Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00
     @                                  NUMBER Ctf7 SET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                        EVENT FROB. IDENTIFIER             5' ca 1                               1.00E*00 100.00 EQ- ! EV- AWS                                           1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-ATWS            !
EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                            1.00E+00     EQ-IRW-INJSQ 2                                1.00E+00 100.00 EQ- I EV- AWS                                           1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-ATWS           E h
r.
EQ-IPW-INJCV                                            1.00E+00     EQ-IRW-INJCV A                                                                  3                               3.00E-05    .00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                             1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATWS COMMON LAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES  3.00E-05     IWX-CV-AO
(_
4                               2.60E-05    .00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                             1.00E+00     EQ-!EV-ATWS COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES  2.60E-05     IWX-EV-SA 5                               1.20E-05    .00 EQ-IEV-AW S                                             1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-AWS COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK         1.20E-05     IWK-FL-GP 6                               5.76E-09    .00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                             1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATWS IWRST DISCHARGE LINE *A* STRAINER PLtFJGED              2.40E-04     IWA-PLUG u                                                                                                                     IWRST DISCHARGE LIN3 *B" STRAINER PLUGGED               2.40E-04     IWB-PLUG W
L w
k c
n a4
 -n f 7 5m                                                                                                                                                                                                                   l i:
yy                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .
ee
 ;32 I
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s u ::

3                                                                                                                                                   Table 55B-23                                               ,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   -"i il sr5,  . C,                                                                                                                                                                                                           "
g$                                                                                                                                        EQATW.04. DES
    =r d:c ap E
                                                                                                                                       .*.*. DOMINANT CUTSETS - -                  Pa0e:   1 O. **

==Title:==
AP600 yJ                         File: egatw-04. mix t File created by linking egatw-04.in                                                                  WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02  **)
g q                       Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 m
C                          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                         EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER cr                         ...... __._._..... ..___.. ..._..____.______.......__......._______......___.__._.__..__......... _...__..... ........ ____
--8                             1   1.00E*00                                                          100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-AWS w                                                                                                                                                                               1.00E+00   EQ-ADS-S3MOVS EQ-ADS-S3MOVS 2   1.00E*00                                                          100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-ADS-S2MOVS                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-ADS-52MOVS 3   1.00E*00                                                          100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-ADS-SIMOVS                                                     1.00E+00   EQ-ADS-SIMOVS 4   1.00E*00                                                          100.00 EQ-IEV-AWS                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                  1.00E*00   EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 5   1.00E*00                                                          100.00 EQ-1EV-ATWS                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-CMT-LEVELSwr                                                   1.00E+00    EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 6   1.00E*00                                                          100.00  EQ-IEV-A"ws                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-TRSFSWITCH                                                     1.00E*00    EQ-TRSFSWITCH g
(Jn tgy                             7    1.00E+00                                                         100.00 EQ-!EV-ATWS                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-ATWS e                                                                                                            EQ-DCMCC                                                           1.00E*00   EQ-DCMCC t                               8    1.00E*00                                                         100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-CABLETRAY                                                       1.00E*00   EQ-CABLETRAY 9    1.00E*00                                                         100.00 EQ-!EV-ATWS                                                         1.00E*00    EQ- 1 EV- AWS EQ-DCDISPANEL                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-DCDISPANEL 100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                         1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-ATWS Q                         10     1.00E*00 EQ-DC-SWBRD                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-DC-SWBRD
    ;;f A
h                          11    1.00E*00                                                         100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-ACDISPANEL 1.00E*00 1.00E+00 EQ-!EV-ATWS EQ-ACDISPANEL g                          12    1 00E+00                                                         100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                         1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-INVERTER                                                       1.00E+00    EQ-INVERTER         tps
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 ?
13    1.00E*00                                                         100.00 EQ-1EV-AWS                                                          1.00E+00    EQ IEV-ATWS EQ-BAT-FACK                                                       1.00E+00    EQ-BAT-RACK         [
1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-AWS l                          14    1.00E*00                                                         100.00   EQ- 1EV- AWS EQ-BATTERY                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-BATTERY n
15    1.10E-03                                                             .11  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-ATWS          V cD COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN          1.10E-03   ADX-MV-GO            7, O                        16    1.03E-04                                                             .01  EQ-IEV-ATHS                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-ATWS         3-
      ~
1.03E-04   CCX-INPUT-LOGIC      D COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)
U 17    4.70E-05                                                             .00  EQ-IEV- AWS                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-A W S h                                                                                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                         4.70E-05   CCX-BY-PN            E w                                                                                                                                                                                                          %.
cD                                                                                                                                                                                                          g O                                                                                                                                                  O                                               e

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Table 55B-23 (cont.)                                                              M EQATW-04. DES                                                                    h e
T g                                                         "* ' DOMINANT CUTSETS "'
* Page:           2                    [
n a                                                                                                                                                  a,

==Title:==
AP600 File: eqatw-04. mix ( Flie created by linking eqatw-04.in       WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                                    p 3       Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER              g~
yg NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT EASIC EVENT NAME
* n
                                         .00                                                                    1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-A WS              sa 18    3.84E-05             EQ-IEV-ATWS 3.84E-05        CMX-VS-FA cot' MON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS 1.00E+00         EO-I EV- AWS E
19    3.00E-05         .00 EQ-IEV-AWS                                                          3.00E-05       ADX-EV-SA h
s COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUw VALVES TO OPERATE
                                         .00 EQ-IEV-AWS                                                         1.00E+00         EO-IEV-ATWS A            20    2.40E-05                                                                                2.40E-05        CCX-IV-KR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS
     .f-                                                                                                         1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-ATWS 21    1.10E-05         .00 EQ-!EV-AW S                                                                        CCX-FMXMODI-SW COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE               1.10E-05 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-ATWS 22    1.10E-05         .00 1.10E-05       CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPtfr II)GIC SOFTWARE 23    1.10E-05         .00  EQ-!EV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-ATWS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION LOGIC SOFWARE             1.10E-05        CCX-FMXMOD2-SW g
t.fm 24    1.01E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-ATWS W                                            HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 52 LINE 1                                   5.64E-02        AD2 MOD 01 g                                             HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 82 LINE 2                                  5.64E-02        AD2 MOD 02 g                                                                                                               5.64E-02         AD3 MOD 03 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 83 LINE 1 HARDWAFE FAILURE OF ST. 83 LINE 2                                  5.64E-02        AD3 MOD 04 25    8.62E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-AWS                                                         1.00E+00        EQ-!EV-ATWS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                              8.62E-06        CCX-EP-SAM 26    1.20E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00        EQ- I EV- AWS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE CF PMS AND PLS SOFWARE                        I.20E-06        CCX-SFTW 27    7.30E-07         .00  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                        1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-ATWS MARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 92 LINE 1                                  5.64E-02        AD2 MOD 01 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 92 LINE 2                                  5.64E-02        AD2 MOD 02 HARDWAPE FAILURE OF ST. 83 LINE 1                                  5.64E-02        AD3 MOD 03 FAILURE OF ACTUATION LOGIC GROUP 1                                 4.07E-03        PMBMOD21 E
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EEC                                                                    Table 55B-24                                                                                          nig cB g g, 9$                                                               EQATW-05. DES g :r                                                                                                                                                                        Epi 2*                                                          ** ** oOMIN m r (:UTSETS ****-                      PaOe:     1 Xi Ew

==Title:==
AP600 SMA
                                                                                              **)
y$y        File: egatw-05. mix ( File created by linking eqatw-05.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 C          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                       EVENT 6R08. IDENTIFIER er         _.._.. ..___....._ ....... .........__..._______.___.._______......__.._ _.__.__. ....___....____ .....___.._ .__......____
S                                                                                                              3.00E*00   EQ- I EV - ATWS C              1    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-CMT-1 ANES                                                      1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-TANRS 2    1.00E*00      100.00   EQ-1EV- A1WS                                                       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-CMT-ACV                                                         1.00E+00   EO-LM- AOV 3    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-I EV- ATWS EQ-CMT-CV                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-CV 4    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-ATWS FQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-PRIR-LVTRANS 5    1.00E+00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-PRIR-SENSOR 6    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-ATW!
EQ-MPLEX-CAB                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-MPLEX-CAB g
t.n tg3             7    1.00E*00      100.00   EQ-IEV- AWS                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-ATWS 1.00E*00    EQ-INTEG-CAB g                                           EQ-INTEG-CAB 8    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-LOGIC-CAB                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-LOGIC-CAB 9    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-ESFAC-CAB                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-ESFAC-CAB 10    6.10E-05          .01  EQ-IEV-ATUS                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-A WS 33                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                             6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA A
1.00E*00    EQ- I EV- AWS
{          11    5.10E-05         '. 01 EQ-!EV-ATWS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECR VALVES TO OPEN                 5.10E-05   CMX-CV-GO g          12    5.29E-07          .00  EQ-1EV-ATWS                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-1EV-A1MS CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                      7.27E-04    CMA-PLUG                                         tn CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                      7.27E-04    CMB-PLUG                                         ?
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Table 55B-25                                                                                                                                         3 l(                                                              EQATW-06. DES Page:
h n
T 3
                                                         * * * *
* DOMINANT CtJTSETS * * * *
* 1 X
      $  Titler AP600 SMA                                                                                                                                                                                                   y File: EQAW-06. MIN i File created t:y linking eqatw-06.in        WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **t                                                                                                                           **
3 Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 NL?BER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVEtrr NAME                                                                                                          EVENT PROB.                                     IDENTIFIER   3' o
1    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATwS                                                                                                                      1.00E*00                               EQ-I EV- AWS h EQ-PRZR-SV                                                                                                                      1.00E*00                               EQ-PRZR-SV 2    3.27E-01       32.70 EQ-IEV-ATwS                                                                                                                     1.00E+00                                EQ-IEV-ATwS  E UET-OCCURS                                                                                                                     3.27E-01                                UET-OCCURS 33 s
A       3    1.35E-03         .34  EQ-I EV- AWS                                                                                                                   1.00E*00                                EQ-IEV-ATwS NO-UET                                                                                                                         6.73E-01                                NO-UET l"                                 PPZR-SV-FAIL                                                                                                                   2.00E-03                                PRZR-SV-FAIL t>i 1.Ja W
L w
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MEC                                                                     Table 55B-26                                                             ,
m'*                                                                EQATW-07. DES n p                                                                                                                                          ;t:
7                                                                                                                                         i J"'
p                                                         ..... DO,.INAN,c m SETS .....                    ,,,e.      1 O. W

==Title:==
AP600 SMA
                                                                                               **)
WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 y$
y q File: EQATW-07. MIX ( File created by linking eqatw-07.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 v
EVENT PROS. II'ENTIFIER 2
cr NLHBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVDIT NAME 1    1.00E+00      100.00 EQ-I EV- A1WS                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-ATWS O                                                                                                              1.00E+00     EQ-PPHR-XV EQ-PRHR-XV 2    1.00E+00      100,00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                            1.00E*00     EO-IEV-ATWS EQ-PRHR-MOV                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-PRHR-MOV 3    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                            1.00E*00     EQ-LEV-ATWS EQ-IPWST-TANK                                                        1.00E*00     EQ-IRWST-TANK 4    1.00E+00      100.00   EQ- 1 EV- A1MS                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-1EV-ATWS EQ-PRHR-HX                                                           1.00E*00     EQ-PPHP-HX
              $    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-A1ws                                                            1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATWS EQ-PRHR-AOV                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-PRHR-AOV 6    9.60E-05          .01  EQ-1EV-A1MS                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-!EV-A1MS COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05     PKK-AV-LA 9
th                                                                                                             1.00E*00     EQ-!EV-ATwS W             7    2.40E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-ATWS PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                   2.40E-06     PCNHR001ML g
8    2.40E-06          .00  EQ-TEV-A1ws                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-ATWS FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IPWS TANK FAIWRE                             2.4GE-06     IWNTft001AF 9    1.19E-06          .00  EQ-1EV-ATWS                                                          1.00E*00     EO-IEV-ATWS P-PHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V109A (NO MOVEMENT)               1.09E-03    PRAAV10ALA P-RHR FAILUPES OF AIR-OFERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMDfT)              1.09E-01    PRBAV10BLA b
E         10    5.45E-07          .00  EQ-IEV-ATWS                                                           1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-AWS A                                      P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V109A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04     PRAAV10RTM P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03    FRBAV109LA 11    5.45E-07          .00  EQ-IEV-A1wS                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-AlwS P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V10RA (NO MOVEhENT)               1.09E-03    PRAAVIORLA P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V109B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04     PRBAV10BTM      tm 12    2.50E-07          .00  EQ-IEV-A1wS                                                           1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-ATWS P-RHR AIR-OPERATED YALVE V109A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04     PRAAV109TM      M P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.       5.00E-04    PRBAV108TM      h.
II                                                                                                                                       !.
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Table 55B-27                                                                        M h
l(                                                                                                      EQLLO-02. DES
                                                                                                 * * * " DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* Page:      1 T
[
es y
Q

==Title:==
AP600 SMA Filet eq110-02. mix ( File created by linking eq11o-02.in                                          WLINK2 ** Ver. 4 02 ")                                                           p 3        Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 8.7500E-01 EVENT FRGB.       IDENTIFIER            E NUMBER CUTSET PROB PEPCDET BASIC EVENT NAME e                                                                                                                                                     1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-LLOCA            h 1   5.00E-01                                         57.34 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAR SIZE 5.00E-01        BSIZE-LARGE            Q I.00E*00         EQ-IRW-PECSQ EQ-IPW-RECSQ 1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LLOCA I$             2    5.00E-01                                         57.I4 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                5.00E-01        BSIZE-LARGE 5                                                                           LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER DID OF BPEAK SIZE                                  1.00E*00        EQ-IRW-PECCV
{                                                                            EQ-IPW-PECCV                                                               1.00E*00        EQ-IPW-PECMOV EQ-IPW-RECMOV 1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA 3    5.00E-01                                        57.14   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                               5.00E-01        BSIZE-LARGE g                                                                            LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPFER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                 I.00E*00        EQ-IPW-LVTRANS EQ-IPW-LVTPANS
                                                                           .03 1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-LLOCA 4    2.39E-04                                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                               5.00E-01        BSIZE-LARGE L1DCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                 4.78E-04         IWX-KMTR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT) 1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA S    1.30E-05                                           .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                               5.00E-01        BSIZE-LARGE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE Q                                                                               COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIRC LINES                     2.60E-05         IWX-EV4-SA g
EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1.00E*0C         EQ-!EV-LLOCA 6    6.00E-06                                           .00 5.00E-01         BSIZE-LARGE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                                  PEK-FL-GP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCPEEN PLUGGING           1.20E-05
                                                                           .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1.00E*00         EQ-IEV LLOCA 7    7.15E-08                                                                                                                           5.00E-01         BSIZE-LAPGE LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAR SIZE LOW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILUPE                                        5.23E-03         IW2TLO46UF 5.23E-03         IW3TLO470F LOW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILUPE LOW IPWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILUPE                                        5.23E-03         IW4TLO4RUF 3
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a7C                                                                                 Table 55B-28                                                                             .
h                                                                       EQLLO-03. DES
-q                                                                      * * * " DOMINArrr CUTSETS * * '
* Page:    1 ge O ==*

==Title:==
AP600 SMA gj y q File eq11o-03. mix ( File created by linking eq11o-03.in Redaced Sum of Cutsets : 1.0000E*00 WLINK2 ' ver. 4.02       **)
m C            NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                 EVD4T PROB. IDENTIFIER 7            ...___ .__........ _______ ._....____.....___________...__________.. _____.___..____...__________ .__. .... . ___.____.___.
S g                 1     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EC-IEV-LLOCA 4                                                  LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-IJ.RGE
"                                                                                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IRWST-TANK EQ-!PWST-TANK 2     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                                           1.00E*00   EQ- 1RW-IPUSQ 3     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-IRW-IMJCV                                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-INJCV 4     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-1.LOCA                                                                             1.00E*00   FQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE FQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-LEVELSWF g3                5     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA tp                                                 LthCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-1ARGE (D                                                 EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-LVTPANS e
[                 6     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-PFZR-SDfSOR 7     5.00E-01          50.00    EQ-I EV- L1DCA                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LAPGE EQ-CMT-AOV                                                                             1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-AOV b
:;             8     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EO-!EV-LLOCA E                                               LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE l                                               EQ-CMT-CV                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-CV 9     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                               LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-tARGE IQ-TRSFSWITCH                                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-TRSFSWITCH      #A
                                                                                                                                                                        ?
10     5.COE-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSI ZE-IARGE       M EQ-DCMCC                                                                               1.00E*00   EO-DCMCC           h.
11     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA O
LLDCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-CABLETRAY                                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-CABLETRAY       g
:E                                              .                                                                                                                 .
G          12      5.00E-01         50.00 EC-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LIDCA      g N                                            LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE-IARGE        ..
U 5                                            EQ-DCDISPANEL                                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-DCDISPANEL g                                                                                                                                                                   >
13     5.00E-01          50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA       3 W
O g/p LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-DC-SWBPD 5.00E-01 1.00E*00 BSIZE-LARGE EO-DC-SWBPD       j_
G*
O                                                                                    O                                                                    O

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Table 55B-28 (cont.)                                                    M EQLLO.03. DES                                                          h 2.
we
                                                                                                   **"* DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                      Page:    2                    3 t9 E
y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA Files eglio-03. mix 4 File created by linking eq11o-03.in                                     WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02  **)                                          p 3         Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                   EVDIT PROB. IDENTIFIER            3' e                                                                                                                                        1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LLOCA          !
14              5.00E-01                              50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE           Q EQ-ACDISPANEL                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-ACDISPANEL            ,
6 5
15              5. M r;-01                            50.00 EQ-IEV-L1DCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE-i>RGE EQ-INVERTER                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-INVERTER s
16              5.00E-01                              50.00 EQ-IEV-L1DCA                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-BAT-RACK                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-BAT-RACK 17              5.00E-01                              50.00 EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-BATTERf                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-BATTERY 18              5.00E-01                              50.00 EQ-IEV-L1DCA                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA 9                                                                                 LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE u                                                                                                                                                1.00E*00   EQ-MPLEX-CAB (g}                                                                               EQ-MPLEX-CAB 19               5.00E-01                             50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-INTEG-CAB                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-INTEG-CAB 20               5.00E-01                             50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                 .
LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER DID OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE EQ-LOGIC-CAB                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-LOGIC-CAB 21               5.00E-01                             50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LAPGE EQ-ESFAC-CAB                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-ESFAC-CAB 22               5.15E-05                               .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BS!7E-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)  1.03E-04   CCK-INPUT-IDGIC E                   23                3.05E-05                               .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA I                                                                                LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER DID CF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-1ARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPD1                         6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA 24               2.55E-05                                .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LLOCA U                                                                                LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPEP END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN             5.10E-05   CMX-CV-GO
: f. 3 v B3 EQ-IEV-LIDCA yQ                  25                2.35E-05                               .00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01   BSIZE-1JRGE g gy.
g                                                                                COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                     4.70E-05   CCX-BY-PN                  g b                   26                1.92E-05                               .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
 $ s.4 U                                                                          LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01   BSIZE-LARGE ggy 3 y ;p CcMMON CAUSE rAILURE Or CMTiSUMP LEVEL NEATED RTD SENSORS      3.s4E-05   CMx-vS-rA
                                                                                                                                                                                  .mi.c p

REC                                                                Table 55B-28 (cont.)                                                             mmc' c.5g 7
EQLLO-03. DES
                                                                                                                                                      ;l:
N                                                           ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                            Page:     3 En w

==Title:==
AP600 SMA yJ         File: eq110-03. mix ( File created by linking eq11o-03.in     WLINK2 " Ver. 4.02       **)
g q        Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 m
NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                           EvDfT PROB. IDDITIFIER cr         ...__. ..._....... . . _ _ . . . __.__.....__ ___.__.____..______........... ...__..____.__._____.___.. .___....... ....__ ._..__
b              27                         EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                     1.50E-05       .00 5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE e                                         LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IPWST IPi1ECTION CHECK VALVES                 3.00E-05    IWK-CV-AO 29     1.30E-05       .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00    EC-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.0CE-01    BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES                  2.60E-05    IWX-EV-SA 29    1.20E-05       .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LIDCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILLPE OF CLASS 1E IN'vERTERS                             2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR 30    6.00E-06        .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER DID OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                         1.20E-05    IWX-FL-GP 31    5.50E-06        .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA u                                         LIECA BPEAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE u                                                                                                                 1.10E-05   CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW W                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT IAGIC SOFTWAPE
$               32    5.50E-06        .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE-LARGE COneMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION LOGIC SOFTWAPE               1.10E-05    CCX-PMXMOD2-SW 33    5.50E-06        .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT IAGIC SOFTWARE                   1.1CE-05    CCX-PMXMODI-SW b
5            34    4.31E-06        .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA Ab                                     LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER DID OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                                  8.62E-06    CCX-EP-SAM 35    6.00E-07        .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00    EQ- I EV - LIACA LLOCA BREAK SIZE - UPPER END OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE-LARGE COMMON CAUSE FAILLME OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWAPE                            1.20E-06    CCX-SFTW            m (11 e
T e
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Table 55B-29                                                               M EQLLO-05. DES                                                                h e~
In
                                                             *"'  DOMINANT CITTSETS * * "*                       Page:    1                      kn a                                                                                                                                           y Q

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: eq11o-05.mLx t File created by linking eq11o-05.in     WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **1                                                p 3       Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 8.7500E-01 EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER             3~
NUMBER CUTSET PROB FEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME O                                                                                                                                            3 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-L1hCA            a; 1   5.00E-01      57.14 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01    BSIZE                  y LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-!PW-RECSQ 1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-FECSQ 5.00E-01      57.14 EQ-ITV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA M
2 LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                          5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-IRW-PECCV                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-IPW-RECCV 1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-PECMOV fp                                     EQ-IRW-PECMOV 3   5.00E-01      57.14  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-IPW-LVTRANS                                                      1.00E*00   EQ -IPW-LVTPANS 4   2.39E-04         .03 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           5.00E-01   BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IPWST, BAT)        4.78E-04   IWK-XMTR 5   1.30E-05         .00 EQ-IEV-L1hCA                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5,00E-01   BSIZE g                                          LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIRC LINES              2.60E-05   IWK-EV4-SA g
6   6.00E-06         .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLCCA LLOCA PPEAK SITE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01   BSIZE 1,20E-05   P EK - FL-G P COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING 7   7.15E-08         .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-L1hCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           5.00E-01   BSIZE LOW IPWST LEVEL TPANSMITTER FAILUPE                                 5.23E-03   IW2TLO46UF LOW IPWST LEVEL TPANSMITTER FAILUPE                                5.23E-03   IW3TLO47UF LOW IPWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE                                 5.23E-03   IW4 TLO 4 86UF E
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a                                                                       Table 55B.30                                                                    mh.
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                                                                                                                                                             ~
4 n
E,                                                             EQLLO-06. DES                                                                       ;I 7                                                                                                                                                 .u::1.j
                                                                "***  DOMINANT CUTSETS *''                          Page:        1 D[3 If C. *d

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ' Ver. 6.02   **)
yJ g q File: EQLLO-06.MIM i File created by linking eq11o-06. ira Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 9.9610E-01
  -J EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER 2
cr NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NARE S                   5.00E-01       50.20 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00r*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1
C e                                          LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01        BSIZE
   "                                          EQ-IPWST-TANK                                                      1.00E*00        EQ-IRWST-TANK 2   5.00E-01       50.20 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01         BSIZE EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                       1.00E*00         EQ-IPW-INJSQ 5.00E-01      50,20 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00        EQ-1EV-LLOCA 3
LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-03        BS!ZE EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                        1.00E*00        EQ-IRW-INJCV 1.00E*G;        EQ-IEV-LLOCA 4    5.00E-01      50.20 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          5.00E-01        BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAR SIZE EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 1.00E*00        EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 5    5.00E-01      50.20 EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00        EQ "EV-LIACA u                                           LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01        BSIZE u                                                                                                               1.00E+00        EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS 5.00E-01      50.20 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA
[                6 LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01 1.00E*00 BSIZE EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                                       EQ-PRZR-SENSOR 7    5.00E-01      30.20 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1LOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           5.00E-01         BSIZE EQ-CMT-AOV                                                          1.00E*00         EQ-CMT-AOV b
3            8    5.00E-01      50.20 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00         EO-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           5.OOE-01         BSIZE Af                                                                                                          1.00E*00         EQ-CMT-CV EQ-CMT-CV 9    5.15E-05         .01  FQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01         BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWAPE)        1.03E-04        CCX-INPtTT-IP31C     tm Y
10     3.05E-05        .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5,00E-01         BSIZE                M LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER E2fD OF BREAK SIZE                                                               "-
COMMON CLUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                               6.10E-05        CCX-AV-LA 11    2.55E-05         .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00        EC-YEV-LLOCA         O LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAR SIZE                           5.00E-01        BSIZE 5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO            %*
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN I                                                                                                                                               $
        #         12     2.35E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE g-
        $                                      LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE COMMON CAUSE FA1 LURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                         4.70E-05        CCX-BY-PN             3 3                                                                                                                                               >
g          13     1.92E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                        1.00E+00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LIDCA BSIZE U
E LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -! EWER END OF BPEAK $1ZE m                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS          3.94E-05        CMX-VS-FA            M 0                                                                       O e

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v                                                                                                                        QJ Table 55B-30 (cont.)                                                                                                                                         M EQLLO-06. DES                                                                                                                                               h.
E'
                                                               ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                                                Page:                                    2                                             (
n
     @                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .;p

==Title:==
AP600 SMA                                                                                                                                                                                                    ==
Q--*     File: EQLLO-06. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-06.in    WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
g Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 9.9610E-01 EVDIT PROB.                             IDENTIFIER                                          E NUMBER CUTSET FROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME y       - ---. ---......- --- ..- .--.------...-...--- .... -------..- ----....--....--- ---..--------- ..--... --- --..--- --.-                                                                                            3
* 1.00E*00                              FQ-IEV-LLOCA                                         g 14   1.50E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              5.00E-01                              BSIZE                                               &d LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                 1 00E-05                               IWX-CV-AO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES                                                                                                                               E' EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1.00E+00                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA N
5 15   1.30E-05         .00 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -14WER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                 5.00E-01                               BSIZE 2.60E-05                               IWX-EV-SA
{                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES i
                                        .00  EQ-IEV-LLDCA 1.00E*00                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA 16   1.20E-05                                                                                                        5.00E-01                               BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                 2.40E-05                              CCX-IV-KR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS
                                        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1.00E*00                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA 17   6.00E-06                                                                                                        5 00E-01                               BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                         IWM-FL-GP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                                           1.20E-05
                                        .00  EQ-! EV-LI4CA                                                                             1.00E*00                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA 18   5.50E-06 u                                            LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                 5.00E-01                                BSIZE u                                            COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF FMS ESF INPUT IMGIC SOF'IWARE                                     1.10E-05                               CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW g
1.00E*00                                EQ-!EV-LLOCA
$                 19   5.50E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                 5.00E-01 1.10E-05 BSIZE CCX-FMXMOD2-SW COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION LOGIC SOFTWARE 5.50E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA 20                                                                                                                   5.00E-01                                BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                         CCX-FMKMODI-SW COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OlnPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE                                     1.10E-05 4.31E-06         .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00                                EQ-IEV-LLOCA 21                                                                                                                   5.00E-01                                BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                                                    8.62E-06                                CCX-EP-SAM 6.00E-07         .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                              1.00E*00                                EQ-!EV-LLOCA 22                                                                                                                   5.00E-01                                 BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE                                               1.20E-06                               CCX-SFTW E
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9 2ll C                                                                           Table 55B-31                                                           :%*~
* EQLLO.08. DES
(%  n ":I
    ~Y p                                                                                                                                                +
                                                                        ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                    Page:    1 U
W }$
O. >d

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y            File: EG 2.LO - 0 8 . M I X t WLINK2 4.02
* WARNING
* MAX CUTSET LIMIT REACHED, PROBABILITY INCREASED)
Peduced Sum of Cutsets- 1.0000E*00 g %4 9                                                                                                                   EVENT PROB. IDDfTIFIER NUMBER CtfrSET PROB PEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME cr           . . .. _. ._____.. _._____ ___.____.. .___.___....___.___..____..____._____..__...____.__.______ ..______. . __.__.-___._
8                   1    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA Co                                                  I LOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                  1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-IRW-RECSQ 1.00E+00   EQ- I PW - R ECSQ 50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LLOCA 2    5.00E-01                                                                                    5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE EQ-CAS-AOVI4/15                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-IRW-RECCV 1.00E*00   EO - I RW - P ECCV 1.00E*00   EQ- I RW- P ECMOV EQ-IRW-PECMOV 5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 3                                                                                                           BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END CF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01 EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-LVTRANS 4    5.00E-01           50.00   EQ-I EV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA (3                                                  LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPF.AK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE (n                                                                                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 00                                                  EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                  1.00E*00 EQ-IPW-R ECSQ                                                              EQ-IRW-RECSQ
{                                                                                                                    1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -IEWER END OF BREAK SIZE EO-VFS-ADV09/10                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 EQ-IPW-RECCV                                                    1.00E+00   EQ - I RW - R ECCV EQ - I RW - P ECMOV 1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-PECMOV 6    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 33                                              LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01   BSIZE 5                                                                                                                1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-AOVO9/10 Af                                               EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 EQ-IPW-LVTRANS                                                  1.00E*00   EQ-IPW-LVTRANS
()-
7    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE 1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04      um EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 EQ-IPW-PECSQ                                                    1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-PECSQ         YN 1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA          LA 9    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                  BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LCWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                       5.00E-01                         h.
EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                 1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04       g 1.00E+00 I                                                EQ-IPW- P ECCV EQ-IPW-RECMOV                                                   1.00E+00 EQ-IPW-RECCV EQ-IRW-RECMOV O
                                                                                                                                                      '?
9    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEv-tLOCA                                                       1.00E+00   eQ-IEv-LLOCA          EF
:E!                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE                 9 CD                                             LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE 1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04      33-II                                             EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                                                  3 EQ-IPW-LVTRANS                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-IFW-LVTRANS 23"                                                                                                                                            >
Og            10    5.00E-01           50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA          D LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE                 BL
[$                                             EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                 1.00E+00   EQ-WLS- AOV55 / 57   'e cs                                                                                                             1.00E+00 CD                                             EQ-IRW-RECSQ                                                               EQ-IPW-RECSQ          h-O O                                                        e      -

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Table 55B.31 (cont.)                                                               y EQLLO-08. DES                                                                    m e
G*
g                                                               "*'   DOMINANT CUTSETS * ' *
* Pa0e:           2                        k n
CD                                                                                                                                                       ;;p

==Title:==
AP600 SMA                                                                                                                               p g         File: EQLlh-08. MIX ( WLINK2 4.02
* WARNING
* MAK CUTSET LIMIT REACHED. PROBABILITY INCREASED)
Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 IN3                                                                                                                                                      ya~
               'd                                                                                                          EVENT FROB.        IDENTIFIER                 3 NUMBER CUTSET PROB FERCENT BASIC EVERT NAME y         ------ ........... ....--. ...... ..--...------------.--- --- ..---- ------..------- ----. ---
3 8                                                                                                           1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LI4CA               gg 11     5.00E-01        50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     5.00E-01          BSIZE                     Q Ll4CA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                     1.00E*00          EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 EO-WLS-AOV55/57                                               1.00E*00          EQ-IPW-RECCV E
EQ-IPW-RECCV                                                  1.00E+00          EQ-IRW-PECMOV N
0 EQ-IRW-RECMOV 1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LLOCA 6               12    5.00E-01        50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     5.00E-01          BSIZE LIACA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE i"                                             EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 1.00E+00 1.00E*00 EQ-WLS-ACV55/57 EQ-IRW-LVTRANS EQ-IRW-LVTRANS 1.00E*00          EQ- 1 EV - LIMCA 13    5.00E-01        50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                     5.00E-01          BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -14WER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E+00          EQ-WLS-AOV04106 EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-IPW-LVTRANS 1.00E*00          EQ-IPW-LVTRANS 50.00 EQ-!EV-LIACA                                                     1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                    14    5.00E-01                                                                               5.00E-01          BSIZE u                                                   LIhCA BREAK SIZE -! EWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                               1.00E*00          EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 W*                                                  EQ-IRW-RECCV 1.00E*00          EQ-IPW-PECCV 1.00E*00          EQ -IPW - P ECMOV EQ-IPW-RECMOV 5.00E-01        50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-LLOCA 15                                                                                           5.00E-01          BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END CF BREAK SIZE EO-WLS-AOV04/06                                               1.00E*00          EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EC-IPW-RECSQ                                                  1.00E*00           EQ-IRW-PECSC 16     3.85E-04          .04   EQ-!EV-LIACA                                                  1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                     5.00E-01           BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                  7.70E-04          CIK-AV-LA EQ-IRW-LVTPANS                                                 1.00E+00          EQ-IRW-LVTRANS 17     3.85E-04          .c4 EQ-IEV-LlacA                                                     1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                     5.00E-01           BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CIDSE                  7.70E-04          C1K-AV-LA EQ-IRW-RECCV                                                   1.00E*00          EQ-IRW-PECCV EQ-IRW-RECMOV                                                  1.00E+00          EQ-IRW-PECMOV 18     3.85E-04          .04   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E+00          EQ-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                     5.00E-01           BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                  7.70E-04           CIX- AV-IJL 1.00E+00          EQ-IRW-PECSQ f7 o    =
                                                        .02 EQ-IPW-RECSQ 1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LLOCA 0 =BB              19     2.39E-04                EQ-IEV-LLOCA yy g y LLOCA BPEAR SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE EO-CAS-AOV14/15 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IPWST. BAT)   4.7PE-04          IWK-XMTR                         .
K -a
                                                                                                                                                                             - .l;;
T*                 20     2.39E-04          .02   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E*00          EQ-1EV-LLOCA
            $ pa D                                            LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                      5.00E-01 1.00E*00 BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10
            ~3yp$Q EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)   4.78E-04          IWK-KMTR              .
iffljij
                                                                                                                                                                               ,h

aZp                                                                     Table 55B-31 (cont.)                                                      mni
    $8 7
EQLLO-08. DES en D "q                                                          . . . .
* DOMINANT CUTSETS ""
* Page    3 ff C. w

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y         File: EQLLO-08. MIX ( WLINK2 4.02
* WAPRING
* MAX CUTSET LIMIT PEACHED, PROBABILITY INCREASED) g q      Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 m
C         NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                           EVENT FROB. IDENTIFIER or        __.... ___________ .______ _.......___.__....______ ...____.._______ ._________________.________ ..._______. ____________
S                                                                                                                1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA C             21    2.39E-04          .02   EQ-IEV-LLOCA e                                           LLOCA BREAR SIZE -LOWER E D CF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE
"                                           EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT)         4.79E-04   IWX-KMTR 22    2.39E-04          .02   EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END CF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTEPS (IRWST, BATl         4.78E-04   IWX-XMTR 23    2.19E-04          .02   EQ-IEV-LI4CA                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 77NK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IPWST, BAT)         4.79E-04   IWK-KMTR 24    1.07E-04          .01   EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE g                                                                                                                2.45E-02   CANCVC15CC u                                           INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE g                                           ACV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                              8.76E-03   CANAV014LA 1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-LVTRANS g                                           EQ-IRW-LVTRANS 25    1.07E-04          .01   FQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE                               2.45E-02   CANCV015GC ADV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                              B.76E-03   CANAV014LA EQ-IRW-RECCV                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-PECCV EQ-IRW-RECMOV                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-PECMOV N;         26    1.07E-04          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA A                                        LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE l
p INSIDE CONTAIN. CV VOIS FAILS TO CLOSE AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.45E-02 9.76E-03 CANCV015GC CANAV014LA EQ-IRW-RECSQ                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-RECSQ 27    6.00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA      tre LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -thWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE             %
PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                         1.20E-04   OTH-PO EQ-IRW-RECSQ                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IPW-RECSQ      [
29    6.00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA l                                        LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM 5.00E-01 1.20E-04 BSIZE OTH-PO            O EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                                                       1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-LVTRANS    LP k                                                                                                                                       5 G       29    6.00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA
      $                                     LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER E D OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01   BSIZE             D"t PPE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                         1.20E-04   OTH-PO            U.
6                                     EQ-IRW-PECCV                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-PECCV      >
EQ-IPW-RECMOV                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-PECMOV     D D                                                                                                                                       BJ
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w./                                                 v Table 55B-31 (cont.)                                                    p m
k                                                                                                                                             EQLLO 08. DES
                                                                                                                                          ""
* DOMINANT CUTSETS " * *
* Fage-    4 M
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==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EQLLO-08.MIK ( WLINK2 4.02
* WARNINO
* MAX CUTSET LIMIT PEACHED. PROBABILITY INCREASED) y 3       Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 EVENT FRCB. IDDITIFIER                     [
NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME y       ...... ........... ----... .------...........- ......----- .....--...................--.... -... --- ---- .. -- ---------                                                                                 3
* 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                   3:
30   3.84E-05                 .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE                          q LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER D1D OF BREAK SIZE                                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAVO55LA                     E AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                           8.76E-03   WLOAV0571A
* AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                           1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-LVTRANS ki                                                EQ-IRW-LVTRANS 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
[              31   3.84E-05                 .00  EQ-IEV-LIECA                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAV055LA AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                           8.76E-03   WLCAV057LA AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-RECCV EQ-IRW-RECCV                                                                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-PECMOV EQ-IPW-RECMOV
                                                  .00                                                                                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 32   3.84E-05                      EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER D1D OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                          WLIAV004LA INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                8.76E-03 R 76E-03   WLOAV006LA OUTSIDE CONT 71N. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE g                                                                                                                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-IPW-LVTRANS u                                                      EQ-IPW-LVTRANS W                                                                                                                                                                              I.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
* 33    3.84E-05                .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                          WLIAV055LA AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                           8.76E-03 8.76E-03   WLOAV0571A AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE EQ-IPW-RECSQ 1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-PECSQ 1.00E*00   EQ -I EV - LI OCA 34    3.84E-05                .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5.OOE-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                          WLIAV004LA INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                8.76E-03 OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CIDSE                                                                          8.76E-03   WIDAV006LA EQ-IPW-RECCV                                                                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-RECCV EQ-IFW-RECMOV                                                                                                           1.00E*00   EQ-IPW-RECMOV 35   3.84E-05                 .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                            1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE . LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                              5.00E-OI   BSIZE INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                          8.76E-03   WLOAV006LA E                                                    EQ-IPW-PECSQ                                                                                                             1.00E*00  EQ-IRW-FECSQ 6
36   1.30E-05                 .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                             1.00E+00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA B3 TEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE EC-CAS-AOV14/15                                                                                                          1.00E+00  EQ-CAS-AOVI4115 COMMON CAUSE FA!LUPE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES                                                                  2.60E-05   IWX-EV4-SA f
a     ==
0    =10           37   1.30E-05                 .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                            1.00E+00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                               5.00E-01   BSIZE yQ                                                    EQ-VFS-AOV09/IO                                                                                                         1.00E*00  EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 g af                                                                                                                                                                         2.60E-05   IWX-EV4-SA                         g COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIPC LINES K                                                                                                                                                                                                                           m
  -w O'
* 38   1.30E-05                 .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                            1.00E*00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWF.R END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                              5.00E-01  BSIZE                        -
8ts U                                                                                                                                                                         1.00E*00  EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 Cgy
   $qg EO-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIPC LINES                                                                  2.60E-05   IWX-EV4-SA                  7  dHlglUj

aZc                                                                        Table 55B-31 (cont.)                                                        q
  $%h                                                                          EQLLO-08. DES n
m 4 w                                                             * * * *
* DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * '                     Page:       5
                                                                                                                                                       .iE' g  .4 w w         Tittet AP600 SMA yj g q File: EQLLO-08. MIX t WLINK2 4.02
* WARNING
* MAX CUTSET LIMIT REACHED. PROBABILITY INCREASED)
Reduced sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 95 EVDfT PRCB.      IDENTIFIER C          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCDif BASIC EVDIT NAME 7
S                                                                                                                1.00E*00        EQ-1EV-LLOCA O               39   1.30E-05          .00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                        BSIZE c                                            LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01 EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                    1.00E+00        EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIRC LINES              2.60E-05        IWK-EV4-SA 40   1.30E-05           .00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01        BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                    1.00E*00        EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 Cor90N CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 SQU1B VALVES IN PECIRC LINES             2.60E-05        IWX-EV4-SA 41   6.00E-06           .00   EQ-IEV-LIACA                                                       1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01        BSIZE EO-CAS-AOV14/15                                                    1.00E*00        EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIPC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING   1.20E-05        R EX - FL-G P 42   6.00E-06           .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LIDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01        BSIZE g                                                                                                                 1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 u                                              EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PECIRC LINES [UE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING   1.20E-05        PEX-FL-GP Q3 EQ-I EV-LIDCA h               43   6.00E-06           .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01        BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                    1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING   1.20E-05        REK-FL-GP 44    6.00E-06          .00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                          5.00E-01        BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                    1.00E*00        EQ-WLS-Auv55/57 Q
       ;;                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILUKE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGIfri  1.20E-05        PEX-FL-GP A
45    6.00E-06          .00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA
("                                        LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5. JOE-01       BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                    1.00E+00        EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREDE PLUGGING   1.20E-05        REX-FL-CP tn 46    4.60E-06          .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00        EC-IEV-LLOCA      7 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                          5.00E-01        BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                  8.76E-03        VFOAV009          W VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                  6. *l 6 E - 0 3 VFIAv010          2.
TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                      1.20E-01        VFSFRAC 1.00E+00         EQ-IPW-PECCV 1                                         EQ-IRW-PECCV EQ-IRW-RECMOV                                                      1.00E+00         EQ-IRW-PECMOV O
                                                                                                                                                      */
k         47   4.60E-06           .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00         EQ-1EV-LLOCA     [
          @                                      LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          5.00E-01         BSIZE            *t M                                      VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                  8.76E-03        VFOAV009          D.
5.76E-03        VFIAV010          3 5                                      VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMDIT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                      1.20E-01        VFSFRAC           >
EQ-IRW-RECSQ                                                       1.00E*00         EQ-IPW-PECSQ     CB a                                                                                                                                           E-O                                                                            O                                                          O

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                                                                                                                                                       .' s)                                                                                                      L.J Table 55B-31 (cont.)                                                                                                                    p EQLLO-08. DES                                                                                                                          m l                                                                                                                                                                                                              e tl" Pager        6                                                                               3_
                                                                                                                                      *"' DOMINANT CUTSETS * ''
(
m a
gis Q"--

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EQLLO-08. MIX ( WLINK2 4.02
* WARNING
* MAX CUTSET LIMIT REACMED, PROBABILITY INCREASED)                                                                                                      p g                                                                                                                                                                                                          .,
Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00                                                                                                                                                                 To
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ~
EVENT FRCB. IDENTIFIER                                                                         D O        NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCDIT BASIC EVENT NAME D
O                                                                                                         1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                       y 48 4.60E-06          .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5.00E-01       BSIZE                                                                             7 LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                         i VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                               8.76E-03       VFOAV003 na VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                               8.76E-03       VFIAV004 1.20E-01       VFSFRAC h
l; TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN EQ-IRW-LVTRANS 1.00E*00       EQ-IPW-LVTRANS
                                                                                                             .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E+00       EO-IFV-LLOCA
                                                                      $                 49 4.60E-06                                                                                5.00E-01       BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                               8.76E-03       VFOAV003 VLS ADV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CIDSE                               8.76E-03       VFIAV004 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURCE LINE IS OPEN                   1.20E-01       VFSFRAC EQ-IPW-RECCV 1.00E*00       EQ-IRW-RECCV 1.00E*00      EQ-IRW RECMOV EQ-IRW-RECMOV 50 4.60E-06          .90    EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                   1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-LIDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.0GE-01       BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO C1DSE                               8.76E-03       VFOAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                               8.76E-03       VFIAV004 g                                                                                                                1.20E-01       VFSTRAC e                                                TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS CPEN 1.00E+00       EQ-IRW-RECSQ
                                                                  $                                                 EQ-IPW-RECSQ 51 4.60E-06          .00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                      5.00E-01       BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CIDSE                                8.76E-03      VFOAV009 VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                B.76E-03      VFIAV010 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                    1.20E-01      VFSFRAC EQ-IPW-LVTRANS                                                  1.00E*00       EQ-IPW-LVTRANS 52 1.84E-07          .00    EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -1DWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                      5.00E-01       BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                    7.70E-04       CIX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)    4.78E-04       IWX-XMTR 53 7.15E-08           .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                    1.00E*00       EQ- I EV- L1DCA LIDCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                       5.00E-01       BSIZE E                                                 EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                 1.00E*00       EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 I                                                 LOW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE                            5.23E-03        IW2TLO46UF LOW IPWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILUPE                             5.23E-03       IW3TLO47UF IDW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE                            5.23E-03        IW4TLO48UF n
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Table 55B-32                                                         ,3 R
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P.,                                                              EQLLO-09. DES
:P                                                                                                                                            g:
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                                                                  ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                    Fage:     1
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==Title:==
AP600 SMA File EOLLO-09. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-09.in         WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
O!
W %J l      Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00
-s
 ."           NUPBER CUTSET FROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                     EVDIT FRCB. IDENTIFIER 7            ---... ......----. --..... ----.... ....---.....- ..........---.........--- ....-- ..---...--.. ----....... ------.....
8                1    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA e                                             LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BBEAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-IPWST-TANK                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-IRWST-TANK 2    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BFEAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BPEAP SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-ADV14/15 EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                    1.00E+00   EO-IRW-INJSQ 3    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-AOv14/15 EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                    1.00E*00   EO-IRW-INJCV 4    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE (3                                                                                                             1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 (n                                             EQ-VFS-AOvo9/10 EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-IRWST-TANK Q@
1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA f)                $    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LIDCA PREAK SIZE -14WER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                 1.00E+00   EO-VFS-AOV09/10 EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-IRW INJSQ 6    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZF Ij                                        EQ-VFS-ADV09/10                                                 1.COE*00   EQ-VFS-ADV09/10 e                                         EQ-IPW-INJCV                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-IPW-INJCV 7    5.00E-01         50.00  EQ- I EV - LLOCA                                                1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA l=                                        LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-ADV03/04 EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                   1.00E*00    EO-IRWST-TANK t/s 8    5.002-01         50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LLOCA       $N LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK 91ZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE 1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04     CA EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                    1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-INJSQ       h-9    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA        !b O
LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01   BSIZE 1.00E*00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04     kr EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 ll[                                     EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                    1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-INJCV        gf 9
CD Il        10    5.00E-01         50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA      $b 5.00E-01   BSIZE              3 ET                                      LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WLS- A0755 / 57                                              1.00E*00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57    >>
EQ-IPWST-TANK                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-IRWST-TANK      3 C3                                                                                                                                     g EZ                                                                                                                                   't==
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v Table 55B-32 (cont.)
p EQLLO-09. DES                                                                   m e
l                                                                                                                                                                              E'
                                                                                         * * * *
* DOMINANT CUTSETS ' * *
* Page:       2                           [
n g                                                                                                                                                                            p a

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: ECLIh-09. MIX f File created by linking eq11o-09.in         WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                                     y g                                                                                                                                                                            m M
Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 EVENT PROB. IDDfTIFIER                    E NUMBER CU1 SET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVDIT NAME                                                     ----------- --- ---- - -
y                             .- --- ------ ---- .---.-- ----- ------------- -------------------- ---------- -----------------                                              3 8                                                                                                                                1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                  p 11   5.00E-01     50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         5.00E-01      BSIZE                         v""
LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 1.00E+00      EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                i 48 1.00E+00      EQ-IRW-IILISQ EQ-IPW-1NJSQ 1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA T.                                    12   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01      BSIZE 4                                                              LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          1.00E+00      EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 lp"                                                             EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 EQ-IRW-IfLJCV 1.00E+00      EQ-IRW-INJCV 1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA 13   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01      BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                          1.00E+00      EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                    1.00E*00      EQ-IRWST-TANK EQ-IRWST-TANK 1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA 14   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01      BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BRE.AK SIZE g                                                                                                                                       1.00E+00     EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 u                                                                   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                    1.00E*00      EQ-IRW-INJSQ g                                                                   EQ-IPW-INJSQ 1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA
  $                                         15   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BitEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01 1.00E*00 BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-IRW-INJCV 1.00E+00     EQ-IPW-INJCV 1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA 16    3.85E-04        .04 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01     BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE COFMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                       7.70E-04      CIK-AV-LA EQ-IPWST-TANK                                                       1.00E+00      EQ-IRWST-TANK 3.85E-04        .04 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA 17                                                                                            5.00E-01      BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BFEAK SIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO C1DSE                        7.70E-04     CIK-AV-LA EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                        1.00E*00      EQ-IPW-INJSQ 19    3.95E-04        .04 EO-IEV-110CA                                                        1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-LLDCA E                                                                  LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           5.00E 01      BSIZE I                                                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                        7.70E-04      CIX-AV-LA EQ-IPW-INJCV                                                        1.00E+00      EQ-IPW-INJCV 19    1.07E-04        .01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA O                                                                  LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01      BSIZE CANCV015GC k[
Ca p INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE 2.45E-02 8.76E-03      CANAV014LA yy                                                                 EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                       1.00E*00      EQ-IRWST-TANK 4   J'                                                                                                                                1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                     -o J                                       20    1.07E-04        .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE                     I j!
  '2 T=
        $                                                              LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE 5.00E-01 2.45E-02      CANCV015GC ACV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                             8.76E-03      CANAV014LA 8 We U g       y                                                           EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                       1.00E+00      EQ-IRW-INJSQ               -
                                                                                                                                                                                   -   dijigij.h
   $ q ;;P

5KC c
Table 55B-32 (cont.)                                                             ig 1 g. 5                                                                         EQLLO.09. DES 5:r-                                                                   ''
* DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * '                           Page:    3 C. w

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y$                   File: EQLLO-09. MIX t File created by linking eq110-09.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 WLINK2 " Ver . 4.02 ')
g q m
C                    NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                          EVENT FROB. IDENTIFIER pr                   _...__ -._______ _ .._____ ____..._.....__...__..__...._____......_______..-__. ..__ _____...... __. .__..__ _.__........
S                                                                                                                          1.00E+00    FQ- I EV- LLOCA 0                       21    1.07E-04         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA o                                                   LLOCA BREAK SIZE -liMER END OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE INSIDE COffrAIN . CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE                               2.45E-02   CANCV015GC AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                8.76E-03   CANAV014LA EQ-IRW-IW CV                                                           1.00E+00    EQ-IRW-INJCV 22    6.00E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                           1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.00E-01    BSIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                           1.20E-04   OTH-PO EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-IRWST-TANK 23    6.00E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                           1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.00E-01   BSIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                           1.20E-04   OTH-PO EQ-IRW-IU SQ                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-INJSQ 24    6.00E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LIX)CA                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                                                                                                          5.00E-01   BSIZE u                                                   LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE g                                                   PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                           1.20E-04   OTH-PO
* EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IRW IM CV 25    3.84E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                              5.00E-01   BSIZE AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                          8.76E-03   WLIAV055LA ADV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE                                          8.76E-03   WLOAV057LA EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-IRWST-TANK EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA Q
5 26     3.84E-05        .00 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.00E-01   BSIZE A                                              AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                          8.76E-03   WLIAV055LA WLOAV057LA l                                              ADV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE EQ-IRW-INJSQ 8.76E-03 1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-INJSQ g                  27     3.84E-05        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.00E-01   BSIZE            i   tn AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                          8.76E-03   WLIAV0551A           }^
ADV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE                                          8.76E-03   WLOAV057LA EQ-IPW-INJCV                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-INJCV         [
28     3.84E-05        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                              5.00E-01   BSIZE 1                                              INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                               8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA           "
OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                         8.76E-03   WLOAVOO6LA           V
       $                                            EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-IRWST-TANK        [
G                                                                                                                                                   D-D                 29    3.84E-05        .00  EQ-IEV-LIX)CA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE                D 3                                            INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                               8.76E+03   WLIAv004LA           J>
OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                         8.76E-03   WLOAV006LA           D E.
h m
EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-170SQ G                                                                                                                                                   g O                                                                           O                                                              O

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                ^                                                                                                          r     i Q ,)                                                                                                              Q/                                             Q/
Table 55B-32 (cont.)                                                  3
   %                                                                                                            EQLLO.09. DES
                                                                                                    * * * *
* DOMINANT CITTSETS * * * *
* Page:    4 h,
W
[
en y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EQLLO-09. MIX t File created by linking callo-09.in                                          WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02  **)                                       p 3           Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 EVENT PROB. II DITIFIER                g NUMBER CUTSET FROB FERCENT BASIC EVENT MAME Q
y           -----. --. -...--- -- . -- - .. ---------...... --------------------- --- --- ------------------ -- -------- -------.. --
      "                                                                                                                                                                              3 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA               y 30    3.84E-05                                          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5.00E-01   BSIZE                     4:*
LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BPEAK SIZE                                                         *=
INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV VOO4 FAILS TO CLOSE                     8.7EE-03   WLIAV004tA 8.76E-03   WLOAV006LA                 E OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE 1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-INJCV N
s EQ- I RW- !!LICV
                                                                             .00                                                               1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
[                 31    1.50E-05                                               EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DJD OF BREAK SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE E
EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                              1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 2"                                                                                                                                          3.00E-05   IWX-CV-AO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES 32    1.50E-05                                          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BREAK SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                              1.00E+C0   EQ-VFS-ADV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES       3.00E-05   IWK-CV-AO 33     1.50E-05                                         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                                                                                                                              5.00E-01   BSIZE u                                                                                 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BPEAK SIZE g                                                                                 EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                              1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES       3.00E-05   IWX-CV-AO g
34     1.50E-05                                         .00  EQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                 1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LLOCA LIDCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                              1.00E*00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST IfMECTION CHECK VALVES       3.00E-05   IWK-CV-AO 35     1.50E-05                                         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LIhCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-WLS-ADV04/06                                              1.00E*00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES       3.00E-05   IWX-CV-AO 36    1.30E-05                                         .00  EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                              1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES       2.60E-05   IWX-EV-SA E                    37    1.30E-05                                         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA I                                                                                LLOCA BPEAK S!ZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE k                                                                                 EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES 1.00E+00 2.60E-05 EQ-VFS-ACV09/10 IWX-EV-SA O                    39    1.30E-05                                          .00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                 1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LI,0CA k                                                                                LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                    5.00E-01   BSIZE O. 933                                                                            EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                             1.00E*00 2.60E-C5 EQ-VFS-ACV03/04 IWX-EV-SA yQ                                                                               COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES T    3"                                                                                                                                       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-L1hCA
-3                    39    1.30E-05                                          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                             .
 "                                                                                 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                   5.00E-01   BSIZE                   '
T*
      $                                                                            EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                             1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 h*
 $    e,m n D                                                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES       2.60E-05   IWX-EV-SA U@
y qp03                                                                                                                                                                               ! ! UmN.. I..

Table 55B-32 (cont.)                                                              ,
sh.n R
c E, ,C
* EQLLO-09. DES n n
:r Page:     5 "q                                                        . . . . . IIOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* n-O. W

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 " I y$q          File: EQLLO-09. MIX 4 File created t y linking eq11o-09.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 EVENT PROB. IDWTIFIER 2            NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME cr S                                                                                                              1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-L14CA C               40     1.30E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA c                                           LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                         5.00E-01   BSIZE
"                                            EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST IfkTECTION SQUIB VALVES           2.60E-05    IWX-EV-SA 41     6.00E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                         5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-CAS-ACV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF STRAINERS IN IPWST TANK                   1.20E-05    IWX-FL-GP 42     6.00E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -I.atER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                   1.20E-05    IWX-FL-CP 43     6.00E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00    EO-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE g                                                                                                              1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 u                                            EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STPAINEPS IN IPWST TANK                   1.20E-05    IWX-FL-GP t.gy
                                        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA
[               44     6.00E-06 LLOCA BPEAK SIZf -LOWER C OF BREAK SIZE                           5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                   1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV35/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STPAIPsC." C. IRWST TANK                  1.20E-05    IWX-FL-GP 45     6.00E-06         .00  EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-!EV-1.LOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                   1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 Q
r                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF STRAINERS IN IPWST TANK                   1.20E-05    IWX-FL-GP
                                        .00                                                                    1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA hlla       46     4.60E-06              EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01 8.76E-03 BSIZE VFOAV009 VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VFIAV010 TIME FPACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01    VFSFRAC                             tm EQ-IRWST-TANK                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-IRWST-TANK                       ?
1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA                        Z 47    4.60E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                      2-LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VNIAV009                            l VLS ADV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VFIAV010 1                                       TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01    VFSFRAC                             O 1.OCE+00    EQ-IRW-INJSQ                        7 EQ-IRW-INJSQ k                                                                                                                                                       $
M CD        48    4.60E-06          .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5.00E-01                                        D.
N                                     LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03 BSIZE VFOAV009                            3 5                                     VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VF1AV010                            >
TIME FPACTION- CONTAINMENT PUPGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01    VFSFPAC                             D 1.00E+00    EQ-IPW-IPLICV e
EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                                                                      y;ll
* Gr O                                                                           O                                                   O

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Table 55B-32 (cont.)                                                                                                                                                        M EQLLO.09. DES                                                                                                                                                 h G~
                                                                                             ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                                                                             Page:                                                6                                                     3, n
y

==Title:==
Ar600 SMA File: EOLLO-09. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-09.in                                                                                             WLINK2 *
* Ver . 4.02 ")                                                                                                                  p 3           Peduced Sum of Cutsets: I.0000E*00 NUMBER CtftSET PPOB PEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                   EVENT PROB.                                          IDENTIFIER                                                  5'
* a g
49 4.60E-06        .00  EQ-1EV-LI4CA                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00                                           EQ-IEV-LLOCA LIDCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                                                                                                        5.00E-01                                            BSIZE                                                       &
VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                  8.76E-03                                          VFOAV003                                                     i da VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                  8.76E-03                                          VFIAV004 1.20E-01                                          VFSFRAC h
5 TIME FRACTILN- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN EQ-IPWST-TANK                                                                                                                                     1.00E*00                                           EQ-IRWST-TANK 5
50 4.60E-06        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00                                           EC-IEV-LLOCA
("                                           LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -14WER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                                                                                         5 00E-01                                           BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO C*4SE                                                                                                                  R.76E-03                                           VFVAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO C14SE                                                                                                                 8.76E-03                                           VFIAV004 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                     1.20E-01                                           VFSFRAC EQ-IPW-INJSQ                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00                                           EQ-IPW-!MJSQ 51 4.60E-06        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00                                           EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -!DWER END OF PREAK SIZE                                                                                                         5.00E-01                                           BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO C14SE                                                                                                                 8.76E-03                                           WOAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                 8.76E-03                                          VFIAV004 u                                               TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                     1.20E-01                                           VFSFRAC g                                                                                                                                                                                                 1.00E*00                                           EQ-IPW-INJCV g                                               EQ-IPW-IRJCV 52 2.88E-08        .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00                                           EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -14WER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                         5.00E-01                                           BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                                                                                                   1.00E*00                                           EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 IWRST DISCHARGE LINE *A" STRAINiR PLUGGFD                                                                                                         2.40E-04                                             IWA-FIDG IWRST DISCHARGE LINE *B* STRAINER PLUGGED                                                                                                         2.40E-04                                             IWB-PLUG E
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Table 55B-33                                                              m.n 8EC 6 gg *1
                                                                                                                                                  ~
g$                                                                EQLLO-10. DES W
                                                            ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                        Page:     1 W
Cn **

==Title:==
AP600 SMA yj         File: EQLIA-10. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-10.in     WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
g q        Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 m                                                                                                          EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER C          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME cr 8                                  50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA g              1    5.00E-01 5.00E-01    BSIZE c                                         LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BPEAK SIZE EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                    1.00E*00    EQ-PRZR-Sm SOP EQ-MSL-SENSOR                                                     1.00E*00    EQ-MSL-SmSOP EQ-CONTPR -SENSOR                                                 1.00E*00    EQ-CONTPR-SENSOR 2    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LthCA                                                       1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LIDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-CAS- AOV14 /15                                                 1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-ADS-54VLLVES 1    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-CMT-LEVELStrF                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 4    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LI4''A u                                         LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BS1ZE u                                                                                                           1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 gy                                        EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 1.00E*00    EQ-PPZR-LVTRANS g                                         EQ-PRZR-LVTPANS 5    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOv14/15                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOv14/15 EQ-PRZP-SENSOR                                                    1.00E*00    EQ-PRZR-SENSOR 6    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1_00E*00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA fj                                     LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE
   ;                                      EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 4                                      EQ-CMT-AOV                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-CMT-AOV f"          7    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14115                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 EQ-CMT-CV                                                         1.00E*00    EQ-CMT-CV            tre
                                                                                                                                             ?
8    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE                M EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOV09/10      h.
EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-ADS-54 VALVES     g 9    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-L14CA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE                '#
     $                                    EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOvo9/10      7
                                                                                                                                             *1
     @                                    EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT N                                                                                                                                       D.
1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA         3 5        10    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                     LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK 7                            5.00E-01    BSIZE                >
EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOV09/10      3 8
e EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-PRZR-LVTPANS      8, v
     @                                                                                                                                       g.
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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                        a EQLLO-10. DES                                                              h e
X g                                                                                                                               * * "
* DOMINANT CUTSETS ' * *
* Page-         2                         [
n
       @                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .p
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ==
       $       Titler AP600 SMA File: EQL14-10.MfK t File created by linking e 311o-10.in                                                                              WLINK2 ' Ver. 4.02 **)
3       Reduced Sum cf Cutsets: 1.0000E+00                                                                                                                                                                           ~
EVENT PROB.       IDENT1FIER                   g NUMBER CUTSET FPCB PEPCDf? BASIC EVENT MAME y       ---... - -....---- ---- .. ..-..--...------...........-- --- -..--- ..-----------.......... - .                                                               .. .. -...- .. - .... --
3 O                                                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00        EQ-1EV-LLOCA                  y 11                           5.00E ~)1                                                    50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                               5.00E-01         BS!ZE                        C LLOCA BPEAR SIZE -IAWER END OF BPEAE SIZE                1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 W
EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                                                        E 1.00E+00        EC - PRZR - SDISOR EQ ?RZR-SENSOR 33                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA e             12                            5.00E-01                                                    50.00 EQ-!EV-LIDCA                                               5.00E-01         BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DfD OF BPEAK SIZE                 1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 l
f                                                                                                               EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                           1.00E+00        EQ-CMT-AOV EQ-CMT-AOV 1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LI4CA g             13                            5.00E-01                                                    50.00 EQ-!EV-LIACA                                                5.00E-01        BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                 1.00E+00        EQ-vFS-AOV09/10 EO-VFS-AOV09/10                                           1.CCE*00        EQ-CMT-CV EQ-CMT-CV 1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-L14CA 14                             5.00E-01                                                   50.00 EQ-!EV-LICCA                                                5.00E-01        BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                 1.00E+00        EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                           1.00E*00        EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES g                                                                                                                    EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES e
50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LIDCA
@                  15                              5.00E-01                                                                                                                    5.00E-01        BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END CF BREAK SIZE                 1.00E*00         EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                           1.00E+00         EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                1.00E*00         EQ-!EV-LLOCA 16                              5.00E-01                                                                                                                    5.00E-01         BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 1.00E*00         EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 1.00E*00         EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS EQ PRZR-LVTRANS 50.00 EQ-IEV-Lt4CA                                                1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LLOCA 17                              5.00E-01                                                                                                                   5.00E-01         BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-VFS-ADV03/04                                          1.00E+00         EO-VFS-AOV03/04 EQ-PRZR-SENSOR 1.00E+00         EQ-PPZR-SENSOR 50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LLOCA 18                              5.00E-01                                                                                                                   5.00E-01         BSIZE q                                                                                                                    LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BFEAK SIZE 6                                                                                                                    EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                           1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 EO-CMT-AOV 1.00E*00         EQ-CMT-AOV 50.00 EC-IEV-LLOCA                                                1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA 19                               5.00E-01                                                                                                                  5.00E-01         BSIZE
 ,E                                                                                                                  LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER D3D OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 k3 O B3 EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 EQ-CMT-CV 1.00E*00        EQ-CMT-CV
 $N g gr              20                               5.00E-01                                                 50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE                               .
5                                                                                                                     LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00        EQ-WLS-AOV55/57
: 3.                                                                                                                  EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 1.00E*00        EQ-ADS-S4 VALVE 3 O' +                                                                                                                EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                                                    -
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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                        %m^
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        "C EQLLO-10. DES n A                                                                                                                                                 m
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                                                                    ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                      Page:    3 t
O. W         Titler AP600 SMA File: EQLLO-10. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-10.in           WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
y$
yq           Reduced Sum of Cutset s : 1.0000E+00 e                                                                                                               EVDIT PROB. IDENTIFIER 2            NUMBER CUTSET FROB PEPCENT BASIC EVDIT NAME pr 8                21     5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                               LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BDEAK SIZE                        5.00E-01   BSIZE e                                                                                                               1.00E*00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57
 "                                              EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                  1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 22    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 1.00E+00   EQ-WLS- AOv55 / 57 1.00E*00   EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS 50.00 EO-IEV-LLDCA                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA 21    5.00E-01                                                                                 5.00E-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WS.AOy35/57                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOv55/$7 1.00E*00    EQ-PRIR-SENSOR F'w' - PFIR -SDiSOR 1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LthCA 24    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ *EV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01    BSIZE LITA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 g
u                                               FJ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                  1.00E+00    EQ-CMT-AOV W                                              140-CMT-AOV e
1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LthCA h                 25    5.00E-01       $0.00 EQ-IEV-LLDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01 1.00E+00 BS!ZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-CV EQ-CMT-CV 1.00E*00   EQ - ! EV- LII.,CA 26    5.00E-01       50.00 EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01    BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 y                                           EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-ADS-54 VALVES 1.00E+00   EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES L
AE                                                                                                            1.00E+00   EO-IEV-LIDCA h             27    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         5.00E-01   BSIZE a                                         LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WLS-AOVD4/06                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                  1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-LEVEtEWT tm 50.00 EQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA           P 28    5.00E-01                                                                                  5.OOE-01   BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                          CA EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOv04/06 EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS 1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS        h.
50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA            9.
29    5.00E-01 5.00E-01   BSIZr.
* LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                           *#
1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-WLS-AOVO4/06 1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-SENSOR          7 m
EQ-PRZR-SENSOR D.
1.00E+00   EQ-1EV-LLOCA N            30    5.00E-01       50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA L14CA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                        5.00E-01   BSIZE                   3 3                                                                                                           1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06        ;>
g                                           EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-CMT-AOV 1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-AOV              D b
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                 .\s                                                                                                                             L/                                                         \d Table 55B.33 (cont.)                                                                  M EQLLO-10. DES                                                                        h e
E'
                                                                                                                           * * * " DOMINANT CUTSETS " * *
* Page:   4                                 3 X

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File ECLLO-10. MIX i File created by linking eg11o-10.in         WLINK2 *
* Ver . 4.02 "I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ==
3                                                                   Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00                                                                                                               $
50 NUMBER CUTSET FROB FERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT FROB. IDDITIFI3                          E g                                                                   ...___ ..__...___. ___.... ...__._______..___..____._._... . .__.______ _________.____. ..__._. .___._...___ ._____.. __
m                                                                                                                                                                    1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LIDCA                       h 31    5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       5.00E-01     BSIZE                              Q LLOCA BPEAR SIZE -LOWER DID OF BREAK SIZE                                                                        g, EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-WLS-A0V04/06                    'a EQ-CMT-CV                                                         1.00E+00    EQ-CMT-CV
   %                                                                                             50.00 EO-!EV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA li                                                                        32    5.00E-01                                                                                            BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER Ef!D OF BREAK SIZE                       5.00E-01
{                                                                                                     EQ-TRSFSWITCH 1.00E+00    EQ-TRSFSW11DI
(                                                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00     EU-IEV-LLOCA 33    5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                       5.00E-C1     BSIZE g                                                                                                     LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF EREAK SIZE EQ-DCMCC 1.00E*00    EQ-DCMCC 34    5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00    EQ- I EV- LIACA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01     BSIZE EQ-CABLETRAY                                                      1.00E*00    EQ-CABLETPAY 1.00E400    EQ-IEV-110CA tg 35    5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LIACA BREAK SIZE -IEWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-DCDISPANEL                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-DCDI$ PANEL 36    5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+0G    EQ-IEV-LLDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01     BSIZE EQ-DC-SWBRD                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-DC-SWBRD 37    5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-ACDISPANEL                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-ACDISPANEL 39   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-INVERTER                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-INVERTER 39   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -I4WER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-BAT-RACK                                                       1.00E+00    EQ-BAT-RACK g
d                                                                            40   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA kQ                                                                                                       LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER D3D OF BREAK SIZE EQ-BATTERY 5.00E-01 1.00E+00 BSIZE EQ-BATTERY el   5.00E-01      50.00    EQ-IEV- LIDCA                                                    1.00E+00    EO-!EV-LLOCA BSIZE k3 S la LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BREAK SIZE EQ-MPLEX-CAB 5.00E-01 1.00E*00    EQ-MPLEK-CAB hb g g=                                                                         42   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA v                                                                                                         LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-C1    BSIZE                                    -
l EQ-INTEG-CAB C$ .
EQ-INTEG-CAB                                                     1.00E*00 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA
 $ >* U                                                                       43   5.00E-01      50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA ggy 3 q ;p LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-LOGIC-CAB 5.00E-01 1.00E*00 BSIZE EQ-thGIC-CAB                       - in ig
__          -                     . = _      _ _ _        ._

3EC                                                                                                          Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                  >
       %h                                                                                                         EQLLO-10. DES                                                      }
C 7
E                                                                                                     * "' DO 4INANT CUTSETS * * * *
* Page:    5 EW

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 " I
  $             File EQLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq110-10.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 g q m
2             NUMBER C1.f7 SET PROB                                     BASIC EVENT NAME                                                       EVDIT PROB. IDENTIFIER 7             -..... --.......--          PERCEN'.
8                    44          5.00E-01   50.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                  1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
  ;-,                                                                                                                                             5.00E-01   BSIZE e                                                                       LIACA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE
  "                                                                                                                                               1.00E*00   EQ-ESFAC-CAB EQ-ESFAC-CAB 45          3.85E-04              .04              EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01   BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                            7.70E-04   CIK-AV-LA EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 46          3.85E-04               .04             EQ- I EV- LIACA                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LI4CA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01   BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                            7.70E-04   CIN-AV-LA EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-LEVELSwr 47          3.85E-04               .04             EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LIMCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01   BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CIASE                            7,70E-04   CIX- AV-1A g                                                                                                                                               1.00E+00   EQ-P9ZR-LVTRANS u                                                                       EQ-PRZA-LVTRANS W                                                         .04                                                                                   1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
* 48          3.85E-04                               EQ-IEV-LI4CA LLOCA PREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01   BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                            7.70E-04   CIK-AV-LA EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                          1.00E*00   EQ - PP ZR - S EN SOR 49          3.85E-04                .04            EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00   EQ - I EV- LIMCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -14WER END OF BPEAK SIZE                               5.00E-01   BSIZE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE                            7.70E-04   CIX-AV-LA 1.00E+00 6
is EQ-CMT-AOV                                                                         EQ-CMT-AOV A                50          3.95E-04                .04            EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01   BSIZE
(                                                                                                                                           7.70E-04   CIK-AV-LA p"                                                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF ALL CI AOVS TO CLOSE EQ-CMT-CV                                                                1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-CV EQ-IEV-LIACA                                                            1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA              tm 51          1.07E-04                .01 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01    BSIZE                    la INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE                                  2.45E-02   CANCVOI5GC AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                 8.76E-03   CANAV014LA                 M EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES          h.
52          1.07E-04                 .01           EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                             1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA              O LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                               5.00E-01    BSIZE INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CIASE                                  2.45E-02    CANCV015GC                V
         $                                                                AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                  8.76E-03   CANAV014LA                7
                                                                                                                                                                                        *1
         @                                                                EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-LEVEL 9fT
         $                                                                                                                                                                             D.
1.00E+00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA              D E             53          1.07E-04        . 01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                               5.00E-01    BSIZE                     J>
INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE                                  2.45E-02    CANCV01SGC                D AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                  B.76E-03   CANAV014LA                E.
gn                                                               EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS          $y CD O                                                                                                              O                                                     O

l (m  \                                                                        l t
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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                                    $
h k                                                                         EQLLO-10. DES
                                                                                            * * * " DOMINANT CUTSETS * ' *
* Page:            6 2
M
[
o n
y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: ECLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq110-10.in         WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                                           p 3         Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00                                                                                                                  ~
EVENT PROB.              IDENTIFIER                c NUMBER CUTSET PPOB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME y        ...... ..-.------- -.-- -- .- -......---... - .............--......--. ---.....--- ---..----..
* s 1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA              e 54   1.07E-04          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      5.00E-01               BSIZE                    Q LIACA BREAK SIZE -LOWER WD OF BREAK SIZE                                                 c m '015GC
* 2.45E-02 INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CIASE 8.76E-03               CANAV014LA                E AOV Vale FAILS TO CLOSE 1.00E+00               EQ-PRZR-SENSOR Ej                                          EQ-PRZR-SENSOR To 01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA f              55   1.01E-04                                                                                  5.00E-01               BSIZE f                                           LI4CA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                CANCV015GC INSIDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CLOSE                            2.45E-02 AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                           8.76E-03               CANAV014LA 1.00E*00               EQ-CMT-AOV EQ-CMT-AOV 56    1.07E-04         .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00               EQ-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01               BSIZE IN5IDE CONTAIN. CV V015 FAILS TO CIhSE                            7.45E-02               CANCV015GC AOV V014 FAILS TO CLOSE                                           8.76E-03               CANAV014LA EQ-CMT-CV 1.00E+00               EQ-CMT-CV g
tn                                                                                                                    1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA W                      57    6.00E-05         .01   EQ-IEV-LIACA LLOCA PREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01               BSIZE e
PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                      1.20E-04               OTH-PO EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 1.00E+00               EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 58    6.00E-05          .01  EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00               EQ-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01               BSIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ C14                    1.20E-04               OTH-PO EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 1.00E+00               EC CMT-LEVELSWT 59    6.00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00              EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -IDWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01               BSIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPWING > 100 SQ CM                       1.20E-04              OTM-PO EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                   1.00E*00              EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS 60   6.00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                      1.00E+00              EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01              BSIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                      1.20E-04              OTH-PO
: g.                                                 EQ-PRZR-SENSCR                                                    1.00E+00              EQ-FRZR-SENSOR EI 61   6.00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00              EQ-!EV-LLCCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01               BSIZE PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                      1.20E-04              OTH-PO U                                                  EQ-CMT-AOV                                                        1.00E+00              EQ-CMT-AOV O. In                 62   6,00E-05          .01   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00              EQ-IEV-LLOCA LIDCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER WD OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01               BSIZE yQ                                                 PRE-EXISTING CONTAINM mT OPENING > 100 SQ CM                      1.20E-04              OTH-PO g y                                                                                                                 1.00E+00              EQ-CMT-CV                   , ,;
y,,,                                                EQ-CMT-CV                                                                                                     ,
k                    63   5.15E-05           .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE 8wU LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E+00              EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                jj!
OgQ 3yp EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAuSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWAR E)    1.03E-04              CCX-INPUT-LOGIC       .* :ddt];

  } K $7 Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                         >q EQLLO-10. DES                                                              J     J g%$ T C
C     i 3w                                                            ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                             Page:     7 O. -

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y           File: EQLI4-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq11o-10 in      WLINK2 ' Ver . 4. 02 * * )
y q        Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 9                                                                                                               EVE *'T FROB . IDDITIFIER 2ar NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVDET NAME o
                                         .01                                                                       1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA hc             64     5.15E-05              EQ-IEV-1.LOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                            5.00E-01      BSIZE
   "                                          EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                      1.00E+00      EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS EFF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)        1.0?E-04      CCK-1NPUT-LOGIC 65     5.15E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LCWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01      BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                      1.00E+00      EQ-VFS-AOVO3/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)        1.03E-04      CCX-INPUT-LOGIC 66     5.15E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAF SIZE                            5.00E-01      BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                      1.00E+00      EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAdSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GPOUPS (HARDWARE)        1.03E-04      CCX-INPtTT-LOGIC 67     5.15E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01      BSIZE g                                                                                                                1.00E*00      EO-WLS-AOV04/06 u                                           EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARIMARE)        1.03E-04      CCX-INPUT-LOGIC g
EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00      EO-!EV-LLOCA
[              68     3.84E-05         .00 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER FND OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01      BSIZE WLIAV055LA AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                        8.16E-03 AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE                                        8.76E-03      WLOAV057LA EQ-ADS-54 VALVES                                                      1.00E*00     EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 49    3.84E-05          .00 EQ-I EV- LLOCA                                                       1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5.00E-01      BSIZE y                                       LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DGD OF BREAK SIZE AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                         8.76E-03     WLIAV055LA A                                       AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE                                         8.76E-03     WLOAV057LA EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 70    3.84E-05          .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                             5.00E-01     BSIZE AOV VALVE YO55 FAIL': TO CLOSE                                        8.76E-03     WLIAV055LA           tn WLOAV0571A           'A AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE                                         8.76E-03                          .
EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-FRZR-LVTRANS f/)
71     3.84E-05         .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA         h.
LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01     BSIZE                g I                                       AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CIASE 8.76E-03 8.76E-03 WLIAV055LA WLOAV057LA C
EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                       1.00E+00      EQ-PRZR-SENSOR      g m
I                                    EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA         9 CD 72     3.84E-05         .00 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                            5.00E-01      BSIZE               E 8.76E-03     WLIAV055tA           D
         $                                     AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE AOV VALVE VO57 FAILS TO CLOSE                                        8.76E-03     WLOAV057LA           >
3 EQ-CMT-AOV                                                           1.00E*00      EQ-CMT-AOV cD                                                                                                                                           g.
9                                                                      9                                                              9

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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                M l                                                                                                                                         EQLLO-10. DES                                                    6 E'
                                                                                                                                                  * * * ' DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* Page:   8                       3 5'

==Title:==
AP600 SMA                                                                                                                                                                           .p
                      $            File: EQLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq11o-10.in                                                                     WLINK2 " Ver. 4.02  **)                                      m 3            Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                           EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER                3'
{
y            --- .- .....------ ...-- - ...---..... ----.... ----....------------..-..----------..---------- ....--.---- - ...-------
* 3 73            3.84E-05   .00              EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                             1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA             pa LLOCA BREAK SIZF -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                               5.00E-01   BSIZE                    v""
AOV VALVE V055 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                            R.76E-03   WLIAV055LA                ta.
8.76E-03   WLOAV057LA                E AOV VALVE V057 FAILS TO CLOSE h
E EQ-CMT-CV                                                                                               1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-CV 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA f                  74            3.84E-05   .00              EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE E
INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                           8.76E-03   WLOAV006LA
                                                                        ~ EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                                                                1.00E+00   EQ-ADS-54 VALVES 75           3.84E-05   .00               EQ-IEV-LI4CA                                                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIER -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                               5.00E-01   BSIZE INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                          b.76E-03   WLOAV006LA EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT g
u                                                                                                                                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA m                        76           3.84E-05   .00               EQ-IEV-LIDCA
* LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAR SIZE                                                               5.00E-01   BSIZE 8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA d                                                                   INSIDE CONTAINM. ADV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                          e.76E-03   WLOAV006LA EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS 77           3.84E-05   .00               EQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                                                            1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                               5.00E-01   BSIZE INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                          8.76E-03   WLOAV006LA EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-SENSOR 78           3.84E-05   .00               EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                               5.00E-01   BS!ZE INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAV004LA OLTTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                         8.76E-03   WIMAV0061A EQ-CMT-AOV                                                                                              1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-AOV E                       79           3.84E-05   .00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                            1.00E+00   EO-IEV-LLOCA I                                                                  LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                              5.00E-01   BSIZE 3                                                                   INSIDE CONTAINM. AOV V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                               8.76E-03   WLIAV0041A OUTSIDE CONTAIN. AOV V006 VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE                                                          8.76E-03   WLOAV006LA EQ-CMT-CV                                                                                              1.00E*00   EQ-CMT-CV k3 En DD 80           3.0$E-05   .00                EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE yQ                                                                 EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                                                        1.00E+00   EQ-CAS-AOv14/15 g gly                                                            CO*tMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                 6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA
               'O                                                                                                                                                                                                           '
1.00E+00 C$
T*
81           3.75E-05   .00                EQ-IEV-LloCA LI4CA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                              5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE b.
3 >+ U                                                             EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                                                        1.00E+00
: 6. ICE-05 EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 CgQ
                $qp COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                             CCX-AV-LA                      :p
:!iilh:

Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                      ,
gj 9%C c      "
g$                                                                  EQLLO-10.DFS yi 7
                                                             * * "
* DOMINANT CUTSETS " * *
* Pager       9
$q
: 0. **

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
yJ         File: EQLLO-10. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-10.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 q
EVDr? PROB.      IDENTIFIER 2
pr NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCDIT BASIC EVENT NAME 8                                     .00                                                                   1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA g             82    3.05E-05               EQ-IEV-LLOCA 5.00E-01        BSIZE e                                          LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-VFS-AOV02/04                                                   1.00E*00       EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                           6.10E-05        CCX-AV-LA 83    3.05E-05          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00        EO-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER D2D OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01         BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                   1.00E+00        EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                            6.10E-05       CCX-AV-LA 94    3.05E-05          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01        BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                   1.00E*00        EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                            6.10E-05        CCX-AV-LA 85    2.55E-05          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LIDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER DID OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01        BSIZE g
EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                   1.00E*00        CQ-CAS-AOV14/15 u                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO (g
1.00E+00        EQ-1EV-LLOCA j             86    2.55E-05          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LCWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01        BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                   1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4.CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO 87    2.55E-05          .00 EQ-IEV LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -IfWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01        BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                   1.00E*00        EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 Q
e                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO 88    2.55E-05          .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA
   $                                                                                                         5.00E-01        BSIZE LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                    1.00E*00        EQ-WLS-AOv55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO tn 89    2.55E-05          .00  EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E*00        FQ-IEV-LIACA        P LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01         BSIZE 1.00E+00        EQ-WLS-AOv04/06     M EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPD3                5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO            h-90    2.35E-05          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LLOCA        "
* LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01         BSIZE 1.00E+00        EQ-CAS-AOV14/15     7 EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 I                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                        4.70E-05        CCX-BY-PN           [
     .                                                                                                        1. 00 E* 00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA        E N         91    2.35E-05          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01        BSIZE               D 6                                      EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                   1.00E+00        EQ-VFS-AOV09/10     ;>
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                        4.70E-05        CCX-BY-PN           D
     =                                                                                                                                            w G                                                                       G                                                            e

            ,. m                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 ,,
          /      's                                                                                                                           [                     \                                                                                          /    \
              )
Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                                                                                            U; k                                                                                                                        EQLLO-10. DES                                                                                                                               h e
E'
       $                                                                                                       ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                                                                                             Page:    10                       3
       @                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  X

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File; EQLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq11o-10.in                                                                                                                                                  ')
* 7 3           Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 WLINK2 *
* Ver . 4.02 g
NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER                 g
        "                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 5 92         2.35E-05                        .00      EQ-IEV LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA               3a LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01    BSIZE                     q EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOV03/04           3.
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                                                                                           4.70E-05   CCX-BY-PN 5                   93         2.35E-05                        .00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA
{                                                                       LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01    BSIZE E                                                                       EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                                                                                           4.70E-05   CCR-BY-PN g                   94          2.35E-05                       .00      EO-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LIDCA L14CA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOVQ4/06                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00   EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                                                                                           4.70E-05   CCX-BY-PN 95          1.92E-05                       .00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                                                             LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE u                                                                             EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 t gy                                                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                                                                                           3.84E-05   CMX-VS-FA e
96          1.92E-05                       .00      EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00   EO-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END C8' BREAK SIZE                                                                                                           5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                                                                                           3.84E-05   CMX-VS-FA 97          1.92E-05                       .00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   ESIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                                                                                           3.84E-05   CMX-VS-FA 99          1.92E-05                       .00      EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS                                                                                           3.84E-05   CMX-VS-FA g                       99          1.92E-05                       .00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE I                                                                           EO-WLS-AOV04/06                                                                                                                                      1.00E+00   EO-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED PTD SENSORS                                                                                           3.84E-05   CMX-VS-FA 100           1.50E-05                       .00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE k3 O. BD EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE 1.00E+00 3.00E-05 EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 ADX-EV-SA ER s gy=                101           1.5CE-05                       .00      EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
 %                                                                            LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                            5.00E-01   BSIZE C$
7
* EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS EQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE 1.00E+00 3.00E-05 EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 ADX-EV-SA
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           . h.'
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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                             l!il In a E,, C c,m!!!,                                                                                                                  EQLLO-10. DES n n                                                                                                                                                                                  f
    *T Page:     11 D                                                                                                   ' * ' DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* O. **

==Title:==
AP600 SMA                                                                                                   WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
y$        File: EQLLO-10. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-10.1n q     Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 EVENT FROB. IDENTIFIER C         NUMBER CtJTSET FPOB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                               ....___.___ .... ...._..
cr        ... .. ... ..._.._ ._____. .___.__......___......___. ..._..__.....__......__..____.._...___...
8            102      1.50E-05                                              .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE g                                                                                                                                                     5.00E-01 o                                                                                 LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           1.00E+00    EQ-VFS-AOV03/04
"                                                                                 EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                     3,00E-05    ADX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE 1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA 103      1,50E-05                                              .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01    BS!ZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           1.00E*00    EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 EO-WLS-AOV55/57                                                     3.00E-05    ADX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-L1DCA 104      1.50E-05                                              .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        5.00E-01    BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                     3.00E-05    ADX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OTERATE 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LIDCA 105      1.20E-05                                                00 EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                         5.00E-01    BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           1.00E+00     EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 g
q,3 EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                     2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR COMMON CAUSE FAILUPL %F CLASS 1E INVERTERS W.
1.00E+00     EQ-1EV-LLOCA 106      1.20E-05                                              .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA M                                                                                 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01 1.00E+00 BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                     2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA 107     1.20E-05                                              .00 5.00E-01     BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE 1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 y                                                                             EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                          2.40E-05     CCX-IV-XR
    ;;l A
1.20E-05                                               .00  EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA 109                                                                                                                                     5.00E-01     BSIZE h=                                                                            LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWFR END OF BPEAR SIZE 1.00E*00    EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 EQ-WLS-AOv55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS lE INVERTERS                           2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR th 1.20E-05                                              .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                         1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA      ?
109                                                                                                                                      5.00E-01    BSIZE LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                          M EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                      1.00E*00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                           2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR         1 2
3 5.50E-06                                                     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1         110                                                            .00 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                           5.00E-01    BSIZE O
                                                                                                                                                                                     *P EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                     1.0CE+00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15    .
1.10E-05    CCX-PMXMODI-SW    7, I
m COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PMS ESF OUTPtJT LOGIC SOFTWAPE 1.00E+00    EQ-!EV-LLOCA N       111      5.50E-06                                              .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                           5.00E-01    BSIZE             D 3                                                                                                                                                1.00E+00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15   >
g                                                                             EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                       .
COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION EDGIC SOFTWAPE            1.10E-05    CCX-FMXMOD2-SW     D O                                                                                                                                                                               -
5
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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                                                                                                                     l2 k                                                                                                                    EQLLO-10. DES                                                                                                                                                       h o
W
                           $                                                                                                 ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* Page                           12                                   3
                           @                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     X
                           $      Title AP600 SMA File: ECLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq11o-10.in                                                                   WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02                                                  **)
y em 3      Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                          EVENT PROB.              IDENTIFIER                                       E O                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     3 112                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E+00                EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                     go LIDCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01                BSIZE                                           Q**
EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                                                                                             1.00E*00                EO-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF IhPUT LOGIC EOF'! WARE                                                                                      1.10E-05               CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW                                   E I3
                        ;;            113                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E*00                EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                                                   LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01               BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                                                                                             1.00E+00                EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 i"'                                                                 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF FMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE                                                                                       1.10E-05               CCX-PMXMOD1-SW g             114                         5.50E-06             .00  EO-!EV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01               BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                                                                                             1.00E*00               EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION LOGIC SOF1 WARE                                                                                   1.10E-05               CCX-FMXMOD2-SW 115                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLDCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01               BSIZE (n                                                                         EQ-VFS-AGV09/10                                                                                                                             1.00E*00               EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 W                                                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE                                                                                        1.10E-05              CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW j                    116                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAM SIZE 1.00E*00 5.00E-01 EQ-1EV-LLOCA BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                                                                                             1.00E*00               EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF CUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE                                                                                       1.10E-05              CCX-FMXMOD1-SW 117                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E*00               EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01               BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                                                                                             1.COE*00               EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION 1,0GIC SOFTWARE                                                                                   1.10E-05              CCX-FMXMOD2-SW 118                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E*00              EQ-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01              BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                                                                                             1.00E*00              EQ-VFS-ACV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC SOF7 WARE                                                                                       1.10E-05              CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW 119                         5,50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E*00              EQ - I EV - LIACA g                                                                                                                                                                                                                     5.00E-01 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                         BSIZE N                                                                         EQ-WLS-AOV55/57                                                                                                                             1.00E*00              EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF FMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE                                                                                       1.10E-05              CCX-FMXMODI-SW 120                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E+00              EQ-!EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAR SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01              BSIZE k3 0 93 EQ-WLS-AOv$5/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF AC7UATION LOGIC SOFTWARE 1.00E*00 1.10E-05 EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 CCX-FMXMOD2-SE EE g y                 121                         5.50E-06             .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                1.00E+00             EQ-IEV-LLOCA v                                                                          LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                   5.00E-01             BSIZE                                                - .
C$
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EQ-WLS-ACVS$/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE 1.00E*00 1.10E-05 EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW i
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E; c n, "2;                                                                EQLLO-10.DFS                                                       -
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* DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* Page:     13
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==Title:==
AP600 SMA yj gq Filer EQLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq11o-10.in Peduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 " I m
   "          NUMBER CUTSET FROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                     EVENT PFOB. IDENTIFIER pr         _ __.. _______.... _._____ _______.. .______......._...__......__..__....-._ __________________ __________. __.___..__..
8            122    5.50E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA C
e                                          LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWAPE            1.10E-05    CCK-PMXMOD1-SW 123    5.50E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION LOGIC SOF1MAPE         1.10E-05    CCX-FMXMOD2-SW 124    5.50E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOV04/06                                                  1.00E+00    EO-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC SOFTWAPE             1.10E-05    CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW 125    4.60E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E400    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE g                                                                                                           8.76E-03    VFOAV009 tA                                         VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE (g                                         VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                8.76E-03    VFIAV010
* TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01   VFSFRAC
   $                                          EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                 1.00E+LO    EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 126     4.60E-06         .00  EQ-1EV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03   VFOAV009 l                                             VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03   VFIAV010 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01   VFSFRAC 1.00E*00    EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT Q
E EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT A          127    4.60E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE
{a                                      VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VFOAV009 i
I                                            VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VFIAV010 l                                             TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01    VFSFRAC EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                   1.00E+00    EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS     #A
                                                                                                                                                ?
128    4.60E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA
(
1                                             LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE               M h
!                                             VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VFOAV009 g                                       VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                 8.76E-03    VFIAV010            g I
:     3     -                                 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01    VFSFRAC I                                              EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                   1.00E*00    EQ-PRZR-SENSOR V
l l       I        129    4.60E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA        $
G                                      LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE VFOAV009 g
        $                                     VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE 8.76E-03 8.76E-03    VFIAV010 3
F                                     TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                     1.20E-01    VF3FPAC             >
EQ-CMT-AOV                                                        1.00E+00    EQ-CMT-AOV C
4/3                                                                                                                                     7.*
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Table 55B-33 (cont.)                                                                                                                                   g; k                                                                                                                      EQLLO-10. DES                                                                                                                                     L e
F
     $                                                                                                      ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                                                                                                     Page:    14                     3
     @                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       E'

==Title:==
AP600 SMA Filer EQLLO-10. MIX ( File created by linking eq110-10.in                                                                   WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02                                                         **)
y 3                     Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 To NUMBER CWSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER              E 130         4.60E-06                    .00     EO-IE'V-LLOCA                                                                                                                                            1.00E+00   EQ-!EV-LLOCA             h LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE                   &
VLS AOV VALVE V009 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFOAV009                 g, VLS AOV VALVE V010 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFIAV010                 'a h                                                                          TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                            1.20E-01   VFSFRAC 5                                                                          EQ-CMT-CV                                                                                                                                                1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-CV A
131                                             EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                             1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA
("                                     4.60E-06                    .00 LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFOAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        6.76E-03   VFIAV004 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                            1.20E-01   VFSFRAC EQ-ADS-54 VALVES                                                                                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 132         4.60E-06                    .00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                             1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK Sr2E                                                                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFOAV003 g                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       8.76E-03   VFIAV004 m                                                                              VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                            1.20E-01   VFSFRAC W                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT EQ-CMT-LEVELSW 133         4.60E-06                    .00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                             1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFOAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFIAV004 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                            1.20E-01   VFSFRAC EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS                                                                                                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-PRZR-LVTRAN$
134         4.60E-06                    .00     EQ-1EV LIACA                                                                                                                                             1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BPEAK SIZE                                                                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFOAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFIAV004 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                            1.20E-01   VFSFRAC EQ-PRZR-SENSOR                                                                                                                                           1.00E+00   EQ-PRZR-SENSOR 135        4.60E-06                    .00     EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                                                                                                             1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA g
 -.                                                                            LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                5.00E-01   BSIZE I                                                                             VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFOAV003 VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFIAV004 TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                            1.20E-01   VFSFRAC EQ-CMT-AOV                                                                                                                                               1.00E+00   EQ-CMT-AOV 1.00E+00 k3 O 50 136        4.60E-06                    .00     EQ- 1 EV- LIDCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                                                                                                                5.00E-01 EQ-IEV-LLOCA BSIZE S.76E-03   VFOAV003 yQ                                                                            VLS AOV VALVE V003 FAILS TO CLOSE VLS AOV VALVE V004 FAILS TO CLOSE                                                                                                                        8.76E-03   VFIAV004 g y                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   1.20E-01   VFSFPAC m                                                                             TIME FRACTION- CONTAINMENT PURGE LINE IS OPEN                                                                                                                                             '
1.00E*00                                h.
C$
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EQ-CMT-CV                                                                                                                                                           EQ-CMT-CV
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g%                                                                                           EQLLO-10. DES n .E.,                                                                                                                                             Hi 3"                                                                                                                                             iiHiili T                                                                                                                                        Page:    15 l                                             q                                                               * * "* DOMINANT CUTSETS * " *
* En >

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 *
* Ver . 4.02 ')
i                           y$                              Flie EQLLO-10. MIX t File created by linking eq11o-10.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 l                           g q l                        %
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIEF l                           C                              NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME 137    4.31E-06         .00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LI4CA LLOCA BPEAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01   BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                           8.62E-06   CCX-EP-SAM 138    4.31E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-1EV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV09/10                                                  1.00E*00    EQ-VFS-AOV09/10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                           8.62E-06    CCX-EP-SAM 139    4.31E-06          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWEP END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-VFS-AOV03/04                                                  1.00E+00    EQ-VFS-AOV03/04 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF OUTPUT DRIVEisS                          8.62E-06    CCX-EP-SAM 140    4.31E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LIDCA                                                      1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE.                        5.00E-01   BSIZE g                                                                                                                                1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 g3                                                             EQ-WLS-AOV55/57 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                            8.62E-06   CCX-EP-SAM 00                                141    4.31E-06         .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-1EV-LLOCA 9                                                              LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                         5.00E-01    BSIZE EQ-WLS-AOv04/06                                                  1.00E+00    EQ-WLS-AOV04/06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                            8.62E-06    CCX-EP-SAM 142    6.00E-07          .00  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                     1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA LLOCA BREAK SIZE -LOWER END OF BREAK SIZE                        5.00E'01    BSIZE EQ-CAS-AOV14/15                                                  1.00E+00    EQ-CAS-AOV14/15 Q                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE                     1.20E-06    LTX-SFTW
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U                                                                     b                                                            b Table 55B.34                                                             m EQLLO-II. DES                                                              h 4
G'
                                                                          ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                        Page:      1                   5 o
n y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File EQLLO-11. MIX ( File created by linking eq11o-11.in      WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                               p 3    Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 EVENT PROS. IDENTIFIER        6' NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME y    ------ ----.. .... ---.- - ------.....--. -------....---- ------------..------....------- -------. -- .------- --. . ...---
* a y
1   1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV LLOCA                                                            1.00E+00     EO-!EV-LLOCA EQ-ACC-CV29                                                           1.00E+00     EQ-ACC-CV29 1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA      E' 2   1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00     EQ-ACC-CV28 N
L EQ-ACC-CV28 A          3   1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA 1.00E+00     EQ-ACC-MOV27
(-                                   EQ-ACC-MOV27 4   1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                            1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA EQ-ACC-TANKS 1.00E*00     EQ-ACC-TAf"KS 5   5.10E-05         .01  EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 2 ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVES                    5.10E-05     ACX-CV-GO 6   3.06E-06          .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA ACCUMULATOR CHLJK VALVE 029B FAILS TO OPEN                            1.75E-03     ACBCV029GO ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 029A FAILS TO OPEN                            1.75E-03     ACACv029CO u
IU              7                     .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EO-IEV-LLOCA
* 3.06E-06                                                                                    1.75E-03     ACBCV029GO 00                                        ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 029B FAILS TO OPEN ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 028A FAILS TO OPEN                            1.75E-03     ACACV028GO 8   3.06E-06          .00 EO-!EV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 028B FAILS TO OPEN                            1.75E-03     ACBCV028GO ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 029A FAILS TO OPEN                            1.75E-03     ACACV029GO 9   3.06E-06          .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00     EO-IEV-LLOCA ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 028B FAILS TO CPEN                            1.75E-03     ACBCV028GO ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 028A FAILS TO OPEN                            1.75E-03     ACACV028CO 10   1.27E-06          .00 EQ-IEV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EO-IEV-LLOCA ACCUMULATOR FLOW TUNING ORIFICF PLIK.S                                7.27E-04     ACBOR001SP ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 029A FAII.S TO OPEN                           1.75E-03     ACACV029GO 11   1.27E-06          .00 EQ-IEV-LIhCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA g                                        ACCUMULATOR FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                 7.27E-04     ACBOR001SP d                                        ACCUF"v% TOR CHECK VALVE 028A FAILS TO OPEN                           1.75E-03     ACACv028GO 12   1.27E-06          .00 EQ-IE% A CA                                                           1.00E*00     EQ-!EV-LLOCA ACCUMUT AMR CHECK VALVE 029B FAILS TO OPE 24                          1.75E-03     ACBCV029GO ACCUMUL.ATOR FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                7.27E-04     ACAOR001SP O$            13   1.27E-06          .00 EQ-!EV-LLOCA                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LLOCA y*y                                     ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVE 028B FAILS TO OPEN ACCUMUT (TOR FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS 1.75E-03 7.27E-04 ACBCV028GO ACAOR001SP g ga 14   5.29E-07          .00 EQ - I Ek' '.10CA                                                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LLOCA    I
                                                                                                                                                                ^
F*                                      ACCUMULATOR FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                 7.27E-04     ACBOR001SP
                $ s* D                                                                                                                     ACAOR001SP
* ACCUMULATOR FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                 7.27E-04
                =
s $y E.
min

Table 55B-35                                                             ,e     -
M E.#C c
EQLSP-03. DES n :P                                                                                                                                                    p:
U"
                                                                  " * ' DOMINANT CUTSETS * " *
* Page      1 3lI *G
: 0. e-a

==Title:==
AP600 SMA yJ        File: EQLSP-03.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in                 WLINK2 *
* Ver . 4.02 ')
q     Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.6260E-09 EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 2
cr NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME S                    2.50E-09         54.04 SEISMICALLY INDUCED loss OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)          1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP g              1 9.60E-05    FXX-AV-LA
@                                             COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs
"                                             COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES                 2.60E-05    IWX-EV4-SA 2     1.15E-09         24.86 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)          1.00E*00    EQ-IE'l-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                      9.60E-05    FXX- A'/- LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DOE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING       1.20E-05    REX-FL-GP 3     4.59E-10          9.92   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                      9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF TANK LEVEL TPANSMITTERS (IPWST. BAT)           4.78E-04    IWX-XMTR OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)       1.00E-02    REN-MAN 04 4     6.24E-11          1.35   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF    = 0.09g)     1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP PLUG / LEAK OF PPHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                     2.40E-06    PCNHROOIML COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES                 2.60E-05    IWX-EV4-SA 1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP g
5     6.24E-11          1.35 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)
FAILURE OF P-PHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILUPE                              2.40E-06    IWNTF001AF e                                             COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES                 2.60E-05    IWX-EV4-SA 6     4.59E-11            .99  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                      9.60E-05    PXX- AV- LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TPANSMITTERS (IRWST. BATI           4.7AE-04    IWX-XMTR FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS            1.00E-03    ALL-IND-FAIL 7     3.09E-11            .67  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A INO MOVEMENT)                1.09E-03    PRAAV108LA Q
    ;;,                                       P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V100B (NO MOVEMENT)               1.09E-03     PRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES                 2.60E-05     IWX-EV4-SA a        8     2.SRE-11            .62  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)        1.00E*00    EQ-!EV-LOSP PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCMANGER                                     2.40E-06    PCNHROO1ML COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING       1.20E-05    R EX - FL-CP Un 9     2.88E-11            .62  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP            !^
FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILURE                              2.40E-06     IWNTF001AF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREDE PLUGGING       1.20E-05    P EX - FL-G P          [
10     1.97E-11            .43  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)        1.00E+00    EQ-IF"-LOSP            h I                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GPOUPS (HAPDWAPE) 9.60E-05 1.03E-04 PXX-AV-LA CCX-INPtTI'-LOGIC O
1.99E-03    PEN-MANO2              'd' OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL WORKS)
      $                                       PEN-MAN 04C                                                            1.00E+00    REN-MANO4C             [
m                                                                                                                                                3.
N       11     1.43E-11            .31  SEISMICALLY INDUCED 14SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP            D P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)                 1.09E-03    PPAAV108LA 3                                       P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)               1.09E-03     FRBAV108tA            >
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING        1.20E-05   PEX-FL-GP              g g                                                                                                                                                y e                                                                                                                                                 t5
      @                                                                                                                                                 g O                                                                           O e
: n.                                                                                                                                -
                                                                 %9                                                                              MA/
Table 55B-35 (cont.)                                                                                                                               m l                                                                        EQUSP-03. DES                                                                                                                                    h e
E' g                                                               ''*    DOMINANT CUTSETS *""                       Paget      2                                                                                           k n
a                                                                                                                                                                                                                       y

==Title:==
AP400 SMA File: EQLSP-03,WLK ( File created by linking losp.in                 WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                                                                                                      p 3     Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.6260E-09 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCDIT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                           EVENT PROB. IDDITIFIER                                                                                    E y     . ---- ...--.--.-- ---.--- --- -------..--.---- ...------.------ -------------- ....---- - ----- ----------- ------------
O                                                                                                                                                                                                                        5 12     1.42E-11               .31 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-14SP                                                                                   3:
P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TUT OR MAIN. 5.00E-04     PRAAV108TM                                                                                    y P-RHR FAILUPES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V1088 (NO MOVEMENT)          1.09E-03     PRBAV108LA                                                                                    m,,,
2.60E-05     IWX-EV4-SA                                                                                    m COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES E          13     1.42E-11               .31 SEISMICALLY INDUCED 14SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)   1.00E*00     EQ-!EV-LOSP
{                                            P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)           1.09E-03     PRAAV108LA P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN. 5.00E-04     PFBAV108TM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES            2.60E-05     IWX-EV4-SA g          14     1.15E-11               .25 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gl   1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP PLUG / LEAR OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                2.40E-06     PCNHR001ML COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT)      4.78E-04     IWX-XMTR OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)  1.00E-02     FEN-MAN 04 15     1.15E-11               .25 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.CCE+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF P-PHR DUE TO IPWS TANK FAILURE                         2.40E-06     IWNTK001AF COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)      4.78E-04     IWX-XMTR u                                                                                                                  1.00E-02     PEN-MAN 04 OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS) 00 g              16     6.54E-12               .14 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-14SP P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V1C8A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN. 5.00E-04     PRAAVIORTM P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPEPATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)          1.09E-03     PRBAV1081A COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING  1.20E-05     PEX-FL-GP 17     6.54E-12               .14 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)   1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-14SP P-RNR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)           1.09E-03     PRAAV1081A P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN. 5.00E-04     PRBAV108TM COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING  1.20E-05     PEX-FL-GP 18     6.50E-12               .14 SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHM AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR M11N. 5.00E-04     PRAAV108TM P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN. 5.00E-04     PRBAV108TM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES            2.60E-05     IWX-EV4-SA 19     5.68E-12               .12 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)           1,09E-03     PRAAV108LA I                                               P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V1088 (NO MOVEMENT)          1.09E-03     PPBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)      4.78E-04     IWX-XMTR OPERATOR FAILS TO AC7UATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)  1.00E-02     REN-MAN 04 3             20     5.53E-12               .12 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)   1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP k3 O. Si COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs SUMP SCREEN A PLUGS AND PREVENTS FLOW 9.60E-05 2.40E-04 PXX-AV-LA REA-PLUG yQ                                              SUMP SCPEEN B PLUGS AND PREVENTS FLOW                             2.40E-04     REB-PLUG v :r 5w                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ,      lm "U
p ;J C                                                                                                                                                                                                                   -
82 C$a
                                                         $q                                                                                                                                                                                                                           dnhn!
ii

Table 55B-36                                                               g cR E, ,t:f
* EQLSP-04. DES n ::r                                                                                                                                             ...
:r
                                                                ' * " DOMINANT CUTSETS " * "                      Paget         1 O e-a

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EQLSP-04.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in            WLINK2 *
* V'   4.02 **)
 $           Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 7.0360E-09 q
EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER 2
cr NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME O
40.93 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWEM EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)        1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LOSP h
c 1   2.88E-09 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05         FXX-AV-LA
 "                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES               3.00E-05          IWX-CV-AO 35.51 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (ECLPF = 0.09g)        1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LOSP 2   2.50E-09                                                                                                      PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST ItCECTION SQUIB VAL'ES               2.60E-05          IWX-EV-SA 3   1.15E-09       16.34 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)        1.00E+00          EQ-1EV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                    9.60E-05          PKX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                      1.20E-05          IWX-FL-CP 4   7.20E-11        1.02   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)      1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LOSP 2.40E-06          PCNHROOIML PLUG / LEAK OF PPHR HEAT EXCHANGER COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES               3.00E-05          IWX-CV-AO 5   7.20E-11        1.02   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF   = 0.099)    1.00E*00          EQ-IEV-LOSP u                                            FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IPWS TANK FAILURE                            2.40E-06          IWNTFOCIAF u                                            COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES               3.00E-05          IWX-CV-AO W
e 6.24E-11          .89  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.COE*00          EQ-IEV-LOSP
[                6 PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                   2.40E-06 2.60E-05 PCNHR00lML IWX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES 7   6.24E-11          .89  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)      1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF P-RMR DUE TO IPWS TANK FAILURE                            2.40E-06           IWNTK001AF COMMON CAUSE FA: LURE OF 4 IPWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES              2.60E-05           IWX-EV-SA h             8   3.56E-11          .51  SEISMICALLY INDUCED IASS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)       1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LOSP l;f A                                        P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE VIO8A (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03          FRAAV108LA P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03         PRBAV10BLA h=                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES                3.00E-05          IWX-CV-AO 9   3.09E-11           44 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)        1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)               1.09E-03          FRAAV108LA    tm P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03          PRBAV10RLA    P COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST IlUECTION SQUIB VALVES               2.60E-05           IWX-EV-SA Ch SE!SMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)       1.00E*06         EQ-IEV-LOSP    2.
                                        .41 10    2.88E-11 PLUG / LEAK OF PRMR HEAT EXCHANGER                                   2.40E-06           PCNHR001ML    l I                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                       1.20E-05          IWX-FL-CP     6 7
11    2.88E-11         .41  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)       1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-IbSP
      $                                      FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILURE                             2.40E-06          IWNTK001AF    [1 CD COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                       1.20E-05          IWX-FL-GP 1"2.
53                                                                                                           1.00E+00          EQ-IEV-LOSP U
5          12    1.64E-11         .23  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)
P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.       5.00E-04          PRAAV108TM    >
3 P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03          PPBAVIOOLA IWX-CV-AO      E h
vs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IEWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES                3.00E-05 M
9                                                                         9                                                           e

I t        i                                                                    ()
s V
V 1 V
Table 55B-36 (cont.)                                                                                             3l l                                                                                  EQLSP-04. DES                                                                                                  h G*
                                                        $                                                                      '"* DOMINANT CUTSETS """                           Page:         2                                                     k n
                                                        @                                                                                                                                                                                              ;p

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EQLSP-04.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in         WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02  **)                                                                                   y 3                     Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 7.0360E-09 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                        EVENT PROB.             IDENTIFIER                                   3*
h,                    ....__ ._.. ..... .... __ . ...__...............___...................._____....___...--_. -___... ___....____ -...___..__.
13    1.64E 11         .23  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E+00               EQ-!EV-LOSP                                  3 P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (MO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03               PRAAV109LA                                   C 5.00E-04               PRBAV109TM
* P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.                                                                          "
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES               3.00E-05               IWX-CV-AO L                           14    1.43E-11         .20  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.C99)      1.00E+00               EQ-IEV-LOSP A                                                       P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03               PRAAV100LA l                                                       P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V109B (NO MOVEMENT)             1.09E-03               PRBAV10BLA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                      1.20E-05               IWX-FL-GP g                          15    1.42E-11         .20  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E+00               EQ-IEV-1 CSP P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRAAV108TM P-RRR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMDJT)             1.09E-03               PRBAV100LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES               2.60E-05               IWX-EV-SA 16    1.42E-11         .20  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E+00               EO-IEV-LOSP P-RNR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V109A (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03               PRAAVIORLA P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V100B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRBAV10RTM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 1RWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES               2.60E-05               IWX-EV-SA 00                                       17   7.50E-12         .11  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E+00               EQ-IEV-LOSP q                                                                                                                                        5.00E-04               PRAAV10BTM P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V10RA UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.
P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRBAV10RTM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES               3.00E-05               IWX-CV-AO 18    6.54E-12         .09 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E*00               EQ-!EV-LOSP P-RHR AIR-OPERATED NALVE V108A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRAAV108TM P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V109B (NO MOVEMENT)             1.09E-03               FRBAV10RLA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                      1.20E-05               IWX-FL-GP 19    6.54E-12         .09 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LCSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E+00               EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)              1.09E-03               PPAAV10 8 LA P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRBAV108TM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                      1.20E-05               IWX-FL-GP 20    6.50E-12         .09 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)      1.00E+00               EQ-IEV-LOSP E                                                                P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRAAV10RTM I                                                                P-RHR AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST OR MAIN.      5.00E-04               PRBAV108TM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 LRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES               2.60E-05               IWX-EV-SA n           -
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Table 55B-37                                                                                           a B K t:                                                                                                                                                                                ~
   %   !,!,                                                                   EQLSP-05. DES                                                                                   ,
O =                                                                                                                                                                                4:
                                                                   * * * *
* DOMINANT CUTSETS * * "
* Page:     1 0, w

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
yj gq File: EQLSP-05.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.3570E-08 m                                                                                                                    EVENT PROB. IDDITIFIER C           NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME er 8                1     4.51E-09        31.24   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)         1.00E+00    EO-!EV-LOSP O                                              COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                       9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA c                                                                                                                      4.70E-05    CCX-BY-PN
"                                              COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES 21.22 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)           1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP 2     2.88E-09                                                                                        9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                   ADX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE           3.00E-C5 16.95 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-I4SP 3     2.30E-09                                                                                        9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                              2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR 1,06E-09        7.81   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (18CLPF = 0.099)        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP 4
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                       9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFWARE                    1.10E-05    CCX-FMXMOD1-SW 6.10 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E*00    EQ-1EV-LOSP 5     8.28E-10                                                                                                     PXX-AV-LA u                                              COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                       9.60E-05 u                                              COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                                  8.62E-06    CCX-EP-SAM 2.56 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gi           1.0CE+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP
$                6      3.49E-10 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                       9.60E-05 1.10E-03 PXX-AV-LA ADX-MV-GO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DE' t (MLOCA)                  3.30E-03    LPM-MAN 02 2.35 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP 7      3.19E-10                                                                                       9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN               1.10E-03    ADX-MV-GO
[g                                                                                                                  3.02E-03     ADN-MAN 01 5                                           OPE *RATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS 6
1.15E-10               SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)         1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP
{              8                       .85 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                       9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA p"                                                                                                                  1.20E-06    CCX-SFTW COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE 1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP                                 Os
                                          .83  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g) 9     1.13E-10 PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                      2.40E-06     PCNHROO1ML                                  P COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                              4.70E-05     CCX-BY-FN
($1 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDTF (HCLPF = 0.09g)         1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP                                 3.
10      1.13E-10          .83 FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IPWS TANK FAILURE                               2.40E-06     IWNTK001AF                                  h CCX-BY-PN I                                           COMMON CAC3E FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                              4.70E-05                                                 .
n W
1.06E-10          .78  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOS$ OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)         1.00E+00     EQ-LEV-LOSP 11 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                       9.60E-05     FXX-AV-LA                                   7 "1
m                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN               1.10E-03     ADX-MV-GO FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS             1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL                                    -
h
:s                                                                                                                1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-I4SP                                 >
12      7.20E-11          .53  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                  :3 PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                      2.40E-06     PCNHR00!ML 3.00E-05     ACX-EV-EA                                   8, COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE e                                                                                                                                                                          %.
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                                                                                                                                                      'G Table 55B-37 (cont.)                                                                  12 EQLSP.05. DES                                                                       h en E'
     $                                                            **'* DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                         Page:            2                     k n
     @                                                                                                                                                       y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: ECLSP-05.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in              WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 ')                                                        p 3       Reduced Sum of cutsets: 1.3570E-08 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                      EVENT PROB.           IDENTIFIER               E y       - .--. --....--... ....- - .........--........-- ...-- ...........- ----....---...---..------...
     #                                                                                                                                                        3 1.00E*00             EQ-!EV-LOSP               g
                      *F.20E-11        .53   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099) 13 FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILURE                         2.40E-06             IWNTK001AF               Q*
COMMON CAUSE FAILUBE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE     3.00E-05             ADX-EV-SA                 E,
                                       .42   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E*00             EQ-IEV-LOSP 6
E 14    5.76E-11 PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXC*rtANGER                              2.40E-06             PCNHR001ML 2.40E-05             CCX-IV-XR l                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS t
15
* 76E-11         .42   SEISMICALLY INDUCED IMSS OF OFFSITF POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.09g)   1.00E+00             EQ-IEV-LOSP IWNTKOOIAF FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IEWS TANK FAILURE                         2 . 40 E- 06 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                        2.40E-05             CCX-IV-XR 16   5.58E-11          .41  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E+00              EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO NOVEME237)          1.09E-03              PRAAV108LA P-RNR FAILURES OF AIR-OPEPATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)          1.09E-03              FRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                        4.70E-05              CCX-BY-PN 1.00E+00             EQ-IEV-LOSP g
17    3.56E-11         .26  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)
P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)            1.09E-03             PRAAV108LA e                                            P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE v108B (NO MOVEMENT)           1.09E-03             PRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE      3.00E-05             ADX-EV-SA 18    3.26E-11         .24  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)    1.00E+00              EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                  9.60E-05              PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)      1.03E-04             CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCAI             3.30E-03              LPM-MAN 02 19    2.99E-11          .22 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HOLPF = 0.09g)    1.00E*00              EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                  9.60E-05              PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)      1.03E-04              CCX-INPUT-LOGIC CPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                             3.02E-03              ADN-MAN 01 20    2.85E-11          .21  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)   1.00E+00              EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)           1.09E-03              PRAAV108LA P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)          1.09E-03              PRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                        2.40E-05              CCX-IV-XR g
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REC (g *1 Table 55B.38                                                                      -m ip' 2$
:r EQLSP*10. DES
                                                                            * * "
* DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * *
* Page:     1 En w

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y$        File EQLSP-10.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in                              WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02         **)
g 9       Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 8.5290E-11 m
2 cr NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB. IDmTIFIER 8                                          22.63 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                        1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-IDSP g               1     1.93E-11 9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA c                                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs
"                                                                                                                                       6.10E-05     CCX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                       3.30E-03     LPM-MANO2 2      1.17E-11            20.75 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                        1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                    9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                               6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                               3.02E-03     ADN-MAN 01 3      1.62E-11            18.99 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gt                        1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs                                                    9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                   5.10E-05    CMN-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                       3.30E-03     LPM-MANO2 4      1.48E-11            17.35 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                        1.00E*00     EQ-!EV-! ESP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                    9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA g                                                                                                                                                   CMX-CV-GO u                                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                   5.10E-05 g                                                  OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                               3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01 e
SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP
[               5      5.86E-12             6.87 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRRR AOVs                                                    9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                               6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                          1.00E-03    ALL-IND-FAIL 6      4.90E-12             5.7b SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gt                        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs                                                    9.60E-05    PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                   5.10E-05    CMX-CV-GO
(
l;                                              FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                          1.00E-03    ALL-IND-FAIL A
7      4.83E-13              .57   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HOLPF = 0.09g)                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP
{"                                              PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                                   2.40E-06    PCNHR001ML COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                               6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                       3.30E-03    LPM-MAN 02 tm 8      4.83E-13               .57  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP      %
FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IPWS TANK FAILURE                                            2.40E-06    INNTK001AF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                               6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA        W OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                       3.30E-03    LPM-MANO2        h.
D I           9      4.42E-13               .52  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EV mT (HCLPF = 0.09g)
PLUG / LEAR OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER 1.00E+00 2.40E-06 EQ-IEV-LOSP PCNHR001ML ti.
0 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                               6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA        V
      $                                            OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                               3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01       E e                                                                                                                                                             D+
      $        10      4.42E-13               .52  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LCSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                      1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP 2.40E-06    IWNTKOOIAF       2 3                                            FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILUPE COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                               6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA        A OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                               3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01       3 8
      =
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       %/
Table 55B-38 (cont.)                                                                                                                                                                                                 ig EQLSP-10. DES                                                                                                                                                                                       h e
T
                      $                                                                        ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                                                                                                                                                                                   Page:     2                             3 W                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               R'

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: ECLSP-10.WLK ( File created by linking losp.in                                                                                                   WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02                                                                                                 **)
y
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ==
3      Reduced Sua cf Cutsets: 8.5290E-11 y
y NUMBER CUTSET PROB FERCENT BASIC EVENT MAME EVENT PROB. IDm (IFIER                  3'
                      #                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               23 11         4.04E-13           .47    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP                 y PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                                                                                                                                                                                     2.40E-06     PCNHR001ML                 &
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPm                                                                                                                                                                                      5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO                   m OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                                                                                                                                                                         3.30E-03     LPM-MAN 02                  E k
L           12         4.04E-13           ,47    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP
                     &                                                FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILURE                                                                                                                                                                                              2.40E-06     IWNTK001AF COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                                                     5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO
(**                                              OPERATCR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                                                                                                                                                                         3.30E-03     LPM-MANO2 g           13         3.70E-13           .43    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP PLUG / LEAK OF PRHR HEAT EXCHANGER                                                                                                                                                                                                     2.40E-06     PCNHR001ML COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPDi                                                                                                                                                                                     5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.02E-03     ADN-MAN 01 14         3.70E-13           .43    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E+00     EO-!EV-LOSP g                                                    FAILURE OF P-RHR DUE TO IRWS TANK FAILURE                                                                                                                                                                                              2.40E-06     IWNTK001AF u                                                    COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                                                     5.10E-05    CMX-CV-GO (g                                                   OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01 15         2.39E-13           .28    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V10RA (NO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                                1.09E-03     PRAAV108LA P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                               1.09E-03     PRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPDr                                                                                                                                                                                                 6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                                                                                                                                                                         3.30E-03     LPM-MANO2 16         2.19E-13           .26    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                                1.09E-03     PRAAV108LA P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B iNO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                               1.09E-03     PRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                                                                 6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01 17         2.00E-13           .23    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                                1.09E-03     PRAAV10RLA P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                               1.09E-03    FRBAV108LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                                                     5.10E-05    CMX-CV-GO g                                                   OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.                                                                                                                                                                                         3.30E-03    LPM-MAN 02 18         1.83E-13           .21    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-LOSP P-RHR FAILURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108A (NO MOVEMENTI                                                                                                                                                                                1.09E-03    PRAAV108LA P-RHR FAILURES OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE V108B (NO MOVEMENT)                                                                                                                                                                               1.09E-03    PRBAV108LA e*                                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                                                     5.10E-05    CMX-CV-GO f3 vs 93 OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.02E-03    ADN-MAN 01 yy              19        1.67E-13           .20    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                                        1.00E*00 9.60E-05 EQ-IEV-LOSP PXX-AV-LA g y                                                 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs 7.27E-04    CMA-PLUG m                                                    CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .
C$
C'
* CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR.
7.27E-04 3.30E-03 CMB-PLUG LPM-MANO2 8C                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     W
                  ;$B 3 y ;p                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            :Hihn
_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .                                  _ _ _ _ .          __a

C                                                          Table 55B-38 (cont.)                                                             ir1j a Z. n gg                                                               EQLSP-10. DES r:
T "g                                                       ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                        Page:     3 Pa   w

==Title:==
AP600 SMA
                                                                                             **)
* WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 7$
g q File: EQLSP-10.WLK ( File created by linking losp.irt Reduced Suse of Cutsets: 8.5290E-11 m
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER C          NUMBER C17FSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME er 8             20    1.53E-13          .1B SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)       1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP g                                                                                                               9.60E-05     PKX-AV-LA
@                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs CMT FLOW 1tNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                         7.27E-04     CMA-PLUG CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                         7.27E-04     CMB-PLUr3 OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                3.02E-03     ADN-MAN 11 t.h tJs W
U tJ h
s I
s t''
r en a
E*
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p)                                                                    [s                                                           /, ,\
         ;V                                                                    Q}                                                           Q ,i Table 55B-39                                                                  M EQSLO-02. DES                                                                  h e
W
                                                            " * " DOMIMANT CUTSETS * "'                           Page     1                        3 e
n y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EOSLO-02. MIX ( File created by linking egslo-02.in   WLINF2 ** Ver. 4.02   **)                                                   p 3    Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 NUMBER CUTSET PRCB PERCENT SASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER               E g    ...___ ___.___.... ....__. ............_______....._........__.._....._.... ....__........ ..... .._.....___ __.._... ._.
* c y
100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                          1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-SLOCA 1    1.00E*00                                                                                   1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-RECSQ EQ-IRW-RECSQ 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-SLOCA E
2    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                          1.00E+00   EQ-IRW-RECCV k                                     EQ-IRW-RECCV EQ-IRW-RECMOV 1.00E*00   EQ-IRW-RECMOV E
A 1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-SLOCA I
* 3    1.00E*00      100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-IRW-LVTRANS                                                       1.00E+00   EQ-IPW-LVTRANS
                                      .05  EQ-IEV-SLOCA 1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-SLOCA g          4    4.78E-04 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANR LEVEL TRAMSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)         4.78E-04   IWX-XMTR
                                      .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-SLOCA 5    2.60E-05                                                                                   2.60E-05   IWX-EV4-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES 1.00E*00   EQ -I EV- SIXH~A g               6    1.20E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA 1.20E-05   PEX-FL-GP u                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING CU
* 7     1.43E-07        .00  EQ-1EV-SLOCA                                                         1.00E600   EQ-IEV-SLOCA 5.23E-03   IW2TLO46UF
$                                          LOW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE LOW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILUPE                                  5.23E-03 5.23E-03 IW3TLO47UF IW4TLO4RUF LOW IRWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE E
6 If
  .   -7 v "nT b, -                                                                                                                                              '
y!d EF
  $O                                                                                                                                                      r:
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M E t:I                                                                 Table 55B-40                                                                                                 im c,m n ;2
* EQSLO-03. DES e'
I*
U                                                             ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                          Page:     1
 $q Ew

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02  **)
yJ          File: EQSLO-03. MIX t File created by linking eqslo-03.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E*00 q
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 2           NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCEh.       BASIC EVENT NAME 1    1.00E*00     100.00   EQ-lh'-SLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ- I RWS't TANK                                                      1.00E*00     EQ-IRWST-TANK 2    1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                            1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-IRW-INJSQ                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IRW-INJSQ 3    1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                            1.00E+00     EO-IEV-SLOCA EQ-IRW-INJCV                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IRW-INJCV 4    3.00E-05          00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 IRWST ItMECTION CHECK VALVES                3.00E-05     IWX-CV-AO 5    2.60E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                          1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES                2.60E-05     IWX-EV-SA 6    1.20E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                       1.20E-05     IWX-FL-CP g
t.A                                                                                                                1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA tty               7    5.76E-08         .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA
* IWRST DISCHARGE LINE 'A' STRAINER PLUGGED                             2.40E-04     IWA-PLUG IWRST DISCHARGE LINE *B" STRAINER PLUGGED                             2.40E-04     IWB-PLUG
[
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A N
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Table 55B_41                                                                          M l                                                                       EQSLO-04. DES                                                                          h e
CI g[
                                                                      * * "
* DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                      Page:     1                                  f, o
: c.                                                                                                                                                           g,
          $1         Titlet AP600 SKA Files EOSLO-04. MIX ( File created by linking eqslo-04 in      WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                                            ga "3'        Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 OC NUMBER CUTSET PROB PEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                     EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER                           E
          @          ..____ .__________ ._______ ._ ._____ .____________..___......____________________..___________ _ ___ .____.. .___.-___._.                        ),
1    1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E+00    EQ-IEV-SLOCA                         h EQ-ADS-S3MOVS                                                    1.00E*00     EQ-ADS-53MOVS                        {
UI 2     1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-ADS-S2MOVS                                                    1.00E+00    EQ-ADS-S2MOVS
        $3 E                                                                                                             1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA A                 3    1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-ADS-S1MOVS                                                    1.00E*00     EQ-ADS-SIMOVS
(-
4    1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES                                                 1.00E+00     EQ-ADS-S4 VALVES 5    1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-1EV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT                                                  1.00E+00     EQ-CMT-LEVELSWT 6    1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-TRSFSWITCH                                                    1.00E*00     EQ-TRSFSWITCH g3 Um                                                                                                                  1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA g3                      7    1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA
* EQ-DCMCC 1.00E+00     EQ-DCMCC C
    ^                      B   1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E+00     EQ-1EV-SLOCA EQ-CABLETRAY                                                     1.00E*00     EQ-CABLETRAY 9   1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-DCDISPANEL                                                    1.00E+00     EQ-DCDISPANEL 10     1.00E*00    100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-DC-SWBRD                                                      1.00E*00     EQ-DC-SWBRD 11     1.00E+00    100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA EQ-ACDISPANEL                                                    1.00E*00     EQ-ACDISPANEL 12     1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                      1.00E*00     EQ -I EV- S LOCA EQ-INVERTER                                                      1.00E+00     EQ-INVERTER 13     1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                      1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-SLOCA I                                                EQ-BAT-RACK                                                     1.00E+00     EQ-BAT-RACK 14     1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                      1.00E+00     EQ-1EV-SLOCA EQ- BATTERY                                                     1.00E*00     EQ-BATTERY 1.00E*00    EQ-IEV-SLOCA kO. 3(
b3 15     1.10E-03        .11   EQ-IEV-SLOCA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN        1.10E-03    ADX-MV-GO h?
g =r               16     1.03E-04        .01   EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                     1.00E*00    EQ-I EV-S LOCA T                                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GPOUPS (HAR EMARE)   1 03E-04    CCX-INPUT-LOGIC                   ,
i 5   >m                                                                                                                                                               '
k                  17     4.70E-OS        .00   EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                     1.00E+00 4.70E-05 EQ-IEV-SLOCA CCX-BY-PN 3    >d  5)                                     COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES M!)
C )h ::
sy

Table 55B-41 (cont.)
og S Z $f g 4 P.!,                                                             EQSLO-04. DES n -                                                                                                                                                  :
lr Page:        2 q                                                       "'* DOMINANT CUTSETS * "'
4 Sw

==Title:==
AP600 SMA WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
yj  q File: EQS!4-04. MIX ( File created by linking eqslo-04.in Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 2          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME pr S                                          EQ-IEV-SthCA                                                      1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA g              18    3.84E-05         .00 3.84E-05       CMX-VS-FA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS
                                      .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                      1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 19    3.00E-05                                                                                3.00E-05       ADX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPEPATE 1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 20    2.40E-05         .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                      2.40E-05       CCX-IV-XR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS
                                      .00                                                                    1.00E+00       EQ-I EV-SIACA 21    1.10E-05              EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                      1.10E-05       CCX-PMXMOD1-SW COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE EQ-IEV-SLOCA 1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 22    1.10E-05         .00 1.10E-05       CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW COMMON CAUSE FAILttRE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE
                                      .00  EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00      EO-IEV-SLOCA 23    1.10E-05                                                                                 1.10E-05      CCX-FMXMOD2-SW COMMON Cf.U5E FAILURE OF PMS ESF ACTUATION IAGIC SOFDiARE g
t>i
                                      .00                                                                    1.00E*00       EQ - I EV- SIDCA W              24    1.01E-05              EQ-IEV-SLOCA
* HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 52 LINE 1                                 5.64E-02       AD2 MOD 01 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 92 LINE 2                                 5.64E-02       AD2 MOD 02 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 93 LINE 1                                 5.64E-02       AD3 MOD 03 5.64E-02       AD3 MOD 04 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 93 LINE 2
                                      .00  EO-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 25    8.62E-06                                                                                 8.62E-06      CCX-EP-SAM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPtfr DRIVERS 1.20E-06          .00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                       1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA
{3         26                                                                                             I.20E-06      CCX-SFDi 5                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE A
1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA
(          27    7.30E-07         .00  EO-IEV-SLOCA HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 82 LINE 1                                  5.64E-02      AD2 MOD 01 HARDWARE FAILUPE OF ST. #2 LINE 2                                  5.64E-02       AD2 MOD 02 5.64E-02       AD3 MOD 03 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 83 LINE 1 FAILURE OF ACTUATION LOGIC GROUP 1                                 4.07E-03       PMEMOD21                (se D
en e
T l                                                                                                                                                n 7
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m to 9                                                                      9 e-

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Table 55B-42                                                                                                                     y, w
                  %                                                                                                                             na*
EQSLO.05. DES poMINANT CUTSETS "* '                                  Page:       1 e
E' h,
g                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    et
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ;p q
                   !Q

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: EQSLO-05. MIX ( File created by linking eqslo-05.in                        WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)                                                                                                       y g                                                     Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.0000E+00 g
M en                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ~
                  'd                                                                                                                                                                                 EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER                                                          3 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                ----- ----- ..-. - --- .
{
y                                                     ...... ........... .......     .--...-...- ..........---......-- -- --.---.-..--.....---
a
* 100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA 1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                        3a 1   1.00E+00                                                                                                          1.00E+00       EQ-CMT-TANKS EQ-CMT-TANKS E'
1.00E+C0       EO-1EV-SLOCA 2   1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                  1.00E*00       EQ-CMT-AOV EQ-CMT-AOV h                                                                                                                                                                                    1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-SLOCA 3   1.00E+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SthCA                                                                                   1.00E*00      EQ-CMT-CV EO-CMT-CV f,
1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 4   1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                   1.00E+00       EQ-PRZR-LVTRANS EQ- PFZR-LVTRANS 100,00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                   1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 5   1.00E+00                                                                                                           1.00E+00       EQ-PRZR-SENSOR EQ-PRZR-SENSOR 1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 6   1.00E*00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                   1.00E+00       EQ-MPLEX-CAB EQ-MPLEX-CAB g
t>t                                                                                                                                                                                      1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA g                                                                 7   1.0CE+00     100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                   1.00E+00       EQ-INTEG-CAB
* EQ-INTEG-CAB 1.00E+00       EQ-!EV-SLOCA 8    1.00E*00    100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                   1.00E*00       EQ-LOGIC-CAS EQ-LOGIC-CAB 1.00E+00       EQ-IEV+SLOCA 9    1.00E*00    100.00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                   1,00E+00       EQ-ESFAC-CAB EQ-ESFAC-CAB
                                                                                                     .01                                                                                               1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 10    6.10E-05            EQ-!EV-SLOCA                                                                                  6.10E-05       CCX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN
                                                                                                     .01                                                                                               1.00E+00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 11    5.10E-05            EQ-IEV-SLOCA 5.10E-05       CMX-CV-GO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN 5.29E-07        .00 EQ-IEV-SLOCA                                                                                  1.00E*00       EQ-IEV-SLOCA 12                                                                                                                      "J 27E-04      CMA-PLUG CMT F1hW TUNING OPIFICE PLUGS CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                                                 7.27E-04       CMB-PLUG g
d
              )
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* 1              ;; $ 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      :liidp!
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l

RE$                                                                     Table 55B-43                                                          g 4 E, n -
LOSP.DFS 7
                                                              ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                         Page:   1 C. >*

==Title:==
AP600 SMA LOSP EVDET MIXED CUTSETS y          File LOSP.OUT 4 File created by linking losp.in             WLINK2 ' Ver. 4.02 * *)
y  ,,4    Peduced Sum of cutsets: 3.8710E-08 t
2          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                         EVDIT PROB. IDENTIFIER gr         _.____ ____.....__ -...... __.___..... .__. ....._____._. .. .___.__.._____.___.__..__._____. ... __________. _.__________
8                                   11.65 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LOSP g                 1   4.51E-09 9.60E-05   PXX-AV-LA c                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                          4.70E-05   CCX-BY-PN 2   3.87E-09      10.00 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDJT (HCLPF = 0.099)       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY $1DE RELIEF VALVE TO CIASE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-02   OTL-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                              6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                              3.02E-03   ADN-MAN 01 3   3.21E-09       8.34   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)     1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                  5.10E-05   CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                              3.02E-03   ADN-MAN 01 4   2.88E-09       7.44   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E+00   EQ-1EV-LOSP OOMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PPHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05   PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAIINPE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES              3.00E-05   IWX-CV-AO g
t>t g                 5   2.88E-09       7.44   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP
 +                                          COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05   PXX-AV-LA h                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE       3.00E-05   ADX-EV-SA 6   2.50E-09       6.46   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVDIT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                   9.60E-05   PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES              2.60E-05   IWX-EV4-SA 7   2.50E-09       6.46 SEISMICALLY INDUCED I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.090)       1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHP AOVs                                   9.60E-05   PXX-AV-LA h                                       COMPON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST IfUECTION SQUYB VALVF.S             2.60E-05   IWX-EV-SA
    ;;k A
SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE PCWER EVD4T (HCLPF = 0.09gi h
pa 8    2.30E-09      5.94 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRNR AOVs 1.00E*00 9.60E-05 EQ-IEV-LOSP PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                          2.40E-05   CCX-IV-XR 9    1.72E-09      4.44   FEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E*00   EQ-!EV-LOSP     tn 2.10E-02   OTM-SLSOV1      tA FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                              6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA / TRANSIDIT)  1.34E-03   LPM-MAN 01      [
g 10                   3.72   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g1     1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP     g i                  1.44E-09 FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN 2.10E-02 5.10E-05 OiH-SLSOV1 CMX-CV-GO       "
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCA/ TRANSIENT)   1.34E-03   LPM-MAN 01      {
:E                                                                                                                                   .:
      @         11     1.28E-09      3.31 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)       1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP     *1
      $                                     FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)         2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1     D.
6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA       3 5                                     COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS         1.00E-03   ALL-IND-FAIL
      @         12     1.15E-09      2.97   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)     1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP     E y,                                    COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRNR AOVs                                   9.60E-05   PXX-AV-LA      $g-W                                     COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING    1.20E-05   REX-FL-GP O                                                                       O                                                      O

         ,a l
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V Table 55B-43 (cont.)                                                                                                                                                                                  M LOSP. DES                                                                                                                                                                             ho G*
                                                                                                      ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                                                                                                                                                 Page:        2                  kn a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              y

==Title:==
AP600 SMA LOSP EVENT MIXED CUTSETS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               aa
     $      File; IASP.OUT ( File created by linking losp.in                                                   WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
3      Reduced Sum of Cutsetsr 3.8710E-08 EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER         g' NUMBER CtFTSET PROB PEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME 3
O                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-14SP         ga 13    1.15E-09                          2.97   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                 9.60E-05        PXX-AV-LA          Q COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                                1.20E-05         IWX-FL-GP
* COMMON CAUSE FAIINRE OF STRAINERS IN IPWST TANK                                                                                                                                                                                                     E' SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                 1.00E+00         EO-IEV-LOSP 2.76 N
5 34     1.07E-09 FAILURE OF A SECONDARY $1DE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                                                                                                     2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1 A                                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                              5.10E-05        CMX-CV-GO 1.00E-03       ALL-IND-FAIL l                                                           FAILURE OF PMS. PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.74 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                    1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-14SP 15     1.06E-09                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 9.60E-05        PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE                                                                                                                                                            1.10E-05        CCX-FMXMOD1-SW 2.14   SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                  1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LOSP 16     8.28E-10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 9.60E-05        PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs 8.62E-06        CCX-EP-SAM COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS 1.00E+00        EO-!EV-LOSP W
17     4.59E-10                         1.19 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                                9.60E-05 4.78E-04 PXX-AV-LA IWY-XMTR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST. BAT)
OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FAILS)                                                                                                                                                  1.00E-02        PEN-MAN 04 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                  1.00E*00        EQ-IEV-LOSP 18     3.4PE-10                           .90 9.60E-05         PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                                                ADX-MV-G3 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOV.5 TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                       1.IOE-03 OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGMIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (MLOCA)                                                                                                                                                           3.30E-03         LPM-MANO2 3.19E-10                           .82  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                                                                                                  1.00E*00         EQ-IEV-LOSP 19                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              9.60E-05         PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4/4 STAGE 2 & 3 LINE MOVs TO OPEN                                                                                                                                                        1.10E-03        ADX-MV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                                                                                           3.02E-03         ADN-MAN 01 20     1.15E-10                           .30  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                                                                                                  1.00E+00         EQ-!EV-LOSP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs                                                                                                                                                                                9.60E-05         PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE                                                                                                                                                                     1.20E-06         CCX-SFTW E
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Table 55B-44                                                            ,
v.i'.
REC c 6w"2                                                                  LSP-SGTR. DES                                                                     ;':
2"                                                                                                                                              Mk$
    +d                                                         " * *
* DOMINANT CUTSETS * "*
* Page:       1 g
a
   *q O +=*

==Title:==
AP600 SMA yJ         File: 1sp-sgtr.wik ( File created by linking esgtr.in             WLINF2 *
* Ver . 4.02 'I gq         Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9640E-08 o                                                                                                             EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER C          NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME pr 8               1   9.87E-09        19.88 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                             1.00E-02       OTH-SGTR C
e                                           SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)     1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-LOSP
"                                            FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)       2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOVI COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                         4.70E-05        CCX-BY-PN 12.69 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR 2   6.30E-09                                                                                    1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LOSP SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE ISV/PORV)       2.10E-02         OTH-SLSOVI 3.00E-05        IWX-CV-AO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES 12.69 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS 1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR 3   6.30E-09                                                                                    1.00E+0C        EQ-IEV-LOSP SEISMICALLY INDUCED I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)        2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1 3.00E-05        ADX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE 1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR 4   5.46E-09        11.00 CONSEQUDITI AL SGTR OCCURS SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)    1.00E*00        EQ-!EV-LOSP u                                                                                                               2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1 M                                            FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                        IWX-EV4-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES             2.60E-05
.f.                                 11.00 CONSEQUENTIAL SCTR OCCURS                                             1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR 5    5.46E-09 8                                            SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV) 1M0E+00 2.IOE-02 EQ-IEV-LOSP OTH-SLSOVI 2.60E-05         IWX-EV-SA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES 10.15 CONSEQUDITIAL SGTR OCCURS                                             1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR 6    5.04E-09                                                                                   1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LOSP SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO C14SE (SV/PORV)        2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1 Q                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E INVERTERS                         2.40E-05        CCX-IV-ER
    ;d 7    2. 52 E- 09      5.08 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                            1.00E-02        OTH-SCTR ha                                       SEISMICALLY INDUCED 14SS OF OFFSITE TtWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)    1.00E+00         EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)        2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RECIRC LINES DUE TO SUMP SCREEN PLUGGING   1.20E-05        REX-FL-GP Um 5.08 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                            1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR            In 8   2.52E-09                                                                                   1.00E+00 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                     EQ-IEV-LOSP        CA FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)        2.10E-02         OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF STRAINk.RS IN IPY7ST TANK                   1.20E-05        IWX-FL-GP          h.
9   2.31E-09         4.65 CONSEQUENTIAL SCTR OCCURS                                             1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR O
SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g1     1. 0( E
* 00    EQ-!EV-LOSP 2.10E-02         OTH-SLSOV1         *7 FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
I                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF OUTPUT LOGIC SOFTWARE               1.10E-05        CCX-FMXMODI-SW     7 ce                                                                                                         1.00E-02        OTH-SGTR           D.
      $        10    1.81E-09         3.65 CONSEQUENTIAL FGTR OCCURS 1.00E+00        EQ-IEV-LOSP D
SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)
      $~                                      FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (Sv/PORV)        2.10E-02        OTH-SLSOV1         >D COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF OUTPUT DRIVERS                              8.62E-06        CCX-EP-3AM          go C                                                                                                                                             3 C                                                                                                                                              t5 CD y
* O                                                            e

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Table 55B-44 (cont.)                                                l2 LSP-SGTR. DES                                                     6 e
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(
G
                                                                                                                                             * " ' DOMINANT CUTSETS * * * '               Page     2                    [
o

==Title:==
AP600 SMA File: 1sp-sgtr.wik ( File created by linking cegtr.in                                                                                       WLINR2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .j, g
3      Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9640E-09
       @      NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVmT NAME                                                                                                                            EVENT PROB. IDmTIFIER               E
      *                                                                                                                                                                                                                 :s 11    1.00E-09       2.01 CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                                 1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR                3p SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVD4T (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP             Q FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1              m.
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)                                                                            4.79E-04   IWX-XMTR                E N                                        OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (LEVEL SIGNAL FA!LS)                                                                        1.00E-02   REN-MAN 04
                                        .51                                                                                                                                          1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR
{            12    2.52E-10              CONSEQUENTIAL SCTR OCCURS SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-!EV-LOSP f
FAILURE OF A SECONDAPY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS AND PLS SOFTWARE                                                                                            1.20E-06   CCX-SFTW 13    1.00E-10         .20  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                               1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                                                                         1.00E*00   EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (IRWST, BAT)                                                                            4.78E-04   IWX-XMTR FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                                                                             1.00E-03   ALL-IND-FAIL u
M                14    6.53E-11         .13  CONSEQUDITI AL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                              1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR D                                            SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.090)                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP i                                            FAILUFE OF A SECONCARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO C14SE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 O                                            COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                                           1.03E-04   CCX-INPUT-LOGIC
"                                            OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                  3.02E-03   ADN-MAN 01 15    4.30E-11         .09  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                               1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED L45S OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT I4GIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                                           1.03E-04   CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE CONT. SUMP RECIR. (L*' VEL SIGNAL WORKS)                                                                      1.99E-03   P D4 -MANO2 PEN-MAN 04C                                                                                                                             1.00E+00   REN-MAN 04C 16    3.87E-11         .08  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                               1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR SEISHICALLY INDUCED IMSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                         1.00E+0C   EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE "O CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                                                  6.10E-05   CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                  3.02E-03   ADN-MAN 01
 !               17    3.23E-11         .07  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                                                                                               1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR I                                          SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                                                                         1.00E+00   EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 fg                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CNT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                      5.10E-05   CMX-CV-GO
$                                            OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                                                                  3.02E-03   ADN-MAN 01 k3 S 10 IB   2.90E-11         .06  CONSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099) 1.00E-02 1.00E+00 OTH-SGTR EQ-IEV-LOSP yQ                                          FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                                                                             2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 g gy                                       COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS (HARDWARE)                                                                           1.03E-04   CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCAITRANSIENT)                                                                        1.34E-03   LPM-MANG1 K                                                                                                                                                                                                                           .a
 ;; p 8C                                                                                                                                                                                                                  -
O   $ 2, 3 y ::                                                                                                                                                                                                                um0 1

8E                                                                   Table 55B-44 (cont.)                                                  i ipb g                                                                                                                                                 ~
3 ,g ,t:f                                                              LSP-SGTR. DES 9 :r $                                                                                                                                           g
                                                               ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                       Page:     3 "q
Em W

==Title:==
AP600 SMA y$          File: 1sp-sgtr.wlk I File created by linking cogtr.in          WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 **)
g q        peduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9640E-08 9
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER C
ar NUMBER CUTSET PPOB PEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME b                   2.44E-11              CONSEQUDITI AL SGTR OCCURS                                         1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR g             19                     .05 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)    1.00E*00   EO-IEV-LOSP e
 "                                         FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)        2.10E-02   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CMT/ SUMP LEVEL HEATED RTD SENSORS         3.94E-05   CMX-VS-FA OPERATOR FAlt.S TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                            3.02E-03   ADN-MAN 01 20    2.16E-11         .04  CCNSEQUENTIAL SGTR OCCURS                                          1.00E-02   OTH-SGTR SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.0)g)    1.00E*00    EQ-LEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)        2.10E-0;   OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PMS ESF INPUT LOGIC CROUPS (HARDWAPE)      1.03E-04   CCX-INPUT-LOGIC FAILUPE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS        1.00E-03   ALL-IND-FAIL th tA o
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Table 55B-45                                                  y 1                                                                                                                    LSP-SLBV. DES                                                  m e
T a
                                                                                                                      * "" DOMINAWT CUTSETS * * '
* Page:     1                        E n
                                      $         Titler AP600 SMA                                                                                                                                                        .;,
g        Filer lep-slbv.wik ( File created by linking esib-v.in                                                      WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02 ")                                      y Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.3940E-08
                                      @         NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                        EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER            $'
8 3
1      3.87E-09             27.76 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                              1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP           as FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 ACVS TO OPEN 2.10E-02 6.10E-05 OTH-SLSOV1 CCX-AV-LA Q
en OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                 3.02E-03      ADN-MAN 01            E b
li                2      3.23E-09             23.17 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09gt                             1.00E+00      EQ-IEV-LOSP A
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                            2.10E-02      OTH-SLSOV1 l                                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                     5.10E-05      CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                                 3.02E-03      ADN-MAN 01 g                 3       1.72E-09            12.34 SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                             1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CIDSE (SV/PORV)                            2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                 6.10E-05     CCX- AV-IJL OPERATOR F.dLS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR PCS DEPR. (SLOCA/ TRANSIENT)                      1.34E-03      LPM-MAN 01 4       1.44E-09            10.33 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.099)                             1.00E*00      EQ-IEV-LOSP t>n                                                          FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                            2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 til                                                          COMMCN CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                     5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR RCS DEPR. (SLOCAiTRANSIENT)                       1.34E-03     LPM-MAN 01 C)                    5       1.29E-09              9.18     SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWR EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                         1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP 48                                                           FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/POPV)                            2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                                 6.10E-05     CCX-AV-LA FAILURE OF PMS, FLS AND DAS IN21CATIOt3 FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                           1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL 6       1.07E-09              7.68     SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (MCLPF = 0.099)                        1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                            2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILL9E OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                     5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO FAILURE OF PMS, PLS AND DAS INDICATION FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS                            1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL 7      9.48E-11                 .69    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                        1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                            2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs                                                      9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                             4.70E-05     CCX-BY-PN g                    8      6.53E-11                 .47    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                        1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-14SP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO ( LOSE (SV/PORV)                           2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 I                                                           COMMON CAUSE FAILL9E OF 4 AOVS TO OFDI                                                 6.10E-05     CCX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 2 ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVES                                      5.10E-05     ACX-CV-GO 9      6.05E-11                 .43    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                        1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CIDSE (SV/PORV)                           2.10E-02      OTH-SLSOV1 f3 v 83 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IRWST INJECTION CHECK VALVES 9.60E-05 3.COE-05 PXX-AV-LA IWX-CV-AO b
y gy*              10       6.05E-11                 .43    SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)                       1.00E+00      EO-!EV-LOSP
                                *d                                                           FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                           2.10E-02      OTH-SLSOV1 C$
T*
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF PRHR AOVs COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAf3E ADS SQU!B VALVES TO OPERATE 9.60E-05 3.00E-05 FXX-AV-LA ADX-EV-SA h.
8wU C$2 e, q ;;p                                                                                                                                                                               hi!jii m

REC                                                                Table 55B-45 (cont.)                                                         ,
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c,*n ;2                                                              LSP-SLBV. DES 7                                                                                                                                                    iF
                                                            ***** DOMINANT CUTSETS *****                            Page:      2 h
es O bd

==Title:==
AP600 SMA yJ          File: 1sp-sibv.wlkt File created by linking estb-v.in        WLINK2 ** Ver. 4.02   **)
q        Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 1.3940E-08 2           NUMBER CUTSET PROB PEPCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                            EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER cr          ______ ____._.._._ ....___ .______.._______.._._......___.__.....____..__ ______._ .... . .._______ ...______-. ____________
8              11    6.02E-11        .43  SEISMICALLY INDUCED IDS $ OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)          1.00E+00     EQ-1EV-LOSP 3
e                                         FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORVI               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1
"                                         COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                    6.10E-05     CCX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                4.70E-05     CCX-BY-PN 12    5.46E-11        .39  SE!*MICALLY INDUCED LOSS C' OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.090)           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILUDE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                        5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 2 ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVES                        5.10E-05     ACX-CV-GO 13    5.24E-11        .38  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF PRHR AOVs                                         9.60E-05     PXX-AV-IA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN RECIRC LINES                    2.60E-05     IWK-EV4-SA 14    5.24E-11        .38  SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)           1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP tA                                        FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 Ut                                        COMMON CAUSE FAILU8E OF PRHR AnVs                                         9.60E-05     PXX-AV-LA W                                         COMPON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 1RWST INJECTION SQUIB VALVES                    2.60E-05      IWK-EV-SA 5
g              15    5.03E-11         .36 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENY (HCLPF = 0.09g)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/POPV) 1.00E+00 2.10E-02 EQ-IEV-LOSP OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 CMT CHECE VALVES TO OPEN                        5.10E-05     CMX-CV-GO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF CLASS 1E BATTERIES                                4.70E-05     CCX-BY-PN 16    4.94E-11         .35 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVE 247 (HCLPF = 0.09g)          1.00E+00     EQ-IEV-LOSP FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)               2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMCN CAUSE FAILUPE OF PPHR AOVs                                         9.60E-05      FXX-AV-LA h                                      COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF CLASS IE INVERTERS                                2.40E-05     CCX-IV-XR
   ;;h E
h a 17    3,84E-11         .28 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVEffr (HCLPF = 0.09g)
FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV) 1.00E*00 2.10E-02 EO-IEV-LOSP CTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                     6.10E-05    CCX-AV-LA COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4 IPWST IPUECTION CHECK VALVES                     3.00E-05     IWX-CV-AO Um 18    3.84E-11         .28 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWEP EVENT (MCLPF = 0.099)            1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-14SP     %
FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CthSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1 COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                     6.10E-05     CCX-AV-LA       M COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 4TH STAGE ADS SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE              3.00E-05     ADX-EV-SA       h.
19    3.35E-11         .24 SEISMICALLY INDUCED LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)            1.00E*00     EQ-IEV-LOSP         .
* FAILURE OF A SECONDARY SIDE PELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/POPV)                2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1       "
CMT FLOW 'ItNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                             7.27E-04     CMA-PLUG         V
     $                                    CMT FLOW TUNING ORIFICE PLUGS                                              7.27E-04     CMB-PLUG         7 m                                    OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY ACTUATE ADS                                     3.02E-03     ADN-MAN 01
     $                                                                                                                                            D"I.
                                      .24 SEISMICALLY INDUCED 14SS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (HCLPF = 0.09g)            1.00E+00     EQ-1EV-LOSP      3 5         20    3.33E-11 FAILUPE OF A SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF VALVE TO CLOSE (SV/PORV)                2.10E-02     OTH-SLSOV1       '>
50 "lY                                  COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 AOVS TO OPEN                                     6.10E-05     CCX-AV-LA        13
     @                                    COMMON CAUSE FAILUPE OF 4 SQUIB VALVES IN PECIPC LINES                     2.60E-05     IWX-EV4-SA       E,.
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l Enclosure 2 to Westinghouse letter NSD-NRC-97-5014 March 18,1997 3
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l OITS # 2536 l The use of the NUREG/CR-0098 median shape response spectrum for the review level earthquake of 0.5g supported in the Appendix H. Section H.I on the basis of NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities is questionable.   ;
The NUREG-1407 guidance is intended for use in IPEEE of currently operating nuclear power plants and is not        ;
intended for use in the seismic margins evaluation for advanced standard passive reactor designs such as the AP600. The NRC staff does not believe that it is appropriate to use the median shape spectrum from i NUREG/CR-0098 nor the guidance from NUREG-1407 for the advanced passive design of AP600.
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l Response The development of the revised HCLPF values for the seismic margin assessment did not employ the median shape spectrum from NUREG/CR-0098 nor the guidance from NUREG-1407. As stated in the transmittal to the l NRC [ Reference (1)], and in agreement with the strong suggestion by the NRC staff, the AP600 design response spectra curves are used to define the response spectra shapes for the seismic margin assessment.
l I Reference (1):     Westinghouse letter to USNRC, NSD-NRC-96-4879, "AP600 Seismic Margin HCLPF Methodology," November 6.1996.
l j OITS # 2537 Uncertainty parameters "Br" and "Bu" have been assigned values that do not seem to have consistency amongst similar structural elements and components. Provide the rationale for determining the uncertainty parameters.

===Response===
A review of the uncertainty parameters used in the development of the HCLPF values was made to assure that l they have consistency among similar structural elements and components. Uncertainty parameters were I developed using accepted industry practices as described in Section 55.2 of Revision 9 of the PRA report. This section addresses seismic margin assessment HCLPF calculations.
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l OITS # 2538 In the calculation of the HCLPF values using the conservative deterministic failure margin approach, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Guidelines are generally used. However, certain conservatism factors are used for the AP600 that are specifically suggested to be ignored in the EPRI guideline. Also, there are two ductility factors of 2 and 3 that were mcdified to suit individual cases and then multiplied together to obtain a combined ductility factor that may be too optimistic for characterizing the overall system behavior. The concerns are that there may be local failures or that other failure modes could take over and produce a lower HCLPF value.
Provide a rationale for using the additional conservatism factors and for modifying the ductility factors.         j l

===Response===
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The methodology used to define the HCLPF was reviewed and modified. The method is described in Revision 9 of the PRA in Section 55.2. The EPRI conservative deterministic failure margin method was used only for the shield building roof. The deterministic margin factors that were defined for this structure used only conservative factors recognized by EPRI. They were defined for three items: strength; inelastic energy absorption; and damping. They are discussed in detail in the referenced PRA report section given above. In the development of HCLPF values, ductility was considered for only the shield building roof and the inner containment structures &
IRWST modules. The ductility factor for the shield building roof was defined following the EPRI method using the formulation defining ductility margin by the effective frequency / effective damping approach given in Reference (1). The inner containment structures & 1RWST modules are of shear wall type construction. The ductility fragility data was defined from Reference (2) for this type of construction. Local inelastic energy absorption was not considered.
Reference (1):       R.P. Kennedy, et al.. Engineerine Characterization of Ground Motion - Task I, Effects of Characteristics of Free-Field Motion on Structural Response, NUREG/CR-3805, May 1984.
Reference (2):       Uncertaintv and Conservatism in the Seismic Analvsis and Design of Nuclear Facilities.
Working Group on Quantification of Uncertainties. American Society of Civil Engineers, ISBN 0-87262-547-8, 1986.
l OITS # 2539 There is inconsistency in the way safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and design basis accident related loads are combined for the margins assessment of various components. Loads from loss of coolant accidents and SSE are combined to determine the margin for reactor vessel supports, but similar considerations were not given in the margins assessment for the fuel assemblies or for the containment structure. Provide the rationale for not applying the same considerations uniformly for all components.

===Response===
See response given for OITS # 3431 (RAI 230.106) which addresses DBA and SSE load combination, and response for OITS #2540 which addresses the fuel assembly HCLPF calculation.
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OITS # 2540 The seismic margin for the fuel assembly yielded the lowest HCLPF value. The HCLPF calculation was performed on the basis of judgmental factors obtains from a telephone conversation with the Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Division. During the audit, the NRC staff could not deselop an understanding of the aspects of fuel assembly design that provide additional seismic ruggedness. Provide documentation that discusses the bases for all factors included in the HCLPF calculation for the fuel assembly.

===Response===
l in the revised SMA, the HCLPF value for the fuel assemblies is based on URD recommended generic fragility
[               data [ Reference (1)). This is because the fuel will be qualified plant specifically.
l               Reference (1):      Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document, Volume III. ALWR Passise Plant, Chapter 1. Appendix A, PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules. Revisions 5 & 6, issued 12/93.
l OITS # 2541                                                                                                           ;
1 The NRC staff observed that the seismic margins calculations need to be performed with the latest seismic model       i and seismic response analyses results, including the consideration of various site conditions, after they have been   l
;               fully verified by Westinghouse for use in safety related calculations. Westinghouse should notify the staff when      l l               the calculations are complete.
l               Response l
l               The seismic margm calculations have been completed with the latest seismic model and seismic response                 !
l               analysis results. The seismic response spectra that were developed for safety-related design considered the           i
!               various site conditions, representing envelop spectra of the different responses associated with the range of soil    I cases, i
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1 OITS #2542 The following changes were discussed during the meeting and should be made to Appendix H of the SSAR:
- [1]    Add a discussion on site specific soil liquefaction consideration on page 1.
- [2]    Remove reference to NUREG-1407 on page I, since it is not applicable to advanced reactor designs.
- [3]    Clarify statement on no vendor calculations on page 1.
- [4]    Add that the calculations are made based on vendor specifications for the design on page 1.
- [5]    Delete the word " generic" in second column on page 1.
-[6]     Under H.2.2 on page 2, provide a clarification as to how far Westinghouse went on safe shutdown that standby, cold shutdown, etc.).
- [7]    Add the relationship between Am and Am' on page 3.
- [8]    Discuss what phase this submittal is on page 6. Also, under H.3.1, discuss why only the fu!! power operation mode is selected for margins analysis.
- [9]    On page 7, provide clarification on the bases for not analyzing the normal residual heat removal system further.                                                                                                     '
- [10] Under H.3.2.4, provide an explanation of why a fault tree model is not required to determine this                l HCLPF.                                                                                                        i
- [11] Several blanks have been left in the fault trees. For example, on page 53, failure of buildings is left         I blank. The numbers should be provided.
-[12] Under H.3.4.3, it is stated that main feedwater valves SGS V057A and V057B must close for a steam line break. However, these valves are not shown on the fault tree in Figure H-11. Provide clarification.
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i Appendix H was rewritten and the changes discussed were addressed. Appendix H is Chapter 55 of Revision 9              l of the AP600 PRA. Additionally, the response to some of the changes listed above are further discussed below:          !
[6]      The same success enteria as in the AP600 focused PRA, where no credit is taken for nonsafety-related          l systems. is used as the starting point for the risk-based seismic margins analysis. This success criteria is not necessarily defined in terms of reaching specific plant modes, but rather on reaching a sustainable safe plant state. The bases for this success criteria are given in the AP600 PRA report, Chapter 55.           j 1
[8]      There are two reasons for performing a SMA on the full power operation:
i)        Full power y: ration is the most likely state a plant would be in, in the unlikely case of a seismic event (the availability goal for AP600 is 877c and even current plants routinely reach high availabilities over 807c). Thus, more than 4/5 of the time, a seismic event is expected to coincide with the power operation.
ii)      Historically, SMAs have been performed on the full power operation state. There is no basis to deviate from this convention, although there is a basis to perform the analysis with the assumption of full power operation, as discussed in [8il.
19]       Normal RHR (RNS) is a nonsafety-related system, for which no credit is taken in the focused PRA (see the response to [6] above). Thus, this system does not appear in the SMA success paths, and is not further pursued.
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i OITS #2792         Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 1:                                                              l
            ' The risk-based seismic margins (SMA) must be updated to reDect revisions made in the internal event analysis.
!             Such revisions include changes in event and fault tree models, success criteria. hardware failure and human error probabilities. The updated analysis should state explicitly all important assumptions made in constructing the                 !
seismic event trees, starting with the internal event trees.
l             RESPONSE                                                                                                                       '
l The SMA is provided in Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA. It has been updated to reflect the revisions made in the internal event analysis. The revisions include changes to the event and fault tree models, i             success criteria, hardware failure, and human error probabilities. Important assumptions are explicitly stated in
;             the analysis.
l OITS #2793          Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 2:
l The guidance provided by NRC for SMA requires that in addition to seismic only contributions, combinations of j             seismic and random failures / human errors need to be identified and reported. Only random failures having a
!             failure probability of IE-3 or greater need to be considered. The explanation provided in Sections H.3.5 and 2.2                i is not clear. Please explain how potential combinations of seismic and random failures were systematically 1
identified.
RESPONSE                                                                                                                       ,
l The seismic fault tree models for accident mitigating systems are modeled to include both seismic and random l             failures, as discussed in subsection 55.3.5 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA. The sequence quantification results l             are discussed in subsection 55.4.4 and the dominant mixed cutsets (combinations of seismic and random failures                  l
              / human errors) are also given in the Chapter 55.                                                                               .
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!             OITS #2794         Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 3:                                                               j Because of the extra demands on the operators following a seismic event, human error probabilities (HEPs) used in seismic events should be reviewed to determine their applicability to the conditions expected to exist after the seismic event of the postulated magnitude. Please identify which of the internal event's " operator failure to start l             ADS" is used in the SMA and provide a brief discussion of its applicability.                                                    ;
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===RESPONSE===
The SMA, as presented in Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA, is performed without taking credit for operator actions for sequences evaluated at 0.5g review level earthquake for the first 24 hours. This is very                   j conservative, because there is no basis to assume the operators will do nothing to protect the plant after a seismic            i 1-            esent. Operator action sensitivity analyses are given in Section 55.5, and operator action insights are discussed in Section 55.6.
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l OITS #2795         Seismic h1argins Analysis follow-on question 4:
A mission time of 24 hours is assumed in the Sh1A (as for the internal events analysis). This assumption must be justified on the basis of the plant state at 24 hours. If the plant is not at a stable state, the beyond 24 hours risk must be assessed or shown to be negligible (e.g., in terms of available options, time windows for human actions, etc.). An example is the scenarios of a seismic event that causes loss of offsite power and loss of all non-safety related " active" systems (Iow HCLPF values) combined with failure to isolate the containment (random plus seismic).
RESPONSE                                                                                                                      i l
The potential effects of a seismic event beyond 24-hours is discussed in Section 55.5 of Revision 9 of the AP600              !
PRA.                                                                                                                          j l
OITS #2796         Seismic h1argins Analysis follow-on question 5:                                                            i The seismic fault tree for the passive RHR (Figure 2.2-2) shows a system failure when the DC power needed to open the AOVs is lost. Do not these AOVs fail open upon loss of 125 V DC power? Please explain.

===RESPONSE===
Figure 2.2-2 was given as an example. The AOVs in PRHR fail open when de power is lost due to a seismic event, allowing flow through the PRHR heat exchanger. The example and the figure from the previous analysis are no longer in the Sh1A documentation provided in Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the PRA.                                      l OITS #2797         Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 6:
Section H.3.2.8 states: "a consequential small LOCA could occur because the pressurizer safety valves open and do not close, small pipe breaks occur, or for any other reason." Are these small pipe breaks due to the seismic event? If the answer is yes please provide the HCLPF values for such small pipes.

===RESPONSE===
The previous SN1A referred to consequential small LOCAs, which did not contribute to plant HCLPF The revised Sh1A includes seismically induced small LOCAs, and their HCLPF values.
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  .. - - - - - - ~ ~ _ - . -.._._ -. - - . -                                                 _ _  - . -            - . . . _ _ . .-.      . . . . - -
l OITS #2798                Seismic Margins Analysis follow on question 7:
No seismic event tree is included in the analysis for main steam line breaks inside containment (MSBI). The                        j explanation for this (provided in H.3.3.5) is not clear. Please provide a seismic event tree for MSBI or explain why this event tree is not needed to gain additional insights than those already available through other seismic event trees.                                                                                                                       !
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===RESPONSE===
The seismic initiating event hierarchy tree has been revised since the previous analysis to include seismically                    ;
                                                                                                                                                      ~
induced small LOCA and loss of offsite power / transients events. Large main steam line break (SLB) events are considered within the SLOCA success criteria. These events are conservatively assumed to be the non-
;                  isolable in-containment breaks.
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!                                                                                                                                                     i l                  From a SMA perspective, main steam line break event trees are represented by either small LOCA or transient                        j type behavior, depending upon the break size. Separate modeling of main steam line break events in SMA has not in the past, and will not now provide new information about the plant HCLPF values.
OITS #2799                Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 8:
Westinghouse should correct several errors in reporting combinations of seismic and random failures (mixed cut sets). For example, in sequence 27 of MSBO event tree,1.28g + OA(2.2E-3) is reported. The correct result                            ;
should be stated as: 1.28g + 1.28g
* OA(2.2E-3) = 1.28g.                                                                            )
i RESPONSE                                                                                                                            i i
During the revision of the SMA model, typographical errors were corrected. The revised SMA is presented in                          l Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA.
l OITS #2800                Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 9:
The only failure mechanism considered for loss of containment cooling, as a result of blockage of the baffle, is                    ;
the structural failure of the baffle itself. However, it is possible for the baffle to be blocked as a result of release            l of water following the seismic induced failure of the Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank                                l (PCCWST) and failure to drain the water below the baffle plate due to, for example, blockage of the drains by                       I l                - debris from the failed PCCWST. Westinghouse should report the HCLPF for the PCCWST and evaluate and                                 I j                  discuss the feasibility of this containment cooling failure mode.
1 RESPONSE                                                                                                                            l I
Failure of the shield building roof with a HCLPF of 0.58g is assumed to fail the PCCWST. Thus this failure mode is already accounted for. The HCLPF of the PCS tank is higher than the roof and does not affect the results.
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t OITS #2801        Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 10:                                                           >
For several components, the reported HCLPF and median values seems to be inconsistent. For example, the                     ,
HCLPF value for the RCS components V001 A/B/C/D is estimated to be 2.85g. This is higher than the listed                    ,
median value of 2.38g (Table H-1). Please explain.                                                                          ,

===RESPONSE===
The HCLPF analysis has been updated and typographical errors have been corrected. The revised SMA is provided in Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the PRA.                                                                             !
OITS #2802          Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question i1:
Westinghouse should evaluate the results of the seismic analysis. This should include sensitivity analyses to                f evaluate the effects of changes in certain assumptions. For example, the effect on the plant HCLPF of a                      ,
                                                                                                                                ~
reduction in the assumed HCLPF valves of certain systems, structures and components (e.g., due to                            ,
uncertainties). Such sensitivity analyses provide important insights about the design. The documentation of this            ,
evaluation should include: (1) a discussion of the plant HCLPF; (2) a discussion of the dominant seismic and                 !
mixed (seismic /aon seismic) sequences; (3) conclusions and discussion of the conclusions; and (4) a list of
   ~important assumptions and insights.

===RESPONSE===
Section 55.5 of Revision 9 of the PRA presents sensitivity studies. These sensitivity analyses are reviewed for important insights about the design, and they are discussed. They include a discussion of the plant HCLPF, a discussion of the dominant seismic and mixed sequences, and conclusions and a discussion about the conclusions.                                                                                                                 ;
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OITS #2803         Seismic Margins Analysis follow-on question 12:
Passive systems depend on very low driving heads to generate the required flow. The specific orientation of equipment and piping may have a significant impact on the ability of these systems to generate sufficient head.
Seismic events in excess of the SSE have the potential to result in inelastic behavior and associated permanent distortion of systems or the structures they are anchored to. In forced now systems, such minor distortions (such that the operability of the equipment would not be compromised) would not result in system failure, since pumped flow would be able to overcome minor changes in flow resistance. Therefore, previous SMAs (for operating and advanced evolutionary reactor designs) do not consider such failure modes. However, it is not clear that this assumption can be fully supported for passive systems.
Changes in the orientation of equipment or piping (e.g., the downstream end of a pipe being raised above the upstream end) could result in loss of suf6cient driving head through increases resistance or the formation of gas bubbles (" loop seals") within the piping runs. There is a need to understand the importance of piping orientation to the success of these systems. Similarly, seismically-induced failure of check valves to open has not been considered. While the existing guidance on SMA justifies this assumption for check valves in active systems, that guidance did not consider whether such an assumption would be valid under the operating conditions present for passive systems.
A systematic investigation is needed to determine whether there are " passive system related" failure modes with HCLPF values lower than those already considered in the SMA. If such failure modes are found, they should be addressed in the SMA or show (e.g , using results from the passive system performance reliability analysis) that they will not affect the conclusions and insights expected from the SMA.

===RESPONSE===
The AP600 passive systems and functions that would be used to mitigate the effects of a seismic event are:
passive containment cooling water
  +
automatic depressurization system (ADS) core makeup tank (CMT)
  +         accumulators in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) injection
  +         containment recirculation
  +
passive residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchanger These systems are composed of valves, including check valves, some piping, tanks, including the IRWST, a heat exchanger, and the many supports for these components.
These components and their supports will be designed to withstand seismic events up to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). That is, they will have be able to function after the SSE. These components and their supports will have HCLPF (high confidence of a low probability of failure) values which are discussed in the seismic margins analysis (SMA), Chapter 55 of the PRA. ne HCLPF values do not define the acceleration which will cause failure of the component, although that is what is assumed in the SMA, since the HCLPF value redects only a 5% failure probability with a 95% conGdence. Therefore, as the HCLPF is defined, there is a high confidence that the components will continue to function for a seismic event with accelerations up to and including the HCLPF values. In fact, there is a 95% probability that the components will continue to function for acceleration levels greater than the HCLPF values. The SMA considers the seismic failures of the components. These components are assumed to fail at the HCLPF value in the SMA, and the analysis evaluates the effects of those failures.
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   . - . . - -          - -- ---__                                  . . . - . - - . -             ~ . - _---._- ._.-
These components will be able to perform their function for a seismic esent of magnitude less than, or equal to        i the HCLPF value, as denned by the HCLPF. " Performing their function" means that check valves will be able             ;
to open as needed. even under small pressure differentials as they are designed to do, squib valves will be able      !
                - to open, a tank will continue to hold water, water will continue to flow down in a tank, and hot water will           j continue to rise above cold water, causing How in the PRHR heat exchanger.
The HCLPF analysis for the components considers the types of deformation that could occur with components              i with the seismic forces. There is a high confidence that the components and their supports will not exhibit any significant plastic deformation for accelerations less than ot equal to the HCLPF value. This means there is a         i high confidence that the components and their supports will not fail for accelerations less than or equal to the       j HCLPF value.
1 The orientation of the components, including lines, tanks, check valves, and their supports couuld be changed by       l a seismic event, that causes the system to signincantly deform plastically. Since there is a high confidence that there will be no failure for accelerations less than or equal to the HCLPF value, the SMA does not assume the          ;
components will continue to function after large deformations such as those discussed in the RAI occur. At accelerations greater than the HCLPF value, the component is assumed to fail, although there is a significant          j probability that the component will not fail. The failure of the component is cor sidered in the analysis.
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               - Thus, the failures of the passive components in the design are considered in the SMA. The importance of piping         ;
orientation is considered, because if the piping orientation is changed significantly, it is considered a failure, and  j failures are considered. Failures of check valves are also considered. The SMA reviews the HCLPF values of              1 all components modeled in the focused PRA, including the passive system components. Failures related to the components modeled are addressed in the SMA model, The conclusions and insights for these failures are presented in the SMA, Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA.
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Meeting Open item 2: (0170 # 5034)                                                                                       1 A table of updated fragility parameter. , i.e., median, ,,,   , and HCLPF values, was presented together with a list of available documents for review. The final report on the seismic margin analysis (SMA) methodology will be piovided in Chapter 55 of the AP600 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) report in early March.
Westinghouse stated that the floor response spectra used for the fragility analysis were the envelope of four spectra of different soil conditions. However, the spectra for a rock site dominate for almost the entire frequency range. Westinghouse stated that the time history analysis results for a rock site were used to represent the enveloping response values for components.
Meeting Open Item 2: The staff requested Westinghouse to provide an explanation demonstrating that the use of the time history analysis for the rock site was bounding for all AP600 soil sites.

===Response===
The methodology used to develop the revised HCLPF values, as well as a summary table of HCLPF values is given in AP600 PRA (Revision 9) Section 55.2. The methodology reflects a change where the HCLPF values are developed using the composite log-normal standard deviation, y. The HCLPF log-normal formula did not use random and uncertainty variability. The HCLPF is defined by a log-normal probability distribution that is a function of median seismic capacity and composite standard desiation, .:
HCLPF = Median Capacity x be "' A' The median seismic capacity is related to the mean seismic capacity by the expression:
Median Capacity = Mean Capacity lx e **'
l When seismic time history analysis results were used, the margin factor was adjusted so that the seismic i
response associated with the time history reflected the response that would be obtained if the envelope spectra associated with the different soil cases were used. This was accomplished by verifying that the time history seismic response, defined by its response spectrum, at the dominant component frequencies, envelope the broadened design floor response spectrum asscciated with the analyzed soil cases.
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Meeting Open item 3 (OITS # 5035)
The HCLPF calculations for an MCC were reviewed based on a document, SM96-9 Class IE Equipment. The HCLPF values were determined based on the estimated lower bound of qualification test results. Information regarding critical failure modes (e.g., relay chatter) was not made available during the meeting. Variability values of , = 0.05 and p,, = 0.10 were used to establish the relationship between the median and HCLPF values. The staff considered these variability values to be too low, and it seems that the calculation procedure does not follow the acceptable SMA methodologies (detemiinistic or probabilistic). Another concern is the calculation of the ratio of Test Response Spectra to Required Response Spectra. This ratio. which was             l determined only at 4.6 Hz, should be calculated throughout the frequency range of interest.
Meeting Open item 3: Westinghouse responded by proposing to eliminate all the median and -values from the fragility table, and to calculate HCLPF values deterministically for electric equipment.

===Response===
For the electrical equipment where documented test results are available, the HCLPF value is delined from comparison of required response spectra (RRS) and test response spectra (TRS). The method employed follows a deterministic approach using existing test data for similar types of equipment.
The existing test data was reviewed to determine a lower bound sesmic R.cacity.
When the natural frequency of the equipment is not known, it was assumed that the natural frequency coincided with the required response spectra peak acceleration so that the lowest HCLPF value was calculated. It is noted   l that where equipment frequencies are known, and are used for comparing RRS and TRS, these frequencies will be included in the design specification for the equipment to assure that the dynamic characteristics are the same as those expected.
1 Solid state switching devices and electro-mechanical relays will be used in the AP600 protection and control      j systems. Solid state switching devices are inherently immune to mechanical switching discontinuities such as      i contact chatter. Robust electro-mechanical relays are selected for AP600 applications such that inherent mechanical contact chatter is within the required system performance criteria. Therefore, contact chatter has no  l effect on system operation and was, therefore, not included in the seismic margin analysis.
Moreover, the loss of offsite power event has a very low HCLPF value (0.09g). The control rod motor generator sets are powered by ac load cer.ters that are de-energized on loss of offsite power sources. When the control rod motor generator sets are de-energized, current to the magnetic jack mechanisms stops and the gripper coils open, allowing the rods to drop into the core. Therefore, relay chatter is deemed to be a non-issue for reactor trip.
Finally, PRHR and CMT valves automatically fail open upon loss of air due to loss of seismically-induced loss of offsite power. Thus, relay chatter is deemed to be a non-issue also for PRHR and CMT system functions.
12

Meeting Open Item 4 (OITS # 5036) l The fragility calculations for the reactor vessel support structures were reviewed based on documents, Sh196-1 l (support structure), Sh196-3 (nozzles), and several design drawings. In the fragility calculations, an inelastic j energy absorbing factor of F,, = 4.0 was used for the support structure based on the estimated ductility factor of p = 10.0 for a plate bending failure. During a phone conversation with a Westinghouse engineer who performed l the stress analysis for the support structure,it was found that the critical stress condition was a localized shear l stress rather than an overall bending stress. The estimated ductility factor of p = 10.0 is considered to be too
) high by the staff for such a stress condition. hioreover, the " local" ductility factor was directly used to estimate the inelastic criergy absorption factor for the reactor vessel. In a fragility evaluation of a system which consists of several sub-components, e.g., anchor bolts and support structures, the deformation of each sub-system contributes only partially to the overall deformation of the system. As a result, the combined ductility factor for the whole system is usually much lower than the maximum ductility factor due to a localized deformation.
hiceting Open Item 4: Westinghouse responded to eliminate the inelastic energy absorbing factor altogether for the reactor vessel in an updated calculation.

===Response===
For those structures whose HCLPF values were determined by probabilistic fragility methods, only the inner containment structures & IRWST modules considered ductility. These structures are of shear wall type construction. The associated ductility margin factor and variability used is given in Reference (1); median l
margin factor equal to 2.25; composite standard deviation equal to 0.25. Local inelastic energy absorption was            l not considered.                                                                                                           I l
1 Reference (1):     Uncertainty and Conservatism in the Seismic Analysis and Desien of Nuclear Facilities,                 l j                    Working Group on Quantification of Uncertainties, American Society of Civil Engineers, ISBN            l 0-87262-547-8. 1986.
Meeting Open Item 5 (OITS # 5037)
Westinghouse was requested to include the failure modes that were considered in each calculation and provide the staff a written explanation of the process Westinghouse uses to identify the possible critical failure modes.

===Response===
Failure modes were identified for a component. For example, for each of the potential failure modes in each of the support areas (e.g., lower support, upper support) the margin to strength allowable for the governing seismic l margin load case was determined. A review of those elements (e g., bolts, welds, embedments, struts, columns, ring girders) which have the lowest margin factors was made to determine if the loss of that element would cause loss of component safety function. For the primary component supports, this review was made with the support design engineers involved with the development of the support design and/or calculation of seismic margin capacities. The critical failure areas are documented in the calculations.
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Meeting Open item 6 (OITS # 5038)
Westinghouse was requested explain how they consider local and system ductility in their calculations.

===Response===
For those structures whose HCLPF values were determined by probabilistic fragility methods, only the inner containment structures & IRWST modules considered ductility. See response given for meeting open item 4 (OITS # 5036) which discusses local and system ductility for these structures.
The HCLPF value for the shield building roof was calculated using the conservative deterministic failure margin approach. A finite element analysis was performed of this structure that considered cracking of the concrete and redistribution of the loads. Deterministic margin factors were defined for three items: strength; inelastic energy absorption; and damping. How inelastic energy absorption was considered is discussed below.
The increased capacity due to inelastic energy absorption is defined using recognized deterministic methods. It is only applied to the column structural elements which act as shear walls in the shield building roof. The formulation defining ductility margin follows the effective frequency / effective damping approach given in Reference (1). The formulation is summarized below.
S3 (f,p)
F, = [ f, / f, ]2 S(f,,p,)
3 The ratio of secant to clastic frequency is given in terms of ductility factor, p.
                                                        /,       T
                                                         /     h5
!  The effective frequency, f, is:
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f' = [1 - A) + A [ f' ] -
I                                                /                       /
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where A = 2.3 [l - ( )] s 0.85 14

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The effective damping p, is estimated by the formula:
P,
* V, //,l* IP + Pul l
l The symbol p represents the clastic damping, and pu is the pinched hysteretic damping that is approximated by:
Pu =11% [1 -(f, /f) ]
Reference (1):   R.P. Kennedy, et al. Engineerine Characterization of Ground Motion - Task I, Effects of Characteristics of Free-Field Motion on Structural Response. NUREG/CR-3805, May,1984.
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l Meeting Open item 7 (OITS # 5039)                                                                                 l Almost all the estimated variabilities are considered to be too low, and the methodologies to evaluate the -
values are not consistent with the acceptable SMA evaluation practice. For example, in evaluating the building response factor, the variability of the damping value was ignored. According to Westinghouse, it was done so because a conservative damping value of $7c was used in the response analysis rather than a higher median-        ,
centered value (e.g.,77c). This was considered to be not acceptable, because the use of a slightly lower damping value does not guarantee a HCLPF margin. It was observed that both deterministic and probabilistic methods were somehow mixed together in the fragility estimate of a single component. The Westinghouse HCLPF               i margins were found to be low in comparison to the past SPRA (seismic probabilistic risk assessmeno studies in     I which the margins are 2.5 to 3.0 for component fragility levels.
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Meeting Open Item 7: Westinghouse was requested to provide the rational for using lower bound median values and if the values was used in the PRA.

===Response===
In the calculation of revised HCLPF values, damping was considered. The methodology used to calculate the revised HCLPF values is described in PRA (Rev. 9) Section 55.2. In no case were both deterministic and            ,
probabilistic methods mixed together in the fragility estimate of a single component as is evident in this report l section which addresses what method was used for each component. A review of the ratios of median to              ;
HCLPF values used by Westinghouse was made. This comparison is given below.
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Description                                 Median            HCLPF           Ratio                     '
pga              pga Containment Vessel - buckling                         3.29              0.7             4.7                       l containment Vessel Overturning                        4.07              0.98            4.2 Interior Containment Structure &
IRWST Tank                                       1.47             0.6             2.5 Reactor Pressure Vessel Support                        1.44             0.77            1.9 Pressurizer Support                                    1.63             0.67            2.4 Steam Generator Support                                1.25             0.65            1.9 Reactor Coolant Pump                                  2.2               0.7             3.1 Reactor Internals and Core Assembly (includes fuel)                           1.5              0.5             3.0 Control Rod Drive Mechanism and Hydraulic Drive Units                         2.2               0.7             3.1 Piping - Support Controlled                           3.3               0.81            4.1 Cable Trays                                           2.2               0.54            4.1 Accumulator Tank                                      2.2               0.76            2.9 Vals es                                               3.3               0.81            4.1 Battery Racks                                         3.3                1.14           2.9 MCR Oper. tion and Switch Stations                    2.8               0.97            2.9 Ceramic Insulators                                    0.2               0.09            2.2 As seen from this comparison, the ratios are not that much different from the ratio range given that is found in other studies. Further, it is noted that the seismic median values were not used in the PRA.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITsONAL INFORMATION b         :
Question: 230.106           (OITS # 3431)
In the response (Ref.1) to RAI 4 (Ref. 2), Westinghouse stated that seismic HCLPF values will be uniformly deseloped without the combination of seismic and design basis accident (DBA) loads since the probability of the seismic loads occurring at the same time as the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) loads is sery  ,
small.                                                                                                                I In Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report, NP-6(MI-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1)," dated August 1991, the seismic margin earthquake (SME) loadings are combined with normal operating loads (NOL) for the conservative, deterministic failure margin (CDFM) approach. However, it is prudent to combine an accident pressure (Pa) with NOL + SME for the containment design analysis. This accident pressure should be based upon a postulated small or medium LOCA and might be substantially less than the design pressure.                                                                                                  j in final safety evatustion reports (FSERs) for the EPRI evolutionary and passive plants, the elimination of load      )
combinations with a probability of occurrence less than 1.0E-6 per reactor-year is accepted, except that a safe       !
shutdown earthquake (SSE) plus LOCA, for the design of seismic Category I structures, is to be considered.
Based on the above discussion, it is the staff's position that the seismic loads and DBA loads should be combined for the seismic Category I structures.

==References:==
: 1. Letter from Brian A. McIntyre of Westinghouse to Theodore R. Quay, 

==Subject:==
Westinghouse AP600 Seismic          j Margin HCLPF Values Methodology and Responses to Meeting Open items, dated January 17,1996.                           1
: 2. Letter from Kristine M. Schembarger of NRC to Westinghouse, 

==Subject:==
Summary of Seismic Margins Audit           i for the AP600, dated March 6,1995.                                                                                    l

===Response===
The staff's position that the seismic loads and DBA loads be combined for the seismic Category I structures was       I followed in the AP600 SMA.
The seismic Category I structures subjected to DBA leads are:                                                         l l       Containment Vessel Containment Internal Structure and IRWST Tank modules Steam Generator Supports Pressurizer Supports Reactor Pressure Vessel Supports 230,106-1 T Westinghouse I
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION s     :::
Only the HCLPF values for the primary component supports (steam generator. pressurizer, and reactor vessel supports) are affected by the DBA loads. For the containment sessel and critical containment modules the DBA loads would increase the HCLPF value if included. That is because the DBA loads would cause tension in the containment vessel which is controlled by the compressive buckling stress and the DBA pressure acts opposite to the hydro-pressure stress associated with the tank module walls which control the containment structure HCLPF value.
PRA Revision: None.
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Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Hs     s
                                                                                                            =      r Question: 230.107                       (OITS # 3432)
The fragility analysis methodology should consider the following analysis parameters:
Capacity           Response Strength          Soil Structure Interaction Ductility         Spectral Shape Damping Modeling Mode Combination Combinations of Earthquake Components In Section 3.3, " Fragility Analysis," in Reference 1. Westinghouse did not mention soil-structure interaction (SSI),
mode combination, damping, and combination of earthquake components. Also, the consideration of sliding and overturning of the containment and the nuclear island will likely impact the fragility calculations.
Reference 1 - Letter from Brian A. McIntyre of Westinghouse to Theodore R. Quay, 

==Subject:==
Westinghouse AP600 Seismic Margin HCLPF Values Methodology and Responses to Meeting Open items, dated January 17, 1996.

===Response===
In the revised HCLPF seismic calculations, the following analysis parameters were considered in the fragility analysis:
  .       Strength
* Material
* Damping
  +       Ductility Analysis Error (considers mode shape error; time history results)
* Modeling error in frequencies
  .       Soil Structure Interaction
  .       Imperfection in Containment Vessel These fragility analysis parameters are discussed in PRA (Rev. 9) Section 55.2 addressing seismic margin assessment HCLPF calculations.
Fragility parameters associated with mode combination and combination of earthquake components are not included in the fragility analysis methodology because they do not effect the HCLPF values calculated using the probabilistic fragility method. The reasons are stated below.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION q.g a
Primary component supports:
    +
Steam Generator Supports and Reactor Pressure Vessel Supports The seismic response for these structures is from time history analyses and not response spectra. Therefore, mode combination fragility parameters are not appropriate. The critical support component seismic load is dependent primarily on a single earthquake component, and therefore, fragility parameters associated with the    I combination of earthquake components are not included.
* Pressurizer Supports The pressurizer response is predominantly resulting from modes around 23 hertz, and modes above 33 hertz which are in the rigid region. Therefore, the response is not multi-mode in character and thus mode combination fragility parameters are not appropriate. The critical support component seismic load is dependent primarily on a single earthquake component, and therefore, fragility parameters associated with the combination of earthquake components are not included.
Containment Vessel The seismic response that contributes to the critical " failure mode" which is buckling is predominantly single  j l          mode and not multi-mode. Therefore, mode combination fragility parameters are not appropriate. The               i containment vessel is a cylindrical structure so that the earthquake response from each of the seismic components are uncoupled and any effect from variations in response due to the combination of earthquake components are negligible.
Containment Internal Structure and IRWST Tank modules The seismic response is not made up of multiple modes as a multi-mass system, and therefore, variation in        j seismic response due to mode combination is not applicable. The critical component seismic load is primarily     '
influenced by a single earthquake component, and therefore, fragility parameters associated with the combination of earthquake components are not included.
L   In the seismic margin analysis sliding and overturning of the containment vessel were considered. Overturning of the containment vessel controls over sliding.
PRA Revision: None.
l 230.107-2 W
Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION y   =
                                                                                                                                      =
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,       Question: 230.108             (OITS # 3433) l In Subsection 3.3.2.2.2, : Structural System " Westinghouse stated that for structural systems, when part of the
;       structure begins to fail, it does not mean that the structure cannot adequately perform its safety function. Inherent reserve strength can exist due to redistribution of the load to another portion of the structure. For the variability of this behavior, Westinghouse estimated the capacity just prior to redistribution as 98-percent failure probability.
3 Provide an example used and the rationale for the use of this failure probability.                                                        j
:                                                                                                                                                i

===Response===
Inherent reserve strength due to redistribution of the load was not considered in the calculation of revised HCLPF l       values. Therefore, it is not necessary to give examples or rationale for the use of this failure probability.
PRA Revision: None.
W85tlfigtl00St

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l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION jEHEig
                                                                                                             =-      =
l Question: 230.109                     (OITS # 3434)
With respect to Section 23.3 6. " Testing." provide the pmcedures for the estimation of a seismic fragility for equipment for which one has only a seismic qualification test report showing that the equipment did not fail when subjected to a specific test response spectrum applied at the support points for the equipment.

===Response===
The procedure used to establish the HCLPF value is given in Revision 9 of the PRA. section 55.2 and is described below.
For the electrical equipment where documented test results are available, the HCLPF value is defined from comparison of required response spectra (RRS) and test response spectra CI'RS). The method employed follows a deterministic approach using existing test data for similar types of equipment.
The existir.g test data was reviewed to determine a lower bound seismic capacity.
When the natural frequency of equipment is not known, it was assumed that the natural frequency coincided with the required response spectra peak acceleration so that the lowest HCLPF value was calculated. It is noted that           ,
where equipment frequencies are known, and are used for comparing RRS and TRS, these frequencies will be                  !
included in the design specification for the equipment to assure that the dynamic characteristics are the same as those expected.                                                                                                                 ;
1 PRA Revision: None.
l 230.109-1 W-Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 2:=  :g
                                                                                                                       =
Question: 230.110           (OITS # 3435)
In Section 3.3.6, " Testing," Westinghouse stated that for equipment testing, the equipment rarely fails to perform its intended function because of structural failure. Also, Westinghouse estimated the median seismic margin factor as 1.1 and assumed that the seismic level associated with the equipment being tested results in a 98-percent failure probability. Provide an example used and the rationale for the use of this failure probability.

===Response===
A deterministic approach was used to establish revised HCLPF values where documented test results were available.
Where this information is not available, generic fragility data was used to define the HCLPF value based on the Utility Requirements Document [ Reference (230.110-1)].

==References:==

230.110-1     Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document, Volume III, ALWR Passive Plant, Chapter 1, Appendix A. PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules Revisions 5 & 6, Issued 12/93.
PRA Revision: None.
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[ Westingh00Se l
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION pu:     .:u n:
g Question: 230.111        (OITS # 3436)
Provide the methodologies for the evaluation of the seismic accident sequences and plant level HCLPF calculations.

===Response===
These methodologies are given in Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA.
PRA Revision: None.
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230.111-1 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION f.P [;..
Question: 230.113         (OITS # 3485)
Provide the basis for the frequency values for the random failures (1.E-3) and human errors (2.2E-3) used in evaluating the sequence-level HCLPF-values (high conGdence, low probability of failure). The frequency values reported in Section H.3.5 of Reference I appear to be low.

===RESPONSE===
The random failure probabilities are taken from the PRA. In general, the failure probabilities are taken from standard industry data. The common practice for SMA applications is to use standard industry data. These random failure probabilities do not have any seismic effect on them. The seismic related failures are added separately to each fault tree. Of course, the seismic failures are rssigned HCLPFs rather than probabilities for the SMA.
The human errors are discussed ir. the response to OITS # 2794. No credit is taxen for operator actions for sequences evaluated at the 0.5 g itview level earthquake for the 24 hour mission time.
PRA Revision: None.
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Westinghouse I
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
                                                                                                                    )
gu   :=q  i
                                                                                                          =      ;  '
Ouestion: 230.114           (OITS # 3486) flow are spatir.1 interactions (e.g., seismic impact between adjacent components and Seismic 11/1 interactions) included in the seismic margins assessment (SMA)?

===Response===
The interaction between the turbine building and the north end of the auxiliary building is explicitly discassed in PRA Section 55.5.
PRA Revision: None.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i
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Question:      230.115      (OITS #3487)                                                                                      !
Since no walkdowns can be performed at this time, how can the key assumptions for structures, systems, and components considered in the SMA be verified for the as-built and as-operated plant conditions? Examples of this              1 include proper anchorage of equipment and seismic fragility of electrical / electronic equipment a hich may be different in the future.

===Response===
A verification that the as-built plant confirms the basis of the seismic margin evaluation will be performed by the COL applicant. See also response to RAI 230.109.
PRA Revision: None.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION r
                                                                                                                    ~5iy Ouestion:     230.116        (OITS # 3488)
The conclusion in Section H.1 of Reference 1, regarding reserve rnargin in the soil for liquefaction potential, is not evident from the information provided. The potential for soil liquefaction should be evaluated at the site specific conditions. Explain how this will be done.

===Response===
Since the evaluation is performed for a generic site, both rock and soil foundation conditions are considered. There will be no necessity to perform a new site-specific risk-based seismic analysis by an applicant for a combined license as long as the site-specific parameters are enveloped by those defined in Section 2.5 of the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR). See also SSAR Section 2.5 for a discussion on soil liquifaction.
PRA Revision: None.                                                                                                          ;
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 15 5
i Question:     230.117      (OITS # 3489)
Were any sensitivity analyses performed to evaluate the effect of changes in certain assumptions used in the SMA (e.g., changes in HCLPF values of key components due to different site soil conditions)?

===Response===
Various sensitivity analyses are performed and are presented in the AP600 PRA (Rev 9j Chapter 55. The liCLPF calculations are made with a spectra that considers different types of soil properties, and no additional sensitivity analyses are needed to reflect different soil conditions.
PRA Revision: None.
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230.117-1 W Westinghouse

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MiB hie m
I Question:      250.118       (OITS # 3490)
How are the HCLPF values calculated for concrete-filled steel type modules which are not conventional type structural elements (i.e., reinforced concrete and structural steel members)?
Response                                                                                                                               i I
The HCLPF values are calculated for the concrete-filled steel type modules in the folowing manner:                                      l I
The strength capacity is deteimined by identifying the most critical module and the mon critical region of the                    l module through a review of the design qualification packages. The critical items included the face plates and                     I the module base connections. It is noted that the steel plates provide the concrete reinforcement since there are                 I shear connectors bonding the concrete and the fa e plate.
  . Use of probabilistic analysis method as described in PRA (Rev. 9) Section 55.2.
l PRA Revision: None.                                                                                                                    l I
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230.118-1 W
Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION j=n- -aE 3
Question:       230.119       (OITS # 3491)
It is stated that the AP600 design and analysis will consider various site conditions. To account for the response                        :
variability due to different site conditions, an additional uncertainty. Bu. should be included in the HCLPF evaluation.
The quantification of this additional uncertainty should be described in the SSAR.

===Response===
It is noted that an envelop spectra for the different soil conditions is used in the development of the HCLPF values.                     '
No credit is taken for the margin at a specific site. Variability is included to account for soil structure interaction effects. The variability, composite log-normal standard deviation R,, is estimated to be 0.1.
PRA Revision: None.
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I 230.119-1 W Westinghouse

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! NRC REQUEST FOR ADDiisONAL INFORMATION l
i.s.. iM4E Question:       230.120      (OITS # 3492)
The use of old generic fragility values, e.g., NUREG/CR-3558 and NUREG/CR-4334, is implied. These older fragility values are largely based on the SAFEGUARD test results and espert opinions. A rationale for using such data, e.g., similarity in design, needs to be established. Also, all the generic fragility values (including newer ones by ANCO/GERS, BNL and LLNL) are given in terms of the local acceleration, whereas, the ilCLPF values for SMA should be expressed in terms of the ground motion acceleration. A way to convert the local acceleration values to the ground lesel should be given in the SSAR.

===Response===
In the development of the revised HCLPF values, generic fragility data was used when insuf6cient information was available. Those cases where this approach was used are:
Reactor Internals and Core Assembly that includes fuel a
control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) and hydraulic drive units Reactor Coolant Pump
  . Piping
  . Cable Trays
  . Accumulator Tank
  . Valves
  . Battery Racks                                                                                                        j Main Control Room Operation and Switch Stations                                                                      !
  . Ceramic Insulators                                                                                                   '
The Utility Requirements Document for Advanced Light Water Reactor, Reference (230.120-1), was used for all of the components listed above except ceramic insulators which used recognized industry low fragility data (Reference 230.120-2).
The generic fragility data is in terms of peak seismic ground accelerations. It was not necessary to convert any local seismic acceleration values to the peak ground acceleration levels.

==References:==

230.120-1      Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document, Volume III, ALWR Passive Plant, Chapter 1, Appendix A. PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules Revisions 5 & 6. Issued 12/93.
230.120-2 Cover, L.E., et al., NUREG/CR-3558 Handbook of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Fragilities, Seismic Safety Margins Research Program, June 1985, p. F-16.
PRA Revision: None.
[ W85tiflgtl0USS

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION is Em E'      ig Question:        230.121      (OITS # 3493)
It is stated that both the deterministic and fragility approaches are used to calculate the HCLPF values. Since significant ditferences exist between the two methods (e.g., the deterministic approach does not require the evaluation of B's), the SSAR should clearly identify which method is to be used for which component, including a presentation of a table comparing HCLPF values obtained from the two methods.

===Response===
See AP600 PRA Section 55.2 (Rev. 9) for a discussion of the methods used to calculate HCLPF values.                     l PRA Revision: None.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION iEE 9
                                                                                                                     ~i Ouestion: 230.122            (OITS # 3494)
For the shear wall equations (e.g., Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) in Section 3.3.2.2.1 of Reference 2], a Bu value of 0.15 is used. Ilowever, according to recent PRA studies (e.g., Diablo Canyon PRA by PG&E, Reference 3), a higher value of 0.20 is suggested.

===Response===
In the calculation of th: revised HCLPF values, the referenced equations were not used in the probabilistic fragility analysis approach.
PRA Revision: None.
t W westinghouse

i NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION rm m
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Ouestion: 230.123          (OITS # 3495)
Eq. (8) in Section 3.3.2.2.1 of Reference 2 would be modified to, 6,=(u(6re ( v, ) } 2 + ( 6,, ( v, ) 1 )% f 2
y.
Ref. 2 -- AP600 Seismic Margin HCLPF Values Methodology, January 1996, transmitted as enclosure to Westinghouse letter NTD-NRC-96-4625 to the U.S. NRC on January 17,1996.

===Response===
Agree, however this formula was not used in the calculation of revised HCLPF values that are reported in Chapter 55 of Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA.
PRA Revision: None.
i 230.123-1 T Westinghouse l

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION EF T.
Em Ouestion: 230.124            (OITS # 3496)
The estimation of the llCLPF factor of 0.96 based on the reserve margin is not acceptable because of the following reasonr:
: a. The factor of safety.1.25, is arbitrarily assumed;
: b. The evaluated variabilities, Br - 0.075 and Bu = 0.11. are much lower than the ones in the past PRNSMA studies (e.g., Reference 3 used Br .21 and Bu = .26); and
: c. The variability in responses (demand) is ignored.
Ref. 3 - Seismic Fragilities of Civil Structures and Equipment Components at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Report Number IM3.02 Attachment Q2d-1, prepared by NTS Engineering for Pacific Gas and Electric Company, September 1988.

===Response===
The subject of the RAI was an example of application,it was not used in the calculation of revised HCLPF values.
See AP600 PRA (Rev. 9) Section 55.2 for discussion of HCLPF methodology.
PRA Revision: None.
2m2u T westinghouse

l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION sw sg s
Question: 230.125           (OITS #3497)
In performing fragility analysis for equipment the effects of structure response, equipment response and equipment capacity need to be considered. For example, in evaluating the variability of equipment responses due to frequency, the variabilities for both the primary structure (e.g., reactor building) and the equipment should be combined.
Provide the complete procedures for the equipment response and capacity variables for fragility computations based on analysis in the standard safety analysis report (SSAR).

===Response===
i When using the probabilistic fragility analysis method to calculate HCLPF values, variability in mode shape and frequency in system response was considered. This is discussed in PRA (Rev. 9) Section 55.2. Variability in building response is accounted for through the use of broadened response spectra which considered both the variability in building model parameters as well as the different soil cases.
PRA Revision: None.                                                                                                  l l
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230.125-1 W-Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question: 230.126             (OITS #3498)
The following addition should be made to Eq. (23) in Section 3.3.3 of Reference 2 for the lower frequencies (0.3 to 2 Hz):
q = 2.7 ( " , r = 0.66 (d""                                                                                  l Ref. 2 -- AP600 Seismic Margin HCLPF Values Methodology, January 1996, transmitted as enclosure to Westinghouse letter NTD-NRC.96-4625 to the U.S. NRC on January 17, 1996.

===Response===
The referenced formula in the RAI was not used in the calculation of revised HCLPF values. For those structures       l whose HCLPF values were determined by probabilistic fragility analysis methods, only the inner containment structures & IRWST modules considered ductility. These structures are of shear wall type construction. The associated ductility margin factor and variability used is given in Reference 230.1261: median margin factor equal to 2.25; composite standard deviation equal to 0.25. Local inelastic energy absorption was not considered.

==Reference:==
1 230.126-I       Uncertainty and Conservatism in the Seismic Analvsis and Desien of Nuclear Facilities. Working Group on Quantification of Uncertainties, American Society of Civil Engineers. ISBN 0-87262-547-8,1986.
PRA Revision: None.
2      2 T Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question: 230.127           (OITS #3499)
The uncertainty of the ductility factor (u) should be larger than the assumed value of 0.20 (a value of 0.4 to 0.5 may be more appropriate for a generic use, Reference 3).
Ref. 3 -- Seismic Fragilities of Civil Structures and Equipment Components at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Report Number 1643.02, Attachment Q2d-1, prepared by NTS Engineering for Pacific Gas and Electric Company, September 1988.

===Response===
See response to RAI 230.126.
PRA Revision: None.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
                                                                                                             == ==-
                                                                                                            ?     =l Ouestion: 230.128          (OITS # 3500)
For Eq. (26) in Section 3.3.3 of Reference 2, the Br is assumed to be 0.11 for Fu = l.5 (a typical case). According to most recent SMA studies, a higher value of 0.15 is suggested (e.g., Seabrook SMA, Reference 4).
Ref. 4 -. Seismic Fragilities of Structures and Components at the Seabrook Generating Station, Units I and 2, Technical Report Number 1589.01, prepared by NTS Engineering for Pickard. Lowe, and Garrick, Inc. and Public Service Company of New Hampshire, June 1986.

===Response===
See response to RAI 230.126.
PRA Revision: None.
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230.128 1   l T Westinghouse                                                                                                 t I

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i
Question: 230.129           (OITS # 3501)
The use of Eq (25) in Section 3.3.3 of Reference 2 may not be appropriate for shear wall structure, as the determination of the factor, Cd, is highly judgmental. Possible use of other methods, e.g., the spectral averaging method (NUREG/CR 3805), needs to be discussed in the SSAR.

===Response===
Equation (25), cited in the RAI was not used in the calculation of the revised HCLPF values. See AP600 PRA (Rev.
: 9) Section 55.2.
PRA Revision: None.
230.129-1  1 3 Westinghouse                                                                                                  ,
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question: 230.130          (OITS # 3502)
Certain non-safety related buildings such as the turbine building can collapse at 0.5g level earthquake and impact on the nuclear island. Explain how this has been accounted for in your seismic margin assessment.

===Response===
See Revision 9 of the AP600 PRA. Sections 55.2 and 55.5.
PRA Revision: None.
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  - WestinEhouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
                                                                                                         =       _
is        _
Question: 230.131           (OITS # 3503)
Does the connection between the containment cooling water tank and the spent fuel pool affect the plant level HCLPF? If not, why not?

===Response===
The seismic failure of the containment cooling is dominated by the passive containment cooling tank, with a HCLPF value of 0.58g. This is not changed by the connection of PCS to the spent fuel pool. The connections to the spent    ,
fuel pool are not the limiting factor in any of the seismic or mixed cutsets, and have no effect on the plant level  l HCLPF.
PRA Revision: None.
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
                                                                                                      }i=   "~ji 7-     =g Ouestion: 230.132          (OITS # 3504)
Do the air bottles for control room habitability have any effect in human performance under certain conditions?
What is the anchorage requirement for this air bottles?

===Response===
The air bottles for control room habitability, and their anchorages, are located in room 12555 of the auxiliary building. They are a part of a safety-related system designed for the SSE, and have a HCLPF at least as good as the RCS piping support and valves, or 0.81g. Thus, the air bottles do not affect the plant HCLPF.                .
l PRA Revision: None.
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1 230.132 1 W westinghouse

I Enclosure 3 to Westinghouse Letter NSD-NRC-97-5014 l
March 18,1997           I l
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REVISION 1 Question:      720.357       (OITS # 4206)
For the safe shutdown analysis, all of the conditional core damage probabilities (CCDPs) are identical (2.6E-8),          j although the damage states differ. The staff is requesting Westinghouse to explain these results in the fire PRA.         l l

===Response===
Each fire scenario was assigned to one of several damage category bins based on the anticipated impact. During            l the damage category assignment process, multiple categories with similar impacts were defined (e.g., LPl. LP2, LP3, LP4, LP5, which are all transients modeled as loss of offsite power)in order to allow sequence-specific quantification if later deemed necessary. Prior to quantification, the category impacts were reviewed, and it was determined that        ,
several were sufficiently similar that a smaller number of quantifications could be performed to bound the impacts.       l Table 57-24 shows the CCDP assigned to each damage category to calculate contribution to core damage frequency            I (CDF) for the safe shutdown scenarios. Rese are summarized Table 720.357-1, which also notes those cases for              l which a given scenario quantification result was also used for other categories, because the impacts for those            !
categories were judged to be less severe.
  'S hm !&n T.cd :: The following errors have been identified in Table 57-24. The damage category and CCDP entries for the first scenario for Fire Area !!00 AF 11206 are incorrect. The damage category should be V24C, not LP4; the CCDP should be 4.72E-04, not 2.60E-08. His changes the Fire Area Contribution to CDF to 1.68E-10                 .
for both the scenario and the area, and makes the Total Fire Area Contribution to CDF for Fire Area 1000 AF 01            l (Containment) 2.95E-10 rather than 1.27E-10. The damage category and CCDP entries for both Fire Area 2000 AF              l 01 scenarios are incorrect. The damage category for the first scenario (loss of Div. D) should be LPS, not NPl; the CCDP should be 2.60E-8, not 1.64E-08; and the scenario CDF should be 1.13E-12, not 7.10E-13. The damage category for the second scenario (hot-short LOCA with loss of Div. D) should be V24A, not V24N; the CCDP should be 3.94E-4, not 2.48E-4; and the scenario CDF should be 1.02E-9, not 6.44E-10. This changes the Fire Area 2000 AF 01 Contribution to CDF to 1.02E-9. There is no significant change to the discussion, summary, or conclusions currently stated in the report.
An erroneous entry in Table 57-25, page 135, has also been identified. In Table 57-25, there are two similar              l scenarios, F(CR3-SD(I)) and F(CR4-SD(I)). Rese have the same impact except that the latter scenario also results in a hot-short-induced LOCA. In the report, the CDF for F(CR4-SD(I)) dominates the MCR core damage results.
This is because the scenario frequency for F(CR4-SD(I)) was entered and used in subsequent calculations incorrectly.
The value for Scenario Freq. for F(CR4-SD(I)) was incorrectly reported in Table 57-25 as 1.92E-05; the correct value is 1.93E-09. With this correction, the MCR contribution to CDF for the Safe Shutdown case is actually much smaller than the contribution indicated in the report: the CDF for F(CR4-SD(1)) becomes 9.94E-13, and the total MCR core damage frequency at safe shutdown becomes 1.29E-12, which is a small contribution to the total fire CDF at safe shutdown.
720.357(RI)-1

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL. INFORMATION tu BP                                                                                               REVISION 1 Table 720.357-1 Summary of Quantification Cases and Damage Categories Damage Category                 CCDP                       Comment LPI                             1.64E-08                  (Note 1)
LP2                            2.60E-08                    Loss of one div. passive core cooling; LP5 quantification results used LP3                            2.60E-08                    Loss of one stage 4 ADS valve; LP5 quantification results used LP4                            2.60E-08                    Loss of div. A&C safety related power &
control LP5                            2.60E-08                    Loss of one div. safety related power &       .
control; Modeled as loss of div. B NPl                             1.64E-08                   (Note 1)
NRN                             1.64E-08                   Loss of all nonsafety systems RNS                             1.64E-08                   Loss of RNS; NRN quantification results used V24A                            3.94E-04                   Loss of one div safety related power &             i control;
                                                                                                                  )
Modeled as loss of div. B                          j V24C                            4.72E-04                   Loss of div. B&D safety related power &            l control
                                                                                                                  )
V24N                            2.48E-04                   Loss of all nonsafety systems l
Note 1: LPI and NPI cases are equivalent for the focused PRA 1
l 720.357(RI)-2 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REVISION 1 PRA Revision:
Thefollowing changes will be made to the indicated sections. to address thefirst correction to the Safe Shutdown analysis noted in the response:
In Table 57-24. the following changes are made for Fire Area 1100 AF 11206. first scenario:
o Entry for Damage Category changes from LP4 to V24C; o Entry for Conditional Core Damage Probability changes from 2.60E-08 to 4.72E44; o Entry for Fire Area Contrib. to CDF changes from 9.24E-15 to 1.68E-10; o    Entry for Total Fire Area Contrib. to CDF for 1100 AF 112% changes from 1.63E-13 to 1.68E-10.
In Table 57-24, the following changes are made for Fire Area 2000 AF 01: In the first scenario:
o Entry for Damage Category changes from NP1 to LP5; o Entry for Conditional Core Damage Probability changes from 1.64E-08 to 2.60E-08;                               .
o Entry for Fire Area Contrib. to CDF changes from 7.10E-13 to 1.13E-12; In the second scenario:
o Entry for Damage Category changes from V24N to V24A; o Entry for Conditional Core Damage Probability changes from 2.84E-04 to 3.94E4t; o Entry for Fire Area Contrib. to CDF changes from 6.44E-10 to 1.02E-9; Entry for Total Fire Area Contrib. to CDF for 2000 AF 01 changes from 6.458-10 to 1.02E-9.
Thefollowing changes will be made to the indicated sections. to address the second correction to the Safe Shutdown analysis noted in the response:
In Table 57-25:
o Entry for Scenario Freq. for F(CR4-SD(I)) changes from 1.92E-5 to 1.93E-9; o Entry for CDF for F(CR4-SD(I)) changes from 9.89E-09 to 9.94E-13.
In Table 57-24:
a.
o Entry for Fine Area Contrib. to CDF for Fire Area 1242 AF 01 changes from 9.89E-09 (aggregate) to 1.3E-12 (aggregate),
o Entry for Total Fire Area Contrib. to CDF for Fire Area 1242 AF 01 changes from 9.89E-09 (aggregate) to 1.3E-12 (aggregate).
720.357(RI)-3

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l
REVISION 1 The second paragraph in Section 57.10.2 is revised as follows:
The total calculated cont-ibution to core damage frequency caused by fires that occur during safe shutdown is estimated as 3.5F ,2.5E S 2.6E-8 per year, and the contribution to core damage frequency from fires that occur during mid-loop operation is estimated as 3.lE-7 per year. Of these totals, the contribution from control room fires is very small, specifically 941M-1.3E-12 per year for safe shutdown and 7.8E-10 for mid-loop operation.                  l l
In the discussion of Dominant Contributors During Safe Shutdown in Section 57.10.2 (page 57-43), the following                      j changes are made:                                                                                                                   l l
o The first entry (1242 AF 01 Main control room          9.9E-9 /yr) in the list of dominant contributors is deleted.
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o In the first sentence of the last paragraph on page 57-43, the word approximately is inserted between contribute                  i and 94 percent.                                                                                                                l 1
o The first paragraph on page 57-44 is deleted.                                                                                     l
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l 720.357(RI)-4 W Westinghouse

i NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question: 720.358           (OITS # 4207)
In the at-power containment arialysis, the dominant contribution comes from Fire Zone i100 AF 11500 (see Table 57-14). The fire leads to damage category CM3, i.e., a medium LOCA, loss of two divisions (A&C) of power and control, and loss of IRWST/recire train B. The CCDP is 1.2E-2; the scenario frequency is 2.lE-7/yr. In the safe shutdown analysis, only one division of PXS is lost (see Table 57-24, Sheet 2). The CCDP is 2.6E.8; the CDF is 8.0E-12. The staff is requesting Westinghouse to explain the difference.

===Response===
The entry in Table 57-24 for fire impact in i100 AF i1500 is incorrect, and should be loss of two divisions (B&D) of power and control. Although the notation for damage category CM3 in Table 57-11 of the at-power analysis indicates divisions A&C, this case (along with CL3)is used for loss of 2 divisions of power and control, either A&C or B&D. For the safe shutdown analysis, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for loss of one division of power and control was approximately equal to the CCDP for loss of two divisions of power and control (both 2.6E-8). This is because loss of division B was assumed in the single-division loss scenario, resulting in a higher CCDP, as explained in the response to RAI 720.360.                                                                   -
In the safe shutdown evaluation, spurious ADS actuations were not modeled for the containment fire zones, for the following reasons.
o It is believed unlikely that a single hot short would result in the opening of a large relief path (i.e., one or more ADS stage 4 valves.
o The probability of multiple hot shorts, as modeled in the at-power analysis, when applied to the containment scenarios, would result in relatively small additional containment fire CDF.
o The shutdown fire screening results for those zones did not indicate ADS Stage 4 hot short vulnerabilities.
However, if it were assumed that the same hot-short ADS actuation scenarios could occur at safe shutdown as were modeled at power, then the containment fire core damage frequency would increase. The following sensitivity shows the potential effect on the safe shutdown results, assuming that a single hot short resulted in a loss of coolant.
The " additional" safe shutdown scenarios would be as listed in Table 720.358-l.
720.358-1

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION nui !HE
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l Table 720.358-1 Safe Shutdown Containment Single-Hot-Short LOCA Sensitivity                                                I l
Ctmt Zone                            Zone Fire      Prob.                                                                  !
1100AF-         Postulated           Freq.          of Hot         Scenario      Damage                         Scenario   l Fire impact                         Short          Freq.         Category      CCDP             CDF i1300A          Hot short ADS +      7.2E-6         0.06           4.3E-7        V24A          3.94E-4           1.7E-10 Loss of I div                                                                                              i 11300C          Hot short ADS +      8.lE-5         0.06           4.9E-6        V24C          4.72E-4          2.3E-9 Loss of 2 div i1301           Hot short ADS         1.9E-5        0.06           1.lE-6        V24N          2.48E-4          2.7E-10 11302           Hot short ADS         1.2E-5        0.06           7.2E-7        V24N          2.48E-4           1.8E-10 11500           Hot short ADS +      3.lE-4         0.%            1.9E-5        V24C          4.72E-4          9.0E-9 ~
Loss of 2 div 4
12356           Hot short ADS +       1.5E.5        0.06           9.0E-7        V24A          3.94E-4           3.5E-10 .
Loss of I div Total: 1.2E-8 The total safe shutdown fire CDP would change from 2.6E-8 (per the revised value noted in the response to RAI 720.357) to 3.8E-8. The single-hot-short-LOCA teenario for zone 1100 AF i1500 would become the dominant contributor, and the hot-short LOCA scenario for zone 1100 AF ll300C would become a significant contributor.
Containment fire CDF would contribute appmximately 32 percent of the total safe shutdown fire CDF. Containment fire contribution would then be more consistent among the at-power, safe shutdown, and midloop results (50%,32%,
and 14% contributions, respectively).
If it were assumed that multiple hot shorts were required to cause an ADS LOCA (as is expected), the total increase in containment fire CDF would be less than 3% of the total safe shutdown fire CDF.
PRA Revision-1 Table 57-24 will be corrected for fire area 1100 AF 11500 to change the fire impact to be loss of two divisions      ,
I (B&D) of power and control. The above discussion of the effect of assuming hot short ADS actuations will be added to PRA subsection 57.10.2, before the discussion of Midloop Dominant Contributors.                                   )
720,358-2 W
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION g    .
Question: 720.359          (OITS # 4208)
Similar to Question 6 [720.358), the staff is requesting Westinghouse to explain why the midloop analysis assumes that only one division of power and control is lost due to a fire in Fire Zone 1100 AF 11500 (see Table 57 27, Sheet 2).

===Response===
The entry in Table 57-27 for fire impact in i100 AF 11500 is incorrect, and should be loss of two divisions (B&D) of power and control. For the midloop analysis, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for loss of one       ,
division of power and control (modeled as division B) was 4.95E-4, and the CCDP for loss of two divisions of power   I and control (modeled as divisions A & C) was 2.73E-4. This is because loss of division B resulted in a higher        l CCDP, as explained in the response to RAI 720.360. The CCDP for failure of divisions B & D was not calculated.       l but is expected to be close to that for division B. The correct CCDPs have been used in Table 57-27.                 !
PRA Revision:
1 The scenario impact for 1100 AF 11500 will be corrected in Table 57-27 to be loss of two divisions (B&D) of power     j and control.
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720.359-1

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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION                                                                                    l l
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I Question: 720.361            (OITS # 4210)
The discussion in the second paragraph of page 57-45 indicates that the greater importance of midloop fires as compared with safe ;,hutdown fires is due to the increased access required to perform necessary activitier.. The instantaneous containment fire frequencies for both conditions appears to be about the same. (This can be seen by dividing the safe shutdown fire frequencies by 0.0715 and the midloop fire frequencies by 0.0177.) The staff is asking Westinghouse to explain this statement in the PRA.

===Response===
The referenced statement was intended to note that the containment area fire core damage frequeng ,during mid-loop constituted a greater percentage of total mid-loop fire-related core damage frequency than was the case for fires in containment at safe shutdown relative to the safe shutdown total. It was not intended to indicate a comparison between " instantaneous" containment core damage probabilities between the two states.
The instantaneous frequencies are expected to be the same between safe shutdown and midloop since, for any given area, each scenario init: sting event frequency is weighted by the fractional time in the respective operating condition, (The scenario frequencies at midloop are about a factor of four lower at midloop than at safe shutdown, reflecting the shorter midloop operating duration.) The fire ignition frequency calculation process is described in subsections 57.9.1 and 57.9.4.2.
The difference is due at least in part to not modeling hot short ADS scenarios in containment for the safe shutdown case, for the reasons provided in the respotise to RAI 720.358. Hot short ADS actuations are not of concern at midloop, since the system is open. Thus, had the hot short ADS actuations been unrealistically included in the safe shutdown modeling, the safe shutdown containment fire CDF would have been higher than the midloop containment fire CDF. For the events that were modeled for the containment zones, the differences in CDFs are the result of the higher midloop CCDPs for a given event, which is s Gnction of the shutdown focused PRA event sequence r."xiels.
PRA Revision:
The last paragraph in Section 57.10.2 (page 57-45) will be revised for PRA Revision 9 as follows:
7; n!== hp =.;n ;f 'Irx h :=:i x: :: nid !=p (!? F;.=:), x cppa.;' :: Em h ;=:i ;x: :: mf; d;;d;; . (!= i . ! ,cx;:) =fx:: i; diff;.x;n k^ am. i; ;F= .; ma'n :- - '.!d. xxx ; ixxxd ::
g;^ m $2 :-        7 x:: . x x,;2::f nii afx!:r.g ud mi:xx=.
The contnbuticeW&letabunent fires to core damage frequency at midloop is a higher percentage of the midloop fire core damage,$ugnacy total than is the case at safe shutdown (i.e., containment fires contribute 14 percent of midloop core demuge italmency vs. less than 1 percent at safe shutdown).
720.361-1 W-Westinghouse

l i'
l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The difference is due at least in part to not modeling hot short ADS scenarios in containment for the safe shutdown case, for the reasons provided in the safe shutdown containment sensitivity case. Hot short ADS actuations are not             l of concern at midloop, since the system is open. Thus, had the hot short ADS actuations been unrealistically included in the safe shutdown modeling, the safe shutdown containment fire core damage frequency wo 21d have been              ,
l higher than the midloop containment fire core damage frequency. For the events that were modeled for the containment zones, the differences in core damage frequencies are the result of the higher midloop CCDPs for a given event, which is a function of the shutdown focused PRA event sequence models.                                            ;
1 1
1 1
I 720.36?-2                                                                                   gg

                                                                            ~
i l
NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
:-   :m:
j     E Question: 720.362           (OITS # 4211)
The staffis asking Westinghouse to document in the shutdown PRA the minimum separation between the cables for the 41RWST squib valves in containment.

===Response===
The minimum separation between Division A and C cables and Division B and D cables for the IRWST squib valves consists of a 3-hour fire barrier and approximately 10 feet distance. This occurs in the penetration area inside containment in fire zone 1100 AF 11300B. A fire in this zone might affect cables of Divisions A and C, but the Division B and D cables are enclosed in a 3-hour fire barrier enclosure.
Within fire zone 1100 AF ll300B, Division A and C cables collect in main cable trays and run east and west. From 1100 AF 11300B, cables for the two IRWST squib valves associated with containment recirculation screen B rur.
down into fire zone 1100 AF 11207, where the valves are located. The Division B and D cables for the two IRWST squib valves associated with containment recirculation screen A run from i100 AF i1300B up the containment wall, within their 3-hour fire barrier, to their main cable trays above the 153' level. The cables then run back down in the south-southeast portion of fire zone 1100 AF 11500 and into fire zone 1100 AF 11206, where the valves are located. The Division A and C IRWST squib valves are separated from the Division B and D IRWST squib valves by multiple concrete walls, each at least two feet thick, and 60-70 feet distance. A fire in either 1100 AF 11206 or 1100 AF 11207 can oaly affect the two valves in the zone.
PRA Revision:
The above two paragraphs will be added to Section 57.9.4.1, before the last paragraph on page 57-34.
l l
720.362-1

4
                                                                                                                             \
o                                                                                                                            4 l
NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION is an       !
1 Question: 720.363          (OITS # 4212)                                                                                 l I
I For a number of midloop scenarios (e.g., see Fire Areas 1100 AFI1206. Table 57-27, Sheet I and 1202 AF 05. Table 57-27. Sheet 3), the scenario frequency is lower than the fire ignition frequency. The reduction factor appears to be 0.06, the hot short probability used elsewhere in the study, although it appears that no hot shorts have been postulated. The staff is requesting Westinghouse to explain the difference.
l Response:                                                                                                                l 1
The entry for cor.tainment fire zone 1100 AF i1206 correctly includes the factor of 0.06, since this is a fire-induced   l hot short openirg of RNS valve V-024 (RCS draindown).
There are, however, several errors in Table 57-27.
i A factor of 0.06 has been incorrectly included in the scenario frequencies for the following areas, for which fire-induced hot-short actuations were not identified:
1201 AF 05        1201 AF 06        1202 AF 04       1202 AF 05 1212 AF 02        4G41 AF 01       4042 AF 01.
Table 720.363-1 shows the corrected information for Table 57-27 for these areas at midloop.
The increase in midloop fire core damage frequency resulting from these corrections is approximately 5.0E-08. This increases the total midloop fire core damage frequency from 3.lE-07 to 3.6E-07 per year. It also affects the list of dominant fire scenarios at midloop (as presented in the response to RAI 720.364).
PRA Revision:
The discussion of dominant contributors (other than in-containment or in the yard) on page 57-44 will be revised as follows to reflect the contributionsfromfire areas 1202 AF 04 and 1202 AF 05:
1202 AF 05 Division C electrical equipment                             3.2E-8 /yr 1222 AF U2 Division B RCP trip switchgear                              2.6E-8 /yr 2053 AF 01 Generator Panel Room                                        2.5E-8 /yr 1201 AF 03 Division D DC equipment /l&C                                2.lE-8 /yr 1202 AF 04 Dip @g'A eleiitrical equipment                              2.1E-8 /yr 1231 AF 01 Division B I&C equipment                                     1.3E-8 /yr 1222 AF 01 Division B electrical equipment                              1.3E-8 /yr 1200 AF 01 RCA/suxiliary building                                      8.6E-9 /yr 4031 AF 04 Demir.eralizer water degasifier room                         6.6E-9 /yr 1201 AF 02 Division B batteries                                        6.4E-9 /yr 1202 AF 03 Division C batteries                                        6.4E-9 /yr 6030 AF 02 Diesel generator Room B                                      5.7E-9 /yr 6030 AF 01 Diesel generator Room A                                      5.6E-9 /yr ap .
720.363-1

I l
                                                                                                                               }
l NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l
I 403' ^ r 05 E!r-ia! :g:pma re-                                        SIE a !p
       '2 ' ^r ^' Di , c- D 5= ry - ---                                       . 4 E a '; -
g ,7 ,, e ni 9. 7_ i, p .. .. ; _j. _ _                           e , g n fg l
The tot.:) contribution to overall core damage frequency from this group is 4-GF41.8E-7 /yr, or approximately 49 50 pere.:nt of the total for mid-loop operation.
The redlined corrections noted in Table 720.363-1 will be incorporated into Table 57-27.
Table 720.363-1 Summary of Corrections to Table 57-27.
Fire ignition          Scenario       Damage Category /          Fire Area CDF Fire Area               Frequency              Frequency      CCDP                       Contribution      Comment 1100 AF 11206            1.50E-06              9.00E-08       V24CD/ 6.03E-03            5.43E-10          Includ,es Hot Short 1201 AF 05               1.14E-05              1.14E-07       LPS-D / 4.95E-04           5.64&ll           Includes Propagation 1201 AF 06              5.74E-M                5.74E-08       LPS-D / 4.95E-M            2.84E-Il          includes Propagation 1202 AF 04              4.26E-05               4.26E-05       LPS-D / 4.95E-04           2.1lE-06 1202 AF 05               6.51E-05              6.51D05        LPS-D / 4.95E-M            3.23E-08 1212 AF 02                1.09E-05             1.09E-07       LPS-D / 4.95E-M             5.40E-11         Includes          ;
Propagation 4M1 AF 01                4.70E-05              2.35B-06       NPI-D / 2.13E-04            5.01E-12         Includes (sequence 2)                                                                                               propagation       j
  ~
and              i suppression 4042 AF 01                1.48E-04             7.40E-08       NPI-D / 2.13E-04            1.58E-11          Includes (sequence 2)                                                                                                propagation
                            ,                                                                                   and suppression  l 720.363-2 W Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 5-
                                                                                                                   =
N Question: 720.364             (OITS # 4213)
In order for the staff to understand the differences between the safshutdown and midloop fire results, the staff needs the top 100 cutsets for both analyses (such as that provided in Table 57-12 for the at-power results).

===Response===
The process used in the shutdown analyses quantifications was to calculate conditional core damage probabilities (CCDP) for various scenarios, and then, separately combine the CCDPs with the scenario frequencies to obtain scenario core damage frequencies. As a result, the top 100 cutsets for safe shutdown (or for midloop) are not available. (The dominant cutsets were available for the at-power analysis since an additional step to combine the scenarios was taken; this was not done for shutdown.) However, dominant cutsets for individual damage category CCDP quantifications are available. These provide similar information, when used in conjunction with the dominant scenarios.
Table 720.364-1 lists the top 10 fire CDF-contributing scenarios for safe shutdown, along with their CDF contributions and damage categories. As can be seen from Table 720.364-1, the top 10 scenarios account for approximately 98% of the total safe shutdown fire CDF. All of these scenarios are in damage categades V24A and V24N, with over 90% of the top 10 contribution in V24A.
l Table 720.364-2 provides the same information for midloop. The top 27 scenarios are listed, to account for a similar percentage of total fi c CDF at midloop as was done for safe shutdown (approximately 9% in this case). There are six dan? age categories represented in this listing, but about 90% of the midloop fire CDF is accounted for by categories LPI-D, LP2-D, and LP5-D. LPI-D accounts for about 30% of the midloop fire CDF, LP2-D accounts for about 15% of the midloop fire CDF, and LP5-D accounts for about 45% of the total midloop fire CDF.                  l i
Damage category LPI-D is fire-induced loss of offsite power, with no additional fire-related equipment damage.
Thus, the CCDP for LPI-D was derived from the corresponding case (LOSPD) from the shutdown focused PRA, by dividing the LOSPD core damage frequency by the LOSPD initiating event frequency; cutsets were not generated, but would be the same as those appearing in the shutdown focused PRA but adjusted for the new initiating event frequency. Similarly, cutsets for V24N do not involve fire-induced component failures other than initiation of a hot-short LOCA, and so are the same as the cutsets appearing in the shutdown focused PRA for the draindown LOCA at midloop, after correcting for initiating event frequency.
As noted in Table 720.364-2, the CCDP for category LP5-D (which assumes loss of division B of safety related power and control) was used for category LP2-D (which is loss of one division of passive core cooling). Dominant cutsets for the fire quantifications for the remaining dominant damage categories (V24A and LP5-D) are provided in Tables 720.364 3 and -4. These cutset listings are in nonnalized form, i.e., initiating event frequencies are set to 1.0 for all, since the quantifications for the shutdown analyses were performed to obtain conditional core damage probabilities for each scenario.
PRA Revision: None.
720.364-1

1 l
i l
NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL. INFORMATION l
Table 720.364-1 Dominant Fire Core Damage Scenarios at Safe Shutdown Scenario                Contrib. to CDF         Damage Category               Comment             j 1202 AF 05,                6.22E-9                   V24A                                                 j hot short LOCA with                                                                                        !
loss of div.C                                                                                              l l
1222 AF 02,                5.01 E-9                  V24A hot short LOCA with loss of div. B 1201 AF 03,                4.07E-9                   V24A hot shon LOCA with                                                                                         i loss of div.D                                                                                             1 1202 AF G4,                4.07E-9                   V24A hot short LOCA with                                                                                        l loss of div.A                                                                                             i 1
1222 AF 01,                2.46E-9                   V24A hot short LOCA with loss of div. B 1230 AF 03,                1.65E-9                  V24N hot short LOCA with loss of DAS 2000 AF 01,                 1.02E-9                  V24A                      Incorrectly shown as hot short LOCA with                                                            V24N in Table 57-24; loss of div.D and                                                              corrected freq. shown nonsafety                                                                      here 1242 AF 02,                5.25E-10                  V24A hot shon LOCA with loss of div.A 4024 AF 03,                 4.64E-10                  V24N hot shon LOCA with loss of div. B and nonsafety & DAS 1230 AF 01,                1.74E-10                  V24N hot shon LOCA with loss of DAS 720.364-2 W-Westinghouse

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION                                                                  l Hui nii El    Il l
Table 720.364-2 Dominant Fire Core Damage Scena os at Midloop                     l Scenario                Contrib. to CDF         Damage Category             Comment           ;
0000 AF 00,                7.54 E-8                  LPI-D                                            I d
Loss of Offsite Power 1
1100 AF 11500,             3.78E-8                   LP2-D                   CCDP for LP5-D was Loss of I Safety-                                                            used for LP2-D l
Related Div.                                                                                          '
1202 AF 05,                3.23E-8                   LPS-D                                            l Loss of div.C 1222 AF 02,                2.59E-8                   LPS-D                                            q Loss of div.B                                                                                         j 2053 AF 01,                2.53E-8                   LPI-D 1.oss of Offsite Power                                                                                l 1201 AF 03,                2.1IE-8                   LPS-D Loss of div.D                                                                                         ,
l 1202 AF 04,                2.I1E-8                   LPS-D                                            ;
Loss of div.A                                                                                         j 1231 AF 01,                1.33 E-8                  LP5-D Loss of div.B 1222 AF 01,                 1.27E-8                  LPS-D                                            I Loss of div.B i
1200 AF 01,                8.59E-9                   RNS-D                                            l Loss of RNS                                                                                           )
4031 AF (M,                6.59E-9                   RNS-D Loss of RNS 1201 AF 02,                6.44E-9                   LPS-D                                             i l
Loss of div.B 1202 AF 03,               6.44E-9                   LPS-D Loss of div.C                                                                                         ,
1 6030 AF 02,                5.72E-9                   NPI-D Loss of DG B 720.364-3

1 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 11     ":3 if      E!
Table 720.364-2 Dominant Fire Core Damage Scenarios at Midloop Scenario                Contrib. to CDF         Damage Category               Comment 6030 AF 01,                5.64E-9                   NPI-D Loss of DG A 4031 AF 05,                5.60E-9                   NPI-D Loss of nonsafety 1100 AF 11300C             5.49E-9                   LP4-D                                         l Loss of div. A&C 1211 AF 01,                5.40E-9                   LP5-D Loss of div.D                                                                                      j 1212 AF 01,                5.0$E-9                   LP5-D                                         ;
Loss of div.A I
i100 AF i1300B             4.27E-9                   LP2-D                     CCDP for LP5-D was  !
Loss of I div. of PXS                                                          used for LP2-D
                                                                                                          ]
1201 AF 04,                 3.02E-9                  LPS-D                                          l Loss of div.D 1242 AF 02,                 2.72E-9                  LP5-D Loss of div.A 4031 AF 03,                 2.43E-9                  RNS-D Loss of RNS 4032 AF 03,                 2.32E-9                  NPI-D Loss of Nonsafety Div.
4032 AF 04,                 2.32E-9                  NPI-D Loss of Nonsafety Div.
1200 AF 12356,             1.89E-9                  LP2-D                     CCDP for LPS-D was Loss of I Safety-                                                              used for LP2-D Related Div.
4042 AF 01,                 1.58E-9                  NF1D less of Nonsafety Div.
720.364-4
[ Westingflouse

         .                                                    .m., - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                                                          ----- -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              't I
Table 720.364-3                                                                                             Page:       1

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 8 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B File: Ic24ndf3 wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUBSER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVE 3rr MANE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER I              1.50E-04                        38.04 . IACA/RAIS-V024                                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-I4CA24ND CCF 08P GRAVITY               IDL7ECTION CHECE VALVES TO OPEN                                                                                                                     1.50E-04       IWX-CV-AO 2              1.50E-04                       38.04 IAC&/MS-V024                                                         OPENS INITIATING EVDrr OCCURS                                                                                WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-LOCA24ND
                                                                                                                         . DUE TO CCF OF                   1ME SQUIB VALVES TO OPERATE                                                                                                                          1.50E-04       ADX-EV-SA                                        j 3              4.70E-05                        11.92 1ACA/ RIBS-VO24                                                     OPDIS INITIATING EVEBrF OCCURS                                                                               WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-LOCA24ND COWEMI CAUSE                 FAILURE OF THE                                                BATTERIES                                       IDSA-DB-1A/IB                          4.70E-05       CCX-BY-PN 4              2.40E-05                             6.09 LOCA/RNS-V024                                                   OPDIS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-!DCA24ND                                      [
Crummms CAUSE                FAILURE OF THE - INVERTER                                                                                                                            2.40E-05       CCX-IV-XR                                         ;
: 5.             1.20E-05                             3.04 14CA/RIIS-V024                                                  OPENS INITIATING EVDrr OCCURS                                                                                WITH RCS FHJED                          1.00E+00       IEV-IDCA24ND                                     {
CCF OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANR                                                                                                                                                    1.20E-05       IWK-FL-GP 6              8.62E-06                            2.19 1DCA/Rses-v024                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-LOCA24ND CCF OF 1ME PONER INTERFACE OUTPUT BOARDS IN Pets                                                                                                                                  8.62E-06       CCX-EP-SAN 7              1.20E-06                                    .30                              LOCA/RNS-V024                OPD8S INITIATIIIG EVE 3rr OCCURS                                                                             WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-LOCA24ND                                    'i SOFTWARE CCF                 OF ALL CARDS                                                                                                                                         1.20E-06       CCX-SFTW 8              1.03E-07                                    .03                              LOCA/RMS-V024                OPDES INITIATING EVE 3rr OCCURS                                                                              MITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-14CA24ND Coselott NODE                FAILURE OF INPtfr LOGIC GROUPS                                                                                                                       1.03E-04       CCX-INPUT-IDGIC IEICATI001                   FAILURE                                                                                                                                              1.00E-03       ALL-IND-FAIL 9              7.03E-08                                    .02                              14CA/RNS-V024                OPDIS INITIATING EvDrr OCCURS                                                                              -WITH RCS FILLED                          1.00E+00       IEV-14CA24ND COpeIDIE DIODE               FAILURE OF INPUT IAGIC GROUPS                                                                                                                        1.03E-04       CCX-INPUT-LOGIC OPERATOR FAILS               TO RECOGIIIZE lite IIEED FOR RCS                                                                             DEPRESSURIZATION                        6.83E-04       LPN-NANO 5 10              6.10E-08                                    .02                              I4CA/RMS-V024                OPDIS INITIATIl0G EVElfr OCCURS                                                                              NITM RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-LOCA24ND Cole 00N CAUSE                FAILURE OF 4                                                 AOVS TO OPEN                                                                            6.10E-05       CCX-AV-LA INDICATIOBE                  FAltmRE                                                                                                                                              1.00E-03       ALL-IND-FAIL 11              5.76E-08'                                   .01                              LOCA/RNS-V024                OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-IDCA24ND IItNST DISCHARGE LINE *A*                                                                  STRAINER                                       PEDGGED                                 2.40E-04       IWA-PLUG IRefST DISCNAltGE LIIst "B"                                                                STRAINER-                                      PIDGGED                                 2.40E-04       IWB-PLUG                                          ,
12              5.10E-08                                    .01                              LOCA/RMS-V024                OPENS INITIATIBIG EVENT OCCURS                                                                               WITH RCS FILLED                         1.00E+00       IEV-IDCA24ND                                     -
COese005 CAUSE               FAILURE OF 4                                                 CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                                    5.10E-05       CMX-CV-GO IRE 1ICATIOBE                FAIIDRE                                                                                                                                              1.00E-03       ALL-IND-FAIL i
t i
l t
            . _ . . - _ -_             . - _ _ .     ._m.____      _         ____m___________._..__.___.____m.___._.___.____m                                                                 _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ - ., - < _ . . _ _ , _ - .---                                        m     .c, e-. e       e    - - - e-.ew+- 3-..+ -. r .e

Table 720.364-3                                                                               Page:  2

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA S Safe SD with Loss of Div. B                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  +
File: Ic24ndf3.wik Reduced Suan of Cutsetos-3.9430E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCMT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                         -                                                     EVENT PROB.             IDENTIFIER 13     5.00E-08                               .01               LOCA/RMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                         1.00E+00        IEV-LOCA24ND m IKEE            FAILURE OF INPLTT LOGIC GROUPS                                                                            1.03E-04         CCX-INPUT-IDGIC 6 FAILS           TO ACTUATT ADS         BEFORE CORE                 DAMAGE                                                 4.93E-04         ADN-MAN 01 y>g ,
14     4.17E-08                               .01.3dDth/ M .VO24                . OPENS INITIATING EVM T OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND CW NM             FAILURE OF 4           AOVS TO OPEN                                                                       6.10E-05         CCX-AV-IJL OPWRMUR FAU.S     TO RECOGNIZE W E NEED FOR RCS                      DEPRESSURIZATION                                       6.83E-04         LPM-MANOS                                                                                          r t
15     3.84E-08                               .01               IDCA/ Ries-V024   OPMS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                       WIM RCS FILLED                                          1.00E+00        IEV-LOCA24ND CMI-VS-FA                                                                                                                   3.84E-05         CMX-VS-FA                                                                                          s IEICATIDIf        FAILURE                                                                                                   1.00E-03         ALL-IND-FAIL 16     3.48E-08                               .01               IDCA/RIAS-V024    OPE 24S INITIATING EVE 2f? OCCURS                  WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-IDCA2 4ND COpeIOef CAUSE    FAILURE OF 4           CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                               5.10E-05         CMX-CV-GO OPERA 10R FAILS   TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR RCS                      DEPRESSURIZATION                                       6.83E-04         LPM-MANG5 17     3.01E-08                               .01               LOCA/RMS-V024     OPMS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                       WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND Cope 00N CAUSE    FAILURE OF 4           AOVS M OPE 24                                                                      6.10E-05         CCX-AV-LA OPERATOR FAILS    TO ACTUATE ADS. BEFORE CORE                        DAMAGE                                                 4.93E-04         ADN-MANU1 18     2.70E-08                               .01               LOCA/RMS-1rO24    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA14ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. to LINE 1                                                                                           3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 07 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 3                                                                                           3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 09 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 4                                                                                           3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 10 19     2.62E-08                              .01                IDCA/RMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND CMX-VS-FA                                                                                                                   3.84E-05         CMX-VS-FA OPERATOR FAILS    TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR RCS                      DEPRESSURIZATION                                       6.83E-04         LPM-MANOS 20     2. 52 E-08                             .01               LOCA/RNS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENI OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND PMcMOD33                                                                                                                    5.02E-03         PMCMOD33 FMDIeOD34                                                                                                                   5.02E-03         PMEMOD34 INDICATION        FAILURE                                                                                                   1.00E-03         ALL-IND-FAIL LOCA/RNS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.0CE+00         IEV-LOCA24ND 21    2.52E-08                                .01 PMAMOD31                                                                                                                   5.02E-03          PMAMOD31 PMDMOD34                                                                                                                   5.02E-03          PMDMOD34 1.00E-03         ALL-IND-FAIL                                                                                       I INDICATION        FAILURE                    .
22     2.52E-08                               .01               IDCA / kNS-V024   OPENS INETIATING EVENT OCCURS                      WITH RCS FILLED                                        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND PMAN3D31                                                                                                                   5.02E-03          PMAMOD31 PMCMOD33                                                                                                                   5.02E-03          PMCMOD33 INDICATION        FAILURE                                                                                                   1.00E-03         ALL-IND-FAIL l
i t
s
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               > .es
                    -.m       --r                                                                   y- T-       w
* T                         i- .,                  .                                   v                7-i-                                                y- w---   -

Table 720.364-3                          Page:     3

==Title:==
Dondnant Cutsets for State V24A Mot Short LOCA 9 Safe SD with loss of Div. B File: Ic24ndf3.wlk Reduced Stum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERC8NF BASIC EVENT MAME                                                             EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 23    2.51E-08         .01 LOCA/RMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND Cnemmu CAUSE    FAILURE OF 4       CHECK VALVES TO OPDI                 5.10E-05    CMX-CV-GO OPM450R FAILS   TO ACTUATE ADS     BEFORE CORE     DAMAGE               4.93E-04    ADN-MAN  01 24    1.89E-08         .00 14M:A/RMS-V024    OPENS INITIAT1tlG EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND ORK-VS-FA                                                               3.84E-05    CMX-VS-FA OPWLATOR FAILS  TO AC'!UATE ADS    BEFORE CORE     DAMAGE               4.93E-04    ADN-MAN 01 25    1.88E-08         .00   LOCA/RNS-V024   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      6fITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAIIMRE OF      PNS OUTPUT         LOGIC I/Os                           2.09E-03    PMAMOD11 NARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 3                                       3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 NARDMARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 4                                       3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 B
26    1.88E-08         .00 LOCA/RNS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVDfT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LIHE 1                                       3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 07 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 3                                       3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 a
MEBODD11                                                                2.09E-03    PMDNOD11 27    1.88E-08         .00   EDCA/RNS-V024   OPDIS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-14CA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 1                                       3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 07 PNCMOD11                                                                2.09E-03    PMCMOD11 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 4                                       3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 28    1.84E-08         .00   LOCA/RNS-V024   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE     122A               FAILS TO OPEN                        8.76E-03    IMACv122AO CHECK VALVE     124A               FAILS TO OPEN                        8.76E-03    IWACV124AO IRWST DISCHARGE LINE *B"           STRAINER        PLUGGED              2.40E-04    IWB-PLUG 29    1.84E-08         .00   LOCA/RNS-V024   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND -
CHECK VALVE     122A               FAILS TO OPEN                        8.76E-03    IWACV122AO CHECK VALVE     125A               FAILS M OPEN                         8.76E-03    IWACV125AO IRWST DISCHARGE LINE *B*           STRAINER        PLUGGED              2.40E-04    IWB-PLUG 30    1.84E-08         .00   LOCA/RNS-V024   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND +
CHECK VALVE     123A               FAILS TO OPEN                        8.76E-03    IWACV123AO CHECK VALVE     124A               FAILS TO OPEN                        8.76E-03    IWACV124AO IRWST DISCHARGE LINE *B*           STRAINER        PLUGGED              2.40E-04    IWB-PLUG LOCA/RNS-V024   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS      WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00    IEV-14CA24ND 31    1.84E-08         .00 8.76E-03    IWACV123AO CHECK VALVE     123A               FAILS TO OPEN CHECK VALVE     125A               FAILS M OPEN                         8.76E-03    IWACV125AO IRWST DISCHARGE LINE *B*           STRAINER        PLUGGED              2.40E-04    IWB-PLUG s
4                                   h i
a

Table 120.364-3                                     Pane:                                                4

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 8 Safe SD with Loss of Div. 8 File: Ic24ndf3.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NL9tBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                    , EVENT PROB.                                                IDENTIFIER 32     1.84E-08                              .00 LOCA/RNS-V024                                              OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS   WIDI RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-LOCA24NL INIST DISCHARGE LINE *A*                                          STRAINER      PLUGGED                            2.40E-04                                                   IWA-PLUG
                                                               - VALVE                                          1238              FAILS TO OFm                                     8.76E-03                                                   IWBCv123AO finNrgr yALVE                                     1258             FAILS TO OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   IWBCV125AO 33     1.84E-08                             .00            IACA/RMS-v024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                     1.00E+00                                                  IEV-IDCA2 4ND IIBIST DISCHARGE LINE *A*                                          STRAINER      PLUGGED                            2.40E-04                                                   IWA-PLUG CNBCE VALVE                                      123B              FAILS TO OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   IWBCV123AO CNBCE VALVE                                       124B             FAILS TO OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   TWBCV124AO 34     1.84E-08                              .00           IDCA/RNS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVErr OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                     1.00E+00                                                  IEV-IDCA24ND IRet37 DISCNARGE LINE 'A'                                         STRAINER      PLUGGED                            2.40E-04                                                   IWA-PLUG CHECE VALVE                                      122B              FAILS TO OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   IWBCV122AO CNBCE VALVE                                      325B              FAILS TO OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   IWBCV125AO 35     1.84E-08                              .00           LOCA/RNS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-IDCA24ND IRWST DISCHARGE LINE *A*                                          STRAINER      PLUGGED                            2.40E-04                                                   IWA-PLUG CHECE VALVE                                     .122B              FAILS TO OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   IWBCV122AO CHECE VALVE                                      124B              FAILS 10 OPEN                                    8.76E-03                                                   IWBCV124AO 36     1.72E-08                              .00           IDCA/RMS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EV W T OCCURS  WITH RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-IDCA24ND PteANOD31                                                                                                           5.02E-03                                                   PMAMOD31 PNCMOD33                                                                                                            5.02E-03                                                   PMCMOD33 OPERATOR FAILS                                   TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR RCS   DEPRESSURIZATION                   6.83E-04                                                   LPM-MANOS 37     1.72E-08                              .00           LOCA/RNS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVEWF OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-LOCA24ND PNCMOD33                                                                                                            5.02E-03                                                   PMCMOD33 PMDNOD34                                                                                                            5.02E-03                                                   PMDMOD34 OPERATOR FAILS                                   TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR RCS   DEPRESSURIZATION                   6.83E-04                                                   LPM-MANOS 38     1.72E-08                              .00           LOCA/RMS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-LOCA24ND PNAMOD31                                                                                                           5.02E-03                                                   PMAMOD31 PMDIGOD34                                                                                                           5.02E-03                                                   PMDMOD34                                                         "
OPERATOR FAILS                                   TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR RCS   DEPRESSURIZATION                   6.83E-04                                                   LPM-MANOS 39     1.315-08                              .00           LOCA/RNS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-LOCA24ND.
FAILURE OF                                       PNS OUTPUT        IDGIC I/Os                                      2.09E-03                                                    PMAMOD11 PNCMOD11                                                                                                            2.09E-03                                                   PMCMOD11 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 4                                                                                   3.00E-03                                                   AD4 MOD 10 40     1.31E-08                              .00           IDCA/RMS-V024                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS   WITH RCS FILLED                    1.00E+00                                                   IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 44 LINE 1                                                                                   3.00E-03                                                   AD4 MOD 07 PNCMOD11                                                                                                           2.09E-03                                                    PMCMOD11 PIEGIOD11                                                                                                          2.09E-03                                                    PMDMOD11 I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .4

Table 720.364                                                                                                                              Page      5

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 9 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B Filer ic24ndf).wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER C17FSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 41                 1.31E-08                 .00        IDCA/RNS-V024                                                  OPENS INITIATIM EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                 WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00     IEV-LOCA24ND FAZIAME OF                                                     PMS OUTPL7F                                                                                      IDGIC I/Os                                                                                                        2.09E-03    PMAMOD11 m FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 9BEMEB11                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          2.09E-03    PMDMOD11 42                 $. 24E-08               .00        EDCA/RMS-V024                                                 OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                 WIDI RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00     IEV-LOCA24ND yearsmn33                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         5.02E-03    PMCMOD33 Pmmmerm34                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         5.02E-03    PMDMOD34 OPERATOR FAILS                                                TO ACTUATE ADS.                                                                                   BEFORE CORE                                                 DAMAGE                                                4.93E-04    ADN-MAN 01 43                 1,24E-08                  .00       IDCA/RMS-V024-                                                 OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.OnE+00    IEV-LOCA24ND                                             i ymnamarm31                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        5.02E-03    PMAMOD31 PNCIE)O33                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         5.02E-03    PMCMOD33 OPERATOR FAILS                                                TO ACWATE ADS                                                                                     BEfVRE CORE                                                 DAMAGE                                                4.93E-04    ADN-MAN 01 44                 1.24E-08                  .00       EDCA/RNS-V024                                                 OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                 WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND PNAMOD31                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          5.02E-03    PMAMOD31 PMDNOD34                                                                      .
5.02E-03    PMDMOD34 OPERATOR FAILS                                                1U ACTUATE ADS                                                                                    BEFORE CORE
* DAMAGE                                                4.93E-04    ADN-MAN 01 45                 1.10E-08                 .00        EDCA/RMS-V024                                                 OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                 WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND CCF OF SOF"! WARE FOR INPUT EDGIC GROUPS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.102-05    CCX-IN-LOGIC-SW INDICATION                                                     FAILURE -                                                                                                                                                                                                          1.00E-03    ALL-IND-FAIL 46                 1.04E-08                 .00        LOCA/RMS-V024                                            - OPENS INITIATING EVDrP OCCURS                                                                                                                                    WITN RCS FILLED-                                      1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE UPON                                                   DEMAND OF IDGIC GROUP PROCESSING                                                                                                                                                                                   1.16E-03    PMA0301ASA HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10                                               ,
5 1.04E-08                            LOCA/RNS-V024                                                 OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                 WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND 47                                          .0J FAILURE UPON                                                   DEMAND OF IDGIC GROUP PROCESSING                                                                                                                                                                                   1.16E-03    PMA0301BSA                                               -
I HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 48                 1.04E-08                 .00        EDCA/RNS-V024                                                 OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                               - WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST 94 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 07 PMCO301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03    PMC0301BSA HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4h0D10 6
49                 1.04E-08                 .00        EDCA/RMS-V024                                                 OPENS INITIATINC EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                                 WITH RCS FILLED                                       1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 07 PMCO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03    PMC0301ASA MARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 Y
I b
9
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ?
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  )
         - - - - . _ .            __              ,-_.i.-_             _m           _.____w.-                                                  - _ - _                 __.__m.__                   . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ .-                                          _--__..____-___.aww_-_-_____--_._-____..__.___m.                            _ V4 -ru_____ m -:+- ___-__.__.w___m__._ _

Table 720.364-3                        Page:          6

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 9 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B File: Ic24ndf3.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER CtrTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVEprF NAME                                                        EVENT PROB.      IDENTIFIER 50   1.04E-08         .00 LOCA/R30S-V024    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND mannasame FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 1                                     3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 07 m m FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 3                                           3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 09 PMD0301ASA 6 1ASA                                                                 1.16E-03 51   1.04E-08         .00  IACA/NES-V024    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND maarmamme FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                     3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 07 mansnamar FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                     3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 09 Ptm0301384                                                             1.16E-03         PMD0301BSA 52   9.13E-09         .00  IACA/RMS-v024    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE OF        PMS OUTPUT        IDGIC 7/Os                         2.09E-03         PMAMOD11 Punann11                                                               2.09E-03         PMCMOD11 PREN0011                                                               2.09E-03         PMDMOD11 53   7.72E-09         .00  LOCA/RNS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND OEI-VS-FA                                                              3.045 05         CMX-VS-FA CCX-XIffR                                                              2.01E-04         CCX-KMTR 54   7.51E-09         .00  IACA/RMS-V024    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED     1. 00 E+' . s    IEV-LOCA24ND CCF OF 30F'IWARE FOR INPtTF LOGIC GROUPS                               1.10E-D.         CCK-IN-LOGIC-SW OPERATOR FAILS   'IO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR RCS    DEPRESSURIZATION    6.83E-04         LPM-MANOS 55   7.27E-09         .00  LOCA/RMS-V024    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE UPON      DEMAND OF LOGIC GROUP PROCESSING                     1.16E-03         PMA0301BSA PMCMOD11                                                               2.09E-03         PMCMOD11 MARDNARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                      3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 10 56   7.27E-09         .00  LOCA/RMS-V024    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS     WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                      3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 07 PMCO301BSA                                                             1.16E-03         PMCO301BSA PMDMOD11                                                               2.09E-03         PMDMOD11 57   7.27E-09         .00  LOCA/RNS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 1                                      3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 07 PNC0301ASA                                                             1.16E-03         PMCO301ASA PMDesOD11                                                              2.09E-03         PMDMOD11 7.27E-09         .00  LOCA/RMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED     1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND 58                                                                                                1 16E-03         PMA0301ASA FAILURE UPON      DEMAND OF LOGIC GROUP PROCESSING                       .
MARDNARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                      3.00E-03         AD4 MOD 09 PM0seOD11                                                              2.O9E-03         PMDMOD11 a
                                                                                                                                         + e- de

Table 720.364-3                     Page:     7

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 8 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B File: Ic24ndf3.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                 -
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 59      7.27E-09                   .00                        LOCA/RMS-V024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAI1ARE UPON                             DEMAND OF LOGIC GROUP PROCESSING                  1.16E-03    PMA0301BSA M FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 3                                                                 3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 m                                                                                          2.09E-03    PMDMOD11 60      7.27E-09                   .00                        r e a/ AIM-VO24                          OPENS INITIATING EVErr OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAILDRE OF                               PMS OUTPUT          LOGIC I/Os                    2.09E-03    PMAMOD11 PRICO301ASA                                                                                1.16E-03    PMC0301ASA
                                                                        "-"'"""" FAILURE OF ST. de LINE 4                                                      3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 61      7.27E                  .00                        14CA/RMS-V024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E*00    IEV-14CA24ND FAILURS UPON                             DDEAND OF 14GTC GROUP PROCESSING                  1.16E-03    PMA0301ASA PNC3 GOD 11                                                                                2.09E-03    PMCMOD11 pmmar FAIIARE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                             3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 62      7.27E-09                   .00                        I4CA/RMS-v024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE OF                               PMS OUTPUT          LOGIC I/Os                    2.09E-03    PMAMOD11 PNCO301BSA                                                                                 1.16E-03    PMCO301BSA   l HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 4                                                          3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 10 63      7.27E-09                   .00                        14CA/RNS-V024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+C0    IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                                          3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 07 PNCMOD11                                                                                   2.09E-03    PMCMOD11 PMD0301BSA                                                                                 1.16E-03    PMD0301BSA   [
64      .7.27E-09                  .00                        14CA/RNS-V024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 1                                                          3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 07 PNCMOD11                                                                                   2.C9E-03    PMCMOD11     i PMD0301ASA                                                                                 1.16E-03    PMD0301ASA   ,
65      7.27E-09                   .00                        14CA/RNS-V024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE OF                               PMS OUTPUT          LOGIC I/Os                    2.09E 03    PMAMOD11 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                          3.00E-03    AD4MODC9 PMD0301BSA                                                                                 1.16E-03    PMD0301BSA 66      7.27E-09                   .00                        LOCA/RNS-V024                            OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS    WITH RCS FILLED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE OF                               PMS OtJTPUT         IAGIC I/Os                    2.09E-03    PMAMOD11 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                           3.00E-03    AD4 MOD 09 PMD0301ASA                                                                                 1.16E-03    PMD0301ASA

                                                                                                        . Table 720.364-3                                 .Page:          8

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A-Hot Short LOCA 8 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B File: Ic24ndf3.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NLBIBER CUTSET PROB PERCBKr BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                           EVENT PROB.      IDENTIFIER 67   5.89E-09                                  .00 14CA/RMS-V024                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS FILLED        1.00E+00           IEV-14CA24ND rumrw VALVE                      122A              ' FAILS TO OPEN                               8.76E-03           IWACV122AO M MVE                            125A                 FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03           IWACV125AO M EVE                           122B                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03           IWBCV122AO rumrw VALVE                     1248                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03           IWBCV124AO 68   5.89E-09                                  .00 14CA/RMS-V024                   OPENS INITIATING EVE 3fT OCCURS           WITH RCS FILLED        1.00E+00           IEV-LOCA24ND CNBCE VALVE                      122A                 FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWACV122AO CNBCK VALVE                     225A                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWACV125AO CNECK VALVE                     1228-                 FAILS M OPEN                               8.76E-03          IWBCV122AO CNBCK VALVE                     125B                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWBCv125AO 69   5.89E-09                                  .00 LOCA/RMS-V024                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS FILLED        1.00E+00          IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE                      122A                 FAILS 70 OPEN-                             8.76E-03          IWACV122AO CHECK VALVE                     125A               - FAILS TO OPEN                               8.76E-03          IWACV125AO CHECK VALVE                     123B                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWBCV123AO CHECK VALVE                     124B                  FAILS M OPEN                               8.76E-03          IWBCV124AO 70   5.89E-09                                  .00 LOCA/RNS-V024                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WIN RCS FILLED         1.00E+00          IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE                     122A'                 FAILS 70 OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWACV122AO CHECK VALVE                     125A                  FAILS M OPEN                               8.76E-03          IWACV125AO CHECK VALVE                     1238                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWBCV123AO CNECK VALVE                     1258                  FAILS M OPEN                               8.76E-03          IWBCV125AO 71   5.89E-09'                                 .00 I4CA/RNS-V024                   OPE 3tS INITIATING EVErr OCCURS           NIN RCS FILLED         1.00E+00          IEV-I4CA24ND
  .                                                        CNECK VALVE                     123A                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWACV123AO CHECK VALVE                     124A                  FAILS M OPEN                               8.76E-03          IWACV124AO CHECK VALVE                     1228                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWBCV122AO CHECK VALVE                     124B                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWBCV124AO 72   5.89E-09                                 .00  LOCA/RNS-V024                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS FILLED        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE                     123A -                FAILS M OPEN                               8 76E-03         IWACV123ho                                   ,
CHECK VALVE                     124A                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03          IWACV124AO d
CHECK VALVE                     122B                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03         IWBCV122AO CHECK VALVE                     1258                  FAILS TO OPEN                              8.76E-03         IWBCV125AO 73   5.89E-09                                 .00  LOCA/mtS-V024                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS FILLED        1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND-CHECK VALVE                     123A                  FAILS M OPEN                               8.76E-03         IWACV123AO CHECK VALVE                     124A                 FAILS TO OPEN                               8.76E-03         IWACV124AO CHECK VALVE                     123B                 FAILS TO OPEN                               8.76E-03         IWBCV123AO CHECK VALVE                     124B                 FAILS TO OPEN                               8.76E-03         IWBCV124AO I
I i
0
_._.._m __ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . _ _  -    m___._.__.__ _ _ __ _ _ _ ._ _ __.___mm__       m_ _ _ .       -- _ -,-              .  . .-           -, - .-              . _r. 4 __ ___-__ _ _m._   -_

Table 720.364-3                                                Page:         9

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short IDCA 8 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B File: Ic24ndf3.w1k Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT SASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                 EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER 74 5.89E-09 .00  14CA/RMS-V024         OPENS INITIATIIE3 EVENT OCCURS                 WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00           IEV-LOCA24ND
                                                                        .C m VALVE             123A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWACV123AO CM MVE                124A                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03            IWACV124AO
                                                                        . CM MVE               123B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCV123AO rimmrw VALVE          1258                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03            IWBCV125AO 75 5.89E-09 .00  IACA/IRI8-V024        OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                  WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00            IEV-LOCA24ND CNBCK VALVE           123A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03            IWACV123AO CHEK VALVE            125A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            B.76E-03            IWACV125AO CNBCK VALVE           122B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCV122AO CNBCK VALVE           1248                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCv124AO 76 5.89E-09 .00  IDCA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                  WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00           IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE           123A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03            IWACV123AO CHECK VALVE           125A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWACV125AO CHECK VALVE           122B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCV122AO CHECK VALVE           125B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCV125AO 77 5.89E-09 .00  LOCA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                  WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00           IEV-IhCA24ND CHECK VALVE           123A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWACV123AO CHECK VALVE           125A                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03           IWACV125AO CHECK VALVE           123B                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03           IWBCv123AO CHECK VALVE           1248                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03           IWBCV124AO 78 5.89E-09 .00  IOCA/RNS-V024        OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                   WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00           IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE           122A                   FAILS 'IO OPEN                                           8.76E-03           IWACV122AO CHECK VALVE           124A                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03           IWACV124AO CHECK VALVE           123B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCV123AO CHECK VALVE           1258                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03           IWBCV125AO 79 5.89E-09 .00  LOCA/RNS-V024        OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                   WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00           IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE           122A                   FAILS M OPEN                                             8.76E-03          IWACV122AO CHECK VALVE           124A-                  FAILS 70 OPEN                                            8.76E-03          IWACV124AO CHECK VALVE           123B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03          IWBCV123AO CHECK VALVE           124B                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03          IWBCV124AO 80 5.89E-09 .00  LOCA/RMS-V024        OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                   WITH RCS FILLED                  1.00E+00          IEV-LOCA24ND CHECK VALVE           122A                   FAILS TO OPEN                                            8.76E-03          IWACv122AO CHECK VALVE           124A                   FAILS 70 OPEN                                            4.76E-03          IWACV124AO CHECK VALVE           122B                   FAILS 70 OPEN                                            8.76E-03          IWBCV122AO CHECK VALVE           125B                   FAILS 70 OPEN                                            8.76E-03          IWBCV125AO a.Wah
- - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ . _ _ . - - _ _ _ - - - - - _                                                          .-                                     r     .~               ,                          -     . - - - . - - - - - - _ - _ .

,_      1    _ __          _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _                     - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - -           - - - . _ - - . _ - -
                   .                                                                                                                                                                                 t Table 720.364-3                                        Page:          10

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 8 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B                                                                                                               >
File Ic24ndf3.wik                             .
Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER ' CtTPSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                 EVENT PROB.       IDENTIFIER 81       5.89E-09                        .00      LOCA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-IACA2 4ND   i CMSCE VALVE             122A                           FAILS TO OPEN                                       8.76E-03         IWACV122AO CNECE VALVE             124A                           FAILS TO OPEN                                       8.76E-03         IWACV124AO N WhLVE                 1228                           FAILS M OPEN                                        8.76E-03         IWBCV122AO CNBCK VMNE              1248                           FAILS TO OPEN                                       8.76E-03         IWBCV124AO 82       5.89E-09                        .00      LOCA/ sets-V024       OPENS INITIATING EVEFF OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND CNBCE VALVE             123A                           FAILS TO OPEN                                       8.76E-03         IWACV123AO CNBCE VALVE             125A                           FAILS M OPEN                                        8.76E-03         IWACV125AO CNBCK VALVE            123B                            FAILS TO OPEN                                       8.76E-03         IWBCv123AO CNBCK VALVE            125B                            FAILS TO OPEN                                       8.76E-03         IWBCV125AO 83'      5.42E-09                        .00      14CA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND CCF OF SOP 1tIARE FOR INPUT 14GIC GROUPS                                                                   1 10E-05         CCX-IN-I4GIC-SW OPERATOR FAILS        M AC7UATE ADS                    BEFORE CORE                    DAMAGE               4.93E-04         ADN-MAN 01 84       5.07E-09                        .00      LOCA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE UPON          DEMAND OF 14GIC GROUP PROCESSIhG                                                     1.16E-03         PMA0301BSA PNCMOD11                                                                                                   2.09E-03         PMCMOD11 FIE000D11                                                                                                  2.09E-03         PMDMOD11 85       5.07E-09                        .00      LOCA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-IACA24ND FAILURE UPON          DIDEAND OF LOGIC - GROUP PROCESSING                                                  1.16 E- O '. PMA0301ASA PIECte0D11                                                                                                 2.09E-03         PMcMOD11 PMDB00D11                                                                                                  2.09E-03         PMDMOD11 86       5.07E-09                        .00      14CA/RNS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVD(T OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE OF             PtIS OUTPtTF                    I4GIC I/Os                                          2.09E-03         PMAMOD11 PeeC0301BSA                                                                                                1.16E-03         PMCO301BSA PIEDMOD11                                                                                                  2.09E-03         PMDMOD11 5.07E-09                                 LOCA/RMS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-14CA24ND 87                                       .00 FAILURE OF             Pets OtfrPUT                    Los17 1/Os                                          2.09E-03         PMAMOD11 PtedO301ASA                                                                                                1.16E-03         PMC0301ASA POEDes0D11                                                                                                 2.09E-03         PMretoD11
                                                 .00     LOCA/RMS-V024         OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                   WITH RCS FILLED      1.00E+00         IEV-LOCA24ND 88       5.07E-09                                                                                                                                            2.09E-03         PMAMOD11 FAII.AJRE OF           PtES OtfrPUT                    LOGIC I/Os PetCNOD11                                                                                                  2.09E-03         PMCMOD11 PND0301BSA                                                                                                 1.16E-03         PMD0301BSA a

m_         _        ,    _     - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ __ -. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                                              _ . _ - - _.___           _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ __ _ . _ _ _ _ ---_ _ _ _ . __. ____ _ _ _ _ __ _ _
u Table 720.364-3                                                 Page:     11 i

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short LOCA 9 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            '
File: Ic24ndf) wik.
Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NLBtBER ' CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                                                                                           EVENT PROB.               IDENTIFIER 89      5.07E-09                  .00                        EDCA/RMS-V024                                                                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                          WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                       IEV-14CA24ND FAIIAME OF                                                                                       PNS OUTPUT                                  LOGIC I/Os                                                  2.09E-03                       PMAMOD11 genann11                                                                                                                                                                                                2.09E-03                       PMCMOD11 l                                                               .E M 303ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                    1.16E-03                       PMD0301ASA 90      4.64E-09                  .00                         LOCA/RMS-V024                                                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                          WITH RC5 FILLED                                  1.00E+00                       IEV-LOCA24ND unmensame FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                       3.00E-03                      AD4 MOD 07 unarmamme FAILURE OF ST. 64 LINE 3                                                                                                                                                                       3.00E-03                      AD4 MOD 09 FAIIAME OF INV. , STATIC SWITCH                                                                                                              AND ASSOC. BREAKERS                                         5.16E-04                       IDDMOD33 91      4.64E-09                  .00                        EDCA/RNS-V024                                                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                           WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                       IEV-LOCA24ND pammaar FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                         3.00E-03                      AD4 MOD 07 FAI!JJRE OF INV. . STATIC SWITCH                                                                                                             AND ASSOC. BREAKERS                                         5.16E-04                       IDCMOD29 NApresame FAILURE OF ST. to LINE 4                                                                                                                                                                       3.00E-03                      AD4 MOD 10                                                                                             ;
92      4.64E-09                  .00                        14CA/RMS-V024                                                                                    OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                          WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                       IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE OF INV., STATIC SWITCH                                                                                                               AND ASSOC. BREAKERS                                         5.16E-04                       IDAMODOS HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03                     AD4 MOD 09 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03                     AD4 mD10 93      4.04E-09                      00 LOCA/RNS-V024                                                                                                       OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                           WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                      IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03                     AD4 MOD 07 PMCO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                              1.16E-03                      PMCO301ASA P95)0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                             1.16E-03                      PMD0301hSA 94      4.04E-09                  .00                        LOCA/RMS-V024                                                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                           WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                       IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03                     AD4 MOD 07
                                                                'PNCO301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                    1.16E-03                      PMCOs01BSA PMD0301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                              1.16E-03                      PMD0301ASA 95      4.04E-09                  .00                        LOCA/RNS-V024                                                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                           WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                      IEV-LOCA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03                     AD4 MOD 07 PNCO301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                              1.16E-03                      PMCO301BSA PMD0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                              1.16E-03                      PMD0301BSA                                                                                             ,
96      4.04E-09                  .00                        14CA/RNS-V024                                                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                           WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                      IEV-14CA24ND HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 1                                                                                                                                                                        3.00E-03                     AD4 MOD 07 PNC0301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                              1.16E-03                      PMCO301ASA PMD0301ASA-                                                                                                                                                                                             1.16E-03                      PMD0301ASA                                                                                             .
I LOCA/RNS-V024                                                                                   OPENS INITIATING EVEL'T OCCURS                          WITH RCS FILLED                                  1.00E+00                      IEV-LOCA24ND 97      4.04E-09                  .00 FAILURE UPON                                                                                     DEMAND OF IDGIC GROUP PROCESSING                                                                        1.16E-03                      PMA0301ASA 1.16E-03                      PMC0301ASA                                                                                             '
PMC0301ASA 3.00E-03 AD4 MOD 10 HARDWARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4 i
6                                                                                                                                                             i
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           . . , ,a
               -    -        ._                  _                            _                                                   . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _              _m . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _                  =_-               a_m-s                     4                                     _       w.             -             -- a _-   w

                                                                                                                                              . . . . . - .   . - ~         .
Table 720.364-3                              Page:               12 Titler Dominant Cutsets for State V24A Hot Short IOCA 6 Safe SD with Loss of Div. B
- File: Ic24ndf3.wik                                                                                                                                                                    l' Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 3.9430E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENP BASIC EVEKF NAME.                       _     .
EVENT PROB.               IDENTIFIER                                 f 98      4.04E-09           .00 14CA/RMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS               MITH RCS FILLEI'   1.00E+00                   IEV-LOCA24ND                             !
FAILIBE UPON       DEMAND OF LOGIC . GROUP PROCESSING                            1.16E-03                  PMA0301BSA pet 0301tSA                                                                      1.16E-03                  PNC0301BSA MARIMERE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 4                                                3.00E-03                  AD4 MOD 10 99      4.042-09           .00 EDCA/BMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCtJRS              MITH RCS FILLED    1.00E+00                   IEV-LOCA24ND FAILURE UPON       DEMAND OF LOGIC GROUP PROCESSING                              1.16E-03                  PNA0301BSA PNCO301ASA                                                                       1.16E-03                  PNCO301ASA-Fam m ar FAILURE OF ST. 84 LINE 4                                                3.00E-03                  AD4 MOD 10 100      4.04E-09           .00 EDCAIRMS-V024     OPENS INITIATING EVENT OCCURS               MITH RCS FILLED    1.00E+00                   IEV-IDCA24ND FAILURE UPON       DDEAND OF LOGIC GROUP PROCESSING                              1.16E-03                  PNA0301BSA NARDNARE FAILURE OF ST. 94 LINE 3                                                3.00E-03                  AD4 MOD 09 PRID0301BSA                                                                      1.16E-03                  PMD0301BSA L
4 k
4 t
U I

Table 720.364-4                        Page:     1

==Title:==
Dominant Catsets for State LPS-D LOSP G Midloop with Loss of Div. B File: lospdf6.. elk Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERC83ff BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                 EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 1      2.40E-04          48.50 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00     IEV-14SPD IMMT DISCHARGE LINE *B'                                                                                  STRAINER         PLUGGED           2.40E-04     IWB-PLUG 2      5.50E-05          11.12 IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD CCF OF IMIST IKI DOVs 121A, '121B, & RMS V023                                                                                                5.50E-05    IWK-MV-COL 3      4.70R-05           9.50 I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD Crismanas CAUSE                                                                       FAILURE OF THE,     BATTERIES        IDSA-DB-1A/IB     4.70E-05    CCX-BY-PN 4      2.40E-05           4.85 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD Crimmanas CAUSE                                                                       FAILURE OF THE      INVERTER                           2.40E-05    CCX-IV-XR 5      1.20E-05           2.43 IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD CCF OF STRAINERS IN IRWST TANK                                                                                                               1.20E-05    IWX-FL-GP 6      8.62E-06           1.74 14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVE 3fr OCCURS                                                                                         WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD                                   {
CCF OF THE POWER INTERFACE OUTPUT BOARDS IN PMS                                                                                              8.62E-06    CCK-EP-SAM 7      7.12E-06           1.44 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWEC INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD MECHANICAL                                                                            FAILURE CAUSES      NOV 121B TO      FAIL-M-OPEN       3.22E-03    IRWMOD06S MECHANICAL                                                                            FAILURE CAUSES      MOV 023 TO       FAIL-TO-OPEN      2.21E-03    RN23MODSS 8      6.73E-06           1.36 14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-IDSPD MECHANICAL                                                                            FAILURE CAUSES      MOV 121B TO      FAIL-TG-OPEN      3.22E-03    IRWMOD06S PM00eOD11                                                                                                                                   2.095-03    PMDMOD11 9      5.15E-06           1.04 14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-IDSPD MECHANICAL                                                                            FAILURE CAUSES      MOV 121B TO      FAIL-TO-OPEN      3.22E-03    IRWMOD06S OPERATOR FAILS                                                                        TO RECOGNIZE        NEED AND TO OPEN RNS MOV V023      1.60E-03    RHN-MANOS 10      4.62E-06            .93              LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                              WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD PMCMOD11                                                                                                                                    2.09E-03    PMCMOD11 MECHANICAL                                                                            FAILURE CAUSES      MOV 023 M        FAIL-M-OPEN       2.21E-03    RN23MODSS 11      4.37E-06            .88              I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                              WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD PMCN D11                                                                                                                                     2.09E-03    PMCMOD11 PMDeOD11                                                                                                                                     2.09E-03    PMDMOD11 12      4.07E-06            .82              LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                              WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD INDICATION                                                                           FAILURE                                                1.00E-03    ALL-IND-FAIL PMOeOD21                                                                                                                                     4.07E-03    PMCMOD21

                                                                                                                                                                                                                  . .~ ~ ~ .            -u_,..    ~_ n                . .. -           -. -.
Table 720.364-4                          Page:          2 Title- Dominant Cutsets for State LPS-D LOSP S Midloop with Loss of Div. B Filet lospdf6.wlk Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCEBrf BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                           EVENT PROB.         IDENTIFIER 13                                    3.74E-06 .76   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00             IEV-IDSPD M ICAL               FAILURE CAUSES      MOV 121B TO      FAIL-TO-OPEN      3.22E-03             IRWMOD06S                                                 '
PgmO301ASA                                                                  1.16E-03            PMD0301ASA i
14                                    3.74E-06 .76   14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVEBrf OCCURS            WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00             IEV-LOSPD IWCIIAIIICAL         FAILURE CAUSES      NOV 1218 TO      FAIL-TO-OPEN      3.22E-03            IR1mMOD06S .
Pam0301BSA                                                                  1.16E-03            PMD0301BSA 15                                  '3.34E-06  .58   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00             IEV-LOSPD                                                 >
POIC3EOD11                                                                  2.09E-03            PMCMOD11                                                    i OPERATOR FAILS       TO RECOGNIZE        NEED AND TO OPEN RNS MOV V023      1.60E-03            PJOI-MANOS 16                                    3.22E-06 .65   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD MECMANICAL           FAILURE CAUSES      NOV 1218 *IO     FAIL-TO-OPEN      3.22E-03            IRWMOD06S                                                  L INDICATION           FAILURE                                                1.00E-03            ALL-IND-FAIL                                                4 17                                    2.56E-06 .52   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-14SPD                                                   "
P90CO301ASA                                                                 1.16E-03            PMCO301ASA MECHANICAL           FAILURE CAUSES     teOV 023 TO       FAIL-TO-OPEN      2.21E-03            RN23 MOD 5S 18                                    2.56E-06 .52   IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD                                                  ?
PMC0301BSA                                                                 '1.16E-03            PMCO301BSA                                                -I MECHANICAL           FAIEURE CAUSES     MOV 023 TO        FAIL-TO-OPEN      2.21E-03            RN23 MOD 5S                                                 ;
19                                    2.42E-06 .49   14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-IDSPD                                                   [
PteCMOD11                                                                   2.09E-03            PMCMOD11                                                    F PIE)0301BSA                                                                 1.16E-03            PMD0301BSA 20                                     2.42E-06 .49   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-IDSPD PMCMOD11                                                                    2.09E-03            PMCMOD11 PMD0301ASA                                                                  1.16E-03            FMD0301ASA                                                  .
r 21                                      2.42E-06 .49   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD                                                   i PleC0301ASA                                                                 1.16E-03            PMC0301ASA                                                  T PMDIeOD11                                                                   2.09E-03            PMDMOD11 22                                     2.42E-06 .49   IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS             WITH RCS DRAINED  1.00E+00            IEV-IDSPD P90CO301BSA                                                                 1.16E-03            PMC0301BSA                                                  l PMDMOD11                                                                    2.09E-03            PMDMOD11                                                    [
23                                     2.09E-06 .42- LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS              WITH RCS DRAINtm  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD                                                   l IIIDICATION          FAIIDRE                                                1.00E-03            ALL-IND-FAIL PMCDIOD11                                                                   2.09E-03            PMCMOD11 f
4 F
s m__.m m ._. _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                             _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                                                                                                        .r      w       e      -+               _      _ m._____-______________.______

Table 720.364-4                                                                                                                                                         Page:               3

==Title:==
Dcuninant Cutsets for State LPS-D LOSP G Midloop with Loss of Div. B File: lospdf6.wlk Reduced Susa of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUNDER CtrTSET PROB PERCSPF BA31C EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            EVENT PROB.           IDENTIFIER 24                2.04E-06                              .41                         IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                   WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                   1.00E+00           IEV-IDSPD
                                                                                                         - at                                              FAI WRE CAUSES                NOV 1218 M                                                        FAIL-TO-OPDI                                                                                      3.22E-03           IPWMOD06S M1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                6.35E-04            PMDMOD41 25                1.86E-06                              .38                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                    W111t RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.00E+00           IEV-LOSPD fMCO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMCO301ASA OPERATOR FAILS                                    TO RECOGNIZE                  NEED AND TO OPE 36 RMS NOV V023                                                                                                                                    1.60E-03           RHN-MANOS 26                1.86E-06                              .38                        IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                    WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD PNC0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMC0301BSA OPERATOR FAILS                                    M PECOGNIZE                   NEED AND TO OPEN RMS NOV V023                                                                                                                                      1.60E-03           RHM-MANO5 27                1.66E-06                              .34                        1453 OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                    WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.COE+00            IEV-LOSPD IWCNANICAL                                        FAILURE CAUSES                NOV 1218 TO                                                      FAIL-TO-OPEN                                                                                      3.22E-03           IRWMOD06S FAllCRE OF INV., STATIC SWITCH                                                  AND ASSOC.                                                       BREAKERS                                                                                          5.16E-04           IDDMOD33 26                1.35E-06                              .27                        'R d CF OFFSITE POWER INITIATINr EV M r OCCURS                                                                                                   WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.00E+00           IEV-LOSPD P9CO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.16E-03           PMCO301ASA PMD0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         1.16E-03           PMD0301BSA 29                1.35E-06                              .27                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVE 3rr OCCURS                                                                                                  WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.00E*00           IEV-IDSPD PNCO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMCO301ASA PIWO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMD0301ASA 30                1.35E-06                             427 IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                                           WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                   1.00E+00           IEV-LOSPD PNCO301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMCO301BSA PMD0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMD0301BSA 31                1.35E-06                              .27                        14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                   WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                   1.00E+00           IEV-lhSPD PMCO301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMCO301BSA PMD0301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        1.16E-03           PMD0301ASA 32                1.33E-06                              .27                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                    WIT 14 RCS DRAINED                                                                                1.00E+00           IEV-LOSPD PNCNOD11                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         2.09E-03            PMCMOD11 PMDNOD41                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         6.35E-04            PMDMOD41 33               1.20E-06                              .24                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVE 3f7 OCCURS                                                                                                 WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD SOFIisARE CCF                                     OF ALL CARDS                                                                                                                                                                                    1.20E-06            CCX-SFTW 34               1.16E-06                              .23                        IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER IMITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                   WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                  1.00E+00            IEV-LOSPD INDICATION                                       FAIwRE                                                                                                                                                                                          1.00E-03            ALL-IND-FAIL PMCO301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       1.16E-03            PMC0301ASA

Table 720.364-4                                         Page:     4

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State LP5-D IASP G Midloop with Loss of Div. B File: lospdf6.wlk Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT MAME                                                                                                                                                                                                               EVENT PROB.               IDENTIFIER 35         1.16E-06                                .23                1488 OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVEfrF OCCURS                                                                                                              WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                      IEV-14SPD IEICATION                                                            FAILURE                                                                                                   1.00E-03                     ALL-IND-FAIL WWC930198A                                                                                                                                                                     1.16E-03                      PMC0301BSA 36         1.14E-06                                .23                IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                               WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                      IEV-14SPD FAIIAIRE OF INV., STATIC SWITCH                                                                                                             AND ASSOC.      BREAKERS            5.16E-04                      IDCMOD29 M ICAL                                                                FAILURE CAUSES                                                       MOV 023 M -      FAIL-M-OPEN         2.21E-03                     RN23 MOD 5S 37         1.00E-06                                .22                LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVDrF OCCURS                                                                                                               WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                      IEV-14SPD PMcMOD11                                                                                                                                                                       2.09E-03                     PMcMOD11 FAILI1RE OF INV., STATIC SWITCH                                                                                                            AND ASSOC.       BREAKERS            5.16E-04                     IDDMOD33 38         1.08E-06                               .22                 LOFS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVDrf OCCURS                                                                                                               WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                     IEV-LOSPD FAIIURE OF INV., STATIC SWIKH                                                                                                              AND ASSOC.       BREAKERS            5.16E-04                     IDCMOD29 POEMOD11                                                                                                                                                                       2.09E-03                     PMDMOD11 39         1.02E-06                                .21                IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVDrF OCCURS                                                                                                               v.tTH RCS DR).INED  1.00E+00                     IEV-LOSPD MECHANICAL                                                            FAIIURE CAUSES                                                       MOV 1215 TO      FAIL-M-OPEN         3.22E-03                     IRWMOD06S IASS OF DIST.                                                         PANEL OR BREAKER A28 SPURIOUSLY                                                       OPENS               3.17E-04                     IDDMOD32 40         8.26E-07                                .17                LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                               WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                     IEV-LOSPD FAILURE OF INV., STATIC SWIKH                                                                                                              AND ASSOC.       BREAKERS            5.16E-04                     IDCMOD29 OPERATOR FAILS                                                       M RECOGNIZE                                                           NEED AND M OPEN RMS MOV V023         1.60E-03                    RHN-MANOS 41         7.37E-07                                .15                LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVDrr CCCf2                                                                                                                WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                     IEV-LOSPD PMr0301ASA                                                                                                                                                                      1.16E-03                    PMCO301ASA P'As O 41                                                                                                                                                                       6.35E-04                    PMDMOD41 42         7.37E-07                               .15                 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVEKr OCCURS                                                                                                              'WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                     IEV-LOSPD PMC0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                      1.16E-03                    PMC0301BSA PMDMOO41                                                                                                                                                                        6.35E-04                    PMIMOD41 43      ~'.02E-07 7                                       .14                LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                               WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00E+00                    IEV-LOSPD OPERAMM FAILS                                                        M OPEN 7WO                                                             IRWST NOVs                          1.15E-03                    IWN-MANDO PMCMOD21                                                                                                                                                                        4.07E-03                    PMCMOD21 COND. PROB. OF                                                        RMN-MANOS (OP.                                                       FAILS TO OPEN    RMS MOV V023)       1.50E-01                    RHN-MAN 05C de         7.01E-07                                .14                LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                                                               WITH RCS DRAINED    1.00R+00                    IEV-LOSPD LOSS OF DIST.                                                         PANEL OR BREAKER A21 SPURIOUSLY                                                       OPENS               3.17E-04                    IDCMOD28 MECHANICAL                                                            FAILURE CAUSES                                                       MOV 023 M        FAIL-M-OPEN         2.21E-03                   RN23 MOD 5S

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       -. . . . . , . ~
P Table 720.364-4                                                                                                                                        Page:      5                                i

==Title:==
Domiinant Cutsets for State LPS-D IASP G Midloop with Loss of Div. B                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ,
File: lospdf6.wlk Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCDff BASIC EVENT NANE                                                                                  -
EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 45                6.6381-07     .13   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00       IEV-LOSPD HEMID11                                                                                                                                                                                                   2.09E-03      PMCMOD11 IASS OF DIST.                         PANEL OR BREAKER A28 SPURIOUSLY                     OPENS                                                                                                           3.17E-04       IDDMOD32 46                6.63E-07      .13   1485 OF OFFSITF POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-IASPD IDSS OF DIST.                         PANEL OR BREARER A21 SPURIOUSLY                     OPENS                                                                                                           3.17E-04      IDCMOL28 gamurm11                                                                                                                                                                                                  2.09E-03      PMDMOD11                     !
47                5.99E-07      .12   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS - WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                                                          1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD                    i PNCO301ASA                                           .
1.16E-03      PMCO301ASA FAILURE OF INV.. STATIC SWI7CH                                AND ASSOC.                  BREAKERS                                                                                                        5.16E-04      IDDMOD33 r
48                5.99E-07      .12   IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVDfT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-14SPD PNCO301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                1.16E-03      PMC0301BSA FAILURE OF INV., STATIC SWITCH                                AND ASSOC.                  BREAKERS                                                                                                        5.16E-04    -IDDMOD33                      ,
r 49                5.99E-07      .12   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-14SPD FAILURE OF INV. , STATIC SWITCH                               AND ASSOC.                  BREAKERS                                                                                                        5.16E-04      IDCMOD29                     i FND0301BSA                                                                                                                                                                                                1.16E-03      PMD0301BSA 50                5.99E-07      .12   LOSS OF OFF.lTE POWER INITIATING EVElfr OCCURS                                            WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E*00      IEV-14SPD FAIIDRE OF INV. , STATIC SWI1CH                               AND ASSOC.                  BREAKERS                                                                                                        5.16E-04      IDCMOD29 PND0301ASA                                                                                                                                                                                                1.16E-03      PMDQ301ASA                   i WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD                    I 51                5.55E-07      .11   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS NECHANICAL                            FAILURE CAUSES          NOV 121B TO                 FAIL-M-OPDI                                                                                                     3.22E-03'     IRWMOD06S                    i' OPERATOR FAILS                        M OPEN TWO              IRWST NOVs                                                                                                                                  1.15E-03      IWN-MAN 00 COND. PROB. OF                        RHN-MANOS (OP.          FAILS TO OPEN               RMS NOV V023)                                                                                                   1.50E-01     RHN-MAN 05C 52                5.51E-07      .11   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD FAIL-TO-OPEN                                                                                                    3.22E-03      IPNMODO6S                    !
MECHANICAL                            FAILURE CAUSES          NOV 121B TO FAILURE OF                            OUTPUT DRIVER                                                                                                                                                       1.71E-04      RNDEP0235A s
53                5.16E-07      .10   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD INDICATION                            FAILURE                                                                                                                                                             1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL FAIIARE OF INV. . STATIC SWIICH                               AND ASSOC.                  BREAKERS                                                                                                        5.16E-04      IDCMOD29 t
54                5.07E-07      .10   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                             WITH RCS DRAINED                                                                                                1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD LOSS OF DIST.                         PANEL OR BREARER A21 SPURIOUSLY                     OPENS                                                                                                           3.17E-04      IDCMOD28                     i RHN-MANOS                     !
OPERATOR FAILS                        M RECOGNIZE             NEED AND E OPEN RMS NOV V023                                                                                                                1.60E-03                                   F i
3 I
t t
i 1

Table 720.364-4                                                Page:      6

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State LPS-D LOSP S Midloop with Loss of Div. B File: lospdf6.wik Reduced Sum of Cu+ sets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CITTSET PROB PERCErr thSIC EVENT NAME                                                                                              EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 55       3.68E-01              .07   148S OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD SE930195A                                                                                         1.16E-03     PMC0301BSA th M OSPDIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A28 SPURIOUSLY                 OPENS                           3.17E-04     IDDMOD32 56      3.68E-07               .07   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD 1488 OF DIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A21 SPURIOUSLY                 OPENS                           3.17E-04     IDCMOD28 8830301ASA                                                                                         1.16E-03    PMD0301ASA 57       3.68E-07              .07   14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00     IEV-IDSPD LOSS OF DIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A21 SPURIOUSLY                 OPENS                            3.17E-04    IDCMOD28 PIS0301BSA                                                                                        1.16E-03     PMD0301BSA 58       3.68E-07              .07   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                   - WITH RCS DRAINED                1.00E+00     IEV-14SPD PNC0301ASA                                                                                        1.16E-03     PMCO301ASA LOSS OF DIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A28 SPURIOUSLY                OPENS                            3.17E-04     IDDMOD32 59       3.61E-07              .07   I4SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD OPERA 70R FAILS  M CPEN WO                IRWST NOVs                                              1.15E-03     IWN-MAN 00 PNCMOD11                                                                                          2.09E-03     PMCMOD11 COND. PROB. OF   RMN-MAN 05 (OP,         FAILS TO OPEN            RNS NOV V023)                   1.50E-01     RHN-MAN 05C 60       3.57E-07              .07   1455 OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD PNCMOD11                                                                                          2.09E-03     PMCMOD11 FAIIARE OF       OUTPUT DRIVER                                                                    1.71E-04     RNDEP0235A 61       3.32E-07              .07   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATIM3 EVENT OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD CCF OF GRAVITY    IIUECTION CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                  1.50E-04     IWX-CV-AO MECHANICAL       FAILURE CAUSES          NOV 023 TO               FAIL-TO-OPEN                    2.21E-03     RN23MODSS 62       3.28E-07              .07   14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVErr OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E*00     IEV-LOSPD FAILURE OF INV., STATIC SWITCH           AND ASSOC.               BREAKERS                        5.16E-04     IDCMOD29 PMDMOD41                                                                                          6.35E-04     PMDMOD41 63       3.17E-07              .06   IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVEFF OCCURS                    WI111 RCS DRAINED                1.00E+00     IEV-14SPD INDICATION       FAILURE                                                                          1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL LOSS OF DIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A21 SPURIOUSLY                CPENS                            3.17E-04     IDCMOD28 64       3.13E-07              .06   LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVEWF OCCURS                    WITH RCS DRAINED                 1.00E+00     IEV-14SPD CCF OF GRAVITY    ltLIECTION CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                 1.50E-04     IWX-CV-AO PIOMOD11                                                                                          2.09E-03     PMDMOD11 e
: m. _ u.mm_ . .- .
i L
Table 720.364-4                                                          Page:     7

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State LPS-D LOSP G Midloop with loss of Div. B Filei lospdf6.wik Reduced Susa of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04                                                                                                                                                                .
NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                            EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 65       2.66E-07                 .05    IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                       Willi RCS DRAINED     1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD FAIMME OF INV. , STATIC SWI1tX              AND ASSOC.                              BREARERS              5.16E-04    IDCMOD29                       i FMIM OF INV. , STATIC SWITCH                AND ASSOC.                              BREAKERS              5.16E-04    IDEMOD3 3                      !
66       2.58E-07                 .05 IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                          WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-thSPD IECMANICAL       FAILURE CAUSES             MOV 1215 TO                             FAIL-TO-OPEN          3.22E-03    IRWMOD06S                      4 PteRS00ASA                                                                                                8.00E-05    PMDXS00ASA 67       2.40E-07                 .05    LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-IASPD CCF OF GRAVITY    INJECTION CMECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                          1.50E-04    IWK-CV-AO                      7 OPERA 10R FAILS  TO RECOGNIZE               NEED AND M OPEN RNS MOV V023                                  1.60E-01    RMN-MANOS                      !
t 68       2.01E-07                 .04    IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                       WITH RCS D8AINED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD                      [
I4SS OF DIST. PANEL OR BREARER A21 SPURIOUSLY                                   OPENS                 3.17E-04    IDCMOD28                       k PMDMOD41                                                                                                  6.35E-04    PMDMOD41 69       2.00E-07                 .04    145S OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD OPERATOR FAILS   M OPEN TWO                 IRWST MOVs                                                    1.15E-03    IWN-MAN 00 PNCO301BSA                                                                                                1.16E-03    PMCO301BSA                     e COND. PROB. OF   RHN-MANOS (OP.             FAILS TO OPEN                           RNS MOV V023)         1.50E-01    RHN-MAN 05C 70       2.00E-07                 .04    LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD OPERATOR FAILS   M OPEN TWO                 IRWST MOVs                                                    1.15E-03    IWN-MAN 00                    .i PMC0301ASA                                                                                                1.16E-03    PMC0301ASA                     :*
COND. PROS. OF   RMM-MANOS (OP.             FAILS TO OPEN                           RNS MOV V023)         1.50E-01    RHN-MAN 05C A
11       1.98E-07                 .04    14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD PMC0301BSA                                                                                                1.16E-03    PMCO301BSA FAIIURE OF       OUTPUT DRIVER                                                                            1.71E-04    RNDEP023SA 72       1 98E-07                 .04    LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCLM                                        WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD PMC0301ASA                                                                                                1.16E-03    PMCO301ASA                      (
FAILUBE OF       OUTPUT DRIVER                                                                            1.71E-04    RNDEP023SA                      l 73       1.77E-07                 .04    14SS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVEFF OCCURS                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD                       i PMcKS00ASA                                                                                                8.00E-05    PMCKS00ASA                     !
MECMANICAL       FAI!ERE CAUSES             MOV 023 TO                              FAIL-10-OPEN          2.21E-03    RN23 MOD 55 74       1.74E-07                 .04    IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                    - WITH RCS DRAINED       1.00E+00    IEV-LOSPD CCF OF GRAVITY    IILTECTION CHECK VALVES 10 OPEN                                                         1.50E-04    IWX-CV-AO PMD0301ASA                                                                                                1.16E-03    PMD0301ASA s

Table 720.364-4                                                   Pager     'J

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State LP5-D LOSP G Nidloop with Loss of Div. B File: lospdf6.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CUTSET PROB PERCHIT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                                   EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 75                                  1.14E-07                   .04                         LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                               WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD OCF SF MAVITY              IBLIECTION CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                      1.50E     IWK-CV-AO M 301ast                                                                                                       1.16E-03      PMD0301BSA 76                                  1.70E-07                   .03                         IJDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVDIT OCCURS                              WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD CNBCE VALVE                1228                      FAILS TO OPEN                                              8.76E-03      IWBCV122AO CNBCE VALVE                125B                      FAILS TO OPEN                                              8.76E-03      IWBCV125AO ISCNAMICAL                 FAILURE CAUSES            NOV 023 M               FAIL-TO-OPEN                       2.21E-03     RN23 MOD 5S 77                                 1.70E-07                    .03 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00      IEV-IDSPD CNBCK VALVE                123B                      FAILS to OPEN                                              8.76E-03      IWBCV123AO CNBCK VALVE                124B                      FAILS M OPEN                                               0.76E-03      IWBCV124AO IWCNAMICAL                 FAILURE CAUSES            NOV 023 TO              FAIL-TO-OPEN                       2.21E-03     PN23 MOD 5S 78                                 1.70E-07                    .03                         LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVErr OCCURS                               WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00      IEV-LOSPD CHIICK VALVE               1238                      FAILS TO OPEN                                              8.76E-03      IWBCV123AO CNECK VALVE                125B                      FAILS TO OPEN                                              8.76E-03     IWBCV125AO IWCNAMICAL                 FAILURE CAUSES            NOV 023 M               FAIL-TO-OPEN                       2.21E-03     RN2iMODSS 79                                  1.70E-07                   .03                         LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                               WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD CHECK VALVE                122B                      FAILS M OPEN                                               8.76E-03     IWBCV122AO CNECK VALVE                1248                      FAILS TO OPEN                                              8.76E-03     IWBCV124AO MECNAMICAL                 FAILURE 0..             S NOV 023 TO              FAIL-TO-OPEN                       2.21E-03     RN23MODSS 80                                 1.67E-07                    .03                        IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATII82 EVENT OCCURS                               WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00     IEV-IESPD PNCXS00ASA                                                                                                     8.00E-05     PMCIS00ASA P9EBOOD11                                                                                                      2.09E-03     PMDMcD11 81                                  1.67E-07                   .03                        toss OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                WI718 RCS DRAINED                  1.00E+00     IEV-IDSPD P9ECNOD11                                                                                                      2.09E-03     PMCMOD11 PfeAS00ASA                                                                                                     8.00E-05     PMDXS00ASA 82                                 1.64E-07                    .03                        thSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                W11W RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD LOSS OF DIST.              PANEL OR BREAKER A21 SPURIOUSLY                   OPENS                              3.17E-04     IDCMOD28 FAILURE OF INV.. ST.9 TIC SWITCH                     AND ASSOC.              BREAKERS                           5.16E-04     IDDMOD33 83                                 1.64E-07                    .03                        LOSS OF OFFSITE- POWER IMTIATING EVENT OCCURS                                WITH RCS DRAINED                   1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD FAILURE OF INV. STATIC SWITLH                        AND ASSOC.              BREAKERS                           5.16E-04     IDCMOD29 14SS OF DIST.              PANEL OR BREAKER A28 SPURIOUSLY                   OPENS                              3.17E-04     IDDMOD32
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        - A .h
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _   _ _ . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _             . _ _ _ _ _ _         _ _ _ _ . - . . me--  _-_ m.__z-, -~ .~. - - - ~

Table 720.364-4                           Page:                      9

==Title:==
Demir. ant Cutsets for State LPS-D LOSP 8 Nidloop with Loss of Div. B                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          \
File lospdf6.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 i
NUMBER CUTSET PROS PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                                                                                                                                                                                  EVENT PROB.                   IDENTIFIER
                                                                                                                                              --__ ........_........--.-__..... ......_.-_..----...--..___...--.. ..... ...                                          ...........u....
84    1.60E-07                                                   .03                        IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED       1.00E+00                    IEV-LOSPD r m N VALVE                                             1229                       FAILS TO OPEN                           8.76E-03                    IWBCV122AO                                             +
CIWCE VALVE                                             124B                       FAILS TO OPEN                           8.76E-03                    IWBCV124AO ymmmen11                                                                                                                   2.09E-03                   PNtseOD11 85    1.60E-07                                                   .03 IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                                              WITH RCS DRAINED       1.COE+00                    IEV-LOSPD CNBCE VALVE                                            122B                        FAILS TO OPEN                           8.76E-03                    IWBCV122AO CNBCE VALVE                                            125B                        FAILS TO OPEN                           8.76E-03                   IWBCV125AO pommunn11                                                                                                                  2 . 09 E- 03               PMDNOD11 86    1.60E-07                                                   .03                        IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATIN2 EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED       1.00E+00                   IEV-IDSPD CNECK VALVE                                            1238                        FAILS TO OPEN                           8.76E-03                   IWBCV123AO                                                 '
CNBCE VALVE                                            1259                        FAILS TO OPEN                           8.76E-03                   IWBCV125AO PIEBIDD11                                                                                                                  2.09E-03                   PMDNOD11                                                   ;
87    1.60E-07                                                   .03                        IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED       1.00E+00                   IEV-LOSPD 4                                                                                                               CNBCK VALVE                                            123B                        FAILS 10 OPEN                           8.7 6E-0 3                 IWBCV123AO CHECK VALVE                                             124B                        FAILS TO OPEN                           B.76E-03                   IWBCV124AO                                                {
Pes]ee0D11                                                                                                                2.09E-03                    PMDNOD11 S8    1.50E-07                                                   .03                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WIT 1I RCS DRAINED     1.00E+00                   IEV-iDSPD CCF OF GRAVITY                                         IK7ECTION CNECK VALVES TO OPEN                                      1.50E-04                   IWX-CV-AO                                                 ,
INDICATION                                            FAILURE                                                            1.00E-03                    ALL-IND-FAIL                                              l t
89    1. 29 E- 07                                                .03                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITN RCS DRAINED       1.00E*00                   IEV-LOSPD                                                  -
IRCEP121BSAX -                                                                                                            5.83E-05                   IRCEP121BSAA                                               r MECNANICAL                                             FAILURE CAUSES              NOV 023 TO       FAIL-TO-OPEN          2.21E-03                    RN23NODSS
[
90     1.28E-07                                                   .03                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED       1.00E+00                   IEV-tDSPD                                                  ,
PMCAS00ASA 8,00E-05                   PNCXS00ASA OPERATOR FAILS                                         M RECOGNIZE                 NEED AND TO OPEN RNS NOV V023          1.60E-03                    RMN-MAN 05                                                l 91    1.23E-07                                                   .02                        IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00                    IEV-LOSPD                                                 t 1238                        FAILS TO OPEN                          8.76E-03                    IWBCV123AO                                                [
CNECK VALVE CHECK VALVE                                            125B                        FAILS TO OPEN                          8.76E-03                    IWBCV125AO                                                k OPERATOR FAILS                                         TO R8 COGNIZE               NEED AND TO OPEN RMS 900V V023         1.60E-03                    RMN-MANOS                                                 [
t 1.23E-07                                                   .02                        LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                                                       WITH RCS DRAINED      1.00E+00                    IEV-IDSPD                                                 ,
92                                                                                                                                                                                                                     8.76E-03                    IWBCV123AO                                                !
CNECK VALVE                                             1238                        FAILS TO OPEN CNECK VALVE                                             124B                        FAILS TO OPEN                          8.76E-03                    IWBCV124AO                                                ,
TO RECOGNIZE                NEED ANO TO OPEN RMS ttOV V023         1.60E-03                    RHN-MANOS                                                 ;
OPERATOR FAILS t
i e
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ?
t r
I

                                                                                                                                                     . ~ . ,- .- --                                               -
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Table 720.364-4                                                  Pa0ez     10

==Title:==
Dominant Cutsets for State LPS-D LOSP S Nidloop with Loss of Div. B File: lospdf6.wik Reduced Sum of Cutsets: 4.9480E-04 NUMBER CtfrSET PROB PERCENT BASIC EVENT NAME                               -                                                 EVENT PROB. IDENTIFIER 93    1.23E-07        .02  IASS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD rismrsr VALVE    122B              FAILS TO OPD1                                                8.76E-03     IWBCV122AO                                                               j M VALVE           125B             FAILS TO OPEN                                                4.76E-03     IWBCV125AO                                                               i O9WATOR FAILS    TO RECOGNIEE      NEED AND 70 OPEN RNS NOV V023                                1.60E-03     RHN-NAN 05                                                               .
94    1.23E-07        .02  IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED              1.COE+00     IEV-IDSPD CNBCK VALVE      122B              FAILS TO OPEN                                                8.76E-03     IWBCV122AO CNBCE VALVE       1248             FAILS TO OPEN                                                8.76E-03     IWBCv124AO OPERATOR FAILS   TO RECOGNIZE      NEED AND 10 OPDI RMS NOV V023                                1.60E-03     RHN-NAN 05 95    1.22E-07        .02  LDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD IRCEP121BSAE                                                                                    5.83E-05     IRCEP121BSAX PersarO11                                                                                       2.09E-03     PMDNOD11 96    1.03E-07        .02  IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WIDI RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-thSPD COISEON NODE     FAILURE OF INPUT LOGIC GROUPS                                                  1.03E-04     CCX-INPUT-LOGIC INDICATION       FAILURE                                                                        1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL
* 97    1.00E-07        .02  IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-IDSPD                                                                L IDSS OF DIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A21 SPURIOUSLY                  OPENS                         3.17E-04     IDCNOD28 IDSS OF DIST. PANEL OR BREAKER A28 SPURIOUSLY                  OPENS                         3.17E-04     IDDNOD32 98    9.53E-08        .02  IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WIDI RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD CCF OF GRAVITY    IEIECTION CHECK VALVES TO OPEN                                                1.50E-04     IWK-CV-AO PaeseOD41                                                                                       6.35E-04     PMDNOD41                                                                 l 99    9.46E-08        .02  IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVFNT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-LOSPD ORIFICE FAILURE DUE 10 PLUGGING                                                                 9.46E-05     IW20R160SPX INDICATION       FAILURE                                                                        1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL 100    9.46E-08        .02  IDSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT OCCURS                     WITH RCS DRAINED              1.00E+00     IEV-IDSPD ORIFICE FAILURE DUE TO PLUGGING                                                                 9.46E-05     IW10R170SPX INDICATION       FAILURE                                                                        1.00E-03     ALL-IND-FAIL                                                           ,
1 l
s b
I t

.       i NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REVISION 3                                                                                                 .E"
                                                                                                                 =
                                                                                                                        "E m
Re:       Shutdown PRA question from NRC letter dat;d December 22,1995 Question 720.30S (#3009)
In the shutdown PRA, many of the potential boren dilution initiating events are discussed and dropped as being not     j significant. However, since the shutdown core damage frequency is 5.5E-8 per year, the staff cannot conclude that      !
these initiators have frequencies less than this value. Based on previous screening calculations and the Surry shutdown PRA, the staff requests Westinghouse to quantify the following boron dilution events identified in the        j AP600 PRA:
: a. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) during safe shutdown using the DILUTE mode of                  ,
operation.
                                                                                                                             )
: b. CVS water injection and boron dilution during plant startup.                                             i l
: c. CVS water injection and boron dilution following a loss of offsite power event, with subsequent startup of the reactor coolant pumps.                                                                           1 1
: d. Steam generator tube rupture event with transfer of water to and from the primary circuit.

===Response===
The AP600 shutdown PRA identified several potential events which could result in a dilution of the primary system boron concentration and possible power excursion concerns. These events included:
: a. Chemical and Volume Control System operation during Safe Shutdown using the DILUTE mode of operation.
: b. CVS water injection and boron dilution during plant startup.
: c. CVS water injection and boron dilution following a loss of offsite power event, with subsequent startup of the reactor coolant pumps.
: d. Steam generator tube rupture event with transfer of water to =J fm the primary circuit.
I Dilution events during low power modes can occur for a number of reasons, including malfunctions of the makeup I control system. Regardless of the cause, the protection is the same. The chemical and volume control system is I designed to avoid and/or terminate boron dilution events by automatically closing either of the two series, safety-I related valves in the demineralized water supply line to the chemical and volume control system makeup pump I suction to isolate the dilution source. Additionally, the suction line for the chemical and volume control system I makeup pump is automatically realigned to draw borated water from the boric acid tank. The automatic boron I dilution protection signal is safety-related and is generated upon any reactor trip signal, source range Oux 1 multiplication signal, low input voltage to the Class lE de power system battery chargers, or a safety injection signal.
g                                                                                                  720.305-1(R3)

e      b NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITICNAl. INFORMATION IE 9                                                                                                      REVISION 3 I
I a. During a dilute mode, the reactor operator intentionally injects a pre-selected quantity of deminert.lized water i      from the chemical and volume control system makeup pumps at a pre-selected flow rate to the reactor coolant I      system. Postulated malfunctions of the n:akeup control system of importance to an inadvertent boron dilution I      would be a malfunction of the control system to limit the demineralized water flow rate or malfunction of the I      flow totalizer (ir.tegrator) to terminate the dilution when the requisite amount of dilute makeup water has been i      added. The makeup flow is controlled by a tiow controller. A flow control valve is controlled to maintain the i      desired total flow as sensed by the flow transn:itter. To allow the operator to verify the proper total water Dow, I      flow indication is available in the main control room. The makeup control system also receives input to I      determine that the proper flow has been established according to its automatic serpoint. If the total water flow I      deviates beyond a predetermined amount from its setpoint, a flow deviation alarm will be generated and the
                                                                                                                                )
I      makeup flow control valve will automatically close to terminate the dilution flow. Additionally, operation in I      dilute mode is a planned plant evolution. Therefore, the operators are expecting a specific response. It is            <
l      expected that any malfunctions which occur would be immediately observed, resulting in timely operator action          I i      to mitigate the dilution.
I
                                                                                                                                )
I I      In the event of an inadvenent boron dilution transient during safe shutdown, the source range nuclear I      instrumentation detects an increase of 60 percent neutron flux, automatically initiates closure of the CVS I      demineralized water system isolation valves to terminate the dilution, and initiates an alarm. Additionally, the       i I      three-way blending valve in the makeup pump suction is realigned to the boric acid tank.
I                                                                                                                             l I      An event tree to estimate the magnitude of possible boron dilution frequency during safe shutdown was I      constructed. The event tree is illustrated in figure 720.305-1. The initiating event is detined to be during a i      startup dilute operation, the plant control system fails to term:nate the dilution process, and failure of either the 1      operator to manually terminate the dilution process or failure of the manual controls. The initiating event is         j l      calculated as follows:
I I           IEV = SU_FREQ * (AUTO _CTL
* MAN _CTL + AUTO _CTL
* OPERATOR) l I      Where:
1 1           SU_FREQ =                       Startup Frequency = 2.7 events / year I
I                                           This value is based on the shutdown frequency used in the shutdown PRA.
I I                     AUTO _CTL =           Failure probability of automatic dilution control function = 1.0E-03 I
I                     MAN _CTL =            Conditional probability of manual control failure, given automatic control I                                           failure = 0.1 1
I                                           These values are based upon similar fault tree models for the calculation of I                                           other initiating event frequencies in the shutdown PRA. These values are 720.305-2(R3)
W Westinghouse

e    e NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REVISION 3                                                                                                E
* s 1                                      deemed to be conservative since the mission time for the dilution event is i                                      much shorter, and the loss of power failure mode terminates the dilution I                                      process by causing the air operated derr.neralized water isolation valves to fail j i                                      closed.                                                                           i l
l                 OPERATOR =           Failure of the operator to recognize the flow mismatch condition and realign I                                      the CVS for boration = 1.39E-02 I
I                                      Since dilution in this mode is a planned process, the operator will be I                                      monitoring the boron dilution process. Therefore, given failure of automatic 1                                      isolation of dilute water from the makeup pumps on a flow deviation alarm, I                                      the operator is expected to be cognizant of the situation, respond to the alarm I                                      cue, and immediately close the demineralized water isolation valves or realign I                                      the three-way pump suctica valve to the boric acid tank. As a worst case I                                      scenario, it is assumed that the operator has a time window of five minutes I                                      from the time the flow deviation alarm is generated until the time that a high I                                      flux alarm is generated to perform this action. Since the dilution process is     l I                                      being closely monitored, the actual time for the operator to respond to the       !
I                                      alarm cue and operate one of the three valves is estimated to be less than five i                                      minutes. No detailed evaluation is conducted for this human error. As an I                                      estimate, the human error probability of 1.39E-02, evaluated for RCS-l                                      MANOD2S, is assigned to this action. RCS-MANOD2S is evaluated in l                                      Section 54.8 and in Attachment I to RAI 720.291.
I I       Therefore; 1
I                  IEV = 2.7/yr * (IE-3
* 0.1 + IE-3
* 1.39E-2) = 2.7E-4 + 3.8E-5 = 3.08E-04/yr.
I                                                                                                                        I I       Therefore, the first node of the event tree represents the initiating event with a frequency of 3.03E-04/yr.
l l
1       From the initiating event frequency calculation shown above, failures that involve human error are shown I       to represent 12.2 percent of the initiating event frequency; (i.e., the human error fraction of the initiating I       event frequency is: (2.7 x 1.0E-03 x 1.39E-02) / 3.08E-04 = 0.122). Therefore, the fraction of the initiating I       event frequency attributed to hardware-related failures is 0.878. These values are shown in node 2.
I I       The second node of the event tree splits the initiating event into two conditional components. One portion I        is directed at mitigation activities following human errors in the initiating event (lower path). The other I       portion is directed at mitigation following only failures of the automatic and manual controller (upper path).
I       This distinction is made so the proper conditional failures can be assigned to operator actions credited later I        in the event (specifically in ncde 7.)
i I        If the dilution event occurs, the protection and safety monitoring system source range nuclear I        instrumentation will detect an increase of neutron flux, automatically initiate valve movement to isolate the I       demineralized water system isolation valves and generate a high flux alarm. This action is shown in the 720.305-3(R3)

,     a NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL. INFORMATION P                                                                                                       REVISION 3 I        third node of the event tree. Failure of a high Dux signal is assigned a probability of 1.0E-04 based on data i        provided in Chapter 26 and RAI response 720.307.
I l        Assuming the automatic signal is generated by the protection and safety monitoring system, mechanical I        failure of both demineralized water supply line isolation valves in addition to failure of the three-way pump I        suction valve will prevent boron dilution protection. Node 5 of the event tree models the closure of the i        demineralized water supply line isolation valves. A common cause failure probability of 8.8E-05/d is I        applied based on a random failure per demand rate of 1.0E-03 (these valves are tested quarterly) and a beta i        factor of 8.8E-02. Node 6 of the event tree models the realignment of the three-way valve on the suction i        side of the makeup pumps. The random failure probability of this valve is 1.0E-03.
I 1        If the automatic protection and safety monitoring system actuation fails, the operator can manually initiate I        closure (via the protection and safety monitoring system) of the demineralized water line isolation valves I        or realign the three-way valve to draw suction from the boric acid tank . The operator will perform this I        action in response to either a makeup flow deviation alarm or a high Hux signal. Failure of this manual I        action could result from a manual control hardware or software failure or failure of the operator to perform I        the appropriate actions. Node 4 of the event tree models the availability of the manual signal given failure I        of the automatic signal. The manual signal path is assigned a conditional failure probability of 0.1. This I        value is assigned based upon information contained in Chapter 26 and RAI response 720.307.
I I        Operator action to close the demineralized water isolation valves or realign the three-way valve to the i        borated water source is modeled in node 7 of the event tree. As previously stated, the operator is expected I        to be monitoring the dilution process. Therefore, given failure of the automatic isolation of boron dilution I        on a high flux signal, the; operator is expected to be cognizant of the situation, respond to the high nur I        count or now deviation alann, and immediately close the demineralized water isolation valves or realign I        the three-way pump suction valve. A time window of 15 minutes is assumed from the high Dux alarm to I        criticality. Since the dilution process is being closely monitored, the actual time for the operator to respond I        to the alarm cue and isolate one of the three valves is estimated to be less than five minutes. No detailed i        evaluation is conducted for this human e: Tor. The human error probability of 1.39E-02 is assigned to this I        action when treated as an independent operator error. Where assessed to be dependent on the previous I        action to monitor the dilution process and respond to the now devution alarm, a moderate dependency I        human error probability is assigned to this action.
I I        The operator can also terminate a boron dilution by tripping the chemical and volume control system I         makeup pumps. This action is modeled in node 8 of the event tree. This action can be performed as an I        alternate means of terminating the dilution. Given the relatively short time window of 15 minutes, this I        operator action is given a high dependency on the previous operator action. Therefore, a HEP of 0.5 is I        assigned to this operator action.
J i
I i
no. sos 4(R3)                                                                                         g           ,   l

a
* NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REVISION 3                                                                                                  # E5 j
l l
l       As shown in the event tree (figure 720.305-1), the sequences that lead to criticality end states are sequences i       4,7,8,12,15 and 16. For this assessment, the criticality end states are conservatively assumed to lead to I       core damage. The estimated frequencies for these criticality end states are:
1                                                                                                                          I I                  Sequence 4 = 1.2E-II/yr i                  Sequence 7 = 1.7E-10/yr i                  Sequence 8 = 2.7E-09/yr i                  Sequence 12 = 1.7E-12/yr i                  Sequence 15 = 2.5E-10/yr                                                                                l l                  Sequence 16 = 3.8E-10/yr l       The total criticality end state frequency for this boron dilution event is assessed to be 3.5E-09 events per 1       year. The low power / shutdown core damage frequency was calculated to be 5.5E-08 events per year. The I       projected contribution for this dilution scenario to the total low power / shutdown core damage frequency I       is approximately six percent. Therefore, the frequency of dilution during safe shutdown should not result i       in a significant increase in the total low power / shutdown core damage frequency.
I I b. The plant is in startup mode only for the purpose of startup testing at the beginning of each cycle. During i       this mode of operation, rod control is in manual. Normal action taken to change power level, either up or I       down, require operator actuation. This mode of operation is a transitory operational mode in which the I       operator intentionally dilutes and withdraws control rods to take the plant critical. For a normal approach I       to criticality, the operator manually initiates a limited dilution and then manually withdraws the control rods; I       a process that takes several hours. The Technical Specifications require that the operator determine the I       estimated critical position of the control rods prior to approaching criticality, thus providing confidence that I       the reactor does not go critical with the control rods below the insertion limits. Once critical, the power i       escalation is slow enough to allow the operator to manually block the source range reactor trip after I       receiving the P-6 permissive signal from the intermediate range detectors. Too fast of a power escalation I       (due to an unknown dilution) would result in reaching P-6 unexpectedly, leaving insufficient time to i       manually block the source range reactor trip. Failure to perform this manual action results in a reactor trip I       and immediate shutdown of the reactor.
1 I       As discussed above, boron dilution protection logic isolates the dilution source on a reactor trip. Therefore, I       the plant response to terminate an inadvertent boron dilution event during startup is the same as for safe i       shutdown. The event tree model addresses both postulated dilution scenarios with the conclusion that the I       frequency of an inadvertent boron dilution during safe shutdown would not result in a significant increase I       in the core damage frequency.
I I c. Following a loss of offsite power, the demineralized water isolation valves automatically close on low input I        voltage to the Class IE de power system battery chargers. The three way suction valve in the suction line I        for the CVS makeup pumps is automatically realigned to draw borated water from the boric acid tank. The i       unborated water is supplied to the CVS makeup pumps from the demineralized water system pumps. Since I       the demineralized water system pumps will not be available following a loss of offsite power, the unborated I       water source from the CVS to the RCS is unavailable. Additionally, the CVS makeup pumps are I       automatically sequenced on to the diesel generator but do not start automatically. Boron dilution events 720.305-5(R3) g

NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
    @"                                                                                                     REVISION 3
         ]
I          resulting from unborated slugs of water when the reactor coolant pumps are started is discussed in the I          response to RAI 440.120.
I I   d. Boron dilution following a steam generator tube rupture event with transfer of water to and from the i          primary circuit is evaluated for the AP600. In conventional PWRs, it has been postulated that dilute reactor I          coolant could collect in the crossover leg and cause a criticality problem if the associate 1 reactor coolant I          pump were subsequently restarted. Since the AP600 does not contain a crossover leg, the amount of dilute I          water that could collect in the reactor coolant system is limited. Dilute water entering from the secondary I          side to the primary side would enter the cold leg and sufficiently mix prior to entering the core. The I          amount of water that could collect in the reactor coolant pump is limited. Evaluations have been performed I          that show that if the reactor coolant pump collected unborated water following a steam genentor tube I          rupture, subsequent startup of that pump would not cause a boron dilution event.
I I          To provide additional protection against the possibility of an unborated slug of water being directly injteted I          into the core, the AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines instruct the operator to restart a reactor coonnt I          pump in the opposite loop of a faulted steam generator during recovery from a tube rupture event. Th?s I          operation will cause reverse flow in the faulted tteam generator, thus mixing any unborated water in the i          steam generator, prior to it entering the core.
I I          Based on the above considerations, boron dilution events following a steam generator tube rupture are not      .
I          credible events for the AP600. This issue is discussed in the response to RAI 440.120.                         l l
l l PRA Revision: None.
l 720.305-6(R3)
W Westinghouse

_      . ~ - ~ . ~ . .           .-.n.          .            . ~ . - . .         .. .. - - . - - .                . _ _ . . - - . -             ...
NOIE I                                        NODE 2        NOIE 3           NODE 4            NODE 5                   NODE 6                 NODE 7                  - NODE 8      END STATE            END DILUTION EVENT                                         liARIKJARE      lilGH FLUX      M ANUAL PMS         CVS-Vl36A            3-WAY CVS-                 OPB2AT O                 OPERATO                               STQTE         -
OCCURS DURING                                          FAILURE &        (AUTO PMS)      OUTPUT              ORBAUTO..            Vil5 AUTO.                  RECOGNIZES              STOPS CVS        (CR =                FREQ STARTUP DUE TO                                         HUMAN           SIGNAL          SIGNAL              CLOSES TO            REALIGNS TO                 HIFLUX                  MAKE-UP          CRITICAL.
FAILURE OF THE                                        ERROR            GENERATED       AVAILABLE           ISOLATE              BORATE                     COUNT AND                PUMPS            ITY END                             -
PLS AUTOMATIC                                          RATICS                          (GIVEN AUTO         DEMIN.                                          CLOSES                                    STATE)
CONTROL AND                                            (FRACTIONS                       OUTPUT              WATER                                           Vl36A OR B,                                                                        ,
FAILURE OF                                            OFREV                            SIGNAL              SOURCE                                          OR REALIGNS EITHER THE                                             FREQUENCY)                       FAILURE)                                                            Vil5 OPERAT(Mt OR i    PLS MANUAL CONTROL IOK                 2.7E4Wyr 2OK                 2.4E-08/yr 8.8E-05                                                                                   3OK                  l.2E-II/yr 1.0E-03 l
0 878                                                                                                                           0.5              4 CR                 I.2E-l1/yr 5 OK                3.1E-08/yr l                                                                                                                                                                                                         6OK                 1.7E-10/yr I
        ;                                                                                                                                                                1.39E-02 1.0E-04                                                                                                     0.5              7 CR                I.7E-10fyr
{
3 08E4M/vr                                                                              0.1                                                                                                           8CR                2.7E-09/yr 9OK                 3.8E-05/yr           !
         !                                                                                                                                                                                                        10 OK               3.3E4N/yr
                                                                                  !                                     8.8E-05                                                                                   11 OK               l.7E-12/yr 1.0E-03 0.122                                                                                                                        0.5               12 CR               I.7E-12/yr 13OK               2.9E4)9/yr 14 OK              2.5E-10ryr 0.15 1.0E-M                                                                                                    0.5                15 CR              2.5E-10/yr 0.1                                                                                                           16 CR              3.8E-10/yr Total Criticality End State Frequency (CR) = 3.5E4N/yr
-s t s,                                                                                         Finure 720.305-1: Dilution Durina Startup From Safe Shukiown
.n I
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NRC REQUEST FOR ADDmONAL INFORMATION F.                        5  e                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        REVISION 3                                     l i
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