View source for Information Notice 2005-08, Monitoring Vibration to Detect Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Coolant Pump and Reactor Recirculation Pump Shafts

{{Adams
| number = ML050730093
| issue date = 04/05/2005
| title = Monitoring Vibration to Detect Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Coolant Pump and Reactor Recirculation Pump Shafts
| author name = Hiland P L
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DIPM/IROB
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = 
| docket = 05000354
| license number = NPF-057
| contact person = Telson,  R  - NRR/DIPM/IROB - 415-2256
| case reference number = TAC MC6269
| document report number = IN-05-008
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| page count = 5
| revision = 0
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555April 5, 2005NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-08:MONITORING VIBRATION TO DETECTCIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING OF REACTORCOOLANT PUMP AND REACTORRECIRCULATION PUMP SHAFTS

==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who havepermanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removedfrom the reactor vessel.

==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alertaddressees to the importance of timely detection of circumferential cracking of reactor coolantpump (RCP) and reactor recirculation pump (RRP) shafts to minimize the likelihood ofconsequential shaft failures. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities andconsider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problem However, the suggestions in this INare not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
General Electric (GE) Nuclear Services Information Letter (SIL) 459-S2, issued October 21,1991, informed GE boiling water reactor (BWR) owners of shaft cracking in RRP The rootcause was determined to be fatigue initiated by thermal stresses that, combined withmechanical stresses, caused cracks to propagat GE recommended countermeasuresincluding shaft vibration monitoring, inspection of shafts with greater than 80,000 hours ofservice, and measures to reduce mechanical and thermal stresses.At Hope Creek, RRPs had accumulated over 130,000 hours of service without pump shaftinspection The licensee had operated the B RRP for several refueling cycles with vibrationlevels approaching vendor limit During this time, the licensee also identified failed anddegraded RRP seals and concluded that the most likely causes of the failed and degraded RRPseals were a possible bow in the pump shaft and low reliability of the seal purge system. The licensee's decision to restart following the fall 2004 refueling outage without correcting thiscondition led to heightened public interest and prompted a close NRC revie The staffevaluated site-specific technical details, related domestic and international operatingexperience, and the generic safety aspects of vibration-related shaft and seal failure. Circumferential cracking of RCP and RRP shafts had previously been reported at severalfacilities including Sequoyah, Palo Verde, St. Lucie, and Grand Gul In addition, reactorcoolant pump shafts at Crystal River separated completely during operation on two occasions(see IN 86-19 and IN 89-15).The staff evaluated the licensee's determination that the Hope Creek unit could be safelyreturned to power with the existing pump shaft and the interim compensatory measuresimplemented to provide reasonable assurance that a shaft failure could be detected in itsincipient stage and operators would take prompt action to prevent the occurrence of a potentialshaft and seal failur The licensee committed to (1) replace the B pump shaft at the nextoutage of sufficient duration and to (2) establish a comprehensive program of enhancedcontinuous vibration monitoring to ensure timely detection of circumferential crack propagationwith proceduralized contingency actions for plant operators to act promptly at specifiedadministrative vibration limits to reduce pump speed or shut the pump down completel Thesame monitoring regime was implemented for the A RRP.The Hope Creek licensee implemented a program to continuously monitor the synchronousspeed (1X) vibration amplitude, two times synchronous speed (2X) vibration amplitude, 1Xphase angle, and 2X phase angl These parameters provide a more sensitive leadingindicator of circumferential crack initiation and propagation giving the operators enough time torespon Alarm limits were established using the ASME OM standard, "Reactor Coolant andRecirculation Pump Condition Monitoring." GE SIL 459 indicates that all Byron Jackson (now Flowserve) RRP shafts inspected haveshown some degree of thermally induced crackin The cracking occurs near the pumpthermal barrier where the cold seal purge system water mixes with the hot reactor coolantwate The cracks initiate as axial cracks in the pump shaf Axial cracks are generally benign,grow slowly, and do not affect the operation of the pum However, given sufficient mechanicalloads, the axial cracks can change direction and propagate circumferentiall The time it takesto transition from slow-growing axial cracks to more rapidly growing circumferential cracksdepends on the magnitude of the mechanical loads on the pump shaf It could take year Onthe other hand, circumferential shaft cracking can propagate rapidly and, if not detected early,may result in complete severance of the shaft.Circumferential shaft cracking or shaft separation could result in pump damage anddegradation or failure of the pump seal package resulting in leakage of reactor coolant throughclearances around the upper portion of the pump shaf However, at Crystal River - where theonly two instances of shaft failure occurred at domestic nuclear power plants - there was noevidence of seal degradatio A loss-of-coolant accident can occur if leakage through the sealsof a RRP or RCP exceeds the capacity of the normal makeup system Thus circumferentialshaft cracking that leads to shaft or seal failure is a safety concer As noted above, vibration-monitoring systems are available to detect circumferential cracking ofpump shaft As circumferential cracks propagate, the stiffness of the pump shaft changes. These changes are detectable through changes in the pump vibration signature prior to shaftfailur Although overall pump vibration limits are necessary for assessing gaps and clearancesin the pump, they are not the most appropriate indicator of shaft crackin Monitoring the 1Xand 2X steady-state vectors (1X and 2X amplitudes and phase angles) provides a betterindication of changes in shaft integrity resulting from circumferential crack propagation. Licensees should be alert to the possibility of circumferential RCP or RRP shaft cracking andshould evaluate the information in this IN and determine what actions, if any, are prudent toprovide early detection of circumferential shaft cracking and prevent failure of RRP or RCPshafts and shaft seals.GENERIC IMPLICATIONSA significant number (about half) of the BWR RRP pump shafts currently in service are olderand have more hours of operation than those at Hope Creek and many have not beeninspected as recommended in GE SIL 459-S2.About a half-dozen BWR RRPs were identified as having higher vibration levels than HopeCree Such issues would not necessarily be reported to the NR The staff contacted threeBWR licensees whose plants had been reported to have higher vibration levels than HopeCree The three plants included Susquehanna Units 1 and 2, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3,and Browns Ferry Units 2 and The staff discussed with each licensee how it monitors pumpvibration, the vibration acceptance criteria used, and why the current vibration levels areacceptabl These licensees indicated that they have either replaced their pump shafts (or willin the near future) or are taking steps to monitor RRP vibration and have establishedacceptance criteria to detect anomalous behavior.Operating experience suggests that pressurized water reactor (PWR) RCPs are not immune tovibration-related shaft and seal failure concerns similar to BWR RRP concern PWR RCP sealfailure can be more safety significant than BWR RRP seal failure because (1) PWR reactorcoolant systems operate at higher pressures, increasing the differential pressure across thepump seals and (2) PWR RCPs, unlike BWR RRPs, typically can not be isolated from thereactor coolant system following a seal failur In addition, while a number of BWR RRP shaftshave cracked, several PWR RCP shafts have completely severe IN 2005-08 }}

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