View source for 05000259/LER-1983-018, Updated LER 83-018/031-2:on 830325,while Performing SI 4.2.A-13,standby Gas Train B Found Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Mcdonnel & Miller Flow Switch.Switch Replaced & SI 4.7.B-1 & SI 4.7.A-13 Completed

{{Adams
| number = ML20094D881
| issue date = 07/27/1984
| title = Updated LER 83-018/031-2:on 830325,while Performing SI 4.2.A-13,standby Gas Train B Found Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Mcdonnel & Miller Flow Switch.Switch Replaced & SI 4.7.B-1 & SI 4.7.A-13 Completed
| author name = Carter S, Jones G
| author affiliation = TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
| docket = 05000259
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = LER-83-018-031, LER-83-18-31, NUDOCS 8408090020
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 3
}}
{{LER
| Title = Updated LER 83-018/031-2:on 830325,while Performing SI 4.2.A-13,standby Gas Train B Found Inoperable.Caused by Erratic Mcdonnel & Miller Flow Switch.Switch Replaced & SI 4.7.B-1 & SI 4.7.A-13 Completed
| Plant = 
| Reporting criterion = 
| Power level = 
| Mode = 
| Docket = 05000259
| LER year = 2083
| LER number = 18
| LER revision = 
| Event date = 
| Report date = 
| ENS = 
| abstract = 
}}

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              ;*                                                                                 Update Raport - Previous Report Data 2/21/84 M F4MM 366                                                         U.Q. RUCLOA2 OOKULATffGY C$MMIS$gM                                                                              APP 4 Veli LY OMB UCENSEE EVENT REPORT                                                                                     8858 88 "
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h o2 l During normal operation on units 1. 2. and 3. while performine SI 4.2.A-13.                                                                                                                      l 1013 [ l standbv Ras (SBGT) train "B"                                           was found inonerable duo to orrnric F1 nu cuierb                                                                          l l o l 4 l l FS-65-42A (T.S. 3.7.B.3 and T.S. Table 3.2. A) . The SBGT system is common to                                                                                                                 I l o Is l l all three units. There was no effect on public health or safety.                                                                                                 T.S.3.7.B.3                   l o6 l permits operation for 7 days with one train inoperable. SBGT train                                                                                                             "A" and            l l 0 l 7 l ! "C" were available and operable.                                             SBGT train          "B"   was inoperable for about                                                               I o a l 12 hours.                                                                                                                                                                                        l
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h 11 l o l l "B" SBGT train was inoperable due to erratic McDonnel and Miller flow switch.                                                                                                                  l l 1 l 1 l l Model AF-1.                      The switch was renlaced and SI 4.7.B-1 nnd RT 4.2.A-l'4 unrn                                                                                                 l 2 l successfully completed. The paddle-type switches are to be replaced                                                                                                                            l 1 3      l with dif ferential pressure switches ner the BFNP NRC Integrated Commirmone                                                                                                                l 1 4      l Schedule. Replacement is currentiv scheduled for December 1985.                                                                                                                            I
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T:nnessco Vall;y Authcrity-                                              F:rm DF 17 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant                                                   BF 15.2 2/17/82 l'                                       LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 1.
BFRO      259/ 83018 R2 Technical Specification Involved    3.7.B.3 Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b. (2)
* Date Due NRC_ 08/01/84 Event Narrative:
[-         Unit 1 was operating at 87 percent power, unit 2 was operating at 68 percent power, and unit 3 was operating at 100 percent power. All three units were affected by this event. The standby 3as treatment system is common to units 1,
    ,               2, and 3. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.2.A-13, Calibration of Flow Switches for Standby Cas Treatment System Train A, B, and C Heaters, standby gas treatment train "B" was found inoperable due to erratic flow switch FS-65-42A (Technical Specification J.7.B.3 and Technical Specification Table 3.2.A). There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 allows operation for 7 days with one train inoperable.
Standby gas treatment trains "A" and "C" were available and operable. "B" train was inoperable for about 12 hours. The flow switch was replaced and S14.7.B-1, Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test, and SI 4.2.A-13 were successfully completed.
The cause for the erratic operation of the flow switch could not be determined; however, the most probable cause for failure was a weak tension spring.
The paddle-type flow switches on trains "A" and "B" were expected to be replaced f                with differential pressure switches similar to those installed on "C" train by February 15, 1984.
Due to incomplete design information and material delays, this modification will be implemented in accordance with the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Integrated Commitment Schedule. It is currently scheduled to be performed during December,1985.
This update report is also an update to LER 259/83029 RI.
* Previous Similar Events:
i' None I
L i
l lletention:   Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor
* Revision :     h                                                      .
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o .,
e   e TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY                               !
CHATTANOOG A. TE NNESSEE 37401 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602 July 27, 1984 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

==Dear Sir:==

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR REPORTABI.E OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/83018 R2 Tne enclosed updated report provides details concerning standby gas train "B" found inoperable due to erratio flow switch. This report is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2).
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
: 0. T. Jones Plant Manager Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Enclosure oo (Enclosure):
Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30303 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA          30339 NRC Resident Inspector, BFN 9, I An Equal Oppor tumty Ernployer
             . _ . . , -_  _ , _ _ , _ _ _           . _ . . _     _          __ _
}}

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