View source for Information Notice 2013-07, Premature Degradation of Spent Fuel Storage Cask Structures and Components From Environmental Moisture

{{Adams
| number = ML12320A697
| issue date = 04/16/2013
| title = Premature Degradation of Spent Fuel Storage Cask Structures and Components From Environmental Moisture
| author name = Lombard M
| author affiliation = NRC/NMSS/SFST
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = 
| docket = 
| license number = 
| contact person = Allen W C
| document report number = IN-13-007
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| page count = 6
| revision = 0
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ML12320A697 April 16, 2013 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2013-07: PREMATURE DEGRADATION OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASK STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL MOISTURE 

==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of, applicants for, and registered users of spent fuel storage system certificates of compliance (CoCs) as well as all holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) license under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High- Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste."

==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of recent operating experience on environmental moisture causing premature degradation of structures and components important to safety during spent nuclear fuel storage operation The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problem However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is require DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station ISFSI On October 11, 2010, a cask seal pressure monitoring system low pressure alarm was received for Cask TN-68-01 during storage at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station ISFS Cask TN-
68-01 is a bolted closure cask system with a double mechanical O-ring seal (cask lid seal) that provides confinement between the lid and cask interface. The cask had been in service at Peach Bottom since June 200 Figure 1 shows a cross sectional view of the lid region for a TN-68 cas A protective cover was installed on the lid region to protect the system from external weatherin During disassembly and removal of the protective cover, the licensee found streaks of rust on the underside of the cover, a pronounced pattern of rust directly under the access plate, and water or signs of moisture around most of the bolt lid holes and bolt The licensee found the elastomer O-ring seal on the bottom of the protective cover to be completely intact and sealed against the top of the cask li After performing a sequence of helium leak tests, the licensee identified that the outer sealing surface of the main cask lid seal was leaking at a rate greater than allowed by the CoC technical specification The licensee returned the spent fuel assemblies to the spent fuel pool to perform additional inspections on the cask lid and seal The initial evaluation revealed corrosion of the outer portion of the cask lid seal, lower than expected torque on some of the main lid bolts, and corrosion on the threads of the lid bolt The inner portion of the cask lid seal remained intact; therefore, the cask's primary confinement was not compromise A root cause evaluation concluded that the seal leakage was caused by corrosion of the outer portion of the cask lid seal from water infiltration through the access plate in the protective cove The water infiltration caused galvanic corrosion of the outer portion of the cask lid seal due to the presence of moisture at the interface of the aluminum-clad cask lid seal and the stainless steel clad cask body sealing surfac The presence of the moisture at the interface of the two dissimilar metals set up a galvanic cell that caused the aluminum to corrode and allowed helium to leak through the outer portion of the cask lid sea The root cause evaluation further stated that the helium leak was attributed to inadequate sealing of the access plate in the protective cover and a lack of any verification of the integrity of the water-tight cove The primary corrective actions developed by the cask vendor and the licensee involved improving the access plate design and developing a method for verifying protective cover seal integrit Additional corrective actions, which were incorporated into operating procedures immediately after the event, included a change to the lid bolt torquing process and ensuring access plate gaskets and O-rings were inspected at installatio Figure 1 Additional information is available in "Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station-NRC Inspection Report 05000277/12010010," dated July 8, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML111890441).

Three Mile Island, Unit 2 ISFSI at the Idaho National Laboratory Site The Three Mile Island, Unit 2 ISFSI uses NUHOMS-12T horizontal storage modules (HSMs). The HSMs were delivered to the Idaho National Laboratory site in 1999 as precast concrete component The storage system consists of an external rectangular reinforced concrete vault (i.e., HSM) with a storage canister resting horizontally on internal rails inside the HS The prefabricated modules consist of a body and a roof joined together by anchor bolt All sections were a minimum of 0.6-meters (2-feet) thic In 2000, the licensee noted cracks in the HSMs, and concluded they were cosmetic and insignifican However, in 2007, the licensee observed continued cracking, crazing and spalling as well as increased efflorescence on the HSM surface The efflorescence was a solid, whitish crystalline material which was determined through sampling and analysis to be calcium carbonat The licensee performed an evaluation in 2007, during which it determined that the HSMs were capable of performing their design basis function In 2008, the licensee noted that 28 of the 30 HSMs had cracks, mostly emanating from the anchor bolt blockout holes with widths up to 0.95 centimeters (0.38 inches).

At that time, the licensee determined that the HSMs appeared to be prematurely deteriorating and that continued crack growth could impact the ability of the HSMs to fulfill their originally planned 50-year design service lif Subsequent evaluations by the licensee initiated the development of an annual inspection plan for the HSMs and base mat as well as an examination of the inside of the HSM The evaluation also recommended that the licensee retain the services of a company experienced and qualified in testing and evaluating concrete to determine the degradation mechanism and make recommendations both for repairs and to prevent further degradatio Although the cracking was discussed with the storage system vendor, the licensee chose an independent vendor to perform an evaluation of the HSMs and base mat concrete in 200 The evaluation included a field investigation and laboratory analysis to evaluate the concrete material quality, strength, and long-term durability potentia The conclusion reached was that water had entered the anchor bolt blockout holes on the roof of the HSM Subsequent freeze and thaw cycles initiated the crack formatio Repetition of the process resulted in both continued crack growth and the efflorescence growth identified in 200 In addition to identifying the root cause of the cracking, the report also suggested repairs (injecting resin into the cracks), preventative actions (e.g., installing caps over the anchor bolt blockout holes), and monitoring (use of crack gauges). The licensee incorporated the suggested corrective action Additional information is available in "Three Mile Island, Unit 2, ISFSI-NRC Inspection of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-Inspection Report 07200020/2012-001," dated August 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12228A457).

DISCUSSION The instances described above illustrate how the intrusion of water can potentially decrease the effective life of both the structures and components of a spent fuel storage syste In one instance, the presence of water not only caused chemical degradation through oxidation of one metal, but it also facilitated the formation of a galvanic cell between two dissimilar metals that contributed to the degradation of the secondary confinement barrier of the storage syste In another instance, water contributed to an accelerated aging process of concrete structures of the spent fuel storage syste Water entered cracks and crevices around the anchor bolt blockout holes in the concrete structure, and when subjected to freezing temperatures, generated mechanical forces that produced cracks in the concret These cracks provided additional and larger pathways for water to enter the interior of the concrete which resulted in larger cracks from subsequent freezing temperatures and promoted efflorescenc If remedial actions had not been taken, this accelerated aging process could have inhibited the ability of the concrete structure to perform its design function of protecting the canister system containing the radioactive material, as well as protecting personnel from ionizing radiation, during normal and accident condition The effects of weathering and environmental moisture may lead to degradation of structures, systems, and component Several phenomena are discussed in NUREG-1536, "Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems at a General License Facility," NUREG-1567, 
"Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities," and Table D-1 of NUREG-1927, "Standard Review Plan for Renewal of Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System Licensees and Certificates of Compliance" (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML101040620, ML003686776, and ML111020115, respectively). Identifying potential moisture entry points, such as cracks, crevices and joints in both vertical and horizontal storage systems, can facilitate the incorporation of gaskets and sealing materials into both the design of and maintenance of spent nuclear fuel storage systems to minimize premature degradation of structures and components important to safet Adequate drainage of the base mat (i.e., ISFSI pad) may also prove advantageous for the following reason First, pooled water may cause premature degradation of the base ma Second, since humidity and deliquescence have been shown to contribute to stress corrosion cracking in marine environments (see Information Notice IN2012-20, ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12139A440), the combination of pooled water and heat from canisters containing irradiated spent nuclear fuel could produce humid conditions within the storage syste These examples show the importance of periodically monitoring the physical condition of a spent nuclear fuel storage syste By obtaining baseline measurements and performing periodic evaluations, accelerated degradation can be detected before the structures and components of a storage system are unable to perform their intended function, and corrective actions can be implemente Such information may prove useful in assessing aging management in license renewal application 

==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written respons Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation (SFST) project manage /RA/
Mark Lombard, Director Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Technical Contacts: Chris Allen, NMSS/SFST 301-492-3148 E-mail: william.allen@nrc.gov John Nicholson, R-I/DNMS 610-337-5236 E-mail: john.nicholson@nrc.gov Lee Brookhart, R-IV/DNMS 817-200-1549 E-mail: lee.brookhart@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Librar 

==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written respons Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation (SFST) project manage /RA/ 

Mark Lombard, Director Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Technical Contacts: Chris Allen, NMSS/SFST 301-492-3148 E-mail: william.allen@nrc.gov John Nicholson, R-I/DNMS 610-337-5236 E-mail: john.nicholson@nrc.gov Lee Brookhart, R-IV/DNMS 817-200-1549 E-mail: lee.brookhart@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Librar ADAMS Accession No. ML12320A697 OFC: SFST Technical Editor BC:RIV/NMSS/RSFS BC:RI/NMSS/Dec NAME: WAllen KAzariah-Kribbs via e-mail BSpitzberg via e-mail MFerdas via e-mail DATE: 11/9/12 11/14/12 1/18/13 2/14/13 OFC: BC:SFST/RIO BC:SFST/LB D:SFST NAME: EBenner MSampson MLombard DATE: 3/4/13 3/22/13 4/ 10 /13, 4/16/2013 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}

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