View source for 05000346/LER-1982-028

{{Adams
| number = ML20055A600
| issue date = 07/09/1982
| title = LER 82-028/03L-0:on 820611,during Performance of Svc Water Refueling Test,Swing Check Valve SW44 Would Not Close.Caused by Design Error in Selection of Matls for Use in Svc Water Environ.Internals Cleaned & Valve Successfully Tested
| author name = Thompson T
| author affiliation = TOLEDO EDISON CO.
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION &amp; ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| docket = 05000346
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = LER-82-028-03L, LER-82-28-3L, TAC-48561, NUDOCS 8207190231
| package number = ML20055A597
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 2
}}
{{LER
| Title =  
| Plant = 
| Reporting criterion = 
| Power level = 
| Mode = 
| Docket = 05000346
| LER year = 2082
| LER number = 28
| LER revision = 
| Event date = 
| Report date = 
| ENS = 
| abstract = 
}}

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REPORT 0 ATE J                  60             61               DOCK ET NUVB E R             68              EVENT DATE EVENT DESCHIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h E l (NP-33-82-34) On June 11, 1982 during the performance of the Service Water Refuelina l E l Test ST 5075.02, it was found that swing check valve SW44 would not close. This                                                                                         l g l valve is located in the Service Water Tunnel on the return line from the Component                                                                                      l g l Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 1-2.' Surveillance Requirements of 4.0.5 could not be met'.;
p l There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel, j                                                                                           ,
E LThe ability of the unit to remove decay heat from the reactor core was not affected                                                                                     j g j by this occurrence.                                                                                                                                                    80 l
8 9 SYSTEM              CAUSE            CAUSE                                                      COMP.           VALVE CODE               CODE         SUBCODE                   C09PONENT CODE                    SUBCODE          SUBCODE E                             I W I A l h [E_j@ l B l h l yl Al Ll VI E l X lh [C_j @ [.2,j @
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[))@ WQ 41                42 l43Al@         lV 44 l0 l8 l5 l@47 CADSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 2 l_The apparent                        cause is a design error in the selection of materials for use in the                                                                   l Although the hinge pin is made of stainless                                                            I E l service water environment.
y l steel, the remainder of the valve is made of carbon steel. The corrosion products                                                                                          l g l forming on those parts caused the disc to freeze in an open position.                                                                             Under WO 82-            l 3 l 1790 and 82-1809 the internals were removed, disassembled, and cleaned. The valve wasl 8 9                                                                                            successfully tested on June 13, 1982.                               80 gg g, STATUS             *.POWE R                          OTHER STATL'S             DISCOVERY                              DISCOVERY DESCR PTif)N E lG l@ l0l0l0l@l                                          NA                        l     lBl@l            ST 5075.02                                                        l ACTIVITY     CONTENT RELEASED OF RELE ASE                       AYOUNT OF ACTIVITY                                                         LOCATION OF RELEASE E [_KJ@ l3l@l                                NA                                      l          l    NA                                                                       l PERSONNE L E XPOS          ES NUYBER               TYPE         DESCRIPTION E I 010101@l al@l                                      NA                                                                                                                     l PERSONNE L INJUR ES NUWE R               D E SCRIPTION E l8 el  9 0101@l NA  11        12                                                                                                                                      80 l
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    #82-071             g4ytogpngpangg                 Tim Thompson

.                                                                                                   i o
TOLED ' EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMEhTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-82-34 DATE OF EVENT: June 11, 1982 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1                                                             _
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:      Swing check valve SW44 in service water system stuck open, a
Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.
Description of Occurrence: On June 8, 1982, operations personnel reported that service water system swing check valve SW44 failed its reverse flow test.          This was discovered during performance of surveillance test ST 5075.02. This test was performed to meet. the requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME code class 1, 2, and 3 components as specified in the Technical Specifica-tions, Section 4.0.5. The unit did not enter an action statement as a result        _
of this failure.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this oc-currence is a component failure. Although the hinge pin, which provides "
the pivot point for the disc, is manufactured from stainless steel, the re-mainder of the valve is carbon steel. The corrosive environment of the service            -
water system caused the disc to freeze in its normally open position.
    . Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the pub-lic or to station personnel. The ability of the unit to remove decay heat from the reactor core was not affected by this occurrence.
Corrective Action: Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 82-1790 was initiated to in-vestigate the problem and on June 11, 1982 the valve cover was removed for in-          _
ternals inspection. The disc was found in the open position and efforts to move the disc failed. The valve seized due to internal corrosion and the buildup of corrosion Products at pivot points.       The disc assembly was removed, disassembled, and thoroughly cleaned. The threads on the mounting stud portion of the disc were deteriorated such that the disc nut would thread on but was free to wobble.            ,
MWO 82-1809 was issued to provide an additional tack weld between the disc and disc nut to stake the disc nut in position.        The valve disc assembly was rein-stalled and the valve put back into service. SW44 successfully passed its reverse flow test as per ST 5075.02 on June 13, 1982 at 0415.
Failure Data: A similar problem was reported in NP-33-78-56 (78-046).
LER (182-028 1
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