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Issue Date: 05/19/05 K-1 0609, App K
Appendix K
MAINTENANCE RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS
1.0 OBJECTIVE
To determine the significance of inspection findings related to licensee assessment and
management of risk associated with performing maintenance activities under all plant
operating or shutdown conditions in accordance with Baseline Inspection Procedure (IP)
71111.13, “Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control.”
2.0 BASIS
NRC requirements in this area are set forth in paragraph (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65,
“Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power
Plants.” Detailed bases information for this appendix is provided in Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 308, “Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Basis Document, “ Attachment
3, Appendix K.
3.0 GENERAL GUIDANCE

Appendix K is to be used as a Phase 1/ 2 Significance Determination Process (SDP) tool
for assessing the significance of inspection findings related to compliance with
Maintenance Rule (a)(4) requirements. The input to this SDP evaluation tool is a
greater than minor inspection finding that results from the licensee's underestimate of
plant risk or lack of risk assessment from ongoing or completed maintenance activities
and/or the licensee's ineffective implementation of risk management actions (RMAs).
Examples of greater than minor inspection findings are provided in Appendix E of IMC
0612, “Power Reactor Inspection Reports.” In addition, minor and SDP screening
questions are included in Appendix B of IMC 0612. A licensee performance deficiency
of the paragraph (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65 requirements must exist for the significance of
a finding to be evaluated using this SDP. If appropriate, a more detailed assessment
may be performed in an SDP Phase 3 evaluation.
Attachment 1 provides the assumptions and defined terms used in this SDP. Flowcharts
1 and 2 are used to categorize individual inspection findings as either Green, White,
Yellow, or Red. Specifically, flowchart 1 provides guidance to determine the significance
of inspection findings related to inadequate risk assessment and risk management
actions. Flowchart 2 is to be used for evaluating the significance of failure to implement
risk management actions when the maintenance risks are adequately assessed.
It is expected that resident inspectors will support Senior Reactor Analysts (SRAs), or
other risk analysts, as necessary to assess the significance of maintenance rule a(4)
related inspection findings. 
0609, App K Issue Date: 05/19/05 K-2
Note: This guidance does not apply to the following situations: (1) those
licensees who only perform qualitative analyses of plant configuration
risk due to maintenance activities, or (2) performance deficiencies
related to maintenance activities affecting SSCs needed for fire or
seismic mitigation. When performance deficiencies are identified with
either 1 or 2 above, the significance of the deficiencies must be
determined by an internal NRC management review using risk insights
where possible in accordance with IMC 612, “Power Reactor Inspection
Reports.”
4.0 SPECIFIC GUIDANCE
Step 4.1 Determination of Actual Risk
This SDP uses the Incremental Core Damage Probability (ICDP) metric rather than
ªCDF (annualized risk increase) used in other reactor safety SDPs. The ICDP accounts
for the amount of the time in which the plant configuration change existed. Attachment
1 provides the mathematical formulas for these metrics.
The risk deficit for performance deficiencies is determined in an increasing order of
magnitude to reflect the amount of the risk increase due to an inadequate risk
assessment and lack of risk management actions. Specifically, the incremental core
damage probability deficit (ICDPD) and the incremental large early release probability
deficit (ILERPD) are the risk metrics used to evaluate the magnitude of the error in the
licensee’s inadequate risk assessment of the temporary risk increases due to
maintenance activities/configurations.
Step 4.1.1 - Licensee Evaluation of Risk
When the inspector has identified that the licensee has performed an inadequate risk
assessment, or none at all, the actual maintenance risk configuration-specific CDF must
first be adequately or accurately assessed. The inspector should discuss the results of
the risk assessment with the licensee before proceeding with any further risk
assessment. The new risk assessment value may be obtained in several ways including
having the licensee perform the omitted maintenance risk assessment; or re-perform the
assessment, correcting those errors and/or omissions that rendered the original risk
assessment inadequate. It is expected that having the licensee re-evaluate the actual
maintenance configuration would be the norm for (a)(4) issues.
Step 4.1.2 - NRC Evaluation of Risk
Alternatively, the inspector may request the regional SRA or other risk analyst to
independently evaluate the risk if there are specific concerns regarding the adequacy of
the licensee’s assessment such as:
a. The licensee’s maintenance configuration change excluded multiple systems.
b. There are notable limitations with the licensee’s configuration risk assessment tool
(e.g., does not address potential changes to initiating event frequencies).
Issue Date: 05/19/05 K-3 0609, App K
c. There are known quality issues with the licensee’s configuration risk assessment
tool (e.g., is not consistent with the plant PRA).
d. The quantitative risk assessment contained invalid assumptions and/or omissions.
To request an independent risk assessment, the inspector should provide the following
information to the regional SRA or risk analyst:
a. Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) configuration in the specific time
window of concern with actual time of SSCs removed from service and when
returned to service.
b. Description of testing or other maintenance activities that potentially increased the
likelihood of an initiating event
c. Description of actual compensatory actions implemented
d. Licensee’s risk assessment
If the finding involves maintenance activities during shutdown conditions, then the
appropriate checklist reflecting the plant shutdown mode from IMC 0609, Appendix G,
Attachment 1, should be checked and provided to the SRA.
For findings that have significance preliminarily determined to be White, Yellow, or Red,
an SRA may perform a Phase 3 analysis, if necessary.
Step 4.2 Determination of Risk Deficit
If the licensee did not perform a risk assessment at all, the actual risk increase
(ICDPactual ) is the product of the incremental CDF and the annualized fraction of the
duration of the configuration [i.e., ICDPactual = ICDFactual x (duration in hours) ÷ (8760
hours per reactor year)], where ICDFactual = CDFactual - CDFzero-maintenance
The risk deficit, ICDPD, is equal to ICDP when the licensee’s performance deficiency
involves not conducting a risk assessment.
For a flawed risk assessment, the risk deficit, ICDPD, = ICDPactual - ICDPflawed assuming
the ICDPactual > ICDPflawed.
If the actual, correctly assessed ICDP is significantly greater than 1E-6 (i.e., one order of
magnitude or greater), the net risk deficit is determined by subtracting 1E-6 from the risk
deficit (ICDPD) as determined above, prior to determining an SDP color.
The significance of the licensee’s underestimate (or lack of estimate) of the risk (ICDPD)
is then determined by using Flowchart 1. The significance of the ILERPD, if applicable,
is determined in a similar fashion.
Step 4.3 - Evaluation of Risk Management Actions
0609, App K Issue Date: 05/19/05 K-4
As discussed in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11.3, “Assessment of Risk Resulting from
Performance of Maintenance Activities,” and in Appendix A of IP 71111.13, the following
categories of appropriate RMAs can be used to manage risk associated with a
maintenance activity.
C increasing risk awareness and control
C reducing duration of maintenance activity
C minimizing magnitude of risk increase
C establishing other compensatory measures to provide alternate success paths for
maintaining the safety function of the out-of-service SSC (e.g., using diverse
means of accomplishing the intended safety function)
Because the risk benefits of some of these RMAs are generally not quantifiable, the
approach chosen for quantitatively determining the significance of failure to manage risk
is to assign credit for these actions in reducing the risk impact of the assessed
configuration. Therefore, the simple screening rule used in this SDP is to assign a credit
of one half order of magnitude reduction in risk to the correctly calculated risk if the
licensee effectively implemented one or two categories of the RMAs to manage risk. The
RMAs credited for risk reduction are only those for which credit was not already taken
in the risk calculation. If the licensee effectively implemented three or more categories
of the RMAs that have not already been evaluated in the risk calculation, an order of
magnitude reduction in risk is credited against the actual maintenance risk. This
approach allows the significance of failure to manage risk to be expeditiously determined
without using quantitative approaches that would likely require intensive resources.
If the risk is inadequately assessed, or not assessed at all, the significance of the
performance deficiency is evaluated using this SDP. The resultant failure to take RMAs
due to lack of risk recognition merely provides no mitigation of the risk deficits.
When the risk is adequately assessed, the licensee will normally be expected to
effectively implement only those RMAs prescribed for the assessed risk by site
procedures. Under certain circumstances, specific compensatory measures may also
be prescribed by license conditions, technical specifications, notices of enforcement
discretion, and/or special commitments, as applicable. Flowchart 2 is provided to
evaluate the significance of a licensee’s failure to implement one or more categories of
RMAs either as prescribed by any of the sets of requirements discussed above. The
adequacy of licensee’s RMAs should be assessed using the guidance provided in
baseline IP 71111.13 and licensee’s applicable implementing procedures.
Issue Date: 05/19/05 K-5 0609, App K
10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)
Performance Issue
Is finding related to
RMAs only?
Yes
Determine actual
risk (Step 4.1)
No
Determine risk
deficit (Step 4.2)
Is Risk Deficit
 > 1 E-6 (ICDPD) or
> 1 E-7 (ILERPD)?
Is Risk Deficit
 > 1 E-5 (ICDPD) or
> 1 E-6 (ILERPD)?
Yes
Is Risk Deficit
 > 1 E-4 (ICDPD) or
> 1 E-5 (ILERPD)?
Yes
Yes
Yellow Finding
Yes
1 or 2 RMAs
taken? No
Red Finding
No
Is Risk Deficit
< 5 E-4 (ICDPD) or
< 5 E-5 (ILERPD)?
No
Yes
Yes
No
White Finding
Yes
1 or 2 RMAs
taken? No
Is Risk Deficit
< 5 E-5 (ICDPD) or
< 5 E-6 (ILERPD)?
Yes
Yes
Yellow Finding
No
No
No
No Green Finding
Yes
1 or 2 RMAs
taken? No
Is Risk Deficit
< 5 E-6 (ICDPD) or
< 5 E-7 (ILERPD)?
Yes
Yes
White Finding
No
No
3 or more RMAs
taken?
3 or more RMAs
taken?
3 or more RMAs
taken?
(Step 4.3)
Go to flowchart 2
Flowchart 1
 Assessment of Risk Deficit
0609, App K Issue Date: 05/19/05 K-6
Is
 ICDP > 1 E-6 or
ILERP > 1 E-7 ?
Is
 ICDP > 1 E-5 or
 ILERP> 1 E-6?
Yes
Is
 ICDP > 1 E-4 or
 ILERP > 1 E-5?
Yes
Yes
Yellow Finding
Yes
1 or 2 RMAs
taken? No
Red Finding
No
Is
 ICDP < 5 E-4 or
 ILERP < 5 E-5 ?
No
Yes
Yes
No
White Finding
Yes
1 or 2 RMAs
taken? No
Is
 ICDP < 5 E-5 or
 ILERP < 5 E-6?
Yes
Yes
Yellow Finding
No
No
No
No Green Finding
Yes
1 or 2 RMAs
taken? No
Is
 ICDP < 5 E-6 or
ILERP < 5 E-7?
Yes
Yes
White Finding
No
No
3 or more RMAs
taken?
3 or more RMAs
taken?
3 or more RMAs
taken?
Flowchart 2
Assessment of RMAs
10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) performance
issue associated with RMAs only
From Flowchart 1
Issue Date: 05/19/05 App K, Att 1 Att 1-1
ATTACHMENT 1
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
The following assumptions and defined terms regarding licensee risk assessments and risk
management actions (RMAs) are necessary to understand and efficiently use this
maintenance rule (a)(4) SDP evaluation tool.
1.0 RISK ASSESSMENTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
The intent of paragraph (a)(4) is for licensees to appropriately assess the risks of proposed
maintenance activities that will:
• directly, or may inadvertently, result in equipment being taken out of service,
• involve temporary alterations or modifications that could impact SSC operation or
performance,
• be affected by other maintenance activities, plant conditions, or evolutions, and/or
• be affected by external events, internal flooding, or containment integrity.
Paragraph (a)(4) requires management of the resultant risk using insights from the
assessment. Therefore, licensee risk assessments should properly determine the risk
impact of planned maintenance configurations to allow effective implementation of RMAs
to limit any potential risk increase when maintenance activities are actually being
performed. Although the level of complexity in an assessment would be expected to differ
from plant to plant, as well as from configuration to configuration within a given plant, it is
expected that licensee risk assessments would provide insights for identifying risksignificant
activities and minimizing their durations. In general, the following two types of
licensee performance deficiencies in meeting (a)(4) requirements can be defined.
A. Failure to Perform an Adequate Risk Assessment. The failure to perform an
adequate risk assessment in accordance with 10CFR50.65 (a)(4) prior to the
conduct of maintenance activities includes the following deficiencies which result
in underestimating the risk.
1. Failure to perform a risk assessment for maintenance configuration changes.
2. Failure to update a risk assessment for changes in the assessed plant
conditions (e.g., changes in maintenance activities or emergent conditions).
However, performance or re-evaluation of the assessment should not
interfere with, or delay, the operator and/or maintenance crew from taking
timely actions to restore the equipment to service or take compensatory
actions. If the plant configuration is restored prior to conducting or reevaluating
the assessment, the assessment need not be conducted, or reevaluated
if already performed. 
App K, Att 1 Issue Date: 05/19/05 Att 1-2
3. Failure to perform a complete risk assessment including all affected/involved
SSCs within the scope of SSCs required for (a)(4) assessments, and
considering (or adequately considering) all plant-relevant plant conditions or
evolutions, external events (excluding fire and seismic), internal flooding,
and/or containment integrity
4. Failure to consider maintenance activities which have historically had a high
likelihood of introducing a transient leading to an initiating event that would
result in risk-significant configurations
5. Improper use of the risk assessment tool or process (i.e., beyond its
capabilities or limitations, or under plant conditions for which it was neither
designed nor in accordance with site procedures)
6. Deficient risk-informed evaluation process for limiting the scope of SSCs to
be included in (a)(4) risk assessments as identified by NRC inspection (e.g.,
IP 62709).

7. Flawed risk assessment tool or process as identified by NRC inspection (e.g.,
IP 62709).
Underestimating or not estimating the risk of maintenance activities may not
significantly increase the expected overall plant risk, in terms of core damage
frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF). However,
underestimating the risk may result in lack of risk awareness that could preclude
RMAs and allow a high-risk configuration to persist unrecognized and
uncompensated. Allowing a high-risk configuration with an unassessed CDF
increase to persist longer than necessary, or desirable, will increase the exposure
time and hence the incremental (integrated) core damage probability (ICDP) and/or
the incremental large early release probability (ILERP) as defined below. Finally,
unawareness of unassessed or inadequately assessed risk may allow actions or
events to occur that could directly increase risk or hamper recovery from accidents
or transients.
Licensees that have adopted RMA color thresholds that are not ICDP or ILERP
based, may need to have performance converted to correspond to a probability unit
of measure.
B. Failure to Manage Risk. Failure to manage the risk impacts of proposed
maintenance activities means a failure to implement, in whole or in part, the key
elements of the licensee’s risk management program. However, this deficiency will
not result in an additional risk increase to the assessed risk of the maintenance
configuration in terms of CDF or LERF. Measures to minimize the duration of the
risk associated with a maintenance activity/configuration are a principal RMA.
Nevertheless, failure to implement such measures when they are possible and
practicable will allow the ICDP and/or the ILERP to increase further as the elevated
risk condition persists. Appropriate and suitable RMAs can only reduce the risk
incurred from a given configuration change.
Issue Date: 05/19/05 App K, Att 1 Att 1-3
RMAs should be implemented in a graduated manner, commensurate with various
increases above the plant’s baseline risk, to control the overall risk impact of an
assessed maintenance configuration. However, licensees use a variety of methods
for categorizing risk significance and managing the risk according to the
significance category.
In Regulatory Guide 1.182, the NRC endorsed the RMA levels or categories/bands
prescribed in the revised Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, and
subsequently incorporated in Revision 3 of NUMARC 93-01. These risk bands are
defined in terms of the ICDP, making them readily comparable to the risk levels
used in determining the significance of the risk deficits. For licensees that have
adopted this guidance, normal work controls are allowed by site procedures for
ICDPs less than 1 E-6. For ICDPs of 1E-6 or greater, RMAs are prescribed.
Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01 states that maintenance risk configurations above
ICDP value of 1E-5 should not be entered voluntarily. Site procedures will prohibit
this activity entirely or will allow it only with fairly rigorous restrictions that typically
include the plant manager’s written permission along with extensive RMAs. Site
procedures may further define specific detailed RMAs or plans for routinely
allowable risk categories as well. It should be noted that when evaluating the
adequacy of a licensee’s RMAs, the inspector should consider only those actions
that could have potential risk implications and are required by the licensee’s
procedures, such as working around the clock, installing backup equipment, and
reducing duration of maintenance activity.
2.0 DEFINITIONS
The following are definitions of terms used throughout this SDP.
Incremental Core Damage Frequency (ICDF). The ICDF is the difference between the
actual, adequately assessed, maintenance risk (configuration-specific CDF) and the zeromaintenance
CDF. The configuration-specific CDF or ICDF are annualized risk estimates
with the out-of-service or otherwise affected SSCs considered unavailable. The term,
“Incremental Core Damage Frequency” is also equivalently referred to as delta CDF, or
change in CDF.
Incremental Core Damage Probability (ICDP). The ICDP is the product of the incremental
CDF and the annual fraction of the duration of the configuration [ i.e., ICDP = ICDF x
(duration in hours) ÷ (8760 hours per reactor year)]. Note that the ICDP is sometimes
expressed as the integrated or integral ICDP ( i.e., the delta CDF or ICDF integrated over
the time of its duration which increases as the elevated-risk configuration persists). Figure
1 is a graphical representation of this concept.
App K, Att 1 Issue Date: 05/19/05 Att 1-4
Incremental Core Damage Frequency Deficit (ICDFD). The ICDFD is that portion of the
ICDF defined as the difference between the actual maintenance-configuration-specific CDF
(called ICDFactual for purposes of this definition) and the maintenance-related ICDF as
originally and inadequately assessed (flawed) by the licensee (ICDFflawed). Therefore, the
ICDFD = ICDFactual - ICDFflawed. Note that if the licensee has failed to assess maintenance
risk entirely when required ( i.e., there is no licensee risk assessment), then the ICDFD will
be equal to the entire value of the ICDF. The safety significance of the ICDFD (i.e., the
magnitude of the licensee’s underestimate (or lack of estimate) of the risk) is determined
by means of this SDP.
Incremental Core Damage Probability Deficit (ICDPD). The ICDPD is the product of the
ICDFD and the exposure (i.e., the annual fraction of the duration of the unassessed or
inadequately assessed configuration, or that portion of the annual fraction of the duration
of the maintenance configuration during which its risk remained unassessed or
inadequately assessed). Thus the ICDPD = ICDFD x (exposure in hours) ÷ (8760 hours
per reactor-year). Note that similar to the ICDFD, the ICDPD equals the ICDP when there
is no risk assessment, rather than a flawed risk assessment. Note also that Exposure
equals Duration if the risk remained unassessed or inadequately assessed for the entire
duration of the configuration. The safety significance of the ICDPD (i.e., the magnitude of
the licensee’s underestimate (or lack of estimate) of the risk (in terms of ICDP)), may also
be determined by means of this SDP. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of this
concept.
Issue Date: 05/19/05 App K, Att 1 Att 1-5
Incremental Large Early Release Frequency (ILERF). The ILERF is the difference between
the actual, adequately determined maintenance activity/configuration-specific LERF and
the zero maintenance model results, if determinable. Note that LERF and ILERF are
determinable only if the plant has a Level-II PRA and a risk tool or process capable of
quantitatively assessing Level-II risk beyond a qualitative assessment of the impact of
containment integrity. If calculated, the ILERF may also be referred to as the delta LERF
or LERF difference.
Incremental Large Early Release Frequency Deficit (ILERFD). The ILERFD is used to
evaluate the significance of a finding under the following conditions (1) an impact on
containment integrity from or concurrent with the maintenance activity occurs, (2) this
impact is/was not qualitatively assessed, and (3) the impact is/was quantitatively assessed,
but not adequately. Then the ILERFD is meaningful and is that portion of the ILERF
defined as the difference between the actual maintenance-configuration-specific LERF
(called ILERFactual for purposes of this definition) and the maintenance-related ILERF as
originally and inadequately assessed by the licensee (ILERFflawed). Therefore, the
ILERFD=ILERFactual ! ILERFflawed. Note that if the licensee has failed to assess
maintenance risk entirely when required (i.e., there is no licensee risk assessment) and
there is an impact on containment integrity from or concurrent with the maintenance
activity, this impact can be neither qualitatively nor quantitatively assessed. Therefore, the
ILERFD will be equal to the entire value of the ILERF. The safety significance of the
App K, Att 1 Issue Date: 05/19/05 Att 1-6
licensee’s underestimate (or lack of estimate) of the Level-II risk ( i.e., ILERFD) may also
be determined by means of this SDP, if appropriate.
Incremental Large Early Release Probability (ILERP). The ILERP is the product of the
incremental large early release frequency (ILERF) and the annual fraction of the duration
of the configuration. The ILERP=(ILERF x duration in hours)÷(8760 hours per reactoryear).
Incremental Large Early Release Probability Deficit (ILERPD). The ILERPD is the product
of the ILERFD with the annual fraction of the duration of the unassessed or inadequately
assessed configuration, or that portion of the annual fraction of the duration of the
maintenance configuration during which its risk (in terms of ILERF or ILERP) remained
unassessed or inadequately assessed.
NOTE: Although an adequate maintenance risk assessment is expected to include the
impact of containment integrity, at least qualitatively, there is no regulatory
requirement for a quantitative risk assessment using a Level-II PRA. Paragraph
(a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65 neither prohibits nor explicitly discourages incurring
maintenance risk. It only requires that the risk of maintenance activities be
assessed (which can be done qualitatively, quantitatively, or, as is often the case,
in a blended fashion) and managed.
Zero-Maintenance CDF(Risk). The CDF estimate of plant baseline configuration where all
SSCs modeled in PRA are considered available.
Baseline CDF(Risk). The CDF estimate derived from a PRA model that considers average
annual maintenance (preventive and corrective maintenance) unavailability data, and plant
specific reliability data (failure rates).
Note that inadequate risk assessment or risk management for work not yet started is not
an (a)(4) violation, but it still represents a licensee performance deficiency and may be
indicative of deficiencies in previous risk assessments, RMAs and/or in the licensee's (a)(4)
program. This SDP is not suited for determining the significance of this type of
performance deficiency. This type of issue can normally be expected to be screened to
Green in accordance with Reactor SDP Phase 1 screening.