NOC-AE-13003067, Supplement to Seismic Walkdown Summary Report of Items Classified as Inaccessible

Supplement to Seismic Walkdown Summary Report of Items Classified as Inaccessible

ML14077A279
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/27/2014
From:	Gerry Powell South Texas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NOC-AE-13003067
Download: ML14077A279 (96)

Text

Nuclear Operating Company South Texas Pro/ect Eleatric GeneratIn$ Station PO Sow 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 February 27, 2014 NOC-AE-1 3003067 10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 South Texas Project Unit 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-499 Supplement to STPNOC Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Summary Report Walkdown of Items Classified as Inaccessible

References:

1. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," March 12, 2012 (ML12056A046)

2. Letter from D.W. Rencurrel, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

November 27, 2012 (ML13003A275)

3. Letter from D.W. Rencurrel, STPNOC, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Revision to Commitment for Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," June 19, 2013 (ML13191A910)

The purpose of this letter is to supplement the seismic walkdown report for STP Unit 2 to include the walkdown results for these inaccessible items. On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 requesting information pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f). Enclosure 3 of Reference 1 contains specific requested actions, requested information, and required responses associated with Recommendation 2.3, Seismic. South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) submitted the final seismic walkdown response including a list of areas that were unable to be inspected due to inaccessibility and a schedule for when the seismic walkdown would be completed (Reference 3).

STI: 33801032

NOC-AE-1 3003067 Page 2 of 3 The commitment due date provided in Reference 3 for reporting the seismic walkdown results for the inaccessible items was based on the Unit 2 refueling outage that was originally scheduled for completion in May 2013. Emergent station issues caused the Unit 2 refueling outage to be rescheduled and the commitment to provide walkdown results was changed accordingly from July 2013 to February 2014 in Reference 4.

The results of the inaccessible walkdown features are provided in the enclosure. Per the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390, the enclosed information is no longer considered proprietary.

There are no commitments in this letter.

If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Wendy Brost at (361) 972-8516 or me at (361) 972-7566.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on c) a*7, zMi G.T. Powell Site Vice President web

Enclosure:

Supplement to Seismic Walkdown Summary Report for STPEGS Unit 2

NOC-AE-13003067 Page 3 of 3 cc:

(paper copy) (electronic copy)

Regional Administrator, Region IV A. H. Gutterman, Esquire U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 Balwant K. Singal U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Balwant K. Singal John Ragan Senior Project Manager Chris O'Hara U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jim von Suskil One White Flint North (MS 8 B1) NRG South Texas LP 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Kevin Polio U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard Pefia P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116 L.D. Blaylock Wadsworth, TX 77483 City Public Service Jim Collins Peter Nemeth City of Austin Crain Caton & James, P.C.

Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road C. Mele Austin, TX 78704 City of Austin Eric Leeds Richard A. Ratliff Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert Free U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Texas Department of State Health Services One White Flint North (MS 13 H16M) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Supplement to Seismic Walkdown Summary Report For South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit 2 STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC)

Revision 1

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page i Executive Summary On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued requests for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) related to the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations. Enclosure 3 of the NRCs 50.54(f) letter requested utilities to provide information related to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, as amended by the SRMs associated with SECY-1 1-0124 and SECY-1 1-0137 (Reference 1). The nuclear power industry and the NRC cooperatively developed guidelines and procedures to perform the seismic walkdowns. The resulting EPRI Report No. 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Termn Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic (EPRI 1025286) provides guidance and procedures for performing the seismic walkdowns (Reference 2).

South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) incorporated the guidance in EPRI 1025286 during development of the site-specific procedure that governs identifying the scope of the seismic walkdowns, performing the seismic walkdowns, and developing the summary report. The initial seismic walkdowns were conducted at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) Units I and Unit 2 in September and October 2012, in part during a Unit 1 outage. The results of these initial seismic walkdowns were documented the Final STPNOC Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (Reference 5), hereafter referred to as Revision 0.

Since Unit 2 was not in an outage during the initial walkdowns, some items included in the Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) were inaccessible at that time. The initial STP Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (Reference 5) committed to completing the walkdowns of these inaccessible items during the next Unit 2 refueling outage.

This revision of the Unit 2 report, hereafter referred to as Revision 1, provides the results of the final Unit 2 seismic walkdowns and area walk-by which were performed during the November 2013 Unit 2 refueling outage (2RE16). The walkdowns and walk-by were performed by two experienced, qualified seismic walkdown engineers, who also participated in the original walkdowns. With the submittal of this information, all of the information required by the 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Letter (Reference 1) regarding seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for STP Units I and 2 is complete.

The format and content of Revision I is based on the NEI agreement with the NRC that licensees only need to submit the body of their report, updated to include the results of the final walkdowns, and only those attachments or appendices which provide new or revised walkdown results. The attachments or appendices which did not change are not included in Revision 1.

This summary report contains the following:

• Section 1.0 of this report summarizes the seismic licensing basis for STPEGS Unit 2, including definition the seismicity of the site, the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), and the applicable codes and standards used in the design of Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

• Section 2.0 of this report describes the qualifications of the personnel involved in developing the scope of the walkdowns, performing the walkdowns, performing peer reviews, and providing licensing basis evaluations.

• Section 3.0 of the report describes the process by which the scope of the walkdowns was identified.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page ii

" Sections 4.0 and 5.0 summarize the results of the scoping process, the results of the seismic walkdowns and walk-bys, and the results of any licensing basis evaluations that were performed.

Potentially adverse conditions identified during the seismic walkdowns were entered in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution and are listed in Table 4-1 of the report.

• Section 6.0 is a summary of seismic vulnerabilities identified during the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program, as well as, a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce these seismic vulnerabilities.

• Section 7.0 provides a description of the results of peer reviews performed for scoping, walkdown packages, and the summary report.

" Section 8.0 provides a list of documents referenced in this revision of the seismic report, including the original report (Revision 0).

As previously stated, the appendices include specific personnel qualifications; the intermediate equipment lists used for developing and the resulting seismic walkdown equipment list (SWEL); and copies of the completed walkdown and walk-by checklists. The appendices have not been provided in Revision 1 unless they are new or have been changed to provide new or revised information.

In summary, the walkdowns and walk-bys identified some minor seismic and housekeeping items, documented in Appendices C and D, which were entered into the site CAP for resolution, as documented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. However, the walkdowns and walk-bys indicate that, generally, the condition and configuration of equipment were such that it was determined to be capable of performing its intended safety function.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page iii Table of Contents SECTION PAGE Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... iii 1.0 Seism ic Licensing Basis Summary ................................................................................................ 1-1 1.1 Seismic Licensing Basis ............................................................................................................. 1-1 1.2 Codes and Standards Used to Design Seism ic Category I SSCs ............................................... 1-4 2.0 Personnel Qualifications Summ ary ................................................................................................ 2-1 2.1 Equipment Selection .................................................................................................................. 2-1 2.2 Seismic Walkdowns ................................................................................................................... 2-1 2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations ...................................................................................................... 2-1 2.4 IPEEE Review ........................................................................................................................... 2-1 2.5 Peer Review ............................................................................................................................... 2-1 3.0 SSC Selection ................................................................................................................................. 3-1 3.1 Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 3-1 3 .2 Re su lts ........................................................................................................................................ 3-2 3.3 Inaccessible Items ...................................................................................................................... 3-9 4.0 Seism ic W alkdowns and Area W alk-Bys ...................................................................................... 4-1 5.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation ............................................................................................................ 5-1 5.1 Summary of Evaluations ........................................................................................................ 5-1 5.2 Plant M odifications .................................................................................................................... 5-1 6.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities .................................................................................................................... 6-1 7.0 Peer Team Review Summary ................................................................................................... 7-1 8.0 References ...................................................................................................................................... 8-1 Appendix A Personnel Qualifications (Not included in Revision 1)

Appendix B Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWEL) and Area Walk-By Lists Table B-i: Unit 2 Base List 1 (Not included in Revision 1)

Table B-2: Unit 2 SWEL 1 (Not included in Revision 1)

Table B-3: Unit 2 Base List 2 (Not included in Revision 1)

Table B-4: Unit 2 SWEL 2 (Not included in Revision 1)

Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Revised version included in Revision 1)

Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List (Revised version included in Revision 1)

Appendix C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Only new Checklists included in Revision 1)

Appendix D Area Walk-by Checklists (Only new Checklists included in Revision 1)

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page iv Introduction Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction. The NTTF was tasked with conducting a review of NRC regulations and processes, and determining if the NRC should make additional improvements.

A set of recommendations made by the task force was included in a report provided to the Commission.

Although the NRC concluded that continued plant operation did not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety, the Commission directed the NRC staff (in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-1 1-0093) to determine those recommendations that should be implemented without unnecessary delay. In SECY- 11-0124, the NRC staff identified the NTTF recommendations that should be implemented without delay, including the development of information requests to be made under 10 CFR 50.54(f).

The NRC issued the requests for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) on March 12, 2012 related to the following NTTF recommendations (Reference 1):

• Recommendation 2.1: Seismic

• Recommendation 2.1: Flooding

" Recommendation 2.3: Seismic

• Recommendation 2.3: Flooding

" Recommendation 9.3: Emergency Preparedness of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter addressed providing information related to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, as amended by the SRMs associated with SECY-11-0124 and SECY- 11-0 137. Enclosure 3 requested that licensees:

1. Develop a methodology and acceptance criteria for seismic walkdowns to be endorsed by the NRC staff,

2. Perform seismic walkdowns using the NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology,

3. Identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through a corrective action program, and

4. Verify the adequacy of licensee monitoring and maintenance procedures.

The nuclear power industry and the NRC agreed to cooperate in the development of guidelines and procedures to perform the seismic walkdowns. The resulting EPRI Report No. 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3:

Seismic (EPRI 1025286) (Reference 2) provides guidance and procedures for performing the seismic walkdowns. The guidance addresses selection of personnel, selection of a sample of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that represent a diversity of component types and ensures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions as described in the NRCs 50.54(f) letter, conduct of the walkdowns, evaluations against the plant seismic licensing basis, and reporting requirements. EPRI 1025286 also includes checklists to be used by the seismic walkdown engineers for seismic evaluations.

The guidance contained in EPRI 1025286 was developed to meet NRCs objectives, and in a letter dated May 31, 2012 (Reference 3), the NRC confirmed that the EPRI 1025286 guidance directs licensees to perform walkdowns in a manner that will address Requested Information Items l.a through 1.g in the 50.54(f) letter. The NRC staff also confirmed that Section 8, "Submittal Report," of the EPRI 1025286

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page v guidance outlines the appropriate information to be submitted in response to Requested Information Items 2.a through 2.f. of Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.

South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) used the EPRI 1025286 guidance in developing and performing the seismic walkdowns at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter. In addition, STPNOC followed the EPRI 1025286 Section 8 guidance for the development of this report.

As explained in Section 3.3, the content of Revision I of the report is based on the agreement between NEI and the NRC regarding the content and format for report updates, which is to only update the body of the report to provide final walkdown information and only submit those attachments and appendices which contain updated information for items inaccessible during the initial walkdowns.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page 1-1 1.0 Seismic Licensing Basis Summary 1.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Texas consists of two major regions separated by a relatively narrow transitional zone of foothills and escarpments. The Texas Gulf Plain occupies the southeastern one-third of the state; a stable interior region covers the northwestern two-thirds of the state, within which are the Edwards Plateau and the High Plains. The STPEGS site is located in the Gulf Coast portion of the Texas Gulf Plain. It is a low-lying, flat, featureless terrain composed primarily of river floodplain and littoral and deltaic sediments.

Compared with that of many areas of North America, the geologic history of the Texas region has not been particularly complex, but the significant factors follow:

I. Numerous transgressions and regressions of seas from the Cambrian period into the Cenozoic.

2. Major uplift and erosion at the end of the Precambrian, Permian, Jurassic, Early Cretaceous, Late Cretaceous, Tertiary, and Pleistocene.

3. Geosynclinal developments from Cambrian to Pennsylvanian creating the Ouachita Geosyncline, and from Triassic to the present creating the Gulf Coast Geosyncline.

4. Ouachita orogeny from mid-Pennsylvanian to the end of Permian, with major compressive forces destroying the Ouachita Geosyncline and creating the Ouachita Tectonic Belt.

5. Post-Ouachita orogeny relaxation of compressional stresses and change to tensional stresses with development of normal faulting in a peripheral graben system.

6. An arid climate and widespread salt and gypsum deposition during Jurassic time.

7. Pleistocene interglacial deposition along the Gulf Coast laying down alluvial sediments in the site vicinity.

8. A post-Mesozoic environment of little or no seismic activity in the Texas Gulf Plain region.

The most important stratigraphic feature of the site region is the degree of consolidation and induration of the subsurface formations rather than their petrologic descriptions or formational names. The formations can be separated into those that are hard and consolidated enough to accumulate sufficient shear strain to allow the possible occurrence of an earthquake of engineering significance, and those that are too weak and plastic to store significant strain energy. In the site region, a separation on this basis can be made near the top of the Mesozoic era. Most Mesozoic and older rocks are hard and consolidated and are considered to represent the upper basement beneath the site. Clayey sediments that were deposited at the end of the Mesozoic and during the Cenozoic have generally not fully consolidated and are characterized by massive shales containing highpore fluid pressures. These relatively soft materials are primarily deltaic and littoral in origin and were deposited gradually gulfward into the Gulf Coast Geosyncline by transgressing and regressing seas and meandering surface streams.

There are three major regional tectonic provinces within a 200-mile radius of the plant site: the Foreland, a stable interior region; the Ouachita Tectonic Belt; and the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The principal structural elements of the region are the Ouachita Tectonic Belt and the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The Ouachita Tectonic Belt extends generally westward from the Mississippi River in a belt or sinuous trend to the Rio Grande and then southward into Mexico. A zone of regional normal faults, known as the peripheral graben system, is located south of and subparallel to the Ouachita Tectonic Belt and is generally regarded as the northern margin of the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The axis of the geosyncline, where an estimated 40,000 feet of Cenozoic sediments were deposited, is about 70 miles southeast of the present Gulf of Mexico shoreline. Within the sediments are numerous gravity-related salt and shale diapirs as well as gravity-included slip surfaces known as coastal growth "faults."

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 1-2 Three principal classes of faults have been identified in the 200-mile radius of the plant site: the thrust faults of the Ouachita Tectonic Belt, the nonnal faults of the peripheral graben system at the inner or northern and northwestern periphery of the Texas Gulf Plain, and the growth "faults" of the Texas Gulf Plain. The thrust faults of the Ouachita Tectonic Belt originated in the period from mid Pennsylvanian into Permian and accompanied the uplift and destruction of the previously developed Ouachita Geosyncline. The thrust faults are buried beneath Mesozoic sediments, except in West Texas. The normal faults of the peripheral graben system, collectively ternmed the "older" faults of the region, are related to adjustments to conditions set up in the wake of the thrust faulting of the Ouachita orogeny. The nontectonic growth "faults" of the Texas Gulf Plain are gravity-related features formed by slumping, creep, and consolidation of thick sections of geosynclinal sediments. They are confined entirely to sediments of Cenozoic age within the Gulf Coast Geosyncline. The closest mapped faults of the peripheral graben system are approximately 85 miles northwest of the plant site. At this point, the graben system is 65 miles wide. The Ouachita Tectonic Belt lies just beyond the graben system away from the plant site. The thrust faults of the Ouachita Tectonic Belt and the normal faults of the peripheral graben system are of tectonic origin because they involve rupture of the hard, well-consolidated pre-Cenozoic formations. On the other hand, the growth "faults" are nontectonic in origin because they are not related to tectonic forces originating in basement rocks and involve only the unconsolidated Cenozoic sediments.

Since growth "faults" are found in the Cenozoic sediments in the vicinity of the site, their characteristics and mode of occurrence are important to the evaluation of differential ground displacement due to subsidence. Because of their significance to the petroleum industry, growth "faults" have been extensively investigated for many years.

The following are some of their characteristics:

• All growth "faults" in the Texas Gulf Coast are of the normal type and nontectonic. For the most part they are downthrown on the Gulf side.

• The growth "faults" tend to flatten at depth.

• Stratigraphic units on the downthrown side are thicker than correlative units on the upthrown side.

• Separation of correlative stratigraphic units tends to increase with depth to some maximum and then, as the slip plane flattens, to decrease with further depth.

" Growth "faults" tend to die out upward over relatively short distances in a given section; whereas tectonic normal faults have greater vertical continuity. The youngest displaced sediments mark the time at which slippage along a growth "fault" ceased.

" Over long distances, horizontal traces of growth "faults" tend to be broadly arcuate and roughly parallel to regional stratigraphic strike.

• The zones of active growth "faults" tend to conform to depocenters, where the sediments of the thickest part of a given stratigraphic unit are deposited.

There are no known tectonic faults in the site vicinity, nor were any detected by this investigation.

Furthermore, the absence of historic seismicity supports the conclusion that there are no active tectonic structures in the site area. Surface displacements have occurred in the region, but without perceptible ground-shaking or other evidence that the displacements are the result of movement along tectonic faults or other faults capable of significant seismic activity. Differential surface displacements, such as those in the vicinity of Houston, Texas, are apparently related to man-induced aseismic creep on preexisting growth "faults." Growth "faults" are found to exist in the site vicinity, but extensive study revealed no evidence of significant seismic activity on growth "faults" at any time. This almost aseismic character is in keeping with the conclusion that growth "faults" are nontectonic in that they are confined to Cenozoic formations, and Cenozoic formations are not sufficiently consolidated and indurated to enable them to store strain energy to the point where sudden rupture can produce an energy release in the form of an

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page 1-3 earthquake. This negligible seismicity is also in keeping with the gravitational mechanism of growth "faults" involving gradual, almost plastic, creep-like slippage along the growth "fault" surfaces as they develop.

Seismic records dating back to 1699 for the region within a radius of 600 miles of the plant site were examined to evaluate the potential earthquake activity that might affect the site. Only 23 tectonic earthquakes have been reported within 200 miles of the plant site and none within 80 miles. The only documented earthquake effects at or in the vicinity of the site were minor disturbances to bodies of water caused by low-amplitude low-frequency surface waves generated by the Alaska earthquake in March 1964. Although the 1811 and 1812 New Madrid, Missouri earthquakes were felt in New Orleans, there is no historical documentation to indicate they were felt in the site vicinity.

Based on review of post-construction permit (post-CP) catalogues of seismic history, the maximum intensity reported within 200 miles of the site is intensity V (modified Mercalli) reached in three events:

the 1887 Paige event (112 miles from the site), the 1902 Creedmore earthquake (130 miles from the site),

and the 1983 Fashing event (130 miles from the site). The nearest intensity VI event is the 1932 Mexia-Wortham earthquake (201 miles from the site). The nearest intensity VII earthquake is the 1952 El Reno, Oklahoma event (467 miles from the site) and the nearest intensity VIII event is the 1931 Valentine, Texas, earthquake (500 miles from the site).

Differential ground displacement in the site vicinity due to vibratory motion is considered remote.

Differential ground displacement from other than vibratory causes has been classified as due to natural causes or induced by man's activities. Natural causes include growth "fault" displacement, regional subsidence related to continued development of the Gulf Coast Geosyncline, tectonic depression

.associated with the peripheral graben system, landslides, piercement of sediments by rising salt domes, and collapse of solution cavities. The sources of potential ground displacement from man's activities are mineral and fluid extraction from or fluid injection into the subsurface geologic section.

No growth "faults" were found at the ground surface in the area of the site; geophysical investigations and analysis of oil and gas well logs show that growth "faults" do occur at depth in the vicinity of the site. The Miocene and younger geologic strata to a depth of at least 5,000 feet beneath the plant site are not displaced by growth "faulting". It is concluded that growth "faulting" does not affect plant safety or design.

The distance to the closest faults of the peripheral graben system (85 miles) is sufficiently great to eliminate the possibility of differential surface movement at the site due to displacement on these faults.

In addition, uplift or subsidence in this system is not known to have occurred since the middle of the Cenozoic era. Cavernous conditions and karst terrains are the result of differential erosion of soluble rocks, usually limestone, gypsum, or salt. None of these rocks is present in the upper 16,000 feet of sediments in the site area; therefore, no differential surface displacement related to such rock types can occur at the site.

The SSE producing the maximum vibratory ground acceleration at the site is conservatively assigned an intensity of VI modified Mercalli. This earthquake is based on two potential sources: an intensity VII modified Mercalli earthquake at least 70 miles from the site in the Ouachita Seismotectonic Province, which is conservatively attenuated to an intensity VI modified Mercalli earthquake at the site; and an intensity VI modified Mercalli earthquake in pre-Cenozoic rocks at a depth of at least 34,000 feet below the site. Acceleration/intensity correlations indicate an acceleration of 0.07g for an earthquake of intensity VI modified Mercalli. However, the minimum ground acceleration in Appendix A to 10CFR100, is 0.1Og, and accordingly is adopted for the SSE. Because only three intensity V modified Mercalli earthquakes have been reported within 200 miles of the site in the last 100 years and no earthquakes have been

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 1-4 reported within 80 miles, the maximum earthquake reasonably expected within the site vicinity, based on historical records and geology, is an earthquake of Intensity IV to V modified Mercalli.

Acceleration/intensity correlations show the maximum acceleration of an intensity V modified Mercalli earthquake to be 0.035g which would represent a reasonable operating basis earthquake (OBE). However, to comply with Appendix A to 10CFRI0O, a minimum acceleration of 0.05g (1/2 of the SSE) is adopted for OBE.

1.2 Codes and Standards Used to Design Seismic Category I SSCs The peak accelerations associated with SSE and OBE have been established based on the seismicity evaluation described in UFSAR Section 2.5, as summarized above. As noted, the expected peak horizontal acceleration at this site is less than 0.10g. The peak horizontal accelerations of 0.10g and

0. 0 5g incorporated in the design response spectra for the SSE and OBE, respectively, comply with Appendix A, "Reactor Site Criteria," to 10CFR100. The ground acceleration as represented by the spectral acceleration at 33 Hz is 0.1g for both the horizontal and the vertical directions. At 50 Hz the vertical spectral acceleration is reduced to two-thirds of the horizontal acceleration.

Horizontal design response spectra for 1-percent, 2-percent, 4-percent, 7-percent, and 10-percent spectral damping values are presented on UFSAR Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2 for the SSE and OBE, respectively. Vertical design response spectra for the SSE and OBE for the same damping values are presented on UFSAR Figures 3.7-3 and 3.7-4. The design response spectra are developed in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.60, Revision 1. The percentages of critical damping values applicable for structural components and systems of Category I structures are those listed in RG 1.61, October 1973, and included in UFSAR Table 3.7-1.

As discussed in UFSAR Section 3.2,. safety-related SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of an SSE (described above) and remain functional if they are necessary to assure:

• The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary

• The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition

" The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10CFRI00 Plant structures, systems, and components, including their foundations and supports, which are designed to remain functional in the event of an SSE, are designated as seismic Category I and are indicated in UFSAR Table 3.2.A-1. These classifications meet the requirements of RG 1.29.

SCCs, including their foundations and supports, that are designed to remain functional in the event of an SSE are designated as seismic Category I. Information regarding the loading conditions for these seismic Category I SSCs and the methods used for their seismic qualification are provided in various UFSAR sections as follows:

• Mechanical-UFSAR Sections 3.7 and 3.9

• Electrical-UFSAR Section 3.10

• Structures-UFSAR Sections 3.7 and 3.8

• Instrumentation and Controls-UJFSAR Section 3.10

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page 1-5 The seismic qualification and documentation procedures used for safety-related equipment and their supports meet the intent of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-1975 and RG 1.100. The project compliance to RG 1.48 is noted in UFSAR Section 3.12 and UFSAR Table 3.9-2.5. Seismic qualification of equipment by analysis and!or tests demonstrates that the equipment is able to withstand seismic loads as a result of the SSE preceded by five OBEs without loss of function in the operating mode.

Codes and standards for Seismic Category I balance of plant SSCs are provided in UFSAR Table 3.2.A-1. Codes and standards for the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) are provided in UFSAR Table 3.2.B-1.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 2-1 2.0 Personnel Qualifications Summary A summary of the requirements, as outlined in EPRI 1025286 (Reference 2), for different seismic activities is provided as follows. Appendix A provides the qualifications of the personnel involved in performing the seismic walkdown activities at STP.

2.1 Equipment Selection Personnel responsible for equipment selection should have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. They should have the capability to select a broad distribution of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The Equipment Selection Personnel should also have knowledge of the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program.

Equipment Selection Personnel: Steve Sieben (STPNOC), Sanjay Dankar (Bechtel), Elena Papadopoulos (Bechtel), Rattan Tawney (Bechtel) and Surinder (S.P.) Singla (Bechtel).

2.2 Seismic Walkdowns The seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs) should have a degree in mechanical or civil/structural engineering, or equivalent; and experience in seismic engineering as it applies to nuclear power plants.

In addition, the SWEs must successfully complete one of the following two training courses: NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course or SQUG Walkdown Training Course.

SWEs: Javier Burgoa (Bechtel), Ken Clough (Bechtel), David Dujka (STPNOC), Xuan Hoang (Bechtel), Tammy Jacobs (STPNOC), Ali Nikaeen (Bechtel), Surinder (S.P.) Singla (Bechtel).

2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions were documented and evaluated using the Corrective Action Program (CAP).

2.4 IPEEE Review Reviewers should have adequate engineering experience to review and understand the results of the IPEEE program. Because of the limited scope of the IPEEE, due to the low seismic hazard at STPEGS, no specific IPEEE reviews were performed.

2.5 Peer Review The peer review team should consist of a minimum of two individuals, one of whom has seismic engineering experienceas it applies to nuclear power plants.

Peer Reviewers: Leo Nadeau (Bechtel) and Roger Smith (Bechtel).

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-1 3.0 SSC Selection This section describes the process used to select the SSCs that were included in the SWEL and documents the resulting SWEL and Area Walk-by lists for STPEGS, in response to NRC's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 1).

3.1 Methodology The SWEL was developed using the guidance provided in EPRI Technical Report 1025286 (Reference 2). This guidance describes the process to be used to identify items to be included on a SWEL. In general, the SWEL is comprised of two groups of items. The first is a sample of components used to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain containment integrity. The second is a sample of spent fuel pool (SFP) related items. These lists are designated as SWEL 1 and SWEL 2, respectively. SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 are combined to form the SWEL for use in conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

The following steps, consistent with the guidance in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, were taken in developing SWEL 1, SWEL 2, and the SWEL. A more detailed discussion of these steps, their implementation, and the results are provided in Section 3.2.

Development of SWEL 1 (SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain containment inteerity):

For development of SWEL 1, the following screens were applied to the Master Equipment Database (MED):

Screen #1: Identify seismic Category 1 equipment list Screen #2: Screen out structures, piping, and penetrations Screen #3: Screen out SSCs that do not support the five safety functions described in Section 3.2, Screen #3 or are major pieces of the NSSS, located inside containment.

Screen #4: Select a representative sample of SSCs based upon including:

• A variety of types of systems

" Major new and replacement equipment / recently modified/upgraded

• A variety of types of equipment

• A variety of environments

• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

• Equipment access considerations

• Repeat maintenance considerations Development of SWEL 2 (Spent Fuel Pool Related Items):

Similarly for development of SWEL 2, the following screens were applied to the MED:

Screen #1: Identify seismic Category 1 equipment list

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-2 Screen #2: Screen out all SSCs not appropriate for the walkdown process Screen #3: Select SWEL 2 items considering the following:

• A variety of types of systems

• Major new and replacement equipment / Recently modified/upgraded

• A variety of types of equipment

• A variety of environments

• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

• Potentially risk-significant SSC considerations Screen #4: Perform rapid drain-down assessment. For STPEGS there are no components or penetrations that could drain the SFP down to below 10 feet above the fuel.

Development of SWEL The SWEL was developed by combining SWEL 1 and SWEL 2.

3.2 Results The methodology outlined above was implemented. A detailed description of that implementation along with the results is provided in the following subsections.

3.2.1 Results of Screening Process for the Development of SWEL 1 The following section describes how the screening processes were applied to meet the objectives of Section 3 of the EPRI guidance, particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate variety of classes of equipment, environments, systems, new and replacement equipment, and other elements. Per the guidance, the four screening processes were accomplished as follows:

Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:

The purpose of Screen #1 is to restrict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified as Seismic Category I and thus have a defined seismic licensing basis, against which to evaluate the as-installed configuration.

The MED was screened to obtain a list of all seismic Category I SSCs. This resulted in the identification of 9967 seismic Category I SSCs.

Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:

The purpose of Screen #2 is to narrow the scope of SSCs by selecting only those which do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis. The types of SSCs that were screened out include seismic Category I structures, containment penetrations, and safety-related piping systems. In addition, manual valves, check valves, flow orifices, flow elements, fire dampers, relief valves, snubbers, spent fuel racks/cells, and thermowells were excluded in keeping with the intent of the guidance.

Out of 9967 items resulting from Screen #1, 5559 items were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed on to Screen #3.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-3 Screen #3 -Support for the 5 Safety Functions:

The purpose of Screen #3 is to narrow the scope of items to be included in SWEL 1 to focus on those SSCs associated with providing or maintaining the following five safety functions:

1. Reactor reactivity control

2. Reactor coolant pressure control

3. Reactor coolant inventory control

4. Decay heat removal

5. Containment Function A list of STPEGS systems was reviewed by a previously-licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at STPEGS to determine which systems support the five safety functions described above (Table 3-1 lists the systems supporting the five safety functions). The systems identified were consistent with those provided in Tables B-1 and B-3 of the EPRI guidance. Components of systems not included in this list were then screened out. Note that the specific safety functions supported by each component were determined with assistance from a previously-licensed SRO at STPEGS, during completion of the final sampling of components for the SWEL 1 list.

Of the 5559 items from Screen #2, 4799 items were retained by Screen #3. These 4799 items are identified as Base List 1 in Appendix B, Table B-1.

Screen #4 -Sample Considerations:

Screen #4 represents a process intended to reduce Base List 1 to a list (SWEL 1) that sufficiently represents a broad population of Seismic Category 1 SSCs considering the following:

1. A variety of types of systems

2. Major new and replacement equipment / Recently modified/upgraded

3. A variety of types of equipment

4. A variety of environments

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

6. Repeat maintenance considerations SWEL 1, containing 105 representative items, was generated using the required sampling selection attributes, as further described below. The SWEL 1 list is provided as Table B-2, in Appendix B.

1. A variety of types of systems:

SWEL I items were selected from the Base List 1 after sorting it by the system types determined to support the 5 safety functions as shown in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Unit 2 Base List 1 and Selected SWEL 1 Items Based on "System Type"

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-4 System Type Definition # of Items in # of Items in Base List 1 SWEL 1 BS 7300 Process System 7 0 DO Standby DG Fuel Oil 141 1 HG Standby DG HVAC 54 0 JW Standby DG Jacket Water 54 0 LU Standby DG lube oil 63 1 SD Standby DG starting air 42 1 AF Auxiliary Feedwater 111 7 AM Qualified Display Processing System 26 3 CC Component Cooling Water 393 12 CH Essential Chilled Water 247 4 CS Containment Spray 12 2 CV Chemical Volume Control 246 4 DG ESF Diesel Generator 205 11 DJ Class 125 VDC 75 5 EH Electro-Hydraulic Control 7 1 EW Essential Cooling Water 117 5 FW Feedwater System 196 0 HC Containment HVAC 137 1 HE Control Room & Electrical Aux. 484 4 HM Mechanical Auxiliary Building HVAC 122 1 II Reactor Vessel Water Level 65 1 MS Main Steam 243 2 PM Class IE 480 Motor Control Centers 496 8 PK Class IE 4160 Power 65 1 PL Class 1E 480 Load Centers 83 3 RC Reactor Coolant 235 3 RH Residual Heat Removal 76 2 RS Rod Control 6 2 IA Instrument Air 7 1 SF Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3 2 SI Safety Injection 263 7 SP Solid State Protection 296 3

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-5 Table 3-1: Unit 2 Base List 1 and Selected SWEL 1 Items Based on "System Type" Cont.

System Type Definition # of Items in # of Items in Base List 1 SWEL 1 VA Class IE 120 VAC 18 4 RA Radiation Monitoring 117 2 XC Contaimnent 87 1 Total 4799 105

2. Major New and Replacement Equipment A list of all major modifications listed in STPEGS database as complete/implemented/working status within the last 15 years was reviewed by a previously licensed SRO at STPEGS to identify major new or replacement equipment appropriate for inclusion in the SWEL. This review resulted in the following items being included in SWEL 1.

Table 3-2 Equipment Selected for SWEL I Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" New/Replacement or Item Equipment ID Description Equipment Modification 7 3EI72EMCEICI MCC E2CI Equipment Modification 19 A2MSFSV7444 Steam Generator 2D Main Steam ORC Isolation Valve Equipment Modification 67 3E242EIV002 25 KVA Single Phase Class IE Inverter/Rectifier Channel Equipment Modification IV (Train C) 78 C2CCMOV0197 RCFC Train C CCW Supply ORC Isolation MOV Equipment Modification Operator 83 3E242EIV 1204 10 KVA Single Phase Class IE Inverter/Rectifier Channel Equipment Modification IV (Train C) 86 D2MSPV7441 S/G 2D Main Steam Outlet Power Operated Relief Valve Equipment Modification ORC 91 2C262XXC0 19 Personnel Airlock Outer Door Open/Close Equalizing Equipment Modification 91___ 222X01 Valve 113 3QI52MDG0500 Diesel Generator #21 Speed Governor Equipment Modification 115 C2CCMOVO2IO RCFC Train C CCW Return ORC Isolation MOV Equipment Modification Operator

3. A variety of types of equipment:

SWEL items from Base List 1 were extracted to meet the 22 classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of the EPRI Guidance. Note that two classes, compressors and motor generators, are not represented because there is no seismic Category I equipment in those categories.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page 3-6 Table 3-3: Selection of SWEL 1 Items Based on "Classes of Equipment"

1. of Items Class Description in SWEL 1 0 Miscellaneous 8 1 Motor Control Centers 4 2 Low Voltage Switchgear 3 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 4 Transfonners 7 5 Horizontal Pumps 10 6 Vertical Pumps 7 7 Fluid Operated Valves 4 8 Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 13 9 Fans 2 10 Air Handlers 4 tI Chillers 1 12 Air Compressors 0 13 Motor Generators 0 14 Distribution Panels 2 15 Batteries on Racks 2 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 4 17 Engine Generators 1 18 Instruments on Racks 4 19 Temperature Sensors 1 20 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 13 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 13 Total 105

4. A variety of environments:

Items located in the following buildings were included on the SWEL I list: Diesel Generator Building, Electrical Auxiliary Building, Mechanical Auxiliary Building, Isolation Valve Cubicle, Fuel Handling Building, Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure, Reactor Containment Building, and the Turbine Generator Building. The installed location of the SWEL 1 items, which provides an indication of the operating environment for the item, is indicated by the associated walk-by area number included in Appendix B, Table B-2. The Base list did not include any items located outside, and therefore, no outside components were included on the SWEL 1 list.

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program In the STPEGS IPEEE, a limited scope, conservative and bounding analysis was performed.

This was included as a seismic PRA. The basis for the limited scope was that the fact that the seismic hazard at STP is extremely low. No seismic vulnerabilities were identified.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-7

6. Repeat Maintenance Considerations No components were selected for inclusion into the SWEL in this category.

3.2.2 Results of Screening Process for the Development of SWEL 2 SWEL 2 was developed based on a review of systems associated with the SFP that are seismic Category I or SSCs whose failure could result in a rapid drain-down of the SFP water level to less than ten feet above the fuel. The review was supported by a previously licensed senior reactor operator at STPEGS.

The following demonstrates how the screening processes used meet the objectives of Section 3 of the EPRI guidance. Per the guidance, the four screening processes for SWEL 2 were accomplished as follows:

Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:

Similar to Screen #1 for SWEL 1, the list of Seismic Category 1 SSCs were considered for SWEL 2.

Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:

Screen #2 considers only those SSCs associated with the SFP that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process. Similar to Screen #2 for SWEL 1, SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis were removed. The same types of SSCs that were screened out during Screen #2 of SWEL 1 were also screened out here.

Also, the following seismic Category 1 systems associated with the SFP screened:

• Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System

• Component Cooling Water System Eight items were retained by Screen #2 and constitute Base List 2 (Appendix B, Table B-3). All of these items are in included in system type FC (Spent Fuel Pool Cooling).

Screen #3 -Sample Considerations:

Screen #3 included the following five sample selection attributes to be represented in SWEL 2:

1. A variety of types of systems

2. Major new and replacement equipment / Recently modified/upgraded

3. A variety of types of equipment

4. A variety of environments

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program From the eight items from Screen #3, two items were selected for SWEL 2. These two items constitute the final select for SWEL 2, because no rapid drain down items are present, see Screen #4 below. See Appendix B, Table B-4 for SWEL 2 items.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-8 Screen #4 -Rapid Drain-Down:

Screen #4 identifies items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly. The SSCs considered are not limit to seismic Category I items but are any that could allow rapid drain-down of the SFP. Rapid drain-down is defined as lowering the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after an earthquake.

Systems interfacing with the SFP were reviewed to identify any components that could, upon failure, result in rapid drain-down of the SFP water level to below ten feet above the fuel. As stated in UFSAR Section 9.1.3.1.2 (Reference 4), system piping and the pool itself are arranged so that failure cannot drain the spent fuel pool or the in-Containment temporary storage area below a depth of approximately 23 feet of water over the top of the stored spent fuel assemblies. Therefore, no rapid drain-down items were added to the SWEL 2 list (Appendix B, Table B-4).

Table 3-4: Selection of SWEL 2 Items Based on "Classes of Equipment" Equipment Description # of Items Class Number inSWEL2 5 Horizontal Pumps 1 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 1 Total 2 3.2.3 SWEL The SWEL was developed by combining the items on SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. The SWEL is provided in Appendix B, Table B-5. Items on the list are indicated as being included as a part of SWEL 1 or SWEL 2.

The items on the SWEL were reviewed to identify those that included anchorage (i.e., items that were not line-mounted equipment such as valves). Eighty-six (86) items were identified with anchorage and approximately 56 percent (48 items) were selected for confirmation that the as-installed equipment anchorage is consistent with plant documentation of the anchorage design. The items selected for anchorage verification are indicated on the SWEL.

The SWEL is what was used for the seismic walkdowns in accordance with a site-specific procedure.

Walk-by areas were identified to include all of the items on the SWEL and are listed in Appendix B, Table B-6.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-9 3.3 Inaccessible Items In the process of selecting SSCs to be included on the SWEL, items that are accessible and have visible anchorage were selected wherever possible. However, because Unit 2 was in operation during the time of the initial walkdowns. there were 15 walkdown items included in the SWEL and one area walk-by, which were not sufficiently accessible to complete the walkdown and walk-by during normal plant operations. Revision 0 of this report committed to completing the remaining walkdowns during the next Unit 2 outage when these items would be accessible. These items are listed in Table 3-5 and are identified by a footnote on the SWEL (Appendix B, Table B-5).

The walkdowns and walk-bys were completed during the recent Unit 2 (2RE16) refueling outage and the results are documented in this revision of the report.

Revision 1 of the report is based on the following agreements between NEI and the NRC regarding the content and format for report updates submitted to provide information for items which were unavailable during the initial walkdowns:

• The complete body of the initial report (Reference 5) is to be resubmitted, but it only needs to be revised to the extent necessary to provide the results of the final walkdowns and walk-bys.

" Only those attachments or appendices which require revision to provide the results of the final walkdowns of inaccessible items need to be included in the updated report. Thus, resubmittal of the attachments or appendices which have not changed is not required by the NRC.

• General updates to the remainder of the report are not required.

The contents of Appendix A and some contents of Appendix B (Tables B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4), which have not been revised, are not included in Revision 1. However, title pages for each of these appendices are included and are annotated to indicate the content has not been provided but is available in Revision 0 of the report (Reference 5).

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 3-10 Table 3-5 Unit 2 Walkdown Items and Area Walk-Bys completed during November 2013 Seismic Walkdown Items Completed During November 2013 Item # Equipment ID Equipment Description Completion Date 5 3EI52ESGOE1C 4160 VAC SWGR E2C 11/25/13 6 3E162ESGOEIC 480V CLASS IE Load Center E2C 11/25/13 7 3EI72EMCE1CI MCC E2C1 11/25/13 35 3E172EMCE1C2 MCC E2C2 11/25/13 37 4Z552ZLP661A Isolation Relay Cabinet Train C ZLP661A 11/23/13 38 3E232EBC047G Battery Charger E2CI 1-1 11/25/13 42 4Z172ESGOO1B Reactor Trip Switchgear Train B 11/24/13 64 3EI72EMCE1C4 MCC E2C4 11/25/13 65 3E132ESGOE1C2 Load Center Transformer E2C2 11/25/13 66 3E232EBC047H E2C 11-2 Battery Charger 11/23/13 67 3E242EIV002 25KVA Inverter EIV 002 (Channel 4, TRAIN C) 11/24/13 69 3EI32ESGOE1C1 Load Center Transformer E2C 1 11/25/13 83 3E242EIV1204 10 KVA Inverter EIV 1204 (C Train, Channel IV) 11/25/13 87 3E152ESGOOIA RCP 2A 15KV Class 1E Cubicle 2A 11/23/13 116 3Q352EDG0334 & Diesel Generator #23, Generator & Motor 11/24/13 3Q 152MDG0334 Area Walk-By Completed During November 2013 Area Walk-By STP2-WB-002E 11/25/13

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-1 4.0 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed consistent with the guidance provided in EPRI 1025286 (Reference 2).

A site-specific procedure was developed to implement the EPRI 1025286 seismic walkdown guidance for conducting and documenting the seismic walkdowns. A walkdown package was prepared for each component listed on the SWEL and for each area walk-by to be performed. Each package included a seismic walkdown checklist (SWC) or an area walk-by checklist (AWC), and the drawing(s) showing equipment location, plant documentation showing the anchorage details for each SWEL item requiring anchorage configuration verification, and documents from prior seismic walkdowns, as applicable. A hardcopy of the package was available for the SWEs during performance of the equipment walkdown or area walk-by.

The seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed by walkdown teams, which consisted of at least two (2) qualified SWEs.

For the seismic walkdowns, the SWEs focused on the following adverse seismic conditions associated with each item of equipment as described in the EPRI 1025286 guidance:

• adverse anchorage conditions,

• adverse seismic spatial interactions, and

• other adverse seismic conditions.

The purpose of the area walk-bys was to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL items. For the area walk-bys, SWEs focused on the following potentially adverse seismic conditions as described in the EPRI 1025286 guidance:

• anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment),

" significantly degraded equipment in the area

• condition of cable/conduit raceways, including condition of supports or fill conditions, and HVAC ducting,

" potential adverse seismic interactions including those that could cause flooding, spray, or a fire in the area, and

" housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interactions.

During the walkdown or walk-by, the walkdown teams discussed conditions and/or any findings in the field, reached agreement on the results of the walkdown, and documented results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys on the checklists. The results of the completed seismic walkdowns are documented on SWCs, which are included as Appendix C. The results of the completed area walk-bys are documented on AWCs, which are included as Appendix D.

For Unit 2, the SWEL includes 107 items to be walked down and 58 area walk-bys to be completed. Of these, 92 walkdowns and 57 area walk-bys were completed during the initial walkdowns, and the results documented in Revision 0 of this report. The remaining 15 walkdowns and I area walk-by

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-2 were completed during the outage in November 2013 and are documented Revision 1. Note that all of the electrical cabinets included on the SWEL were accessible and were opened and inspected.

A low threshold was used to identify and document potential adverse conditions observed during the walkdowns and walk-bys. Table 4-1 lists these potential adverse conditions, which have been submitted as Condition Reports (CRs) and included in the station CAP. The items listed in Table 4-1 include non-seismic issues, such as various housekeeping and material condition items, as well as seismic issues.

Table 4-1 summarizes the issue, describes how the issue has been or is being addressed and provides the current status of the resolution.

Table 4-1 provides the status of the CRs for the initial walkdown and walk-by items as of November 27, 2012, just prior to the issue date for Revision 0. Table 4-2, added in Revision 1, provides the status of the two additional CRs (13-14021 and 13-14022), identified during the November 2013 walkdowns and walk-by. The status of these CRs is as of February 5, 2014.

In some cases, immediate operability determinations (IODs) were performed by the senior reactor operators on shift. In all cases where an IOD was performed, the equipment was determined to be operable and no additional evaluation was needed. Thus, no significant issues that challenged the STPEGS seismic licensing or design basis were identified as a result of the walkdowns.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page 4-3 Table 4-1: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During the September and October, 2012 Walkdowns The Potentially Adverse Conditions listed in this table are those conditions which were identified during the initial walkdowns performed during September and October 2012. This table provides the status of these CRs as of November 27, 2012. It has not been updated in Revision 1.

DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS CR#

RELATED? (See Note 1) 12-27023 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTED AT 24 AFW PUMPS N OPEN THAT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT BY: 1. THE OIL LINE THAT RUNS BETWEEN BEARINGS HAS A PERFORATED PLATE ATTACHED TO THE TOP OF IT THAT APPEARS TO SOMEWHAT PROTECT FROM SOMEONE STEPPING ON THE OIL LINE. HOWEVER, THE PLATE IS ONLY ATTACHED TO THE LINE & PRESSURE ON THE PLATE DIRECTLY PULLS THE OIL LINE. THE PLATE SHOULD BE FIXED TO THE FOUNDATION & NOT THE OIL LINE. OR, AT LEAST, PUT A SIGN UP THAT SAYS DON'T STEP ON THE PLATE. THIS CONDITION EXISTS IN BOTH UNITS. 2. THE COUPLING COVER IS MADE OF VERY LIGHT WEIGHT SHEET METAL & MOVES CONSIDERABLY WITH PRESSURE. THE ENGINEERS BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISER TO BE MADE OF A STRONGER MATERIAL. 3.

THERE IS MINOR CORROSION IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS ALL OVER THE TURBINE, PUMP

& AUXILIARIES THAT SHOULD BE CLEANED UP & REPAINTED THE NEXT TIME THE PUMP IS DOWN FOR ENOUGH TIME. EVALUATE AFW PUMP 24 COUPLING GUARD AS WELL NONE OF THESE ISSUES AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALITIES OF THE PUMP OR TURBINE.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-4 DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS CR#

RELATED? (See oeI 12-27096 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS- IN ROOM 010 IN ELEVATION 10', EAB, A ROD HANGER SUPPORT Y OPEN HAS BEEN OBERVED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH CONDUIT A2XEIGRS099. SEE THE COMMENTS FOR PERSPECTIVE ON NON-ADVERSE NATURE OF CONTACT.

REWORK ROD HANGER SUCH THAT A SEPARATION OF 3" 1S ACHIEVED WITH CONDUIT A2XEIGRS099, PER SEISMIC SEPARATION CONTROL DRAWING UNIT I&2, 3A010S10003.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - THE SEISMIC WALK DOWN ENGINEERS THAT PERFORMED THE WALK DOWN NOTED THAT THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED NOT ADVERSE. -DESIGN ENGINEERING HAS PROVIDED A SECOND PARTY PEER REVIEW, AND CONFIRMS WITH THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS CONCLUSION OF ACCEPTABLE (SEE FOLLOWING JUSTIFICATION): THE DIAMETER OF THE CONDUIT IS MANY TIMES LARGER THAN THE HANGER ROD DIAMETER. THE ROD HANGER WILL READILY FLEX WITHOUT ADVERSE INTERACTION TO THE CONDUIT. NOTE THAT THE ROD HANGERS EXHIBIT SUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY AS THEY GO TO THE CEILING, THUS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE CONDUIT. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS CONDITION IS OPERABLE BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND EVALUATION BY ENGINEERING.

12-27097 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - TRANSFORMER EDT02J2 IN ROOM 001 OF 10 FT ELEV EAB HAS 2 Y OPEN LOOSE ANCHORS (SUPPORT BOLTS) UNDER THE TRANSFORMER. THERE IS ENOUGH THREAD ENGAGEMENT TO PREVENT A I1/I CONCERN PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS.

REPAIR AS NECESSARY.

• IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THE ANCHORS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED TO BE REPLACED OR TIGHTENED AS THE NEXT AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.

12-27099 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE BASE ANCHORS HAVE MINOR CORROSION FROM N OPEN CONDENSATION & THE INLET & OUTLET CHILLED WATER FLANGES HAVE CORROSION ON THE BOLTS.

REPAIR AS NECESSARY.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-5 DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS CR#

RELATED? (See Note I) 12-27102 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - A SMALL LIGHTWEIGHT CART WAS FOUND IN THE RELAY Y CLOSED ROOM THAT WAS NOT SECURED PER ZA-98, ADDENDUM 7. ONLY 1.LEG OF THE CART WAS SECURED SO THE CART WAS ABLE TO COME INTO WITH A SAFETY RELATED CABINET. THE WHEELS OF THE CART WERE NOT PREVENTED FROM ROLLING ALSO.

OPERATIONS TOOK PROMPT ACTION TO SECURE THE CART PROPERLY & REMOVE THE WHEELS. THE CART IS SO LIGHT THAT IS WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE ROOM PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS.

BASED ON ENGINEERING INPUT, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS LIGHT WEIGHT CART WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS ROOM. THE CART HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ROOM.

12-27103 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ESSEN CHILLED WATER FLOW INDICATOR IS MISSING 2 BOLTS Y OPEN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE ANCHORAGE PANEL. 4 ARE INSTALLED, 2 ARE MISSING.

THERE IS ADEQUATE SECURING FOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

REPLACE MISSING BOLTS.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS. THE BOLTS SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOOD OPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.

12-27104 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - CCP 2B LUBE OIL COOLER CCW RETURN FLOW INDICATOR IS Y OPEN MISSING ONE BOLT ON TOP. THERE ARE 5 BOLTS THAT SECURE THE INDICATOR ADEQUATELY.

REPLACE BOLT.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS. THE BOLT SHOULD BE INSTALLED DURING NEXT FEG TO SUPPORT GOOD OPERATING/MAINTENANCE PRACTICE.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-6 DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS CR#

RELATED? (See Note I) 12-27111 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS- IN ROOM 013, ELEVATION 10', OF THE EAB IT WAS IDENTIFIED Y OPEN ON TRAIN 'A' CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING UNIT ONE NUT WAS FOUND LOOSE, AND ONE ANCHOR BOLT WAS SUSPECT OF NOT BEING COMPLETLY SEATED ON THE FOUNDATION. PER THE SEISMIC ENGINEERS, T IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION- UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT AFFECT OPERABILITY. THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THIS COMPONENT WOULD REMAIN INSTALLED UNDER ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO EQ OR SEISMIC CONCERNS.

12-27140 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - A HANGER ON THE FIRE PROTECTION PIPE IN ESF DG 21 BAY Y OPEN ALONG THE SOUTH WALL (VERTICAL) IS TWISTED. PIPE HANGER SHOULD BE ROTATED 90 DEGREES & ADJUSTED TO CARRY LOAD.

PER DISCUSSION WITH ORIGINATOR, SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS DISCUSSED THIS CR AND CONCLUDED THAT THE TWISTED HANGER IS STILL CARRYING SOME VERTICAL LOAD BUT, BEING TWISTED, THIS WOULD NOT BE ITS FULL DESIGNED LOAD.

THE SECOND HANGER AT THE TOP OF THE VERTICAL PIPE RISER ON THE HORIZONTAL PORTION JUST A FEW INCHES FROM THE ELBOW AT THE TOP OF THE RISER, IS CARRYING THE VERTICAL LOAD SUFFICIENTLY FOR ANY SEISMIC CONCERNS. FP PIPE SUPPORT IS CONSIDERED FUNCTIONAL BUT DEGRADED IN THIS CONDITION.

12-27158 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT BOLTS & WELDS IN MAB N OPEN CHILLED WATER IN THE FHB HAVE ENOUGH RUST TO WARRANT CLEAN & RECOAT:1.

CH04632. CH04623. CH04644. CH04655. CH04666. CH0413THESE ARE IN ROOM 002 IN FHB 4' ELEV.

12-27165 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - INSULATION IS TORN/DEGRADED IN A COUPLE LOCATIONS N OPEN AROUND CH-FE-9320 ON 4 FT ELEV OF FHB.

REPAIR AS NECESSARY 12-27167 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ED-PI-8101 FHB CASK POOL PUMP DISCHARGE PI HAS A BORIC N OPEN ACID LEAK JUST BELOW THE GAUGE.

I&C REPAIR NEEDED.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-7 CR # DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC RELATED?

STATUS (See Note 1)

I 12-27174 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW PUMP 2A HAS CORROSION AT THE BASEPLATE THAT N OPEN SHOULD BE CLEANED UP & RECOATED.

12-27176 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - HCMOV0007 HAS SOME CORROSION & SLIGHT OIL LEAK THAT N OPEN WARRANT REPAIR.

THIS SLIGHT AMOUNT OF CORROSION AND OIL SEEPING IS NOT AT THE QUANTITY THAT WOULD IMPACT THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE VALVE WHICH IS TO STAY CLOSED AS IT CURRNRTLY IS. NOT AN OPERABILITY CONCERN.

12-27188 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ESSEN CHILLED WATER PUMP 21A HAS A COUPLING GUARD Y CLOSED THAT IS BOLTED TO THE FLOOR WITH 4 BOLTS. 3 OF THESE BOLTS HAVE A SLIGHT GAP BETWEEN THE BOLT HEAD & THE LEG OF THE GUARD. THE COVER IS STILL STURDY &

DOESN'T FLEX IN ANY DIRECTION.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THIS SLIGHT GAPS ON THE MOUNTING FASTENERS FOR THE COUPLING GUARD DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO THE CONTINUED OPERABILITY OF THIS PUMP AS DESCRIBED. ENGINEERS AGREE THAT THIS IS NOT AN OPERABILITY CHALLENGE. PUMP CONTINUES TO BE OPERABLE 12-27484 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - EAB ROOM 212 HAS AN EMERGENCY LIGHT THAT IS MISSING A N CLOSED NUT. REPAIR AS NECESSARY. THERE IS NOT A II/1 ISSUE, IT IS ADEQUATELY SECURED FOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

12-27485 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ROOM 76 & ROOM 106 NEED RELAMPED N CLOSED 12-27492 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ONE OF THE ESSEN CHILLED WATER LINES IN ROOM 206 HAS A N OPEN CLAMP NEAR THE FLOOR PENETRATION THAT IS CORRODED & WARRANTS RECOATING. THIS IS FOR C TRAIN ESSEN CHILLED WATER.

12-27499 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - THERE IS LOOSE INSULATION ON 10' MAB MEZZININE LEVEL N OPEN NEAR CC-137.

REPAIR AS REQUIRED 12-27552 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - ECW 2B HAS RUSTED BASEPLATE BOLTS ON THE WEST SIDE. N OPEN THIS IS MORE THAN MILD CORROSION.

REPAIR/RECOAT.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-8 DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS CR#

RELATED? (See Note 1) 12-27690 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - BAT 2A & 2B BOTH ARE BOLTED TO THE FLOOR BUT THE Y OPEN HOLD-DOWN NUTS DO NOT HAVE WASHERS AS DETAILED IN THE DRAWINGS. INSTALL WASHERS. SEISMIC ENGINEERS & STP ENGINEERS AGREE THESE MISSING WASHERS DO NOT AFFECT THE TANK'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT.

BASED ON ENGINEERING INPUT, SEISMIC RESTRAINT IS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT THE USE OF WASHERS AND THE TANKS CAN WITHSTAND A SEISMIC EVENT GIVEN THE CURRENT CONDITION OF THE BOLTS AND NUTS INSTALLED.

12-27832 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS - 2 NON-CLASS ELECTRICAL JUNCTION BOXES (COVERS) ARE Y OPEN MISSING ONE BOLT EACH & ONE OF THE PANELS (BFZZ00I 1) ALSO HAS 2 LOOSE BOLTS.

REPLACE/REPAIR AS NECESSARY. SEE PAGE 3 FOR MED COMMENTS. THESE PANELS' TPNS NUMBERS ARE NOT IN MED. THEY ARE PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN FHB-29' ROOM 4.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION N2VMBFZZ003I IS THE TPNS OF ONE OF THE PANELS (ACT # 496963); N2VMBFZZOO IIS THE TPNS FOR THE OTHER ONE (ACT #

540620) THE JUNCTION BOX HAS A LIGHT WEIGHT METAL COVER. ONE OF THE BOXES IS MISSING I BOLT WITH 2 OTHERS LOOSE. THE 15 REMAINING BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE LIGHT WEIGHT COVER FROM A SEISMIC Il/I CONCERN. THE OTHER BOX IS MISSING I BOLT. THE REMAINING 7 BOLTS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE COVER FROM A SEISMIC 1I/I CONCERN. THESE CONDITIONS WOULD NOT THREATEN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OR SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS, AND THEREFORE NO OPERABILITY CONCERNS EXIST PER ENGINEERING.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-9 CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS RELATED? (See Note 1) 12-27896 A NUMBER 9 (#9) GAGE WIRE IS ATTACHED TO ONE OF FIFTY EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS ON SI Y OPEN ACCUMULATOR 2A. PLEASE REWORK BY REMOVING THE PIECE OF WIRE. THE BACKGROUND ON THIS WIRE IS THAT IT WAS USED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERMANENT SCAFFOLDING BUILT AROUND THE SI ACCUMULATORS. REVIEW OF THE CONDITION, THE SCAFFOLD, THE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE, AND THE PROCEDURE THAT INSTALLED THE SCAFFOLD CONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE WIRE TIE WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE ANCHOR BOLT OR ACCUMULATOR FUNCTION, AND 2) THE WIRE TIE IS UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE SCAFFOLD INSTALLATION.

THE REASON FOR THESE TWO CONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE SCAFFOLD ASSEMBLY ALREADY USES EMBEDDED HILTI BOLTS AND SEISMIC BRACES TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC STABILITY.

FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: A NUMBER 9 (#9) GAGE WIRE IS ATTACHED TO ONE OF FIFTY EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS ON SI ACCUMULATOR 2A. THE BACKGROUND ON THIS WIRE IS THAT IT WAS USED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERMANENT SCAFFOLDING BUILT AROUND THE SI ACCUMULATORS. REVIEW OF THE CONDITION, THE SCAFFOLD, THE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE, AND THE PROCEDURE THAT INSTALLED THE SCAFFOLD CONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE WIRE TIE WOULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE ANCHOR BOLT OR ACCUMULATOR FUNCTION, AND 2) THE WIRE TIE IS UNNECESSARY TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE SCAFFOLD INSTALLATION. THE REASON FOR THESE TWO CONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE SCAFFOLD ASSEMBLY ALREADY USES EMBEDDED HILTI BOLTS AND SEISMIC BRACES TO MAINTAIN SEISMIC STABILITY. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS. IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN TO TIE OFF THE SCAFFOLD FRAME TO THE FLANGE BOLT OF THE ACCUMULATOR TANK. THE SCAFFOLD FRAME IS ADEQUATELY TIED OFF IN THE HORIZONTAL DIRECTION BY 3 BRACES FOR SEISMIC LOADS. THIS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN VERIFIED BY SEISMIC ENGINEER AND AS SUCH DOCUMENTED IN THE DCP 02-86-10 SUPP. I. THEREFORE, THE WIRE TIE-OFF TO THE ACCUMULATOR ANCHOR BOLT (ONE OF FIFTY-EIGHT ANCHOR BOLTS) WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE ANCHOR BOLT, OR THE ACCUMULATOR, FROM PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION DURING A DESIGN BASES EVENT. LIKEWISE, THE WIRE TIE-OFF MAY BE REMOVED FROM THE ACCUMULATOR ANCHOR BOLT, SINCE ADEQUATE SCAFFOLD SUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE 3 SEISMIC BRACES. BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE ACCUMULATOR IS OPERABLE.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-10 SEISMIC STATUS CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION RELATED? (See Note 1) 12-27897 DURING THE SEISMIC COMPONENT WALKDOWN OF E2CI 1-2 BATTERY CHARGER (TPNS Y OPEN 3E232EBC047H) IT WAS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR (I OF 4) FASTENERS WHICH HOLD DOWN THE INDUCTOR IS FULLY ENGAGED, BUT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT. PLEASE REWORK THIS CONDITION BY TIGHTENING THIS FASTENER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROPORATE INSTRUCTIONS. FOUND DURING SEISMIC WALKDOWNS.

FOR THIS ONE FASTENER THAT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT, THE LOCK WASHER IS NOT FLAT, INDICATING THAT IT COULD BE TIGHTER. ON THE REMAINING THREE BOLTS THE WASHERS, LOCK WASHERS AND NUTS APPEAR TO BE TIGHTLY CONNECTED. BECAUSE THE THREE REMAINING BOLTS ARE TIGHTLY CONNECTED, AND THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL BOLT STRENGTH MARGIN, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE INDUCTOR WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, AND THE PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDUCTOR AND THE BATTERY CHARGER ASSEMBLY WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT MMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION - UPON EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION AND DISCUSSION WITH ENGINEERING, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE AFFECTED COMPONENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: FOR THIS ONE FASTENER THAT IS NOT WRENCH TIGHT, THE LOCK WASHER IS NOT FLAT, INDICATING THAT IT COULD BE TIGHTER. ON THE REMAINING THREE BOLTS THE WASHERS, LOCK WASHERS AND NUTS APPEAR TO BE TIGHTLY CONNECTED. BECAUSE THE THREE REMAINING BOLTS ARE TIGHTLY CONNECTED, AND THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL BOLT STRENGTH MARGIN, THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE INDUCTOR WILL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT, AND THE PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTION OF THE INDUCTOR AND THE BATTERY CHARGER ASSEMBLY WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS EVENT.

BASED ON THE ABOVE THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE BATTERY CHARGER IS OPERABLE

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-11 DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION SEISMIC STATUS CR#

RELATED? (See Note 1) 12-27969 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 2C HAS I JAM NUT OUT OF 14 THAT IS NOT TIGHT Y OPEN AGAINST THE FOUNDATION HOLD DOWN NUT.

IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY DETERMINATION: THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE JAM NUT ON ONE OF 14 HOLD DOWN BOLTS IS NOT AN OPERABILITY ISSUE. PER ENGINEERING, THIS JAM NUT IS TO KEEP THE HOLD DOWN NUT FROM COMMING LOOSE. THE HOLD DOWN NUT IS NOT LOOSE. THE JAM NUT SHOULD BE TIGHTENED THROUGH THE NORMAL CAP PROCESS.

12-28083 DURING THE SEISMIC WALKDOWNS SEVERAL INSTANCES OF EQUIPMENT IMPROPERLY N CLOSED STAGED / SECURED IN SEISMIC I1/I AREAS WERE NOTED. DISCUSSIONS WITH WORKERS INDICATED SOME AREAS THAT ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD WELL REGARDING THIS ISSUE.

Note 1: This table provides the status of these CRs as of November 27, 2012, which has not been updated in Revision I of this Report.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 4-12 Table 4-2: Potentially Adverse Conditions Identified During the November 2013 Walkdowns The Potentially Adverse Conditions listed in this table are those conditions which were identified during the Unit 2 walkdowns performed during November 2013. This table provides the status of these CRs as of February 5, 2014. This table was added in Revision 1 of this Report.

SEISMIC STATUS CR# DESCRIPTION/RESOLUTION RELATED? (See Note I) 13-14021 SEISMIC WALKDOWN - LOOSE BOLT ON THE BACKSIDE OF LC 2L1 TRANSFORMER ON Y CLOSED THE MIDDLE TOP PLATE. TAG HUNG. TIGHTEN BOLT ACTION WAS CLOSED USING WAN 473121 TO TIGHTEN THE BOLT 13-14022 SEISMIC WALKDOWN- TWO EXIT SIGNS IN ROOM 318 NEED RELAMPED N OPEN Note I: This table provides the status of these CRs as of February 5, 2014. This table was added in Revision 1 of this Report.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 5-1 5.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation The plant CAP system was used to document the evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified in Section 4.

5.1 Summary of Evaluations As indicated in Section 4.0, a low threshold was used to identify and document potential adverse conditions observed during the walkdowns and walk-bys (refer to the lists provided in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2). In some cases, IODs were performed by the senior reactor operators on shift. In all cases where an IOD was performed, the equipment was determined to be operable and no additional evaluation was needed. Thus, no significant issues that challenged the STPEGS seismic licensing or design basis were identified as a result of the walkdowns.

Evaluations of Other Potentially Adverse Conditions No other potentially adverse conditions were noted by the SWEs; therefore there are no licensing basis evaluations.

Evaluations of Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards No potential flooding/spray hazards were noted by the SWEs; therefore there are no licensing basis evaluations.

Evaluations of Potentially Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically-induced fire interactions were noted by the SWEs; therefore there are no licensing basis evaluations.

5.2 Plant Modifications There are no planned or newly installed changes to the plant as a result of implementation of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.

As identified in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, actions planned as a result of seismic walkdown findings include documentation updates, maintenance items, and engineering evaluations to document as-found conditions.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page 6-1 6.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities In the STP IPEEE, a limited scope, conservative and bounding analysis was performed. This was included as a seismic probabilistic risk assessment. The basis for the limited scope was the fact that the seismic hazard at STPEGS is extremely low. No seismic vulnerabilities were identified.

I

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 7-1 7.0 Peer Team Review Summary The Peer Review Team finction and required activities are delineated in EPRI 1025286, Section 6, Peer Review. The Peer Review Team provided an overview of the following seismic walkdown activities, as defined in EPRI 1025286:

1. Selection of the SSCs included on the SWEL

2. Checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys

3. Licensing basis evaluations

4. Decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions into the CAP process

5. Submittal report Peer Review activities have been performed throughout the duration of the Seismic Walkdown portion of the STP 1& 2 Fukushima Response Project. The Peer Review Team members were Leo Nadeau, Bechtel Power (Lead) and Roger Smith, Bechtel Power.

A summary of the results of the Peer Review is provided below:

1. Selection of SSCs The Peer Review Team performed a comprehensive review of the SWEL The SWEL was compared to the requirements of EPRI 1025286, Section 3, Selection of SSC, utilizing Appendix F, Peer Review Checklist and was found to appropriately apply the EPRI 1025286 guidance including:

• Selection of SWEL 1 SSCs

• Use of sample selection attributes (e.g., types of systems and environments)

• Adequate representation of the five safety functions

• Consideration of risk insights

• Selection of spent fuel pool related items

2. Sample of SWCs and AWCs The Peer Review Team reviewed a sample of walkdown results and concluded that the SWC and AWCs were completed in accordance with the EPRI 1025286 guidance.

a. Packages - The Peer Review Team reviewed seismic walkdown packages for 32 Unit 2 SWCs, before walkdowns were performed. This initial sampling of the SWC reviewed the determination of the equipment class and that related documentation was included (e.g.,

location drawings, anchorage details, etc.). The initial issue of the walkdown packages sampled was determined to be adequate to support the seismic walkdowns and in accordance with EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance.

b. SWC/AWC - There are a total of 107 SWCs and 58 AWCs for Unit 2. The Peer Review Team sampled approximately 21% (34 of 165) of the completed Unit 2 SWC and AWC which exceeds the EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance requirement of 10-15%. The Peer Review Team concluded that SWC and AWC were completed in accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 7-2

c. SWEs - SWEs were interviewed by the Peer Review Team to verify that they understood and followed the guidance in EPRI 1025286, Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

Results of the interviews indicated that each team understood and followed the EPRI 1025286 guidance.

3. Review of Licensing Basis Evaluations/Review of CAP Decisions Licensing Basis Evaluations, as defined in EPRI 1025286, were accomplished in accordance with the STP Corrective Action Program (CAP). Potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the walkdowns were entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) consistent with plant procedures. The Peer Review Team sampled thirty condition reports (CRs) submitted between September 20 and October 1, 2012 and determined that the threshold level at which a CR was generated was low enough to ensure that any licensing basis issue would have been appropriately documented. CRs were written for many items other than those related to seismic issues including minor corrosion, housekeeping, fire suppression, damaged insulation, foreign material, missing hardware on non-seismic equipment and equipment interactions. STP Station Engineering personnel took direct responsibility for the resolution of potentially adverse conditions and appropriate functional organizations (e.g., Operations, Design Engineering, Maintenance Engineering, and Station Management) were routinely consulted as required by the CAP.

Supporting documentation prepared (e.g., photographs) was appropriately included on the SWC/AWC prepared and CR submitted.

4. Review of Submittal Report A review of the submittal report was performed by members of the Peer Review Team and it was determined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter were met.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page 8-1 8.0 References

1. NRC Letter, Request for Infonrmation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of the Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12056A046).

2. EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated May 29, 2012 (ML12164A751).

3. NRC letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Draft Report 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance," dated May 31, 2012 (ML12145A529).

4. South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 16.

5. Letter, D. W. Rencurrel to NRC Document Control Desk, "Final Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated November 27, 2012 (ML13003A275).

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page A- I Appendix A Qualifications of Seismic Walkdown Personnel The information in Appendix A was previously provided in Revision 0 of the Seismic Walkdown Report and has not been revised.

The information in Appendix A is not included in Revision 1 of the Report.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B- 1 Appendix B Seismic Walkdown Equipment List The information in the following Appendix B tables was previously provided in Revision 0 of the Seismic Walkdown Report and has not been revised:

Table B-i: Unit 2 Base List 1 Table B-2: Unit 2 SWEL 1 Table B-3: Unit 2 Base List 2 Table B-4: Unit 2 SWEL 2 These tables are not included in Revision 1 of the Report.

The following Appendix B tables have been revised and are included in Revision 1 of the Report:

Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-Bys

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-2 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL 4t Z E Equipment ID Equipment Description " -

E z

-% -9 3ZI02ZRR00I SSPS LOGIC CAB R 20 SP HIGH I NA Y N Y 03A (ZRRO01)

REACTOR CONTAINMENT 2 2V142ZHC0007 BUILDING NORMAL 10 HC MED 5 NA N N N 13A PURGE SUPPLY (ORC)

ISOLATION DAMPER EAB ELECTRICAL 3 3V1 12VAH004 PENETRATION SPACE 10 HE LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02A EMERGENCY AIR 5 HANDLING UNIT 21A SDISTRIBUTION PANEL 001 1,2,3,4 4 3E242EDP001 14 VA MED 123 NA Y N Y 02C (CLASS I E) 5 57 3EI52ESGOEIC 4160 VAC SWGR E2C 3 PK MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02E

'5 67 3EI62ESGOEIC 480V CLASS 1E LOAD PL MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02E CENTER E2C 25 77 3EI72EMCEICI MCC E2CI I PM MED 1,2,3,4 Mnt Y N Y 02E

,5 8 3VI 12VAH007 CONTROL ROOM TRAIN 10 HE HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02F A AIR HANDLING UNIT ,5

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-3 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

E r 15 E g 9 3N092ZLP801 TRAIN A ESF LOAD 20 SF HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02H SEQUENCER CABINET 25 10 3Z102ZRR002 SSPS ACTUATION TRN A 20 SP HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03A CAB ZRR02 5 11 4ZI02ZRR057 SSPS INTERPOSING ISOL 20 SP HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03A RELAY CAB 5 12 A2SPRXTRPSG2 TRAIN R REACTOR TRIP 2 RS HIGH I NA Y N N 04C BYPASS BREAKER 13 3R282NSP201A ECW SELF CLEANING 0 EW MED 4 NA Y N Y 14A STRAINER 2A ECW SCREEN WASH 14 A2EWFY6914 PUMP 2A FV-6914 8 EW LOW 4 NA N N N 14A SOLENOID VALVE LOW HEAD SAFETY 15 2NI22NPA202A INJECI INJECTION SUMETA PUMP 2A 6 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 12C REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK SI 16 A2SIMOV0001A PUMPS TRAIN A SUCTION 8 SI MED 1&3 NA N N N 12C ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR 17 2N 102NPA201A CONTAINMENT SPRAY 6 CS LOW 5 NA Y N Y 12C PUMP2A

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B-4 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

Ea -Z' 18 3S142MPA0I AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 5 AF HIGH 2&4 NA Y N N 10B PUMP 21 STEAM GENERATOR 2D 19 A2MSFSV7444 MAIN STEAM ORC 7 MS MED 2&4 NA N N N 11A ISOLATION VALVE 20 Not Used.

21 Not Used.

22 3E342EDTB170 DP XFMR DTB170 (FEEDS 4 PM LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03D THROUGH TO DPB 135) 5 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 23 A2CCFT4512 2A OUTLET FLOW 18 CC NRS 4 NA Y N N 07A TRANSMITTER RCFC TRAIN C CHILLED 24 A2CCFY0864 WATER RETURN FV-0864 8 CC NRS 5 NA N N N 08A SOLENOID VALVE CVCS CHARGING 25 A2CVFT0205 DISCHARGE HEADER 18 CV LOW 3 NA Y N N 06F FLOW TRANSMITTER 26 C2RHMOV0061B RHRPUMP2B SUCTION 8 RH HIGH 4 NA N N N 15D MOV OPERATOR 27 C2CCMOV0129 RHRcc LOW 4 NA N N N 16B RETURN HEADER IRC

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B-5 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

C. <C<

ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR RCFC TRAIN B CHILLED 28 C2CCMOV0147 WATER/CCW RETURN 8 CC LOW 4 NA N N N 16C IRC ISOLATION MOV OPERATOR MAIN TURBINE EHC N FLUID TO REACTOR TRIP 29 A2EHPSL6327 0 EH LOW 2 NA Y N 17A LOGIC INPUT LOW PRESSURE SWITCH 30 3E342EDTA370 DTA 370 TRANSFORMER 4 PM LOW 4 NA Y N 14A (FEEDS DPA 335)

FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK 1,2,3,4 N 31 3Q152MTF0237 #22 21 DG MED ,5 NA Y Y 01B 32 3N092ZLP802 TRAIN B ESF LOAD 20 SF HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y Y 02G SEQUENCER CABINET 25 QDPS APC (AUXILIARY 1,2,3,4 N 33 4Z552ZLP678 PROCESS CAINET) B I 20 AM HIGH 1, NA Y Y 02G ZLP678 ,5 34 3V112VFN008 CONTROL ROOM HE LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03C CLEANUP FAN 21B 95 N

357 3EI72EMCEIC2 MCC E2C2 1 PM j MED NA Y Y 02E

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-6 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

.z E N: - e' *%

EE 36 Not. Used 377 4Z552ZLP661A ISOLATION RELAY CAB 20 AM 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03F TRAIN C ZLP66IA 25 387 3E232EBC047G BATTERY CHARGER 16 DJ LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 04B E2C 1-1 ,5 DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1234 39 3E242EDPI203 1203 (B TRAIN, CHANNEL 14 VA HIGH 5 NA Y N N 03E 111) ,5 40 B2DJPL037CI MAIN BATTERY DJ MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03E BREAKER (B TRAIN) '5 41 3E232EBT045C CLASS IE BATTERY E2BI1 15 DJ MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 03E

,5 427 4Z 172ESG001B REACTOR TRIP RS HIGH NA Y N N 04C SWITCHGEAR TR B 43 3R282NPA202B WASH 5 EW LOW 4 NA Y N Y 14B BOOSTER PUMP 2B ECW PUMP 2B 44 3R282TEW0137 DCH DISCHARGE MO2MOV 8 EW HIGH 4 NA N N N 14B LOW HEAD SAFETY 45 2N122NPA202B INJECI INJECTION SUMP2B PUMP 2BI 6 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 12B

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-7 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

_ _ - . \0 z LO HEAD SAFETY 46 B32SIMOV0018B3 IJCIN UP2 SI MED 1&3 NA N N N 12D DISCHARGE MOV OPERATOR (ORC) 47 3SI42MPA02 AXLAYFEWTR 5 AF HIGH 2&4 NA Y N Y 10A PUMP 22 48 3E342EDTB370 FEED TO 120/208V DP 4 PM LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 14B DPB335 VIA XFMR DTB370 5 COMPONENT LO R-EACTSFETCOOLING 49 3R202NHX201 B WATER HEAT 21 cc LOW 4 NA Y N Y 07A EXCHANGER 2B TRAIN B ESSENTIAL 234 50 3 V1I12VTS005 CHILLED WATER 21 CH MED 5,,, NA Y N Y 07A EXPANSION TANK ,

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 51 B2CCTE4515 2B OUTLET 19 cc NRS 4 NA N N N 07B TEMPERATURE ELEMENT INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY 52 B2IAFV8565 TOJECTOR 7 IA LOW 5 NA N N N 06D CONTAINMENT BUILDING ORC ISOLATION VALVE ROEACTOR COOLANT 53 B2RCPT0406 SYSTEM LOOP 2C 18 RC LOW NA Y N N 06D PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 54 3E342EDTA470 D VA XFMR 4 PM LOW 4 NA Y N Y 02K (FEEDS THROUGH TO DPAI

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-8 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

co t Cu 435)

RESIDUAL HEAT 55 2RI62NHX201B REMOVAL HEAT 21 cc HIGH 4 NA Y N Y 16A EXCHANGER 2B RHR TRAIN A CCW 56 A2CCMOV0012 SUPPLY ORC ISOLATION 435) 8 cc LOW 4 NA N N N 08A MOV OPERATOR 57 3Q152MAB0334 STANDBY JACKET 5 DG LOW 1,23,4 NA Y N N 01A WATER PUMP (DG 23) ,5 58 3QI52MHX0336 LUBE OIL COOLER (DG 23) DG HIGH 1, 59 3Q152NPCO334 STANDBY LUBE OIL DG MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 01A PUMP (DG 23) ,5 60 3Q152MTS0534 STARTING AIR RECEIVER 10 SD MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 01A

1. 25 ,5 58 3QI52Mi-10 DG 23 GENERATOR L ) 0 DG HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N OIA CONTROL PANEL 1,5 INCORE INSTRUMENTATION Y N N 03A 62 C211K008B HEATER JUNCTION T/C 20 S11 LOW NA CABINET HEATER CONTROLLER

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B-9 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

2e U STEAM GENERATOR 2C 63 C2AFMOV0085 ORC AFW ISOLATION 8 AF HIGH 4 NA N N N 10D MOV OPERATOR 64' 3E172EMCEIC4 MCC E2C4 1 PM MED 1,2,3,4

'5 NA Y N Y 02E 657 3EI32ESGOEIC2 LOAD CENTER E PL MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02E TRANSFORMER E2C2 ,5 667 3E232EBC047H E2CH 1-2 BATTERY CHARGER 16 DJ LOW 1,2,3,4

,5 NA Y N Y 04B 67 7 3E242EIV002 25KVA INVERTER EIV 002 16 VA LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 04B (CHANNEL 4, TRAIN C) ,5 68 3V1 12VFN003 EAB MAIN AREA RETURN 9 HE HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 05A FAN 21C ,5 697 3E]32ESGOE1CI LOAD CENTER 4 PL MED 1,293,4 NA Y N Y 02E TRANSFORMER E2CI 45 70 2N102NPA201C CONTAINMENT SPRAY 6 CS LOW 5 NA Y N Y 12A PUMP2C HIGH HEAD SAFETY 71 2NI22NPA201C INHECI INJECTION PUMP2C PUMP 2C 6 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 12A C AFW CROSSOVER 72 C2AFFV7515 VALVE (AF-FV- 7 AF MED 4 NA N N N 10D 7515)

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B- 10 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

E I~

z- =

CHEMICAL & VOLUME 73 3R172NPA203A CONTROLCV LOW NA Y N Y 06A BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 2A CHEMICAL & VOLUME 74 2RI72NPA201A CONTROL SYSTEM 5 CV MED 1&3 NA Y N Y 06B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 2A TRAIN C ESSENTIAL 11234 75 3VI12VCH006 CHILLED WATER II CH HIGH 1,2,3 NA Y N Y 06H CHILLER UNIT 22C ,5 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 2A 76 3VI02VAHOOI SUPPLEMETAR SUPPLEM ENTARY 21 HM HIGH 4 NA Y N N 06E COOLER 21A DTB 470 TRANSFORMER 77 3E342EDTB470 (FEEDS THROUGH TO DPB 4 PM LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 03D 435) ,5 RCFC TRAIN C CCW 78 C2CCMOV0197 SUPPLY ORC ISOLATION 8 CC LOW 5 NA N N N 08A MOV OPERATOR 79 Not Used.

80 2R162NPA201B RESIDUALRH HIGH NA Y N N 15 REMOVAL PUMP 2B

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B- 1I Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

SAFETY INJECTION 81 2NI122NRC201B SYSTEM ACCUMULATOR 21 SI MED 1&3 NA Y N Y 15A 213 82 3E232EBT045B CLASS IE BATTERY E2DI 1 15 DJ MED 1,2,3,4 NA Y N Y 02B

,5 S0 KVA INVERTER EIV 83 3E242EIV1204 1204 (C TRAIN, CHANNEL 16 VA HIGH 1,,-, NA Y N Y 04B IV) L QDPS (QUALIFIED DISPLAY PROCESSING 1234 84 4Z552ZLP680 SYSTEM) APC 20 AM HIGH 1,23, NA Y N Y 02J (AUXILIARY PROCESS CABINET) DI ZLP680 85 3SI42MTU01 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP 0 AF HIGH 2&4 NA Y N N 10C 24 TERRY TURBINE S/G 2D MAIN STEAM OUTLET POWER 86 D2MSPV7441 OPERTPER OPERATED RELIEF 8 MS HIGH 2&4 NA N N N 11A VALVE (ORC) 877 3EI52ESG00IA RCP 2A 15KV CLASS IE RC --- I NA Y N N 02A CUB12A SAFETY INJECTION 88 2N I22NTF20IA SYSTEM REFUELING 21 SI HIGH 1&3 NA Y N Y 06C WATER STORAGE TANK I II

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-12 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

u u 89 N2CHFI9502 ESSENTIAL CHILLER 22A 20o CH NRS 1,2,3,4 NA N N N 06E FLOWMETER ,5 90 3R202NTS201A 21 cc MED 4 NA Y N N 09A WATER SURGE TANK 2A PERSONNEL AIRLOCK 91 2C262XXCH009 STIERD2A xc LOW N NA N N N 091 OPEN/CLOSE EQUALIZING VALVE 92 Not Used.

93 Not Used.

94 Not Used.

95 3V112VPA004 ESSENTIAL CHILLED 5 CH HIGH 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 06E WATERPUMP21A 5 CONTROL ROOM /EAB 96 A2RART8033 VENTILATION 20 RA NRS 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 05B RADIATION 5 TRANSMITTER DIESEL GENERATOR #21 97 N2DOPT5475 FUEL OIL SUPPLY 18 DO NRS 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N 01C HEADER PRESSURE 15 TRANSMITTER I I

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B- 13 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

E z E 4 z MAIN STEAM LINE A 98 A2RART8046 RADIATION 20 RA LOW 1 NA Y N N 02A TRANSMITTER 99 Not Used.

100 3R202NPA201C COMPONENT COOLING 5 CC HIGH 4 NA Y N Y 06H WATER PUMP 2C CHEMICAL & VOLUME 101 3R172NTF201B CONTROL SYSTEM BORIC 21 CV LOW 3 NA Y N Y 06G ACID TANK 2B 102 3Q152MHX0334 JACKET WATER COOLER 21 DG LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N O0A (DG 23) ,5 JACKET WATER 1234 103 3Q152MPX0334 CIRCULATION PUMP (DG 5 DG LOW 5 NA Y N N OIA

23) ,5 104 3QI52MHT0335 JACKET WATER CIRC 21 DG LOW 1,2,3,4 NA Y N N OIA HEATER (DG 23) 21 DG LOW ,5 105 3Q]52MFR346 LUBEOILFILTER (DG23) 0 LU LOW NA Y N N OA

'5 DIESEL EXHAUST 1,2,3,4 106 3Q]52MTS3334 SILENCER (DG 23) 0 DG LOW 5 NA Y N N OA 107 Not Used.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B-14 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

- -" =

z _ rE EE E.~

108 7RO92NTS20IA PRESSURIZER RELIEF 21 RC LOW 2 NA Y N N 15E TANK 109 Not Used.

TERRY TURBINE LUBE 110 3SI42MHIX01 TERRYOTURBANE OIL COOLER (AFW 24) 21 AF HIGH 2&5 NA Y N N 10C 111 3S142MSP0I TERRYTURBINELUBE 0 AF HIGH 2&4 NA N N N 10C OIL FILTER (AFW 24) 112 Not Used.

113 3QI52MDG0500 DIESEL GENERATOR #21 DG HIGH 1,2,3,4 SPEED GOVERNOR 05 Up. Y N N 01C 114 3R282NPA201A ECW PUMP 2A 6 EW HIGH 4 Rep. Y N Y 14A RCFC TRAIN C CCW 115 C2CCMOV0210 RETURN ORC ISOLATION 8 LU LOW 4 Rep. N N N 08A MOV OPERATOR 3Q352EDG0334 DIESEL GENERATOR #23 1,2,3,4 116' and GENERATOR and 17 DG HIGH 1 NA Y N N OIA 3Q152MDG0334 GENERATOR MOTOR ,5 201 3R212NHX201A SPENTFUELPOOL HEAT 21 FC MED NA Y N Y 13B EXCHANGER2A

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page B- 15 Table B-5: Unit 2 SWEL (Cont.)

z z05 -0 4t E 10 E4

=

0. C 49-SPENT FUEL POOL 202 3R212NPA20IA I SPENT COOLING PUEPOO2A PUMP 5 FC MED NA Y N Y 13C Notes:

1 Class designations are provided in Table 3-3 Equipment Class Summary 2 System designations are provided in Table 3-1 System Summary 3 Safety functions are defined as follow (NA for SWEL 2 items):

1= Reactivity control 2= RCS Pressure control 3= RCS Inventory control 4= Decay heat removal 5= Containment 4 NA=Not applicable, "Rep" indicates a major modification replacement, and "Up" indicates upgraded items 5 Y indicates that equipment includes anchorage.

6 y indicates that equipment was subject to anchorage verification during walkdown.

7 The walkdowns for items superscripted with Note 7, were completed in November, 2013.

I.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B- 16 Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List Walk-By ID Building Elevation Room I Walkdown Items STP2-WB-001 STP2-WB-00IA DGB 25'-0" 003 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 STP2-WB-OO1B DGB 55'-0" 108 31 STP2-WB-00IC DGB 25'-0" 001 97, 113 STP2-WB-002 STP2-WB-002A EAB 10'-0" 001 3, 87, 98 STP2-VB-002B EAB 10'-0" 006 82 STP2-WB-002C EAB 10'-0" 007 4 STP2-VB-002D EAB 10'-0" 009 Not Used STP2-VB-002E EAB 60'-0" 318 5, 6, 7, 35, 37, 64, 65, 69 (See Note 1)

STP2-WB-002F EAB 10'-0" 013 8 STP2-WB-002G EAB 10'-0" 015C 32, 33 STP2-WB-002H EAB 10'-0" 015D 9 STP2-VB-002J EAB 10'-0" 015 84 STP2-WB-002K EAB 10'-0" 010 54 STP2-WB-003 STP2-VB-003A EAB 35'-0" 202 1,10,11,62 STP2-WB-003B EAB 35'-0" 214 Not Used STP2-VB-003C EAB 35'-0" 206 34 STP2-WB-003D EAB 35'-0" 212 22, 77 STP2-VB-003E EAB 35'-0" 213 39,40 STP2-VB-003F EAB 35'-0" 214 41 STP2-WB-004 STP2-WB-004A EAB 60'-0" 318 Not Used STP2-WB-004B EAB 60'-0" 319 66, 67, 38, 83 STP2-WB-004C EAB 60'-0" 323 12, 42

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B- 17 Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List (Cont.)

Walk-By ID Building Elevation Room Walkdown Items STP2-WB-005 STP2-WB-005A EAB 72'-0" 410 68 STP2-WB-005B EAB 86'-0" 510 / 96 STP2-WB-006 STP2-WB-006A MAB 10'-0" 018A 20, 73 STP2-WB-006B MAB 10'-0" 039 74 STP2-WB-006C MAB 10'-0" 063 88 STP2-WB-006D MAB 10'-0" 064 52, 53 STP2-WB-006E MAB 10'-0" 067 76, 89, 95 STP2-WB-006F MAB 10'-0" 067B 25 STP2-WB-006G MAB 10'-0" 076 101 STP2-WB-006H MAB 10'-0" 067F 75, 100 STP2-WB-007 STP2-WB-007A MAB 29'-0" 106 23, 49, 50 STP2-WB-007B MAB 26'-0" 106A 51 STP2-WB-008 STP2-WB-008A MAB 41'-0" 216 24,56,78,115 STP2-WB-009 STP2-WB-009A MAB 60'-0" 324B 90 STP2-WB-009B MAB 60'-0" 326 91 STP2-WB-010 STP2-WB-OIOA IVC 10'-0" 006 47 STP2-WB-O1OB IVC 10'-0" 007 18 STP2-WB-01OC IVC 10'-0" 008 85, 110 STP2-WB-0IOD IVC 21'-2" 101 63, 72 STP2-WB-011 STP2-WrB-0 IIA IVC 58'-6" 504 19, 86

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page B- 18 Table B-6: Unit 2 Area Walk-By List (Cont.)

Walk-By ID Building Elevation Room Walkdown Items STP2-WB-012 STP2-WB-012A FHB -29'-0" 004 70, 71 STP2-WB-012B FHB -29'-0" 005 45 STP2-WB-012C FHB -29'-0" 006 15, 16, 17 STP2-WB-012D FHB -29'-0" 008 46 STP2-WB-012E FHB Not Used STP2-WB-013

'STP2-WB-013A FHB 68'-0" 304 2 STP2-WB-013B FHB 36'-0" 207 201 STP2-WB-013C FHB 30-0" 107 202 STP2-WB-014 STP2-WB-014A ECW 32'-0" 101 13, 14, 30, 36, 114 STP2-WB-014B ECW 32'-0" 105 43, 44, 48 STP2-WB-014C ECW 32'-0" 106 Not Used STP2-WB-015 STP2-WB-015A RCB 0" OIOB 81 STP2-WB-015B RCB 0" 010 Not Used STP2-WB-015C RCB 0" 110 80 STP2WB-015D RCB 0" 111 26 STP2-WB-015E RCB 0" 103 108 STP2-WB-016 STP2-WB-016A RCB 37'-3" 306 55 STP2-WB-016B RCB 52'-0" 402C 27 STP2-WB-016C RCB 19'-0" 210C 28 STP2-WB-017 STP2-WB-0 7A 1GB 55-0" 204 29 Notes:

1. The walk-by of this area was completed during the walkdowns performed during the November 2013 Unit 2 outage (2RE16).

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page C- I Appendix C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)

(210 pages in Revision 0)

(31 pages in Revision 1)

The SWCs for all items included in the original walkdowns were provided in Revision 0 of this report.

The SWCs in Appendix C of Revision 1 of the report are only those which are new or revised.

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page C-2 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEIO05 AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YZ NEI U[I Equipment. ID No. 3E152ESGOElC Equip. I Equipment Description 4160 VAC SWGR E2C Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 318 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)_

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document theresults of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space. is provided at the end.of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verifi cation required (iLe-, is the item one Yo NO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing Or loose hardware? YO NEI UI5 N/AUj

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface Y0 NEI u] N/AD oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YO ND 13 N/A[I

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YO ND U1I N/AD (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3M11-9-C-34003 Sh.-1, Rev. 12; 3MI1-9-C-34019, Rev.. 6- Serial No. I 14926-8121-01028-BGU

• 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Y0VZ NEI U1I potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Endo sure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-3 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-005 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Yi NEI Ut] N/AO

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, Ceiling tiles and lighting, Y[MNO Ut* N/AO and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO NEI U[] N/Al]

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NE] UE]

.of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YN N[O U]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None Date: 11-25-2013 Date: 11-25-2013

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-4 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-006 AWO # STP2-NVB-002E Status Y0 NO UEiZ Equipment ID No. 3E162ESGOElC Equip.

Equipment Description 480V CLASS 1E LOAD CENTER E2C Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60.'-0" Room, Area 318 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one Y0 NO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?* YZ* NEI U5 N/A[]

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface Y9* NO U[1 N/Al]

oxidation?*

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y*I, NO UIF N/A[]

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YZ* NE1I 31 N/A[]

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref. Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040,Rev. 15 3M01-9-C-4118,Rev. 9 3Ml1-9-C-34003 SH.-I, Rev. 12 3M11-9-C-34019,Rev. 6-SerialNo. 27 14926-8114-01028-BWU

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Y0* NO Ul]

potentially adverse seismic conditions?

• See Comments on Page 2.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-5 Seismic Walkdown .Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEA-006 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ ND UI" N/AU]

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YO NEI UV N/AO and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have-adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO NEI UO N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZNDC U of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO N]D UE]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary) 4 of 5 Sections inspected. One Section (CabinetE2CI/4D) could not be openedfor anchorage inspection as it was to remain energizedfor spentfuel pool cooling due to 2RE16 outage work going on.

-n i Evaluated by: Ken Clough .r Date: 11/25/2013 LI Evaluated by: S. P. Singla Date: 11/25/2013 j U

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page C-6 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-007 AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YN. NEI UlO Equipment ID No. 3E172EMCElC1.. Equip.

Equipment Description MCC E2CI Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 6'-0'"" Room, Area 318. TRAIN C ESF SWlTCHGEAR ROOM Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the-results of the Seismic Walkdown of an.item of equipment on the SWEL.,The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is thle anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YN N[

of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YN NO Ui N/AO

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YO No UO N/AO oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YN NO3 UE] N/AE]

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YN NE] U-] NIAO]

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration, verification is required.)

Ref Dwgs: 3M0i-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3M01.-9-C-4118, Rev. 9 3Mli-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 12 3M11-9-C-34019, Rev. 6- Serial No. 51 8066-00270-CGB 14926-8066-00038-BGB, includingFCR# CE-05080

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YO NO U]

,potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-1 3003067 Page C-7 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-007 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment orstmctures? YO NEI U1 N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NEI. US N/AD.

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

• 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YZ, NEI UD N/AD 10, Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YO NEI U[1 of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions SI. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ No U[]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: K N. Clough Date: i-25,-13 Evaluated by: S. P. Singla Sa Date- 11-25-13

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-8 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-035 AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YI NEI UOr Equipment ID No. 3E172EMCElC2 Equip. Class Equipment Description MCC E2C2 Location: Bldg. EAB FloorEl. 60-0" Room, Area 318, TRAINCESFSWITCHGEAR ROOM Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document.the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an-item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YZ NO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YO ND UO] N/A!]

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YO NO UO N/AD oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YZ NOl UO N/AI

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent .withplant documentation? Y0 ND UE] N/ADI (Note:. This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% .for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 9 3M11-9-ýC-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 12 3M11-9-C-34019, Rev. 6- SerialNo. 52 8066-00218-CGB 8066-00219-CGB 14926-8066-00038-BGB, includingFCR# CE-05080

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchoragefree of YONOJ U[

potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13 003067 Page C-9

.Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-035 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YR NEI UfO N/ACI

8. Are overhead. equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YO NO Ui N/AD3 and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YN NEI UC- N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YNEI UI of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y[ NEI UOl adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: K N. Clough -56ý 04C., Date: 11-25-13 Evaluated by: S. P. Sinlla Date: 11-25-13

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-I 0 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-037 AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YO NO UIll Equipment ID No. 4Z552ZLP661A Equip..

Equipment Description ISOLATION RELAY CAB TRAIN C ZLP661A Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-O" Room, Area 318 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YO NEI of the 50% of SWEL items'requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YV ND UD N/A-

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YO N[E]I N/AD oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YM ND UD N/AD

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y0R NEI Uli N/A[]

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref.Dwgs: 3M0!-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3MO1-9-C-4141, Rev. 12 3M1l-9-C-34030, Rev. 11 - Se 'alNo. 31 3M 1-9-C-34003 So-i, Rev. 12 3M01-9-C-34040,Rev. 7 3MOi-9-C-4031, Rev. 18 3MO1-9-C-34038, Rev. 2 3M11-9-C-34031, Rev. 4 14926-8331-00093-D2Y

.14926-8331-00047-B2Y FCN 2C-00588 to Dwg 3M]1-9-C-34003, Sh 1

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YO NEI UD potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-II Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWELQ$7 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y0 NE UD N/AED

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NEI U[I N/AD and masonry. block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO NE] UJ N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic, interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NEI U of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have.you looked. for and found no other seismic conditions that could. YZ NO] UD adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be. added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: S. P. Sinwa Date: 11-23-2013 I

Evaluated by: Ken Clough Date: 11-23-2013

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-12 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-038 AWC # STP2-WB-004B Status YN NOI UO Equipment ID No. 3E232EBC047G Equip. Class 16 Equipment Deription E2CJ1-1 BATTERY CHARGER Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60"-0" Room, Area 319 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YONO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Y0 NO UQ N/A]

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YWNO UN] N/AD oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YZ NOIUO N/AO

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YO NO U[] N/AM (Note: This question only applies'if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Y NO UIO potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C- 13 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC).

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-038 Interaction Effects 7., Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ NEI UO N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ ND UlD N/AD and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YCK NDI U[I N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YN NO UO]

.of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NI LUD adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?:

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: S. P. Singla Date: 11-25-13 J

Evaluated by: K N. Clough Date: 11-25-13 LI

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-14 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-042 AWC # STP2-VV]340C Status YN NO UOI Equipment IDNo. 4Z172ESGOOB Equip. Class 3 Equipment Description REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR TR B Location: Bldg. EAD Floor El. 60"-O" Room, Area 323, RX TRIP SWGR -TRIP BKRS SIDE Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) ...

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions maybe used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchoraae

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YEI NO of the 50% .ofSWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NOE UD N/AC3

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YO NEI] U N/A["

oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y0 NEI U17 N/AD

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YO NEI uEn NIAO (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YN NCI U1" potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Endosure NOC-AE- 13 003067 Page C- 15 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-042 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y0 NEI Ur" N/A[.

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YS N[O U0] N/AUl and masomny block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YID NE] UD N/AE]

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NE] U[]

of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y.NEI U0 adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

-3/" gap observed to adjacent equipment (Rod DriveMG#2 Output Breaker), Westinghouse Equipment 7Z1 72ERD0202. Gap between cabinetbolt heads andthe adjacent cabinetsurfaceis small as -1/8".

No seismic concern -. 3/32" gap allowed, based on Dwg 5-E-02-9-E-1863, Rev. 9 Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See Qi1 above.

Evaluated by: S. P. Singly Date: 11-24-13 Evaluated by: K NX Clough Date: 11-24-13

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-16 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-064 AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YO NE] Ui]

Equipment ID No. 3E172EMCE1C4 Equip. Class 1 Equipment Description MCC E2C4 Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El.:60U0 Room, Area 31.8, TRAIN C ESF SWITCHGPAR ROOM Manufacturer,'Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YO NEI of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NI] U[3 N/A[]

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion. that is more than mild surface YZ NEI U] N/Al]

oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YZ NO UO N/AQ

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YM NE UO1 N/AN (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref Dwgs: 3MOI-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 9 3M11-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 12 3Mll-9-C-34032, Rev. 3- SerialNo. 16 14926-8337-00005-EOU 8337-00107-BOU 14926-8066-00038-BGB, in.cludingFCR# CE-05080

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is.the anchorage free of Z NI] UOi potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C- 17 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-064 Interaction Effects

7. Are,soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment oristructures? Y0 NO U* N/AN

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yo NO Uli] N/AD and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YZ ND UD N/AD

10. Based. on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YM NND UD of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

1. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y0 NEI uo adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added .as necessary).

None.

Evaluated by: K. N. Clough -

Date: 11-25-13

./

Evaluated by: S. P. Singla Date: 11-25-13

Enclosure NOC-AE-1 3003067 Page C-I 8 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-065 AWC # STP2-WB-002E Status YZ NEI UE],

Equipment..ID No. 3EI32ESGOEIC2 Equip.

Equipment :Description .LOAD CENTER TRANSFORMER E2C2 Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 318 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results:of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchoraae

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YNNE of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NO UOZ N/AO

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface Y9 NOJ UF N/A[5 oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y9 NO U[] N/Af-

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YM NEI UU N/AO]

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref. Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3M01-9-C-4118, Rev. 9 3Mll-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 12 3M!1-9-C-34019, Rev. 6 - SerialNo. 29 14926-8454-00007-CKV

.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Y ZNO UO potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13 003067 Page C-19 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-065 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ NO UEJ N/AfJ

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NI LUEI N/AEl and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO NEI UD]N/AC"

10. Based on the above-seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YO NI UO of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that. could YO NEI UO]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Date: 11-25-43 Date; 11-25-13

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-20 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-066 AWC # STP2-WB-004B Status YZ NEI U!]

Equipment ID No. 3E232EBC047H Equip.

Equipment Description E2Ci 1-2 BATTERY CHARGER Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 319 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments, Anchoraze

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one Y0 NO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NI] U!] N/AD

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YZ NEI U!] N/AD oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y NO U!] N/AO

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y0 N! U!] N/A (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref Dwg 3M01-9-C-4031, Rev. 18 3M01-9-C-4043, Rev. 9 3M11-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 12 3Ml1-9-C-34019, Rev. 6-SerialNo. 42 14926-8100-01016-EDO MTD-P319-0001, Rev. 0, S7T # 30074607

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YS NO UO potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosuie NOC-AE- 13003067 Page C-21 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STF2-WD-SWEL-066 Interaction Effects

7. Are.soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or.structures? YO NO U3 .N/AE-]

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YO N[3 U1 N/AU and masonry block wallsnot likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? Y0 NEI U0 N/AU

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NE] US of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse COnditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO NE] U[1]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages: may be added as necessary)

None Evaluated by- S. P. Sin*ia Date: 11-23-13 Evaluated by: K N. Clough Date: 11-23-13

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-22 Seismic.Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-067

.AWC # ,STP2-WB-004B Status Y9NEI U[]

Equipment ID No. 3E242EIV002 Equip. Class 16 Equipment Description 25KVA INVERTER EIV 002 (CHANNEL 4. TRAIN C)

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 319, CH 4 DIST RM Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YZ NEI of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YO NI UD N/AD

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface Y0 NEI uI N/AD1 oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y NEI UD N/AED

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YO NI UO N/A[

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref. Dwgs:. 3M01-9-C-4031, Rev. 18 3M01-9-C-4043, Rev. 9 3Ml1-9-C-34003, Skt. 1. Rev. 12 3M01-9-C-34039, Rev. 2 114992-00005H4 DCN 1001943 to 3MI19C34032,Rev. 3 DCN 1001941 to 3Ml19C34003, Sht. 2, Rev. 1

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YO NEI UI potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-1300-3067 Page C-23 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-067 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YO NEI UE N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YJZ NOl U[t N/AD and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO ND UE] N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NE UD of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NDl U]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None Evaluated by: .S. P. Singla Date: 11-24-13 e~c~U J

Evaluated by::K N. Clownh Date: 11-24-13 J

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-24 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-069 AWC #.STP2-WB-002E Status YZ N[ UE Equipment ID No. 3E132ESGOE1C1 Equip.

Equipment Description LOAD CENITE TRANSFORMER E2C1.

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 318 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item. one YZ NEI of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NEO U[1 N/AQI

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YN NO U0 N/AO oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

• YCK NEIO U N/A]

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YZ NE U3* N/AD (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4040, Rev. 15 3MO1-9-C-4118,Rev. 9 3M11-9-C-34003, Sht. 1, Rev. 12 3M1 1-9-C-34019, Rev. 6- Serial No. 28 14926-8454-00006-DKV

6. Based on the above.anchorage evaluations, is the.ancho.,rage free of YZ NEI1U potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page C-25 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-069 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YR NEI UI N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Yg N[] U[] N/A[]

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YN NO U[i N/ADi

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NO UD of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y0 N[3 UID adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

6~

Evaluated by: K N. h Date: 11-25-13 Evaluated by: S. P. Singia -. 1~~ -

Date: 11-25-13 i

d

Enclo sure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page C-26 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-083 AWC # STP2-WB-004B :Status Y0 N[] UC]

Equipment ID No. 3E242EIV1204 Equip.

Equipment Descriptiona 10 KVA INVERTER EIV 1204 (C TRAIN, CHANNEL MV)

Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 319. CHANNEL 4 DIST RM Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions .for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YO NO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YO NO U] N/AE]

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface Y. NEI UtJ N/AtI oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YO NI0 Ut- N/A[]

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? Y0 NC- Ut] N/AD (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Ref Dwgs: 3M01-9-C-4043, Rev. 9 3M01-9-C-34039,Rev. 2 3MOI-9-C-4031, Rev. 18 3M11-9-C-34003 Sh.-1, Rev. 12 BO3050-00009H4 DCN 0500325 to Dwg 3MI1-9-C-34003 DCN 0500327 to Dwg 3M11-9-C-34019 3A010SIO003, Sh. 1, Rev. 8.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YZ NO UO potentially adverse seismic conditions?

.rALIbUm IC NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-27 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-083 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YO NEI UE[ N/A[l

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceilingtiles and lighting, YO NEI UFJ N/A[]

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YZ NEI UD NIAFJ

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YMNEIhU11~

of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other-Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YE N[] U[]

adversely affect the safety functions of the 'equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Light Fixture above the cabineton backside is about 2" clearfrom top surface of the.cabinet. This is acceptableper Seismic Separation ControlDrawing 3A01 0SI0003, Sh. 1, Rev. 8, which shows that minimum separationbetween Group 6 (Light Fixtures)and Group5 (Safety RelatedPanels) can be as little as I ".

Evaluated by: S.£P1 Singla U Date: 11-25-2013 Evaluated by: Ken Clough  :ýgLaýc Date: 11-25-2013

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page C-28

• Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-087 AWC # STP2-WB-002A Status YZNEI UE Equipment ID No. 3E152ESGO01A Equip.'

Equipment Description RCP 2A 15KV CLASS lE CUB 2A Location: Bldg. EAB Floor El. 10'-6" Room, Area 001, PENETRATION AREA Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist.

This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchdrage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YONO of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YS NO UD N/A-

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface YO NO UOZ N/All oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YZ NO uD N/AD

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? 'YO NE LIU N/AZ (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YNDO U potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-1 3003067 Page C-29

.Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-087 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? YZ NE UDI N/AD

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NF] U[] N/AD and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YZ NEI UD N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YO NEUIj of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NEI ULI adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: S. P. Singda I-;

Date: 11-23-13

/

Evaluated by: K N. Clough Date: 11-23-13 (I

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13 003067 Page C-30 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STP2-WD-SWEL-116 AWC # STP2-WB-OO1A Status YZ NEI UQ]

Equipment ID No. 30352EDG0334 & Equip. Class 17 30152MDG0334 Equipment Description DIESEL GENERATOR #23 GENERATOR AND MOTOR Location: Bldg. DGB Floor El. 25'-0" Room, Area 003, Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment On the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one Y[3 NE of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? YZ NO UC1 N/AO

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? YZ NEI U[C N/Al[

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? YOJ NEI U[] N/AN (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of YN WO UO potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13 003067 Page C-31 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

SWC # STF2,WD-SEL116 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures? Y[ NDI UE N/AOl

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NIO UV] N/AD and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage? YO NO U! N/AD

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free YZ NEI U-]

of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO ND UO adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be.added as necessary)

None Evaluated by: S. P.Sin-gla Date: 11-24-13 Evaluated by: K N Clouh Date: 11-24-13 j

Enclosure NOC-AE- 13003067 Page D- 1 Appendix D Area Walk-by Checklists (AWCs)

(145 pages in Revision 0)

(4 pages in Revision 1)

The AWCs for the items included in the original walk-bys were provided in Revision 0 of the Report.

The area walk-by checklists in Appendix D of Revision 1 of the Report are only those which are new or revised.

Enclosure NOC-AE-13 003067 Page D-2 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

AWC #.STP2-WB-002E Status YM NEI UO Location: Bldg. :EAB Floor El. 60'-0" Room, Area 318 Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist shall be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appearto be free of YN NO U0 N/AD potentially adverse seismic conditions (if visible withoutnecessarily opening cabinets)?

2. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant Y@ NO U"0 N/AO degraded conditions?

3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit YS NEI UO N/ADl raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic. conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)?

4. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial 'YON.O UL N/AD3 interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)?

5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic YZ NO U13 N/A[l interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area?

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page D-3 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

AWC # STP2-WD-002E 64 Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic YO NEI U- N/A-interactions that could cause a fire in the area?

7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic YO NO] UOJ N/A[l interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?

8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO NI] UI]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Associated Seismic Walkdown Checklists:

STP2-WD-SWEL-005, 006, 007,035,.037, 064, 065, 069

1. One bolt on the backside ofLC 21, Transformeron the middle topplate was found not completely tightened. See Photo on Page 3 of 3. Judgedto be not a seismic condition. CR 13-14021 was written. Bolt was fully tightenedthe same day andCR 13-14021 was closed.

2. Two exit signs in Room 318 need re-lamped.CR 13-14022 was written.

Evaluated Date: 11-25-2013 Evaluated Date: 11-25-2013

Enclosure NOC-AE-13003067 Page D-4 Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

AWC # STP2-WB-002E