CNL-25-078, Expedited License Amendment Request to Modify Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5 for Shutdown Board Subsystems (BFN TS-556)
| ML25191A239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/2025 |
| From: | Hulvey K Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| CNL-25-078 | |
| Download: ML25191A239 (1) | |
Text
1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 CNL-25-078 July 10, 2025 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296
Subject:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Expedited License Amendment Request to Modify Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5 for Shutdown Board Subsystems (BFN TS-556)
In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting a request for an expedited amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR 68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The proposed amendment revises BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.5, DC Sources - Operating, regarding the minimum battery charger capacity for the direct current (DC) shutdown board subsystems.
In September 2023, BFN replaced the 250 volt DC (VDC) main bank and shutdown board battery chargers that had exceeded the expected life of 20 years and were obsolete. The C&D battery chargers that were replaced provided a minimum of 50 amps to the 250 VDC shutdown board subsystem. The replacement Gutor battery chargers have a tighter tolerance and, in some cases, may provide less than 50 amps. This is acceptable for battery loading design requirements, as 48 amp output is sufficient to charge the batteries in the required timeframe.
However, while currently able to meet the 50-amp charging requirement of SR 3.8.4.5, the internal circuit resistance leaves little margin available as the Surveillance is currently written.
This impact was not understood prior to installation of the replacement equipment. The reason for an expedited license amendment is explained in the enclosure to this letter.
In accordance with the BFN Surveillance Frequency Control Program, the nominal 48-month Frequency for SR 3.8.4.5 is set due to the requirements being met with TS SR 3.8.4.2 during the performance of the diesel generator, shutdown board, and main bank battery test surveillances, which are on a 48-month Frequency. Following replacement of the 250 VDC shutdown board battery chargers, the SR 3.8.4.5 charging capacity is required to be tested
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNL-25-078 Page 2 July 10, 2025 within 2 years (September 29, 2025), in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 450, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications. If the 50 amp requirement of SR 3.8.4.5 is not modified prior to the next performance of the Surveillance on September 29, 2025, there is potential that BFN Unit 3 will be required to declare the 3EB shutdown board DC electrical power subsystem inoperable and enter the 7-day Completion Time of TS 3.8.4, Required Action A.1, or up to 30 days in accordance with Risk-Informed Completion Times to restore operability. Because the battery charger will be functioning properly with no path for technical resolution, a charging rate obtained that is greater than 48 amps but less than 50 amps could result in a unit shutdown to comply with the TS as currently written. Therefore, SR 3.8.4.5 is overly restrictive for the current 250 VDC shutdown board battery chargers to meet their acceptable design criteria and presents a potential challenge to plant operation.
TVA requests Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval of this request by September 19, 2025, with the amendment being implemented within 10 days. This expedited approval is requested to avoid a potential TS compliance issue during the next scheduled performance of this Surveillance on September 29, 2025.
The enclosure provides a description and assessment of the proposed change. The attachment to the enclosure provides the existing BFN TS pages marked-up to show the proposed changes. There are no proposed changes to the associated TS Bases pages for this license amendment request.
TVA has determined that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with the proposed change and that the TS change qualifies for a categorical exclusion from environmental review pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), TVA is sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to the Alabama Department of Public Health.
There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this submittal. Please address any questions regarding this request to Amber V. Aboulfaida, Senior Manager, Fleet Licensing, at avaboulfaida@tva.gov.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 10th day of July 2025.
Respectfully, Kimberly D. Hulvey General Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs & Emergency Preparedness Enclosure cc: See Page 3 Digitally signed by Edmondson, Carla Date: 2025.07.10 16:10:02
-04'00'
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNL-25-078 Page 3 July 10, 2025
Enclosure:
Description and Assessment of the Proposed Change cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant State Health Officer, Alabama Department of Public Health
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E1 of 9 Description and Assessment of the Proposed Change
Subject:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Expedited License Amendment Request to Modify Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5 for Shutdown Board Subsystems CONTENTS 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION.............................................................................................. 2 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION............................................................................................... 2 2.1 System Design and Operation...................................................................................... 2 2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements........................................................... 3 2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change................................................................................. 3 2.4 Description of the Proposed Change............................................................................ 4
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
.............................................................................................. 4
4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
.......................................................................................... 5 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements and Criteria........................................................ 5 4.2 Precedent...................................................................................................................... 7 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration........................................................................... 7 4.4 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 9
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
............................................................................ 9
6.0 REFERENCES
.................................................................................................................. 9
Attachment:
- 1. Proposed TS Changes (Markups) for BFN Units 1, 2, and 3
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E2 of 9 Description and Assessment of the Proposed Change 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting a request for an expedited amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR 68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The proposed amendment revises BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.5, DC Sources - Operating, regarding the minimum battery charger capacity for the shutdown board subsystems.
2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation The BFN direct current (DC) electrical power system provides the alternating current (AC) emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 17, the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.6, Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems (Safety Guide 6), and meets the intent of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 308, IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (Reference 1).
The 250 volt (V) DC power system consists of two subsystems: a six-battery unit system and a five-battery control power system (shutdown board batteries).
Five 250 VDC shutdown board subsystems supply control power for 4.16 kilovolt (kV) shutdown boards A, B, C, D, and 3EB, respectively, and 480 V shutdown boards 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B.
Each DC shutdown board subsystem consists of a battery together with the associated charger, circuitry, switches, indicators, and alarms. Each shutdown board DC subsystem can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from the spare charger. Normal 250 VDC control power for 4.16 kV shutdown boards A, B, C, D, and 3EB is supplied by one of the shutdown board DC subsystems with an alternate supply from one of the unit DC battery boards through a manual transfer switch, and control power for 480 V shutdown boards 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B is supplied by one of the shutdown board DC subsystems with an alternate supply from one of the unit DC battery boards through a manual transfer switch. Separation between redundant control power circuits is maintained external to and within the switchgear.
During normal operation, the DC loads are powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of a loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC loads are automatically powered from the batteries. Each shutdown board battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for approximately 30 minutes.
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E3 of 9 The batteries for the shutdown board DC electrical power subsystem are sized to produce required capacity at 80 percent (%) of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. The minimum design voltage limit for the shutdown board DC subsystem is 210 V.
Each battery charger for the shutdown board DC electrical power subsystem has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> while supplying normal steady state loads.
2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements The current TS SR 3.8.4.5 for BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 is shown below:
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.5
NOTE---------------------------
Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each required battery charger supplies 300 amps for the Unit and 50 amps for the Shutdown Board subsystems at 210 V and 15 amps for DG subsystems at 105 V.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program 2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change In September 2023, BFN replaced the 250 volt DC (VDC) main bank and shutdown board battery chargers that had exceeded the expected life of 20 years and were obsolete. The C&D battery chargers that were replaced provided a minimum of 50 amps to the 250 VDC shutdown board subsystem. The replacement Gutor battery chargers have a tighter tolerance and, in some cases, may provide less than 50 amps. This is acceptable for battery loading design requirements, as 48 amp output is sufficient to charge the batteries in the required timeframe.
However, while currently able to meet the 50-amp charging requirement of SR 3.8.4.5, the internal circuit resistance leaves little margin available as the Surveillance is currently written.
This impact was not understood prior to installation of the replacement equipment. The impact to SR 3.8.4.5 was identified in August 2024 and entered into the TVA Corrective Action Program, but TVA did not apply the appropriate attention and priority befitting a TS compliance issue. The process to develop a TS change did not begin until April 2025. Therefore, BFN is now in a position that requires an expedited license amendment change to avoid a potential threat of plant shutdown.
Following replacement of the 250 VDC shutdown board battery chargers, the SR 3.8.4.5 charging capacity is required to be tested within 2 years (September 29, 2025), in accordance with IEEE Standard 450, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications. If the 50 amp requirement of SR 3.8.4.5 is not modified prior to the next performance of the Surveillance on
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E4 of 9 September 29, 2025, there is potential that BFN Unit 3 will be required to declare the 3EB shutdown board DC electrical power subsystem inoperable and enter the 7-day Completion Time of TS 3.8.4, Required Action A.1, or up to 30 days in accordance with Risk-Informed Completion Times to restore operability. Because the battery charger will be functioning properly with no path for technical resolution, a charging rate obtained that is greater than 48 amps but less than 50 amps could result in a unit shutdown to comply with the TS as currently written. As discussed in Section 3.0 to this enclosure, SR 3.8.4.5 is overly restrictive for the current 250 VDC shutdown board battery chargers to meet their acceptable design criteria and presents a potential challenge to plant operation.
2.4 Description of the Proposed Change The proposed change to TS SR 3.8.4.5 for BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 is shown below:
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.5
NOTE----------------------------
Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each required battery charger supplies 300 amps for the Unit and 50 48 amps for the Shutdown Board subsystems at 210 V and 15 amps for DG subsystems at 105 V.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program The attachment to this enclosure provides the existing BFN TS pages marked-up to show the proposed changes. There are no proposed changes to the associated TS Bases pages for this license amendment request (LAR).
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
Each 250 VDC control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger. The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system. Zero-resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply A, B, C, D, or 3EB. Each power supply is located in the reactor building or diesel generator building near the shutdown board it supplies. Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.
The replacement battery chargers have the same design function as the previous battery chargers. The chargers are designed to provide the 250 VDC supply during normal operations, keep its associated battery fully charged at all times, and recharge the battery after a discharge.
Calculations and technical evaluations performed for the battery charger replacement addressed impacts to electrical power systems, software quality requirements, and seismic impacts. These evaluations ensured that electrical changes associated with the AC auxiliary power or DC power systems have no adverse impacts with respect to loading, cable ampacity,
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E5 of 9 circuit protection, and voltage drop. Design functions of the 250 VDC electrical power system are not adversely affected.
The original C&D battery chargers had the capability to be set at 115% of the 50 amp rating.
The replacement Gutor battery chargers have a tighter tolerance and are not capable of exceeding 50 amps. From a battery loading perspective, this is acceptable, as 48 amp output is sufficient to charge the battery in the required timeframe. Below is an excerpt of the BFN battery charger sizing calculation that utilized the methods described in IEEE Standard 450 to verify that the battery charger is adequate to recharge the battery and simultaneously supply connected continuous control load at the shutdown battery distribution boards. This assures that the battery will not continue to discharge once the charger becomes available. The calculation was performed using continuous loads during a loss of offsite power with postulated fire events.
BFN Battery Charger Sizing Calculation BATTERY CHARGER MAX CONT LOAD (L)
MAX SUM AMP-HR REQUIRED SIZE (AMPS)
I1 ACTUAL CHARGER SIZE (AMPS)
Shutdown Board Batteries A, B, C, D, 3EB 27.584 213.77 47.180 50 I1 = L + 1.1 x AH T
I1 = CONT LOAD AMP + 1.1 x SUM AMP-HR 12 HOURS I1 = 27.584 A + 1.1 x 213.77 AH 12 HOURS I1 = 47.180 A The above calculation demonstrates that the 250 VDC shutdown board battery chargers are designed to fulfill their safety function with a minimum 47.180 amperage. TVA has conservatively established a 48 amperage limit for the BFN TS.
4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements and Criteria 4.1.1 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications Regulation 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications. Part (3) of this regulation sets the governing requirements for the inclusion of surveillance requirements in the technical specifications included in the operating license for a commercial nuclear power plant.
(3) Surveillance requirements. Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E6 of 9 TVA proposes a modification to the SR for battery charger capability needed to meet the design function of the shutdown board DC electrical power subsystem.
4.1.2 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria The BFN units were designed and constructed based on the proposed GDC published by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the Federal Register (32 FR 10213) on July 11, 1967 (hereafter called draft GDC). The AEC published the final rule that added Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, GDC for Nuclear Power Plants, in the Federal Register (36 FR 3255) on February 20, 1971, (hereafter called final GDC). As discussed in Appendix A of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the licensee has made changes to the facility over the life of the plant that may have invoked the final GDC. The extent to which the final GDC have been invoked can be found in specific sections of the FSAR and in other design and licensing basis documentation.
Each criterion listed below is followed by a discussion of the design features and procedures that meet the intent of the criteria.
Criterion 17Electric power systems. An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
The onsite electric power supplies, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.
Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits is acceptable. Each of these circuits shall be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of all onsite alternating current power supplies and the other offsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained.
Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.
Section A.2.3 of FSAR Appendix A describes BFN compliance with Criterion 17.
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E7 of 9 4.1.3 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 308 Chapter 5 of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 308, IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, describes the design criteria for batter chargers in DC power systems.
The capacity of each battery charger shall be based on the largest combined demands of the various continuous steady-state loads plus charging capacity to restore the battery after the bounding design basis event discharge to a state in which the battery can perform its design basis function for subsequent postulated operational and design basis functions.
TVA proposes a modification to the SR for battery charger capability needed to meet the design function of the shutdown board DC electrical power subsystem.
Compliance The proposed change is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 to verify the capability of the shutdown board battery chargers to meet their safety function. The proposed change follows analyses that verified the ability of the battery chargers to provide continuous steady-state load plus charging capacity following a loss of offsite power and postulated fire events, in accordance with GDC 17 and IEEE Standard 308. Therefore, the proposed change to BFN TS SR 3.8.4.5 complies with the applicable regulatory requirements.
4.2 Precedents The following precedents are similar to the proposed change in that they also modified the battery charger amperage requirements in TS 3.8.4.
- 1. NRC Letter to Duke Energy, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments to Modify DC Sources Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.5 (EPID L-2017-LLA-0477), dated September 27, 2018 (ML18243A298)
- 2. NRC Letter to NextEra Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center - Issuance of Amendment to Revise Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements 3.8.4.1 and 3.8.4.6 Due to Replacement of Battery Cells (TAC No. MF2763), dated September 26, 2014 (ML14259A292) 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting a request for an expedited amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR 68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The proposed amendment revises BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.5, DC Sources - Operating, regarding the minimum battery charger capacity for the shutdown board subsystems.
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E8 of 9 TVA has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, Issuance of amendment, as discussed below.
- 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed change to the battery charger amperage requirements of SR 3.8.4.5 contained in BFN TS 3.8.4 does not impact the physical function of plant structures, systems, or components (SSC) or the manner in which SSCs perform their design function. The proposed change does not authorize the addition of any new plant equipment or systems, nor does it alter the assumptions of any accident analyses. The direct current (DC) electrical power system, including the battery chargers, is not an initiator of any accident sequence analyzed in the BFN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Rather, the DC electrical power system supports operation of equipment used to mitigate accidents. Specifically, the purpose of the battery chargers is to continuously maintain their respective battery in a charged standby condition while providing power to the system loads. The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors, nor does it alter the design assumptions, conditions, and configuration or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No The proposed change to the battery charger amperage requirements of SR 3.8.4.5 contained in BFN TS 3.8.4 does not require any modification to the plant or change equipment operation. The proposed change will not introduce failure modes that could result in a new accident, and the change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. Performance of battery testing is not a precursor to any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change will not alter the design configuration, or method of operation of plant equipment beyond its normal functional capabilities. The proposed change does not create any new credible failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No The proposed change to the battery charger amperage requirements of SR 3.8.4.5 contained in BFN TS 3.8.4 does not alter or exceed a design basis or safety limit. There
Enclosure CNL-25-078 E9 of 9 is no change being made to safety analysis assumptions or the safety limits that would adversely affect plant safety as a result of the proposed change. Margins of safety are unaffected by the proposed change and the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A will continue to be met.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Based on the above, TVA concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.
4.4 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
6.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 308-2020, IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, dated January 30, 2020
- 2. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 450-2020, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, dated December 3, 2020
Enclosure CNL-25-078 Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Markups) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 (3 pages)
DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 BFN-UNIT 1 3.8-25 Amendment No. 234, 315 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.4 Verify battery capacity is 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85%
of expected life with capacity <
100% of manufacturer's rating AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% of expected life with capacity 100%
of manufacturer's rating SR 3.8.4.5
NOTE-------------------------
Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each required battery charger supplies 300 amps for the Unit and 50 48 amps for the Shutdown Board subsystems at 210 V and 15 amps for DG subsystems at 105 V.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 BFN-UNIT 2 3.8-25 Amendment No. 253, 338 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.4 Verify battery capacity is 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85%
of expected life with capacity <
100% of manufacturer's rating AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% of expected life with capacity 100%
of manufacturer's rating SR 3.8.4.5
NOTE-------------------------
Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each required battery charger supplies 300 amps for the Unit and 50 48 amps for the Shutdown Board subsystems at 210 V and 15 amps for DG subsystems at 105 V.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 BFN-UNIT 3 3.8-25 Amendment No. 212, 298 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.4.4 Verify battery capacity is 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85%
of expected life with capacity <
100% of manufacturer's rating AND 24 months when battery has reached 85% of expected life with capacity 100%
of manufacturer's rating SR 3.8.4.5
NOTE-------------------------
Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.
Verify each required battery charger supplies 300 amps for the Unit and 50 48 amps for the Shutdown Board subsystems at 210 V and 15 amps for DG subsystems at 105 V.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program