NL-24-0239, Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090: EA-23-139
| ML24169A622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/2024 |
| From: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| NL-24-0239, EA-23-139, IR 2024090 | |
| Download: ML24169A622 (1) | |
Text
A Southern Nuclear June 17, 2024 Docket Nos.: 50-321 50-366 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Regulatory Affairs Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243 205 992 5000 NL-24-0239 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090: EA-23-139 Ladies and Gentlemen:
By letter dated May 15, 2024, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) provided to Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) the results of a recently completed inspection. The NRC letter, dated May 15, 2024, is titled "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - NRC Inspection Report 05000321/2024090 and 05000366/2024090, Investigation Report 2-2023-003; and Apparent Violation." SNC submits the response to two Apparent Violations (AVs) EA-23-139 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, in the Enclosure. As requested, the response contains the reason for the AVs, the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, the corrective steps that will be taken and the date when full compliance is achieved.
SNC further provides its enforcement perspective of the event for the NRC to consider during its final disposition of the AVs in the referenced letter dated May 15, 2024.
This letter contains no regulatory commitments.
Should you have questions regarding the enclosed information, please contact Amy Chamberlain at 205-992-6361.
Respectfully submitted, Jamie Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-24-0239 Page 2 Cc:
Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager - Hatch Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch RTYPE: CHA02.004
Enclosure:
Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and 2 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139
Enclosure to NL-24-0239 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139 Page 2 of 6 In NRC's letter dated May 15, 2024, 1 NRC provided Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) with an opportunity to respond in writing to two apparent violations (AVs) that occurred at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Plant Hatch). The AVs are summarized below:
AV 05000321,05000366/2024090-1 Failure to Conduct Radiation Surveys An Apparent Violation (AV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 20.1501, "Surveys and Monitoring," was identified for the licensee's failure to conduct, on multiple occasions, surveys that were reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels, concentrations of residual radioactivity, and potential hazards of the detected radiation levels or residual radioactivity in various radiologically controlled areas (RCAs) within the plant, including within the reactor building.
AV 05000321,05000366/2024090-02 Incomplete and Inaccurate Radiation Surveys An AV of 10 CFR 50.9 "Complete[ness] and Accuracy of Information," was identified for the licensee's failure to maintain complete and accurate records of radiation surveys, which the licensee is required to maintain under 10 CFR 20.2103 "Records of Surveys."
The following is SNC's response to the AVs:
(1) The reason for the A Vs or, if contested, the basis for disputing the A Vs:
SNC does not dispute the AVs. Both AVs involve the actions of one individual, a former senior radiation protection (RP) technician who, on multiple occasions, failed to conduct required RCA surveys, and provided inaccurate information relative to these surveys between August 2021 and November 2021. SNC identified these instances through its own investigation.
As explained more fully below, SNC began investigating the individual's RCA surveys promptly upon receipt of information indicating a concern. The issue was identified before the problem resulted in an event, as a result of SNC's follow-up of a concern raised by other employees.
(2) The corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
Upon receipt of information from several witnesses related to whether an individual RP technician had been performing required RP surveys in accordance with procedural requirements, SNC promptly initiated an investigation to ensure the proper compensatory initial actions were taken to restore compliance. Specifically, SNC engaged Southern Company Services' Internal Auditing department to evaluate RP surveys across the entire Hatch RP department to identify any anomalies or outliers. This was done to determine whether there were indications that any individual within the Hatch RP department was not completing RP surveys as required. 2 Internal Auditing reviewed surveys recently performed by the Hatch RP department to determine if there were any outliers or problems in the survey data. The purpose of RP surveys is to collect data on radiation levels throughout the plant; RP survey data is used for radiation work permits to protect workers from radiological hazards. A comprehensive review of both specific and routine 1 The May 15th letter was received by SNC on May 17, 2024.
2 The initial information from witnesses was received in a confidential SNC Employee Concerns Program (ECP) investigation. Given the nature of the ECP investigation, SNC determined that the appropriate next step was to use an independent entity (Southern Company Internal Audit) to objectively review data from the entire department.
Enclosure to NL-24-0239 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139 Page 3 of 6 surveys above the minimum reporting threshold were reviewed for the entire RP department using statistical analysis. Internal Auditing identified multiple RP surveys that were duplicates of prior surveys, all completed by the same former RP technician.
Based on the findings from Internal Auditing indicating anomalies in the former RP technician's surveys, SNC continued its evaluation of the facts and circumstances by engaging an independent, outside investigator to conduct a fact-finding investigation. During this investigation, the former RP technician admitted to not performing the RP surveys identified by Internal Auditing, and identified other surveys not performed. Also, in parallel to the fact-finding investigation, SNC requested Internal Auditing expand the scope of the RP surveys beyond the time period of those previously reviewed to encompass an 18 month period. Finally, an investigator from SNC's Corporate Security department conducted an additional, independent investigation into the former RP technician's actions.
On April 13, 2022, immediately following the technician admitting to not performing several RP surveys, SNC placed the former RP technician on paid administrative leave. In August 2022, upon completion of SNC's review of the individual's other concerns/claims, SNC terminated the former RP technician's employment and placed an administrative flag in the shared industry-wide Personnel Access Data System (PADS) indicating potentially disqualifying information regarding the individual existed.3 Following completion of various confidential proceedings, and while SNC was completing corrective actions, SNC entered a CR (CR 11018617) into its Corrective Action Program to document that the issue had occurred and to track the corrective actions.
Additional actions were taken to reinforce the importance of integrity and to deter future recurrence of RP technicians submitting falsified surveys within RP department through communications and training. These included:
The standard for "Documentation of Radiological Surveys" was covered in a 2022 Manager Kickoff presentation during continuing training at Plant Hatch.
Added permanent slide to RPM continuing training kickoff and supplemental orientation presentations related to integrity and "what it means to be a nuclear professional." (TE 1145862)
In Spring 2023, RP leadership conducted briefings on integrity with the Hatch RP department.
These briefings were held on multiple days during the beginning of shift briefs to ensure all individuals were present.
On June 6, 2023, a speaker specializing in nuclear industry litigation from American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) was used to conduct RP department training at Plant Hatch to heighten importance for complete and accurate records and surveys.
In January 2024, RP leadership reviewed industry issues of integrity with incoming supplemental technicians during orientation at Plant Hatch. (TE 1145861)
Additionally, SNC has maintained a steady communications focus on acting with integrity. In February 2022, the vice president of regulatory affairs issued a video along with the chief nuclear officer to all SNC employees reminding them that compliance with regulations, procedures and technical specifications is always necessary. In July 2023, SNC launched "Southern Nuclear's Risk Behaviors," which highlights Act with Integrity as the first behavior. This launch began with 3 During the period after the former RP technician's initial admission and his termination, the former RP technician pursued several avenues to raise concerns and/or claims, all of which SNC dispositioned prior to making the final decision to terminate employment. Because the individual's access had terminated for being beyond the thirty-day behavioral observation program requirement during this period of administrative leave, upon his termination of employment SNC's access department entered an administrative flag.
Enclosure to NL-24-0239 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139 Page 4 of 6 a video from the SNC President and SNC Vice President of Human Resources, featuring the following:
Our word is our bond, and we act with the highest personal and professional standards at all times.
Through our integrity we are trustworthy, reliable and dependable.
We understand that acting with honor is nonnegotiable, as there is no risk worth taking that involves compromising integrity. Through our words and actions, we "stay on the right side of goodness."
"Act with Integrity" appears repeatedly in SNC materials, including being featured in the 2024 SNC Strategic Plan. This phrase was also adopted as one of our core Values, and presented fleet-wide as the foundation for SNC's strategy.
On November 6, 2023, SNC's President sent out a company-wide message via video focused on SNC's value to "Act with Integrity." Each employee was required to view the video and discuss the key messages within their work group.
The primary results achieved based on the actions summarized above was the restoration of compliance for the performance of RP surveys, reinforcement of personnel behaviors, increased awareness of importance of complete and accurate records and surveys and of acting with integrity.
(3) The corrective steps that will be taken:
In addition to the corrective actions completed immediately after the incident and those completed since then, a causal analysis is being performed on the apparent violations and will be completed by August 1, 2024 (CR 11084355). If additional actions are recommended by this analysis those will be completed pursuant to SNC's corrective action program processes.
Additionally, to deter future recurrences, RP supervisors are required to perform a quarterly work verification documentation (TE 1145860). This corrective action has been established to drive periodic checks (as least quarterly) to verify RP technicians are completing their assigned surveys. As part of this process, management will have increased oversight of survey data which will serve as a deterrent for future willful falsification of data and will promote continuing adherence to the standard.
(4) The date when full compliance will be achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on April 13, 2022 when the individual was removed from performing official duties. SNC subsequently confirmed that at that time, the frequency of routine surveys had repeated such that all surveys completed by the individual had been reperformed in accordance with requirements and governing standards.
Additional Information:
SNC respectfully submits that, should the NRC proceed with escalated enforcement in this matter, SNC has earned Identification and Corrective Action credit such that a civil penalty is not warranted, consistent with the NRC's Enforcement Policy and Enforcement Manual.
In cases where the licensee identifies an apparent violation, the NRC Enforcement Manual provides that self-identification credit is due the licensee and ordinarily no civil penalty will be imposed when prompt and comprehensive corrective action is taken:
Enclosure to NL-24-0239 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139 Page 5 of 6 Licensee-Identified: When a problem requiring corrective action is licensee-identified (i.e.,
identified before the problem has resulted in an event), the NRC should normally give the licensee credit for actions related to identification, regardless of whether prior opportunities existed to identify the problem.
If identification credit is given and the corrective action is judged to be prompt and comprehensive, an NOV should normally be issued with no associated civil penalty. If identification credit is given and the corrective action is judged to be less than prompt and comprehensive, the NOV should normally be issued with a base civil penalty.
See NRC Enforcement Manual Section 2.5.2.2 (D.1.) and (E). Specifically, in cases in which the violation is identified "as a result of the licensee follow-up of safety concerns raised by an employee of the licensee" the NRC Enforcement Manual states that the self-identification credit is warranted. See NRC Enforcement Manual. 2.5.2.3 (B.1.e.)
First, as detailed above, SNC identified the issue through its own internal investigation. When initial concerns were raised by SNC employees about one RP Technician's surveys, SNC took immediate action to evaluate and investigate the issue. As more information was developed, SNC expanded the scope of its evaluation and investigation review.
Second, as explained above, the corrective actions associated with this event were prompt and comprehensive. The immediate actions were focused on restoring compliance. In addition to corrective actions taken immediately and since the event occurred, SNC is developing a causal analysis to identify additional corrective actions to strengthen the program and provide added assurance that recurrence will be prevented.
In assessing the promptness of Licensee corrective actions, the NRC Enforcement Manual provides; Normally, the judgment of the adequacy of corrective actions will hinge on whether the NRC had to take action to focus the licensee's evaluative and corrective process in order to obtain comprehensive corrective action. 1. This will normally be judged at the time of the predecisional enforcement conference (e.g., by outlining substantive additional areas where corrective action is needed). 2. Earlier informal discussions between the licensee and NRC inspectors or management may result in improved corrective action, but should not normally be a basis to deny credit for corrective action.
In the case of the subject AVs, SNC began taking corrective actions immediately upon receiving notice of the failure of the RP to perform the required reviews, and took further corrective actions as soon as SNC's investigation was completed. NRC took no action to "focus the licensee's evaluative and corrective process" prior to SNC taking its corrective actions. See NRC Enforcement Manual 2.5.2.4 (C).
Importantly, SNC placed the subject RP Technician on leave as soon as SNC's investigation had developed sufficient information to determine that a noncompliance had occurred.
More importantly, the scope of SNC's investigation was not limited to the one RP Technician alleged to have caused the noncompliance. SNC's investigation and evaluation included evaluation of survey data from the entire Hatch RP department to determine whether there were indications that anyone else within the Hatch RP department was not completing RP surveys as required.
In addition, as described above, SNC's corrective actions did not focus solely on the specific violation, but extended across the RP organization to monitor and guard against similar events in
Enclosure to NL-24-0239 Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000321, 366/2024090; EA-23-139 Page 6 of 6 the future, and even more broadly to address the importance of personal integrity in licensed activities among all of SNC's employees at each of its licensed units and at corporate headquarters. Accordingly, the corrective actions applied "broadly to the general area of concern" and were not "focused narrowly to the specific violation." NRC Enforcement Manual 2.5.2.4.(B)(2)(c).
For these reasons, SNC respectfully requests that it receive credit for identifying the problem and for its comprehensive corrective actions, and that the NRC refrain from imposing a civil penalty, should the NRC proceed with escalated enforcement action in this case.