ND-20-1406, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a (Index Number 664)

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a (Index Number 664)

ML20357B083
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/21/2020
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-20-1406
Download: ML20357B083 (7)

Text

Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road

^Southern Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4 Waynesboro, GA 30830 706-848-6459 tel DEC 2 1 2020 Docket Nos.: 52-025 ND-20-1406 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a [Index Number 6641 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item C.2.6.09.05a [Index Number 664]. This ITAAC confirms that the access control points for the protected area are configured to control personnel and vehicle access. ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a also confirms that that the protected area personnel access point detection equipment is capable of detecting firearms, incendiary devices, and explosives. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-848-1575.

Respectfully submitted, Michael J. Yox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a [Index Number 664]

MJY/RLB/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-20-1406 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena III (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. L. McKinney (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. D. Meier (w/o enclosures)

Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. M. J. Vox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Mr. T. G. Petrak Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. M. Bailey (w/o enclosures)

M M. King M H. K. Nieh M C. P. Patel M G. J. Khouri M C. J. Even M B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert M C. Welch M J. Gaslevic M O. Lopez-Santiago M G. Armstrong M M. Webb M T. Fredette M C. Santos M B. Davis M J. Vasquez M J. Eargle M E. Davidson M T. Fanelli M S. Rose Ms. K. McCurry Qqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-20-1406 Page 3 of 3 Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson Daiton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinahouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. OrianI (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. C. Durham (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. M. Corletti Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. 8. W. Kline, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., CDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Baich Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-20-1406 Enclosure Page 1 of 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-20-1406 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of iTAAC C.2.6.09.05a [Index Number 664]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-20-1406 Enclosure Page 2 of 4 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment

5. Access control points are established to; a) control personnel and vehicle access into the protected area.

b) detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices at the protected area personnel access points.

Inspections/Tests/Analvses Tests, inspections, or combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment at the access control points to the protected area will be performed.

Tests, inspections, or combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment at the access control points to the protected area will be performed.

Acceptance Criteria The access control points for the protected area:

a) are configured to control personnel and vehicle access.

b) include detection equipment that is capable of detecting firearms, incendiary devices, and explosives at the protected area personnel access points.

ITAAC Determination Basis Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment at the access control points to the protected area were performed to verify the access control points are configured to control personnel and vehicle access, and include detection equipment that is capable of detecting firearms, incendiary devices, and explosives at the protected area personnel access points. The VEGP Unit 3 Plant Security System ITAACs only cover the Unit 3 plant security system design commitment scope.

a) The access control points for the protected area are configured to control personnel and vehicle access.

An inspection was performed to confirm that protected area primary personnel and vehicle access control points are installed per approved construction drawings and to ensure the access control points are configured to control personnel and vehicle access per the applicable personnel and vehicle access control requirements of the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 Physical Security Plan associated with 10 CFR Part 73.55(g)(1).

The inspection of the protected area primary personnel access control point confirmed that personnel are channeled to the designated access control point where personnel are processed before being granted access to the protected area. The primary personnel access control point was confirmed to include: 1) a location where identity and authorization for access can be verified, 2)the ability to search equipment and personnel to verify that unauthorized items are not present prior to entry into the protected area, 3) video surveillance equipment that can be monitored by security personnel, and 4)alarmed entry control devices (e.g., doors, gates,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-20-1406 Enclosure Page 3 of 4 turnstiles, card readers, or biometrics) that prevent or delay unauthorized entry Into the protected area before completion of the required processing.

The Inspection of the protected area primary vehicle access control point confirmed that vehicles are channeled to the designated access control point where vehicles are processed before being granted access to the protected area. The primary vehicle access control point Is confirmed to Include: 1) active vehicle barriers located outside the Protected Area fence which are remotely controlled from the Central Alarm Station or Secondary Alarm Station 2) video surveillance equipment that can be monitored by security personnel, and 3) a vehicle search Isolation area between the Inner and outer protected area fence to search vehicles for unauthorized Items. Vehicle operators are processed via the protected area primary personnel access control point described In the previous paragraph.

The results of the protected area primary personnel and vehicle access control point Inspections are documented In SV3-SES-ITR-800664(Reference 1) and confirm that the protected area access control points are configured to control personnel and vehicle access.

b) The access control points for the protected area Include detection eouloment that Is capable of detecting firearms, Incendlarv devices, and explosives at the protected area personnel access points.

Inspection of the primary personnel access point confirmed the access point Includes a search area containing metal detectors, explosive detectors, and X-Ray devices configured to prevent unauthorized bypass, and that Is capable of detecting firearms. Incendiary devices, and explosives, per the applicable personnel access control requirements of the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 Physical Security Plan associated with 10 CFR Part 73.55(h)(3)(l).

Operational testing of the detection equipment was performed following Installation to confirm the detection equipment Is functioning and performing within design specifications. Walkthrough (portal) metal detectors are used to detect metallic components In weapons; detection of wiring, batteries, and other metallic components of bombs and Incendiary devices; and detection of metals used to shield radioactive material. Portal explosive detectors are used to detect trace amounts of explosives. X-Ray Imaging equipment Is used to Inspect the contents of hand carried Items and packages for unauthorized Items.

The results of the protected area personnel access point detection equipment Inspections and testing are documented In SV3-SES-ITR-801664(Reference 2)and confirm that Installed equipment at the protected area personnel access point Is capable of detecting firearms.

Incendiary devices, and explosives.

Together, these reports (References 1 and 2) provide evidence that the following ITAAC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:

• The access control points for the protected area are configured to control personnel and vehicle access; and

• The access control points for the protected area Include detection equipment that Is capable of detecting firearms. Incendiary devices, and explosives at the protected area personnel access points.

References 1 and 2 are available for NRG Inspection as part of the Unit 3 C.2.6.09.05a ITAAC Completion Package (Reference 3).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-20-1406 Enclosure Page 4 of 4 ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company(SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC. The ITAAC completion review is documented in the ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a (Reference 3) and is available for NRC review.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria were met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References(available for NRC Inspection^

1. SV3-SES-ITR-800664, Unit 3 iTAAC 664 Walkdown Inspection: ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a, Revision 0

2. SV3-SES-ITR-801664, Unit 3 Personnel Access Point Detection Equipment Testing: ITAAC C.2.6.09.05a, Revision 0

3. C.2.6.09.05a-U3-CP-Rev0, ITAAC Completion Package