JAFP-20-0024, Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009

Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009

ML20085H976
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	03/25/2020
From:	David Gudger Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-14-009, JAFP-20-0024
Download: ML20085H976 (5)

Text

200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 www.exeloncorp.com Order No. EA-14-009 JAFP-20-0024 March 25, 2020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 NRC Docket No. 50-333

Subject:

Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009

References:

1. EA-14-009, Confirmatory Order, Notice of Violation, and Civil Penalty - NRC Special Inspection Report 05000458/2014407 and NRC Investigation Report 4-2012-022 - River Bend Station, ML14339A167, dated December 3, 2014

2. Letter from Marvin L. Chase to NRC Mr. Anton Vegel, Notification of Readiness for 92702, "Follow-up on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations," RBG-47701 or ML16235A487, dated August 15, 2016

3. Inspection report, River Bend Station - NRC Confirmatory Order Follow-Up Inspection 05000458/2016407, ML16363A454, dated December 28, 2016

4. Letter from NRC, James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant - Order Approving Direct Transfer of Renewed Facility Operating License and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation General License, ML17041A321, dated March 1, 2017 On December 3, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Confirmatory Order (EA-14-009) [Reference 1] to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy). Order EA-14-009 was issued as a result of a successful Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session and settlement agreement related to an apparent violation involving the willful actions of an unidentified security officer which occurred at Entergy's River Bend Station on March 18, 2012.

This Order confirmed the commitments made by Entergy as part of the settlement agreement and was issued to all power reactor licensees owned and operated by Entergy, which included the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009 Docket No. 50-333 March 25, 2020 Page 2 Section V of Order EA-14-009 describes the actions that were required to be taken at the River Bend Station and other nuclear power facilities within the Entergy fleet. Specifically, Items B through J in Section V describe specific actions that needed to be instituted and the schedules for completing the actions. Item K in Section V explains the process for notifying the NRC when follow-up inspection to ensure the actions have been satisfactorily implemented.

By letter dated August 15, 2016, [References 2], Entergy informed the NRC that the actions agreed upon in the Confirmatory Order had been met and requested the NRC to conduct a follow-up inspection in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 92702, "Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations."

On November 17, 2016, the NRC conducted a follow-up inspection in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 92702, "Follow-up on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations."

As documented in Inspection Report 05000458/2016407, dated December 28, 2016

[Reference 3], the NRC concluded that "..the requirements of the Confirmatory Order have been met."

Subsequently, by letter dated March 1, 2017, [Reference 4] the NRC approved the direct transfer of JAF Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-59 from Entergy to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon). At this point, Exelon became the licensed owner and operator of JAF and the facility transitioned to operating under Exelon's programs, processes, and procedures.

However, Exelon continued to maintain certain provisions relevant to Order EA-14-009 in the site-specific procedure SY-JF-101-106, "Safeguard Information Control," that was developed as part of the integration efforts. Although Exelon recognizes the regulatory obligation that it had to comply with Order EA-14-009, Exelon considers that the additional security requirements Entergy had established in response to Order EA-14-009 to be redundant and unnecessary based on the robust requirements and standards implemented as part of Exelon's fleet Security Plan program.

The following discussion compares the current JAF procedure SY-JF-101-106, "Safeguard Information Control," with the comparable Exelon fleet process established in procedure SY-AA-101-106, "Control and Classification of Safeguards Information (SGI) and Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI)." Rescinding the requirements of Order EA-14-009 for JAF will facilitate aligning the site's SGI control process with the program requirements and measures of the Exelon fleet Security Program. Exelon maintains a rigorous and effective program for controlling SGI material that meets applicable 10 CFR 73 requirements and supporting related guidance. The discussion below provides a comparison between the JAF site-specific procedural requirements related to controlling SGI material and those specified in the Exelon fleet procedure.

1. Commitment to Compliance to SGI Controls

a. SY-JF-101-106 states: "All qualified Members of the Security Organization (MSOs) must have read and signed the SY-JF-101-106-F-01 or equivalent 'Commitment to Compliance' for the control and handling of Safeguards Information. [EA-14-009]."

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009 Docket No. 50-333 March 25, 2020 Page 3

b. Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-106 states: "

Personnel who are routine users of SGI who handle, control, view, transport, transmit, and destroy SGI information shall:

• ANNUALLY, be designated in writing by the departmental CFAM /

SFAM to handle, control, view, transport, transmit, and destroy SGI information.

• MEET the access to SGI requirements of SY-AA-101-106.

• INITIALLY AND ANNUALLY read and attest to in writing, knowledge of the contents and requirements of SY-AA-101-106.

2. Control and Storage of Security Safeguards Documents

a. SY-JF-101-106 states:

Licensee will separate Safeguards documents in the SCCs. Documents such as the procedure(s) outlining the Security Response to plant attacks, site target sets and defensive strategy plans will remain in printed form.

These documents will, however, be controlled at a higher level, be stored in approved containers that promote the ease of inventory and increased security. These documents will be stored in numbered binders placed inside a clear storage container and stored near the operator(s). The box will remain closed and affixed with a tamper indicating seal under normal circumstances and inventory of the box can easily be completed by ensuring the correct number of binders is present in the box and validation that the seal is intact. [EA-14-009].

b. Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-106 states:

SGI material within alarm stations occupied by qualified Security personnel need not be stored in a locked Approved Security Storage Container (ASSC) due to immediate accessibility needs.

• RESTRICT personnel tours of the alarm station while SGI materials are out of the ASSC to only Qualified Individuals, unless otherwise approved by the Manager Site Security (MSS).

• OBSERVE individuals performing maintenance or facilities type activities inside the alarm station in order to ensure SGI is properly protected and restricted from unauthorized access.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009 Docket No. 50-333 March 25, 2020 Page 4

3. Controls on Accessing SGI Materials on a Mobile Device

a. SY-JF-101-106 states:

The second type of Safeguards material in the SCCs is material that an operator or other MSOs may consult periodically in a manner that is not time critical. This could include items such as site procedures related to alarm station operation and the Site Physical Security Plan. Items remaining in the alarm stations will no longer be in a printed form. They will instead be stored on dedicated stand-alone computer laptops. These dedicated laptops will be prepared for Safeguards usage by Licensee Information Technology staff and will be equipped with measures to prevent removal of data from the machines such as port blockers. These machines will be physically secured in each alarm station to prevent removal of the machine from each room. [EA-14-009].

b. Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-106 states:

A mobile device (such as a laptop computer) may be used for the processing of SGI provided; the device is secured in a locked ASSC when not in use. If SGI is stored on a computer that cannot be placed in an ASSC, then the computer shall be continuously located in CAS or SAS.

4. Control of SGI Material

a. SY-JF-101-106 states:

Paper copies of the referenced documents may still remain onsite; however, they will be locked in an approved security storage container with access limited to those with the combination or those viewing the document under the supervision of a combination holder. Documents removed from the containers are logged out and are signed back in when returned. The return is procedurally required to be verified by a second individual. [EA-14-009].

b. Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-106 states: "An Accountable Person shall maintain constant control of SGI material and the associated work areas while SGI is in use until returned to proper storage within an ASSC. USE SY-AA-101-106-F-02 to log SGI item removal and return to the ASSC."

5. SGI Inventory Guidance

a. SY-JF-101-106 states: "Conduct an inventory of SGI per standards upon assumption of posts which house SGI documents/laptops and documented on SY-JF-101-106-F-02 Record of SCC Container Post-Turnover Inventory Log. [EA-14-009]. Additionally, SY-JF-101-106 states SGI items assigned to the SCC(s) will be inventoried upon turnover of the Alarm Station Operators to maintain Chain-of-Custody of the documents utilizing SYJF-101-106-F-02. [EA-14-009]."

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request to Rescind Confirmatory Order EA-14-009 Docket No. 50-333 March 25, 2020 Page 5

b. Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-106 states:

The contents of an ASSC will be listed on an inventory and verified accurate at least once a year. PERFORM an annual review of the ASSC contents. The annual review should utilize a formal tracking mechanism of accomplishment (e.g., predefined action; Passport, MREQ, PIMS etc.).

If SGI is stored on a computer that cannot be placed in an ASSC, then the computer shall be continuously located in CAS or SAS.

c. Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-145, "Standards of Conduct," states: "CONDUCT Post Turnovers face-to-face at a location that minimizes distractions when possible, to promote the effective exchange of information. UTILIZE SY-AA-101-145-F-13, Post Turnover Checklist as an aid to accomplishing effective post reliefs." This aid includes the following:

• Post equipment inventoried and accounted for

• Post paperwork and pass-ons reviewed and understood As described above, Exelon's current Security Plan program requirements establish comparable measures for controlling SGI material as those imposed by Order EA-14-009 on JAF. As a result, Exelon considers it unnecessary to continue including the additional provisions of Order EA-14-009 for controlling and managing SGI based on the justification provided. Because JAF is currently owned and operated by Exelon, it will maintain SGI material per Exelon procedure SY-AA-101-106, "Control and Classification of Safeguards Information (SGI) and Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI)." Therefore, Exelon requests that Order EA-14-009 be rescinded for JAF.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, then please contact Enrique Villar at (610) 765-5736.

Respectfully, Afevv :dT ~Jyv-David T. Gudger Sr. Manager, Licensing Exelon Generation Company, LLC cc: Regional Administrator - NRC Region I NRC Senior Resident Inspector - JAF NRC Project Manager, NRR - JAF A. L. Peterson, NYSERDA