ML20009E406

LER 81-026/01T-0:on 810706,standby Gas Treatment Sys Could Not Be Conclusively Demonstrated to Remain Operable During Design Basis Loca.Caused by Inadequate Documentation

ML20009E406
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	07/20/1981
From:	Mcloughlin M BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20009E404	List: ML20009E403 ML20009E406
References
LER-81-026-01T, LER-81-26-1T, NUDOCS 8107280169
Download: ML20009E406 (2)

Text

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NRC FORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7 77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL 8 LOCK: l l l l l l l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIREO INFORMATION) 1 6 jo lil l Ml Al Pl Pl Sj 1l@l 0l 0l -l 0lUCENSE 14 0l 0l 0l 0l -l 0l 0lgl4 l1 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 l 1 l 1TYPE l 1JO lgl57 CAT l

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[g 7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 15 CON'T Iol11 "'[.RC 5 l_@l 01 5 l 0lDOCK -l ET0lNUMBER 21 9 l 3@l 68 06917 10 l6 l 8 l 1 @l 0 l 7 REPORT kVENT DATE F4 75 l2l0 l 8 l 1W l@

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• 1 8 44 61 EVENT DESCRIF flON AND PROB A8LE CONSEQUENCES h lo l2l l On July 6, 1981 at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, while conducting a start-up from a forced outage, l iol3l l PNPS was informed by offsite Boston Edison support personnel that the SBGTS System l lol4l l could not be conclusively demonstrated to remain operable during the course of a l loisl l design basis LOCA. A controlled shutdown was initiated and modifications effected I 10 ls l l to ensure operability. Modifications were completed and startup commenced at 1944 l 10 l 7 l l hours on 7/7/81. (bee Attachment) l l

l 0 l8 I I 80 7 8 9 E CODE SL8C E COMPONENT CODE SUSCODE 50 E 10191 IS lE I h l Xlh l X l h l X l X l X l X I X l X I@ [_Z_j h W h 18 19 20 i 8 9 10 11 12 TJ

_ SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISIOri LE A RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE No.

@ aE l8 l1l l__l l0l2l6l j,-l l 0l 1l 29 lTl 30 g l0 l 32

_ 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 31 A N AC ON ON PL NT MET HOURS SB IT FO 5 B. SUPPLI E MAN FACTURER

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3J J4 35 J6 3 40 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h li j o l l Cause - Inadequate documentation to demonstrate continued operability during design l Ii li l l basis LOCA. Action was taken to provide verification of eanipment analification. I i1 12l l (See Attachment) I l i l 31 I I It 14 I l F.

7 8 9 ST S %PCWER OTHER STATUS ts O Y DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION l I s l l C l@ l 0l 1l 0l@l N.A. l l A l@l Engineering Analysis l ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION CF RELEASE N.A. l l N.A. l l1 l 61 7 8 9 l Z l @ l10Z l@l 11 44 45 40 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE CESCRIPTION l1 l 7 l l 0 j 0 l 0 l@l Zl@[ N.A. l j

PERSONNE L INJURIES NUveER DESCRIPTION N.A. l II 7

l adl 3l 0 l 0 l 011l@l12 80 LOSS OF OR DAM AGE TO F ACILITY .

TYPE DESCRIPTION l 1 l 98 l9 l Z l@l10 N.A. l 7 80 ISSU E DESCRIPTION l 12 l ol l N lhl N.A. l lll1II1llllll2

! 7 8 3 to 68 69 80 5 l 8107280169 810720 T. McLoughlin 617-746-7900 o l PDR ADOCK 05000293 PHONE: j

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, BOSTON EDISON COMPANY

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PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-293 l t

I Attachment to LER 81-026/01T-0  ?

I Event Description and Probable Consequences

'f s

As a result of engineering analyses conducted in the course of design verifica- l6 tion of the operability of the Primary Containment Purge and Vent System, certain components of the Standby Gas Treatment system were identified as having in- I" sufficient supporting documents to conclusively demonstrate that they would properly and continuously operate following a design basis LOCA. Qualification documentation was not considered adequate for the following components:

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1. Blower drive belts

2. Temperature cutoff switch (

3. Bearing grease

4. Control Power Transformers Cause Description and Corrective Actions Evaluation of systems with the application of 10 CFR 50.44 Criteria identified an (

inability to produce verified documentaticn to conclusively demonstrate continued operability of components for the duratioa of a design basis loss of coolant accident. The following specific action was taken:

1. Blower drive belts f

i The belts were deemed qualified af ter a combined review by the Mechanical Group and the Environmental & Radiological Health and Safety Group of

, the belt composition and expected environment. A safety evaluation was performed by the Systems and Safety Analysis Group. ,

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2. SBGTS Fan Lubrication l f

i The lubrication in the f an was removed and replaced with grease for which qualification documentation was readily available.

3. High Temperature Cutout Switch l l

! The high temperature cutout switch was deemed qualified af ter a review l of the materials used in fabrication. A safety analysis was performed i by the Systems and Safety Analysis Group.

4. Control Power Transformer for SBGTS Heaters i J l

! The control transformers were qualified by establishing the seismic qualification of the cabinet. Radiation qualification was based on verification of component material qualification and documented litera-ture on the generic performance of similar designs in severe radiation environments .

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