ML20003D890

LER 81-014/03L-0:on 810226,train 1 Hpi/Low Pressure Injection cross-connect Isolation Valve Dh 64 Would Not Open During Testable ECCS Valves Quarterly Test.Caused by Loose Set Rod Bushing in Valve Operator.Bushing Tightened

ML20003D890
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/24/1981
From:	Matheny D TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20003D884	List: ML20003D883 ML20003D890
References
LER-81-014-03L, LER-81-14-3L, NUDOCS 8104010339
Download: ML20003D890 (2)

Text

U. S. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION N RC FORM ::GG (1-171 -

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O 2 l (NP-33-81-13) On 2/26/81 at 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br /> during the performance of the Testable Emer-l o 3 l gency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Valves Quarterly Test, operators determined that i

[ o ) ., l l DH 64 would not open. ECCS Train 1 low pressure injection to high pressure injec-I gl tion cross tie was declared inoperable from the control room. The station entered There was no danger to the 4 lo Is l l' the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.a.

l o l 7 l l public or station' personnel. ECCS Train 2 was operable during this time and DH 64 l o is l l would have been manually operated had it been necessary to use Train _1.

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_ 31 l35z lg 3/ 40 41 42 43 44 41 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h li j o l l The cause was a problem in the valve operator. A loose set rod bushing allowed the [

li 11 l l gear box set rod to move which unlocked the limit switches from their adjusted post- 1 y,y7gl tion. This allowed the torque switch circuit to cut in prior to the valve clearing l

, 3 l its seat. Under wo 81-1636 the bushing was tightened and the limit switches re- l

, 4 l adjusted. At 0115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br /> on 2/27/81 ST 5051.13 was successfully perforced. l 80 7 8 9 S1 A S *. POWE H OTHER ST ATUS $15 o HY DISCOVERY DESORtPTION 32 NA l 18151 ( EJ@ l 1l 0 l 0 l@l l lBl@l Surveillance Test ST 5051.13-ACilVITY CONTENT AVOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION oF RELE ASE HELEASED OF RELE ASE F Fl8 LZJ @ l Zl@l NA l l NA l 44 45 80 7 9 to 11 i PEHSONNEL EXPOSUHES l NUVB E R TYPE OESCRIPTION 39 l

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, TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BF2SE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEME;rAL'INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-13 DATE OF EVENT: February 26, 1981 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure of High Pressure Injection (HPI)/ Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Cross-Connect Isolation Valve 1, DH 64 Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2767 and Load (Gross MNE) = 924 Description of Occurrence: During routine performance of ST 5051.13, Exercising

of Testable Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Valves Quarterly Test, Operators determined that the Train 1 HPI/LPI cross-connect isolation valve DH 64 would not open. At that time, 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br />, ECCS Train 1 LPI/HPI cross tie was declared inopera-ble from the control room. The station entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2a which states that the inoperable ECCS train must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant must be placed in a hot shutdown i condition within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

,De_signation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause for the failure of DH 64 was a loose set rod bushing. The loose bushing allowed the gear box set rod f to move about, unlocking the limit switches from their adjusted position. This in turn allowed the torque switch circuit to be cut in prior to the valve completely clearing its seat. The final result of these circumstances was the torquing out of DH 64, i

The vendor, Limitorque, was contacted and indicated that they had NOT seen a similar problem. They conclude that the set rod bushing was NOT properly tightened upon I initial installation. Since there has NOT been a siuticr failure at the station even though there are many of these valve operators in use, this event is considered to be an isolated incident.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Train 2 ECCS was operable. Train 1 was also operable, except that it could not be placed in the " piggy-back" mode from the control room. When in the " piggy-back" mode it is required there is adequate time to manually open this

valve locally with the handwheel.

I Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work Order 81-1636, the set rod bushing was tightened and the limit switches were adjusted. At 0115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br /> on February 27, 1981, e ST 5051.13 was satisfactorily completed and DH 64 was declared operable. At that time the station was removed from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2a.

l Failure Data: There has been no report of a similar failure.

LER #81-014 1

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