ML19330B451

Updated LER 80-037/01T-1:on 800613,Westinghouse Notified Util of Potential for Damage to One or More Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture.Caused by Inadequate Design

ML19330B451
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/25/1980
From:	Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19330B445	List: ML19330B444 ML19330B451
References
LER-80-037-01T, LER-80-37-1T, NUDOCS 8008040036
Download: ML19330B451 (3)

Text

- -

s, .. . . .

I 1 l,1 l l setsAsa eniNr on Tves att Ratus2 a i econniaTizu:

.c:urnoi. stoCm I.

Y lAlLlJlMlFl J 8 9 1 l@l 0 l0 l- l0 l0 l0 l0 l0 l- l0 l0 l@l 4 l 261 l 1UGife&&

UCEtes44 Coot 14 in UCEPsSE NW?.lWLR 2S l 1 TVPg l 1 JOl@lS3 6AT l 68l@

s un l L @l 015 l 0 l 0 l013 l4 18MI 0l 61 1 l'3 l' 3 l 0 j@l 017 l 2 l '5 l 8 l 080l@

S 60 68 DoGK E T hugig g n ud 6'J EVENToAfg 74 7S REPOnT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROGASLE CONSECUENCES h ,

g [ Westinghouse notified Alabama Power Company of the potential for damage to one or'more . l ,

r.u si l centrifugal charging pumps due to' inadequate flow through the pump (s) following a {

, 4 gsecondary side high energy. line rupture. A plant specific review for FNP resulted.in al gg determination on 6/13/80 that this information is reportable under Tech. Spec. '6.9.1.8.ig.

oa l I o r I l o a l I YoEe" Yo'N sNENs componswicoes su"eYo's stsNEoe o 9 ,'l SJ F l@ lB lh l Al@ l P l U I M lP lX IX lh Wh W h 7 8 9 30 13 12 13 18 I9 20

. , ,,,, stoVENTIAL CCCURRENCE REPORT nEVtsloN LtRemo E REPORT No. CooE TYPE No.

y y I h ,argg lVE _8 l047 l YEAR [- j l 0l 3l 7l l 0l 1l lTl 8

_2, u u 24 2. 21 u a u n a

" cV,7Er ^M^&rVi? ,o*010.. ""s'"ritTf- *

• MI!?" 'AciYN 'Ta?o"" wouas uAS*fcE4a W@ l 0 l 0 l 0 @ly@ 0l y@ lP l0 l2 l5 [g 4

i-.

lF 3J QlF l@ l Zl@

34 35 7,6 31 40 41 42

[42Al@ 3 44 4; CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CCFRECTIVE ACTIONS h i o lThe above concerns were not adequately considered durine engineering design review of l

Ithe High Head Safety Injection System. See attach =ent concerning corrective action. 1 i 7 l - l ,

4 CED1 i i 4 l I r as so -

1. 'r*2NeY s spows= orwensvarus h EsEas!N oiscovenypescatenom h i s lEl@ l1l0l0l@l " "

NA-l l D l@[ Notification from Westinghouse l

' Envity A co$ramr

stetsAsto or atLaAsr Locarro's or artsAsE h 6 NAAuousTos 4criviry h l l NA

@ lZ '

l l l

reasonssL sxposOss -

~u.... 1V,. o sC.,P ,o, @ -

l 7 l0l0l0l@lZl@l" NA l

'.. o~~.'i.',~,u',?. i s "

~uv. . ocsco,,nes@

j i a l 0 l 010l@ln NA l

, e, ,, \

' Loss of CR oA4 tace To PActury TYPE otsCHIPTsoN i o lZl@l NA l

eu.usry - "

itsutD O 8008040 0 3 6

• NRe usE enty

! Q g@otsCRIPTICN l N,,s,/

NA g ggllggg;;;;;l~

l ae io se as so :

. . s n, M

. NAME OF PREPARER pHCNE:

l

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY-JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-348 ATTACHMENT TO LER 80-037/01T-1 Facility: Joseph M. Farley Unit 1

- Report Date: 7-25-80 ,

Event Date: 6-13-80 Identification of Event:

Westinghouse notified Alabama Power Company of the potential for damage to one or more centrifugal charging pumps due to inadequate flow through the pump (s) following a secondary side high energy line rupture.

Conditions Prior to Event The unit was' in Mode 1 at the time of notification.

Description of Event Westinghouse notified Alabama Power Company of the potential for damage to one or more centrifugal charging pumps dne to inadequate flow through the pump (s) following a secondary side high energy line rupture. A plant specific review for FNP resulted in a determination on 6/13/80 that this information is reportable under Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.8.i.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

The above concerns were not adequately considered during

_ engineering design and review of the High Head Safety Injection System.

Analysis of Event A review by Westinghouse indicated the potential for the occurrence of the following scenario:

Following a secondary side high energy line rupture and associated reactor trip, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature initially decrease. Safety Injection is actuated and the centrifugal charging pumps (CCP) start to increase RCS inventory. As a result of RCS heatup and inventory increase, the RCS pressure could rise to the pressurizer safety valve setpoint of 2500 psia (pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORV's) actuation cannot be considered since they are not safety-related) within approximately 200 seconds and remain at that pressure until transient " turnaround". Transient " turnaround" can

-r- - ,y- -,

occur between 1800 and 4200 seconds depending on operator action and available equipment. During the initial portion of this= transient, the SI termination criteria may not be satisfied. Consequently, the RCS pressure can reach the pressurizer safety valve relief pressure before CCP operation is terminated. During this period, the minimum flow required for CCP -operation must be satisfied by flow to the RCS since the CCP miniflow isolation valves are automa-tically closed on safety injection initiation. This requires that the CCPs be able to deliver their minimum required flow to the RCS at the safety valve setpoint pressure.

The results of the conservative calculations show that with two charging pumps operating in parallel the maximum RCS pressure at which 60 GPM flowrate is maintained through the " weakest" CCP at FNP is less than the safety valve pressure setpoint of 2500 PSIG. The calculations indicate that the 60 GPM minimum cannot be guaranteed if the pump miniflow valves are closed in the above accident scenario.

Effect on Plant This occurrence had no effect on plant operation.

Corrective Action

~

FNP has implemented the following interim corrective action:

1. A design change to remove the safety injection initiation automatic closure signal from the CCP miniflow isolation valves has been implemented.

2. The plant emergency operating procedures have been modified to instruct the operator when to open and shut miniflow

_ valves.

The above interim corrective action has been reviewed by Westing-house, Southern Company Services, Inc. (Licensing) and the FNP Plant Operations Review Committee. These reviews indicate that an unreviewed safety question is not involved.

Long term corrective action will be initiated after additional studies and analyses are performed by Westinghouse and Alabama Power Company.

Failure Data l None A

-n