05000259/LER-1980-050-03, /03L-0:on 800624,during Performance Check,Found Pressure Switch PS-47-144 Miswired.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Proper Procedures for Working on Cssc Equipment.Pressure Switch Rewired Correctly

/03L-0:on 800624,during Performance Check,Found Pressure Switch PS-47-144 Miswired.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Proper Procedures for Working on Cssc Equipment.Pressure Switch Rewired Correctly

ML19321A502
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	07/18/1980
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19321A496	List: 05000259/LER-1980-050, Forwards LER 80-050/03L-0 05000259/LER-1980-050-03, /03L-0:on 800624,during Performance Check,Found Pressure Switch PS-47-144 Miswired.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Proper Procedures for Working on Cssc Equipment.Pressure Switch Rewired Correctly
References
LER-80-050-03L-01, LER-80-50-3L-1, NUDOCS 8007230531
Download: ML19321A502 (3)

LER-1980-050, /03L-0:on 800624,during Performance Check,Found Pressure Switch PS-47-144 Miswired.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Proper Procedures for Working on Cssc Equipment.Pressure Switch Rewired Correctly

Event date:
Report date:
2591980050R03 - NRC Website

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EvrNT DEscR'PfiON Ar40 PRc8ABLE CCNSEQUENCES h ITTT1 IDuring an outage, control valve fast closure pressure switch PS-47-144 was miswired 3

m lwhen personnel f ailed to follow proper procedures for working on CSSC equipment. _

m Qwo consecutive shutdowns resulted. During the second shutdown all RPS scram group j

[777-] [l and 2 rods initially inserted and stopped prior to completion of the scram stroke j

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• Tenn::ssea Vallcy Authority Firm BF-17 Browns Ferry Nuc! car Plant BF 15.2 1/10/79 LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION BFRO 259 / 8050 Technical Specification Involved 3.3.c

' eported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(3)

R Date of Occurrence 6/24/80 Time of Occurrence 1731 Unit 1

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

Refer to detailed report attached.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 @ 0 We Unie. 2 @ 70% We Unit 3 @ 99% We 1

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met

@c to inoperable equipment.

Describe.

Refer to detailed report attached.

@ parent Cause of Occurrence:

Refer to detailed report attached.

l Analysis of Occi trence:

There was no danger to the public health or safety, no damage to the plant or equipment,and no release of activity.

Corrective Action

switch was rewired correctly.

i Failure Data:

i None l

• Retention :

Period - Lifetime; Responsibility..- Administrative Supervisor

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• Revision:

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a, a ATTACHMENT TO LER BFRO-50-259-80050 Turbine control fluid leaks at PS-47-144 on the #2 control valve resulted

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.in a forced Unit 1 outage.

Plant ' personnel used only mechanical control drawings to identify the switch function and improperly identified the switch as non-CSSC. Personnel worked at the control valve under poor lighting conditions and without the control normally. required for OSSC maintenance (independent verification of functional test).

This resulted in PS-47-144 being rewired incorrectly when normally unused switch #2 was inadvertently wired into the circuit switch number 1.

The resulting wiring scheme consisted of the normally open and normally closed contacts of uncali-brated switch C2 being wired in parallel and then connected in series with the contacts of calibrated switch #1.

This wiring scheme permitted the teactor protection system to fulfill its control valve fast closure scram function but introduced a brief electrical disruption to the parameter sensor relay each time switch #2 actuated.

Unit shutdowns resulted during each of the next two consecutive startup sequences during performance of turbine control v'alve fast closure S.I.

4.1.A-12.

On the first occasion during reopening of an adjacent control valve, brief electrical disruptions initiated by control fluid pressure fluctuations at PS-47-144 resulted in the de-energization of both channel B1 scram actuators.

The A channel 1/2 scram due to closing of the adjacent control valve had not yet been reset and insertion of all control rods resulted.

On the second occasion during reopening of an adjacent control valve, a brief electrical disruption initiated by control fluid pressure fluctuations at PS-47-144 resulted in the de-energization of only one of the paralleled pair of B1 channel scram actuators. The A channel 1/2 scran due to closing of the adjacent control valve had not yet been reset and initial insertion of only RPS scram group 2 and 3 rods resulted. Prior to full insert stroke all rods stopped immediately af ter RPS channel A was reset by the operator.

Reactor protection system time ' delay to reset circuitry was not initiated because the brief electrical disruption de-energized only one of the paralleled pair of B1 channel scram actuators.

Reactor protection system design is such that both B1 scram actuators wapid have to de-energize before initiating the ten second time delay to reset circuitry.