ML18138A055

Updated LER 80-007/03X-1:on 800116,routine Surveillance During Normal Operation Revealed Failure of Heat Tracing Circuit 4 on Line 1-CH-56-152 Boric Acid Supply to Blender Caused by Water Penetration of Heat Tracing Tape

ML18138A055
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	02/25/1980
From:	Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18138A054	List: ML18138A053 ML18138A055
References
LER-80-007-03X, LER-80-7-3X, NUDOCS 8003030455
Download: ML18138A055 (2)

Text

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I During normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing circuit 4 (panels 8,9) on line l-CH-56-152 Boric Acid supply to the blender. This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3 *. B.5.

and is reportable as per T .S. 6. 6. 2._b. (2). There were at all times two oper-able flow paths for Boric Acid to the core and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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A review of the heat tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water Lp:_e_n_e_t_r_a_t_i_o_n_,_o_f_t_h_e_h...:..*e_a_t_t_r_a_c_i_n..::g:__t_a...::p_e_.__Th_e__ c_o_r.::.r_e..:.c..:.t,::::i:..:.v..:.e_*..:.a:..:c:..:t:..:i:..:o:..:n::._:1=*m.::ipi:.:l=..e:::m:::.e:::.n=t.:::e.::d~wc.:::a~s:.--_____ J OJ)) to replace the heat tracing tape with higher water resistant tape.

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• J UPDATED REPORT Attachment (Page 1 of 1)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-280 Report No. 80-007/03X-l Event Date: 1/16/80 Title of Report: Low Current On Heat Tracing

1. Description of Event:

During normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing circuit 4 (panels 8,9) on line l-CH-56-152 boric acid supply to the blender. This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5, and is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:

At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected-line was maintained as required. There were at all times two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause:

The failure of the circuit was due to water penetration damage from previous leakage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit. Lagging on the affected line was also replaced.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The heat tracing tape was replaced with a more water resistant heat tape.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

The problem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Continuous surveillance is maintained on the Heat Tracing System. No addi-tional action is considered necessary.

7. Generic Implications:

A task force has been created to investigate the failures of the Heat Tracing System.

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