ND-18-0349, Unit 4 - ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 (Index Number 842)

Unit 4 - ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 (Index Number 842)

ML18085A015
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/23/2018
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
ITAAC C.3.8.01.01, ND-18-0349
Download: ML18085A015 (6)

Text

Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road

^ Southern Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4 Waynesboro, GA 30830 706-848-6459 tel 410-474-8587 cell myox@southernco.com HAR 2 3 2018 Docket Nos.: 52-025 52-026 ND-18-0349 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 [Index Number 8421 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)

Unit 3 and Unit 4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item C.3.8.01.01 [Index Number 842] for verifying that a report exists for the as-designed pipe rupture hazards analysis. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-848-1575.

Respectfully submitted.

Michael J. Yox ^

Regulatory Affairs Dire6tor Vogtle 3&4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion of ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 [Index Number 842]

MJY/KJD/amw

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0349 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. D. A. Bost (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. D. Rauckhorst (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. D. Meier Mr. D. H. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. M. J. Yox Mr. D. L. Fulton Mr. J. B. Klecha Mr. G. Chick Mr. F. H. Willis Ms. A. L. Pugh Mr. A. 8. Parton Mr. W. A. Sparkman Mr. C. E. Morrow Ms. K. M. Stacy Mr. M. K. Washington Mr. J. P. Redd Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. D. R. Culver Mr. T. G. Petrak Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Reoulatorv Commission Mr. W. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Ms. J. M. Heisserer Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. M. E. Ernstes Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. T. E. Chandler Ms. S. E. Temple Ms. P. Braxton Mr. N. D. Karlovich Mr. A. J. Lerch Mr. C. J. Even Mr. F. D. Brown Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. A. E. Rivera-Varona Ms. L. A. Kent Mr. P. B. Donnelly Oolethoroe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Municipal Electric Authoritv of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0349 Page 3 of 3 Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. 0. Durham (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. M. Corletti Ms. L. G. Iller Mr. D. Hawkins Ms. J. Monahan Mr. J. L. Coward Ms. N. E. Deangells Other Mr. J. E. Hosier, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., CDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Ms. 8. W. Kernizan, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Baich Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0349 Enclosure Page 1 of 3 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-18-0349 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion of ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 [Index Number 842]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0349 Enclosure Page 2 of 3 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment:

Systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are required to be functional during and following a design basis event shall be protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with analyses of postulated failures in high and moderate energy piping.

Inspections. Tests. Analvses:

Inspection of the as-designed pipe rupture hazard analysis report will be conducted. The report documents the analyses to determine where protection features are necessary to mitigate the consequence of a pipe break. Pipe break events involving high-energy fluid systems are analyzed for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, room pressurization, and temperature effects. Pipe break events involving moderate-energy fluid systems are analyzed for wetting from spray, flooding, and other environmental effects, as appropriate.

Acceptance Criteria:

An as-designed pipe rupture hazard analysis report exists and concludes that the analysis performed for high and moderate energy piping confirms the protection of SSCs required to be functional during and following a design basis event.

ITAAC Determination Basis Systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are required to be functional during and following a design basis event (DBE) (essential SSCs) shall be protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with analyses of postulated failures in high and moderate energy piping. This ITAAC requires that an inspection of the as-designed pipe rupture hazard analysis (PRHA) report(s) be conducted. The report(s) document the analyses to determine where protection features are necessary to mitigate the consequence of a pipe break. Pipe break events involving high-energy fluid systems were analyzed for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, room pressurization, and temperature effects.

Pipe break events involving moderate-energy fluid systems were analyzed for wetting from spray, flooding, and other environmental effects, as appropriate.

The methods and criteria for the PRHA is described in Section 3.6 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR) (Reference 1). Pipe failure protection is provided according to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4. In the event of a high- or moderate-energy pipe failure within the plant, adequate protection is provided so that essential SSCs are not impacted by the adverse effects of postulated piping failure. The criteria used to evaluate pipe failure protection are consistent with NRC guidelines including those in the Standard Review Plan Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, and NUREG-1061, Volume 3.

An inspection of the PRHA was performed to verify the analysis included the following items:

• Identification of pipe break locations in high energy piping

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0349 Enclosure Page 3 of 3

• Identification of through wall crack locations in high and moderate energy piping

• An evaluation of the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, temperature, and room pressurization for each high energy line pipe break location

• An evaluation of the effects of wetting from spray, flooding, and other environmental effects for each moderate energy line pipe break location

• Identification and location of essential SSCs that are impacted by pipe break events

• Design and location of protective hardware to mitigate the consequences of the pipe break events The as-designed PRHA summary reports (References 2 and 3) exist and conclude that the analyses performed for high and moderate-energy piping confirm the protection of SSCs required to be functional during and following a QBE and meet the ITAAC Acceptance Criteria.

The PRHA results are provided in Appendix A and Appendix A.1 of References 2 and 3, respectively.

ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all ITAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review, which found no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC, is documented in the Vogtle Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 (Reference 4) and available for NRC inspection.

ITAAC Compietion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria are met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References (available for NRC inspection)

1. Vogtle 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 6.2, Section 3.6 "Protection Against the Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping"

2. APP-GW-GLR-076, Rev 3 "API 000 Pipe Rupture Hazards Analysis (PRHA) As-Designed Summary Report for the Containment Building - All Levels"

3. APP-GW-GLR-075, Rev 3 "API 000 Pipe Rupture Hazards Analysis (PRHA) As-Designed Summary Report for the Auxiliary Building - All Levels"

4. C.3.8.01.01-U0-CP-Rev 0, "Completion Package for Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC C.3.8.01.01 (Index Number 842)