ND-18-0322, Unit 4 - Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.02.1 (Index Number 522)

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML18078A034)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Unit 4 - Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.02.1 (Index Number 522)
ML18078A034
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/2018
From: Yox M
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i, ND-18-0322
Download: ML18078A034 (14)


Text

Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road Regulatory Affairs Director Waynesboro, GA 30830 hk. Southern Nuclear Vogtie 3 & 4 706-848-6459 tei 410-474-8587 ceii mar 1 6 2018 myox @southernco.com Docket Nos.: 52-025 52-026 ND-18-0322 10CFR 52.99(c)(3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtie Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4 Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-davs Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.02.1 [Index Number 5221 Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.99(c)(3), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby notifies the NRC that as of March 1, 2018, Vogtie Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Uncompleted Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.5.02.02.1

[Index Number 522] has not been completed greaterthan 225-days prior to initial fuel load. The Enclosure describes the plan for completing this ITAAC. Southern Nuclear Operating Company will, at a later date, provide additional notifications for ITAAC that have not been completed 225-days prior to initial fuel load.

This notification is informed by the guidance described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215. In accordance with NEI 08-01, this notification includes ITAAC for which required inspections, tests, or analyses have not been performed or have been only partially completed.

All ITAAC will be fully completed and all Section 52.99(c)(1) ITAAC Closure Notifications will be submitted to NRC to support the Commission finding that all acceptance criteria are met prior to plant operation, as required by 10 CFR 52.103(g).

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments.

If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-848-1575.

Respectfully submitted.

Michael J. Yo>

Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtie 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtie Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.5.02.02.1 [Index Number 522]

MJY/PGL/amw

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company / Georgia Power Company Mr. D. A. Bost (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. D. Rauckhorst (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. D. Meier Mr. D. H. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. M. J. Vox Mr. D. L. Fulton Mr. J. B. Klecha Mr. F. H. Willis Ms. A. L. Pugh Mr. A. 8. Parton Mr. W. A. Sparkman Mr. C. E. Morrow Ms. K. M. Stacy Mr. M. K. Washington Mr. J. P. Redd Ms. A. 0. Chamberlain Mr. D. R. Culver Mr. T. G. Petrak Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Reaulatorv Commission Mr. W. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Ms. J. M. Heisserer Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. M. E. Ernstes Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. T. E. Chandler Ms. S. E. Temple Ms. P. Braxton Mr. N. D. Karlovich Mr. P. B. Donnelly Mr. A. J. Lerch Mr. C. J. Even Mr. F. D. Brown Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. A. E. Rivera-Varona Ms. L. A. Kent Oalethoroe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Municipal Electric Authorltv of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Page 3 of 3 Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. 0. Durham (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. M. Corletti Ms. L. G. Iller Mr. D. Hawkins Ms. J. 8. Monahan Mr. J. L. Coward Ms. N. E. Deangelis Other Mr. J. E. Hosier, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., CDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Ms. 8. W. Kernizan, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Balch BIngham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 1 of 11 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-18-0322 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.5.02.02.1 [Index Number 522]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 2 of 11 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment

2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Inspections. Tests. Analvses i) Inspection will be performed to verify thatthe seismic Category Iequipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ill) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded bythe tested or analyzed conditions.

Type tests, analyses, ora combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.

Type tests, analyses, ora combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1.

Acceptance Criteria i) The seismic Category Iequipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 islocated on the Nuclear Island.

ii) Areport exists and concludes that the seismic Category Iequipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Areport exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage isseismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

A report exists and concludes that the Class IE equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 3 of 11 A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ITAAC Completion Description This ITAAC requires that inspections, tests, and analyses be performed and documented to ensure the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) equipment identified as seismic CategoryIor Class 1E in the Combined License (COL) Appendix C, Table 2.5.2-1 (the Table) is designed and constructed in accordance with applicable requirements.

h The seismic Cateoorv I eouioment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

To assure that seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss ofsafety function, all the equipment in the Table is designed to be located on the seismic Category INuclear Island. In accordance with Equipment Qualification (EG) Walkdown ITAAC Guideline (Reference 1), an inspection is conducted of the PMS to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified equipment. The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number and verification of equipment location (Building, Elevation, Room). The EG As-Built Reconciliation Reports (EQRR) (Reference 2) identified in Attachment A document the results of the inspection and conclude that the seismic Category I equipment is located on the Nuclear Island.

ih A reoort exists and concludes that the seismic Cateoorv I eouioment can withstand seismic desion basis loads without loss of safetv function.

Seismic Category Iequipment in the Table requires type tests and/or analyses to demonstrate structural integrity and operability. Safety-related (Class 1E) electrical equipment in the Table is seismically qualified by type testing combined with analysis in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-1987 (Reference 3). The specific qualification method (i.e., type testing, analysis, or combination) used for each piece of equipment in the Table is identified in Attachment A. Additional information about the methods used toqualify API 000 safety-related equipment is provided in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Appendix 3D (Reference 4). The EG Reports (Reference 5) identified in Attachment Acontain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude that the seismic Category Iequipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iiil A report exists and concludes that the as-built eouioment includino anchorage is seismicallv bounded bv the tested or analvzed conditions.

An inspection (Reference 1) is conducted toconfirm thesatisfactory installation of the seismically qualified equipment in the Table. The inspection verifies the equipment make/model/serial number, as-designed equipment mounting orientation, anchorage and clearances, and electrical and other interfaces. The documentation of installed configuration of seismically qualified equipment includes photographs and/or sketches/drawings of equipment/mounting/interfaces.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 4 of 11 As part of the seismic qualification program, consideration is given to the definition of the clearances needed around the equipment mounted in the plant to permit the equipment to move during a postulated seismic event without causing impact between adjacent pieces of safety-related equipment. This is done as part of seismic testing by measuring the maximum dynamic relative displacement of the top and bottom of the equipment. EQ Reports (Reference 5) identify the equipment mounting employed for qualification and establish interface requirements for assuring that subsequent in-plant installation does not degrade the established qualification.

Interface requirements are defined based on the test configuration and other design requirements.

Attachment A identifies the EQRR (Reference 2) completed to verify that the as-built seismic Category I equipment listed in the Table, including anchorage, are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions, IEEE Standard 344-1987 (Reference 3) and NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Reference 6).

A report exists and concludes that the Class IE eouioment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC. EMI. RFI. and ESP conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safetv function for the time reouired to perform the safetv function.

The Class IE equipment in the Table is qualified by a combination of type testing and analysis in accordance with RG 1.180 (Reference 7) and industry standards. The specific qualification method (i.e., type testing, analysis, or combination) used for each piece of equipment inthe Table is identified in Attachment A. The baseline Military Standard ("MIL-STD") program is used in its entiretyfor emissions testing as described in Attachment B, and shows the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) type test and category (SWC, EMI, RFI or ESD), the test standard, and the application. The alternate International Electrotechnical Commission (lEC) program is used in its entirety for susceptibility testing as described in similar fashion in Attachment C. The testing described in the attachments is a complete set for this ITAAC in accordance with RG 1.180 and the ESD test requirement, and compliant results of these tests combined with the location analysis indicate that the ITAAC acceptance criteria is met.

The results ofthe tests and analysis are documented in the EQ Reports (Reference 5) identified in AttachmentA and conclude that the Class IE equipment identified in the Table has SWC and can withstand the EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss ofsafety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

A reoort exists and concludes that the Class IE equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humiditv. pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, durino. and followino a design basis accident without loss of safetv function for the time reouired to perform the safetv function.

The Class IE equipment identified in the Table is qualified by a combination oftype testing and analysis in accordance with IEEE Standard 323-1974 (Reference 8) and RG 1.89 (Reference 9) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. This demonstrates that the equipmentcan withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function. Additional information about the methods used to qualify API000 safety-related equipment is provided in UFSAR Appendix 3D (Reference 4).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 5 of 11 EQ Reports (Reference 5) Identified in Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude the equipment identified in the Table can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Together, these reports (References 2 and 5) provide evidence that the ITAAC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:

  • The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island;
  • A reportexists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipmentcan withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function;
  • A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions;
  • A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function forthe time required to perform the safety function; and
  • A reportexists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

References 2 and 5 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.02.1 Completion Packages (References 10 and 11, respectively).

List of ITAAC Findings In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion. Southern NuclearOperating Company (SNC) performed a review of all ITAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This finding review, which included now-consolidated ITAAC Indexes 523, 524, 525, and 526, found the following Notices of Nonconformance (NGN) associated with this ITAAC:

1) 99900404/2015-204-02 (closed)
2) 99900404/2015-204-03 (closed)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 6 of 11 References (available for NRG inspection)

1. ND-xx-xx-001, "EQ Walkdown ITAAC Guideline"
2. EQ As-Built Reconciliation Reports (EQRR) as identified in Attacfiment A for Units 3 and 4
3. IEEE Standard 344-1987, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
4. Vogtle 3&4 Updated Final SafetyAnalysis Report Appendix 3D, "Methodology for Qualifying API 000 Safety-Related Electrical and Mechanical Equipment"
5. EquipmentQualification (EQ) Reports as identified in AttachmentA
6. Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2, "Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants"
7. Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1, "Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems"
8. IEEE Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
9. Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Importantto Safety for Nuclear Power Plants" 10.2.5.02.02.i-U3-CP-Rev X, "Completion Package for Unit 3 ITAAC 2.5.02.02.1 [Index Number 522]"

11.2.5.02.02.i-U4-CP-Rev X, "Completion Package for Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.02.1 [Index Number 522]"

12. NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 7 of 11 Attachment A System: Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS)

Class 1 El Seismic Type of EG Reports As-Built EQRR Equipment Name^ Qual. For (Reference 2)^

Cat. 1+ Qual. (Reference 5)

Harsh Envir.^

PMS Cabinets, Type Test & APP-PMS-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No Division A Analysis APP-PMS-VBR-003 EQRR-PCDXXX PMS Cabinets, Type Test & APP-PMS-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No Division B Analysis APP-PMS-VBR-003 EQRR-PCDXXX PMS Cabinets, Type Test & APP-PMS-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No Division C Analysis APP-PMS-VBR-003 EQRR-PCDXXX PMS Cabinets, Type Test & APP-PMS-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No Division D Analysis APP-PMS-VBR-003 EQRR-PCDXXX Reactor Trip Type Test & APP-JY50-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No Switchgear, Division A Analysis APP-JY50-VBR-003 EQRR-PCDXXX Reactor Trip Type Test& APP-JY50-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No Switchgear, Division B Analysis APP-JY50-VBR-003 EQRR-PCDXXX Reactor Trip Type Test & APP-JY50-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Switchgear, Division C Analysis APP-JY50-VBR-003 Reactor Trip Type Test & APP-JY50-VBR-002 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Switchgear, Division D Analysis APP-JY50-VBR-003 MCR/RSW Transfer Type Test & APP-JW03-VBR-001 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Panels Analysis APP-JW03-VBR-002 MCR Safety-related Type Test & APP-OCS-VBR-006 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Display, Division A Analysis APP-OCS-VBR-008 MCR Safety-related Type Test & APP-OCS-VBR-006 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Display, Division B Analysis APP-OCS-VBR-008 MCR Safety-related Type Test & APP-OCS-VBR-006 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Display, Division C Analysis APP-OCS-VBR-008 MCR Safety-related Type Test & APP-OCS-VBR-006 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Display, Division D Analysis APP-OCS-VBR-008 MCR Safety-related Type Test & APP-OCS-VBR-006 2.5.02.02.i-U3-Yes Yes/No EQRR-PCDXXX Controls Analysis APP-OCS-VBR-008 Notes:

Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-1

1. The Unit 4 As-Built EQRR are numbered "2.5.02.02.i-U4-EQRR-PCDXXX"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 8 of 11 Attachment B RMS Applicable SWO Test Standards, Baseline (MIL-STD) Emissions Testing Program EMC Type Test Test Standard Application MIL-STD-461E (CE101) "Requirements Conducted for the Control of Electromagnetic Emissions, Reactor Trip Switchgear Interference Characteristics of Low Frequency Power Leads (Note 1)

Subsystems and Equipment," U.S.

(EMI/ RFI)

Department of Defense, August 1999.

PMS Cabinet Power Leads MIL-STD-461E (CE102), "Requirements Reactor Trip Switchgear Conducted for the Control of Electromagnetic Power Leads Emissions, High Interference Characteristics of Frequency Subsystems and Equipment," U.S. Main Control Room (MCR)

(EMI/ RFI) Department of Defense, August 1999. Safety-related (SR) Display &

Control Power Leads MIL-STD-461E (RE101), "Requirements PMS Cabinet Radiated for the Control of Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Emissions, Interference Characteristics of Magnetic Field Subsystems and Equipment," U.S.

(EMI/ RFI) MCR SR Display & Control Department of Defense, August 1999.

MIL-STD-461E (RE102), "Requirements PMS Cabinet Radiated for the Control of Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Emissions, Interference Characteristics of Electric Field Subsystems and Equipment," U.S. MCR SR Display & Control (EMI/ RFI) Department of Defense, August 1999.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 9 of 11 Attachment 0 RMS Applicable SWC Test Standards, Alternate (I EC) Susceptibility Testing Program EMC Type Test Test Standard Application PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &

lEC 61000-4-16, "Electromagnetic Signal Leads Conducted Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 16: Test Main Control Room/Remote Low Frequency, for Immunity to Conducted, Common Mode Shutdown Workstation (MCR/RSW)

(EMI/ RFI) Disturbances in the Frequency Range of 0 Transfer Panel Signal Leads Hzto 150 kHz," 1998.

MCR SR Display & Control Power &

Signal Leads (Note 1) lEC 61000-4-13, "Electromagnetic Conducted Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and PMS Cabinet Power Leads Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 13:

Low Frequency, Harmonics and Interharmonics Including MCR SR Display & Control Power (EMI/ RFI) Mains Signaling at AC Power Port, Low Leads Frequency Immunity Tests," 2002.

PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &

lEC 61000-4-6, "Electromagnetic Signal Leads Conducted Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 6: MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal High Frequency Immunity to Conducted Disturbances, Leads (EMI/ RFI) Induced by Radio-Frequency Fields," 1996.

MCR SR Display & Control Power &

Signal Leads lEC 61000-4-8, "Electromagnetic PMS Cabinet Radiated Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 8: Reactor Trip Switchgear Magnetic Field, Power Frequency Magnetic Field Immunity (EMI/ RFI) Test," 1993. (Note 2) MCR SR Display & Control lEC 61000-4-9, "Electromagnetic PMS Cabinet Radiated Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Susceptibility, Reactor Trip Switchgear Measurement Techniques, Section 9:

Magnetic Field, Power Frequency Magnetic Field Immunity (EMI/ RFI) Test," 1993. MCR SR Display & Control lEC 61000-4-10, "Electromagnetic PMS Cabinet Radiated Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Susceptibility, Reactor Trip Switchgear Measurement Techniques, Section 10:

Magnetic Field, Damped Oscillatory Magnetic Field (EMI/ RFI) Immunity Test," 1993. MCR SR Display & Control

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 10 of 11 EMC Type Test Test Standard Application PMS Cabinet lEC 61000-4-3, "Electromagnetic Radiated Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Reactor Trip Switchgear Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 3:

Electrical Field, Radiated, Radio-Frequency, MCR/RSW Transfer Panel (EMI/ RFI) Electromagnetic Field Immunity Test,"

1995.

MCR SR Display & Control PMS Cabinet Radiated MIL-STD-461E (RS103), "Requirements for Susceptibility, the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Reactor Trip Switchgear Electrical Field, Characteristics of Subsystems and (EMI/ RFI) Equipment," U.S. Department of Defense, MCR/RSW Transfer Panel (Note 2) August 1999.

MCR SR Display & Control PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &

lEC 61000-4-4, "Electromagnetic Signal Leads Electrical Fast Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Transient Measurement Techniques, Section 4: MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal (SWO) Electrical Fast Transient/Burst Immunity Leads Test," 1995.

MCR SR Display & Control Power &

Signal Leads PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &

Surge, lEC 61000-4-5, "Electromagnetic Signal Leads Combination Compatibility (EMC), Part 4; Testing and Wave Measurement Techniques, Section 5: MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal (SWC) Surge Immunity Test," 1995 & 2005. Leads MCR SR Display & Control Power &

Signal Leads PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &

lEC 61000-4-12, "Electromagnetic Signal Leads Surge, Ring Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Wave Measurement Techniques, Section 12: MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal (EMI/ RFI) Oscillatory Waves Immunity Test," 1995 & Leads 2006.

MCR SR Display & Control Power &

Signal Leads

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-18-0322 Enclosure Page 11 of 11 EMC Type Test Test Standard Application PMS Cabinet lEC 61000-4-2, "Electromagnetic Electrostatic Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Reactor Trip Switchgear Discharge Measurement Techniques, Section 2:

Immunity (ESD)

Electrostatic Discharge Immunity Test," MCR/RSW Transfer Panel (Note 3) 2008.

MCR SR Display & Control Notes:

1. Voltage Total Harmonic Distortion (VTHD) tests were performed to support exemption ofthe following equipment from CE101 tests under Regulatory Guide 1.180 Position 3.1.
a. PMS Cabinet Power Leads
b. MCR SR Display & Control Power Leads
2. MIL-STD-461E RSI 03 (Radiated susceptibility, electric field) test is used to extend the alternative susceptibility test range of the radiated electrical fields susceptibility above 1 GHz, as indicated in RG 1.180 Position 6.
3. Testing for electrostatic discharge (ESD) is performed consistent with the RG 1.180 reference to IEC 61000-4-2, ElectromagneticCompatibility (EMC) - Part 4-2: Testing and Measurement Techniques - Electrostatic Discharge Immunity Test.