PLA-6998, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.19 to Increase Diesel Generator E Minimum Steady State Frequency PLA-6998

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.19 to Increase Diesel Generator E Minimum Steady State Frequency PLA-6998

ML13130A127
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	05/10/2013
From:	Franke J Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-6998 EC-024-1014, Rev 3
Download: ML13130A127 (58)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Jon A. Franke Site Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504 jfranke@pplweb.com SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) 3.8.1.19 TO INCREASE DIESEL GENERATOR E MINIMUM STEADY STATE FREQUENCY PLA-6998 Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388

References:

1) Letter from PPL (PLA-6809) to USNRC (Document Control Desk),

"Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Proposed Amendment No. 309 to License NPF-14 and Proposed Amendment No. 280 to License NPF-22: Change to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.19 to Increase Diesel Generator E Minimum Steady State Frequency, " dated September 18, 2012.

2) Letter from NRC to PPL, "Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2-Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Changes to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.19 to Increase Diesel Generator E Minimum Steady State Frequency (TAC Nos. ME9609 and ME961 0),"

dated February 22, 2013. PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL) submitted a proposed amendment to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.19 in Reference 1. On February 22, 2013, the NRC requested additional information (RAI) via Reference 2. Enclosure 1 to this letter contains PPL's response to the RAI. Enclosure 2 contains PPL calculation EC-024-1014, "Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Frequency Acceptance Limits of 60 +/- 1.2 Hz," which is referenced in the RAI responses. There are no new commitments contained in this letter. Please direct any questions or requests for additional information to Mr. Duane L. Filchner at (610)774-7819. Document Control Desk PLA-6998 I declare under penalty of pe1jury that the foregoing is true and correct. /~ Y40 J.~~anke - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information - Calculation EC-024-1014, "Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Frequency Acceptance Limits of 60 +/- 1.2 Hz Copy: Mr. W. M. Dean, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. P. W. Finney, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. J. A. Whited, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. J. Winker, PA DEP/BRP to PLA-6998 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information to PLA-6998 Page 1 of5 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information NRC QUESTION 1: Explain why the steady state frequency requirements in SR 3.8.1.7, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.20 are not considered applicable for demonstrating that the DG will perform its intended safety functions. The staff recognizes that some surveillances with DG in droop mode require manual actions to achieve the required parameters. PPL RESPONSE: Reference 1 submitted the proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) to SR 3.8.1.19. This LAR is based on an issue that resulted in NRC findings at other nuclear power plants. The findings identified a potential violation in which the DG frequency could dip below 57 Hz if the DG is operating at the lower end of allowable frequency range. The LAR proposes to increase the minimum steady state frequency for SR 3.8.1.19 as it pertains to Diesel Generator "E (DG-E) only. The steady state frequency requirements in SRs 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15 and 3.8.1.20 are not applicable to demonstrate that the DG's will perform their safety function described in SR 3.8.1.19. Each of the SR's listed above tests a portion of the DG safety function and therefore each of these SR's is less challenging than SR 3.8.1.19, which demonstrates the DG capability to start and run to provide power to connected loads under simulated design basis accident conditions of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Specifically: SR 3.8.1. 7 is a monthly operability surveillance perfmmed with the DG in test mode to ensure its capability of starting from standby conditions and achieves proper voltage and frequency within the allowable timeframe. As the diesel is operated in droop mode, the frequency of the engine is fixed to the frequency of its connected offsite source. The grid frequency is typically steady at 60 Hz and an offsite source steady state frequency at 58.8 Hz would be an indication of grid power quality issues, which would prevent performance of the DG surveillance test. SR 3.8.1.11 is a bi-annual surveillance, which demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source (LOOP). This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including the shedding of nonessential loads and energization of the ESS buses and respective 4.16 kV loads from the DG. The DG autostarts in the emergency (isochronous) mode with its output frequency fixed by the electronic governor to a preset value of 60 Hz. The largest load to PLA-6998 Page2 ofS connected by the DG under this surveillance would be its aligned ESW pump motor, which starts after the DG has reached steady state operation. SR 3.8.1.12 is the LOCA scenario where the DG is started in the isochronous mode to demonstrate that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (10 seconds) from the design basis LOCA actuation signal and operates for>= 5 minutes. It also ensures that permanently connected loads and the emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on a LOCA signal, without a LOOP. There are no additional loads required to be added to DG-E. The DG frequency regulation will be performed by the electronic govemor. Since Offsite power is available, the diesel will remain running unloaded until it is secured. SR 3.8.1.15 is a bi-annual surveillance performed with the DG operating in test (droop) mode. This test demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from full load temperatures, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. SR 3.8.1.20 is decennial surveillance in which all four DGs are started in test (droop) mode. It demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised and that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. NRC QUESTION 2: Provide excerpts from the calculation [verifying that] with the DGs operating at the lower end of the allowable frequency and voltage ranges, the flow requirements of emergency safety feature (ESF) pumps are not adversely impacted and the shift in operating point of induction motors does not impact DG loading. PPL RESPONSE: The enclosure contains calculation EC-024-1014, Rev. 3, "Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Acceptance Limits of 60 +/- 1.2 Hz." Following is an excerpt from Section 6.4 -Induction Motors, which addresses the flow requirements of ESF pumps. The effects of a 2% speed reduction on the driven load depends on the type of mechanical load being driven. Some examples are discussed below. Pumps -pump discharge pressures are reduced by approximately 4% and pump flows are reduced by approximately 2%. For Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps (Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray), small reductions in to PLA~6998 Page 3 of5 performance are potentially significant to the LOCA analyses because these analyses use 60 Hz nominal pump flows and pressure near the design values of the pumps. of calculation EC-024~1014, Rev. 3 provides a detailed analysis ofLPCI and Core Spray perfonnance in terms of the LOCA analyses considering a 2% variation in the power supply frequency. also shows that a 2% variation in power supply frequency combined with errors in pressure and flow instmmentation result in total ECCS pump flow uncertainties between 5.2% and 7.4% for the various LOCA scenarios; however, this is acceptable due to the inherent conservatism of the Appendix K LOCA analysis in terms of calculating peak cladding temperatures. of calculation EC-024-1014, Rev. 3, provides an excerpt of the calculation, titled "Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components. Specifically, Section III, C, 3 - RHR and Core Spray Pumps states the following: "The need to account for the impacts of uncertainties in ECCS flow~rates, which are induced by a 2% reduction in diesel speed, in the SSES LOCA analysis is addressed in an engineering position paper which has been prepared by the Nuclear Fuels Group. It has been concluded that NRC regulations do not explicitly require an analytical allowance for diesel generator frequency uncertainties in Appendix "K" methods. In addition, these methodologies, which are used for the SSES LOCA analysis, are conservative and consistent with the NRC's current expectations. Hence, the inclusion of such allowance is not needed to assure the health and safety of the public." The shift in operating point of induction motors does not impact DG loading because: "The minimum operating frequency for induction motors is also related to the maximum allowable volts per hertz ratio which affects the magnetizing cutTents and losses. Decreasing the frequency by 2% has the same effect as increasing the voltage by 2% in terms of magnetizing cunent and losses. NEMA Standard MG-2 (EC~024~1014, Rev. 3, ) allows a frequency variation of up to 5% provided the arithmetic sum of the frequency variation and the voltage variation does not exceed 10%. This is very conservative. A 2% frequency reduction reduces the synchronous speed by 2% and causes induction motors to run 2% slower, reducing the mechanical load and the load current of the motor; therefore, the increase in magnetizing losses at the lower frequency is offset by a reduction in the load current losses at the slower speed."

NRC QUESTION 3: to PLA-6998 Page 4 of5 Provide excerpts from the calculation [verifying that] motor-operated valve performance (in accident analyses) is not adversely impacted at the lower end of the steady state TS allowable frequency range coupled with the fl*equency and voltage variations experienced during load sequencing. PPL RESPONSE: contains calculation EC-024-1014, Rev. 3, "Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Acceptance Limits of 60 +/- 1.2 Hz. Following is an excerpt from Section 6.4 -Induction Motors, which addresses the speed-torque characteristics of motor operated valves. The effects of a 2% speed reduction on the driven load depend on the type of mechanical load being driven. Some examples are discussed below. Motor Operated Valves-Since the speed-torque characteristic of a typical MOV induction motor at the operating point is relatively flat compared to pump or fan motors, both voltage and frequency affect motor speed for a given load torque. Reducing the frequency decreases the synchronous speed, however, this is offset by a slight increase in torque due to higher magnetizing cutTent and magnetic flux at the higher volts per hertz ratio. Therefore, MOV stroke times are increased by somewhat less than 2%. Maintenance Technology-Valve Team prepared the following assessment of increasing MOV stroke times by 2%: "Increasing valve stroke times by 2% would have no adverse impact on the valve's ability to change position within its accident analysis limits (Tech Spec or FSAR). Of the 52 MOV s affected, 31 have IST limits, which are at least 2% below the FSAR/Tech Spec limit thereby insuring that the accident analysis limit is not exceeded. For the remaining 21 MOVs theIST limit is the same as the FSAR/Tech Spec limit. A review of the most recent stroke times for the MOV s revealed a greater than 2% margin between the actual stroke time and the accident analysis limit hence no concern exists."

NRC QUESTION 4: to PLA-6998 Page 5 ofS Provide excerpts from the calculation [verifying that] with the DGs operating at the upper end of the allowable frequency range the speed change in ESF motors does not increase the DG loading such that the postulated accident loading exceeds the TS SRs. PPL RESPONSE: contains calculation EC-024-1014, Rev. 3, "Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Acceptance Limits of 60 +1-1.2 Hz. Section 2 of the calculation concludes that the electrical and mechanical equipment driven by the DG are capable of perfotming their required functions at a power supply frequency between 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz. This provides the justification for the acceptance criteria incorporated into the TS SRs. Following is an excerpt from Section 6.4 -Induction Motors, which addresses DG operation at the upper end of the frequency range. A 2% increase in the power supply frequency increases the speeds of driven loads by approximately 2%. This does not decrease the ability of these loads to perform their required functions. In general, horsepower is proportional to the cube of the speed of the driven load; therefore, a 2% increase in frequency results in approximately a 6% increase in the horsepower load on the motors. Induction motors are generally sized to equal or exceed the nominal horsepower of the driven loads." With the exception of RHR and Core Spray pumps, induction motors at SSES were specified to have a service factor of 1.15; therefore, these motors are not overloaded for a 2% increase in frequency. See Attachment 3 ofEC-024-1014, Rev. 3 for discussion pertaining to RHR and Core Spray pump motors. to PLA-6998 Calculation EC-024-1014 Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Frequency Acceptance Limits of 60 +/- 1.2 Hz

)>2. 1YPE:

• )>5. UNIT:

NUCLEAR ENGINEERING CALCULATION COVER SHEET NEPM-QA-0221-1 CALC >3. NUMBER: EC*D24*1014 0

• >6. QUALI1Y CLASS:

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1. Page 1 of 46 Total Pa es 49

)>4. REVISION; 3 ------ >7. DESCRIPTION: Justification for ITS Diesel Generator Frequency Acceptance limits of60 +/-1.2 Hz

8. SUPERSEDED BY:

9. Alternate Number:

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10. Cycle: _N~/~A'--------

11. Computer Code/Model used:

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12. Discipline:

E > 13. Are any results of this calculation described fn the Licensing Documents? 0 Yes, Refer to NDAP-QA-0730 and NDAP-QA-0731 [8J No > 14. Is this calculation changing any method of evaluation described in the FSAR and using the results to support or change the FSAR? (Refer to PPL Resource Manual for definition of FSAR) 0 Yes, 50.59 'screen or evaluation required. t8l No )> 15. Is this calculation Prepared by an External Organization? 0 Yes t8l No EG771 Qualifications may not be required for individuals from external organizations (see Section 7.4.3). >16. Prepared bi: Amanda a Allen Ptint Name{EG771 Qualification Required) >17. Reviewed by1: > 18. Verified by: >19. Approved by: Print Name (Qualified per NEPM*QA-0241 Signature and comply with Seclion 7.8 ofNEPM-QA*0221) >20. Accepted by: ...-::N::-+-:~----:-==:-:--=--:::=----:-:---=-~-:------=-:---:--------=-~----l Print Name(EG771 Qualification Required Signature Date 1For Fire Protection related calculations see Section 7.4.3.n for additional qualification requirements. ADD A NEW COVER PAGE FOR EACH REVISION FORM NEPM-QA-0221-1, Rev. 11, Page 1 of 1 (Electronic Form}

• Verified Fields

)> REQUIRED FIELDS

Page 1a REVISION NO: Revised Pages 1 1a 1b 2 CALCULATION REVISION DESCRIPTION SHEET 3 NEPM-QA-0221-2 CALCULATION NUMBER: EC-024-1014 0 FULL REVISION 0 SUPERSEDED 0 VOIDED 18] PAGE FOR PAGE A R R Description d p m d I v of Revision on the Listed Pages 0 [gJ 0 Replace - Place previous revision coversheet in,Backup 0 [gJ .o Replace - Place previous revision page 1 a in Backup D [gJ D Replace-Place previous revision page 1b in Backup D [gJ D 0 0 0 D D 0 D D D D 0 0 0 o-0 D 0 0 0 o* 0 0 0 0-0 0 D D D 0 0 0 o* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D FORM NEPM-QA-0221*2, Revision 5, Page 1 of 1, ELECTRONIC FORM

Page 1b TECHNICAL CHANGE

SUMMARY

PAGE NEPM-QA-0221-5 Calculation: Number: EC-024"1014 Revision No. 3 This form shall be used to (1) record the Technical Scope of the revision and (2) record the scope of verification if the calculation was verified. It should not be more than one page. Its purpose is to provide summary information to the reviewer, verifier, approver, arid acceptor about the technical purpose of the change. For non-technical revisions, state the purpose or reason for the revision. Scope of Revision: Revision 3 of EC-024"1014 includes reference to Technical Specification LDCN's 4972, 4973, 4974 and 4975, which propose an increase in the minimum steady state frequency for Diesel Generator E for the LOCAILOOP surveillance (SR 3.8.1.19) only. The.change was requested in order to prevent a possible FSAR violation of the 57 Hz minimum transient frequency during the starting of an RHR pump motor. Reference EWR 1486107, CRA 1391273 and CR 1289723. This addition to the calculation was made for information only, and does not affect the outcome of the calculation. Also, Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.2 was deleted from the References Section on page 2. This SR is labeled as "Not Used" in Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Scope of Verification (If verification applie-s): The verifier shall perform a detailed line-by-line check of the revised sections of the calculation. The verifier shall ensure that the content of the calculation satisfies the purpose, that all required inputs have been identified and approved, that the design approach used and the documents produced appear in an overview sense to be technically acceptable and complete. FORM NEPM-QA-0221-5, Revision 0, Page 1 of 1, ELECTRONIC FORM

EC-024-1014 §9£tf9D 1.0

• Purpose a.n.4 Scope

'-l*~ Page2of)8' 'B:rF 'i/z.s}1z. Improved Tach11lcaf Speclflcations (Refarei')C(l 3.1) Incorporates eo Hl :1:2% as the acceptance crlterlon for the steady..stata dles(IJ generator fteqt.lency for th9 diesel genet.ttor suNelllanee requirements. Tha basls tor the acceptance a1tefion Is Reg\\llatory Guide 1.9 Rev 3 Position 0~1.4, requfritlg diesel generator rrequency to ba rastored within 2.% of nominal In less than 60 parcent of each toad-sequence Interval *. for stepload increases and In less than ao percent or esch load-sequence interval for disconnection of tha single latgest' load. The pwpose of this Sbxly l5 to justify the Improved TeChnical SpedflcaUon ~ crit9rfon tor steady-sta~ frequency based on tho abmty tJf th& dl~l genet.rt.orti to aceept load. Reference 3.9 proposes an increase to the minimum steady state frequency for Diesel Generator E for the LOCA!LOOP surveillance (SR 3.8.1.19) from a minimum steady state frequency of 58.8 Hz to 59.3 Hz. This is to prevent a possible fSAR violation of the minimum transient frequency of 57 Hz. This calculation is not affected by this change, because it analyzes the worst-case steady stme frequency tor Diesel Generators A-D (all surveillances) and Diesel Generator E (for all surveutances except the LOCA!l..OOP)*. Sectkm.2.Q-Qgndy§!oM and Reeommandauont Tho results in Section 6.1 through 6.7 demonstrate that etectrlcaJ and mectlan~Q.!t eqlllpment dtfven by emergency dleset generamrs are capable of pefformtna their requitecf functlom at ~ power supply fteqttancy b&WHn 5$.8 HI Md 61.2 Hi fhb pr<Md.es sufficient justification for th& aQCf!lptan!X' Clitefion itleo~tfKt h'lto tha ltn~sd Technical SpecfflcaUons fortha dle.sel gertetatof&l,Jtveil!ance ~uirenumts. ~ §ectfon s.o.. Ref~ 3,1 Unft 1 and Unit 2 lmpi'OVOO Tedmlcal Specifications 8R i.8.42. SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.6.1.15, SR 8.6.~.19, andSR3.9,1.20. 3.2 R~l)ulatory Gtddt) 1.9 Rev 3, M$1ectlon, Oesign, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency otesel Generator Units Used as Class 1 E Onsltt> Electtid!1 Power Sys~ at Nudaar Powet Plants" 3.3 E54, E611 end E119A

• Purchase Specifications fQr VltaJ AC, Computer UPS and SatteJ}fOhargars 3.4 E112
• Putd'lase Spaclticallon tor tnduotlon Motors 3.5 1:117
• P<<rd\\~e Sp0CifidaUon for load Centers 3.e NEMA Standard MG-2-19'17', "Saf(rly Standard for CoostructfQo and Guide for Setectlon, *nwallatlon and Use Qf Eatc Motors Md GeneraloB~

3.7 IEEf/ANSI Standafd C57.12.01*1987. "Standstd General Requitemenl$ for Dry Type DlstribuUon and Power Transformers fncludfng Those with Solid Cast and/or Resin Encapsulated Wlnd!NJ$" 3.8 PL-NF-9B-007(P), *su~ud1anna SES Measurement Un~Ue~ fit Append'PC K LOCA Analyses" 3.9 LDCN's 4972,4973,4974,4975. Proposed Technical Specification Change to Increase MinimumLh steady state Frequency for Diesel Generator E for LOCAA.OOP Surveillance SR 3.8.1.19 ~ ~~~"W\\"_;\\- ~ o.\\\\~~~~ \\~S'-)~tS ~~,_,~ \\"' 3 C"lM\\ \\l~s~.

Section 4.o - Inputs and Assumptions lfl.o Page 3 of)6 Momentary frequency transients during changes in diesel loading are not considered in this Study. Standards and specifications for some equipment types do not have explicit information pertaining to cpntinuous operation at power frequencies other than 60 Hz. For tho!?e cases, this Study uses engineering judgment and qualitative reasoning to evaluate equipment performance with a +/-2% frequency variation. Section 5.0- Method 5.1 - Identify the basic types of plant electrical equipment that are powered by the

• emergency diesel g*enerators.

5.2 - Identify the types of mechanical equipment that are electrically driven by the emergency diesel generators. 5.3 - Describe qualitatively how the power frequency affects* the performance of each type of equipment identified above. 5.4 - Qualitatively evaluate whether a +/-2% change in _diesel generator frequency !is acceptable for the operation of each.equipment type identified above. Section 6.0 - Results 6.1 - Heaters The output from an electric heater depends on the root mean square (RMS) value of the supply voltage and is not affected by the supply frequency. 6.2 - Power Transformers The minimum operating frequency for transformers is limited by magnetizing currents ~and core losses whicli depend on the volts per hertz ratio. The ANSI/IEEE standards (Reference 3.7) do not specify transformer operation at frequencies other than 60 Hz; however, decreasing frequency by 2% has the same effect on the volts per hertz ratio and core losses as increasing the supply voltage by 2%. Since transformers *have a nominal voltage operating range of +/-1.0% at 60 Hz and are loaded by design to 80% or less of their nominal KVA ratings at SSES, it Is reasonable to expect these transformers are able to operate within a frequency.range of*60**Hz-+/-2*% without-overheating from excessive losses within the nominal voltage operating range. 6.3 - Instrument Transformers The above discussion for power transformers also generally applies to potential transformers {PTs), assuming that the electrical burdens are maintained below the volt-amp ratings of the PTs. For current transformers (CTs), operation at a lower frequency reduces the magnitude of the curr~nt where core saturation begins; however, since

~or Information Only J.fft, EC*024-1 014 Page4of% CTs typically operate well below saturation current levels, a 2o/o frequency reduction has a negligible effect on the operation of these devices. 6.4 - Induction Motors -¥;;- The minimum operating frequency for induction l'llotors is also related to the maximum allowable volts per hertz ratio which affects the magnetitlng currents and losses. Decreasing 1he frequency by 2% has the same effect as increasing the voltage by 2% in tenns of magnetizing current and losses. NEMA Standard MG-2 (Reference 3.6) allows a frequency variation of up to 5% provided that the arithmetic sum of the frequency variation and the voltage -variation does not exceed 10%. This is very conservative. A 2% frequency reduction reduces the synchronous speed by 2% and causes induction motors to run 2% slower, reducing the mechanical load and the load current of the motor; therefore, the increase in magnetizing losses at the lower frequency ls offset PY a reduction in the load current losses at the slower speed. The effects of a 2% speed reduction on th~ driven load depend on the type of mechanical load being driven. Some examples are discussed below. Pumps - Pump discharge pressures are reduced by approximately 4o/o and pump flows are reduced by approximately 2%. For ECCS pumps (LPC! and Core Spray}, small reductions In performance are potentially slgnlflcant to the I..OCA analyses because these analyses use 60 H~ nominal pump flows and pressures near the design values of the pumps; therefore, Attachment 1 provides a detailed analysis of LPCl and Core Spray performance in terms of the LOCA analyses considering a 2% variation_ Jn the power supply frequency. shows that a 2% variation In power supply frequency combined wlth errors in pressure and flow instrumenf1.ltion result in total ECCS pump flow uncertainties between 5.2% and 7.4% for the varlous LOCA scenarios; however. thls is acceptable due to the inherent conservatism of the Appendix K LOCA analysis In tetms of calculating peak cladding temperatures. Chillers - The chiller capacity in BTU per hour Is reduced by approximately 2%. This estimate Is based

• on a standard refrigeration cycle yvhere saturated refrigerant vapor is compressed
• by a posltive*displacement pump to a superheated state and is then cooled through a condenser which discharges heat to the environment Saturated liquid from the condenser is bled through a valve at a constant enthalpy to a tower pressure and temperature, and the refrigerant Is then heated through an evaporator which absorbs heat from the process, If the.speed ~f the positive-displacement pump is reduced by 2% the change in enthalpy per pound of refrlgerant passing through the evaporator is essentially the same as at nominal speed; however the refrigerant flow in pounds per second is reduced by approximately 2%. Therefore, the rate of heat absorbed by the evaporator I~ reduced by approXimately 2%.
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For Information Only Lf{? EC-024-1014 Page 5 or,% 41 Fans -Air flow is reduced by approximately 2%. If the fan discharges air through an electric heater, the heated air temperature Is Increased and the heating effect of the air remains essentially unchanged. If the fan fs part of a refrigeration system, the reduction in air ffow is approximately the same as the BTU/hr capacity of the chiller; hence, the chilled air temperature is essentially unchanged but the cooling effect of tha air is reduced by approximately 2%.

• Motor Operated Valves
• Since the speed-torque characteristic of a typical MOV Induction motor at the operating point is relatively flat compared to pump or fan motors, both voltage anrJ frequency affect motor speed for a given load torque.

Reducing the frequency decreases the synchronous speed; however, this Is offset by a slight increase in torque due to higher magnetizing current and magnetic flux at the higher volts per hertz ratio. Therefore, MOV stroke times are increased by somewhat less than 2%. Maintenance Technology -Valve Team prepared the following assessment of increasing MOV stroke times by 2%: "Increasing valve stroke times by 2% would hava no 8dverse impact on the vafw~ ability to change position within its accident analysis limils (Tech Spec or FSAR). Of the 52 MOVs affecled, 31 have 1ST limits which are at least 2% below lhe FSAR!Tech Spec limit.thereby insuring fhaf fh& accident analysis limit is nat exceeded. For the remaining 21 MOVs the 1ST limit is the same as the FSAR/Tech Spec limit. A review of the most recent stroke times for these MOVs revealed a greater than 2% margin between the actual stroke time and the accident ansTJ!$/S limit hence no conaem exists." With the exception of ECCS pumps and MOVs, the effect of a 2% speed reduction on system performance Is Inconsequential because these systems are not typically required to operate continuously at their maximum capabilities. For example, chillers and closed cooling water systems are typically cycled or throttled. A small reduction in performance merely results In changes in the throttle settings or the on/off cycle times. A 2% increase in the power supply frequency increases the speeds of driven loads by approximately 2%. This does not decrease the ability of these loads to perfonn their required functions. In general, horsapow~r is proportional to the cube of the speed of the driven load; therefore, a 2% increase In frequency results In approximately a 6%

• increase in the horsepower load on the motors. Induction motors are generally si2:ed to lA\\.

equal or exceed the nominal horsepower of the driven loads. Per Reference 3.4, 7E:' \\ induction motors at SSES were specified to have a service factor of 1.15; therefore, these motors are not overloaded for a 2% increase in frequency. Detailed evaluations of specific safety-related plant systems and components are presented In At1achment 2 of thls study. ¥.. r-~~ R \\\\-"it. ~ <S:.'" o::.. $.~Y.~ ~ ~ '-> * ~ 'h \\.,. ~>~ ~ ~ S~ P. ~ \\/h. I.e.) s~~ ~-tt'~t:..~ N\\~~ ~... l

t.f(o EC-024-1014 Page6of_;3{5 6.5 - Relays and Solenoid Devh:;:es For electromechanical relays, a 2% decrease in frequency has roughly the same effect as a 2% increase in voltage, since the magnetizing current and the magnetic flux are approximately proportional to the volts per hertz ratio. For over-and under-voltage relays, reducing the frequency by 2% is therefore roughly equivalent to decreasing the voltage setpoint by 2%. Increasing the frequency by 2% is roughly equivalent to increasing the voltage setpoint by 2%. Electromechanical relays are not typically used where high precision is required. For A.C.. solenoids, a 2% reduction in frequency increases the volts per hertz ratio thereby decreasing the minimum pickup voltage. This imprqves the low-voltage performance of solenoids, *although heating losses will increase at full voltage at the lower frequency. Conversely, a 2% increase in frequency increases the minimum pickup voltage; however, since an A.C. solenoid device is typically designed to be fail-safe, the. safety function is performed by de-energizing the solenoid. Th~refore, a 2% frequency variation in either direction should have no adverse consequences on the safety functions of these devices: 6.6 - Electronic Devices, Electronic voltage relays operate by measuring peal< v_oltage values; therefore, these relays are relatively insensitive to the fundamental frequency. For relays equipped with harmonic filters, the peak voltage measurements should not be affected by a 2% change in frequency because these filters only attenuate frequencies approaching 120 Hz. In cases where power quality (i.e., frequency, voltage, harmonics), could.affect th*e performance of electronic devices such as instruments and computers, these device:s are supplied either by D.C. power supplies or uninterruptib!e A1C. power supplies (UPS). A UPS rectifies the A.C. supply voltage to D.C. voltage and the D.C. voltage is then electronically inverted into a high-;quality, regulated 60 Hz output. The SSES purchase specifications for Vital AC, Computer UPS and Battery Chargers {Reference 3.3) all specify an input power frequency range of 60Hz+/- 5%; therefore a 2% variation in frequency does not affect *performance characteristics of these devices.

6. 7 - Circuit Breakers Thermally-operated circuit breakers are unaffected by the power frequency, since these breakers are actuated by the heating effect' of the overtoad current on the *eutectic or bimetal device that operates the breaker. The. heating effect.depends.on the root mean square (RMS) value of the current and is not affected by the frequency.

Magnetic circuit breakers are unaffected by the power frequency, since magnetic breakers are actuated by magnetic forces produced by the overload current. These forces depend only on the magnitude of the overload current and not on the frequency. Therefore, the tripping characteristics of circuit breakers are not affected by a +/-2% frequency variation.

lf(t, Page 7 o!% EC-024-1014 LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses The uncertainties induced by instrumentation inaccuracies during surveillance testing, as well as the uncertainty which results from the potential for a reduced emergency diesel generator speed will be estimated. Since there is an equal probability that these uncertainties could result in a conservatively high flow, it is acceptable to combine them via the Square Root of the Sum of the Squares (SRSS) method provided they are statistically independent. To allow for a comparison of the magnitude of these uncertainties, they will be described in terms of flow (GPM). In adqition, where statistically allowable, the terms will be combined via the SRSS method, and then described in terms of a percentage of the total flow. The Core Spray flow uncertainties_ for one loop and two loop accid~nt scenarios will be determined. For LPCI, the flow uncertainties for the ~allowing accident cases will be determined: 1) a single pump in one loop; 2) a single pump in ef;lch loop; 3) two pumps in one loop; and 4) two pumps in two loops. Finally, the uncertainties will be determined for the most limiting Design Basis LOCA scenarios identified in Table 6.3*5 of the FSAR I} CORE SPRAY a) Assumptions /Inputs With respect to pump quarterly flow surveillance testing: (Ia)

1) The Technical Specification surveillance requirement for a loop of Core*Spray is 6350 GPM a~ a pump discharge pressure of 269/282 PSI for Unit 112.<2>

2) The overall accuracy of the flow and pressure readings obtained during

• quarterly pump surveillance testing is 2%. (3-s>

3) During Core Spray loop surveillance testing, the discharge pressure is read from PI-E21~1(2}R6DOA/B~

1 > or computer point NSPD01/2Z, which have a full scale range of 0 ~ 500 Psl<6>.

4) During surveillance testing, the loop flow is read from FI-E21-1(2)R601A/B<1> or NSFOD1/2Z which have a full scale range of 0-10,000 GPM<6>.

5) The pump test conditions are assumed to be 75°F, which corresponds to.4324 PSI per FT of pump head(1), or 2.313 FT per PSI.

6) The points on the Core Spray' Unit 2 system flow vs. pump head curves which will be used in this evaluation are obtained from Reference 8 and are: 6000 GPM@ 665 FT~TDH, and the test point of 6350 GPM@ 644 FT~TDH.

With respect to emergency diesel generator diesel testing: <9-10>

7) The assumed Technical Specification surveillance re~uirement for steady state diesel generator speed is 60Hz+/~ 2 %, or 58.8 Hz.t 11

~ Page 8 o!}6"" EC-024-1014 LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty 'in the LOCA Analyses

8) Th,e overall accuracy of the frequency measurement during diesel generator testing is 0.5%.<8) b) Flow Uncertainty During Pump (i.e., Loop) Testing During testing, the actual loop flow could be less than the indication on FI-E21-1(2)R601A/B, which has a full scale range of 0- 10,000 GPM. Per Input #2 the accuracy of the instrument is 2% of full scale. Therefore, the uncertainty induced due to flow instrumentation accuracy is:

crcs,Fiow =.02 x 10,000 = 200 GPM c) Discharge Pressure Uncertainty During Pump (i.e., Loop) Testing During testing, the actual loop flow could be less than the indication on Pl-E21-1(2)R600A/B, which has a full scale range of 0 - 500 PSI. Per Input #2 the accuracy of the instrument is 2% of full scale. Therefore, the actual pressure could

• be 10 PSI (.02 x 500} less than indicated. Per Input #5 above, this corresponds to approximately: 10 PSt
• 2.313 FT/PSl = 23FT of pump head.

From Reference 8 and per Input #6 above, *the slope of the Core $pray systern flow vs. pump head at the test flow of 6350 GPM (3175 GPM per pump) is (6000'- 6350) I (665-644) = -16.7 GPM/FT. Therefore, the equivalent reduction in flow corresponding to a 23 FT reduction in 1'\\ead Is: O"CS,Prass = 16.7 GPM/f:+ X 23 f+ = 384 GPM d) Uncertainty Due To The Potential For Lower Diesel Speed Per Input #7 above, the minimum allowable steady state diesel speed assumed for this evaluation is 60 Hz +/- 2%. In addition,.a's the result of instrumentation accuracies, the actual speed could be 0.5% less than the indicated reading. Since the minimum allowable speed and the measurement uncertainty are independent, as well as the fact that there is an equal probability that these factors could result in a conservatively high spe.ed, they can be combined via th!'l SRSS method. Therefore, the minimum expected diesel speed is: SPEEDLow = Since 1 00% diesel speed corresponds to 60 Hz, the minimum diesel speed . expressed in terms of Hertz is: MIN SPEEDHertz = 60 - (.0206

• 60)

= 58.76 Hz Jf(p Page 9 ofjr EC-024-1014 LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses Per Reference 8, and Input #6 above, the point on the Core Spray head vs. system flow curve which is verified via the Unit 2 surveillance testing is: 6350 GPM {3175 GPM per pump) @ a pump total developed head of about 644 FT. In addition, another point on the curve which will be used for this evaluation is: 6000 GPM (3000 GPM per pump)@ 665 FT-TDH. Applying the pump affinity laws (Ref. *.

13) to these points yields new operating points on an "adjusted curve" as follows:

For the operating point of 6000 GPM@ 665 FT-TDH: Osa.76Hz = 060Hz * [ 58.76/60] 6000 * [ 58.76/60 1 = 5876 GPM Hss.76Hz = . '2 HaoHz * [ 58.76160 J = 665 * [ 58.76/60 f 638 FT And for the test point of 6350 GPM @ 644 FT-TDH: Oss.76Hz OsoHz * [ 58.76 (60] = 6350* * [ 58.76 f 601 = 6219 GPM Hss.7GHz = HsoHz * [ 56.76 /60 ]2 = 644,. [ 58.76/60 ]2 = 617 'FT Since tlie potential reduction* in pump speed would result in a reduction of bot_h pump head, and puinp flow, both of these factors must _be accounted for in estimating the overall effect on flow. This overall reduction in flow *will be estimated as the point where the "adjusted curve" (i.e., adjusted for a supply frequency of 58.76 Hz) crosses the original test head of 644FT.

• The "adjusted" points calculated abovlil will be applied to the Point-Slope Form of the Straight-Line Equation to determine the slope of the "adjusted" head vs.

system flow curve: m = (Yz-Y1) I (X2

• X1} = (638
• 617/5876-6219)

= -0.0612 FT/GPM The point where the adjusted curve passes through the head verified by the surveillance tes~ing (i.e., 644 FT) is estimated by applying the straight line equation, and using the: 1) the slope of the adjusted curve (m); _2) the original test point, as adjusted for the reduction in speed (6219 GPM@ 617FT); and, 3) the original test head of 644 FT: Where m = -0.0612 FT/GPM (X11 Y1} = {6219, 617) {The original test point of test point of 6350 GPM @ 644 FT as adjusted for a reduced pump speed)

• EC-024~1014 Page 10of~

LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses (X2 approximates the point where the "adjusted" curve ~;~asses through 644 FT) Therefore: 644 - 617 = -0.0612 * <X2. - 6219) X2 = (644 - 617} /-0.0612 + 6219 = 5778 The overall reduction in loop flow corresponding to the potential for a lower speed is therefore: CSREDVCT*LOOP = 6350 - 5778 = 572 GPM per loop And: OcsPump,Speed = 572 i2 = 286 GPM per pump Note that the reduction in !oop flow (572 'GPM} would represent the uncertainty for a loop of Core Spray if both pump~ were powered from the same diesel. However, since the pumps are powered from separate, independent diesels, the SR~S method can be applied to the uncertainty for

• a single pump (286 GPM}.to determine the true uncertainty for a loop of Core Spray due to the potential fori a lower diesel speed: Therefore:.

= [( )2 + ( )2] 1/2 crcsLoop,Spood crcsPump,Speed crcsPump,Spood O'CSLoop,Speecl = 404 GPM e) Combined Core Spray Uncertainties Core Spray Single Looe Uncertainty (A orB Loop) As previously identified, since the uncertainties due to pressure, flow and speed are. independent, they can. be combined via the SRSS method. Therefore: UNCERT CS-1loop = [(acs,Fiovi + {acs,Presi + (acsLoop,speeit 12 UNCERT CS*1.Loop = 592 GPM Since a loop of Core Spray is rated for, and tested to a flow of 6350 GPM, this uncertainty can be described in terms of a percentage: UNCERT%cs-1Loop

=

592 /6350

tf(p EC~024-1014 Page 11 of~, LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Unc~rtainty in the LOCA Analyses Core Spray Two Loop Uncertainty {A and B Loops} For the two' loop case, it is reiterated that each pump is powered from a separate diesel. In addition, since each loop is completely separate, with independent flow and pressure *test instrumentation, the "A" loop and "B" the loop uncertainties are likewise independent, and can therefore be combined via the SRSS method: UNCERTcs-2Loops = [(UNCERTcs-1Loop)2 + (UNCERTcs-1Loo1ll112 UNCERTcs-2Loops = [(592} 2 + (592}2] 112 = 837 GPM The combined flow of both loops of Core Spray is 12,700 GPM (6350 x 2). Therefore, the two loop uncertainty, in terms of a percentage, is: UNCERT%cs4toops = 837/12,700 6.6 % II) RHR a} Assumptions /Inputs With respect to pump quarterly flow surveill~nce testing: Ob>

1) The Technical Specification surveillance requirement for. an RHR pump is 12,200 GPM at a pump discharge pressure Qf 204/222 PSI for Unit 1/2.(2)

2) The overall accuracy of the flow and pressure readings obtained during quarterly pump surveillance testing is 2%.P-5>*

3) During RHR pump surveillance testing, the discharge pressure is read from PI- :

• E 11-1 (2}R600A/B/C/D(1b), which ha& a full scale range of 0
• 600 PS!<6>.

4) buring surveillance testing, the pump flow is read from FR:E11*1 (2)R608<1> or FI-E11-1(2)R603A/B, which have a full scale range of 0 ~ 30,000 GPM<6>.

5) The pump test conditions are assumed to be 75°F, which corresponds to.4324 PSI per FT of pump h_ead(7}, or 2.313 FT per PSI.

6) The points on the pump curve which is verified via Unit 2 testing which will be

• used in this evaluation are obtained from Reference 12 and are: 12,000 GPM

@ 502 FT-TDH, and the test point of 12,200 GPM@ 492 FT-TDH. With respect to ~mergency diesel generator diesel testing: {9-lO}

7) The assumed Technical Specification surveillance re~uirement for steady state diesel generator speed is 60 Hz +/- 2 %, or 58.8 HzY >

EC-024-1014 14 Page 12 of% LF~Cf and Core ~pray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses

8) The overall accuracy of the frequency measurement during diesel generator testing is 0.5%.<8>

b) Flow Uncertainty During Pump Testing During

• testing, the actual loop flow could be less than the indication on FR-E11-1(2)R608 or FI-E11-1(2)R603A/B, which have a full scale range of 0 - 30,000 GPM. Per Input #2 the accuracy of these instruments is 2.% of full scale. Therefore, the uncertainty induced due to flow instrumentation accuracy is:

0RHR,Flow =.02 X 30,000 = 600 GPM c) Discharge Pressure Uncertainty During Pump Testing During testing, the actual loop flow could be less than the Indication on PI-E11-1(2)R600A/B/C/D, which has a full scale range of 0-600 PSI. Per Input #2 the accuracy of the instrument is 2% of full scale. Therefore, the actual pressure could be 12 PSI (.02 x 600) less than indicated. Per Input #5 above, this corresponds to approximately: 12 PSf

• 2.313 FT/PSl = 28FT of pump head. i From Reference 12 and per.lnput #6 above, the ~lope of the RHR pump curve.. at the test flow of.12,200 GPM {12,000
• 12,200) 1 (502 - 492) = *20 GPM/FT.

Therefore, the equivalent reduction in flow corresponding to a 23 FT re.duction.in head is: 0RHR,Press.= 20 GPM/F+ X 28 H = 560 GPM d) Uncert~inty Due To The Potential For Lower Diesel Speed Per Section 1d above, the minimum expected diesel speed is 58.76 Hz. Per Reference 12 and Input #6 above, the point on the RHR pump curve which is verified via the Unit 2 ~urveillance testing is: 12,200 GPM @ a pump total developed head of about 492FT. In addition, another point on the curve which will be used for this evaluation is: 12,000 GPM@ 502 FT-TDH. Applying the pump affinity laws (Ref. 13) to these points yields new operating points on an "adjusted curve" as follows: For the operating point of 12,000 GPM@ 502 FT*TDH:* Oss.7sHz = OsoHz " [ 58.76/60] = 12,000 " [ 58.76/60] = 11,752 GPM Hss.76Hz = H&oHz * [ 58.76/60 ] 2 = 502 * { 58.76/60 f = 481 FT And for the test point of 12.200 GPM@ 492 FT-TDH:

J-j{p EC~024-1 014 Page 13 of;Mf. LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Unq~rtainty in the LOCA Analyses Q$8.76Hz = Q~OHz * [56.76/60] = 12,200 * {58.76/60] = 11,948 GPM Hss.1sHz = H60Hz * [ 58.76/60 ]2 = 4 92 *. [ 58.76 /60 }2 = 4 72 FT Since the potential reduction in pump speed would result in a reduction of both pump head, and pump flow, both of these factors must be accounted for in estimating the overall effect on flow. This overall reduction in flow will be estimated as the point where the "adjusted curve" (i.e., adjusted for a supply frequency of 58.76 Hz) crosses the original test head of 492FT. The uadjusted" points calculated above will be applied to the Point-Slope Form of the Straight-Line Equation to determine the slope of the "adjustedH head vs. sy~tem flow curve: m = {Y2 - Y1) I (X2-Xt) = (481-472/11,752 -11,948) = -0.0459 FT/GPM The point where the adjusted curve passes through the head verified by the surveillance testing (i.e., ~92 Fn is estimated *by applying the straight liAe equation, and using the: 1) the slope of the adjusted curve (m); 2) the original test point, as adjusted for the reduction in speed (11,948 GPM@ 472 FT); and,. 3) the original test head of 492 FT: Where m

~0.0459 FT/GPM (X1, Y1) = (11948, 472) (The.original test point of test point of 12,200 (Xz, Y~)

{X2, 492) GPM @ 492 FT as adjusted for a reduced pump speed) * (~ approximates the point where the "adjusted>> curve passes through 492 Fn Therefore: 492 - 472 = -0.04~9 * (X2 - 11948) x2 = (492-472)/-0.0459 + 11948 = 11512 The overall reduction in a single pump flow corresponding to the lower pump speed is therefore: O'RHR.Speed = '12,200 - 11,512 = 688 GPM /

EC-024-1014 tl-(o Page 14of)5" LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses e) Combined LPCI Uncertainties LPCI One Pump Uncertainty (1 Pump in 1 Loop) As previously identified, since the single pump uncertainties due to pressure, flow and speed are independent, they can be combined via the SRSS method. Therefore, the single pump uncertainty is: Since a single RHR pump is rated for, and tested to a ~PCI flow of 12,200 GPM, this uncertainty can be described in terms of a percentage: UNCERT%RHR*1Pump = 1071/12,200 = 0.0878 8.8% LPCI Two Pump Uncertainty {1 Pump in Each of 2 Loops) For the two pump case, one pump from each loop is available. Each pump*is powered fro"m an independent diesel, and is-completely separated, with independent flow and pressure test instrumentation. The pump uncertainty for the two pump case (1 P.Ump in each loop) can therefore be calculated ~y applying the SRSS method to the one pump uncertainty: UNCERTRHR*2Pump$ = [{UNCERTRHR*1~ump) 2 + (UNCERTRHR*1Pump)2] 112 UNCERTRHR*2Pumps = [{1071)2 + {1071)2] 112 The combined flow of two pumps, with one in each loop, Is 24,400 GPM. (12,200 x 2). Therefore, the two pump uncertainty, in t~rms of a percentage, is: UNCERT%RHR*2Punlps = 1515/24,400 6.2 % . L~CI One Loop Uncertainty {2 Pumps in the Same Loop) For the one loop case, it is postulated that a single complete loop (i.e., with two pumps) is available. In this case, both pumps are powered from separate. diesels, and tested with separate pressure instrumentation. However, since the same flow instrument is used to test the performance of each pump, this is not an independent variable. Therefore, the uncertainty.due to flow instrumentation must be accounted for separately. Since both diesel' speed and the pressure terms are independent for each pump, these terms may be_ combined for each pump as follows:

EC-024-1014 1-f{o Page 15 b!)6' LPCI and Core Spray Pump flow Unq~rtainty in the LOCA Analyses = 887 GPM This term. is included for each pump, along with the flow uncertainty to determine the total uncertainty for the one loop case as follows: UNCERT RHR-1Loop = [(2 X (887)2} + (2 X 0RHR.Fimi] 112 UNCERT RHR*1Loop = [(887)2 + (887l + (2 X 600)2]112 = 1736 GPM Since a single loop of LPCI is rated for a flow of 21,300 GPM, this uncertainty can be described in terms of a percentage; I UNCERT%RHR-1Loop = 1736/21,300 '8.2 % LPCI Two Loop Uncertainty (4 Pumps: 2 Pumps Available in Both Loopsr For the two loop case, each pump is powered from a separate diesel, and ea9h loop is completely separated, with independent flow and pressure test instrumentation. Hence,. the "A" loop and "B" loop uncertainties are likewise independent, and can therefore be combined via the SRSS method: UNCERT RHR.. 2Lo0ps = 2 2112' [(UNCERTRHR-1Loop) + (UNCERTRHR*1Loop}] = 2455 GPM The combined flow of both loops of LPCI is 42,600 GPM (21,300 x 2). Therefore, the two pump uncertainty, in terms of a percentage, is: UNCERT%RHR-2Loops = 245!;) / 42,600 Ill) DESIGN BASJS LOCA CASES a) Discussion 5.8 % From Sections I.e. and ll.e above, it is seen that the uncertainties for individual Core Spray and RHR subsystems range from 5.8% to 9.3%. It Is also seen that wh.en more pumps are considered in *combination, the overall< *uncertainty decreases. The reason for this is that when more than one pump is considered, the mean flows are added and the flow variances are added. However, the total uncertainty in terms of percentage (UNCERT%), equals the total standard deviation (UNCERT) divided by the total flow. Since the standard deviation is the square root of the variance, the root of the variance is divided by the increase flow. This process results in a lower uncertainty when expressed in terms of percentage.

IJ-h Page 16of~ LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses To illustrate, if four identical pumps are considered, the total flow rate is 4 times the flow n3te of one pump and the total variance is 4 times the variance of one pump. However, the total uncertainty percentage (UNCERT%) is total standard deviation (i.e., the square root of variance) the divided by the total flow. Since the standard deviation is the square root of.the variance, this amounts to only 1/2 of the percent uncertainty of each pump. Conversely, with fewer pumps, the. total percent uncertainty will be higher. It follows that higher uncertainties wiil exist for design basis accident scenarios with fewer pumps available. Table 6.3-5 of the FSAR identifies the most limiting Design Basis LOCA break locations along with the most limiting single failures. That table

• also identifies the ECC sub-systems which remain available for these most limiting scenarios. The six cases identified below identify the uncertainties for all of the scenarios identified in that table.

Finally, note that for these cases, the diesel combination which posses the largest affect on uncertainty will be utilized. In practice, if each pump is assumed to be powered by a separate,.. independent diesel, a lower uncertainty will result. However, for this assessment, a diesel/pump lineup which results in the largest uncertainty will be assumed. b) CASE 1 R One Loop Core Spray Loop AND One LPCI Pump Number of Pumps Available: 3 Total Design Rated Flow: 18,550 GPM = (1 x 6350) + (1 x 12,200) Applic<;lble Break I Single Failu:e Scenarios:

• Recirc Discharge I False LOCA Recirc Discharge I Battery (*)

Recirc Discharge_/ Die~el Generator. (*) To conservatively estimate the effects of diesel speed, it will be assumed that the diesel which is supplying one of the Core Spray pumps is also supplying the available RHR pump. Therefore: UNCERT CASE1 = [(crcs,Flow)2 + (crcs,Press)2 + (crRHR,Fiow)2 + (O'RHR,Ptess)2 + (. )2 { )211/2 CI'CSPump,Speed + O'CSPump,Speed + O'RHR,Speed = [(200)2 + (384)2 + (600)2 + {560)2 + (286)2 + (286 + 688)2]112 UNCERTcASE1 = 1375 GPM UNCERT%cASE1 =. 1375/181550-7.4 % {') Note that for the battery and diesel generator failure scenariOs, nD credit is taken for a third Core Spray pump which could be available per FSAR Table 6.3-5. The rated flow orthe 'uncredited' third Core Spray pump (3175 GPM} exceeds the calculated uncertainty of 1375 GPM.

f(o Page 17 o~

LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses c) CASE 2 - One Loop Core Spray Loop AND Two LPCI Pumps (One Per Loop) Number of Pumps Available: 4 Total Design Rated Flow: 30,750 GPM = (1 x 6350) + (2 x 12,200) Applicable Break I Single Failure Scenarios:

• Recirc Suction I False LOCA This case is similar to Case 1 in that a diesel which is supplying* one of the Core Spray pumps is also supplying one of the available RHR pumps. However, in addition, since two RHR pumps in separate and independent divisions are available, it follows that a third diesel must be supplying the second RHR pump.

The uncertainty from Case 1 can therefore be combined via the SRSS method with the uncertainty of a single* RHR pump (UNCERT RHR-1Pump = 1071 'GPM), as calculated in Section JJ.e above.. UNCERTcASE2 = [(UNCERT CASE1)2 + (UNCERT RHR-1Pumi] 112 = [(1375}2 + (1071)2]112 UNCERTcAsE2 = 1743 GPM UNCERT%cASE2 = 1743/30,750 - 5.7 % d) CASE 3 - One Loop Core Spray Loop AND Three LPCI Pumps (One Complete LPCI Loop plus One Pump in Other Loop) Number of Pumps Available: 5 Total Design Rated Flow: 39,850 GPM = (1 x 6350) + (1 x 21,300} + {1 X 12,200) Applicable Break I Single Failure Scenarios:

• Recirc Suction I Battery {*)
• Recirc Suction I Diesel Generator (")

For this case, three diesels are availabie. The most col)servative line-up assumes that the division which powers Core Spray also supplies a complete loop of RHR. In addition, the remaining RHR pump is powered from a diesel in the opposite division. For this configuration, the uncertainty for the single RHR pump is equal to one pump uncertainty (UNCERTRHR-1Pump = 1071 GPM), as calculated in Section ll.e above. The uncertainty due to the complete division of two Core Spray and two LPCI pumps must account for the fact that they are powered from the same pair of diesels. Also, the fact that the RHR pump flow instrumentation uncertainties a*re not independent must be accounted for as previously outlined in the LPCI one loop

lfb EC-024-1014 Page 18of)8"' LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses uncertainty case in Section ll.e above. The uncertainty due to a complete division of Core Spray and LPCI is: UNCERT cs&RHR = [(crcs,FJD',,l + (crcs,Presi + (2 X GRHR,Fiovi + (2X(O'RHR,Prnss) 2 ) + 2 ( )2 112 ( X O'CSPump,Speod + URHR,Speod ] = [{200)2 + (384)2 + (2 X 600)2 + (2 X 560)2 + (2 X (286 + 688)2)] 112 = 2038 GPM .(Note: 2038/ (6350+21300) - 7.4% for a complete ECCS Division) Applying the SRSS method to this uncertainty and the LPCI one pump uncertainty yields: UNCERT CASE:3 = [(UNCERT CS&RHR}2.+ (UNCERT RHR-1Pu~l] 112 = [(2038)2 + {1071)2] 112 UNCERTcAsE:3 = 2302 GPM UNCERT%cAsE3 = 2302 I 39,850 - 5.8* % (') Note thai for these scenarios, no credit ls taken for a third Core Spray pump which could be available per FSAR *

• Table 6,3-5. The rated flow of !he *uncredited' third Core Spray pump (3175 GPM) exceeds the calculated uncerlaloly of 2302 GPM.

e) CASE 4 ~ Two Core Spray Loops Number <;~f Pumps Available:* 4* Total Design Rated Flow: 12,700 GPM = (2 x 6350) Applicable Break I Single Failure Scenarios;

• Recirc Discharge I LPCI Injection Valve The uncertainty for this case is determined in the Core Spray two loop uncertainty case in Section I.e above.

UNCERT CASE4 = UNCERT CS-2Loaps =.837

• GPM UNCERT%cAsE4 =UNCERTo/ocs-2Loaps

= 837/12,700 6.6 %

EC-024-1014 J..flp Page 19of~ LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the.LOCA Analyses f) CASE 5 - Two Core Spray Loops AND One LPCI Loop Number of Pumps Available: 6 Total Design Rated Flow: 34,000 GPM = (2 x 6350) + (1 x 21,300) Applicable Break I Single Failure Scenarios:

• Recirc Suction I LPCilnjection Valve
• Recirc Disch.aige I HPCI Since all four Core Spray pumps are available, all diesels must be in operation. In this configuration, a complete divisional complement of RHR and Core Spray pumps are available, and the opposite loop of Core Spray is likewise available.

The uncertainty due to a complete division of two Core Spray and two LPCI pumps was calculated above in Case 3 and was determined to be: UNCERTcs&RHR = 2038 GPM The uncertainty for the opposite loop of Core Spray is identified as the Core Spr~y single loop uncertainty as determined in Section l,e above: UNCERT cs.1Loop = 592 GPM Applying the SRSS method to these uncertainties yields: UNCERTcASES = [(UNCERTcs&RHR) 2 + (UNCERT cS-2Loops)2] 112 UNCERT CASE~ = 2123 GPM UNCERT%cAsE6 = 2123 I 34,000 - 6.2 %

Jfltf EC-024-1014 Page20of¥ LPCI and Core Spray Pump flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses g) CASE 6 - Two Core Spray Loops AND Two LPCI Loops Number of Pumps Available: 8 IV} Total Design Rated Flow: 55,300 GPM = (2 x 6350) + (2 x 21,300) Applicable Break I Single Failure Scenarios:

• Recirc Suction I HPCI In this case, all low pressure ECC subsystems in both divisions are available. The uncertainty due to a complete division of two Core Spray and two LPCI pumps was calculated above in Case 3 and was determined to be:

UNCERT CS&RHR = 2038 GPM Applying the SRSS method to account for both separate,. independent divisions yields: UNCERT CASE6 = [(UNCERT CS&RHR)2 + (UNCERT CS&RHR)2t 12 = [(203Bf + (2038)2] 112 UNCERTcA~es = 2882 GPM UNCERT%cAses = 2882/55,300,., 5.2 % CONCLUSIONS The following table summarizes the rated flows for the available RHR and Core Spray systems, along ~ith the associated uncertainties for the most limiting SSES Design Basis Accident scenarios: * "'Single Failure I Recirc Suctiph Recirc Discharge Break-+ Fal~e LOCA 30,750 GPM I 5.7% 18,550 GPM I 7.4% Battery 39,850 GPM I 5.8 % 18,55~ GPM I 7.4% (*} (") . LPCIInjection Valve 34,000 GPM I 6.2 % 12,700 GPM I 6.6% Diesel Generator 39,850 GPM I *s:s-%. '18;550 'GPM I 7.4% (*) (*) HPCI 55,300 GPM I 5.2 % 34,000 GPM I 6.2 % (') Note that for the battery and diesel generator failure scenarios, no credH Is taken for a third Core Spray pump which could be available per FSAR Table 6.3-5. For these cases, the rated flow of the *unoredited" third Core Spray pump (3175 GPM) exceeds the calculated uncertainties.

tf{p EC-024-1014 Page 21 of )f¥ LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses V) REFERENCES 1a) S0-151-A02, Rev. 2, S0-151-802, Rev. 2, S0-25t-A02, Rev. 2, S0-251-802, Rev. 2, "Quarterly Core Spray Flow Verification - Division I {ll)" 1b) S0-149-A02, Rev. 1, S0-149-802, Rev.1, S0-249-A02,* Rev. 1 S0-249-802, Rev. 1, "Quarterly RHR Flow Verification-Division I (II}"

2) SSES Current technical Specification (CTS) 4.5.1.b.1 & 4.5.1.b.2 - Emergency Core Cooling Systems Surveillance Requirements (Core Spray & RHR)

3) NDAP-QA-0423, Rev. 6, "Station Pump and Valve Testing Program"

4) ISI-T-100.0, Rev. 15 & ISI-T-200.0, Rev. 12, "lnService Inspection Program Plan For Pump and Valve Operational Testing" 5} ASME OMa-.1988, Parts*a & 10

6) SSES Nuclear Information Management System Database (NIMS)

7) Crane Technical Paper No. 410, "Flow of Fluidsu, 21st Printing, 1982

8) EC-051-1006, Rev. 0, "Core Spray System: Determination of Pump Flow at Reduced Emergency Diesel Generator Speeds and Determination of Pump Discharge Test Pressure"

9) SE-124-107, Rev. 8 & SE-224-107, Rev. 5, "18 Month Diesel Generator'A' and 'C' (or 'E'} Auto Start and ESS Buses 1(2)A and 1(2)C Energization on Loss Of Offsite Power with a LOCA *.. Plant Shutdown"

10) SEw124-207, Rev. 9 & SE-224w207, Rev. 5, "18 Month Diesel Generator 'B' and '0' (or 'E') Auto Start and ESS Buses 1(2)B and 1(2)0 Energizatron on Loss Of Offsite Power with a LOCA - Plant Shutdown

11) SSES Improved Technical Specification (ITS) SR 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.9, & 3.8.1.11 -

Electrical Power SystemA Surveillance Requirements

12) EC-049-102S, Rev. 0 (Draft), "RHR System: Determination of LPCI Pump Flow at Reduced Emergency Diesel Generator Speeds and Determination of pump Discharge Test Pressure"

13) Cameron Hydraulic Data, Ingersoll-Rand Inc., 17th Edition, 1st Printing

14) FF126510, Sheet 3101, Rev. 1, "Report of Performance Test for Pump SIN 107383" (Core Spray w 2P206C)

Jf-{p EC-024-1014 Page22 of% LPCI and Core Spray Pump Flow Uncertainty in the LOCA Analyses

15) FF124510, Sheet 5301, Rev. 0, "Report of Performance Test for Pump SIN 0573314"

• (RHR - 2P202C) 1~) "Radiation Detection and Measuremenr, Knoll, Glenn F., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1979

4-fp Page23of~ EC-024~ 1 014 Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components I) DISCUSSION With the implementation of Improved Technical Specifications (ITS), the allowable steady state operating frequency band for the emergency diesel generators is 58.8 Hz (60 +/- 1.2 Hz)<1>. The purpose of this licensing requirement {i.e., a 2% allowance band on diesel generator speed) is to assure that on-site emergency power is of an adequate quality, such that proper operation of electrical devices, such as relays, transformers, solenoids, etc., is assured. However, it is PP&L's position that this 2% speed tolerance need not be considered as a penally in evaluating the performance of mechanical equipmenVsystems such as pumps, fans, compressors, etc. As the result of conservative "over-design" margins which are inherent in nuclear power plant components and systems, a 2% increase in speed would not impose excessive stresses, nor cause unusual wear and tear" on equipment during accident periods. Further, the relative.ly modest shortcomings in equipment performance which would result from a 2% decrease in power supply frequency are offset by the inherent conservatism of SSES licensing and design basis evalua.tions. In addition, The uncertainties in equipment performance, which are induced by the potential for a 2% reduction in the power supply frequency, are accounted for oy conservative assun1Ptions and methodologies which are mandated by regulatory analytical practices. II) PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a qualitative assessment addressing the impact on (the performance of) large mechanical components/systems. which results from a potential2% reduction in diesel speed (and heoce a lower power supply frequency}. it wiil be demonstrated that this potential either: 1) does not in any way impact syst~r,n operation; or, 2) does* not adversely affect the system/component capability to satisfactorily perform its design intended function. Hence, the potential for a 2% lower diesel power *supply frequency imposes no implications to plant safety. Ill) EVALUATION In the vast majority of cases, the actual uncertainty of equipment performance which is induced by the subject allowance band in diesel generator frequency is actually less than 2%. This is due to the fact that for any given diesel, there is an equal probability that diesel speed (and hence the speed of rotating equipment) could be conservatively high. Since most safety-related systems contain redundant, 100% capacity components which serve the same function, the overall uncertainty induced by the potential for lower speed decreases so long as each component is supplied by a separate diesel. For example, if two identical pumps are considered, the total flow rate is 2 times the mean flow rate and the total variance is 2 times the variance of one pump. However, the total uncertainty, in terms of percentage, is the total standard deviation (i.e., the square root of variance) divided by the total flow. Since the standard deviation is the square root of the

variance, the uncertainty associated with the 2%

allowance band is [2% X (SQRT(2})/2] = [2%" X (1.41/2)] = [2% X (0.71)J = 1.42 o/o.

Page24o~

• EC~024-1014 Effects of 2% Frequency Vari~tion on Plarit Systems and Components Therefore, the actual expepted reduction in flow would be less than 2%. Similarly, the associated uncertainty is [2% x (SQRT(3))/3] =1.16% if"three pumps are considered and the associated uncertainty is [2% x (SQRT(4))/4] = 1.0% if four pumps are considered.

The uncertainty in performance for most safety related, redundant systems will therefore be less than 2%. Nonetheless, the evaluation below will assess the effects of a full 2% reduction in diesel* speed on large mechanical components and systems. A) Reactivity Control

1) Control Rod Drives The CRD system pumps are not required for the emergency SCRAM function.. The motive force for the rapid insertion of the control rod drives is provided via stored hydraulic/pneumatic energy (i.e., CRD accumulators) and the reactor vessel pressure itself. Hence, the ability for the CRD system to execute a SCRAM is unaffected by a 2% reduction in diesel speed. *

2)

• SBLC Pumps During an A TWS, two SBLC pum*ps would be initiated to inject sodium-pentaborate into*

the vessel~ Since two independent pumps would be in op'eration and powered by separate diesels,, the uncertainty in equipment performance associated with the 2% ailowance band is actually 1.42 %. The SBLC pumps are positive displacement pumps and their discharge :head characteristics would not be affected by a reduction in pump speed, but a proportional reduction in fiOYf would occur. However, the potential for a slight reduction in diesel supply frequency is not seen to impact the conclusions of the SSES A TWS analysis<3> for several reasons. First, the SSES administrative concentration of sodium pentabo*r~te is maintained higher than that required by Technical Specifications. While the Tech Spec allowable concentration ranges from 13.4% to-12.6% (by weight),<~ the minimum administrative concentratiory is 13.6%.< 25 26> Hence, the actual concentration of the solution injected is at least 1.5% higher than that required in Tech Specs. Although the SBLC pumps may run slightly *slower when powered by the diesels, this higher concentration would act to offset the effects of a lower pump speed and thus assure that the required quantity of sodium pentaborate is injected to the vessel in a timely manner. Secondly, the A TWS case which involves a Loss of Off-site Power, which is when the diesels would be supplying the SBLC pumps, is not the most liming event' with respect to peak vessel pressure, suppression pool temperature, nor fuel cladding temperature. Finally, as a result of* the low event probabilities, the regulatory assumptions which govern plant specific ATWS evaluations allow for the use of nominal values. Since there is an equal probability that the diesel supply frequency could be 2% above the 60 Hz setpoint, it is acceptable to assume a nominal supply frequency of 60 Hz. Since the .1{-fp Page 25 ofjt{ EC-024-1014 Effects of 2% Frequency Vari(:ltion on Plant Systems and Components ATWS rules allow for the use of nominal values*, it is not a licensing requirement to assume a penalty for a potential 2% reduction in emergency diesel generator speed. B) RPV Pressure Boundary

1) Main Steam Safety Relief Valves The primary means for ov~rpressure protection of the reactor vessel are the Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSRVs}. These valves have several modes of operation, none of which are affected by a reduction in diesel sp~ed. In the "safety mode", which is the only mode governed by Technical Specifications, the valves are directly actuated by vessel pressure. In the non-safety-related "relief mode", the valves are opened, and maintained in the open position, via stored pneumatic energy (i.e., accumulators).

None of the components which are required for valve operation rely on AC power sources and hence valve operation is not impacted by lower diesel speeds. C) ECCS 1} HPCI/ RCIC Systems!Pumps The HPCI and RCIC system major support components are powered by, DC electrical. sources and do not require AC power for operation. The motive power for the pumps is supplied by steam driven turbines. As such, they a,re not impacted by a 2% reduction in diesel speed.

2) ADS As with the other modes of MSRV operation, the motive force to actuate the *ADS f.unction of the valves is provided via stored pneumatic energy (i.e., accumulators and stored N2 bottles). The function of the ADS system is therefore unaffected by a 2%

reduction in diesel speed; . 3) RHR & Core Spray Pumps The need to account for the impacts of uncertainties in ECCS flow-rates, which *are induced by a 2% ~eduction in diesel speed, in the SSES LOCA analyses is addressed in an engineering position paper which has been prepared by the Nuclear Fuels. Group. 124} It has been concluded that NRC regulations do not explicitly require an analytical allowance for diesel generator frequency uncertainties in Appendix "K" methods. In addition, these methodologies, which are used for the SSES LOCA analyses, are conservative and consistent with the NRC's current expectations. Hence, the inclusion of such allowances is not needed t9 assure the health and safety of the public.

tf~ EC-024-1 014 Page26 of)(( Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components D) Containment Heat Removal The design of the SSES units provides for two independent loops of decay/accident heat removal, and only one is needed for design basis accident mitigation. Each independent loop consists of an RHR heat exchanger which can be supplied by either of two 100% capacity RHR pumps. In addition, as a result of the "cross-unit" RHR Service Water (RHR SW) arrangement, each heat exchanger can be cooled by either of two 100% capacity RHR SW pumps. The redundancy of this configuration provides for a high level of system reliability and assures the adequate capability for decay(accident heat removal. Since multiple pumps are supplied by different diesels, the uncertainty in equipment performance associated with the 2% allowance band is at most 1.42 %. This notwithstanding, the following discussion is provided to demonstrate that any RHR I RHR SW pump combination would provide adequate post accident flows, even if both pumps operated under a 2% speed reduction. . l

1) RHR A 2% reduction in speed will not impact the RHR pumps' ability to provide the design rated shell side heat exchanger flow of 10,000 GPM for post accident decay; heat removal. Although a lower pump speed affects both* flow and total developed :head (TDH), the suppression pool return valves are throttled to only about 10-15% ;open when RH'R is in the suppression pool cooling mode.c4> This is due to the fact -that the suppression pool cooling line losses are relatively small when compared to the total developed head of the pump. The difference is taken up by throttling the return ~alve, which results in a large valve delta-P. If pump performance {i.e., flow and TDH) were to decrease because of a lower speed, a system flow of 10,000 GPM c~uld still be easily established by further opening the. return valve. Therefore, a 2% reduction in pump speed will not affect post accident RHR cooling flow.

2) RHR SW In Figure 1, the pump curve for a typical SSES RHR SW pump is plotted.<5> The pump affinity laws were used to calculate a "degraded" curve corresponging to a pump speed of 58.8 Hz which Is also plotted. Finally, a system resistance curve,.which corresponds to a flow of 9000 GPM at 100% pump speed, is identified. N.ote that this system resistanc~ curve would be estabiJshed by operators via the throttling of the RHRSW heat exchanger inlet valve in accordance with operating procedures.<6}

If pump performance were to decrease because of a lower speed, the RHR SW flow through the heat exchanger would decrease to the point where the system resistance curve intersects the degraded curve. By inspection, it is seen that this flow *is a*pproximateJy 8750 GPM. This flow is well in excess of the minimum required RHR SW flow of 8000 GPM, as identified in Reference 7. Therefore, a 2% reduction in pump speed will not adversely affect post accident RHR SW cooling flow.

Jfb EC-024~1014 Page27of~ Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components E) ESW I DIESEL COOLING

1) ESW System ESW system supplies cooling water to the emergency diesel generators, the ECCS pump room coolers (RHR, C$, HPCI/RCIC), the RHR pump motor oil coolers, the control structure chillers, and the Unit 2 direct expansion units. These loads are also addressed in other sections, but the following discussion is provided to demonstrate that the potential for a 2% reduction in diesel speed will not threaten adequate cooling for emergency loads.

Performance Uncertainty During a Design Basis Accident, at least one loop of ESW (i.e., two pumps} would be in operation. Since all ESW pumps are supplied by separate diesels, the associated uncertainty in equipment performance for a two pump configuration is actually 1.42 %. L

• Likewise, the uncertainties associated with three and four pump operating configurations is 1.16% and 1.0% respectively.
• spray Pond i ESW Short Term Temperatures i

The design basis flows for all ESW users is based on the maximum spray pond design temperature of 97°F. (S) The maximum administrative operating limit of 85°F<9a) assures that the 97°F threshold will not be exceeded, even with the worst case single faitui,e for spray pond temperature; a failure of an ESW return bypass valve to close. (This failure can prevent.the effective use of the spray arrays and hence results in higher spray pond temperatures.} The spray pond temperature profile following a Design Basis Accident increases by about two degrees~F in the first three hours of an accident; from 85.5°F to 87.6°F.<to) Subsequently, after six hours, temperature increases to 90.6°F and then to 93.4°F at twelve hours. With the inability to close a loop's bypass valve, appropriate operator actions are taken but spray pond temperature continues to increase to 95.9°F at 24 hours and peaks at 97.42°F at t=44 hours. Soon thereafter, a downward trend in temperature occurs. Based on this profile, ESW users would be supplied with relatively low temperature cooling water during the initial stages of an accident. As a result of lower initial supply temperatures, as w~ll as the fact that margin exists between the actual and minimum required. ESW cooler flows, it is reasonable to expect that all ESW users would be adequately cooled, even-*if diesel-speeds -(and hence pump speeds) were to be slightly lower. ESW System Performance Two ESW pumps are capable of supplying all required emergency loads during a DBA (i.e., four diesels and a complete division of safety-related equlpment).<11> Jn addition, for most DBA scenarios, it is expected that a minimum of three pumps would be

tf{p EC-024-1014 Page 28 of}6""" Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components available; the only single failures which would prevent the auto-initiation of at least three pumps is the loss of 125 VDC batteries 10614 or 10624. However, for these specific single failures, it is expected that two pumps would nonetheless provide for adequate cooling in the short term, even with a 2% reductioo in speed. This is due to the fact that spray pond temperatures will be Jess than the design basis temperature limit of 97°F as described above. In the short term, the cooter supply temperatures would act to offset the effects of a slightly lower flow which might occur if only two pumps were available and operating at a lower speed.

• In the event of a failure of 10614 or 10624, additional pumps could be placed in service by transferring their control power from the failed batt~ry to the corresponding Unit 2 battery {20614 or 20624). At this point, at least three pumps would be available and capable of supplying all required loads as described below:

In Figure 2, the pump curve for a typical SSES ESW pump is plotted.<12> Also plohed is the equivalent curve for two pump operation in parallel, as well as a conserYative system resistance curve which intersects the two pump curve at a flow of 7000 ~PM. This flow was selected becau*se it bounds the flow requirements of a single lo*op of ESW.<8'J Finally, a "degraded" curve is plotted which corresponds to three pumps operating with a 2% reduction in speed (58.8 Hz). By inspection, it is seen that >7000 GPM, the "degraded" three-pump curve is above the "normal" two pump curve; which is known to provide adequate flow to the associated users.<11l Therefore, as long as three ESW pumps are available, they would be able to provide adequate flow and ~ead even when operat~d with a 2% reduction In speed. Spray Cooling As a final note, it should be identified that the potential for a 2% reduction in ESW pump speed will not result in inadequate spray cooljng. This is due to the fact that

• guidelines have been developed and incorporated* into the appropriate operating procedures<6> which provide direction for the optimum use of the spray networks, based on system flow.

Therefore, operators have the required information and operating guidelines to effectively use the spray netvlorks and optimize spray cooling regardless of actual system/loop flow.

2) Emergency Diesel Generator:Cooling Based on the discussion above, it is reasonable to expect that the emergency diesel generators would be provided enough cooling to provide for the disbursement of their design.heat lo'ad. Hence, a 2% reduction in*ESW pump speed would not affect either the short or long term phases of tiiesel operation during accident scenarios.

In the short term phase, just after diesel start, the engine is cold and operation can continue for several minutes without cooling.<13l In addition, during this point of the accident, cooler inlet temperatures would be at least 12°F <;ooler than assumed in the diesel heat exchanger design calculations. (The heat exchanger design calculations

Page 29 of?6' EC-024-1014 Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems* and Components assume an inlet temperature equal to the ESW spray pond design limit of 97°F, whereas the pond temperature at the start of the event would be at most 85°F - the Tech Spec administrative limit.) In the longer term, it is expected that at least three ESW pumps would be available as described above, and hence the diesels would be supplied with their design flow rates. In addition, it should be noted that if a diesel were running with a 2% slower steady state speed, the mechanical components it powers would also be running 2% slower. Under these conditions, the work done by these mechanical components would be

• less, and hence their assc;>ciated load on the diesel would be less. With a lower diesel load, the cooling requirements would likewise be less. Hence, it is concluded that l,lnacceptable diesel operating conditions would not result from any potential shortcomings i_n ESW.flow due to a 2% reduction in diesel speed.

F) HVAC t.

1) Control Structure Chilled Water The Control Structure Chilled Water (CSCW) system consists of two independent chiller trains, each of which has a 106% capacity of 202 tons with the m~ximum :Esw

• supply temperature of 97°F, and a loop supply temperature of 44°F.<14> in generai, the*

entire temperature profile in the control structure during* Design Basis Accidents qualifies as a flmild" environment. This is evidenced by the fact that equipment qualification is not required for components in the building. Unlike the reactor building, which is completely isolated under accident conditions, outside air is drawn i(ltO the control structure through the CREOASS trains. The overall heat load is therefore dependent not only on the building's internal heat load, but also on the on outside air temperature which varies throughout the day. There are several ways in which a 2% lower diesel speed would affect the CSCW system. There are a number of components which would operate at a lower *speed, and hence provide lowe~ flows. These components include the system's outside supply and area cooling fans. the condenser eire and. loop eire pumps, as well as the chiller's centrifugal compressor. In general, with a tower compressor speed,

• the available capacity of the chiller will decrease since the overall flow rate of the refrigerant* will decrease.

With the fans and loop eire pumps providing lower flo~s, the actual heat load induced on the chiller will be lower, since lower flows would.remove Jess heat from the cooled areas. )'he net effects of a 2% reduction in diesel speed would result in a steady state equilibrium operating point for the system with slightly higher room/area temperatures. This steady state operating point will not only be a function of these areas . temperatures, but also of the chilled loop supply/return temperatures, outside air (i.e., supply} temperatures, and the ESW.supply temperature and flow. 4(q Page 30 of }Pi' EC-024-1 014 Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components A review of the building temperature response during accidents was performed515> That analysis considers the effect of variable chiller loads and loop supply temperatures, as well as outside air temper~ture. When loop supply temperature is increased by 6°F {from 44°F to 50°F), chiller load is reduced by up to 20 tons (about 10%), and peak room/area temperatures increase by an average of about 4°F-5°F. In addition, all peak temperatures do not occur until 720 hours {30 days) after the start of the accid~nt. With a 2% reduction in diesel speed, it is expected that peak room/area temperatures would be slightly higher than those calculated for 100% equipment speed. However, temperatures for those areas which are cooled by the CSCW system would nonetheless still fall within the envelope which defines a "mild" environment. In addition, as the result of the thermal inertia of the. entire building and system, the effect of a slower diesel speed would be slow to develop. This slow response, coupled with the 30 day time required to reach peak room/area temperatures, would provide for an adequate "buffer' to allow for operators to diagnose unusual control structure environmental conditions. Since operators have complete access to the CSCW system during accidents, appropriate corrective actions could be taken to preclude the onset of unacceptable control structure temperatures. Therefore, a 2% 'reduction in ;diesel speed will not affect the CSCW system's capability of maintaining a "mild" environment I tn the control structure. r

2) Unit 2

• OX Units Area cooling for the Unit 2 emergency switch-gear rooms and load *center areas is
• provided by the skid mounted direct expansion units (OX units) which reject heat to the ESW system. lhere are two independent units which are powered from indepenpent diesels and supplied by separate loops of ESW.

With two independent units,. *the uncertainty induced by the potential for a 2% reduction in diesel speed is actually 1.42%, as discussed above. Unlike other chilled wat~r systems at SSES,. these units do not operate in. a "load- . following" mode. At steady state operating conditions. they are capable of removing a heat load of approximately 40 tons with an ESW supply temperature of 97°F.'18*19> However, the heat load in the areas th~se units serve is on the order of approximately 32. tons. '19) Although a 2% reduction in diesel speed could potentially affect the capacity of the OX units, there is sufficient margin between the rated capacities of these units and their worst case accident heat load. Therefore, the potential for a 2% reduction in diesel speed will not affect adequate cooling of the Unit 2 emergency switch gear rooms.

3) Reactor Building HVAC {ECCS Room Coolers)

The performance of the reactor building room coolers could potentially be affected by a 2% reduction in diesel speed since they would be supplied with a lower ESW flow, and fan speed lJVOUld be reduced by 2%. However, adequate cooling:for the affected areas is nonetheless assured as discussed below:

4-~ Page31 o~ -EC-024-1 014 I Effects of 2*% Frequency Vari~lion on Plant Systems and Components RHR & Core Spray Each division of RHR and Core Spray has two 50% capacity fan/cooling *units. Since each fan unit is supplied by separate diesels, the uncertainty associated with the 2% diesel allowance band is actually 1.42%. The design basis ESW flow to the RHR and Core Spray fan units is 120 OPM and 36 GPM respectively. <a> However, catculati.ons performed in support of the Appendix "R" Program have indicated that acceptable room temperatures (i.e., design basis temperatures) are maintained with flows as low as 50 GPM for RHR and 14 GPM for Core Spray.<20l It is therefore evident that a ~ignificant amount of cooling margin exists for these coolers. In addition, it is noteworthy to add that the maximum area temperatures for these rooms does not occur until 30. days after the start of an accident.<19> Therefore, if diesel speed were to be reduced by 2%, any unusual_ conditions would be slow to evolve and there would be ample time to allow for proper operator response. It is* therefore concluded that the potential for a reduction io both ESW and fan flow which results from a 2% lower speed would not re~ult in unacceptable temperatures for the affected areas. HPCI & RCIC The HPCI and RCIC rooms are provided with two 100% capacity fan/cooling units, each of which is powered from a separate diesel and supplied by a separate loop of ESW. As with the RHR * & Core Spray Coolers, their performance could be affected, since they could potentially be supplied with a lower ESW flow, and the fans speed could be reduced by 2%. Calculations have demonstrated that under large break DBA scenarios, these-coolers ,are not required to maintain acceptable area temperatures, *since the HPCI & RClC systems isolate under these conditions.<19> For small break scenarios, these coolers are only required i~ the barometric condense.r piping is assumed to fait<19' 21> For scenarios during which the systems are assumed to operate, the primary heat load in these rooms therefore results from a pipe break outside containment with a small break LOCA inside containment. During these scenarios, peak area temperatures do not occur until several hours after the start of the event. At this point, it is likely that the vessel would be depressurized and high pressure make-up systems would no longer be required. Even under the worst case postulated scenarios, peak temperatures do not occur until a point when the systems would no longer be required. Therefore, even if area cooling was affected by the slower diesel speed, this would not impact the ability of the HPCI and RCJC system to perform their design intended function during the postulated scenarios.

4) The Stand-By Gas Treatment System The Stand-By Gas Trealment System (SBGT) consists of two 100% capacity independent filter trains and fans which are supplied from separ<!lte diesels. Under Page32o;p EC-024-1 014 Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components accident conditions, the system auto-initiates and takes suction from the unit-common reactor building recirculation plenum.

• since each fan unit is Independent, the uncertainty in system performance associated with the 2% allowance band is 1.42%.

The primary functions of the SBGT system are to: 1) establish a negative pressure of 0.25 H20 in the secondary containment upon system initiation (i.e:, draw-down phase); and 2) maintain this pressure to prevent un-monitored effluvium from reactor building leakage pathways. ln.performing Its design function, the SBGT system as~ures that gaseous effluents are filtered and monitored, and maintains off-site doses below 10CFR100 limits. While a ~% reduction In diesel speed would result in lower fan flows, this reduction in system performance is not expected to impact off-site doses. Upon initiation, SBGT is required to "draw-down" secondary containment to -0.25" H20 in 3 minutes. Calculations have indicated that with the maximum allowable reactor building in~leakage of 4000 SCFM,<sb) a single SBGT fan can draw-down Zones I, II, & Ill in 142 seconds. Thus a 38 second, or 21% margin exists.<n> In addition, *another calculation has shown that even with a 13 minute draw-down time *. there is virtu~lly no change in calcuiated off-site ctoses. <23> Thus, even if the system required an ad(litional 10 minutes to draw-down the reactor building, there are no consequences with rEfspect ~o off-site doses. In any case, It Is reasonable to conclude that a 2% reducti9n )n fan speed would not prevent the SBGT system from establishing -o..zsn H20 reactor building pressure prior to the propagation *of fission products into. the secondary containment In the longer term phase of system operation, SBGT must maintain a * -0.25'.' H20 pressure in secondary containment. This is achieved by maintaining a qonstant,SBGT system flow of 1 o, 100 SCFM, which is drawn from two sources: an outside air S!Jpply,

• f:!Od the reactor tiuilding recirculation plenum. Modulating dampers control the~ flows from both the recirculation plenum and the outside air source, such that the re"ctor building is maint;3ined at ~0.25" H20. Since the maximum. allowable reactor building in-leakage is only 4,000 SCFM, it follows that at least 6,1 00 SCFM must be drawn from the outside soume.

The first effect of a lower fan speed would be that the *fan Inlet dampers, which control to maintain a constant flow of 10,100 SCFM would open further. If the fans were unable to maintain a flow of 10;100 SCFM, the other system dampers would modulate to maintain reactor building pressure by drawing less flow from the outside supply source. As a result of the large margin between the maximum reactor building in-leakage (4,000 SCFM)._and the rated fan flow (10, 100 SCFM), it is* concluded that a 2% reduction in fan speed would not prevent the SBGT system from achieving its long term design basis obje<;tive. IV) CONCLUSION As a result of existing calibration procedures and practices, as well as the accuracy of the diesel generator electronic governor, it is unlikely that the diesel speed would devjate from 60 Hz. However, the above evaluation qualitatively considers the effects of a 2% diesel

Jt{p EC-024*1 014 Page 33 of,.a( Effects of 2% Freguency V~riation on Plant Systems and Components speed redUction on large mechanical components and systems. The following summarizes these effects:

• As a result of equipment/system redundancy, the actual uncertainty in equipment speed which results from the potential for a 2% lower diesel speed is, in actuality, less than 1%.
• Wrth respect to the short term plant response during* acddents and transients: It was demonstrated that an actual 2% reduction in diesel speed does not adversely affect: 1} the ability to estaiJiish sub-Critical core conditionsj 2) the ability to maintain and protect the reactor vessel p~essure boundary; and, 3) provide adequate make-up capability during design basis a~cidents and/or transients.
• Wrth respect to the long term plant response during accidents and transients: It was demonstrated that as the result of the redundancy and independence of plant comp!)nents, as well as conservative design practices, an actual 2o/o reduction in equipment speed would not adversely affect the ability to mitigate these events, and will not result In off-site doses in excess of 1 OCFR1 00 limits.

In summary, past and present engif"!eeting practices which govem the design and licensing bases of SSES provide for an extremely conservative and safe plant design. These practices mandate many engineering conservatlsms (i.e., assumptions,

inputs,

• methodologies, etc.) which *are applied in the design of systems and also in the evaluation of specific licensing basis events_ ~s a result of these conservatisms, many of which are mandated by regulatory requirements/commitments, a high level of system and component
• over*design* establishes an ample margin of plant safety. As a result of this margln,,it Is
• not an appropriate Hcensing basis.requirement that an additional 2% penalty be incurred due to the allowance in emergency diesel generator speed.

.See po.~e.. '3'-\\Q ~r E:P~ and o.ddi+lo()o\\ discu.:s::.ion V} REPERENCES

1) SSES Improved Technical Specification {ITS)

SR 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.9, & 3.8.1.11 - Electrical Power Systems Surveillance Requirements

2) "Radiation Detection and Measurement", Knoll, Glenn F., John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

1979

3) EC-PUPC-1009, Rev. 0, "Evaluation Of Susquehanna Anticipated Transient With SCRAM Performance For Power Uprate Conditions" (GE Report GE~E-637~024-0893, 9/93)

4) EC*049*0515, Rev. 0, "Throttling Requirements For.HV-1/251F024NB"

5) FF105620, Sheet 4401, Rev. 1, "Pump Test Data Serial Number 731-S-1152" {RHR SW 1P506A) 6} OP*116-001, Rev. 22 & OP-216..001, Rev. 19, "RHR Service Water System~

7} EC-049-1001. Rev. 2, ~RHR Heat Exchanger Performance At 7850 and 8000 GPM RHRSW Flowrate*

8) EC-054-0537, Rev. 4, "EmergefiCY Service Water System Heat Load & Flow Requirements For Uprated Power Coodltionsw I

rev. ' z.

Jffp Page34o~ EC-024-1014 Effects of 2% Frequency Variation on Plant Systems and Components

9) SSES Current Technical Specifications {CTS):

a) 4.7.1.3.a Ultimate Heat Sink Av~rage Temperature (Also Reference Technical Specification Interpretations (TSI) 1-97-004 & 2-97-004} b) 4.6.5.1.c*Secondary Containment 18 Month Test Requirements c) 4.6.5.3.b Stand#By Gas Treatment System 18 Month Test Requirements d) 4.1.5.a.2 Stand-By Uquld Control System {Figure 3. ~.5-2 Sodium Pentaborate Concentration)*

• 10} E~016-1002, Rev. 3, "Ultimate Heat Sink, Minimum Heat Transfer Design Basis Analysis - Operation With A Failed Open Loop Bypass Valve"

11) TP-054-076, Rev. 3, UESW Lopp A & 8 Flow Balance*

12) FF105610, Sheet4701, Rev. 1, apump Test Data Serial Number 741-&1320* (ESW OP504A).*

13) SSES De'sign Basis Document DBD013, "Diesel Generato"rs and Auxiliaries"

14) EC-030-0506, Rev. 0, "Generate Performance Curves For Control Structure Chlller"

15) EC-030-1007, ~ev. 1,

~Transient Temperatwe Response Of Control Structure Rooms With HVAC Normal & Accident Conditions*

16) EC-030--0514, Rev. 1, "Power Uprate System Impact Review Control Structure HVAC & Chilled Water System*

17) IOM-168, Rev. 20, "Operating Instructions For Carrier Centrifugal Refrigeration Machines~

18) IOM-662, Rev. 12, qRefrigeration System For Unit 2 Emergency Switch-gear Room Cooling*

19) EC-LOCA-0500, Rev. 2, "COTTAP Analysis Reactor Bldg. Post Design Basis Accident Temperature"

20) EC-034-0551, Rev. 2, "Secondary Containment Thermal Response To An Appendix R FireR

21) E~EQQL-0695, Rev. 0, "Determination Of Room Pressure & Temperatur~

Response To High Energy Une Break*

22) EC-070-0526, Rev. 0, "SGTS Draw~down Analysis"

23) EC-RADN-1032, Rev. 0, "Eval~.:~ation Of Offsite & Control Room Dose Consequences For Standby Gas Treatment System Single Failure Events"

24) PL-NF-98;007(P), Rev. 0 {DRAFT),

• susquehanna SES Measurement I rei',

Uncertainties In Appendix "K" LOCA Analyses*, 5/98

25) PLA-3171, *susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Anticipated Transient Without SCRAM"

26) SC-153-101, Rev. 6 & SC-253-101, Rev. 10, *chemistry Surveillance Of Unit 1(2)

Stan_dby Liquid Control System*

Discussion of OE 31798 (AR 1296983) [C ~ 02.'1 -1D.i'i F6~ 3Yo. Discussion: ARJCR 1302108 was generated to document the applicability of the OE to SSES and CRA 1307834 was generated to update this calculation. Clinton Power Station generated OE31798 (AR 1296983) which documented that power uprate significantly reduced the available ECCS margin for the containment analysis. This margin had previously been used to address lower diesel frequencies as allowed by the Technical Specifications. The main concern is that the Clinton uncertainty analysis did not specifically address the containment cooling functions of the RHR pumps. The PPL analysis in EC-024-1 014 Attachment 2 section D specifically addresses the containment analysis. This section was not specifically updated for EPU. A review ofEC-PUPC-20601 determined that the power requirements for safety related systems post-EPU have remained the same. Additiona'uy, a review of each specific section of the Attachment 2 analysis determined that although some of the details have changed slightly the conclusions of each section remain the same for EPU. Since the containment analysis is specifically mentioned in the OE that issue is discussed. As stated in the Attachment 2 section D, the RHR pumps are assumed to have a flow rate of 10,000 gpm through the heat exchanger. This is significantly below the RHR pump capacity and with a 2% reduction in frequency this flow rate will still be met. EC-PUPC" 20400 evaluates containment pressure and temperature response for EPU. The analysis calculated an acceptable response even without containment sprays. Additionally, a review of EC"PUPC-20400 determined that running all4 RHR and all 4 Core Spray pumps is conservative from a containment heat" up perspective since all these pumps add heat to the containment. If the pump speed is reduced by 2% this will reduce the pump heat load within containment which would lower suppression pool temperatures. This is conservative. So based on the specific analysis for SSES, EPU did not impact the margin for these systems as it related to the diesel frequency issue. The other concern would be equipment cooling (RHR. room coolers, diesel cooling DX unit, etc.). The peak spray pond temperature did not change as a result ofEPU (still97°F) and the discussion for each of these cooling systems is still applicable. Based on this evaluation, the concerns of OE 31798 have been effectively evaluated for SSES and the conclusions remain acceptable.

t/b EC-024-1014 Page35o~ Effects of 2% Frequency Vari~tion on f:llant Systems and Components . FIGURE 1 0 o 1an 2ffil :mJ <<m.ron am 10:0 a:m e:oo tlllJJ 11cm 1Al:Xl 1~ FlaNAATE (GJ'Ml

Jf-p Page36o~ EC-024-1014 Effects of 2% Frequency Vari~tion on Plant Systems and Components FIGURE 2 ESWSYSTEM * !~/PACT OF LOY\\E:R PUMP SPEED ~r-~--r--.--r--r~---~~--~-,--~~--~~--~~ ro ~;;;~~;J~;2~?10i;:; *:;~;;:r:;;;;; ;;:;::::r;::;;; :::;;;~b;~;;; ;;;~;;;!:;;;T;~OJm 0 0 1())) 7()))

Issue: ~ <:.- o~Y-\\ 01--j r <:!.~-e. '?) 1 Calculation EC-024-1014 considers the impact of the tech spec allowable +1-1.2 Hz frequency variation on the connected loads. However, a review of the calculation did not show that the Impact of higher frequency on starting torque was addressed. Rux is Inversely related to speed. So an increase in speed decreases motor field flux. This in turn impacts the motor's starting torque. It appears that this Impact needs to be addressed in a calculation.

Response

A detailed review of the calculation shows discussion of MG 2 requirements which state that motors will operate successiully under running conditions at rated load with frequency variations of up to +/-5 percent, voltage variations up to +/-10 percent, and voltage and frequency variations summed by absolute value of +/-10 percent. However, a review of MG 2 shows that the referenced section In MG 2 refers to running loads. In MG 2, the 10/1981 version, the discussion of starting torque is generic but notes that the torque developed by the motor at any speed is proportional to voltage squared and inversely proportional to frequency. For the 4 KV safety related motors, GE speciflcations apply for the RHR and CS motors, and E112 applies to the Bechtel scope of supply. The specifications do not reference MG 2, but instead reference MG 1. The motor specs for RHR (GE 21A9369AZ), Core Spray (GE 21A9369AY} and E1i2 for the Bechtel scope of supply all reference MG 1 requirements for torque. Specification E112 specifically references MG 1*20.45. The number 20.45 is a section/paragraph within MG 1. The requirements relevant to the problem statement are in MG 1*20.45 which states that the motor shall be capable of starting and accelerating a load with a torque characteristic and inertia value not exceeding that listed In MG 1-20.42 with voltage and frequency variations specified in Par. A of MG 1-20.45. Par. A allows frequency variations of up to +1-5 percent, voltage variations up to +/-10 percent, and va~age and frequency variations summed by absolute value of +/-1 0 percent. The inertia values for the RHR and Core Spray motor (respectively 3960, 420 wk2). determined by MPR in developing dynamic motor models are below the inertia values provided in MG 1*20.42 (16780, 2514 wk2). It can be concluded that adequate starting and accelerating torque would be available at a frequency of 60 + 1.2 = 61.2 hertz. Relevant pages of MG 1 and MG 2 folio~:

MG 1-20.42-Load Wk* fox-Polypha4e Squittel-cage Induction Motors g The following table lists load Wkz which polyphase, sq~el-ca.ie ~otors having perlormance ch:u:acteristics in accordance with Part 20 =accelerate without injurious temperature rise und& the allowing conditions: t"' ~

l. Applied voltage ud frequency within the limits set in MG 1~20-45.

=

LP 0

2.

D'L'l'l'ing the ac:celen~.ting~od, the conneaed load torque shall be equal to, or less than, a torque which varies as the square t"' of th.e spee<l and is equ to 100 percent of full-load torque at rated speed.. -a

3. Two starts in succession (eoasti:ng to P!$1: between starts) with the mowr ini~ally at ambient tempera1:w."e or one start with the

'"II motor initially :a.t a temperatute not e:r::cet;ding its rated load ope:rating telllperat:ure. s

u.oo 11100 l::ICO

~ ~ '" SP"d, ll~~ ~ ~

160 U'1 300 c:

Kp L....s Wl:o ~llah**of Hoto..lVI!"), Lb-W I 100 12670 16830 21700 27310 33690 z c 125 JS61() 20750 26760 33680 41550 (:! 150 I.200o ii41o 18520 2i.810 31750 39000 49300 2 200 95ao 17~0 24220 32200 41540 62300 64500 Q 2.SO 65 14880 21560 29800 39640 &1200 M400 79500 'Z 300 11270 17550 .25530 35300 ~ 60600 76400 ~ a:: 350 4ioo 1SSO 12980 20230 29430 .(0110 l.i42()0 69000 88100 lOSSOO ~~ 400 S500 14670 22870 33280 40050 &1300 79200 W800 12a200 -150 4665 . 9460 . 1Cl320 25470 37000 51300 68300 ssaoo 111300 1.37400 soo 4.43 2202 Sl30 10400 17970 28050 40850 63600 75300 97300 122600 151500 600 0030 l2250 21100 33110 48260 66800 89100 116100 1,.5100 t79300 700 503 2614 6900 14000 24340 88080 55500 7&900 102500 lS2BOO 167200 206700 sao 560 2815 7700 lliSaO 274'!0 429.50 62700 S6900 ll&d!JO 149800 180000 233700 900 616 lllOS 8500 17560 30480 47740 69700 96700 129000 166000 210600 260300 I ~*: 1000 668 3393 9410 19200 -~~ ~ 76600 106400 W.'i!OO 188700 23-1800 286700 . 1250 790 oW13 11380 23300 64000 93600 130000 173600 ~ 28.':1900 351300 1600 902 4712. 13260 273SO ~7700 75100 uoooo 1&1000 204SOO 265000 334800 414400 1750 1004 &10 15000 31170 M500 85900 126000 175400 234600 304200 3Si600 476200 2000 1096 SS80 16780 34860 61.100 00500 1-41600 197300 264100 $<l2600 433300 537000 2250 1180 6420 UWMl 38430 67600 106800 1S6000 218700 293000 3S0300 -*81200 woooo 2.500 1206 6930 20030 41900 73800 116800 171800 239700 321300 417300 628000 655000 aooo 1387 7860 23040 48520 85800 136200 200700 280500 are roo 4$9-!00 ll20000 769000 am 149'1 8700 25850 54800 97300 15'1800 228000 Sl91l00 429800 &1)900() 700000 881000 4000 1:;70 9480 ~ 60700 108200 172600 266-(00 S58llOO 481600 621000 796000 989000 4500 1627 10120 30890 66300 118700 189800 281-lOO 395000 532000 693000 881000 1095000 liOOO 1662 10720. 33160 71700 lWOO 200100 306500 430SOO 581000 758000 968000 llliiSOOO 5500 1677 11240 ~- 76700 138300 222300 380800 ~ 1328000 821000 1044000 1200000 6000 11600 87250 81000 141000 237600 354400 499500 675000 8S2000 1123000 lSilSOOO 7000 ~ :. 12400 40770 90500 164000 267100 899&10 li6l5000 164000 1001000 1275000 1590000 8000 12870 43'[00. 98500 181000 294500 442100 626000 8liOOOO 11100 1422000 1775000 flrn 9000. 1.3120 '.16330 105700 195800 320000 482300 685000 931000 12ZJOOO lS6aOOO 195!000 10000 13170 48430 112200 209400 344200 520000 741000 1000000 13!l7000 1690000 2126000 J ;r: 11000 50100 117900 220000 366700 556200 794000 10&1000 1428000 1830000 2291000 12000 51400 123000 233m 387700 li90200 8-14800 1!55000 l62i000 1956000 24.52000 I :o 13000 62300 127500 244000 t07400 622400 S93100 1224000 1617000 2078000 2608000 ~ 14000 152900 l31WO ~ 4.25800 65.2800 934200 1289000 1707000 21915000 27SSOOO 15000 53100 134500 2.62400 442000 681500 il$3100 1SS2000 1793000 2309000 2llO-WOO l.)'l!..C "1;1 oe* ~ j The valu~:S of Wk~ of connected load given ill the foregoing table w&e Calculated from the following fonnula.: ~ i__. Load w.e2... A[ Hp*" ] _ 0 0685 [ ~J Where A-24 for 300 to 1800 rpm, inclusive, motors 10 "'c:: (Rpmr* R.pmy-* ~-27 for 3600 rpm motors "CC:Z =- >ttl ..:..c. 1000 1000 Clt;;

• Thb Cotmubo toa.y JIIOt beappllcablolo..tiD~:> ~"t l"<:ludod Ia the above =ble. Co..Wt thc.....,.ul&<:tU-Ionbel'lltl"P..-bleb""' ao~ lba,.a.

~~ Authori%ecl Bnglu~ng In!onna.tlo!ll 11*12-1953, :revised 6-1*1959; 7*13-1007; 5-17*1971: 11*6-1971!:

• • • • -~*****-~-

JUNEI97& PART lO PAGE 4 MG 1*2D.43 Number of Starts ,\\, Squir11:l-cn~e induction motors shall be ca* pnble of making the following starts, providing the IVk' ol the load, the load torque during accelera-tion, the applied voltage, and the method of start'- ing are those for which the motor was designed:

l. Two starts in succession, coasting to rest between starts, with the motor initially at nrnbient temperature, or

2.

One start with the motor initially at a tem-perature not exceeding its rated load operat-ing temperature. NRMA Stllll&!rd 6-1-1959. B. lC additiorntl starts are required, it is recommended that none be made untU aU condi-tions affeeting opemtion have been thoroughly investigated and the apparatus examined for evidence of excessive heating. It should be reeognized that the number of starts should be kept to a minimum since the life of the motor is affected by the number of starts. C. When req11ested by the purchaser, a sepa-rate starting information plate will be supplied on the motor. Authorized Bngin~riitg Infomllltion 6-1-1959, revised 11*12-1970. MG 1*2D.44 Overspeeds

• squirrel--cage and wound-rotor induction mo-tors sbaU be 110 c.<lltlltructed that, in an emergency, they will withstand without mechanical injury overspeeds above synchronous speed in accordance with the following:

Synchroncus Spted, Rpm 1801 and over 1800 and below OVenj!Hd, Ptrtent of S)'ll~hronllll$ Spud 20 26 NEMA. StandArd 6<1J.l9S5. MG 1*2D.45 Vnrlatlons from Rated Voltage and Rated Frequency A. RUNNINO Motors shall operate. successfully under running conditions at rated load with a variation in the voltage or the frequency up to the following:

1.

Plus or minus 10 percent of rn.ted voltage, with rated frequency.

2.

Plus or minus 5 percent of rated frequency, with rated voltage.

l.

A combined variation in voltage and fre-quency of plus or minus 10 percent (sum of ub:;olute vnlut!S) of tbe ruted v,alues, *pro* vitl~d the frequency variation does not ex-ceed plus or minus 5 percent of ruted fre-quency. E.<: c'J_~ - \\~.\\~. P.::..~~ o'\\ LARGE APPARATIJS-fNDUCtrON MOTORS Performance within these voltnge and frequency variations will not necessarily be in accordance with the standnrds established for operation at rated voltage and frequency. B. STAll'l'lNO

Vrotors shall start and accelerate to running speed a load whfch has a. torque characteristic and an inertia value not exceeding that listed in MG HID.42 with the voltage and freq,uency variations specified in par. A, For loads w1th other charac-teristics, the starting voltage and frequency limits may be different.

• NEMA Stnndard ll*15-lll56, rl'vmd 3-14-1963; 11-12-1970.
• Tbt ll"'IU"A vll*.. ol voll*r~ aod l"'lu*""Y under whloll* IUolOI' ltiU SU.. t:t't:!llsfully :lt.ltt a.D.d &e*t!lU*tt" tu ntdDiDC lpttd dtptod 0.1'1 ~ba m*r.a:ln. bthtt:en lh~t~

... torl')ue: urve: \\ll.the tnCitar at ntcd. volta:~ and r~li*oe.y i\\~ th~ '~*to-tqb~ t:t:lr'Je: of tbe: 1Md undtt.st.srUa.J ccnditloi:JJ. SiDee the r~ue devdoptd by th~ m~;~hit ~t *ny !p.H:d ~~ro;;:~:.o:~:"~u~~:~~J:=c;!c~~~.vft 1 'if~ ~~ir cl.. tno~* to det..,.ine wllot nlt~rre nnd lr~'lu<U<>' varJ.tfo ** wl(t .. t..,.lly """"'ot.,..., ln*ll>ll>ttoa, t.oklng U.to A<<::ttot ony volt.ot* drop reo\\llel*r '"'"' th~ ~irtin,r C>Jm:*t.!"'"'" by th~ M*t.or, TltlslnfatmltiM a.nd the: l.orc:j\\11; nq_Plremenu ()I t.,.. driY~D maehh1e-delln.t tbt h:W:ItOf'*).P<<cf.tnrque.tutve. ~ rutd vo1t!llf-t and r~ueoey. whl< oppii<Atl<>o. NOT&-Iaduetio<>. =otot:o to bo e>pcrattd lrom ~Ud**l&l* or "'1=- typa ol Yoriabl.. lr!'(utaey aod/or 't2ritb1t*~*ll*r:a po,...- <<1Pp11.. for -..IJutt.~lN~drl** "Pplh:~>tlom ~~>&Y,.quln lndhldual.., ** o14W~Uoo to ~d<o ostbf.. loty P<tf-*-. Eopo<lollrlor op<t.. li4ll l>ol<>w 1'it<d *~* It mly b* *..,..,._,y t<> t<<<~ce tb& O>Gtor ~~~~~h~i!: ..,:;:;;:;,:;:~~'Tb':.~.:::.. "uW.~t"e!~~~~M~: ~ ""'tor lot n~eb l'ppii...U..os. Aulltori:~ed Engineuing lnfol'llllltlon 3-14-1963; revist<~ 7*11H!l69; 11*12-11170. MG 1-26.46 Routine Tests

l. Measurement of winding resistance

2. No-load wufings of cun:ent and speed at normal voltage and frequency. On 50-hertt motors, these rendin~ may be: taken at 60 hertz if 50 hertz is not available.

On motors furnished without complete shaft and bearings, this test* will not be taken,

8. Measuremtut of open-tireuit voltage ratio on wound*rotor motors.

4. High-potential test in accordance with MG 1*20.47.

NBMA. Standard U-14-19o?. MG 1*20.47 Hlgh-polentilll Tests A. SAfBTY PRBCAUlfONS AND TEsT PROCIIDURil See*MG l-3.01.

8. 'fEsT VOLTAOE-PRIMARY WINDINGS The test voltage shall be an alternating voltage whose effective value is 1000 volts plus twice the rated voltage of the machine.

• C.

TEST VOLTA<JE-SECONDARY WINDINGS OF WOUND ROTORS The rest voltage shall be an alternating voltage whose effective value Is rooo volts plus twice the maximum voltage which will appear between slip rings on open-circuit with rated voltage on the: primary and with the rotor either at standstlll or at any speed and direction of rotation (with respect

-~*-'-~-*-**---.. ~*,......... ---~--............ -..... _... _. __.:.._..;:. ____________ E, C.- Cl"2'j :_LQl:J __ _ 'fe.~"v 4(.) OCTOBER 1977 PAGE 16 Typical Total Winding iampar9lure Insulation Class 1.15 SerYice Fuclor 1.0 SerYfce FBctor Class H ClassF Class B crass A 1650 1400 115 c 18DC 155C 130C 105C The rotor surface temperature of squirrel-cage Induction motors cannot be accurately measured on production units. The rotor sur-face temperature varies greatly with enclosure type, cooling method, Insulation class, and slip, but may be In the range of 150-225 C for Clas~ B or Class F Insulated normal slip motors when operating at rated load and In a 40 C ambient temperature. The above Insulated winding temperature and rotor surface temperatura values are typi-cal values based on continuous operation at rated voltage and rated frequency under usual service conditions. Margin for vollage and fre* quency variations, manufacturing variation, overload, or hot start and acceleration is not Included. The motor manufacturer should be consulted for further Information. When motor.mounted space heaters are to be furnished, It Is recommended that the ex-posed surface temperature be limited to 80 percent of ihe Ignition temperature of the gas or vapor Involved with rated space heater vol-tage applied and the motor deenerglzed. The range of Ignition temperatures is so great and variable that It Is not practical for the motor manufacturer to determine If a given motor Is suitable for a Division 2 area. The user's knowledge of the area classification, the application requirements, the Insulation system class, and past experience are all fac-tors whioh should be considered by the user, his consultant, or others most familiar with the detalls of the application involved when maklng*the final decision. Authotlzed Engineering Information 9-7*19n. MG 2-3.06 PROPER SELECTION OF APPARATUS Motors and generators should be properly selected with respect to their usual or unusual

• service conditions, both of which involve the environmental conditions to which the machine Is subjected and the operating.con*

ditlons. Machin.es conforming to Parts 1 and 2 of this publication ill'e designed for operation in accordance with their ratings under usual SELECTION, INSTAllATION AND USE service conditions. Some machines may also be capable of operating In accordance with their ratings under one or more unusual service conditions. Definite-purpose or speclat.purpose machines may be required for some unusual conditions. Service conditions, other than those spaoi* fled as usual, may involve some degree of haz-ard. The additional hazard depends upon the degree of departure from usual operating conditions and the severity of the environment to which the machine is exposed. The add!* tiona! hazard results from such things as over-

heating, mechanical

failure, abnormal deterioration of the Insulation system, corro*

slon, fire and explosion. Although past experience of the user may often be the best guide, the manufacturer of the driven or driving equipment and/or the motor and generator manufacturers should be consulted tor further information regarding any unusual service conditions which increase* the mechanical or thermal duty of the machine and, as a result, Increase the chances for fail-- ure and consequent hazard. This further infor. mation should be considered by the user, his consultants, or others most familiar with the. details of the application Involved when mak* lng the final decision. Authorized Engineeril)g Information 11-16-1972. MG 2*3.07 VARIATION FROM RATED VOLTAGE AND RATED FREQUENCY A. lndt.~ction Motors

1. Running-Motors will operate success-fully under running conditions at rated load with a variation in the voltage or the frequency up to the following:

a. Plus or minus 10 percent of rated volt*

age with rated frequency.

b. Plus or minus 5 percent of rated fre-quency with rated voltage.

c. A combined variation In voltage and frequency Qf plus or minus 10 per-cent (sum of absolute values) of the rated values, provided the frequency variation does not exceed plus or minus 5 percent of rated frequency.

Performance within these voltage and fre* quency variations will not necessarily be in ac-cordance with the standards established for operation at rated voltage and frequency,

b.11' ~ ... \\....... -... *-*-**............................................,_,. SELECTION, INSTALLA'TION ANP UsE

2. Starling-The limiting values of voltage and frequency under which a motor will sue*

cestully start and accelerate to running speed depend on the margin between the speed* torque curve of the motor at rated voltage and frequency and the speed*torque curve of the load under starting conditions. Since the torque developed by the motor at any speed is ap* proximately proportional to the square of the voltage and Inversely proportional to the square of the frequency, It Is generally desirable to determine what voltage and frequency varia* tlons will actually occur at each Installation, taking Into account any voltage drop resulting from the starting current drawn by the motor. Thls.informatlon and the torque requirements of the driven machine define the motor-speed* torque curve, at r13ted voltage and frequency, which rs adequate for the application. NOTE-IIindu;Uor> mo!OI$ 016lo be Opela\\6!1 lrotn o\\al~ or 0\\hot i)1>o or *ariabl.. froquaoey IJJ1dkit wlillte-'1'0!\\age power *~ppllu lor tdlllslol>l.. o)>o>l&drlm*appt~UoM. eatb appUea\\lon ~hQIJld te llldhildua!ly *~nal(!ofed to pro'lldo <llUolactO<Y patlonn;ne&. &pecflllly lex-cn>enllon boknr taled !peo<l, IIIMJ too~ 10 roduco \\lie motor lo<<~ue 11>16 1>\\11ow !lie ra\\ed lull4Nd lorque lo aVOid or<Uil&aUng lhs moiOr. '111* motor manul.. turor ohoold b<l t011!1Jll>l<l bel-sel~ll"'lll tn<>IOC lor SlXl1 ~pplle;llono. B. Synchronous Motors

1. Running-Motors will operate success*

fully In synchronism, rated exciting current be-Ing maintained, under running conditions at rated load with a variation in the voltage or the frequency up to the following:

a. Plus or minus 10 percent of rated volt-age wlth rated frequency.

b. Plus or minus 5 percent of rated fre-quency with ratep voltage.

c. A combined variation in voltage and frequency of plus or minus 10 percent (sum of absolute values) of the rated values, provided the frequency varia*

tlon does not exceed plus or minus 5 percent of rated frequency. Perfonnance within these voltage and fre* quency variations will not necessarily be in ac-cordance with the standards established for operation at rated vo~tage anp frequency.

2. Starting-The limiting values of voltage

• and frequency under which a motor will suc-cessfully start and synchronize depend upon the margin between the locked*rotor and pull*in torques of the motor at rated voltage and fre-

f. C. ~ ~

":} LJ

• ~ I (J \\Y:. __ _
• .. '¢~~~* *t:rr~---**

OCTOBER 1981 I>AGE19 quency and the corresponding requirements of the load under starting conditions. Since the locked-rotor and pull*ln torques ol a motor are approximately proportional to the square of the voltage and Inversely proportional to the square of the frequency, it is generally desir-able to determine what voltage and frequency variation will actually occur at each lnstalla* tfon, taking Into account any voltage drop re-sulting from the starting cuuent drawn by the motor. This information and the torque require* ments of !he driven machine determine the values of locked-rotor and pull-ln torque at rated voltage and frequency that are adequate for the application. HO'If-11 syllthronOU5 ll)GIC>~ are to be opera!od fn*n.sollll-$t:ll* 0< olhsr I)>Jlos ol >'#rtalll.. fre<~uoncy power **ppne~ lot ed]11$11b)<>opoed<lrh* ~ppllco* 110M,..-ell ep.pl~allon ~hbukl be lndMduiiiJt cons!llel~ lo Jlforldo sallsfl<* lQ;t pa!formance. Especll!lly lor opetl1\\lon bo\\OH ~led spi>Od. It may be n~¢U~ lo t&lloco \\he motor !otqut ~ l>olowlha flit\\! lu~oload lo<<~** to O'IO!d OYont.;uno lho motor. lll8 mo10< rnanvlact~nr sboul~ ~~ ~~~~ t>oiOiiiiiOitcUno a motor lor 4ucl> :appli~non.

c. Synchronous Generators Synchronous generajors will operate suc-cessfully at rated kVA, frequency, and power factor with a variation in the output voltage up to plus or minus 5 percent of rated voltage.

Performance within these voltage variations will not necessarily be In accordance with the standards established for operation at rated voltage. D. Direct-current Motors Direct-current motors will operate success-fully using the p~wer supply selected for the basis of rating up to and including 110 percent of rated direct-current armature voltage provid-ed the highest rated speed Is not exceeded. Direct-current motors rated for operation from a rectifier power supply will operate succesful-ly with a variation of plus or minus 10 percent of rated alteroatlng*current line voltage. Performance within this voltage variation will not necessarily be ln accordance with the standards established tor operation at rated voltage, For operation below base speed, see MG 2-3.10. Authorized Engineering lnfonnallon 11*16-1972.

Issue: E<:..- C'2.q- \\~\\ '4 i\\., ~ ~,. ')_ EC-024-1014 states that induction motors at SSES were specified to have a service factor of 1.15. This is true of the motors purchased to E112, but not true for the RHR and Core Spray motors which have a service factor of 1.0. The comment is made with regards to the horsepower (HP} demanded from the motor by the pump at a higher generatortrequency which results in higher pump speed. Per the pump affinity laws, HP ls proportional to the cube of the speed. The calculation assumes some increase in motor slip and uses an increase of 6 percent power demand in response to a 2% DG steady state frequency increase. RHR Response: For the RHR pump, the GE purchase spec 21 A9369AZ specilles a maximum brake HP

• for the load of 1800. The RHR is a 2000 HP motor. Since the motor.rating is based on output power, this is more than sufficient margin to allow an 8% load Increase which ls the maximum postulated increase if no increase in slip is assumed (1800~1.08:::: 1944 HP)

The RHR relay setting calc EC-SOPC-0503 uses the motor Full Load Amperes (FLA) as the basis of 1he time overcurreht trip, time overcurrent alarm, and instantaneous overcurrent trip. Since FLA Is based on the rated 2000 HP. Therefore the r~lay setting values are not Impacted by the issue. Since the motor is being operated within its specified values, this issue Is resolved for RHR. Core Spray Response: For the core spray pump, the GE purchase spec 21A9369A'( specifies a maximum brake HP of 690. The Core Spray is a 700 HP motor. This is Jess than a 6% difference. The core spray motor data sheet shows that Full Load Amps (FLA) for the core spray motor is 90 amperes. Operating procedures 0?*151-001 and OP-251*001 specify that the core spray injection shutoff valve be throttled to limit motor amps to not exceed 90 amperes. Since 90 amperes is the specified full load amperes, the motor is being operated within Its specified values. This issue is resolved for CS. Relevant core spray motor data sheet and procedure sections follow:

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~--~............. 0 D NOTE (1): NOTE(2): 2.2.6 D 0 0 0 ... 'E.Se.:.. ~~.t.t.::~.. \\.~\\~1:..,...,._ f>~~~ 1..\\L) OP-151-001 Revision 33 Page 9 of 57

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Core Spray Room Unit Coolers 1 V211A and C(B and D) AUTO START Indicated on Heating and Ventilation Panel 1C681.

h.

CORE SPRAY Loop A(B} flow increases as Reactor Pressure decreases. Placing control switch to CLOSED with initiation signal present and reactor pressure < 420 psig will cause White indicating light over control sw!tch to ILLUMINATE. This Indicates initiation signal present with operator action overriding initiation signal. This light will remain ILLUMINATED until Initiation signal is reset

• even if valve returned to FULLY OPEN position.

In support of Emergency Operating Procedures the Core Spray System can be operated at a maximum current limit of 90 amps on the pump motor. This corresponds to a run out flow of 7900. gpm for 2 loop pumps or 3950 for 1 pump at 0 psig RPV pressure. As Suppression Pool temperature increases and level decreases, pump performance must be monitored for loss of adequate NPSH. Throttle CORE SPRAY LOOP A(B) IB INJ SHUTOFF HV-152F005A(B} as required 1o support RPV leVel control:

a.

b.

c.

d.

<90 amps and <7900 gpm for two pump operation (emergency operation} <90 amps and <3950 gpm for one pump operations (emergency operation) <6350 gpm for two pump operation (non-emergency operation). <3175 gpm for single pump operation (non-emergency operation).

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.<..-~')11- )~\\t; ~~J~ LJ5" OP-251-001 Revision 30 Page 9 of62 Core Spray Room Unit Coolers 2V211A and C {B and D) AUTO START indicated on Heating and Ventilation Panel 2C681. CORE SPRAY LOOP A(B) flow increases as Reactor Pressure decreases. NOTE (1): Placing control switch to CLOSED with initiation signal present and reactor pressure < 420 psig will cause White indicating light over control switch to ILLUMINATE. This indicates initiation signal present with operator action overriding ln~iation signal. This light will remain ILLUMINATED until initiation signal is reset even if valve retumed 1o FULLY OPEN position. NOTE {2): In support of Emergency Operating Procedures the Core Spray System can be operated at a maximum current limit of 90 amps on the pump motor. This corresponds to a run out flow of 7900 gpm for 2 loop pumps or 3950 for 1 pump at 0 psig RPV pressure. As Suppression Pool temperature Increases and level decreases, pump performance must be monitored for loss of adequate NPSH. L-------------------------------------------------~' 2.2.6 Throttle CORE SPRAY LOOP A{B) JB INJ SHUTOFF HV-252F005A(B) as required to support RPV level control:

a.

b.

c.

d.

< 90 amps and < 7900 gpm for two pump operation (emerg~ncy operation) < 90 amps and < 3950 gpm for one pump operation (emergency operation) < 6350 gpm for two pump operation (non-emergency operation). < 3175 gpm for single pump operation (non-emergency operation).

• -~-.:2:::,........ --~*--****.. ******-** *---**..

For !nformation Only PURCHASER USER LOCATION INGERSOLL-RAND ORDER NO. PUMP SERIAL NUMBERS PUMP APPLICATION PUMP SIZE NUMBER OF PUMP STAGES PUMP RATING General Electric Company Pennsvlvaoia Power And Light Company Susquehanna Nos. 1 & 2 Berwick, Pennsylvania 006-36051 1073-79 thru 80 Core Sprav Pumplsl 25 APJ<D 8 (Double Suction First Stage). 3176 GPM at 1780 RPM NET POSITiVE SUCTION HEAD REQUIRED @ 3175 GPM 4.5' (Ref. C.LSuction) TOTAL HEAD FEET @ 3175 GPM SUCTtON PRESSURE DISCHARGE PRESSURE

• PUMP EFFICIENCY @l 3175 GPM SHAFT PACKING 668' 125 PSI (Max.)

500 PSI (Max.} 83.5% Mechanical Seal PUMP DRIVER 700 H.P. Motor with 1.0 S.F. DRIVER MANUFACTURER APPROXIMATE WEIGHTS WEIGHT OF PUMP ELEMENT AND DISCHARGE HEAD WEIGHT OF THE SHELL TOTAL WEIGHT OF PUMP DRY WEIGHT OF WATER IN PUMP WEIGHT OF MOTOR. WEIGHT OF TOTAl FLOOR LOAD W(z. General Electric 5,560 lbs. 1,555 Lbs.. 7,115 lbs. 2,500 Lbs. 6,300 Lbs. 15.915 Lbs. '{7 Lh..fe t-3}}