LIC-12-0077, OPPD 90-Day Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 9.3, Emergency Preparedness, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
| ML12163A251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/2012 |
| From: | Bannister D Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-12-0077 | |
| Download: ML12163A251 (6) | |
Text
~~3 iiiiiiil Omaha Public Power District Fon Calhoun Station 9610 Power Lane Blair, NE 68008 June 8,2012 UC-12-0077 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
References:
- 1. Docket No. 50-285
- 2. Letter from NRC (E. J. Leeds & M. R. Johnson) to OPPD (D. J.
Bannister), "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal,Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)
- 3. Letter from OPPD (D. J. Bannister) to NRC (Document Control Desk),
"Omaha Public Power District's 60-Day Response to INRC letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of rnsights from the Fukushima Dai Ichi Accident,..." dated May 9, 2012 (LlC-12-0048)
Subject:
OPPD 90-Day,Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Reference 2 to all power reactor I'icensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 5 of the letter contains specific requested actions and requested information associated with Recommendation 9.3 for Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," paragraph (f), addressees were requested to submit a written response to the information requests.
The letter a'iso provided requested due dates for written responses.
In accordance with Reference 2, on May 9 2012, the Omaha Pub'lic Power District (OPPD) submitted (Reference 3) an alternative course of action for providing the requested information. The alternative course of action included revised due dates and the basis for those dates.
Employment with Equal Opportunity 4171
u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LlC-12-0077 Page 2 As described in Reference 3, the enclosure to this letter transmits responses to the following information requests.
Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness; Communications Request #2 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness; Staffing Request #3 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness; Staffing Request #4 Recommendation 9.3, Emergency Preparedness; Staffing Request #5 If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Bill Hansher at (402) 533-6894.
No commitments to the NRC are contained in this letter.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 8,2012.
Sincerely,
!lJ~.~
D. J. Bannister Site Vice President and CNO DJB/JKG/mle
Enclosure:
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
'Information Request Regarding Recommendation 9.3 of the Near Term Task Force Report c:
E. J. Leeds, Director of Office of Nuclear Regulation E. E. Collins, Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
LI C-12 -0077 Enclosure Page 1 Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Recommendation 9.3 of the Near Term Task Force Report Communications Request # 2:
Describe any interim actions that have been taken or are planned to be taken to enhance existing communications systems power supplies until the communications assessment and the resulting actions are complete.
OPPD Response:
The following interim actions have been taken or are planned.
- 1. Two (2) additional six (6)-unit battery charging cradles have been purchased as part of a temporary power supply to support charging hand held equipment during a complete loss of alternating current (ac) power.
Each radio has programming for more than nine (9) channels and is capable of communicating with the Washington County Sheriff's Department.
The existing emergency response and B.5.b. radios and batteries are used companywide and the present inventory of radios and batteries are sufficient for long-term use.
- 2. Twenty (20) satellite phones have been purchased to provide an alternate communications capability in the event of unavailab'ility of cellular and landline phones. These new satellite handsets will be distributed as needed to address the required emergency communications capabilities listed in NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities."
- 3. By October 30, 2012, OPPD intends to purchase eight (8) additional satellite phones to provide an alternate communications capability for local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) in the event of unavailability of cellular and landline phones. (AR 51965-11)
- 4. OPPD has purchased four (4) portable diesel powered generators for recharging handheld communications equipment such as radios and satellite handsets.
LlC-12-0077 Enclosure Page 2 Staffing Request # 3:
Identify how the augmented staff would be notified g,iven degraded communications capabilities.
OPPD Response:
During events that would affect the safe operation of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) or large-scale disasters when the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has not been activated and area communications (pagers, cell towers, internet, land line phone systems) are being challenged or are not working, FCS ERO personnel are expected to report to their Emergency Response Facility if they cannot contact the plant for additional guidance.
Self-activation expectations have been communicated to ERO staff and are being included in the 2012 ERO annual requalification training given to ERO personnel.
OPPD expects to complete these efforts by December 31,2012. (AR 51965-12)
LlC-12-0077 Enclosure Page 3 Staffing Request # 4:
Identify the methods of access (e.g., roadways, navigable bodies of water and dockage, airlift, etc.) to the site that are expected to be available after a widespread large-scale natural event.
OPPD Response:
Access to the site is available by means of vehicle or pedestrian traffic via two (2) plant access roads connecting to US Highway 75.
There are detour routes available to bypass obstructions or impediments along these roadways after a widespread large~
scale natural event.
To assist with staff augmentation, OPPD is proceeding to enhance agreements with the states of Nebraska and Iowa to better define logistical support for the transport of emergency responders to the site in the event of a large-scale natural disaster that inhibits access to the site. These agreements will also address the clearing of roads to the site. Emergency plans for Nebraska and Iowa include prov1isions to utilize National Guard support for land, water, and air transportation as conditions warrant.
OPPD expects to complete these efforts by October 30,2012. (AR 51965-13)
lIC-12-0077 Enclosure Page 4 Staffing Request # 5:
Identify any interim actions that have been taken or are planned prior to the completion of the staffing assessment.
OPPD Response:
None. OPPD is not planning to supplement FCS staff at this time. OPPD is currently assessing initial on-shift ERO staffing at FCS for station blackout (SBO) conditions in response to changes to 10 CFR Parts 50, Appendix E, Section IV(A)(9), required by December 24, 2012. Although limited to the time following the initiation of a design basis event until the on-shift ERO is augmented, this assessment is expected to provide an initial indication of the adequacy of the current staffing level and its ability to respond to a beyond design-basis SBO event.