ML112212200
| ML112212200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1990 |
| From: | Mineck D IES Utilities, (Formerly Iowa Electric Light & Power Co) |
| To: | Davis A NRC/OI/RGN-III/FO |
| Shared Package | |
| ML112212201 | List: |
| References | |
| CAL, NG-90-1791, NUDOCS 9007240047 | |
| Download: ML112212200 (228) | |
Text
ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM Ilk REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
RWSSION NBR:9007240047 DOC.DATE: 90/07/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-331 Duane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa Electric Light & Pow 05000331 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MINECK,D.L. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DAVIS,A.B. Region 3, Ofc of the Director
SUBJECT:
Forwards licensed operator requalification documentation of
. remedial & enhanced training,per 900713 CAL.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE42D TITLE:
COPIES RECEIVED:LTR Operator Licensing Examination Reports 2 ENCL +/- SIZE: _____
D NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL A PD3-3 PD 1 1 HALL,J.R. 1 1 D
INTERNAL: ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 NRR SHANKMAN,S 1 1 _ LRQ LHFB11 1 1 D NRR/DLPQ/LOLB10 1 1 REG IE02 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 S EXTERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOI P1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 13 ENCL 13
1owa Electric Light and Power Company July 20, 1990 NG-90-1791 Mr. A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Re: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Subject:
Licensed Operator Requalification Documentation of Remedial and Enhanced Training
Reference:
Confirmatory Action Letter, A.B. Davis to L. Liu, dated July 13, 1990 File: A-204h, A-204t
Dear Mr. Davis:
Please find enclosed copies of the examinations and evaluations in accordance wit h Item G. of the subject Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL). The enclosed documentation is for the first two crews which received the first 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of the enhanced training required by Item B. of the CAL.
This training. as well as the accelerated remedial training (CAL Item A.) is being conducted in segments of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> and 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. The examinations consist of evaluated simulator scenarios which are attached. Also attached are copies of the Instructor Guide, and Student Guides used during the first segment of enhanced training. In addition to this formal training, operators not in training are observing the simulator training sessions as their schedules allow.
If you have any questions, please contact either myseIf or Steve Swails, Training Superintendent, at (319)851-7795.
Very truly yours, C>
Daniel L. Mineck 7 :
C)
- Manager, Nuclear Generation DLM/SS Attachients: listed on Page 2
/
Mr. A. Bert Davis NG-90-1791 Page 2 Attachments: (1) Simulator Evaluation Sc enario Guides:
ESG-3, ESG-8, ESG-15 (2) Simulator Remedial Scenario Guides:
REM 90-1, REM 90-2, REM 90-3, REM 90-4, REM 90-5, REM 90-6, REM 90-7, REM 90-8, REM 90-9 (3) Licensed Operator Requal Exam Preparation (4) Instructor Guide, Licensed Operator Requal 500-008, IG No. H.10 (5) LOR 500-008, Student Guide TTT.12, "EOP-2, Primary Containment Control" (6) LOR 500-008, Student Guide TTT.19, "Alternate Level Control" (7) LOR 500-008, Student Guide TTT.20, "Emergency Depressurization" (8) LOR 500-008, Student Guide TTT.11, "EOP-1 RPV Control" (9) LOR 500-008, Student Guide TTT.16, "EOP ATWS" (10) LOR Remedial Training evaluations for 7/11/90 7/13/90 class (11) LOR Remedial Training evaluations for 7/14/90 7/16/90 class cc: S. Swails w/o L. Liu w/o L. Root w/o R. McGaughy w/o J.R. Hall (NRC-NRR) w/o NRC Resident Office w/o Document Control Desk (original ltr. w/a)
Commitment Control:
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 41 9F - /79/
DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC REQUALIFICATION EXAM SIMI LATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO GUIDE NUMBER 3 TITLE: Recire Pump Seal Failure/Small Steam Line Break Inside Containment DEVELOPED BY:
Date OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR APPROVAL: Name Name Dai6 TRAINING SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:
DC Dfat e Evaluation Scenario Guide 3
Rev. 2, 06f13/90 OBJECTIVES A. TERMINAL OBJECTIVE:
The operator, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
B. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status r' -ort to include:
- a. S tus of safety-related systerr , running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS wil:
- a. Identify all EOP entry conditions.
- b. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure, or containment parameters.
- c. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- d. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 3
Rev. 2, 06/13/90
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain that dant response is as predicte in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, an plant emergencies and repc. abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide tecinical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
I1. The NSOE/ANSOE will be able to perform the following operator actions, in response to plant events:
- a. Reduce Recirc and insert control rods per the pull sheet to exit forbidden zone.
- b. Isolate the "A" Recirc. Pump in response to seal failures.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 2
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
The plant is initially operating at approximately 100% power RCIC inop, 2404 and 2405 shut and tagged. A failure of the #1 seal for a recirculation pump has occurred, coolant leakage remains within limits. Sometime later a gradualfailurc of the #2 seal for the same recirculation pump occurs. The crew responds using annunciator response procedures to secure and isolate the recirculation pump but the suction valve fails to close. Procedures for single loop are utili7ed to meet requirements for operating on one recirculation loop. The operatorsoperation vent the drywell to reduce pressure. may An unisolable. small water line break occurs inside containment. The leak will pressurize containment to 2 psig resulting in reactor bhutdown and entry into EO'-1 and EOP-2. the The Feed pumps and condensate pumps :ip on overload and will no restart level control will he with HPCI and CR90 injecting. on the scram, The scenario is terminated as the crew is cooling down the reactor while maintaining has taken steps to control containment parameters. level and Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 3
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 SIMULATOR SETUP A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
- 1. Reset to IC 24, place simulator in RUN.
- 2. Ensure all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable.
B. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS Verifv E3 is RDPACC.LT.1460 and Type RMF ESG3 Time Malf. Description ET TD SEV RAMP1 t=0 RRllA Recirc Pump A Seal -- - 100%
t= 13 RRI lB Recirc Pump A Seal -,,2 10% 6 min t= scram FWO9 'A' & 'B' Feed Pump trips E3 A&B t= 0 RC02 RCIC Trip t= 30 RRI5A Recirc loop suction break 30% 5 min mm or 1.5 to 2 psig Drywell pressure t = scram FWO2 'A' & 'B' condensate E3 A&B pump trip C. OVERRIDES
- 1. Type ROR ESG3 "A" Recirc Suction Valve Indicating lights Red and Green OFF.
"A" Recirc Suction Valve HS to OPEN.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 4
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO
- 1. Attempt to isolate recirc pump RO/ANSOE Reduce Recirc flow (C.0024)
Close A DISCH Valve Secure Pump Close A DISCH BYP valve Close A SUCT valve
- 2. Direct required actions for loss of Recirc Pump due to sea' .ailure. SRO Order pump to be isolated (C.0020)
Order STP 46F002 started per Tech Specs
- a. Enter EOP I on all entry conditions (TTT.00 1)
- b. Direct level restoration to 170-211 (ensure level does not rise above 250")
- a. RPV level does not exceed 250".
- b. Direct initiation of torus spray and/or DW spray to reduce containment pressure prior to pressure reaching pressure suppression pressure limit.
- d. If exceed 280' Emergency Depressurize
- a. Satisfy containment spray logic (TTT.0012)
- b. Start RHR pump
- c. Open Inboard and Outboard DW spray valves
- 8. Notify state and county within 15 min., notify NRC within one hour SRO (the NRC notification may not be completed due to scenario time (UUU.0051) limit). Plant evacuation initiated. (UUU.0052)
(UUU.0052)
- 9. Perform STP 46F002 and reduce power with rods per the pull sheet. RO/ANSOE Note: Critical Tasks may be assigned to specific individuals; however, any crew member may perform the task without causing a failure of the assigned individual.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 5
Rev. 2. 06/13/90 SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS: Reactor power is at 100% and the Plant is near EOL and has just completed a two week mini-outage for MSIV repairs. STP 47D005-W Main Steam Isolation Valve exercise if due. In Day 2 of 7 day for RCIC INOP.
EQUIPMENT STATUS: RCIC INOP. FCGM work in progress.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 6
4 p
TIME/NOTES INSTRL-'"%R ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR U
V'
- 3. TO When the operators ha-e familiarized Crew commences 47D005-W Main Steam Isolation Valve C,, themselves with the current plant Exercise.
(7 I, conditions, direct them to perform a
-q 47D005-W Main Steam Isolation Valve 0
Exercise.
C, C T1-= 5 mn i i o I' AtiLvate malfunction RRI IB to initiate Respond to annunciator (ICO4A, D-4) "A" RECI RC failure of #2 seal of -A- recirc pump PUMP #2 SEAL HI FLOW 10% @360 sec ramp . Monitor seal pressures - determine #2 seal pressure When/as Recirc pump is isolated, insert decreasing override for 'A' pump suction valve ROR - Notify OSS, Operations Supervisor ESG3.
RO/ANSOE Override of Recirc Suction Valve will prevent closing. Remove "A" recirc pump from service prior to reaching DW pressure of 2 psig.
If requested respond as SANSOE and report mini purge on both pumps at
- Reduce recirc MG set to minimum 4 GPM. Trip recirc pump Secure mini-purge Attempt to isolate recirc pump by closing suction, discharge and discharge bypass valves.
- SRO/OSS Refer to Tech Spec for single loop operations with no baseline data.
- STP 46F002 started
- 01 264 used to secure or check pump secured
- Respond to increasing Drywell pressure
- ARP IC05B C-5
- Crew may vent the containment per OI 573
-J
TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR rp M Perform ARP (ICO4A, A-4) "A'~RECIRC MG DRIVE MOTOR TRIP Monitor APRM recorders for indication of reactor instability. If unstable (at least I APRM exhibit peak-to-peak swings greater than 10% and increasing trend in applitude of swings) manually scram.
a* RO/ANSOE Instructor verify rods are inserted as per Insert control, rods per pull sheet to exit single loop the pull sheet RSCS Group 8; rods forbidden region 18-27, 26-27, 26-19 and 18-19 should be inserted one notch at a time while :
maintaining "GROUP NOTCII GROUP CONTROL", no penalty if rod "double a Perform forward/reverse flow determination notches" as long as crew identifies and 0 Plot to verify outside forbidden region corrects. Perform APRM gain adjustment F-valuate thermal limits
__________________________
- Deternine APRM/LPRM noise T= 30 mim or @ Activate malfunction RRI5A at 30% 5 Respond to annunciator(IC05B, C-5) PRIMARY mini ramp Recirc Line Break Inside the CONTAINMENT Ill/LO PRESSURE HI DW PRESS Primary Containment if'necessary to ALARM maintain Drywell pressure for spraying (1.5 psig) and Drywell or depressurizing reactor. Check well water operating before 2 psig Drywell pressure a Vent the containment per 0f 573 if desired
- Verify proper operation of nitrogen makeup system 573 pek-o01 (CV-4312 and 4313 closed) 00
'1 U
F TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR U 1'
- 5. DW Press 2 psig When it becomes evident that drywell pressure increase cannot m~J 30% line break be kept below 2 psig U
- Reduce recirculation flow to minimum (not a 5.
C, requirement)
" Manually scram reactor a:
1, Perform immediate actions reactor scram IPOI 5
- Verify all control rods fully inserted
- Place the mode switch in SHUTDOWN
- Control eedwater to maintain 170'-2ll1
- Verify non-essential bus IA I and IA2 transfers to Startup Transform i
10
C p
TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY p EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR
- 5. T= 35
=
- SRO/OSS - When Drywell pressure reaches 2 psig, or as C,,
n I'
a result of level transient on scram enter EOP-1
= SRO/OSS- EPIP 1.1 for EAL assessment U
-w (alert BI)
- 5. SRO/OSS - State and county officials notified within C, 15 mn.
C n
- SRO/OSS - Plant evacuation - OSS initiates the evacuation alarm.
Verify isolations, ECCS initiations, SBDG initiations
- RO/ANSOE - Restore and maintain RPV level 170-211 (less than 250"
- CRD
- RO/NSOE - IIPCI - use HPCI to control vessel level
- Verify open CV-4371A (RC/P-2)
- Maintain cooldown rate of less than 100 0 F/hr
- May require securing steam loads in an attempt to control rate
- Secure equipment not required for adequate core cooling - IIPCI, CS, SBDG
- OSS/SRO - When Drywell pressure reaches other entry condition 2 psig (or met) enter EOP-2
- Place all available RIIR pumps not required if adequate core cooling in torus cooling.
- Operate all available drywell cooling
- Initiate torus sprays as directed to control containment pressure primary
- RO/NSOE - Initiate drywell sprays prior to reaching 280'F to control primary containment pressure and when directed. temperature,
TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR T= 50 min When RPV pressure reaches 450# Injection Valves M02003 4
and M02004 will open and LPCI will inject. OSS should direct the "A" loop be secured and the cross tie closed to ensure vessel overfill does not occur.
When the reactor is shutdown with water level and pressure under control, drywell/torus parameters improving under control, and the OSS has addressed the Emergency Plan actions, terminate the scenario by placing the simulator in freeze.
Rev. 2. 06/13/90 REFERENCES PROCEDURE SECTION PROCEDURE REVISION Operating Instructions 01 149 (RI-IR) 5.4 Of 264 (RECIRC 14 7.1 9 Integrated Plant Operating Instructions IPOI 3 4.0 6 IPOI 5 3.2 4
.innunciator Response Procedures IC04A A-5 ICO4A 6 A-4 6 1C04A D-5 IC05B3 6 C-5 10
- Emergency Operating Procedures EOP I RL/L, RCIP FOP 2 0 DW/T, PCIP 0 Emergency Plan EPIP 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 55 Surveillance Test Procedures STP 46F002 0 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 12
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 Failure of #1 Seal for "A"("B") Recirc Pump ENTRY CONDITION: Annunciator "A"("B") Recirc Pump Seal Staging HI/LO Flow K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 202001 Recirculation System A 1.09 3.3/3.3 A 1.10 2.6/2.7 A2.02 2.7/3.9 A2.10 3.5/3.9 A3.04 3.2/3.1 A4.11 3.2/3.3 SG #9 3.8/3.5 SG #12 3.6/3.3 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 13
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Annunciator "A"("B") Recirc Pump Seal Staging HI/LO Flow DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
Recirc (C) C.001I C.0011 C.0020 C.0020 C.0024 C.0024 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 14
Rev. 2, 06/13190 Failure of #2 Seal for "A"("B") Recire Pump with #1 Seal Previously Failed ENTRY CONDITION: Annunciator "A"("B") Recirc Pump #2 Seal HI/LO Flow K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 202001 Recirculation System A1.09 3.3/3.3 A2.02 3.7/3.9 A2.10 3.5/3.9 A3.04 3.2/3.1 A4.01 3.7/3.7 A4.02 3.5/3.4 A4.0'; 4.1/4.1 A4.r 1 3.7/3.7 A4 j9 3.7/3.7 A 4.11 3.2/3.3 A4.12 3.9/3.8 SG #9 3.8/3.5 SG 410 3.5/3.7 SG #11 3.4/4.2 SG #12 3.6/3.3 SG #13 3.6/3.4 202002 Recirculation Flow Control System A4.01 3.3/3.1 A4.04 3.8/3.8 A4.05 3.4/3.4 A4.07 3.3/3.2 A4.08 3.3/3.3 A4.09 3.2/3.3 SG #12 3.5/3.3 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 15
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Annunciator "A"("B") Recirc Pump Seal Staging HI/LO Flow DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
Recirc (C) C.011 C.020 C.012 C.024 C.020 C.024 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 16
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 ENTRY CONDITION: ARP ICOSB, C-5 Primary Containment HI/LO Pressure Due to Small Steam Line Break Inside Containment K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 295010 High Drywell Pressure Abnormal AAl.01 3.4/3.5 (normal < DW press < 2.0 psig) AA1.02 3.6/3.6 AA1.03 2.6i2.6 AAl.04 3.1/3.0 AA1.05 3.1/3.4 AAl.06 3.3/3.5 AA1.07 3.2/3.4 AA2.01 3.4/3.8 A A2.02 3.8/3.9
.A2.03 3.3/3.6 SG #6 3.8/3.9 SG #7 3.6/3.8 SG #9 3.7/3.6 223001 Primary Containment System and Auxiliaries A 1.02 3.6/3.7 A 1.10 3.4/3.6 A2.07 4.2/4.3 A4.07 4.2/4.1 A4.10 3.2/3.2 202002 Recirculation Flow Control System A1.01 3.2/3.2 A 1.05 3.6/3.6 A1.06 3.4/3.3 Al.07 3.1/3.1 A4.01 3.3/3.1 A4.04 3.8/3.8 A4.05 3.4/3.4 A4.07 3.3/3.2 A4.08 3.3/3.3 A4.09 3.2/3.3 SG #10 3.3/3.3 SG #13 3.6/3.4 261000 Standby Gas Treatment System Al.01 2.9/3.1 A 1.02 3.1/3.2 A4.04 3.3/3.4 A4.07 3.1/3.2 SG #10 3.1/3.3 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 17
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: ARP IC05B, C-5 Primary Containment HI/LO Pressure Due to Small Steam Line Break Inside Containment DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
Recirculation System (C) C.002 C.002 Containment System (II) 11.0037 11.0037 IPOI (SSS) SSS.0004 SSS.0004 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 18
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 ENTRY CONDITION: Manual Reactor Scram at Power K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO
- 4 -
295006 Scram Abnormal AAl.01 4.2/4.2 AA 1.02 3.9/3.8 AA1.03 3.7/3.7 AA 1.04 3.1/13.2 AA1.05 4.2/4.2 AAl.06 3.5/3.6 AAl.07 4.1/4.1 AA2.0I 4.5/4.6 AA2.02 4.3/4.4 AA2.03 4.0/4.2 AA2.04 4.1/4.1 AA2.05 4.6/4.6 SG #6 4.1/4 '
SG #10 4.1/.2 212000 RPS A 1.06 4.?,4.2 A 1.07 3.4/3.4 A 1.08 3.4/3.4 A1.11 3.4/3.3 A2.20 4.1/4.2 A4.01 4.6/4.6 A4.05 4.3/4.3 A4.06 4.2/4.1 A4.07 4.0/3.9 SG #9 4.2/4.2 SG #13 4.1/4.1 SG #14 4.3/4.4 201001 CRD Hydraulic System A2.04 3.8/3.9 214000 RPIS A2.02 3.6/3.7 A3.01 3.4/3.3 245000 Main Turbine Generator A2.04 3.7/3.8 A3.01 3.6/3.6 259001 Reactor Feedwater System A4.05 4.0/3.9 259002 Reactor Water Level Control System A4.01 3.8/3.6 A4.03 3.8/3.6 A4.06 3.1/3.2 215005 APRM/LPRM A2.04 3.8/3.9 215003 IRM A4.01 3.3/3.3 A4.03 3.6/3.4 A4.06 3.0/2.9 215004 SRM A4.01 3.9/3.8 A4.04 3.2/3.2 262001 A.C. Electrical Distribution A2.01 3.4/3.6 A3.01 3.1/3.2 A3.02 3.2/3.3 241000 Reactor/Turbine Pressure Regulating System A2.17 3.8/3.8 A2.19 3.8/3.8 A3.03 2.8/2.7 I_ A3.08 3.8/3.8 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 19
Rev. 2, 06f13/90 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Annunciator "A"("B") Recirc Pump Seal Staging 1-I/LO Flow DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
Recirc (C) C.002 C.002 V.010 V.016 V.016 Feedwater (BB) BB.0005 KKK.0030 B8.006 BB.0013 Ni's (1II) III.0029 KKK.0030 III.0031 KKK.0008 SSS.004 KKK (RPS) KKK.0030 KKK.0008 SSS IPOI's) SSS.004 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 20
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 ENTRY CONDITION: Drywell Pressure Above 2 PSIG K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 295024 High Drvwell Pressure Emergency EAl.01 4.1/4.0 EA 1.03 4.0/3.9 EA1.04 4.1/3.9 EA 1.05 3.9/4.0 EA 1.06 3.7/3.7 EA 1.07 3.8/3.9 EA1.10 3.4/3.6 EA 1.14 3.4/3.6 EA l.15 3.6/3.7 EA l.19 3.3/3.4 EA1.20 3.5/3.6 EA 1.21 3.4/3.8 EA2.01 4.2/4.4 EA2.02 3.9/4.0 EA2.03 3.8/3.8 EA2.04 3.9/3.9 EA2.08 3.6/4.0 SG #11 4.3/4.5 SG #12 3.9/4.5 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Annunciator "A"("B) Recirc Pump Seal Staging HI/LO Flow DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
HPCI N.0001 N.0001 CS M.0004 M.0001 RHR L.002 L.002 L.0016 L.0016 L.0009 L.0009 SBGT QQ.004 EOPs (TTT) TTT.011 TTT.011 TTT.012 TTT.012 Admin (UUU) UUU.0050 UUU.0052 UUU.0053 UUU.0051 Evaluation Scenario Guide 3 21
'& /7 9 /
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC REQUALIFICATION EXAM SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO GUIDE NUMBER 8 TITLE: MSL Rupture Outside Primary Containment DEVELOPED BY:
I me Date OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:
Name Date TRAINING SUPERVISOR APPROVAL: '2L 0- ' a2t D,
INam iiiC Date Evaluation Scenario Guide 8
Rev. I, 06/14/90 OBJECTIVES A. TERMINAL OBJECTIVE:
The operator, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
B. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOF will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installcd instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Identify all EOP entry conditions.
- b. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure, or containment parameters.
- c. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- d. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 8
Rev. 1, 06114/90
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain that plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
- 11. The NSOE/ANSOE will be able to perform the following operator actions, in response to plant events:
- a. Conducts all rod movement lAW pull sheet.
- b. Diagnoses failed Group I isolation.
- c. Restores and maintains RPV level 170-211.
- d. Recognize the stuck rod.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 2
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
The plant is operating at approximately 80% power both condensate and Feed pumps in service. The crew will pull rods per the pull sheet and reactor engineering to increase load line.
The crew will assume the watch and commence pulling rods per the sequance pull sheet. When rod 18-19 is selected it will become stuck. Rod 18-19 can not be moved, this will require Tech Spec evaluation of a stuc/inop control rod per Section 3.3 of Tech Specs.
A leak in the RWCU Heat Exchanger room occurs and M02700 trips and fails to isolate. The operators will enter EOP-3 and ARP's, reducing power and inserting a scram.
A MSL Rupture Outside Primary Containment occurs producing a Group I Isolation with the failure of 'A' line MSIV's to close. The turbine and RFPs may trip on the high level produced by the rapid depressurization. Operator action is needed to restore Feedwater flow, use HPCI/RCIC for pressure control. ESW and RIIRSW are placed in service to support RCIC/IIPCI operation and torus cooling. The crew begins a controlled cooldown of the reactor, or emergency depressurizes if required.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 3
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 SIMULATOR SETUP A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
- 1. Reset to I.C. 36 (59% .power, RWM Step 34)
- 2. Insert overrides ZDIH-PH1S2238, ZDIIIPIIS2239 OPEN
- 3. Verify rod pull sheet correct and IPOI-3 signal aired in progress B. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS Verify E17 is RDPACC <1460 or RRNDEMI <62 and Type RMF ESG8 Time Malf. Description ET DEL SEV. RAMP 0 MSO5A CV 4412 Group 1 100 Isolation Fail 0 MSO5B CV 4413 Group I 100 Isolation Fail 0 RDO2 18-19 stuck rod 18-19 15 CUIO Leak in lx room 2 300 sec 30 or MSO8 HPCI steam line break in E17 2%
MS08 tunnel when scram occurs C. Remote Functions HVO6 850 ROR ESG 8 ROR ESG 8a for CUMO2700 fail to isolate.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 9 4
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO
- 1. Recognizes stuck control rod RO/NSOE
- a. Tech Spec inop rod determined per 3.3 SRO
- a. Enters EOP I on low level or hi pressure
- b. Directs level restoration to 170-211.
- 3. Crew verifies isolations and maintains level RO/ANSOE
- a. Crew restores and maints RPV level 170-211 RO/ANSOE
- 1) Level does not exceed 250"
- a. Cleanup leak detection EOP-3 entry
- b. Steam tunnel Hi temperature or Hi radiation EOP-3 entered
- 5. Crew recognizes I main steam line die not isolate SRO/RO/
NSOE
- 6. If Emergency Depressurization is required, Emergency Depressurization directed. RO/NSOE
- 7. Crew recognizes all rods did not insert RO/ANSOE Note: Specific Critical Tasks may be assigned to specific individuals; however, any crew member may perform the task without causing a Failure of the assigned individual.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 5
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS: Reactor up power in progress pulling rods to increase load line per Reactor Engineering, power z8O%. Pulling rods to the target rod pattern per IPOI 3.
EQUIPMENT STATUS: No inop equipment.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 6
TIMEfNOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR To When the operators have familiarized themselves with the current plant conditions, direct power increase by pulling rods. CZ 0
- Respond as SANSOE, when directed to adjust F/D effluent flows.
Crew increases power utilizing rods in accordance with IPOI 3 and pull sheet.
- Limit step change in power to 5% and overall rate of power change
______________________________________to less than I % 1 minute.
t 10 Act as Reactor Engineer and have them place RONSO E - Crew recognizes stuck rod.
group rods at same position and tell them will investigate. 1. Perform AOP 255.1 for stuck rod.
- increase drive pressure Act as Tech Support and confirm 48 hr. LCO. double clutch
-SRO/OSS
- 2. Declare rod inop per TS 3.3
________________3.
STP for mnop rod.
t= 15 min IMF CUl0 at 2% Crew responds to Hi steam leak and/or hi DT alarm.
300 sec ramp, ROR ESG 8A ARP IC04B B4 and/or D4 Act as SANSOE/ANSOE and inform control breaker will not reset on M02700 and inform I C21 checked control water coming out under door. Camera cannot see anything. Report steam tunnel 5R0/OSS enters EOP 3 on HI Temp or AT temperatures 3200 if Steam Tunnel Hi Temp T alarms in.
Manual scram initiated.
INST. NOTE: malfunctieonchange8n2poandtocontinueveatll=ate If reactor scram occurs insert m If plant scrams note of.poer/chang one rod did not go full in.
.EOP AWS not required since TS 3.3 for shutdown margin allows
- Sdetermining plant shutdown.
-4
TIMEfNOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR T= 30 min Activate MAL.F MS08 2% MSI. Rupture inside OSS/SRO - Crew enters EOP-I on reactor vessel low water level/high Primary containment. pressure following scram and Group I Isolation.
44
- OSS/SRO
-RC-I EAL-EPIP 1.1 Alert (B-2) Plant Evacuated
=RC-2 Carryout IPOI Reactor Scram, Immediate Actions R/ANSOE - RC-4 Verify isolations, manually close CV 4412 and CV 4413 R/ANSOE-RCL- Restore and maintain RPV water level 170-211'
-RC/P-2 Verify CV 4371A open aeRC/P-5 Depressurize/cooldown at less than s ty/hr A rRCtQ-t Verify all rods inserted
-RC/Q-4 Exit RC/Q to IPOI 5
- SRO/OSS - Crew enters EOP-3 on hi temperature or hi rad in steam tunnel.
SRO/OSS - Crew recognizes I steam line did not isolate.
Cew begins normal cooldown/depressurization to reduce leak per 11RC-2 -4 or IPO-5,or use I3PVs or SRVs to control pressure and cooldown.
- SRO/OSS- If Emergency Depressurization is required Verify torus level > R4.5 leet
- Verify reactor shutdown
- Prevent initiation from low pressure systems not required for level control if level goes below 46.5 or drywell pressure is greater than 2 psig.
R/NSOE - opens 4ADS SRVs when directed.
Crew operates plant systems to support EOP activities
-ESW
- RC R in Torus Cooling
-HPCI/RCIC Room Cooling Units
-SI3GT t= 50 mI When the reactor is shutdown with water level under control, pressure being intentionally lowered, containment parameters under control, and the OSS has addressed the Emergency Plan Actions, terminate the scenario by placing the simulator inVFreeze.
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 REFERENCES
-PROCEDURE SECTION PROCEDURE REVISION Operating Instructions OI 255 (CRD) 3.6 11 Of 644 (Feedwater)
Integrated Plant Operating Inst IPOI 3 4.0 6 IPOI 5 3.2 4 IPOI 4 Annunciator Response Procedures ARP IC07B B-2 12 ARP IC05A C-1 11 ICO4A D-2 (D-8) 6 Emergency Operating Procedures EOP I RC, RC/L, RC/P 0 EOP 3 SfT 0 Emergency Plant Implementing Procedures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 55 Abnormal Operating Procedures AOP 255.1 Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 9
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 ENTRY CONDITION: Placing Second Reactor Feed Pump in Operation K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 259001 Reactor Feedwater A1.01 3.3/3.3 A1.03 2.8/2.8 A4.01 3.6/3.5 A4.02 3.9/3.7 A4.04 3.1/2.9 A4.05 4.0/3.9 A4.07 3.3/3.2 A4.08 3.3/3.3 SG #9 3.7/3.5 SG #10 3.2/3.3 SG #13 3.6/3.4 259002 Reactor Water Level Control Al.01 3.8/3.8 Al.02 3.6/3.5 A 1.04 3.6/3.6 A 1.05 2.9/2.9 A3.02 3.4/3.4 A3.04 3.2/3.2 A4.01 3.8/3.6 A4.02 3.7/3.6 A4.03 3.8/3.6 SG #9 3.8/3.6 SG #13 3.8/3.5 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Placing Second Reactor Feed Pump in Operation DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
Feedwater (BB) 1313.0018 BB0018 Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 10
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 ENTRY CONDITION: Any Auto Reactor Scram Signal - Full Scram K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 212000 RPS A 1.06 4.2/4.2 Al .07 3.4/3.4 A 1.08 3.4/3.4 A 1.11 3.4/3.3 A2.20 4.1/4.2 A3.01 4.4/4.4 A3.03 4.2/4.2 A3.04 3.9/3.8 A3.05 3.9/3.9 A3.07 3.6/3.6 SG #13 4.1/4.1 SG #14 4.3/4.4 295006 Scram Abnormal Plant Evolution AAl.01 4.2/4.2 AA 1.02 3.9/3.8 AA1.03 3.7/3.7 AAl.04 3.1/3.2 AA 1.05 4.2/4.2 AA1.06 3.5/3.6 AA1.07 4.1/4.1 AA2.01 4.5/4.6 AA2.02 4.3/4.4 AA2.03 4.0/4.2 AA2.04 4.1/4.1 AA2.05 4.6/4.6 AA2.06 3.5/3.8 SG #6 4.1/4.2 SG #10 4.1/4.2 SG #11 4.3/4.5 SG #12 3.8/4.4 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Any Auto Reactor Scram Signal DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
IPOI (SSS) **SSS.004 **SSS.004 UUU.018 Admin (UUU) UUU.027 Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 II
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 ENTRY CONDITION: MALF MSO4A - MSL "A" Rupture Inside Primary Containment/W MSIV Failure K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 239001 Main and Reheat Steam System A2.04 3.5/3.6 A2.07 3.8/3.9 A2.11 4.1/4.3 A2.12 4.2/4.3 A3.01 4.2/4.1 A4.03 3.5/3.5 A4.04 3.8/3.7 A4.05 2.7/2.7 A4.06 3.6/3.8 A4.07 3.3/3.3 A4.08 3.7/3.7 A4.09 3.9/3.9 A4.10 3.8/3.8 SG #15 4.2/4.3 223002 PCIS/NSSS A2.09 3.6/3.7 A3.01 3.4/3.4 A3.02 3.5/3.5 SG #15 4.1/4.3 Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 12
Rev. 1, 06/14/90 ENTRY CONDITION:
K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 295033 HIGH Secondary Containment Temp. EKlI.0 3.6/3.8 EK 1.02 3.6/4.0 EK3.01 3.5/3.8 EA1.05 3.7/3.9 SG #1 3.1/4.0 SG #2 2.9/4.4 SG #6 3.8/3.7 SG #10 3.8/3.6 SG #11 4.1/4.2 SG #12 3.6/4.4 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: MALF MSO4A - MSL "A"Rupture Inside Primary Containment/W MSIV Failure DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
EOP's (TTT) TTT.001 1 TTT.001 1 TTT.0020 TTT.0020 Administrative (UUU) UUU.0050 UUU.0051 UUU.0052 UUU.0053 Evaluation Scenario Guide 8 13
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 A4-tn.
DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC REQUALIFICATION EXAM SIMULATOR EVALUATIC N SCENARIO GUIDE NUMBER 15 TITLE: ATWS W/SORV DEVELOPED BY:
OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:
Name Date TRAINING SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:
Name Date Evaluation Scenario Guide 15
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 OBJECTIVES A. TERMINAL OBJECTIVE:
The operator, acting as a member ofa shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
B. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and in( erable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Identify all EOP entry conditions.
- b. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure, or containment parameters.
- c. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- d. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 1
Rev. 2, 06/13/90
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain that plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during trar ,ients, accidents ind plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate efTective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
I1. The NSOE/ANSOE will be able to perform the following operator actions, in response to plant events:
- a. Predict the impact of ADS/LLS valve operation on torus temperature and tailpipe temperature and determine appropriate mitigating actions. (D.02.01)
- b. Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV water level.
(TTT. 11.02)
- c. Evaluate SBLC condition and determine if system has responded properly to initiation. (0.05.02)
- d. Evaluate plant status and take appropriate actions to achieve a shutdown condition. (TTT. 16.22)
Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 2
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
When shift is assumed, Core Spray pump trips during STP 45A001-LCO. The operators check Tech Specs to verify operability. Then PSV 4407 fails open. The crew attempts to close PSV 4407 but is unable to. When a reactor scram is attempted, the crew will not be able to scram and enters ATWS-EOP. The resulting torus heatup will force the crew to inject with SBLC and perform power level control. The loss of both CRD pumps will not allow the rods to be manually inserted. The reactor can only be scrammed by depressurizing RPS scram air headers. ATWS FOP and EOP-2 procedures are entered and the scenario will be secured after the reactor is shutdown, RPV level is stabilized, and torus cooling is established.
Evaluation Scenario Guide IS 3
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 SIIULATOR SETUP A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
- 1. Reset to IC 25.
- 2. ragout 'B' RIIR, 'C' Well Water, and 'A' CRD pump.
- 3. Place 'A' RIIR in torus cooling; ensure 'A' ESW pump running.
- 4. Override recirc hi temp alarm and Aux xfmr alarms off, IC04A D-6 and IC08B C-5.
B. SCENARIO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
- 1. Use bad lite bulbs for lites on all tagg . pumps.
- 2. RIIR pump inop package done except for core spray.
C. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS Verify E 5 is RPDI Shutdown EQ. true Type RMF ESG 15 Malfunction F.
Time No. Malfunction Title ET Delay Sev. Ramp Sev t= 0 SW21C 'C' Well Water Pump Trip t= 0 RHOlB RHR Pump Trip t= 0 RPO5A RPS Auto Scram Fail t= 0 RPOSB RPS Manual Scram Fail t=O RP05C ATWS ARI Fail t=0 AD01HI PSV 4407 Fails Open 100% 3:00 t= 0 RPO5D RPS Fuse Note: Insert after directed to and power < 5% .
t= 20 RDI3 Loss of RPS Air 100% 5:00 t=0 RDIlIA 'A'CRD Pump Trip t= scram RDIlB B CRD Pump Trip E5 t= CSOIA or B A or B CS pump trip , _I _ I_
Note: When directed to bypass MSIV Lo-Lo-Lo, type in ror defeat 5. rmf defeat Sa and rmf defeat 5b can be used if all MSIV isolations are to be bypassed.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 4
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 D. LIST OF OVERRIDES
- When PSV 4407 fuses simulated pulled, TYPE ROR PSV7
- TYPE in ROR ESG 15
- ROR Defeat 5 for MSIV Lo-Lo-Lo level isolation override Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 5
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO
- 1. Perform required actions for SRV Tailpipe Hi Press. alarm RO/NSOE
- a. Reduce Recirc to minimum and manually scram reactor D.0002
- c. Upon re-entering EOP 1, direct level restoration to 170-211
- a. Level does not exceed 250" TTT.00 11
- 4. Direct required actions for ATWS-EOP SRO
- a. Inject with SBLC prior to torus water temp. reaching I 10'F TTT.0016
- c. Override MSIV Lo-Lo-Lo isolation
- 5. Manually inject with SBLC when directed RO/ANSOE 0.0005
- a. Level does not fall below -30 inches TTT.0016
- 7. Shutdown reactor as directed by OSS. RO/NSOE
- a. Perform EOP-C's as directed TTT.00 17
- a. Enter on torus water temp. > 95*F TTT.0012
- b. Direct torus cooling (maximize)
- 9. Maximize torus cooling as directed. RO/NSOE
- a. Place additional RHR and RHR-SW pumps in operation as L.0009 directed.
- 11. Notify State/County within 15 min. SRO Notify NRC within one hour UUU.0051 Evacuate Plant (Sound Evac. Alarm) UUU.0052
- 12. Determine Tech Spec operability requirements for one core spray and SRO one RHR pump inop Note: Critical tasks may be assigned to specific individuals; however, any crew member may perform the task without causing a failure of the assigned individual.
Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 6
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDTIONS: EOL Steady State at 100%
Torus Hot at 90'F due to IIPCI operability testing.
Plant is immediate 30 day LCO due to hearing replacement on 'B' RIR. Inop package done except for core spray.
EQUIPMENT STATUS: 'B' RIR Inop (bearing replacement)
'C' Well Water Pump Inop (breaker replacement)
'A' CRD pump motor bearing replacement Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 7
TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR t=0 Crew assumes shift and starts core spray Oss directs completion of STP 45A001-LCO.
STP 45A001-LC6, SANSOE respond Crew starts STP.
C6 with normal lubricant levels on pumps ro and pumps check out fine, room coolers U;
are on and air flow is fine, both RIR pumps running.
t= 5 Insert maliunction CSOIA or CSOB RO notes core spray pump tripped and informs OSS.
depending on first core spray pump started. SANSOE responds with core
- SRO/OSS determines LCO requirements with spray pump and room looks fine. Aux I RHR and I CS pump inop.
respond with CS overloads tripped.
t= 15 Insert malfunction ADOIlI at 100% over
- RO/NSOE Perform required actions for SRV/tailpipe a 3 minute ramp. I-li Press. Alarm per ARP IC31A B-5 and as directed.
When RO has simulated pulling fuses . Diagnose PSV 4407 open type in Cycle affected handswitch a Deenergize PSV 4407 by pulling fuses on IC45 "ROR PSV7" this will: a Reduce Recirc to m a Override ofl all SRV tailpipe li a Attempt to manually scram reactor Press. lights on IC21I a Override off red and green lights SRO/OSS Perform required actions for EOP-2 For PSV4407 Place torus cooling on service
- Override off amber lights for Drain torus level PSV 4404, 4405, 4406, 4407
- Override off amber lights for 'B'
- AS 0
rS IC03
0 TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR 0 t= 20 When mode switch taken to shutdown, Operators note pump tripped, send SANSOE and Aux to verify RDIIB is active. On 'B' CRD check.
pump Aux report lockout trip on
- SRO/OSS Perform required actions for EOP I o,
overload.
Enter EOP I due to -Scram required with power above 5%
Exit EOP I and enter ATWS-EOP When directed to bypass MSIV
- RO/ANSOE restore level as directed by OSS in EOP I Lo-Lo-Lo isolation type in ror defeatS
- RO/ANSOE Perform required actions for ATWS-EOP as As any operator/SANSOE respond to directed.
depressurize RPS scram air header when Initiate ARI directed and when Rx power < 5%. Inject with Boron prior to Boron Injection IMF RD I3 100 300 sec. ramp Initiation Temp (I10'F)
Lockout ADS When crew attempts to scram using Lower RPV level by securing all injection into RPV except scram test switches, inform them that SBLC and CRD they are to assume all switches are in Stablize RPV pressure < 1055 psig TOST. Perform OP C's as directed.
Respond as Radwaste that can take all
- SRO/OSS Direct actions per EOP-2 If entered water sent.
- RO/NSOE Maximize torus cooling as directed t= 30
- SRO/OSS Exit Arws-EOP and enter OP I after all rods are inserted, restore RPV level to 170-211 t= 45 When rcactor pressure <7M4 remove Adirected.
- SRO/OSS Notify State/County within 15 min.
Respond as Aux to start [logger. Notify NRC within I hour
[hlat hogger is ready to start.
IiSRO/OSS Initiate Plant evacuation t= 50 when reactor witherminate Br pio shutdown, torus watI tnemp is decreasing and EEIO actions have heen careed out. s
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 REFERENCES PROCEDURE SECTION PROCEDURE REVISION Annunciator Response Procedures B3-5 16 ARP ICO3A C-I Integrated Plant Operating Instructions 3.1, 3.2 4 IPOI 5 Emergency Operating P ocedures All 0 T/T, T/L 0 All 0 EOP 2 5.0 10 ATWS-EOP EOP C's Emergency Plant Implementing Procedures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 57 EPIP's Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 10
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 Stuck Open Relief Valve/DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Stuck Open Relief Valve K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO Automatic Depressurization System 218000 A 1.01 3.4/3.6 A1.04 4.1/4.2 A 1.05 4.1/4.1 A 1.06 4.1/4.3 A3.01 4.2/4.3 A3.04 3.7/3.8 A3.05 3.6/3.7 A3.06 3.9/3.9 A4.01 4.4/4.4 A4.08 3.7/3.8 A4.09 3.9/3.9 SG 9 4.4/4.1 SG 12 4.0/3.8 SG 13 3.9/3.8 SG 15 4.2/4.4 High Suppression Pool Temp. 295013 AAl.01 3.9/3.9 AA1.02 3.9/3.9 AA2.01 3.8/4.0 SG 6 3.6/3.7 SG 11 4.1/4.4 SG 12 3.6/4.2 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Stuck Open Relief Valve DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
ADS/LLS D.0006 D.0006 RHR (L) L.0009 L.0009 EOP's (TTT) TTT.0012 TTT.0012 Evaluation Scenario Guide 15 II
Rev. 2, 06/13/90 ATWS/DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: ATWS K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO Scram Condition Present and Reactor Power above EA 1.01 4.6/4.6 APRM Downscale or Unknown EA 1.03 4.1/4.1 EA 1.04 4.5/4.5 EA 1.05 3.9/4.0 EA 1.06 3.6/3.6 EA 1.07 4.2/4.3 EA 1.08 4.1/4.2 EA 2.01 4.3/4.4 EA 2.02 4.0/4.1 EA 2.03 4.2/4.3 A 2.04 4.0/4.1 A 2.05 4.4/4.7 EA 2.06 3.9/4.6 SG 11 SG 12 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: ATWS DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.
CRD (A) A.0070 A.0070 A.0055 A.0055 A.0059 A.0059 RPS (KKK) KKK.0032 KKK.0032 KKK.0034 K K K.0034 EOP's (TTT) TTT.0016 TTT.0016 ADMIN (UUU) UUU.0050 UUU.0051 UUU.0052 Evaluation Scenario Guide IS 12
/U /79 REM 90-1 LEAK OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALIFJN('TIONS/OVR:
SW34C RllRSW Pump Trip IC-20, 100% maximum decay heat MS28A MO-2700 fails to close CU10 Leakage outside containment C RIRSW pump lights MO-2700 indicating lights and handswitches MS05A MSIV disc failure MS08 Steam leakage in tunnel PROCEDURES:
EOP 3. Rev. 0, 06/16/89 STP 471)003, Rev. 0, 08/21/89 01 734, Rev. 6, 12/15/89 ARP IC35A C-3, Rev. 7, 10/20/89 ATTACI IMENTS:
(1) Shift Turnover Forms (2) Partially complete STP 47D003 (3) Tag for C RHRSW pump
SUMMARY
During the performance of STP 471)003, a leak outside primary containment will develop.
The operators will be required to execute EOP-3.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DUIRATION: 2 lIrs.
QUALIFICATIONS: 6c. (17c), 33 Rev. 1 REM 90-1 07/12/90 -I- Leak Outside Primary Containment
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures. as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room. the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- c. Direct.plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating, Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure, flow. etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
Rev. I REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
- 11. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the Classroom Training Material:
TTT 18 Explain the goal of FOP 3 and relate this goal to the overall strategy of the EOPs.
TYT 19 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action for a Primary System Leak into secondary containment.
Rev. I REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Ensure compliance with Tech Spec. 3.7.D SRO (A OSS)
Directs Rx Scram prior to any max safe operating limit being reached. SRO (A OSS)
Manually Scram Rx when directed RO (NSOE)
Direct Emerg. Depress. if two like parameters exceed max safe operating limit. SRO (A OSS)
Initiate Emerg. Depress. when directed RO (ANSOE)
Declare EPIP EAT B-2 SRO (A OSS)
Notify State/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Does not enter FOP-I in time.
- 2. Fails to use bypass valves to depressurize.
Rev. 1 REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTVITY NOTE: Critical Tasks are indicated by a C
- 1. SIMULATOR INITIAL CONDITION: next to the Trainee Action.
Reset to IC-20 Insert malfunction SW34C (RI-IRSW ump trip) and override the pump breaker lights off on IC03.
Insert malfunction MS05A at 100%
severity.
Place simulator in Run.
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Conduct shift turnover, board walkdown, A. Assign Shift Positions. and assume shift positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
- 1. Give Turnover Forms to students.
- 2. Initial Conditions.
o 100% power o STP 47D003 in progress, all sections requiring jumpers are complete.
o C RHRSW is tagged for motor inspection.
Day number 3of LCO.
Ill. EXERCISE (RO) Continue with STP 47)003.
When requested provide the following Remove RWCIJ from service.
information:
o Chemistry has shifted conductivity monitoring point.
o 2ndAssistant is ready to remove RWCU demins from service.
When asked, remove the demins from service using remote functions CU01 and CU02.
When RWCU is being restored to service perform the following:
o When MO-2700 is open > 75%,
override the valve indicating lights off on IC04 and PC mimic.
o Override MO-2700 handswitch to Rev. 1 REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY open.
o Insert malfunction MS 28A (RO) Diagnose loss of power to MO-2700.
(MO-2700 fails to close).
o Insert malfunction CUIO C(SRO) Ensures compliance with Technical (leakage outside primary Specification 3.7.D.
containment). Ramp from as is to 100% severity over a (RO) Recognize failure of RWCU to isolate 30 minute time delay. as leakage increases.
When requested, provide the (SRO) Recognizes EOP-3 entry condition.
following information: C(SRO) prior to reaching any max safe operating limit directs Reactor Scram.
o Steam is leaking from RWCU pump room. C(RO) When directed manually scrams and carries out IPOI-5 actions:
After Reactor Scram, insert o verify rods in malfunction MS08, Ramp from 0 to o control level 3% over 2 minutes.
o place mode switch in shutdown o complete turbine shutdown o insert IRMs/SRMs (SRO) Direct operators to depressurize through the bypass valvCs.
(RO) Recognizes failure to complete (P I isolation.
C(SRO) Directs emergency depressurization if two like parameters exceed max safe operating limit.
C(RO) Opens 4 ADS SRVs if directed.
(SRO) Makes appropriate notifcations.
C(SRO) Initiates plant evacuation.
Terminate Scenario when plant conditions are stable or operators are making preparations for shutdown cooling.
IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE Discuss major problems and OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, questions about the exercise.
comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
Rev. I REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
TRAINEF ACTIVITY INSTRuCTOR ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
Rev. 1 REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
DEVELOPED BY:
Joseph Bennett Datc SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to dcvclopment/approval process.
Rev. 1 REM 90-1 07/12/90 Leak Outside Primary Containment
2 REM 90-2 LOCA WITH PARTIAL LOSS OF ESSENTIAL POWER AND INSTRUMENT AC INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
EDI3F Inverter 1)15 trouble IC-20. 100% power max RRI5A LOCA decay heat ED08C Bus IA3 fault MO-1902 IIS to close PROCEDURES:
EOP 1, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 EOP 2, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 RPV,/F, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 AOP 301, Rev. 3, 11/20/89 AOP 317, Rev. 10, 06/08/89 ED, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 ATTACHMENTS:
- 1. Shift turnover forms
- 2. Drvwell leakage calculations
SUMMARY
A small steam leak will result in a reactor scram. When ECCS are actuated due to high drywell pressure, a loss of one essential bus will occur. Due to the electrical lincup, this will cause a loss of one side of instrument AC. The leak will increase suliciently to require entry into RPV/F., due to DW temperature and RPV pressure and conditions.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 IHr QUALIFICATIONS: 6A (17a), 8B (19b), 8d (19d), 24c. 33 Rev. 1 REM 90-2 07/12/90 -I- LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance, i.e., pressure, flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
Rev. I REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essentii Power and Instrument AC
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
- 11. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- a. Main Electrical CCC.12 Evaluate loss of any bus(ses) and determine the impact of loss on plant equipment.
CCC.15 Recognize the difference between loss of equipment due to LOAD SHED and the loss of equipment due to loss of power CCC.16 Determine appropriate procedural support for evaluation and operation of electrical busses in normal or abnormal conditions.
CCC.18 Recognize and respond to any EOP Entry conditions reached as a result of loss of portions of the electrical distribution system.
- b. Instrument AC EEE.01 Evaluate plant conditions and recognize a loss of Instrument A.C.
EEE.02 Determine the effects on plant equipment when Instrument A.C. is lost to either IYII or lY21.
EEE.03 Determine the appropriate actions to take to restore the plant to a safe condition following a loss of Instrum ent A.C.
- c. RPV/F TTT.23 Explain the goal of RPV Flooding and relate the use of RPV F to the overall goals of the EOPs.
TTT.24 Determine the actions to be taken if adequate core cooling cannot be assured after having attempted injection with all available systems.
Rev. I REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS:
CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Direct DW spray prior to reaching 2800F or after torus press exceeds 9 psig SRO if allowed by drywell spray initiation graph. (A OSS)
Attempt to initiate DW sprays prior to 280'F when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Direct Emergency Depressurization if DW temp cannot be maintained SRO
<2800 F. (A OSS)
Initiate Emerg. Depress. when directed. RO (NSOE)
Direct level restoration by establishing minimum flooding pressure and SRO isolating MSIV's, Main Steamline Drains, and RCIC. (A OSS)
Restore level by injecting with systems as necessary to establish minimum RO flooding pressure when directed. (ANSOE)
Declare EPIP EAL Al. SRO (A OSS)
Notify State/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Calculates leakage > 5 gpm and informs OSS. RO (NSOE)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Does not enter RPV/F
- 2. Overrides 2/3 core covered interlock Rev. 1 REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY
- 1. SIMULATOR INITIAL CONDITION:
Reset to IC-20 Place simulator in run Insert malfunction EDI3F Reduce power to 95%
Pump DW sumps and take a set of integrator readings Override MO-1902 HS closed via override (ori rhhs)
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING A. Assign Shift Positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
o lYl I is being powered Conduct shift turnover, and assume shift from regulating positions.
Transformer (IYIA) because of work on inverter 1D15.
o D vell unidentified leakage has shown a steady increase over last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Decision to start shutdown was made about an hour ago. Just got started in IP0I-3 a few minutes ago.
Load dispatcher agrees with 3 M WE per minute decrease rate.
o Need to pump sumps every hour to check leakage.
III. EXERCISE (SRO) Directs ROs to continue power reduction per IPOI-3.
Insert malfunction RRI5A. (RO) Reduces RECIRC flow Ramp from 0 to 2% severity over 20 minutes.
(RO) Notes drywell pressure and Rev. I REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIwVIT INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY temperature increase or responds to alarm IC04 D-2 (Floor drain sump hi leakage).
C(RO) Calculates leakage at > 5 gpm (SRO) Directs ROs to increase rate of shutdown. Recognize Tech Spec. required S/D.
C(SRO) Notify State, County, NRC.
(RO) Monitors drywell pressure and temperature increases.
(SRO) May direct venting per 01 573 Section 6.1 or ARP IC05B C-5.
(RO) Vents per 01 573.
When this is directed, set ramp time (SRO) Directs manual scram.
on RRI5A to zero.
When core spray pump A (SRO) Enters EOP-i and EOP-2 due to high drywell pressure.
automatically starts at 2 psig DW pressure, insert malfunction EDO8C (SRO) Recognizes loss of IA3 and lYll .
(Bus IA3 fault) irects actions per AOP 301 Tab 1, and AOP 317 Tab 1.
When requested, provide the (RO) Performs IPOl-5 actions following information: Recognizes failure of a RECIRC pump to runback and trips pump o At IA3, the lockout relays for the (RO) Recognizes loss of instrument air due core spray pump and the bus are to loss of power.
both tripped.
(SRO) Directs use of Torus spray per EOP-2.
(RO) Initiates Torus spray using B RHR, does not override 2/3 core coverage interlock (SRO) Recognize SBDG "A"running with no ESW.
(RO) Secures "A"SBDG.
NOTE: Operators need to Read T/T C(SRO) Directs use of drywell sprays to and DW/T at Backpanel IC-29. maintain drvwell temperature <2800.
After Torus sprays are initiated, (SRO) Does not use bypass valves to depressurize since CIRC water is shutdown.
increase severity of RRI5A to 10%
over a 2 minute ramp rate. C(RO) Attempts to initiate drywell sprays, Rev. I REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITV INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY (does not override 2/3 core coverage interlock).
C(SRO) Directs opening 4 ADS valves when DW/T cannot be maintained 5 280 0 F or Level < 15".
Increase severity of RRI5A slowly, (SRO) Enters RPV/F when drywell temp as necessary to require RPV/F entry. and reactor pressure require.
Do not exceed 20%
C(SRO) Directs Level restoration by establishing minimum flooding pressure.
C(RO) Restores level and establishes min.
flooding press.
TERMINATION:
Terminate scenario when plant conditions are stable and RPV/F has been executed.
FREEZE simulator.
Rev. 1 REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINFF, ACTIVITY IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE Discuss major problems and OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, questions about the exercise.
comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
VERIFY exercise critique forms complete.
Rev. I REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
DEVELOPED BY:
Joseph Bennett Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to development/approval process.
Rev. I REM 90-2 07/12/90 LOCA With Partial Loss of Essential Power and Instrument AC
416 79/
R2 REM 90-3 ATWS With Stuck Open SRV INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
RPO5 A, B, C, 1), F RPS failure to scram IC-20 Max Decay Heat ADO1 II PSV 4407 stuck open PROCEDURES: RXO3 core wide Lasalle event ATWS EOP, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 RD 13 scram air header leak A RIIRSW controller meters ARP ICO3A, B-5, Rev. 6, 01/05/90 A RIIRSW loop flow meter OP 1, Rev. 2, 07/23/88 IC21 SRV tailpipe pressure lights OP 5, Rev. 5, 10/03/89 Amber lights for 4404, 4405, 4406 and 4407 OP 6, Rev. 3, 10/03/89 B ADS override amber light Red and green lights PSV-4407 ATTACHMENTS:
Shift Turnover Forms OP 1, 5, 6 Tag for A RIIRSW heat exchanger outlet valve (MO-2046)
SUMMARY
- During plant opcration. an SRV will lift and stick open. Torus temperature will increase and require a reactor scram. The reactor will not scram and boron injection will be required.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> QUALIFICATIONS: 23d, 27b Rev. I REM 90-3 07/12/90 ATWS With Stuck Open SRV
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
F. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures. the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure, flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
Rev. I REM 90-3 07/12/90 ATwS With Stuck Open SRV
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
- 11. The students will complete the objectives listed in the classroom training material.
- a. CRD and Hydraulics A.05 Determine what conditions exist which warrant Emergency Rod Insertion and the method for emergency rod insertion.
A.28 Evaluate non-performance of steps in EOP-C and determine the impact on ability to insert control rods.
- b. Recirculation C.14 Determine if reactor instability exists and take appropriate corrective action.
C.16 Explain the reason for initiating a reactor scram following a loss of both recirc pumps.
C.20 Explain the purpose of the ATWS Channel Trip relative to the reactor recirc pumps.
- c. ATWS EOP TTT.21 Explain the goal of each section of the ATWS LOP and relate these goals to the overall EOP strategy.
TTT.22. Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to achieve a shutdown condition.
TTr.42 Evaluate plant conditions and determine appropriate use of LOP-C.
TTT.41 Determine the impact of use of the sections of EOP-C on the affected equipment.
1TT.05 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action for reactor power when all rods are inserted or when all rods are not inserted.
Rev. I REM 90-3 07/12/90 ATNWS With Stuck Open SRV
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Direct injection into the vessel be secured except CRD and SBLC. Direct SRO level be maintained in accordance with ATWS level/powcr criteria. (A OSS)
Direct Boron injection prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation SRO Temperature curve. (A OSS)
Direct Torus Cooling be maximized. SRO (A OSS)
Secure injection into the vessel and maintain RPV level as directed. RO (NSOE)
Inject Boron prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature RO curve. (NSOE)
Maximize torus cooling when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Perform Alternate Rod Insertion procedures per FOP C Section 5.0 as SRO directed. (B OSS)
Declare EPIP EAL C-9. SRO (A OSS)
Notify Statc/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
Recognize that all rods did not fully insert. RO (NSOE)
Manually drive rods, if directed. RO (NSOE)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Trips recirc pumps prior to running back
- 2. Does not recognize SRV going shut
INSTRUCTOR ACTVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAIN FF, ACTIVITY I. SIMULATOR INITIAL NOTE: Critical tasks are indicated by a C CONDITION: CONDIION:next to the traincc action.
Reset to IC-25 Override A RIIRSW controller meters to zero (close)
Override A RHRSW loop flow meter to zero Place RIIRSW AP controller in manual and fully shut, hang tag on controller Insert malfunctions RPO5A, B, C, D, E (RPS failure to scram).
Insert RFSWO8 at close.
Override off alarms for A/B recirc Ii temp and Aux transformer trouble.
(ICO4A D6, IC08B C5)
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING A. Assign Shift Positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
- 1. Give turnover forms and Walkdown panels, assume roles, conduct copies of OP 1, 5, 6 to shift briefing.
students
- 2. Initial Conditions.
100% power OP 1, 5, 6 due A RHRSW heat exchan er outlet (M O-2046) operator is being rebuit.
Day 3 of LCO.
Ill. EXERCISE (RO) Commence OP 1. 5, 6 During OP-1, while one of the turbine stop valves is going shut, insert ADOI I (PSV 4407 stuc open) with an initial severity of 50% ramp to 100%
over ) minutes.
(SRO) Directs response to open SRV in accordance with ARP 1CO3A. B-5 o Cycles control switch Rev. I REM 90-3 07/12/90 AT1VS With Stuck Open SRV
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY o Pulls fuses When RO has simulated pulling fuses for PSV-4407 o Override of all SRV tailpipe high pressure lights on IC21 o Override off red and green lights for PSV-4407 on IC04 o Override off amber lights for 4407, 4404, 4405 and 4406 o Override off amber light for B ADS override handswitch on 1C03 (if SRV fuses are reinstalled, delete these overrides)
(Type "ROR PSV7")
(RO) Recognizes that SRV is still open using tailpipc temperature recorder.
(SRO) Directs reactor scram per ATP.
C (RO) Recognizes that reactor does not manually scram.
(SRO) Enters EOP-1, ATWS EOP and EOP-2 (when torus temperature reaches 950 F)
C (RO) Manually drives control rods.
After pumps are tripped, insert (RO) Ensures recirculation pumps are runback to minimum prior to A RI malfunction RXO3 at 100/o initiation.
(RO) Recognizes instability C (SRO) Orders SBLC injection when directed by FOP Graph 6.
C (RO) Injects SBIC when directed.
(SRO) Should direct following actions:
o Lockout of ADS o Bypass MSIV Lo-Lo-Lo isolation Rev. I REM 90-3 07/12/90 ATWS With Stuck Open SRV
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY o Reduce pressure set to 880 psig o C - Vent scram air header o C - Dcenergize scram solenoids C (SRO) Directs maximum torus cooling.
C (RO) Maximizes torus cooling.
C (SRO) Directs lowering of level to reduce power.
If SRO directs venting of air header, C (RO) Maintains level as directed.
wait about 5 minutes and insert malfunction RD 13. Ramp from 0-100% over a 10 minute ramp rate.
When reactor pressure is about (SRO) When all rods are in, stops SBLC 600 psig, remove malfunction ADO1 II. injection.
If directed to repressurize the scram (SRO) Exits ATWS EOP air header, ramp malfunction RD 13 (RO) Diagnoses that SRV has gone shut from 100% to 0% over a 5 minute time delay. C (SRO) Declares C-9 EAIL C (SRO) Makes appropriate EPIP notifications.
C (SRO) Initiates plant evacuation.
Terminate scenario when plant conditions are stable with scram reset.
Rev. 1 REM 90-3 07/12/90 ATWS With Stuck Open SRV
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TrRAINEE A(TIVITY Discuss major problems and IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE questions about the excrcise.
OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
Rev. 1 REM 90-3 07/12/90 AVTWS With Stuck Open SRV
DEVELOPED BY:
Joseph G. Bennett Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difTcrcnce in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to dcvelopment/approval process.
Rev. 1 REM 90-3 07/12/90 ATWS With Stuck Open SRV
REM 90-4 LOCA - Large Line Break Inside Primary Containment INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
IC-14 Full Power Operations RRI5 Recirc Loop Rupture Power Level 100%
Xenon 100% equilibrium Middle of Core Life All systems operable Normal working hours MPS; Restore LOCA PROCEDURES: ATTACHMENTS:
EOP-1, Rev. 0, 06/16/89
- 1. Shift Turnover forms EOP-2, Rev. 0, 06/16/89
- 2. UFSAR Curves for LOCA EPIP 1.1, Rev. 9, 09/23/88 IPOI 5. Rev. 4, 07/27/89 EPIP 1.1, Rev. 9, 09/23/88
SUMMARY
During normal plant operations, a large break in the recirc piping occurs. Operators diagnose LOCA and carry out EOPs. This is a design basis LOCA.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 Hours QUALIFICATIONS: 6b, (17b)
REM 904 Rev. 1 LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 -I- Inside Primary Containment
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Direct theNSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Einergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance: i.e., pressure flow. etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
REM 90-4 Rev. I LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 Inside Primary Containment
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize. the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents.
and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order I1. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
L.01 Determine which loop has been selected following initiation of LPCI Loop Selection Logic.
L.03 Explain why wide range level instruments are not reliable during rapid RPV depressurization.
L.08 Determine any limitations on RIHR system realignment following LPCI initiation.
L.13 Determine Status of plant conditions required to support diversion of water from injection to torus cooling.
1-1.09 Evaluate RCIC system indications and determine if system is properly aligned for automatic initiation.
11.10 Evaluate RCIC system indications and determine if proper automatic initiation has occurred.
M.01 Evaluate core spray system response to automatic initiation signals and determine actions necessary to properly align system.
M.02 Evaluate core spray pump parameters (flow. discharge pressure, amps) and take necessary corrective actions to establish proper values based on plant conditions.
N.01 Evaluate IIPCI system indications and determine if proper automatic initiation has occurred.
TTT.02 Evaluate the status of RPV level instrumentation and take appropriate action to maintain adequate core cooling.
TTT.03 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV water level.
REM 904 Rev. I LOCA - Large Line Break 07/1 2/90 Inside Primary Containment
TTT.06 Verify system isolations, initiations, and actuations.
TTT.07 Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOPs.
TTT.08 Identify and explain the transitions to contingency procedures.
TTT. 10 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate actions to control primary containment parameters.
TTT. II Evaluate plant status and determine if use of containment sprays is appropriate.
TTT.16 Evaluate plant status and utilize EOP curves and limits to assist in determining appropriate corrective actions.
TTT.17 Evaluate plant status and determine corrective action if the curves/limits are exceeded.
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Direct DW spray prior to 280 0 F or after Torus pressure exceeds 9 psig if SRO allowed by DW Spray Initiation graph. (A OSS)
Initiate DW sprays prior to 280'F when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Direct Emergency Depressurization if DW temp cannot be maintained SRO
<2800F. (A OSS)
Initiate Emerg. Depress, when directed. RO (NSOE)
Direct level restoration by establishing minimum flooding pressure and SRO isolating MSIV's, Main Steamline Drains, and RCIC. (A OSS)
Restore level by injecting with systems as necessary to establish minimum RO flooding pressure when directed. (ANSOE)
Declare EPIP EAL B-1. SRO (A OSS)
Notify State/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
Direct level restoration to restore RPV level above + 15". SRO (A OSS)
Restore and maintain RPV level above + 15" but do not allow RPV level to RO rise above + 250" if MSIV's are open. (ANSOE)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Trainees neglect EOP-2.
- 2. Trainees do not verify auto initiations. (See Objective #TTT 06)
REM 90-4 Rev. I LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 Inside Primary Containment
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTTVITY TRAIN FE ACT! VITV NOTE: Critical tasks are indicated by a C I. SIMULATOR INITIAL next to the Trainee Action.
CONDITION:
Reset IC-14 MPS; Restore LOCA Place simulator in RUN II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Conduct shift turnover, board walkdown, A. Assign Shift Positions and assume shift positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information:
- 1. Initial Conditions:
100% Power Xenon 100% equilibrium Middle of Core Life
- 2. All systems operable.
- 3. Give shift turnover forms
- 4. OSS conducts shift briefing with crew.
Ill. EXERCISE RESPOND to alarms and indications Allow operators to familiarize themselves with panels.
Insert malfunction RR15A (Recirc Loop Rupture) at 70%.
C(SRO) Direct level restoration > 15" per A LC.
C(RO) restore level greater than 15" according to A LC.
C(SRO) OSS makes EAL assessment B-1, IAW EPIP 1.1.
(RO) initiate/verify auto initiation of:
Isolations ECCS SBG T SBDGs C(SRO) Directs drywell sprays to control drywell pressure.
REM 90-4 Rev. I LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 Inside Primary Containment
TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIViTY ACTVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITV NOTE: Expect SRV and SV amber (RO) control torus water level between 42.5% and 60%.
lights on IC04 when Drywell pressure reaches 25 psig. These are associated C(RO) maintain drywell with the white lights for high temperature/pressure with drywell sprays.
discharge pressure from an S/RV on (RO) monitor II2 and 02 concentrations in Panel IC21. the torus and drywell.
C(SRO) if drywell temperature exceeds 2800 direct ED.
C(RO) open 4 ADS valves when directed.
C(SRO) if RPV saturation curve exceeded, directs level restoration by establishing minimum flooding pressure.
C(RO) injects as necessary to obtain minimum flooding pressure.
C(SRO) makes appropriate notifications.
C(SRO) initiates plant evacuation.
Terminate exercise once plant is in a stable condition and operators have completed actions for IPOI-5, EOP-1 and EOP-2 and EPIP notifications.
FREEZE Simulator.
IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE Discuss major problems and questions OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, about the exercise.
comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using recorder traces of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory Identify areas for improvement SOLICIT additional questions from REM 90-4 Rev. I LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 Inside Primary Containment
INSTRUCTOR ACTVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY students and promote discussion of correct answers.
DISCUSS DB LOCA: Double ended Participate in discussions.
shear of recirc suction pipe, this is the largest break for a single failure.
QUESTIONS: Answer questions.
- 1. Was the core uncovered?
Answer: Yes
- 2. Do you expect serious fuel failure to occur?
Answer: No. (The ECCS are designed to reflood before fuel failure occurs.)
REM 904 Rev. 1 LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 Inside Primary Containment
DEVELOPED BY:
Kye L. Dawald Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to development/approval process.
REM 90-4 Rev. I LOCA - Large Line Break 07/12/90 Inside Primary Containment
REM 90-5 LOSS OF DRYWELL COOLING REQUIRING USE OF DRYWELL SPRAYS INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
IC-25 (RBCCW) MS 33A Group 7 Isolation Valve Fail to Close (MO 4841A) 100% Xenon EOL 98% Core Flow (RBCCW) MS 331 Group 7 Isolation Valve Fail to Close (MO 484113)
Summertime Hot Operations (102oF outside) MS 32 Spurious Group 7 Isolation.
100% Power MS 02 Small Steam line break inside Dayshift containment (5"/o).
PROCEDURES:
BS-5, Rev. 39, 03/31/89 IPOI-4, Rev. I1, 05/02/89 STP-42A001, Rev. 87, 10/30/89 ARP ICO5B C-5, 11/06/89 EOP 1, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 ARP IC25A/B A-4. 03/03/88 EOP 2, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 P & ID Bech-M143 EPIP 1.1, Rev. 9, 09/23/88 STP-47D003, Rev. 0, 08!21/89 P & I) Bech-M 144 01 261 RWCU, Rev. 11, 07/27/89 P & I) Bech-M 156 01 760 Drywell Cooling, Rev. 04, P & ID Bech-M 157 10/29/87 EOP-C Defeat 4, Rev. 0. 06/16/89 P & ID Bech-M 174 ATTACHMENTS: (1) Shift Turnover forms (2) Partially completed STP 47D003
SUMMARY
Operators will complete STP 47D003. A failure during the STP will result in a loss of Drywell cooling, which in conjunction with a small steam leak will force the use of l)rvwell sprays.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> QUALIFICATIONS: 5(16), 33 Rev. 1 REM 90-5 07112/90 -I- Drywell Cooling Requiring (se of Drywell Sprays
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures. as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures. the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
L 04 Determine if components in RIR system are in correct position/condition based on plant conditions.
L 18 Determine actions necessary to control drywell/torus pressure within specified band.
L 19 Evaluate RHR system/component response to system realignment while preparing to initiate torus/drywell spray.
TTT 02 Evaluate the status of RPV level instrumentation and take appropriate action to maintain adequate core cooling.
TTT 06 Verify system isolations, initiations and actuations.
TTT 07 Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOP's.
TTT 08 Identify and explain the transitions to Contingency procedures.
TTT 10 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate actions to control primary containment parameters.
TTT II Evaluate plant status and determine if use of containment sprays is appropriate.
TTT 15 Evaluate plant conditions and determine when entry into ED will he required.
TTT 16 Evaluate plant status and utilize EOP curves and limits to assist determining appropriate corrective actions.
TTT 17 Evaluate plant status and determine correction action if the curves/limits are exceeded.
Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Direct DW spray prior to reaching 280oF or after torus press exceeds 9 psig SRO if allowed by DW spray initiation graph. (A OSS)
Initiate DW Sprays prior to 280 0 F when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Direct Emergency Depressurization if DW temp cannot be maintained SRO
< 2800F. (A OSS)
Initiate Emerg. Depress. when directed. RO (NSOE)
Direct level restoration by establishing minimum flooding pressure and SRO isolating MSIV's, Main Steam Line Drains, and RCIC. (A OSS)
Restore level by injecting with systems as necessary to establish minimum RO flooding pressure when directed. (ANSOE)
Declare EPIP EAL Al, A7, or Bl. SRO (A OSS)
Notify State/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant if an alert is declared. SRO (B OSS)
Rev. i REM 90-5 07/12/90. Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Failure to enter EOP-I on High Drywell Pressure of 2.0 psig.
- 2. Failure to diagnose only a partial Group 7 isolation. Only Well Water Supply and Return close and NOT RBCCW.
- 3. Trainees forget to shutdown Recirc pumps and drywcll fans before initiating drywell sprays.
- 4. Trainees forget to look at Torus Level ( < 13.5 ft) prior to initiating drywell sprays.
- 5. Trainees forget all isolations, initiations, and auto starts for 2.0 psig. They are per ARP IC05B C-5:
RIIR pumps auto start RIRSW pumps trip if running Drywell fans shift to slow speed Standby DG's start SBGT starts River Water Supply valves CV-4914 and CV-4915 open and Radwaste Dilution valves CV-4910A and CV-4910B close.
Core Spray pumps start HPCI initiates Groups 2, 3, 4, and 8 isolate for PCIS.
Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITV INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY I. SIMULATOR INITIAL NOTE: Critical tasks are indicated by a C CONDITION: next to the trainees action.
Reset IC-25 MPS; Restore DW.01 Place simulator in RUN Override off A/B recirc Hi temp alarm and Aux transformer trouble alarm.
(ICO4A D6, IC08B C5)
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Conduct shift turnover, board walkdown, A. Assign Shift Positions. and assume shift positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
- 1. Give Turnover Forms to Students
- 2. Initial Conditions.
- 3. All systems operable
III. EXERCISE Test the PCIS valves per the STP 47D003.
Insert the following malfunctions prior to RO performing Section 7.12. I. Section 7.12 Well Water Supply and Return to Drywell Cooling.
MS 33A Group 7 Isolation Valve Fails to close (MO 4841A) RBCCW.
MS 33B Group 7 isolation valve fails to close (MO 4841B) RBCCW.
When Step 7.12.1 of STP 47D003 is ( RO) Acknowledge alarms:
performed insert:
MS 32 Spurious Group 7 Isolation. ARP IC058, C-5 "Primary (Last page of malfunction index) Containment Ili/Lo Press" MS 02 (1%) Small Steam Line Break ARI IC25A/B A-4 Drywell inside Containment. (Insert at DW temp of about 2100, later if entry into Cooling Loop A/Loop B ED/RPV F is desired). overtemp.
Ensure trainees also monitor other (SRO) Enter EOP-2 on: Primary Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY EOP-2 parameter especially PC/P containment I ugh Pressure during this evolution. 2 psig. Also enter EOP-1 (SRO) Begin to monitor and Role Play: If students go to back control drywell temp below panels to remove fuses FU-10A and 150o1F using available FU-10B and lift leads 167 & 168 the drywell cooling systems per oI 760. May vent and air isolation still remains in. This would purge the drywell.
be EOP-C defeat #4. Type "ROR Defeat 4". (SRO) Wait until Drywell temp cannot be maintained below NOTE: Trainees should have entered 1500 F and then operate all available drywell cooling7 EOP-1 on High Drywell Pressure of Defeat isolation interlocks 2.0 psig. (EOP-C defeat 4) if necessary.
If SRO directs drywell venting, after vent path is established, insert (SRO) Begin Reactor shutdown per shutdown IPOI-4 and malfunction EDO9H1 (Fault on 1B32). perform concurrently.
(SRO) Before drywell temp reaches 2800 F direct a reactor scram.
( RO) Manually scrams if directed.
(SRO) Check Torus water level below 13.5 ft. and drywell temp. and press. the drywell spray initiation Limit (Graph 7).
( RO) Shutdown recirc pumps and drvwell fans C ( RO) Initiate drywell sprays using only RHR pumps not required continuously for adequate core cooling.
C (SRO) Maintain drvwell temp.
below 2800 F with drywell sprays if in spray curve.
C (SRO) If drywell temp cannot be maintained below 2800F then enter Emergency Depressurization.
C ( RO) Open 4 ADS SRVs if directed.
- SRO may declare A-1, B-1 or A-7. C (SRO) Declare EAL Discuss reasons for declared EVENT C (SRO) Make appropriate during critique. notifications.
C (SRO) Evacuate the plant if an alert is declared.
Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITV C (SRO) If RPV saturation curve violated, enters RPV/F and directs injection to minimum flooding pressure.
C ( RO) Injects to establish minimum flooding pressure when directed.
Terminate exercise when reactor conditions, are stable with level restores, and drywell pressure and temperature stable or decreasing with drywell sprays controlling.
FREEZE: simulator.
IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE Discuss major problems and OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, questions about the exercise.
comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
QUESTIONS: Answer questions.
- 1. What does defeat-4 of Rev. 1 REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY EOP-C accomplish?
Answer: Restores drywell cooling and shifts drywell fans to fast speed following a Group 7 isolation signal.
- 2. What valves are closed on a Group 7 isolation signal?
Answer: RBCCW supply and Return (2 valves) Well Water to drywell cooling supply and return (4 valves).
Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Drywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
DEVELOPED BY:
Joseph Bennett Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to dcvelopment/approval process.
Rev. I REM 90-5 07/12/90 Orywell Cooling Requiring Use of Drywell Sprays
REM 90-6 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock INITIAL CONDITIONS: MA LFUNCTIONS/OVR:
RP05F Hydraulic lock IC-20 Max decay heat SW12B B ESW pump trip RDO7 Accumulator Trouble (06-15)
RDO8 Rod Scram (02-19)
RPO5A RPS fail to scram TC 12 ElIC Fluid Leak TCO6 A/B, Bypass valve failures Alarm overrides ICO5B, A-2, IC05B, A-5 B ESW pump lights PROCEDURES: ATTACHMENTS:
01 358, Rev. 8, 10/11/89
- 1. Shift Turnover Forms 01 255, Rev. 14, 12/05/89
- 2. Tags for B ESW pump, B&D RIR, B ATWS EOP, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 Core Spray, B SBDG ARP ICO7A D-3, Rev. 4, 10/10/89 EOP C, Rev. 8, 11/17/89
SUMMARY
During a transfer of RPS, a rod will scram due to a failed solenoid valve. The rod's scram outlet valve will continue to leak even after the scram is reset. requiring isolation of the HCV.
A loss of EHC will result in a reactor scram, but all rods will not insert due to the scram discharge volumes filling up.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> QUALIFICATIONS: I IB(22 B), 28A, 32A Rev. I REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems. running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as wel as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOF and Auxiliary Operators).
F. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure. flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
Rev. I REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
I1. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
1TT.04 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV pressure.
TTT.07 Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOPs.
TTT.08 Identify and explain the transitions to Contingency procedures.
TTT.10 Evaluate plant statue and take appropriate actions to control primary containment parameters.
TTT.17 Evaluate plant status and determine corrective action if the curves/limits are exceeded.
TTT.21 Explain the goal of each section of the ATWS EOP and relate these goals to the overall EOP strategy.
TTT.22 Evaluate plant statue and take appropriate action to achieve a shutdown condition.
TTT.42. Evaluate plant conditions and determine appropriate use of EOP-C.
- b. CRD A.05 Determine when conditions exist which warrant emergency rod insertion and the method for emergency rod insertion.
A.09 Determine how an HCU should be isolated during reactor operation.
Rev. REM 90-6 07/1 2/90 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock
A.28 Evaluate non-performance of steps in EOP-C and determine the impact on ability to insert control rods.
A.29 Evaluate CRD system/component status and determine impact on control rod operability.
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Determines control rod inoperability per T.S.3.3.B. SRO (A OSS)
Direct injection into the vessel be secured except CRD and SBLC. Direct SRO level be maintained in accordance with ATWS level/power criteria. (A OSS)
Direct Boron injection prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation SRO Temperature curve. (A OSS)
Direct Torus Cooling be maximized. SRO (A OSS)
Secure injection into the vessel and maintain RPV level as directed. RO (NSOE)
Inject Boron prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature RO curve. - (NSOE)
Maximize torus cooling when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Perform Alternate Rod Insertion procedures per FOP-C section 5.0 as SRO directed. (B OSS)
Declare EPIP EAL B- 11. SRO (A OSS)
Notify State/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
Recognize that all rods did not fully insert. RO (NSOE)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 2. Attempt to insert rods by deenergizing RPS
- 3. Starts B loop RIIR pumps with no ESW
- 4. Forget to prevent IHPCI/RCIC injection when lowering level Rev. 1 REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE AcflVITY I. SIMULATOR INITIAL NOTE: Critical tasks are indicated by a C CONDITION: next to the trainee action.
RESET IC-20 Insert malfunction SW12B (B ESW pump trip) override the pump breaket lights on IC06 off.
Hang warning tags Place simulator in RUN
- 11. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Conduct shift turnover. board walkdown, A. Assign Shift Positions. and assume shift positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
- 1. Give turnover forms to students
- 2. Initial Conditions.
o B ESW pump out of service for impeller replacement, Day 2 of LCO o B RPS MG to be in spected for P MAR. Transfer RPS B to alternate source. Inform maintenance when transfer complete.
Ill. EXERCISE While SRO is conducting the shift (SRO) Directs RO to transfer B RPS to brief, insert malfunction RDO7 for alternate source per Of 358.
Rod 06-15 (accumulator trouble) (RO) Responds to alarm When RPS BUS is transferred, insert (RO) Transfers RPS Bus B to alternate malfunction RDO8 for Rod 02-19 (rod scrams in)
Rev. 1 REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Ilydraulic Lock
INSTRUCTOR ACTVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY After 1/2 scram is reset, provide the following information when requested:
o One scram solenoid valve is cold (A side) and the other scram solenoid is warm (1 side) o The scram outlet valve is stuck partially open.
o Rod 06-15 trouble alarm is not due to water.
.Insert Malfunction RP05F (SRO) Diagnoses leakage from scram outlet valve into SDV, orders rod 02-19 isolated.
When directed to isolate the HCU of C(SRO) ensures compliance with Tech Spec 3.3.13. If accumulator on 06-15 02-19, insert malfunction TC 12 cannot be made operable, it must be (EIIC fluid leak) ramp to 100% over inserted and reactor shutdown.
10 minutes. (RO Res ond to Loss of ElIC Fluid per AR ICO A, D-3 After scram, call operators, ask if RO) When reactor scram occurs, performs 1P0 5 actions rod 02-19 IICU should still be isolated. If answer is yes, remove C - Recognizes all rods not in
,malfunction RD 08 for 02-19 and - Places mode switch in shutdown insert malfunction RD 07 (Accumulator Trouble) for - Inserts IRM/SRMs and verifies power Rod 02-19. - Checks main turbine and generator After TC 12 reaches 100% severity, - Controls reactor water level insert TCO6A and B at 0%. (SRO) Again directs I1I isolation to allow SDV drainage (SRO) Enters ATWS EOP and directs the following:
o Lockout of ADS o Bypass of CV-4371A o Initiation of ARI (RO) Carries out SRO orders If SRO directs defeat 3, type "RMF (SRO) Directs use of following EOP-C Rev. I REM 90-6 07/12/90 AT1VS - Ilydraulic Lock
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITV TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINI~T ACTIVITY defeat 3". methods to insert rods o Reset scram and rescram If SRO attempts to manually drive rods, when asked to shut V-17-24, or shut V-17-24 using remote function o Manually driving control rods RD05. (Does not attempt both procedures simultaneously)
(RO) Waits for alarm IC05B, A-2 (SDV Hi evel Trip) clear prior to attempting another scram.
C(SRO) Prior to torus temperature of 1100, directs SBILC initiation.
C(RO) Initiates SBILC if directed.
(SRO) When all rods arc inserted, exit ATWS EOP.
C(SRO) Directs maximum torus cooling if torus temp > 950o C(RO) Maximizes torus cooling if directed.
C(SRO) Directs securing injection to reduce reactor power.
C(RO) Controls level as directed by ATWS EOP.
C(SRO) Implements appropriate EOP C to insert rods.
C(SRO) Declares FAL1 B- 11.
C(SRO) Makes appropriate notifications.
C(SRO) Initiates plant evacuation.
Terminate scenario when plant conditions are stable with all rods in.
Rev. I REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Ilydraulic Lock
IN STRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY Discuss major problems and IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE questions about the exercise.
OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
Rev. 1 REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock
DEVELOPED BY:
Joseph G. Bennett Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to development/approval process.
Rev. 1 REM 90-6 07/12/90 ATWS - Hydraulic Lock
IV6 /7q/
REM 90-8 Station Blackout (Loss of All AC Power)
INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
IC-15 Full Power Operations es Sources Power Level 1000/% DG01 Diesel Generator Fails to Start (lG21)
Xenon 1001/% Equilibrium DGO6A Diesel Generator Overspeed Relay End of Core Life Trip (1G31)
ROR TORNADO MPS: Restore LOOP PROCEDURES:
IPOI-5, Rev. 4, 07/27/89 AOP 301 Rev. 3, 12/06/89 EPIP 1.1 Rev. 9, 09/23/88 EOP-1 Rev. 0, 06/16/89 EOP-2 Rev. 0, 06/16/89 STP 45G002, Rev. 4, 07/28/89 STP 45G001, Rev. 1, 06/30/89 AOP 903, Rev. 0, 07/20/88 ATTACHMENTS:
- 1. Shift Turnover Forms
- 2. STP 45G001
- 3. STP 45G002
- 4. Tag for B DG
SUMMARY
One DG is inop and the other is being tested per the STP. A severe thunderstorm/tornado warning is in effect. A tornado will cause a loss of all offsite power and the running DG will trip. The loss of all AC power will result in an auto scram, turbine trip, and loss of all AC support systems. Primary containment will isolate and relief valves will lift to control pressure.
The DC power sources will be available. Loss of D/W cooling will result in elevated D/W temperature which will cause increased pressure and can cause indicated RPV level to read higher than actual level due to reference leg flashing. DW Pressure/Temperature increase may lead to ED or RPV/F. Loss of AC cooling in the IIPCI/RCIC rooms may result in system isolation.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 lHrs.
QUALIFICATIONS: 8a, 8f. 19a, 19f REM 90-8 Rev. I Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
4.. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures. the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance: i.e., pressure, flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform-the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
REM 90-8 Rev. I Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
I1. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- a. AC Electrical Distribution CCC.06 Evaluate the consequences of Droop Switch position on desired SBDG output breaker operation.
CCC.12 Evaluate loss of any busses and determine the impact of loss on plant equipment.
CCC.15 Recognize the difference between loss of equipment due to LOAD SHED and the loss of equipment due to loss of power.
CCC.16 Determine appropriate procedural support for evaluation and operation of electrical busses in normal or abnormal conditions.
CCC.18 Recognize and respond to any FOP entry conditions reached as a result of loss of portions of the electrical distribution system.
- b. Standby Diesel Generator DDD.03 Determine proper rotation of the synchroscope for various paralleling operations.
DDD.08 Evaluate plant conditions and determine whether SBDG output breaker auto close requirements arc satisfied. or which requirements are yet to be satisfied.
DDD.09 Evaluate plant conditions and determine whether an automatic trip of the SBDG output breaker is required or has occurred.
DDD.10 Evaluate plant conditions and determine whether requirements to reset SBDG lockout relay have been satisfied, or which requirements are yet to be satisfied.
REM 90-8 Rev. I Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
DDD.I I Explain why the governor is run to its minimum position prior to a slow start.
DDD.12 Evaluate and change generator.power factor without exceeding generator ratings while operating the SBDG in parallel with another power supply.
DDD.15 Evaluate plant conditions and determine whether or not the SBDG is operable, and any administrative requirements that must be met
- c. Emergency Operating Procedures TTT.02 Evaluate the status of RPV level instrumentation and take appropriate actions to maintain adequate core cooling.
TI1.03 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV water level.
TTT.04 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV pressure.
TIT.07 Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOP's.
TIT.10 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate actions to control primary containment parameters.
TTT.15 Evaluate plant conditions and determine when entry into ED will be required.
TTT.16 Evaluate plant status and utilize FOP curves and limits to assist in determining appropriate corrective actions.
TTT.17 Evaluate plant status and determine corrective action if the curves/limits are exceeded.
REM 90-8 Rev. I Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power) i
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Direct DW spray prior to reaching 280'F or after torus press exceeds 9 psig SRO or when AC power restored, if allowed by DW Spray Initiation Graph. (A OSS)
Initiate DW sprays prior to 280'F when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Direct Emergency Depressurization if DW temp cannot be maintained SRO
<2800 F. (A OSS)
Initiates Emerg. Depress. when directed. RO (NSOE)
Direct level restoration by establishing minimum flooding pressure and SRO isolating MSIV's, Main Steamline Drains, and RCIC. (A OSS)
Restore level by injecting with systems as necessary to establish minimum RO flooding pressure when directed. (ANSOE)
Declare EPIP EAL B-9 or B-15. SRO (A OSS)
Notify State/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. OSS forgets to upgrade EAL when power is not restored.
- 2. EOP-2 is not entered due to entry conditions not being recognized due to loss of front panel indications.
REM 90-8 Rev. I Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRIXTOR ACTIVITY TRAINFE ACFIVIiV NOTE: Critical tasks are indicated by a "C" I. SIMULATOR INITIAL CONDITION: next to the traince action.
Reset IC-15 MPS; Restore Loop Place Simulator in RUN Select SPMETI screen on SPDS and adjust wind speeds from 20 to 40 mph and wind direction slightly using rf IIVI, HV2.
Place "B" DG in pull-to-lock and hang warning tag.
o Place Droop Switch to Parallel (rf DGl0) o Verify Man/Auto Sel. Switch in Auto (rf DGO5) o Place "A"DG on IA3 Bus and fully load it (2850 kw, 490 amps).
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Conduct shift turnover, board walkdown, A. Assign Shift Positions. and assume shift positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
- 1. Give turnover forms to students
- 2. Initial Conditions.
100% Power Xenon 100% equilibrium end of Core Life
'A" DG which is in its I hour full load run.
(10 minutes at full load.)
III. EXERCISE MALFUNCTION: Loss of offsite Operators perform STP 45G002 Power Sources, and "B" Diesel Generator Fails to Start. - insert after "A" DG fully loaded onto Bus.
RMF Loop Blackl (This has a l 1/2 minute time delay)
REM 90-8 Rev. 1 Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY (D(;OIB (none 100))
(EDOIA (none 100))
(ED01B (none 100))
ROLE PLAY: Security Perform AOP 903 Announce tornado Report a tornado has been sited and Rccirc. to minimum is moving toward DAEC. Manual scram IPOI 5, IPOI 4 OVERRIDE: Respond to alarms and indications.
Insert 5 seconds before Loop Blackl occurs Recognize station blackout condition and perform actions lAW AOP 301 Tab 4.
ROR TORNADO Perform AOP 301 Tab 3 concurrently.
(Will cause loss of indication of offsite sources). Perform all immediate and follow-up IMF DG06A to trip the "A" DG. actions lAW IP1OI 5.
Perform appropriate actions from EOP-1.
NOTE: "A" DG Bkr will trip after RC/L Maintain water level loss of offsite power. between 170" and 211" with ROLE PLAY: Operator in SBDG IIPCI and RCIC.
room. RC/P Stabilize pressure below Cause for "A" DG trip due to 1055 psig with SRVs, IIPCI, or overspeed. RCIC.
ROLE PLAY: Unable to reset fuel RC/Q verify all rods inserted, racks if attempted to at least 02.
ROLE PLAY: Load Dispatcher. RC/P Depressurize at less than Offsite power cannot be 100 F/hr.
regained due to electrical faults in the switchyard that resulted Perform appropriate actions from EOP-2.
from a severe Monitor containment pressure/
thunderstorm/tornado. temperature.
After DW temp reaches z2400 F, C(SRO) Directs DW spray before 2800 if in spray curve and AC power restored.
perform the following:
(RO) Initiate DW spray when directed.
1)M F DGO6A Reset SDR via rf DGO3 (SRO) Directs li) at 2800 (if applicable).
(RO) Open 4 ADS SRV's if directed.
REM 90-8 Rev. 1 Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITVY TRAINEE ACTIVITV INSTRIJCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINFF, ACTIVITY ROLE PLAY: Aux operator reports C(SRO) Directs levcl restoration to achieve mm. flooding press. per RPV/1F (if SDR and fuel racks reset. applicable).
C(RO) Restore level as directed.
C(SRO) Declare FAL 139 or 1315.
C(SRO) Notify Statc/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour.
C(SRO) Evacuate the plant.
Perform Actions from AOP 301:
Send an operator locally to the 1A3 Switchgear room and/or DG room to investigate reason for diesel breaker trip.
Continue attempts to restore normal AC power Upgrade EAL to C-7, Loss of all AC Power, Restoration not possible within 15 minutes, or C-14 (if exceed 15 minutes).
TERMINATION:
Terminate exercise when plant is in a stable, shutdown condition. AC power will be restored to one essential bus.
FREEZE simulator.
IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE Discuss major problems and OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, questions about the exercise.
comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee, responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
REM 90-8 Rev. 1 Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITV INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY students and promote discussion of correct answers.
QUESTIONS: Answer questions.
- 1. How long will the batteries last? Can you extend this?
Answer: By design 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, can be extended by reducing loads.
VERIFY exercise critique forms complete.
REM 90-8 Rev. 1 Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
DEVELOPED BY:
Tim Page Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Dutc Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to development/approval process.
. REM 90-8 Rev. 1 Station Blackout 07/13/90 (Loss of All AC Power)
REM 90-7 RECIRC PUMP TRIP WITH ATWS INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
RDI13 Scram air header leak IC-23 RRO6A (B) - Rccirc MG Drive Power Level 75%
Motor Bkr Trip RR01(2) - A(B) Recirc MG Lockout Relay - reset ROP5 A, 13, C, 1). 1 - Failure to scram MCO4A main condenser air leak RXO3 Core wide LaSallc Event PROCEDURES:
PROCEDURES (CONT.)
ARP ICO4A, Rev. 6, 09/26/89 ARP IC0413, Rev. 10, 01/24/90 STP 461002, Rev. 0, 09/05/89 IPOI-3, Rev. 6, 05/03/89 STP 42F007, Rev. 0. 101/28/88 01 264, Rev. 8, 12/07/89 Tech. Specs., Rcy. 163, 10/89 01 878.4, Rev. 4, 05/04/88 SOER 84-2 Control Rod SER 14-88 Scram Caused by Neutron Mispositioning.
Flux Oscillations Notice of Violation DAEC 07/061!88 FOP ATWS Rev. 0, 06/16/89 NRC B 88-07 Supl. I Power FOP 2 Rev. 0. 06/16/89 Oscillations STP 46F001, Rev. 0, 09/05/89 ATTACHMENTS:
(1) Shift Turnover forms
SUMMARY
During normal plant operation, a Reactor Recirculation Pump trips due to inadvertent isolation of the lube oil pressure switches, causing the Drive Motor Bkr. to trip. Single loop operation is entered and Rx instabilities will occur requiring a Rx Scram. The Reactor will not scram and Boron injection will be required.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Remedial Training)
DURATION: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> QUALIFICATIONS: 9a Rev.1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 -I- Recire Pump Trip With ATWS
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES
- 1. Following a prc-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- c. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOF and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Proccdurc, the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure, flow. ctc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
Rev.I REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the cmergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UJFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
I1. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- a. Recirc C.03 Evaluate plant conditions and determine if proper response to recirc pump speed changes has occurred.
C.05 Evaluate recirculation pump performance during initial startup and determine if starting sequence has been correctly completed.
C.07 Determine reactor loadline using the power to flow map.
C.09 Determine if temperature requirements for start of an idle recirc pump are met. (One or both pumps)
C.13 Determine jet pump operability based on relevant plant data.
C.14 Determine if reactor instability exists and take appropriate corrective action.
C.15 Evaluate plant conditions and take actions necessary to ensure operations within single loop constraints.
C.25 Evaluate recirc system parameters and determine if system is in compliance with Tech Specs.
C.26 Determine if pump speed requirements for restart of an idle loop are met.
Rev.i1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump rrip With ATWS
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Directs performance of STP 46F002 SRO (A OSS)
Perform STP 46F002 and reduce power with rods using pull sheet. RO (NSOE)
Direct Reactor Scram due to power oscillation. SRO (A OSS)
Recognize that all rods did not fully insert. RO (NSOE)
Direct torus cooling be maximized. SRO (A OSS)
Maximize torus cooling when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Direct Boron injection prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation SRO Temperature curve. (A OSS)
Inject Boron prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature RO curve. (NSOE)
Perform Alternate Rod Insertion procedures per EOP-C section 5.0 as SRO directed. (B OSS)
Manually insert rods as directed. RO (NSOE)
Direct injection into the vessel be secured except CRD and SBLC. Direct SRO level be maintained in accordance with ATWS level/power criteria. (A OSS)
Secure injection into the vessel and maintain RPV level as directed, RO (NSOE)
Notify State/County officials within 15 minutes. NRC within I hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Trainees do not control level swell.
- 2. Trainees forget to check direction of idle loop low for Pldata, which will require substitute valve for core flow. (NRC Report)
Rev. 1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recire Pump Trip With ATWS I
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINF.E ACTIVITY
- 1. SIMULATOR INITIAL NOTE: Critical tasks are indicated by a "C" CONDITION:, next to the trainee action.
Reset IC-23 Place simulator in RUN Override OFF Annunciators ICO4A Al and Cl (A Recire MG) or ICO4A A7 or C7 (B Recirc MG).
Insert malfunctions RP05 A, B, C, D, E (failure to scram)
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Conduct shift turnover, board walkdown, A. Assign Shift Positions. and assume shift positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information.
- 1. Give Turnover Forms to students.
- 2. Initial Conditions.
75% Power
- 3. All systems operable
- 4. Increasing power to 100%
Ill. EXERCISE (RO)(SRO) Respond to alarms and MALFUNCTION: Trip A (or B) indications.
Recirc MG Drive Motor Bkr. ICO4A A-4 (or ICO48 A-1)
IMF RRO6A (or B) "Recirc MG Drive Motor Trip" At same time, start Emerg. DC L.O. ICO4A D-3 (or D-9) "Recirc MG pump A (or B) via remote function Fluid Drive Oil Lo Press" RR3 (RR04), and override ON Annunciator ICO4A D3 (A MG) or (RO) Verify automatic actions have IC04A D9 (B MG).
occurred: MG Drive Motor Bkr. and Field CLEAR MALFUNCTION Bkr. Trip.
CMF (RO) Send operator to Panel ICIl3A (B)
Reset A(B) Recirc MG Lockout to tionitor relays and investigate cause of Relay via RROI (RR02) trip.
Clear "OFF" overrides on annunciators.
Rev. 1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 - Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTVITY INSTRuCTOR ACTIVITY 'rRAINTE ACTIVITY (RO)(SRO) Evaluate plant conditions and ROLE PLAY: determine operating point on Power/Flow Map and Reactor stability. (Find operating When asked, investigate cause for in Forbidden region).
Drive Motor Bkr. Trip. After approximately five minutes - report a C(SRO) Directs performance of STP 46F002 per Tech Specs.
laborer cleaning in the MG Room found a valve leaking oil (minor) and C(RO) Perform STP 46F002 and reduce closed the valve to wipe up the oil. power with rods per pull sheet.
(V-16-121 for A MG or V-16-122 for NOTE: Operators should not insert rods B M G). using the CRAM method. Rods should be inserted using the pull sheet, in reverse order NOTE: This valve isolates the lube (SOER 84-2).
oil pressure switches and causes an (RO )(SRO) Verify operation in SLO lAW apparent loss of lube oil to the 01 264 and begin S1 P 46F002 and then control systems. STP 46F00I if baseline data is not available.
Reopen valve when directed. LIMIT operating Recirc Pump speed to 100%, and core low between 39E6 and Stop Emerg. DC L.O. pump A (or B) 45E6 lbm/hr.
via RRO3 (RRO4) and clear override on ICO4A D3 (D9), and then report (RO) Perform STP 42F007 APRM Gain valve reopened. Adjust Calibration, and operate APRM's lAW 01 878.4 for SLO.
NOTE: Instability would be (RO or SRO) Notify Reactor Engineer.
indicated by at least one APRM exhibiting peak to peak swings (SRO) May order restoration to two-loop operation before STP complete once cause greater than 10% and increasing. o trip is known and evaluated.
After 46F002 identified, and rod (RO) Notice instability > 10% peak to peak.
insertion started, insert malfunction RXO3. Ramp from 0-30% severity C(SRO) Direct reactor scram due to power over 5 minutes. oscillation.
C(RO) Recognizes rods did not insert.
After reactor scram is attempted (RO) Recognizes lowering condenser vacuum.
insert malfunction MCO4A. Ramp from 0-100% over 10 minutes. C(SRO) Directs torus cooling maximized (when torus temp exceeds 950),
If asked, report that HP condenser C(RO) Maximizes torus cooling when boot has ruptured. directed.
C(SRO) Directs Boron injection prior to reaching 1OP Graph 6 limits.
C(RO) Initiates Boron injection when directed.
(SRO) Directs EOP C's performed to shutdown the reactor.
Rev.1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTI[VITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY ROLE PLAY: C(SRO) Implements 1OP1 C's as directed.
When directed/requested: C(RO) Manually drives rods if directed.
o Venting scram air header in progress. C(SRO) Direct injection secured (except o Shut V-17-24 using remote Boron and CRD). Directs level maintained function RD05. per level/power criteria.
After power/level control has been C(RO) Maintains level as directed. I-implemented, vent the scram air C(SRO) Declare EAL C-9. .
header using malfunction RD13. C(SRO) Notify Statc/County officials Ramp from 0-100% over 5 minutes. within 15 minites, NRC witfiin I hour.
C(SRO) Initiate plant evacuation.
TERMINATION:
Terminate scenario when all rods are in and level has been restored.
FREEZE simulator.
Rev.I REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE Discuss major problems and OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, questions about the exercise.
comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
DISCUSS Flow direction in idle loop
.et Pumps.
- 1. For operating pump above 50% speed, idle loop reverse flow.
- 2. For operating pump below 50% speed, idle loop forward flow.
- 3. For operating pump near 50% speed, idle loop stagnant.
Rev. 1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTVITV INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY QUESTIONS: Answer questions.
Why should operation in the forbidden region (above 80% load line and below 45% core flow) be avoided?
Answer: Due to the possibility of core instabilities at high loadline/low flow conditions. (SER 14-88, NRCB 88-07 supl.1).
- 2. What may occur in the P1 if the operating loop is below 50%speed?
How do you fix this?
Answer: Core flow is derived from subtracting the idle loop valve assuming it is reverse flow, when in fact it is forward flow and should be added.
A substitute valve must be calculated and inserted into the Process Computer for this case.
- 3. What are core instabilities and what action must be taken if they occur?
Answer: Power oscillations greater than 10% of rated power and increasing.
Scram the reactor. (SER 14-88, NRCB 88-07, Supl 1)
Rev.I REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
TRAINEF. ACTIVITY ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY
- 4. When may core instabilities occur?
When most likely?
Answer: Anywherc on operating Map.
Most likely in forbidden region.
Rev. 1 REM 90-7 07/12/90 -lo- Recire Pump Trip With ATWS
DEVELOPED BY:
Timothy Page Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Ditc Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to dcvelopment/approval process.
Rev.I I REM 90-7 07/12/90 Recirc Pump Trip With ATWS
REM 90-9 TURBINE TRIP WITH ATWS INITIAL CONDITIONS: MALFUNCTIONS/OVR:
RPO5A, B, C, D, F RPS failure to scram IC-13 50% power MCO4A Main condenser leak RDI IA/1 CRD pump trips PROCEDURES:
IPOT-4, Rev. I1, 05/02/89 ARP ICO7A D-6, Rev. 4, 10/10/89 EOP 1, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 ATWS FOP, Rev. 0, 06/16/89 STP 43B005, Rev. 0, 04/14/89 IPOI-3, Rev. 7, 04/30/90 ATTACHMENTS:
Shift turnover forms Tags for RCIC
SUMMARY
During a plant shutdown a loss of main turbine lubc oil will result in a turbine trip. The reactor will fail to scram and the operators will respond using the ATWS 1OP.
COURSE: 500-008 Licensed Operator Requal (1990 Rcmedial Training)
DURATION: 2 Hours QUALIFICATIONS: 30 Rev. I REM 90-9 07/13/90 -I- Turhine Trip With ATWS
TERMINAL OBJECTIVE The student, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- 1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:
- a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.
- b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.
- c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.
- 2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures. as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.
- 3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.
- 4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will he able to:
- a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.
- b. Follow the procedure correctly.
- c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.
- d. Analyze system response.
- e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).
- f. Inform the OSS when complete.
- 5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:
- a. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure or containment parameters.
- b. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.
- c. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.
- 6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures. the NSOE/ANSOE will:
- a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.
- b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure. flow, etc.
- c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.
- d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.
Rev. I REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turhine Trip With ATWS
- 7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.
- 8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:
- a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.
- b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.
- c. Complete required log entries (paperwork).
- 9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:
- a. Ascertain the plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.
- b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.
- c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.
- 10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.
II. The students will complete the following objectives listed in the classroom training material:
- a. ATWS EOP TTT.21 Explain the goal of each section of the ATWS EOP and relate these goals to the general ETO strategy.
TTT.22 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to achieve a shutdown condition.
TTT.42 Evaluate plant conditions and determine appropriate use of EOP C.
- b. CRD A.05 Given plant conditions, determine when conditions exist, which warrant Emergency Rod insertion, and the method for Emergency Rod insertion.
A.28 Evaluate non-performance of steps in OP C and determine the impact on ability to insert control rods.
Rev. I REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turbine Trip With ATWS
LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO Direct injection into the vessel be secured except CRD and SBLC. Direct SRO level be maintained in accordance with ATWS level/power criteria. (A OSS)
Direct Boron injection prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation SRO Temperature curve. (A OSS)
Direct Torus Cooling be maximized. SRO (A OSS)
Secure injection into the vessel and maintain RPV level as directed. RO (NSOE)
Inject Boron prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature RO curve. (NSOE)
Maximize torus cooling when directed. RO (ANSOE)
Perform alternate Rod Insertion procedures per POP-C section 5.0 as SRO directed. (B OSS)
Declarc EPIP EAL C-9. SRO (A OSS)
Notify Statc/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour. SRO (B OSS)
Evacuate the plant. SRO (B OSS)
Recognize that all rods did not fully insert. RO (NSOE)
Manually insert rods as directed. RO (NSOE)
COMMON TRAINEE ERRORS
- 1. Trips turbine before scram.
- 2. Does not use emergency in to drive rods.
Rev. I REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turbine Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITV INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY 'rRAINEE ACTIVITY NOTE: Critical tasks arc indicated by a "C" I. SIMULATOR INITIAL next to the trainee action.
CONDITION:
Reset to IC-13 Insert malfunctions RP05A, B, C, D, E
Place simulator in Run Trip RCIC valve and tag MO-2405 switch Override alarm ICO7A, B-6 off (TLO tank Ili level)
II. PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING A. Assign Shift Positions.
B. Shift Turnover Information. Conduct shift turnover, board walkdown,
- 1. Give attachments to and assume shift positions.
students
- 2. Initial conditions o Shutdown in progress per IPOI-3, 4.
o Proceed to cold shutdown due to RCIC inoperability.
Day 7 of LCO III. EXERCISE (SRO) Directs operators to continue with shutdown.
After shift turnover, insert malfunction TU04 (Turbine Bearing low oil pressure) at 1%, Ramp to 100% over 20 minutes.
(RO) Request aux operator to check out Override alarm 1CO7A, D-6 on (low lube oil system.
turbine lube oil tank level)
Rev. 1 REM 90-9 071 3/90- Turbinc Trip With ATWS I
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY When requested, provide following information:
o Tank level is -5 inches o Last reading was + I (from logs) o Level seems to be dropping about I inch every 3 or 4 minutes.
o MSOP discharge pressure is about 200 psig (at tank and at front standard) o Bearing header pressure is about 25 psig at tank and 18 psig at front standard.
o If told to enter heater bay, evidence of oil in heater bay. Can hear abnormal noises coming from turbine.
(SRO) Direct ROs to Turbine may trip automatically, if so, the feedwatcr temperature decrease Manually scram will cause reactor power to increase.
C (RO) Recognizes all rods did not fully insert.
After turbine trip, insert MCO4A.
Ramp 0-100% over 3 minutes. (SRO) Enters FOP-1 and ATWS FOP.
- initiates ARI
- reduces pressure sctpoint to 880 psig (if lie decides not to break vacuum)
- directs use of HPCI for pressure control.
Perform the following as appropriate - directs ROs to deenergize RPS or vent o Ensure operator pulls scram air header.
correct fuses.
- directs ROs to manually drive rods.
o If told to vent air header, wait until power/level control done and insert RDI13. Ramp to 100%
over 5 minutes.
C (SRO) Direct SBLC injection prior to torus water temperature exceeding EOP graph 6 limits.
Rev. 1 REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turbine Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY INSTRuCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY After approximately six rods are C(SRO) Implements EOP C's as directed.
driven, trip both CRD pumps by C(RO) Manually drive rods if directed:
inserting malfunctions RDI lA/B.
- uses emergency in (SRO) When all rods are in, direct RO to break vacuum to slow main turbine.
C(RO) Injects SBLC when directed.
If RO attempts to reset scram: (RO) Before attempting to reset scram
- repressurizes scram air header o When directed, repressurize scram air header by C(SRO) Directs torus cooling maximized.
removing malfunction C(RO) Maximizes torus cooling when RD 13. directed.
C(SRO) Direct injection to the vessel be secured (except CR) and Boron)
Direct level be maintained per lcvcl/power criteria.
C(RO) Maintain RPV level as directed.
C(SRO) Declare EAL C-9 C(SRO) Notify Statc/County within 15 minutes. Notify NRC within one hour.
C(SRO) Initiate plant evacuation.
Terminate scenario when plant conditions are stable and all rods are in.
Rev. 1 REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turbinc Trip With ATWS
INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITVY TRAINEE ACTIVITV iNSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY TRAINEE ACTIVITY Discuss major problems and IV. POST-EXERCISE CRITIQUE questions about the exercise.
OBTAIN trainee's self-evaluation, comments, and questions.
REVIEW learning objectives.
REVIEW the exercise using trends of the evolutions; compare trainee responses to malfunctions with correct responses.
CRITIQUE student and team performance observed during each exercise.
Reinforce proper individual and team performance.
Reinforce applicable theory.
Identify areas for improvement.
SOLICIT additional questions from Participate in discussions.
students and promote discussion of correct answers.
Rev. 1 REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turbine Trip With ATWS I
DEVELOPED BY:
Joseph G. Bennett Date SRO Instructor VALIDATED BY:
SRO Instructor Date REVIEWED BY:
Frank S. Van Etten Date Training Supervisor-Operations REVIEWED BY:
Charles R. (Bob) Mick Date Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Date Training Supervisor Instructional Standards APPROVED BY:
Stephen L. Swails Date Training Superintendent The difference in signature date vs. revision date is attributed to development/approval process.
Rev. 1 REM 90-9 07/13/90 Turbine Trip With ATWS
LICENSED OPER.ATOR REQUAL 3 EXAM PREPARLATION
- 1. EOP-1 SVerify all rods in Level control - Overfilling Rx vessel with Main Steam L-nes open
- 2. EOP-2
'Spray the drowell before 280 degrees Allow tune or system initiaton
'Emergency Depressurize if cannot maintain below 280
'Spray torus b21fore 9= in the torus (If not go directly to Drvwell sprays)
Scram Rx before torus water temperature reaches 110
- Allow enough time to evaluate ATWS'SBLC prior to 110 During ATWS do not drain torus below 10 ft. - adverse impact on Heat Capacitv Limit
' Consider the value of Defeat 4 if doywell temperature is increasing rapidly
- 3. EOP-3 SBriet review ot procedure and monitored parameters
'PowerLevel Control
-When to enter (relate to need for SBLC)
-Stop injection rather than throttling injection *
-Prevent injection from HPCI and RCIC, Bypass Msiv 1-10-10
'Reduce pressure set to 880# when able
- Verify ARI trips rectrc pumps
- 5. ALTERNATE LEVEL CONTROL
'Review - E/D at -15"
- 6. EMERGE'NCY DEPRESSURIZATION ONLY secure injection if in an ATWS
'Should check Saturation Graph for level instrument accuracy
- 7. RPV FLOODING
'Review establishing 50# dP
8 OTHFR PROCFDLRES a \ enting (onainiment
' \Vhen to use the big valve vs the smalH valve
' Whe0 to usc a iir purge vs.Iutcogen
'Reautre:nents Icr a lifted SBGT Relief b SC)RV ARP
'Urgency of pursung the problem-Cycling the switch & fuses
'Be sure to pull all-fuses-procedure confusing
- c. Others
- 9. M.iscellaneous Problems
'RIIR injection lined up to inject - Operators unaware
- Confusion when ,;sing SPDS indications along with IC03
, Exraneous commuucations during major accidents (small items)
'Confusion on sump indications when determining leak-rates
,Using wrong Power Flow map during single-loop
Rev. 0 11/29/88 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY COURSE TITLE: Reactor Operator 500-007 TERMINAL OBJECTIVE:
Licensed Operator Requal 500-008 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE NUMBER: H.10 LESSON TOPIC: EOP 3, Secondary Containment Control ENABLING OBJECTIVES:
ALLOTTED LESSON TIME: Classroom: Laboratory: See Section I.C. of Instructor Guide 1/2 hour 0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> CRITERION TEST:
INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS: A. Exam A. Whiteboard and Markers HOMEWORK:
B. EOP Flowcharts A. Self study during class time.
INSTRUCTIONAL
REFERENCES:
A. BWROG EPG REV 4 B. BWROG EPG REV 4 Appendix B C. Plant Specific Technical Guideline for EPG REV 4 D. PSTG-EOP Differences Documentation for EPG REV 4 E. EOP Training Material Section K
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE # H.10 Rev. 0 11/29/88 DEVELOPED BY: (7o / & O'c, e/
M~rke p CofinelI REVIEWED BY:
REVIEWED BY: Q 2 SRO INSTRU YOR REVIEWED BY:
1 Training Supervisor - Operations REVIEWED BY: (,'Z 4 harles H. (Bob) Mick Operations Supervisor REVIEWED BY:
Robert K. Tucker Staff Instructional Technologist REVIEWED BY; 6. '{(
Training Superintendent
IULINE OF INSTRUCTION ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
I. INTRODUCTION A. Establish Contact (1) Introduce Self/Topic B. Learning Objective Upon completion of this lesson, the student will 'be (1) Read learning objectives able to use EOP 3, Secondary Containment Control to aloud.
maintain Secondary Containment parameters within allowable limits.
(S) Read objectives printed in Student Guide while instructor reads objectives aloud.
C. Enabling Objectives Upon completion of this lesson, the student will (1) Read enabling objective perform the following objectives at a minimum aloud.
proficiency level of 80% unless otherwise stated.
(S) Read objectives printed in
- 1. From memory explain the goal of EOP 3 and relate student guide while this goal to the overall strategy of the EOPs. instructor reads objective aloud.
- 2. Given EOP flowcharts and a scenario, assess plant status and take appropriate action for a Primary System Leak into Secondary Containment.
Rev. 0 IG # H.10 11/29/88
LINE OF INSTRUCTION ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
SRO ONLY
- 3. When given EOP flowcharts and a scenario, assess overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOPs.
D. Establish Readiness: this lesson will familiarize (1) Bring out the need for this you with the use of Secondary Containment Control lesson.
EOP.
(S) Students bring out their needs for this lesson.
II. PRESENTATION A. Goal and Structure of EOP 3 OBJECTIVE I I. The goal of EOP 3 is to provide protection to (1) Maintain class participation plant equipment and/or provide for personnel through effective oral access to equipment in those areas that is questioning.
required to shutdown the reactor or maintain adequate core cooling. If-mroe than--one-area (S) Participate in class discussion.
- 2. If more than one area experiences high temperature, high water levels or high radiation levels, then RPV depressurization is directed if the leak is known to have been caused by a primary system.
Rev. 0 11/29/88 IG # H.10
OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION W ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
- 3. Plant shutdown is directdd if high temperatures, (1) Review EOP-3 high water levels or high radiation occurs which is not related to the RPV. (S) Participate in review by following along in the flowcharts.
B. Entry into EOP 3 OBJECTIVE 2
- 1. There are 4 major reasons for entering OBJECTIVE 3 EOP 3. These are:
U.)o~e2 L-c'iueQ
- a. Area Temp above max normal
- b. Area Radiation above max normal.
- c. Area Temperatures above max normal
- d. Group III Radiation based Isolation/SBGT Initiation signal
- 2. Each of the above is consistent with observations of a reactor coolant leak that could result in a release outside of the containment. Other non-RPV related events however may be responsible for one or more of the parameters above max normal (e.g. fire involving contaminated anti-C's, TIP malfunction or flooding due to broken GSW or Well water piping). In any event, EOP 3 must be entered. The direction given in EOP 3 will distinguish between the cause.
Rev. 0 IG # H.10 11/29/88
OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION q ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
- 3. Table 6 provides a specific listing of (I) Review EOP-3 the areas monitored. Note that not all areas within Secondary Containment are (S) Participate in review by listed due to instrumentation limitations. following along in the flowcharts.
C. Applicable Continuous Recheck Statements IF REACTOR BUILDING VENT SHAFT EXHAUST RADIATION LEVEL IS ABOVE 11 MR/HR OR REFUEL FLOOR EXHAUST RADIATION LEVEL IS ABOVE 9 MR/HR OR OFFGAS VENT PIPE EXHAUST RADIATION LEVEL IS ABOVE (HI-HI TRIP SETPOINT RM-4116A[B)
THEN VERIFY ISOLATION OF REACTOR BUILDING HVAC AND VERIFY INITIATION OF SBGT.
- 1. If SBGT should have started due to radiation levels, then the operator is directed to start SBGT and verify isolation of Secondary Containment HVAC.
Rev. 0 4 11/29/88 IG # H.10
OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION IF ALL THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS APPLY:
0 ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
(1) Review EOP-3 o REACTOR BUILDING HVAC IS ISOLATED (S) Participate in review by o REACTOR BUILDING VENT SHAFT EXHAUST RADIATION following along in the LEVEL IS BELOW 11 MR/HR flowcharts.
o REFUEL FLOOR EXHAUST RADIATION LEVEL IS BELOW 9 MR/HR o OFFGAS VENT PIPE RADIATION LEVEL IS BELOW (HI-HI TRIP SETPOINT RM-4116A[B])
THEN RESTART REACTOR BUILDING HVAC. DEFEAT HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE AND LOW RPV WATER LEVEL ISOLATION INTERLOCKS AS NECESSARY PER EOP C, DEFEAT 9.
- 2. If the Reactor Building HVAC is isolated for a reason other than radiation levels (e.g.
high Drywell pressure or low RPV water level) then restoration of RB HVAC is directed as RB HVAC should aid in restoring normal Secondary Containment temperatures.
Rev. 0 IG # H.10 11/29/88
OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
D. Action Steps (I) Review EOP-3
- 1. Section SC/T steps SC/T-1 through SC/T-3 (S) Participate in review by direct operation of available coolers and following along in the RB HVAC if permitted. flowcharts.
- 2. Section SC/I directs operation of sump pumps.
- 3. Section SC/R combines actions from SC/T SC/L and SC/R due to the identical nature of these sections once the initial mitigation actions have been taken.
- 4. If after performing the mitigation actions of SC/T and SC/L, the entry condition has not been cleared, then SC/R-1 provides direction to proceed into the significant control steps.
- 5. SC/R-2 provides direction to isolate the source of the discharge by isolating systems that are discharging into Secondary Containment areas unless the system is required to complete reactor shutdown (e.g. SDV leak),
assure adequate core cooling (e.g. RCIC .steam leak) or suppress a fire (e.g. fire in corner room).
Rev. 0 IG # H.10 11/29/88
OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE #
- 6. SC/R-3 through SC/R-5 provide for the (I) Review EOP-3 need to take action per EOP I if the source of the high area temperature, radiation level (S) Participate in review by or water level can be determined to be from following along in the a primary system leak. flowcharts.
- 7. SC/R-7 and SC/R-8 provides for subsequent execution of emergency RPV despressurization IF max safe operating levels are exceeded for the same parameter in more than one area.
- 8. SC/R-10 through SC/R-12 (which parallel execution of the previously mentioned steps) provides for direction to conduct a plant shutdown. If maximum safe operating levels are exceeded for reasons unrelated to the RPV, then plant shutdown is appropriate, while a Reactor Scram and emergency RPV depressurization as directed previously are not required since there is no link between an area and the RPV. If subsequent reports or observations lead to the conclusion that the RPV is indeed the source of the problems, then execution of SC/R-3 through SC/R-9 is valid and should be performed.
Rev. 0 -7 11/29/88 IG # H.10
OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION ACTIVITY/OBJECTIVE W E. EOP Exit (I) Review EOP-3 EOP 3 may be exited once the entry (S) Participate in review by conditions have been cleared. following along in flowcharts.
Rev. 0 11/29/88 IG # H.10
III. Summary A. Questions (I) Briefly discuss each topic and ask factual questions about Q. How do the entry conditions relate presentation materials.
to the goal of EOP-3?
A. The entry conditions are indicative (S) Answer questions.
of a potential release of RPV contents that may eventually be released to the environment.
Q. How does a knowledge that high HPCI room temperatures are caused by a fire relate to EOP-3.
A. The steps following SC/R-3 need not be executed if the sole reason for the high temperature can be traced to something other than a primary system discharging into the area.
Q. What are the implications of exceeding max normal operating levels for temperature in both the RCIC room and HPCI room during the same time frame.
A. EOP-3 would have been entered, but more substantial actions required in SC/R-7 and subsequent steps would not be performed.
Rev. 0 11/29/88 IG # H.10
B. Scenario:
(1) Discuss scenario with students.
Work through EOP 3. Discuss The plant is at full power when a spurious MSIV closure Entry into EOP I and EOP I ATWS results in a turbine trip and reactor scram. The rods but do not pursue.
insert to notch position 22. RPV water level is normal on the startup level controller. Following the scram (S) Follow scenario and respond to the second assistant reports a steam leak from the instructor questions.
North CRD scram discharge volume. RI-9168 reads 95 mr/hr. Reactor Building Exhaust Ventilation Rad monitors are trending up.
Reactor and Containment Parameters are:
RPV Water Level 190 inches and steady RPV pressure 900 to 1025 psig Optional (I) Have the OSS assign crew positions Rx Power APRMs are downscale and have OSS walkthrough the Drywell temp 137 F and steady scenario with the crew.
Drywell press 1.3 psig steady Guide discussions.
Torus level 10.3 ft and steady Torus temp 98 F and rising Systems running No change from initial conditions.
The time is T+3 minutes into the scenario. Data provided above may be placed on the board at once or given out as requested.
Rev. 0 10 11/29/88 IG # H.10
C. Scenario Discussion Items (1) Discuss the following items with the students during the scenario
- 1. Discuss the implications of isolating or use as questions.
the scram discharge volume. Who, and How?
(S) Discuss the items and answer
- 2. What actions are required if the CRD questions.
Rebuild Room ARM alarms?
- 3. Discuss EPIP evaluation.
- 4. What other secondary containment parameters are likely to be affected by this event (even though there is little instrumentation to indicate the parameters)?
- 5. The SRO decides that the leak is unisolable and decides to depressurize the RPV. Is this an appropriate action? Explain.
Rev. 0 11/29/88
- 11 - IG # H.10
IV. APPLICATION A. EOP 3, Secondary Containment Control B. The operator will utilize this procedure during simulator training.
V. ASSIGNMENT A. Self study during class time.
Rev. 0 -12 11/29/88 IG # H.10
4/r - 9 LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL 500-008 TTT.0012 EOP-2, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL Document Number Rev. 0 December 28. 1989 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
Rev. 0 12/28/89 Primary Containment Control I. INTRODUCTION A. Learning Objective:
Ulpon completion of this topic, the student will be able to:
- 1. Use EOP-2. Primary Containment Control to monitor, maintain, and control Primary Containment parameters below design limits.
B. Enabling Objectives Upon completion of this lesson, the student will perform the following objectives 80 % unless otherwise stated.
at a minimum proficiency level of TTT.09 Explain the goal of each section of EOP-2 and relate these goals to the overall EOP strategy.
TTT.10 Evaluate plant status and take appropriate actions to control primary containment parameters.
TIT. II Evaluate plant status and determine if use of containment sprays is appropriate.
SRO ONLY TIT.07 Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate action per the EOPs.
TTT.08 Identify and explain the transitions to contingency procedures.
SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control I
Rev. 0 12/28/89 C. References I. EOP Training Material Section F.
2 SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control
Rev. 0 12/28/89 II. PRESENTATION A. Goal and Structure of EOP-2 I1. EOP-2 monitors and controls parameters that represent containment limits or can result in the loss of containment integrity. Containment integrity is to be maintained, even at the expense of adequate core cooling. The second most significant aspect of Primary Containment is its pressure suppression function. Ilowever, it has no relief or overpressure protection. If pressure suppression is lost, the RPV is placed in its lowest energy state.
- 2. Section T,/T provides direction to maintain ' >rus .emperature and its ability to condense steam from the RPV or the Lrywell.
- 3. Section TAL provides direction to maintain Torus level between high and low limits.
- a. Low Torus levels reduce the amount of energy that the Torus may hold. Very low Torus level may uncover pressure suppression components such as the downcomers and SRV tail pipes as well as the IIPCI discharge.
- b. Iligh Torus levels improve the ability to store energy. Ilowever, Drywell/Torus vacuum breakers may become covered resulting in the inability to use Drywell Sprays, or high loads in the SRV tail pipes may result in the loss of SRV use.
- 4. Section DW/T maintains Drywell temperature less than the design temperature. Steel loses strength as its temperature rises. The Drywell will, therefore, lose strength and its ability to withstand pressure as Drywell temperature increases.
- 5. Section PC'H controls Primary Containment hydrogen and oxygen to preclude reaching a mixture of the two gases that might result in a deflagration. The peak containment pressures resulting from a hydrogen SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 3
Rev. 0 12/28189 burn via deflagration are sufficicntly high and rapidly occurring to overpressurize the containment.
- 6. Section PC, P provides direction to maintain Primary Containment pressure (Torus and Drvwell) below the point of failure.
- 7. At various points throughout LOP-2, Emergency RPV Deprcssurization will he directed to prevent the RPV from being a source of possible containment failure. The CRS for Emergency RPV Depressurization is now activated and the transition from RC.'P to ED can be made if the operator has entered FOP-1. It is imperative that the operator enter EOP-I as directed, execute steps RC-1 through RC-4, and reach the RPV control !ections prior to making the transition to Emergency Depressurization.
B. Entry into EOP-2
- 1. EOP-2 is entered when Torus level and temperature LCO values are exceeded, Drywell pressure exceeds the scram setpoint, normal Drywell temperature is at the alarm setpoint, or hydrogen concentration is at the alarm setpoint.
- 2. 1ligh Drywell pressure also results in entry into EOP- 1. This is the only entry condition common to more than one EOP.
C. Applicable Continuous Recheck Statements while performing the following:
IF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT FLOODING IS REQUIRED, THEN ENTER PRIMARY CONTAINMENT FLOODING
- 1. The goal of Torus level control is to maintain Torus level within the LCO limits. However, when Primary Containment Flooding is required, control is transfered to PCF (Contingency #6) to control water level outside the LCO limits.
While performing the following:
IF TORUS AND/OR DRYWELL SPRAYS HAVE BEEN INITIATED AND TORUS AND/OR DRYWELL PRESSURE DROPS BELOW 2.0 SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 4
Rev. 0 12/28/89 PSIG, THEN TERMINATE TORUS SPRAYS AND/OR DRYWELL SPRAYS.
- 2. Operation of Torus and/or Drywell sprayr may reduce containment pressure below atmospheric which may result in de-inerting the containment as well as threatening the Drvwell/Torus with negative dilTerential pressure.
While performing the following:
IF H2 or 02 MONITORING SYSTEMS ARE UNAVAILABLE, THEN NOTIFY CHEMISTRY TO MANUALLY SAMPLE THE DRYWELL AND TORUS FOR H2 AND 02 PER PASAP 2.6.
IF DRYWELL OR TORUS H2 CANNOT BE DETERMINED TO BE BELOW 6%
AND DRYWELL OR TORUS 02 CANNOT BE DETERMINED TO BE BELOW 5%, THEN PROCEED TO STEP PC/H-14.
- 4. If primary containment hydrogen and oxygen cannot he determined to be below the deflagration point, then actions to mitigate the dangerous containment environment and place the RPV in its lowest energy state are req uired.
While performing the following:
IF THE OFFSITE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RATE REACHES OFFGAS VENT PIPE HI-HI TRIP (RNI-4116A[B) SETPOINT, THEN VERIFY ISOLATION OF TORUS AND DRYWELL VENT AND
-PURGE AND CONTINUE AT STEP PC/H-13.
- 5. Venting the Drvwell or Torus when hydrogen is less than 6%, is contingent upon not exceeding plant release limits for normal operation. If the OfTgas SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 5
Rev. 0 12/28/89 Vent Pipe Rad Monitor exceeds the Ili-ill trip setpoint, the venting lineup is isolated.
). Action Steps
- 1. Section 1 T
- a. Steps T/T-1 through T/T-3 are designed to provide for Torus cooling using RilR.
- b. Steps T/T-4 through T/T-6 direct 17OP-1 entry resulting in a reactor scram prior to exceeding the temperature at which horon injection is required.
- c. Step T/T-7 provides direction to maintain Torus temperature below the Heat Capacity Limit.
- d. Steps T/T-8 through T/T-10 provide direction on actions to take when the Torus temperature cannot he maintained below the Heat Capacity Limit curve. The RPV depressuri7ation directed at this point ensures that the RPV can be depressurized before exceeding the ability of the Torus to handle the heat energy.
C. Step T/T- Il is only performed if adequate core cooling is not aflected.
Note that NPSII considerations for CS and RIIR are now significant.
- 2. Section TIL
- a. Steps T/L-I through T/L-3 provide guidance for monitoring and restoration of Torus water lecl within the LCO limits.
- b. Step T/L-4 holds action until Torus level is outside or expected to go outside the LCO limits while Step T/L-5 directs left or right hand side path execution depending upon level high or low.
- c. Steps T/L-6 through T/L-9 provide the most significant actions for a lowering Torus level. The level is maintained above the 7 1. minimum required for the downcomers and as much margin as possible between the Heat Capacity Limit, actual Torus water temperature, and RPV SG 'TT.0012 Primary Containment Control 6
Rev. 0 12/28/89 pressure. If these limits cannot be maintained, then Emergency RPV Depressurization is required as well as entering EOP-1 at Step RC-I.
- d. Steps T/L-10 through T/L-12 provide For maintenance and actions related to keeping the IPCI exhaust covered with water.
- c. Steps T/L-13 through T/L-17 provide For actions designed to maintain the Drywell/Torus vacuum breakers uncovered in order to retain the ability to conduct Drywell Sprays. Note that adequate core cooling is not sacrificed to maintain Torus level below 13.5 ft.
F. Steps T/L-18 through T/L-25 provide for actions designed to protect the SRV tail pipes from failure. The SRV tail pipe limit is a function of RPV pressure for a very limited region. Therefore, once RPV pressure has been lowered or is being maintained below 1000 psig, the effective Torus level limit is 16 ft. due to instrumentation limitations.
- g. Steps T/L-29 through T/L-31 provide the inal steps of Torus level control with the object of not exceeding the elevation of the Drywell vent line. Sources external to the Primary Containment are sacrificed irrespective of adequate core cooling.
- 3. Section DW/T
- a. Steps DW/T-1 through DW/T-5 provides for successive actions to restore Drvwell Cooling as well as direction for conducting a reactor shutdown if temperatures cannot be restored.
- b. Steps DW/T-6 through DW/T-8 take action to avoid exceeding the Drywell design limit of 281"F, rounded ofT to 280'F. Directions are given to enter EOP-1, which results in a reactor scram, and provides for the execution of the following steps.
- c. Steps DW/T-9 through DW/T-16 provide for the use of Drywell Sprays (if allowed) to reduce Drywell temperature. Also, Emergency SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 7
Rev. 0 12/28/89 Depressuri7ation is required if DW/I cannot be maintained below 280"F.
- 4. Section PC; H
- a. Step PC/H-I provides instructions to monitor and control hydrogen and oxygen concentration. Entry into 1OP-2 is unlikely to have been based on 4% hydrogen without having exceeded the other parameters for a long period of time.
- h. Action is held at Step PC/H-2 until hydrogen concentration exceeds the minimum detectable value of 0.4"'%.
- c. Step PC/H-3 provides for a rough determination of whether or not a vent and purge of the Primary Containment is likely to result in a containment isolation on high radiation. Vent and purge of hydrogen with the concentration below the delagration point (assumes oxygen is also present at 5 % or more) is only conducted under conditions of normally allowable releases. The LCO note corresponds to a value less than a site emergency value (C-25).
- d. Steps PC/H-4 through PC/H-8 provide for preferentially venting via the Torus to make use of the Torus's ability to scrub Fission products.
Note that venting does not reduce concentration of a gas and that the vent path will only be used if activity levels remain below the OfTgas Vent Pipe Ili-Ili Trip Setpoint.
- e. Steps PC/H-9 through PC/H-12. Once a vent path has been established, Drywell purge, preferably nitrogen. must follow to achieve a reduction in hydrogen concentration. However, if the atmosphere is already de-incrted, as measured by oxygen concentration greater than 5%. an air purge is directed due to its high volume flowrate.
SG ITT.0012 Primary Containment Control 8
Rev. 0 12/28/89 F. Step PC/H-13 is the holding point For a variety of situations.
Direction to procced past this point is only granted when concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen reach the point of deflagration.
- g. Steps PC/H-14 through PC/H-16 provide for placing the RPV in its lowest energy state, and conducting Torus Sprays if sprays are not required continuously for adequate core cooling.
- h. Steps PC/H-17 through PC/H-21 parallel previous actions to vent the Primary Containment except when ANY venting interlocks are defeated.
- i. Step PC/H-22 parallel previous actions to establish a purge of the Drvwell with air.
- j. Steps PC/H-23 through PC/H-25 will initiate )ry well Sprays if permitted by the Drywell Spray Initiation graph and Torus level. At this point, sprays are initiated only if not required continuously for adequate core cooling.
- k. Step PC/1-26 provides a holding point. Steps PC/H-19 through PC/H-25 should have mitigated the explosive atmosphere. If not, the remaining actions preserve the containment at the expense of maintaining adequate core cooling.
- 1. Steps PC/H-27 through PC/H-30 provide for initiation of Torus Sprays and Drvwell Sprays (if allowed) irrespective of continued adequate core cooling.
- m. Steps PC/H-31 through PC/H-34 direct a return to sheet I of EOP-2 to continue hydrogen control actions once the concentration has been reduced below 0.40. Venting and purging is secured. Further releases are not warranted until an explosive mixture is again detected.
SG 'TIT.0012 Primary Containment Control 9
Rev. 0 12/28/89
- 5. Section PC/P
- a. Steps PC/P-1 through PC/P-2 provide for initial control actions if Drywell pressure has not yet reached 2.0 psig.
- b. Steps PC/P-3 through PC/P-4 provide for initiation of Torus Sprays anytime after reaching 2.0 psig and before 9.0 psig. If 9.0 psig has been exceeded., Torus sprays should he used anyways.
- c. Steps PC/P-5 through PC/P-8 provide for use of Drvwell Sprays if allowed by torus water level and Drywell Spray Initiation Graph.
- d. Steps PC/P-9 and PC/P-10 are concerned about the ability of the Pressure Suppression System to operate properly. The region outside the limits of the Pressure Suppression Graph represents energy that is bypassing the pressure suppression system. Continued pressurized operation of the RPV is not permitted because the pressure suppression system may not be functioning.
- c. Venting of the containment is directed in Steps PC/P-12 through PC/P-17 to maintain Torus pressure below the maximum allowed.
Interlock defeats are addressed in EOP-C Defeat 10.
- f. If the previous actions to vent the containment were not successful, Step PC/P-18 provides direction to attempt pressure reduction irrespective of adequate core cooling.
- g. Steps PC/P-19 through PC/P-23 provide direction for Torus Sprays (initiation) and Drywell Sprays (if allowed).
E. EOP Exit Once all the entry conditions have been cleared, exiting the EOP is appropriate.
SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 10
Rev. 0 12/28/89 Ill.
SUMMARY
A. Questions Q. What are the containment design parameters that are controlled by EOP-2?
A.
Q. What Functional aspects of the Pressure Suppression System are controlled by EOP-2?
A.
Q. Given a stuck open SRV and dual failures of Torus cooling valves, what limit will be reached as a result of the transient (assumes reactor will be shutdown)?
A.
SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control II
Rev. 0 12/28/89 Q. Given a Torus level of 12.5 ft, what are the implications of a further Torus level rise?
A.
Q. Given Drvwell temperatures of 195"F following a loss of Drywell cooling and Dryvwell pressure of 1.85 psig, what actions may be taken to mitigate the event.
A.
Q. Distinguish between the actions required for a high hydrogen concentration in the primary containment versus high hydrogen and oxygen concentrations simultaneously.
A.
SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 12
Rev. 0 12/28/89 Q. Given a Drvwell pressure of 38 psig with an average Drywell temperature of 260^ F, determine if Drywell sprays may he used.
A.
Q. Given a Torus level of 7.5 ft. and dropping at a rate of I inch per minute, describe the required actions.
A.
SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 13
Rev. 0 12/28/89 B. Scenario A small steam line break has resulted in Drywell temperature increase to 255 degrees while also causing a reactor scram due to Drywell pressure. MSIVs are isolated due to a loss of condenser vacuum. IIPCI. RCIC and RFPs tripped on high RPV water level.
Reactor and Containment Parameters are:
RPV Water Level + 232 inches and dropping slowly RPV Pressure 921 psig RX is shutdown on all rods inserted to 00 Drywell Temp. 255I0 F J)rywell Pressure 9.0 psig Torus Level 10.3 ft.
Torus Temp. 123o1F and rising slowly Systems Running DIV I and 2 components per normal initiation signals.
SG TTT.0012 Primary Containment Control 14
IV6 - 7ri/
LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL (500-008)
STUDENT GUIDE T [T.19 ALTERNATE LEVEL-CONTROL
)orument Number Rev. 0 January 10. 1990 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
Rev. 0 01/10/90 Alternate Level Control LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
Upon completion of this lesson, the student will be able to use the Alternate Level Control Flowchart in conjunction with the EOP-1 to control RPV Water Levcl during any situatio.i.
Enabling Objectives Upon completion of this lesson, the student will perform the following objectives at a minimum proficiency level of 80% unless otherwise stated.
TTT.12 Evaluate plant status and determine when entry into ALC is required.
TTT.13 From memory explain the criteria that lead to steam cooling.
SRO ONLY TTT.07 Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate action per the FOPs.
TTT.08 Identify and explain the transitions to contingency procedures.
Establish Readiness This lesson will familiarize you with the use of the Alternate Level Control Contingency.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control I
Rev. 0 01/10/90 PRES.ENTATION A. Goal and Structure of ALC
- 1. The goal of ALC is to restore adequate core cooling through core submergence with low pressure injection systems. ALC is a contingency procedure that is used temporarily in lieu of the Level Control portion of EOP-1.
- 2. ALC directs the start up of normal injection systems followed by the start up up of alternate injection systems, if necessary.
- 3. Once RPV Water Level drops to + 15 inches then if injection systems are available, the RPV may be depressurized and level restored. If no injection systems are available then steam cooling will be pursued.
B. Entry into ALC
- 1. ALC is entered from EOP 1 when RPV water level cannot be maintained above + 15 inches. This may be either a trend of lowering level or actual level at or below + 15 inches.
- 2. ALC is not entered under ATWS conditions.
C. Applicable Continuous Recheck Statements IF RPV WATER LEVEL CANNOT BE DETERMINED THEN ENTER RPV FLOODING.
- 1. As in any of the EOP sections dealing with RPV water level control, if RPV water level cannot be determined, then RPV Flooding Contingency must be pursued to ensure adequate core cooling is re-established.
IF RPV WATER LEVEL IS RISING THEN ENTER RPV CONTROL.
- 2. If water level is being restored, then the operator is directed to the initial steps of RC/L for level control. This provides an exit from ALC when a previously inoperable system has been restored.
IF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL AND TORUS PRESSURE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control 2 I
Rev. 0 01/10/90 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL 95 FT.
TORUS PRESSURE 53 PSIG THEN IRRESPECTIVE OF ADEQUATE CORE COOLING, TERMINATE INJECTION INTO THE RPV FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT UNTIL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL AND TORUS PRESSURE CAN BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE LIMITS.
- 3. Sources of injection external to the containment are secured to preclude overpressurizing the Torus or filling the containment above the Drvwell vent line penetration (located at 95 ft.). The consequence of not doing so. may be a complete and uncontrolled loss of Primary Containment.
IF THE ADS TIMER HAS INITIATED THEN, PLACE BOTH ADS TIMER HANDSWITCHES IN OVERRIDE.
- 4. In EOPs the operator will be taking action and has the ability to assess when depressurization is appropriate. An operator can draw on more information than ADS logic and thus is better able to judge via EOP criteria, when to depressurize the RPV.
D. Action Steps
- 1. ALC-l through ALC-6 are concerned with providing one or more MOTOR DRIVEN injection systems. Steam driven equipment is not included because these systems are not likely to be available following RPV depressurization.
- a. Note that Table lB refers CS/RIR loop rather than pumps. This additional conservatism ensures that multiple 'loops are available, since a single failure in an injection path could prevent injection from any pump or pumps supplying that loop.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control 3
Rev. 0 01/10/90
- b. Low pressure injection systems may be "lined up and running" without actually injecting. This is acceptable since the following steps will allow RPV depressurization.
- 2. ALC-7 and ALC-8 provide the logic for determining when to proceed as well as which pathway to use. Additional time is gained to allow high pressure systems such as RCIC or CRD (both pumps) to reverse the level trend.
- a. If no motor driven pumps are running, then the only course of action is to conserve RPV inventory by entering steam cooling.
- b. If any motor driven pumps are available then the RPV is depressurized to allow pressure systems to inject.
- c. Prior to level reaching + 15 inches, the severe transient from an emergency depressurization is not warranted.
- 3. ALC-9 is a Continuous Recheck Statement "flag" which provides the "Emergency Depressurization is required" statement. Note that the requirement to use ED results in a transition from the only active section of EOP 1, RC/P. Thus the operator can discard EOP I and now has ALC and ED side by side on the same flowchart for control of RPV Water Level and RPV pressure.
- 4. ALC-l I directs level restoration without the restrictions of NPSII or Vortex limits.
Injection to restore adequate core cooling takes precedence over equipment concerns at this point.
- 5. ALC-12 provides the determination of whether or not Primary Containment Flooding needs to be pursued.
- a. PCF is specified because, despite injection of all available systems, RPV Water Level cannot be raised above + 15 inches. This circumstance must be due to a break beyond the makeup capacity and Primary Containment Flooding is required.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control 4
Rev. 0 01/10/90
- b. Note that Spray Cooling, achieved by one or more CS pumps injecting at rated flow, does provide adequate core cooling, but in the long run core submergence is required and this goal will only be met by PCF flood.
- 6. ALC-16 through ALC-20 provide instructions for maintaining adequate core cooling when NO injection systems are available.
- a. In this case, then the only action is to conserve RPV Water inventory while attempting to make an RPV injection- system available such as during a Station Blackout scenario.
- b. Note that ALC-13 directed an exit from RC/P of EOP 1. Low-Low Set is allowed to control RPV pressure in order to conserve inventory and transfer the maximum amount of decay heat per Ibm of RPV water inventory.
- c. The operator is directed to blowdown at -40 inches since below this level, adequate core cooling cannot be assured due to boil of.
- d. It must be remembered that steam cooling is only a means of buying time, in order to restore injection system. It should not be seen as a final means of restoring adequate core cooling.
E. ALC Exit ALC-9 through ALC-15 provide direction on restoring RPV Water Level and returning to RC/L for water level control.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control 5
Rev. 0 01/10/90
SUMMARY
A. Goal and Structure ofALC Q. Lists the mechanisms used in ALC to assure adequate core cooling.
A.
B. Ent y Into ALC C. Applicable Continuous Recheck Statements D. Action Steps Q. When is it appropriate to enter Steam Cooling?
A.
F. ALC Exit Q. Describe the exit paths from ALC.
A.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control 6 I
LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL (500-008)
STUDENT GUIDE TTT.19 ALTERNATE LEVEL- CONTROL
/)ocument Number Rev. 0 January 10, 1990 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER I
N/& 00-/ 7c/
4 t LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL 500-008 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION STUDENT GUIDE TTT.20 Document Number Rev. I December 21, 1989 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
Rev. 1 12/21/89 Emergency Depressurization LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
Upon completion of this t, pic, the studlent will be able to:
- 1. Use the Emergency Depressurization Contingency flowchart when directed by the EOPs under the appropriate plant conditions.
ENABLING OBJECTIVES
- 1. Explain the goals of Emergency Depressurization.
- 2. Evaluate plant conditions and determine when entry into ED will be required.
- 3. Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOP.
- 4. Identify and explain the transitions to contingency procedures.
SG Requal TTT.20 I I
Rev. 1 12/21/89 PRESENTATION A. Goal and Structure of ED I. The goal of ED is to depressurize the plant irrespective of normal plant cooldown limitations.
- 2. ED directs the use of the ADS SRVs if availabic and when torus water level is sufficient, or various alternate means of depressurization.
B. ED Entry
- 2. ED may be entered under ATWS conditions. Special actions are then provided to prevent injecting as the RPV depressurizes in order to preclude a-positive reactivity excursion.
- 3. Reasons for ED entry include the need:
- To depressurize the RPV in order to allow low pressure systems to inject.
- To place the RPV in its lowest energy state to preclude further threat to Primary Containment Limits.
" To place the RPV in its lowest energy state prior to losing the capability to depressurize.
- To eliminate the driving head behind a leak into Secondary Containment.
- To eliminate the driving head behind a leak outside Secondary Containment.
C. Action Steps
- 1. ED-I and ED-2 provide determination and action for ATWS conditions. It is essential to prevent all but CRD, RCIC and boron injection systems from injecting cold, unborated water into a potentially critical reactor.
- 2. ED-3 and ED-4 prevent RIR and CS from overfilling the RPV during the depressurization. Since high drywell pressure starts low pressure ECCS, these systems will inject once RPV pressure is reduced below their shutoff head.
SG Requal TrT.20 2 f
Rev. I 12/21/89
- 4. ED-8 and ED-9 determine if the RPV is depressurized. The minimum SRV re-opening pressure of 50 psig is used since actions for continued depressurization are not required below this value.
- 5. The list of paths given in ED-10 is prioritized according to capacity, availability, and whether or not the system adds heat to the primary containment.
- 6. ED-Il determines the impact of the depressurization upon the RPV water level instrumentation due to boil off in the -ference or variable legs. RPV flooding may be required.
D. Exit from ED ED-13 provides a return to the shutdown cooling section of RC/P if the reactor is shutdown with rods or boron.
Note: SRV handswitches should remain in the open position.
SG Requal TTT.20 3
Rev. I 12/21/89
SUMMARY
A. Questions Q. Explain the purpose of Emergency Depressurization A.
Q. Emergency Depressurization may be required due to exceeding the Heat Capacity Limit. Explain the transition from EOP 2 to EOP I and then into ED.
A.
Q. What are the implications of less 3 SRVs open while depressurizing?
A.
Q. What is the significance of 50 psig above torus pressure?
A.
SG Requal TTT.20 4
Rev. I 12/21/89 Q. Describe alternate methods to depressurize the RPV and discuss the consequences of each pathway.
A.
SG Requal TTT.20 5
iftt LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL (500-008)
STUDENT GUIDE TTT.11 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE 1 RPV CONTROL Document Number Rev. /
January 3, 1990 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
Rev. I 01/02/90 EOP 1, RPV Control I. INTRODUCTION A. Enabling Objectives Upon completion of this lesson, the student will perform the following objectives at a minimum proficiency level of 80% unless otherwise stated.
- 1. Explain the overall strategy of EOP 1.
- 2. Explain the goal of each section of RPV Control and relate these goals to the overall EOP strategy.
- 3. Evaluate the status of RPV level instrumentation and take appropriate action to maintain adequate core cooling.
- 4. Determine plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV water level.
- 5. Determine plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV pressure.
- 6. Determine plant status and take appropriate action for reactor power.
- 7. Determine when plant conditions require entry into FOP 1.
- 8. SRO
- a. Assess overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOPs.
- b. Explain the transitions to Contingency procedures.
SG TTT.11, EOP I, RPV Control I
Rev. I 01/02/90
References:
I. DAEC Emergency Operating Procedure Flowcharts. Rev. 0, 06/16/89
Rev. I 01/02/90 II. PRESENTATION A. Purpose I. RC:L - Maintain adequate core cooling through core submergence,
- 3. RC/Q - Shut down the reactor.
B. Description
- 1. Section RC!L and RC/P ultimately directs the V perator to proceed to cold shutdown conditions in accordance with normal operating procedures.
- 2. Section RC/Q directs the operator to the Scram procedure or to EOP ATWS if the reactor is not shut down.
- 3. If plant conditions cannot be stabilized, the operator will he directed to various contingencies.
- a. Alternate Level Control will be entered if RPV water level cannot be maintained above the top of the active fuel.
- b. Emergency Depressurization will be entered if rapid RPV depressurization is required.
C. Entry Conditions
- 1. ANY of the following:
- RPV water level below + 170 in.
- RPV pressure above 1055 psig
- Drywell pressure above 2.0 psig
- Scram required with power above 5% or unknown
- a. These conditions are symptomatic of an emergency, or conditions which if not corrected, could degrade into an emergency.
SG TTT.11, EOP 1, RPV Control 3
Rev. I 01/02/90
- b. RPV water level, RPV pressure, and reactor power are all controlled concurrently. Actions taken to control one will aflect the control of all three parameters.
- c. High Drywell pressure is indicative of a line break occurring in the Drywell and thus relates to RPV water level control.
- d. All four entry conditions require a reactor scram. If the reactor is not shut down the procedure exits to EOP ATWS.
D. Operator Actions
- 1. Steps RC-1 through RC-4
- a. Due to the seriousness of these entry conditions an FAL assessment is required.
- b. The potential for multiple sensor relay failures in the automatic RPS logic is addressed when an automatic reactor scram should have initiated, but did not.
- c. It is not appropriate to shut down systems that have valid initiation signals until the plant is in a stable condition.
E. RPV Water Level Control (RC/L)
The RPV Water Level Control section establishes and maintains adequate core cooling through core submergence.
- 1. Continuous Recheck Statements If any of the conditions in the following override statements occur, RPV water level needs to be controlled in a manner other than that specified in this section.
- a. While performing the following:
IF RPV WATER LEVEL CANNOT BE DETERMINED, THEN ENTER RPV FLOODING SG TTT.11, EOP 1, RPV Control 4
Rev. I 01/02/90 Under conditions where level cannot he (Ictermined. level control must be transferred to RPV Flooding to assure adequate core cooling.
- b. While performing the following:
IF THE ADS TINIER HAS INITIATED. THEN PLACE BOTH ADS TIMER RESET HANDSWITCHES IN OVERRIDE ADS actuation imposes a scvre thermal transient on the RPV and may complicate efforts to restore and maintain RPV water level.
- c. While performing the following:
IF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL AND TORUS PRESSURE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:
PRIMARY CONT. WATER LEVEL 95 ft.
TORUS PRESSURE 53 psig THEN IRRESPECTIVE OF ADEQUATE CORE COOLING, STOP INJECTING INTO THE RPV FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT UNTIL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL AND TORUS PRESSURE CAN BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE LIMITS.
Injection into the RPV from sources outside the primary containment is terminated, irrespective of adequate core cooling concerns, as necessary to maintain containment integrity.
SG TTT.11. EOP I, RP1V Control 5 I'I
Rev. I 01/02/90
- 2. Steps RC/L-1 through RC/L-5
- a. These steps define the preferred ranges in which RPV watcr level should be established and maintained, and specify the preferred systems to use. Maintaining lecl above the low end of the identified control band permits the scram to be reset, and allows the use of the normal shutdown cooling system.
- b. The widened RPV water lccl control hand provides added operational flexibility while still assuring adequate core cooling through submergence.
NOTE: Full use of this widened control hand may result in Group I isolations as well as ECCS initiation signals.
- 3. Step RC/L-6 This step in conjunction with Step RC/P, coordinate the exit from FOP I.
F. RPV Pressure Control (RC/P)
The RPV Pressure Control section first stahilizes RPV pressure below the high RPV pressure scram setpoint and then depressuri7es and cools down the RPV to cold shutdown conditions.
- 1. Continuous Recheck Statements If any of the conditions in the following override statements occur, RPV pressure needs to be controlled in a manner other than that specified in this section.
- a. While performing the following:
IF EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED, THEN ENTER EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION.
SG TTT.11, EOP 1. RPV Control 6
Rev. I 01/02/90
- h. While performing the following:
J IF RPV WATER LEVEL CANNOT BE DETERMINED, THEN ENTER RPV FLOODING.
RPV Flooding directs a difTerent modc of prcsure control to achieve the desired effects.
- c. While performing the following:
IF DRYWELL PRESSURE IS ABOVE 2.0 PSiG THEN PREVENT INJECTION FROM CS AND LPCI PUMPS NOT REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING BEFORE DEPRESSURIZING BELOW THEIR MAXIMNUM INJECTION PRESSURES AND PREVENT INJECTION FROM HPCI IF NOT REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING.
Uncontrolled injection only complicates actions to maintain control of RPV water level.
- d. While performing the following:
IF EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION IS ANTICIPATED, THEN RAPIDLY DEPRESSURIZE THE RPV WITH THE MAIN TURBINE BYPASS VALVES.
In this condition, it is appropriate to rapidly reject as much heat energy as possible to a heat sink other than the Toris.
SG TTT.I I, EOP I, RPV Control 7
Rev. I 01/02/90
- 2. Step RC,P-1
- a. SRV cycling is manually terminated 1 reducing prsstire suhstantially below the lowest SRV lifting setpoint.
- h. RPV pressure reduction is continued until the 11 pressurc setpoint for 100% of the bypass valve capacity is reachcd.
- 3. Continuous Recheck Statements While performing the following:
IF TORUS TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE HEAT CAPACITY LIMIT (GRAPH 4)
OR TORUS LEVEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE SRV TAIL PIPE LEVEL LIMIT (GRAPH 2) THEN MAINTAIN RPV PRESSURE BELOW THE CURVE FOR THE GIVEN TORUS I.EVE. AND TORUS TEMPERATURE.
RP1V pressure must bc reduced in order to remain below both of these curves. Failure to do so may lead to SRV system damage, containment failure, or loss of equipment necessary for the safe shut <lown of the plant.
- 4. Steps RC,P-3 through RC/ P-6
- a. The desired RPV pressure control hand is specified and th, preferred system to use.
- b. Torus Water level must be above the top of the SRV discharge device, otherwise discharged steam would pass directly into the Torus air space. The resultant pressure increase could potentially exceed primary containment pressure limits.
SG TTT.11, EOP I, RPV Control 8
Rev. I 01/02/90
- 5. Steps RC/P-5 through RC/P-9
- a. Shutdown cooling is placed in serice when the low RP1V water level and high RPV pressurc interlocks are cicar.
- h. Maintaining the RPV watcr level in the prcferrcd hand takes priority over the forced cooldown of the RPV.
- c. Continued RPV depressuri7ation and cooldown niaY he accomplished using any combination of the systems listed in Step R P-4.
- 6. Steps RC.'P-10 through RC/P-12 I hese statements determine the exit to the appropriate section of IPOf 4.
-After shutdown cooling has heen established, normal operating procedures provide instructions for control of RPV water lcvcl.
G. RPV Power Control (RCrQ)
RC, Q is provided to direct operator actions to-the 1OP AI WS w"hen the reactor may not remain shut down under all conditions.
- 1. Steps RCQ-1 through RC/'Q-5
- a. IF an ATWS condition exists action is directed cither in the lFOP ATWS procedure or to exit this section via normal shutdown procedures.
- b. If entry is made into FOP ATWS. the entire lOP-1 procedure is exited.
SG TTT.1, EOP I, RPV Control 9
Rev. I 01/02/90 III.
SUMMARY
Q. Given a single rod stuck at notch position 48. would OP 1 ATIS he exccutcd in licu of FOP I?
A.
Q. What two unrelated phenomenon may influcncc RPV prcssurc control per the Heat Capacity ILimit?
A.
Q. Why can't the Bypass Valves be used for Emergency RPV depressuri7ation in lieu of SRVs?
A.
SG TTT. 1, EOP 1, RP' Control 10
Rev. 0 01/10/90
- b. Note that Spray Cooling, achieved by one or more CS pumps injecting at rated flow, does provide adequate core cooling, but in the long run core submergence is required and this goal will only be met by PCF flood.
- 6. ALC-16 through ALC-20 provide instructions for maintaining adequate core cooling when NO injection systems are available.
- a. In this case, then the only action is to conserve RPV Water inventory while attempting to make an RPV injection system available such as during a Station Blackout scenario.
- b. Note that ALC-13 directed an exit from RC/P of EOP 1. Low-Low Set is allowed to control RPV pressure in order to conserve inventory and transfer the maximum amount of decay heat per Ibm of RPV water inventory.
- c. The operator is directed to blowdown at -40 inches since below this level, adequate core cooling cannot be assured due to boil off.
- d. It must be remembered that steam cooling is only a means of buying time, in order to restore injection system. It should not be seen as a final means of restoring adequate core cooling.
E. ALC Exit ALC-9 through ALC-15 provide direction on restoring RPV Water Level and returning to RC/L for water level control.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Ievel Control 5
Rev. 0 01/10/90
SUMMARY
A. Goal and Structure of ALC Q. Lists the mechanisms used in ALC to assure adequate core cooling.
A.
B. Ent y Into ALC C. A,plicable Continuous Recheck Statements D. Action Steps Q. When is it appropriate to enter Steam Cooling?
A.
E. ALC Exit Q. Describe the exit paths from ALC.
A.
SG Number TTT.19, Alternate Level Control 6
LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL (500-008)
STUDENT GUIDE TTT.19 ALTERNATE LEVEL- CONTROL Drocnent Number Rev. 0 January 10, 1990 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
/G
,q7tf 7
LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL 500-008 STUDENT GUIDE TTT-16 EOP ATWS Document Number Rev. I February 22, 1990 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
- 1. 1INTRODUCTION A. Learning Objective Upon completion of this iesson, the student will be able to use the ATWS EOP flowchart to control RF I water level, pressure, and power under ATWS conditions.
B. Enabling Objectives Upon completion of this lesson, the student will perform the following objectives at a minimum proficiency level of 80%, unless otherwise stated.
- 1. Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to control RPV water level under ATWS conditions.
- 3. Evaluate plant status and take appropriate action to achieve a shutdown condition.
- 4. Explain the goal of each section of the ATWS EOP and relate these goals to the overall EOP strategy.
SRO ONLY
- 5. Identify and explain the transitions to Contingency procedures.
- 6. Evaluate overall plant status and direct appropriate actions per the EOPs.
- 7. Evaluate plant status and determine corrective action if applicable curves/limits are exceeded.
C. References
- 1. DAEC Emergency Operating Procedure Flowcharts, Rev. 0, 06/16/89
Rev. I 02/22/90 II. PRESENTATION A. Purpose
- 1. /1L - Maintain adequate core cooling and use level control to reduce reactor power when containment is threatened.
- 2. P - Stabilize RPV pressure to facilitate level and power control.
- 3. ,'Q - Shut down the reactor using control rods or Standby Liquid Control System.
B. Operator Actions Continuous Recheck Statements If the following condition occurs, RPV Control needs to be controlled in a manner other than that specified in this secti )n.
While performing the following:
IF ALL CONTROL RODS ARE INSERTED AT LEAST TO POSITION 02 OR IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE REACTOR WILL REMAIN SHUTDOWN UNDER ALL CONDITIONS WITHOUT BORON THEN TERMINATE BORON INJECTION. EXIT ALL SECTIONS OF THIS EOP AND ENTER EOP 1.
C. RPV Water Level Control (/L)
This section control RPV water level under conditions when it cannot be determined that control rod insertion will assure that the reactor remains shut down under all conditions.
- When boron is injected into the RPV, the systems used for control of RPV water level must be operated so as to unimize boron dilution and cold water injection, and to promote boron mixing.
- If the reactor cannot be shut down and Torus temperature continues to rise, RPV water level must be controlled to reduce reactor power and minimize torus heat up.
- 1. Step /L-I
- a. Actions in this section may deliberately lower RPV water level below the automatic initiation setpoint of ADS. Actuating ADS imposes a severe thermal transient on the RPV and complicates the efforts to maintain RPV water level and control power.
- 2. Continuous Recheck Statements If any of the following conditions occur. RPV water level needs to be controlled in a manner other than that specified in this section.
Rev. I 02/22/90
- a. While performing the following:
IF ALL OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS APPLY:
- REACTOR POWER ABOVE 5% OR CANNOT BE DETERMINED
" RPV WATER LEVEL IS ABOVE + 15 INCHES
" TORUS WATER TEMPERATURE IS ABOVE 110 0F
The combination of the above conditions are symptomatic of more heat being rejected to the Torus thri can be removed by Torus cooling. These conditions could ul imately result in loss of NPSH for ECCS pumps taking suction on t' , Torus, containment overpressurization, and loss of p:1 mary containment integrity.
- b. While performing the following:
IF RPV WATER LEVEL CANNOT BE DETERMINED THEN ENTER RPV FLOODING When RPV water level cannot be determined this section cannot be executed, and RPV Flooding is required to assure adequate core cooling.
- c. While performing the following:
IF EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION IS REQUIRED THEN CONTINUE AT STEP RC/L-18 These steps operate systems necessary to minimize the potential for rapid injection of large amounts of cold, unborated water into the core region as RPV pressure decreases below pump shutoff head.
- d. While performing the following:
IF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL AND TORUS PRESSURE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:
PRIMARY CONT. WATER LEVEL 95 ft.
TORUS PRESSURE 53 psig THEN IRRESPECTIVE OF ADEQUATE CORE COOLING, STOP INJECTING INTO THE RPV FROM SOURCES EXTERNAL TO THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT UNTIL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT WATER LEVEL AND TORUS PRESSURE CAN BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE LIMITS.
Rev. I 02/22/90 Injection into the RPV from sources outside the primary containment is terminated, irrespective of adequate core cooling concerns, in order to maintain containment integrity.
- 3. Steps /L-2 through :L-4
- a. Since lowering of RPV water level is performed without regard to system isolation setpoints, the Drywell Nitrogen supply and MSIVs are maintained in the open position by overriding the applicable RPV water level interlocks.
- 4. Steps JL-5 and /L-6
- a. These Steps deliberately lower RPV water level to reduce reactor power.
- b. No action to re-establish injection to the RPV q to be taken until either:
- Torus heatup is terminated or reduced to near that of decay heat.
- RPV water level decreases to the top of the active fuel.
- 5. Steps ,L-7 and /L-8
- a. These steps define the preferred ranges RPV water level should be maintained, and specify the preferred systems to use. The operator must remain aware of system initiations and isolations that may occur if RPV level is allowed to fall below + 119.5 inches or +46.5 inches.
- b. The widened RPV water level control biand provides added operational flexibility while still assuring adequate core cooling through submergence.
- 6. Steps /L-9 and /L-18-19
- a. If RPV water level cannot be maintained above the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level, Emergency RPV Depressurization is required for the purposes of maximizing injection flow from high pressure pumps and to permit injection from low pressure pumps.
- 7. Step /L-18 Injection into the RPV (except CRD, RCIC, and Boron injection) is terminated and prevented, while Emergency RPV Depressurization proceeds, in order to prevent uncontrolled injection of cold water as RPV pressure decreases below the shutoff head of various pumps.
- 8. Steps /L-21 and RC/L-22 When RPV pressure drops below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure, injection into the RPV must be reestablished to maintain adequate core cooling.
- 9. Steps /L-23 through /L-25
- a. Injection is controlled to keep the core submerged and to make up for losses through the open SRVs.
Rev. I 02/22/90
- b. The LPCI System is operated even if NPSH or Vortex Limits are exceeded. The undesirable consequences of uncovering the core and loosing adequate core cooling outweighs the risk of any equipment damage.
- c. If RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level using the preferred systems, additional systems are required.
- 10. Steps /L-26 through ;L-31
- a. If all available systems and alternate systems are unable to restore and maintain adequate core cooling, an attempt to submerge the core is made by flooding the primary containment (Contingency #6).
- b. If RPV water level can be restored and maintained, the operator is looped back to Step /L-6 or /L-7.
- c. Section RC.'L can be exited by maintaining RPV water lev- above
-30 inches and following Steps /L-10 through /L-16.
I1. Continuous Recheck Statement While performing the following:
IF REACTOR POWER BEGINS AND CONTINUES TO INCREASE THEN RETURN TO STEP /L-2
- a. If reactor power increases and continues to increase as RPV water level is restored to the normal range, the boron required to shut down the reactor has not reached the core.
- b. As injection into the RPV is initially increased to raise RPV water level, a small transient increase in reactor power is expected as natural circulation core flow is reestablished.
- 12. Steps /L-10 through /L-12
- a. In-core mixing of the injected boron is achieved by raising RPV water level and increasing natural circulation flow through the vessel.
- 13. Steps /L-13 and /L-17
- a. When adequate core cooling through core submergence cannot be achieved, emergency RPV depressurization is required in order to maximize injection flow from high-head pumps and permit injection from low-head pumps.
- b. Depressurizing the RPV is preferred over restoring RPV water level through the use of systems which inject inside the shroud because of the large reactor power excursions which may result from large volume of unborated, relatively cold water.
- 14. Steps /L-14 through /L-16 Once RPV water level control is stabilized and the reactor is shut down, the exit is through EOP 1. EOP I is intended to be the normal exit for all EOPs.
Rev. I 02/22/90 D. Pressure Control (/P)
The RPV Pressure Control section First stabilizes RPV pressure below the high RPV pressure scram setpoint.
The main turbine bypass valves and the main condenser is the preferred method for discharging steam from the RPV, but alternate methods are identified.
- 1. Continuous Recheck Statements If any of the following conditions occur, RPV pressure needs to be controlled in a manner other than that specified in this section.
- a. While performing the following:
EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION IS THEN ENTER EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION.
- b. While performing the following:
IF RPV WATER LEVEL CANNOT BE THEN ENTER RPV FLOODING.
Continued control of RPV pressure can proceed directly with Contingency #4 (RPV/F).
- c. While performing the following:
IF DRYWELL PRESSURE IS ABOVE 2.0 PSIG THEN PREVENT INJECTION FROM CS AND LPCI PUMPS NOT REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING BEFORE DEPRESSURIZING BELOW THEIR MAXIMUM INJECTION PRESSURES AND PREVENT INJECTION FROM HPCI IF NOT REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING.
If injection from ECCS pumps is not required to assure adequate core cooling, uncontrolled injection only complicates actions to maintain control of RPV water level.
- 2. Steps /P-1 and /P-2
- a. SRV cycling that is not per LLS design is manually terminated by reducing RPV pressure substantially below the lowest SRV lifting setpoint.
- b. EHC Press Set is reduced to 880 psig to ensure steam flow through the main turbine bypass valves is 100% of the bypass valve capacity with SRVs closed at 900 psig.
Rev. I 02/22/90
- 3. Continuous Recheck Statements
- a. While performing the following:
IF BORON INJECTION IS REQUIRED AND THE MAIN CONDENSER IS AVAILABLE AND THERE IS NO INDICATION OF GROSS FUEL FAILURE OR STEAM LINE BREAK THEN OVERRIDE MSIV LO-LO-LO LEVEL TRIP. OPEN MSIVs TO ESTABLISH THE MAIN CONDENSER AS A HEAT SINK. RETURN TO STABILIZE RPV PRESSURE.
- 1) With the reactor not shut down, and the steam discharged to the suppression pool, the Heat Capacity Limit could be reached in a very short period of time.
- 2) This override permits bypassing the low RPV water level portion of the MSIV isolation logic, and any interlocks which inhibit restoration of the pneumatic supply to the MSIV actuators.
- 3) The MSIVs may be reopened if all of the following conditions exist:
- Boron Injection is required.
- The Main Condenser is available.
- No indication of "gross" fuel failure.
- No indication of a steam line break.
- b. While performing the following:
IF TORUS TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE HEAT CAPACITY LIMIT (GRAPH 4)
OR TORUS LEVEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BELOW THE SRV TAIL PIPE LEVEL LIMIT (GRAPH 2)
THEN MAINTAIN RPV PRESSURE BELOW THE CURVE FOR THE GIVEN TORUS LEVEL AND TORUS TEMPERATURE.
RPV pressure must be reduced in order to remain below the SRV Tail Pipe Level Limit and the Heat Capacity Limit. Failure to do so may lead to SRV system damage, containment failure, or loss of equipment necessary for the safe shut down of the plant.
Rev. I 02/22/90
- 4. Steps /P-4 and P-5
- a. The desired RPV pressure control band is specified and the prcferred system to use. Controlling RPV pressure below this value avoids SRVs lifting due to high pressure, and allows the scram logic to be reset.
- b. If the main turbine bypass valves are not available or not ofsuflicient capacity, additional systems must be used to augment RPV pressure control.
- 5. Steps /P-6 through P-8 When the reactor is shut down, an exit from the RPV pressure control section of ATWS EOP I is permitted.
F. RPV Power Control (/Q)
/Q reduces reactor power and shuts down the reactor by manual control rod insertion and boron injection. the reactor is shut down is this section
- 1. Steps /Q-1 through '/Q-3
- a. 'An immediate and rapid reactor power reduction is achieved by reducing reactor recirculation flow rate. The recirculation pumps are tripped after the run back to achieve a more controlled reduction in reactor power and avoid tripping the main turbine if it is on line.
- b. Initiating ARI provides an independent and redundant means of depressurizing the reactor scram air header and operating the scram discharge volume vent drain valves.
- 3. Step /Q-6 The OSS is provided with the "menu" of rod-insertion techniques. lie is to determine which techniques will be most likely to insert rods and proceed with that method per the EOP C's.
- a. Deenergizing Scram Solenoids These actions are designed to vent the scram air header by de-energizing the scram solenoids using the RPS test switches or pulling the scram solenoid fuses. Deenergizing all RPS power could cause unwanted isolations.
- b. Individual Scram Test Switches Opening individual scram test switches acts on only a single control rod at a time, and may be more effective than a full core scram .
because the total available differential pressure of the CRD hydraulic system is applied to the single selected rod.
Rev. I 02/22/90
- c. Vent Scram Air Ileader If the scram air header remains pressurized following de-energization, then the air header is vented. This action is last because other actions can be done from the Control Room, access to the Reactor Building may be impaired, the HCU area may not be accessible, or operators may be occupied.
- d. Manually Driving Rods Independent of efforts to scram the reactor, inward rod motion is attempted. Inward rod motion may be achieved by driving rods with EMERGENCY IN and an increased CRD cooling water differential pressure.
In order to drive rods they must be selectable, and the CRD charging header isolated so that drive header pressure can be established.
- e. Vent Individual CRD Exhaust Headers Venting the CRD over-piston area is a last resort step due to the hazards involved with venting reactor coolant into open areas.
- f. Reset Scram Resetting the scram will require ARI to be reset and may require RPS trips to be bypassed.
- 4. Steps 7 and 8
- a. If Torus temperature and RPV pressure cannot be maintained below the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit, rapid depressurization of the RPV will be required. To avoid depressurizing the RPV with the reactor at power, it is desirable to shut down the reactor prior to reaching the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit, and minimizing the quantity of heat rejected to the Torus.
- b. Defeating ADS is appropriate whenever boron injection is required in order to prevent the injection of large amounts of relatively cold, unborated water from low pressure injection systems.
- 5. Steps 9 and 11 Although the SBLC System is highly reliable, a number of shared components make the SBLC System susceptible to a single failure. Boron injection is therefore handled alternately with the Reactor Water Cleanup System.
- 6. Continuous Recheck Statement While performing the following:
IF SBLC TANK LEVEL DROPS TO 0% THEN MANUALLY TRIP THE SBLC PUMPS.
Failure to secure the SBLC pumps before the SBLC pump suction inlet becomes uncovered may result in mechanical damage to the pumps.
Rev. I 02/22/90
- The filter and demineralizer volume is not included in the shutdown weight calculation.
- The demineralizers remove boron from the reactor coolant.
- 8. Steps 12 through 14 Boron injection is continued until sufficient boron has been injected into the RPV to maintain the reactor shut down under cold conditions irrespective of control rod position.
Rev. I 02/22/90 III.
SUMMARY
Q. Given two rods stuck at notch position 02. What is the response to step RC/Q-1I in EOP I?
A.
Q. The RO notes that the reactor is in the source range with SBLC tank level at 49%.
ttempts to move control rods have met with limited success. The RO requests to
- ecure SBILC injection. Is the proposed action appropriate?
Q. While waiting at step /L-22, RPV pressure drops below 260 psig with 4 SRVs open.
Is adequate core cooling being maintained?
A.
Q. Why is Core Spray not used for injection initially in ATWS EOP I?
A.
Rev. I 02/22/90 Q. Why is pressure set lowered in section RC/P of EOP I ATWS?
A.
416 -970- /79/
44 t /0 LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL REMEDIAL TRAINING 7/11/90 - 7/13/90, Wednesday, Thursday, Fridav INSTRUCTORS: Kve Dawald CREW: Kevin luber Charlie Tirella Wayne Render Ellis Vann lId I larrison John Krueger DAY I ESG-15 ATWS w/SORV REM 90-6 Hydraulic Lock ATWS REM 90-5 Loss of DW Cooling/Steam Leak Requiring Use of DW Sprays LUNCI I (no classroom)
ES(-15 ATWS w/SORV DAY 2 ESG-8 RWCU Leak/MSL Leak in Steam Tunnel REM 90-2 Partial Loss of ESS Bus IA3/Instrument AC W/LOCA REM 90-10 Loss of 125V DC Div I W/Leak Inside Containment LUNCH CLASSROOM EOP-1, HOP-2. ATWS-EOP and Exam preparation concerns.
ARPs IC35B ('-1. SBGT Relief Open ARP ICO3A 13-5, SORV Temp/Bellows Failure ARP IC051 C-5. Primary Containment IiI/Lo Pressure ESG-8, RWCUJ Leak/MSL Leak in Tunnel IIPCI Inop / Loss IA4
DAY 3 ESG-3 Recirc Seal Failure/Small LOCA Inside Containment REM 90-8 Station Blackout REM 90-7 Recirc Pump Trip w/ATWS (ran twice)
LUNCH CLASSROOM Reviewed 01-573, Primary Containment Control, especially venting control changes ESG- 13, Recirc Pump Trip/w LOCA Failure of Inject Valve
1/6 PLEASE USE BLACK INK
-(-90 1 TO 90 W
COURSE:
RSE A QUOTA CONTROL ELECTRIC TRAINING 500-008 Licensed LOG CENTER Operator Requal
/C CLASS HOURS:4 Cycle 4 INSTRUCTOR: ki SPONSOR: 0001 LOCATION:S-vX4L*-r4 WEEK LOF 1 WEEKS DAW4ALD (rTIAL. JV4AJ COURSE LENGTH: .4Grhrs. TIME: o -oo - iRoo CLCVN DATE: T -I(-90 30 r5 NAME EXT. TLD # SSN CO. SIGNATURE 14.45. 1c 72 6.
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STUDENT SIMULA TOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Studcnt Name 14/AV/I F4oFeP Dates Covered 71/I- 90 ro 7-ty- So Position ROO /STA Week'Cycle #
Class IHILC:CLPGRADFE,'STA.AED SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION
,Day I Et/4/4-E Es g<~ e Ze X er9- dmS- // a Day// IDto7 L~f ree I 0- 4 s-L Day / 7 cr r /)ed &5 5S+-r~ i' Day/3 4 Vasg , S4 e8 /eem 96"7, /?en 90-7, EJe- 2mW7
.41w Attached pages Ei Yes DNo
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Student Review Signature Date Instructor(s) Signoture(s) Date(s)
TDF 1802.60(6) 01/O8/90 ,
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STUDENT SIMULA TOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name 6&d /fr'S Dates Covered 7-i- !o 7-/.?
Position SRO/STA Week, Cycle i Class I ILCiPGRAD/STA/'IG \i.
SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION D a y I EeSL 12a " , 2e - g oz
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Day 2 Day-3 Attached pages Yes DNo 4WA-c LA Student Review Signature Date Instructor(s) Si nature(s) Date(s)
TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90
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STUDENT SIMULA TOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name /X4j/4,e6er Dates Covered 7/- 7-/J-fo Position 'SRO/STA Week, Cvcle #
Class HLC I PGRADEST/ 1 i.
SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION Day I RMe~-~-i 90-6 P ~ n14-<ar x 2 re/xu 72Ae code to AA** 90-.es6 9 em-)) 0; -lq 4/I cr,/rc Ag ave'-e SWe A Dayj Attached pages es DNo Student Review Signature Date A~k /,,A Instructor(s) Signature(s) Date(s)
Y-TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90
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LICENSED OPERATOR REQUAL REMEDIAL TRAINING 7/14/90 - 7/16/90, Saturday, Sunday, Monday INSTRUCTORS: J. Bennett CREW: K. Morgan M. Meyer G. Kaegi C. Hunt P. Sullivan S. Archough - day I and day 2
.1. Mcilem - day 3 only DAY I ESG-15 ATWS w/SORV REM 90-6 Hydraulic Lock ATWS REM 90-7 Recirc Pump Trip w/ATWS (ran twice)
REM 90-9 Turbine Trip With ATWS REM 90-6 Hydraulic Lock ATWS Class ATWS FOP DAY 2 ESG-3 Recirc Seal Failure/Small LOCA Inside Containment REM 90-10 Loss of 125v DC Div I W/Leak Inside Containment REM 90-8 Station Blackout REM 90-5 Loss of DW Cooling/Steam Leak Requiring Use of DW Sprays Class EOP 1, EOP 2, LPCI Loop Select, RPV/F, ALC, ED DAY 3 ESG-8 RWCU Leak/MSI. Leak in Steam Tunnel REM 90-1 Leak Outside Primary Containment REM 90-12 Loss of All Power to Nonessential Busses IAI and IA2 Class EOP 3
PLEASE USE BLACK INK URSE QUOTA CONTROL LOG WA ELECTRIC TRAINING CENTER /7/iq/90 TO - //L /90 IURSE: VrcW- .0C - CCO CLASS HOURS:
INSTRUCTOR: O SPONSOR: ccl LOCATION: 5 WEEK OF WEEKS COURSE LENGTH: ho hrs. TIME: CLCV N DATE: 7 / il /90
STUDENT SIMULA TOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name _____\ __ Dates Covered 7/H - 714d&e, Position ROOSTA Week/Cycle # I 1 ~.it Class HlLC/UPGRAD/STA/ CUAL ~~5ci~ 4fi SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION Day I £?& ( (cS a tu q- CAj.)4 o,i z) y/.t ecrc 4 r,,,,rJ 4)r codd its(/ared DA 174 f 3 (7e\ v4- --- e d- V xS .Itw (A decT Se w6ileeseTca Attached pages Yes F No
(~ N Student Review Signature Date 4_1 rv k- R, 144 rnstrtictor( s)Signature(s) Date(s)
TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90
To -o -7 STUDENT SIMULA TOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name __
Dates Covered 7/N - /&,t Position RO /STA Week/Cycle # Wks 8w k10 Class IILC/UPGRAD/STA/ § 9595e 11 SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION Day I 0-4 < 'd'off 1.) ay,0ed E w L s/c/
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TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90
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I STUDENT SIMULATOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name so 4G~N*y Datcs Covered 71@
PositioxR RO/STA Week/Cycle # Cl f r' Class I ILC/UPGRADE/ST 9 SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION Day I C 'F 6,) //y6. r s o lCxec ( (o /
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ID~ oN t r)A-Y N Attached pages Yes DNo Student Review Signature Date 4,t _ 7/IU 1/qf lbstrubtor(s) Signature(s) Date(s)
TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90
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STUDENT SIMULA TOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name Dates Covered 7 N- f Position 1, RO/STA Week/Cycle # VdA~d \ Ms Class ILC/UPGRAD/STA/
SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION (A tArfrd A 01"?\Nl T" T-t Day 4 Day 5 Attached pages Yes DNo Student Review Signature Date
/ /11 Igstrictor(s) Signature(s) Date(s)
TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90
STUDENT SIMULATOR PROGRESS EVALUATION Student Name & \S :Fp 1- \ Dates Covered 7 Ho 7/k. 1 0 Position & /tRO/STA Week/Cycle # rA) w \4it Class IHILC/UPGRADE/STi~TE SCENARIO NO. PROBLEMS NOTES CORRECTIVE ACTION Day I d!Y4 / 1 U tee'r i
-J ----- i nc-c--- --- /e i 1,) 7tte-o )'D JP'vst p'e,- k7 /es e/ 777 7 Ole \re on no arsz ruelr Attached pages Yes No Student Review Signature Date lIstructor(s) Signature(s) Date(s)
TDF 1802.60(6) 01/08/90