RS-10-017, Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time

Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time

ML100200075
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	01/19/2010
From:	Simpson P Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-10-017, TAC ME2293, TAC ME2294
Download: ML100200075 (124)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Exelon Generation 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville.IL 60555 RS-10-017 January 19, 2010 www.exeloncorp.com Nuclear 10 CFR 50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF*66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455

Subject:

Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time

References:

1. Letter from P. R. Simpson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time," dated September 24, 2009 2. Letter from M. J. David (U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to C. G. Pardee (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2-Request for Additional Information Related to One-Time Extension of Essential Service Water Train Completion Time (TAC Nos. ME2293 and ME2294)," dated December 18, 2009 In Reference 1, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), requested a license amendment for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, to revise Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8, "Essential Service Water (SX) System," to extend the Completion Time (CT) from 72 hours to 144 hours. This proposed change will only be used one time during the Byron Station Unit2 spring 2010 refueling outage (Le., B2R15) to restore a unit-specific SX train to operable status. In Reference 2, the NRC requested that EGC provide additional information in support of their review of Reference 1. Attachments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the requested information. EGC has reviewed the information supporting a finding of no significant hazards consideration that was previously provided to the NRC in Reference 1. The additional information provided in this submittal does not affect the bases for concluding that the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b), a copy of this letter and its non-proprietary attachments are being provided to the designated State of Illinois official.

January 19, 2010 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 The regulatory commitments contained in this letter are summarized in Attachment 5. The regulatory commitments provided in Attachment 5 are in addition to the commitment previously provided to the NRC in Reference 1. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Ms. Lisa A. Schofield at (630) 657-2815. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 19th day of January 2010. Patrick R. Simpson Manager - Licensing Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments: 1. Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time 2. BY-LAR-003, Revision 1, Risk Management Responses to NRC RAls on SX One-Time CT Extension 3. Supporting Documentation 4. SX System Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 5. Summary of Regulatory Commitments cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Byron Station NRR Project Manager, Braidwood Station Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time In a letter dated December 18, 2009, the NRC requested that EGC provide additional information related to the application for a one-time extension of the essential service water train Completion Time (CT). Attachments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the requested information. Question 1 The licensee identified that it used a separate fire probabilistic fire assessment (PRA) model to assess the risk impact from internal fires for this LAR. This model was identified as being "not fUlly realistic," and undergoing a significant revision to incorporate methods defined in NUREG/CR-6850, "EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities," September 2005. While the licensee provided some of the characteristics of the fire PRA model, the NRC staff requests the following additional information relevant to the technical adequacy of this model for this LAR. Question 1.8 a. Address how the current Byron fire PRA model satisfies the technical elements identified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk Informed Activities," Revision 1, January 2007, Section 1.2.4. Provide an appropriate justification of any outstanding plant changes not incorporated into the fire PRA model per RG 1.200, Revision 1, Section 4.2.

Response

The response to Question 1.a is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.a. Question 1.b b. Describe where the existing fire PRA methods deviate from the methods described in NUREG/CR-6850, and justify the methods actually used.

Response

The response to Question 1.b is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.b. Question 1.c c. Describe how spurious component operations are addressed in the fire PRA model.

Response

The response to Question 1.c is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.c. Page 1 of 8

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time Question 1.d d. Describe how plant components modeled in the PRA, but not in the scope of the plant's fire safe shutdown licensing basis, have been addressed in the fire PRA. Specifically identify how cable route information for such components is handled if these components are credited in the fire PRA.

Response

The response to Question 1.d is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.d. Question 1.e e. Identify how the human reliability analysis was modified for the fire PRA to account for the impacts of fire on these actions; identify any fire-specific recovery actions credited in the fire PRA, their failure probabilities, and the basis for the probabilities.

Response

The response to Question 1.e is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.e. Question 1.f f. No large early-release frequency analysis was completed for fires, justified based on no impact of service water on containment isolation capability. Provide a more specific justification based on the fire PRA results obtained evaluating the specific sequences which dominate the fire risk profile and their conditional probability of a large early release.

Response

The response to Question 1.1 is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.1. Question 1.9 g. Identify the reviews (internal, external, and/or peer) completed for the fire PRA model to assure its quality.

Response

The response to Question 1.g is provided in Section 2.1.1 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 1.g. Page 2 of 8

ATIACHMENT1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time Question 2 The licensee has not specifically addressed how the cause/effect relationship was modeled in the PRA for this application. Question 2.a a. Describe which basic event(s) in the PRA models (internal events and fire PRA) were modified to evaluate the SX outage, including the separate impacts on mitigation and initiating events.

Response

The response to Question 2.a is provided in Section 2.1.2 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 2.a. Question 2.b b. Describe how any compensatory measures have been credited in the analysis, addressing both the baseline model and the configuration-specific assessment.

Response

The response to Question 2.b is provided in Section 2.1.2 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 2.b. Question 2.c c. Identify whether recovery of inoperable SX pumps is credited, either for mitigation or for the calculation of initiating event frequency, and if so, justify the recovery probability applied.

Response

The response to Question 2.c is provided in Section 2.1.2 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 2.c. Question 2.d d. Provide a sensitivity analysis for crediting any compensatory measures or recovery actions, which are unique for this evaluation.

Response

The response to Question 2.d is provided in Section 2.1.2 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 2.d. Page 3 of 8

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time Question 3 The tier 2 evaluation identifies compensatory measures in Table 3, "Byron SX A Train Outage Summary of Compensatory Measures," in Attachment 1 of the LAR as regulatory commitments, but the description of these items is vague. Question 3.a a. Describe specifically what restrictions on availability are being committed by use of the term "protected equipment."

Response

The response to Question 3.a is provided in Section 2.1.3 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 3.a. A copy of OP-AA-108-117, "Protected Equipment Program," is provided in Attachment 3. Reference Summary of Regulatory Commitments in Attachment 5. Question 3.b b. Identify specifically each component which is "protected," without the use of undefined plant acronyms.

Response

The response to Question 3.b is provided in Section 2.1.3 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 3.b. Question 3.c c. Describe the process applied and basis to determine the scope of the protected equipment.

Response

The response to Question 3.c is provided in Section 2.1.3 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 3.c. Question 3.d d. Describe the fire zones qualitatively, and identify how these zones were selected for a compensatory measure.

Response

The response to Question 3.d is provided in Section 2.1.3 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 3.d. Page 4 of 8

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time Question 4 In Attachment 5 of the LAR, the tier 3 evaluation identifies the plant Configuration Risk Management Program being applied to assess risk of emergent conditions. However, as identified in RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," August 1998, there is no discussion of how external event risk, specifically fire risk, which comprises 90 percent of the total risk reported for this TS change, is assessed within the tier 3 evaluation. Describe how this significant risk contributor is evaluated.

Response

The response to Question 4 is provided in Section 2.1.4 of Attachment 2 to this submittal. Reference Summary of Regulatory Commitments in Attachment 5. Question 5 The LAR identifies the use of the fire protection system to maintain flow from the charging pumps to the reactor coolant pump seals, using dedicated operators and non-seismic connections. The NRC staff's understanding of the current guidance is that seal cooling cannot be restored after about 10 -15 minutes of interruption, due to seal heatup and concerns for thermal shock of the seals. Provide a more detailed discussion of this action as to the duration of the action, and impact on interruption of reactor coolant pump seal cooling and any relevant assumptions made regarding seal performance upon restoration of cooling.

Response

The response to Question 5 is provided in Section 2.1.5 of Attachment 2 to this submittal. Question 6 Throughout the submittal, reference is made to RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," July 1998. However, the current version of RG 1.174 is dated November 2002. Explain why the current version of RG 1.174 was not used as a basis for this submittal.

Response

The response to Question 6 is provided in Section 2.1.6 of Attachment 2 to this submittal. Question 7 NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) 16.1, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications," describes NRC staff acceptance criteria regarding "defense in depth," considerations for TS changes. Criterion 11.1 A.(iii)(3) states that the licensee should consider, "Whether the TS change specifies that voluntary removal of equipment from service should not be scheduled when adverse weather conditions or other situations that likely may subject the plant to abnormal conditions are predicted." Page 5 of 8

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time The licensee has considered adverse weather conditions in its PRA analysis for external events, but has made no specified provision for adverse weather in its TS change in accordance with the guidelines of SRP 16.1, if adverse weather actually occurs. Explain why the TS change (specifically, in Attachment 1, Table 3) does not specify that the removal of 112SX001 A from service will not be scheduled when adverse weather conditions or other situations that likely may subject the plant to abnormal conditions are predicted. The NRC staff notes that implementation of Attachment 1, Table 3 is a regulatory commitment per of the LAR.

Response

The response to Question 7 is provided in Section 2.1.7 of Attachment 2 to this submittal. Reference Summary of Regulatory Commitments in Attachment 5. Question 8 The licensee has stated, in Attachment 5 of the LAR, that defense in depth is maintained, in part, because a best estimate flow analysis has shown that a single SX pump can provide cooling on both units with the exception of the reactor containment fan coolers (RCFC) and emergency diesel generators (EDGs) on the unit without an SX pump and one train of RCFCs on the unit with an available SX pump. Question 8.a a. If, during the one-time extension of the CT, an SX pump is lost, describe the sequence of events and operator actions that will bring both units to safe shutdown.

Response

Prior to the start of the one-time extension of the CT, Unit 2 will already be in cold shutdown (Le., MODE 5). If, during the work window, the Unit 1 Train B (1 B) Essential Service Water System (SX) pump is lost, established procedures will be followed to provide for alternate cooling and to place Unit 1 into MODE 5. Specifically, Operations would initially enter Unit 1 Byron Abnormal Operating Procedure, 1BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 1," Revision 104, which directs a crosstie to the Unit 2 Train B (2B) SX Train. This procedure requires that temperatures of vital equipment are monitored, non-essential loads are shed, and, if necessary, alternate non-safety related cooling sources are established. In parallel, Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8, "Essential Service Water (SX) System," would require an immediate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 entry for two Unit 1 specific SX trains being inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 requires Unit 1 to be placed into a MODE in which LCO 3.7.8 is not applicable (Le., MODE 5). If Unit 1 was at power at the time, then LCO 3.0.3 would require Unit 1 to be in MODE 5 within 37 hours. This shutdown would be accomplished via standard unit shutdown procedures. Page 6 of 8

ATIACHMENT1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time Conversely, if, during the work window, the 2B SX train is lost, Operations would initially enter Unit 2 Byron Abnormal Operating Procedure 2BOA PRI-?, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 2," Revision 105, which would direct a crosstie to the 1B SX Train. Similar to 1BOA PRI-?, this procedure requires that temperatures of vital equipment are monitored, non-essential loads are shed, and, if necessary, alternate non-safety related cooling sources are established. If temperature limits of vital Unit 1 equipment are not being exceeded, then these actions would not necessarily require an immediate shutdown of Unit 1. Copies of 1BOA PRI-? and 2BOA PRI-? are provided in Attachment 3. Question 8.b b. If the SX pump of the operating unit were lost, all ACFCs in the operating unit would lose SX flow. With no RCFCs available in the operating unit, explain why the other means of containment heat removal, Le., the containment spray system of the operating unit, are not on the protected system list during the extended CT.

Response

The response to Question 8.b is provided in Section 2.1.8 of Attachment 2 to this submittal as the response to Question 8.b. Question 8.c c. If the SX pump of the operating unit were lost, both EDGs of the operating unit would be lost. Describe the feasibility of making provisions for temporary use of fire protection water, or another available water source, to supply at least one EDG of the unit without an SX pump during the extended CT and subsequent shutdown.

Response

If the Unit 1 (Le., the operating unit) SX pump were lost during the extended CT, Byron Abnormal Operating Procedure 1BOA PRI-? provides guidance on aligning Unit 2 (Le., the shutdown unit) SX to Unit 1 SX through the unit crosstie valves, 1/2SX005. Aligning Unit 2 SX to Unit 1 SX will provide SX to the Unit 1 EDGs. Byron Abnormal Operating Procedure OBOA PAlo?, "Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Unit 0," Revision 0, provides guidance on aligning the Fire Protection (FP) system to the SX system in the event of a complete loss of SX pump capability coincident with an inability to crosstie to the opposite unit SX supply. Aligning FP to SX will allow at least one EDG to be supplied with cooling in the event of a loss of an SX pump during the extended CT and subsequent shutdown. Copies of 1BOA PRI-? and OBOA PAI-? are provided in Attachment 3. Page? of 8

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information Supporting License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time Question S.d d. Provide piping and instrumentation drawings for the SX system from the units' current licensing basis.

Response

The requested piping and instrumentation diagrams are provided in Attachment 4 to this submittal. Page 8 of 8

ATTACHMENT 2 BY-LAR-003, Revision 1 Risk Management Responses to NRC RAls on SX One-Time CT Extension

PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK BY-LAR-003 Risk Management Responses to NRC RAIs on SX One-Time CT Extension RREEVVIISSIIO ONN 11 Contacts Byron Braidwood Site Risk Management Engineer Joe Edom 815-406-2327 NA Corporate Risk Management Engineer Young In 630-657-3858 NA

Document Review RM DOCUMENTATION NO. BY-LAR-003 REV: 1 PAGE NO. 2 STATION: Byron UNIT(S) AFFECTED: 1 AND 2 TITLE: Risk Management Responses to NRC RAIs on SX One-Time CT Extension

SUMMARY

(Include UREs incorporated): This document provides the responses to questions asked by the NRC in a Request For Additional Information during their review of the SX One-Time CT extension LAR. URE(s) Impacted: None Number of pages: Total 24 pages, including this page. RM Document Level: Category 1, per ER-AA-600-1012. [ ] Review Required after periodic Update [ X ] Internal RM Documentation [ ] External RM Documentation Electronic Calculation Data Files: NA (Program Name, Version, File Name extension/size/date/hour/min) Method of Review: [ X ] Detailed [ ] Alternate [ ] Review of External Document This RM documentation supersedes: BY-LAR-003 REV. 0 in its entirety. Prepared by: Joe Edom / / Print Sign Date Prepared by: Usama Farradj / / Print Sign Date Reviewed by: Young In / / Print Sign Date Approved by: Greg Krueger / / Print Sign Date Do any ASSUMPTIONS / ENGINEERING JUDGEMENTS require later verification? [ ] Yes [ X ] No Tracked By: AT#, URE# etc.):

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 3 of 24 Table of Contents Section Page Revision Summary........................................................................................................................ 3 1.0 PURPOSE & SCOPE........................................................................................................... 4 2.0 RAI RESPONSES................................................................................................................. 4 2.1 PRA RESPONSES................................................................................................................. 4 3.0

SUMMARY

........................................................................................................................... 24

4.0 REFERENCES

..................................................................................................................... 24 Revision Summary Revision Summary Revision Date Summary 0 Refer to the Document Review form Original Issue 1 1/15/10 Editorial changes to Section 2.0. Configuration Control The Exelon Byron PRA model is updated in accordance with ER-AA-600, Risk Management. This procedure requires periodic updates of the PRA Model and on-going reviews of design changes for PRA model impact. Model and Support Application documentation is controlled in accordance with ER-AA-600-1012, Risk Management Documentation. Any outstanding changes to the model or documentation are documented in the Updating Requirements Evaluations Database in File URE-BB 2003.mdb. This database is located on the Risk Management K:\\ drive at the Exelon Cantera office.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 4 of 24 1.0 PURPOSE & SCOPE This document provides responses to questions the NRC has asked in a Request for Additional Information (RAI) (Reference 2) from their review of the Byron Station SX One-Time CT extension (Reference 1). These questions were formally transmitted to Exelon via Reference 2. The response to each of the questions is provided in Section 2 below. 2.0 RAI RESPONSES The RAI responses are provided below. 2.1 PRA Responses The format used below provides a copy of the NRC question and the associated Exelon response. 2.1.1 NRC Statement: The licensee identified that it used a separate fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model to assess the risk impact from internal fires for this LAR. This model was identified as being not fully realistic, and undergoing a significant revision to incorporate methods defined in NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, September 2005. While the licensee provided some of the characteristics of the fire PRA model, the NRC staff requests the following additional information relevant to the technical adequacy of this model for this LAR. Question 1.a: Address how the current Byron fire PRA model satisfies the technical elements identified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk Informed Activities, Revision 1, January 2007, Section 1.2.4. Provide an appropriate justification of any outstanding plant changes not incorporated into the fire PRA model per RG 1.200, Rev. 1, Section 4.2.

Response

The Byron fire PRA (FPRA) model uses the methodology defined in NUREG/CR-6850, and generally includes the technical elements identified in RG1.200 Rev. 1 Section 1.2.4, as discussed in the response to RAI question 1.c. The Assessment Process section of Appendix B (Fire Risk Evaluation) of the SX CT

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 5 of 24 One Time Extension Application Notebook (BY-LAR-001) identifies the changes made to the Revision 6C fire PRA model to ensure consistency with the current Revision 6E internal events PRA model. The 6C fire PRA model was developed using the 6C internal events PRA model as its basis. A review of the changes made in the 6D and 6E revisions of the internal events PRA model was performed and the changes impacting the quantification for this evaluation were incorporated into the 6C fire PRA model to provide a current application specific model for this assessment. A discussion of outstanding plant changes that have been evaluated to be important to the model but have not yet been addressed in the Revision 6E internal events PRA model, and their potential impacts, has been provided in Attachment 6 of the LAR. Question 1.b: Describe where the existing fire PRA methods deviate from the methods described in NUREG/CR-6850, and justify the methods actually used.

Response

The following is a discussion of the fire PRA model status with respect to the methodology of NUREG/CR-6850.

1. Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Review (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 2) -

MSOs are reviewed and considered; however, an expert panel was not used. The Byron FPRA review incorporates a review of potential MSO scenarios identified by the PWR Owners Group in WCAP-16933-NP (PWR Generic List of Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operation Scenarios, PWR Owners Group, 2008 Version). These potential MSO scenarios were reviewed and an action item list generated with respect to additional review required to determine the need and to incorporate, as necessary, these scenarios into the internal events model for use in FPRA quantification. The risk assessment performed for the SX CT Extension application focuses on identifying areas of increased risk due to the extended SX Train A system outage. The primary areas of increased risk for this application are associated with those areas in which a fire will disable the Train B SX system. Any increased risk due to addition of multiple spurious operation scenarios to the fire PRA analysis model are expected to have similar impacts on both the baseline and SX CT Extension models, as any MSO-related potential vulnerabilities will be equally applicable to the baseline model and the model for this application. In addition, conservatisms associated with the fire PRA methodology ignition frequencies and fire sizes will tend to overwhelm any incremental impact of the MSOs. Although not yet formally established, it is expected that as the industry fire PRA methodologies become more

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 6 of 24 consistent with actual fire event frequencies and damage footprints, the reduction in fire risk will be significantly greater than the potential increase in risk due to the incorporation of MSO impacts. A review of recent FPRAs indicates that the increased risk associated with evaluation of MSO impact is not a major contributor to the overall fire risk given the conservatisms currently in the FPRAs. The impact of the MSO risk is not expected to be train specific and will therefore not impact the application risk results in a manner significantly different from its impact on the baseline fire PRA model.

2. Instrumentation Review (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 2) - The new requirements of NUREG/CR-6850 regarding the explicit identification and modeling of instrumentation required to support PRA credited operator actions have not yet been addressed. The industry treatment for this task is still being developed.

The impact of instrumentation cues on the credited internal events HEPs will not result in train specific risk increases which would impact this application. Human failure events (HFEs) associated with actions outside of the control room have been conservatively failed in the model, with the exception of actions which are credited beyond a timeframe of 2 hours after the fire event, since at this timeframe the fire event impact on the associated HEPs is expected to be negligible. As industry methodology for evaluation of the impact of instrumentation cues on post fire shutdown becomes more clearly defined, the methodologies will be incorporated into the fire PRA and may potentially result in an increase in baseline risk which will be well within the anticipated reduction due to future reduction of conservatisms associated with current fire frequency and fire damage assumptions. For this application, the use of additional dedicated operations staff in the field and in the main control room to monitor the performance of the available pumps and take action as necessary (as described in Section 2.3.1.2 of the LAR) directly provides additional mitigation against a loss of instrumentation from a fire or other event.

3. The Balance of Plant (BOP) (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 2) - The BOP is not fully treated in the current fire PRA model. BOP support system failure has been conservatively assumed in cases where details regarding associated cable routing have not been obtained for the FPRA. Additional modeling may be performed in future FPRA model updates to reduce the baseline fire CDF due to this assumption if the need arises.

Conservatisms in the analysis associated with the assumption that BOP systems are unavailable post-fire do not result in a train specific impact on the baseline or SX application fire risk. Reduction in this area of conservatism will

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 7 of 24 result in an overall reduction of the estimated fire risk.

4. Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 2 and 5) -

LERF is not considered in the current fire PRA model; it is expected to be addressed in a future update. The fire risk impact on LERF quantification would normally be expected to be primarily associated with the potential fire induced failure of containment boundary components eliminating potential mechanisms for the isolation of paths for large early releases. The ability to isolate such containment boundaries will not be impacted by the SX outage configuration. A review of the internal events LERF results indicates that the change in LERF is very small as compared to the CDF results, and it is expected that the potential impact of the SX application configuration to the fire LERF results would also be negligible.

5. The scoping fire modeling evaluations (NUREG/CR-6850 Tasks 8 and 11) used in the scenario development effort for the Byron FPRA update did not incorporate an evaluation of the potential impact of hot gas layer formation. A practical treatment of hot gas layer formation is not yet available in the industry.

The impact of hot gas layer formation is not expected to be a significant contributor to risk at a newer plant such as Byron with typically large volumes for dissipation of a hot gas layer. The anticipated fire brigade response to fires will result in control of a fire prior to creation of a significant hot gas layer. Any impact of hot gas layer formation would be applicable to both the baseline and SX CT application quantification and is not likely to alter the risk insights obtained from the current evaluation.

6. Limited Analysis Iterations (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 9-12) - The process of conducting a FPRA is iterative, whereby high risk compartments and associated conservative assumptions are identified and additional analyses are performed to refine the assumptions and reduce those compartment risks.

The scenarios developed for the Byron FPRA are refined as necessary for a specific application. Such an activity was conducted for the SX LAR: additional focus was applied to those scenarios that might be affected by the impact on SX equipment availability during the extended CT, and the scenarios were modified as necessary (for both the baseline and application specific configuration analyses) to more accurately characterize the risk in these areas. The scope of HRA performed for the FPRA was limited to the failure of operator actions outside control room. For specific scenarios where

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 8 of 24 substantial time is available (see response in item 2 above) credit is taken for these actions using screening HEPs. HEPs for control room actions were not modified to attempt to incorporate the impact of fire. The key HEPs associated with control room actions reflect high stress actions which are unlikely to be further increased by the fire. In addition, the compensatory action to provide dedicated operations monitoring of the SX system during this evolution will allow the operators to focus on evaluation of any failures and will allow for prompt response by dedicated personnel thus significantly reducing the failure probability of such actions. Further iteration and refinement of the fire scenarios is expected to reduce both the overall baseline and SX application specific fire risk.

7. Multi-Compartment Review (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 11) - This subtask has not yet been performed for the Byron FPRA. This task would review the fire analysis compartment boundaries to ensure they are sufficiently robust to prevent the spread of fire between FPRA analysis compartments or that such propagations are adequately addressed by the developed scenarios. The design and plant layout of Byron make fire propagation to multiple compartments unlikely compared to the fire risk in individual compartments.

As discussed in item 5 above, hot gas layer impacts, including potential impacts on structural steel required to support fire barriers, are expected to be limited for the Byron plant. The potential for such hot gas layer buildup to result in fire spreading between fire compartments is expected to be even more limited. Any such impacts will not be train specific and are not expected to significantly impact the areas of high risk identified for this SX CT application.

8. Control Room Abandonment Analysis (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 11) - Detailed analysis of control room abandonment scenarios incorporating fire modeling of the postulated spectrum of fires considered in conjunction with the operating modes of the control room HVAC system has not been performed. The proposed SX maintenance configuration does not create unique control room abandonment response requirements. The ability to control SX given the need for control room abandonment will not be affected, as controls for both units trains are available at the remote shutdown panels.

9. Seismic Fire Interactions (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 13) - This task reviews previous assessments to identify any specific interaction between suppression system and credited components or adverse impact of fire protection system interactions that should be accounted for in the FPRA. The results of the IPEEE

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 9 of 24 are considered appropriate for the Byron FPRA in this regard. NUREG/CR-6850 does not require a quantification of the seismic fire interaction risk. Seismic fire interaction methodologies specified in NUREG/CR-6850 do not result in quantifiable results which would impact the fire PRA model. Any potential vulnerabilities are not expected to be train specific. Therefore, seismic fire contribution to overall fire risk is expected to be very small at Byron, and would not affect the conclusions of the analyses supporting the SX CT LAR.

10. Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis (NUREG/CR-6850 Task 15) - This task explores the impacts of possible variation of input parameters used in the development of the model and the inputs to the analysis on the FPRA results.

This task has not yet been performed for the Byron FPRA because the industry is still developing appropriate methodology for the analysis. The conservative nature of the current analysis inputs (ignition frequency and extent of fire damage) ensure that the overall fire risk estimated is conservative and such conservatism is not train specific, and will therefore not impact the SX CT application risk in a manner different than it would impact the baseline fire risk.

11. Conservatisms in the NUREG/CR-6850 methodology associated with ignition frequencies and their correlation to heat release rates as well as the credit given for manual fire suppression response tend to cause an overestimation of total fire risk. However, the model, with this conservatism, will continue to provide a reasonable assessment of relative fire risk between various locations within the plant. This information provides useful insights for the current fire risk profile as well as for assessment of the impact of future applications on the total plant fire risk.

To reduce the conservatism associated with this aspect (heat release rates) of the NUREG/CR-6850 methodology, the transient heat release rate used in the Byron FPRA was based on the heat release rate specified in NUREG/CR-6850 as the heat release rate associated with a motor fire (for any size motor). This deviation in the methodology was implemented based on a review of the EPRI Fire Events Database for fires categorized as transient fires. This review determined that the vast majority of transient fires are associated with electrical cable fires related to temporary cable installations. The temporary cable and its insulation was the transient combustible and a fault in the associated electrical circuit provided the necessary ignition source to create the transient fire. The motor fire more closely represents these types of transient fires than a transient combustible heat release rate which is associated with a large quantity of

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 10 of 24 transient combustibles which are unlikely to contain or be exposed to an ignition source. The quantification results for this application include an additional conservatism associated with the implementation of compensatory actions that are not credited in the FPRA quantification. These compensatory actions provide a significant reduction in risk during the SX system outage which if quantified would further reduce the increased risk associated with this application. Quantification of these compensatory actions was not attempted since no clear guideline exists for crediting such compensatory actions with respect to the FPRA methodology. Question 1.c: Describe how spurious component operations are addressed in the fire PRA model.

Response

See response to RAI 1.b, item 1, above. Question 1.d: Describe how plant components modeled in the PRA, but not in the scope of the plants fire safe shutdown licensing basis, have been addressed in the fire PRA. Specifically identify how cable route information for such components is handled if these components are credited in the fire PRA.

Response

Components for which fire routing data is not available via the safe shutdown analysis are assumed to be failed in all fire zones in the FPRA. However, such assumed failure has been excluded for particular plant locations when that location has been judged to be unlikely to include cables for specific systems which are normally assumed to be failed. This exclusion approach was used in a limited number of fire scenarios. One set of scenarios where it was used is in the SX pump room in which the auxiliary building HVAC components, which are not routed in the SSD analysis, were assumed to be available for fires in the SX pump rooms. The basis for this exclusion of failure of the auxiliary building HVAC components is related to the remote location of the SX pump room (in the basement of the auxiliary building) and the lack of auxiliary building HVAC components and power supplies located in the pump room which could impact other auxiliary building areas. The SX pumps are cooled by dedicated emergency cooling units which are separate from the auxiliary building HVAC system. Therefore, exclusion

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 11 of 24 of this auxiliary building HVAC impact is determined to be more realistic. Question 1.e: Identify how the human reliability analysis was modified for the fire PRA to account for the impacts of fire on these actions; identify any fire-specific recovery actions credited in the fire PRA, their failure probabilities, and the basis for the probabilities.

Response

See response to RAI 1.b, items 2 and 6, above. Question 1.f: No large early-release frequency analysis was completed for fires, justified based on no impact of service water on containment isolation capability. Provide a more specific justification based on the fire PRA results obtained evaluating the specific sequences which dominate the fire risk profile and their conditional probability of a large early release.

Response

See response to RAI 1.b, item 4, above. Question 1.g: Identify the reviews (internal, external, and/or peer) completed for the fire PRA model to assure its quality.

Response

The methodology used for the EXELON fire PRA has been consistently applied at many of the EXELON sites and has been reviewed as part of the fire PRA documentation review process. In addition, a challenge review by engineers performing fire PRAs on other EXELON projects has been performed and the results incorporated into the Byron fire PRA. 2.1.2 NRC Statement: The licensee has not specifically addressed how the cause/effect relationship was modeled in the PRA for this application.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 12 of 24 Question 2.a: Describe which basic event(s) in the PRA models (internal events and fire PRA) were modified to evaluate the SX outage, including the separate impacts on mitigation and initiating events.

Response

The maintenance terms for the 1A and 2A SX pumps were set to True for the quantification of the results supporting this LAR. These events fail the 1A and 2A SX pumps in the PRA model logic which reflects the expected plant configuration. This is applicable to the Internal Events and Fire models. The Byron PRA model has links to automatically adjust the initiating events for loss of SX events when either a single SX pump or 2 SX pumps of the same train on different units are unavailable. The maintenance terms associated with the following equipment were set to False in the quantification of the results supporting this LAR. These terms correspond in part to the list of items contained in Table 3 of the LAR. Setting these terms to False reflects the intent to maintain this equipment function in an available state. This is applicable to the Internal Events and Fire models. 0A Fire Protection Pump 0B Fire Protection Pump 1SX005 - SX Unit Cross-tie Valve 2SX005 - SX Unit Cross-tie Valve Aux Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Plenums (Unit 1) Unit 1 1A Auxiliary Feedwater Train Unit 1 1B Auxiliary Feedwater Train Unit 1 Start-up Transformer (SAT 142) Unit 2 Start-up Transformer (SAT 242) Unit 1 Bus 141 Div 1 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 1 Bus 142 Div 2 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 2 Bus 241 Div 1 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 2 Bus 242 Div 2 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Unit 1 125VDC Div 1 Battery Charger Unit 1 125VDC Div 2 Battery Charger Unit 2 125VDC Div 1 Battery Charger Unit 2 125VDC Div 2 Battery Charger Unit 1 1A Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 1 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 2 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 2 2B Emergency Diesel Generator

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 13 of 24 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP111 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP112 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP113 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP114 Unit 1 1B Essential Service Water (SX) Pump Unit 2 2B Essential Service Water (SX) Pump Unit 1 1SX033 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Unit 1 1SX034 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Unit 2 2SX033 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Unit 2 2SX034 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve One of the compensatory actions utilized in this quantification was to have one of the SX005 valves in the Open position. This enhances the likelihood of success in providing SX cooling from the opposite Unit. To facilitate the credit for this condition the failure to open term for the 2SX005 valve was set to False. This is applicable to the Internal Events and Fire models. Another compensatory action was to perform the action to isolate one train of the Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (RCFC) to insure adequate flow is available for equipment cooling from the SX system. This action was addressed in the quantification by setting the Unit 2 Operator Action basic event associated with the isolation of the Unit 2 RCFC flowpath to False. This is applicable to the Internal Events and Fire models. Dependency between SX Crosstie and Fire Protection Alternate Cooling Alignment to CV pumps operator actions The Base PRA model assumes a high dependency between the SX Crosstie and Fire Protection Alternate Cooling Alignment to the CV pumps operator actions where the probability of the Fire Protection operator action basic event is set to 0.51. With the use of dedicated SX operators for the duration of 1/2SX001A valves replacement, the dependency between these two operator actions can be eliminated. In the sensitivity analysis, a low dependency is assumed, and the basic event probability is set to 0.051 which is incorporated in the quantification of the results. This is applicable to the Internal Events and Fire models. Dependency between SX Crosstie and Establishment of a Cool Suction Source for the CV pumps operator actions The Base PRA model does not consider the dependency between the operator actions for the SX Crosstie and establishment of a cool suction source for the CV pumps. The SX Crosstie action is based on 1BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 1" and takes its initial cue from Loss of SX (LOSX) indications where the following annunciator or indications may cause entry into the SX MALFUNCTION procedure:  Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX.  SX PUMP TRIP (1-2-A1)

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 14 of 24  SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (1-2-A2) The operator action to establish a cool suction source for the CV pumps is based on 1BOA PRI-6, "Component Cooling Malfunction Unit 1", Step 1a Response Not Obtained where the initial cue is provided by CC surge tank level < 13%. There is no direct dependence between the two actions, but the time windows may be overlapping since LOSX will lead to loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW). Therefore, upon reviewing the dependence between the two actions, it was determined that a medium dependence should be assigned between the two actions. The associated basic event for this operator action was added in the recovery file QRX-6E-SX04.txt to account for the medium dependence between two actions. This change was incorporated into the base model quantification for this evaluation. For the planned plant configuration, this dependence will be removed with the use of dedicated SX operators during 1/2SX001A work window. This is applicable to the Internal Events and Fire models. Question 2.b: Describe how any compensatory measures have been credited in the analysis, addressing both the baseline model and the configuration-specific assessment.

Response

As described in the response to 2.a above, several maintenance terms were set to False to reflect the prohibition of performing maintenance activities on those components while in this specific plant configuration. In the base PRA model these terms would be set to the associated probability as defined in the model documentation. Dedicated operations personnel provide the basis for a reduction in the dependency of two operator actions, performing the crosstie of the SX system between units and implementation of the alternate cooling to the CV pump lube oil coolers from the Fire Protection system. For the configuration specific evaluation, this probability has been reduced to 0.051 to reflect the reduction in the dependency from the establishment of dedicated operations personnel. In the base PRA model, there is no credit for the use of dedicated operations personnel as planned for the replacement of the 1(2)SX001A valves. This dependency is accounted for in the Base PRA model by setting the probability for the operator action to align fire protection alternate cooling to the CV pumps given failure to cross-tie the SX systems (1FP-PRI-7X-HMVCA) basic event to 0.51. Question 2.c:

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 15 of 24 Identify whether recovery of inoperable SX pumps is credited, either for mitigation or for the calculation of initiating event frequency, and if so, justify the recovery probability applied.

Response

No recovery of the 1A or 2A SX pumps is credited in the analysis supporting this one-time CT extension. Question 2.d: Provide a sensitivity analysis for crediting any compensatory measures or recovery actions, which are unique for this evaluation.

Response

The following information is provided to address this question. Table 2.d-1 lists the sensitivity cases referenced in question 2.d that were performed for this LAR. Additional sensitivities performed to address modeling uncertainty are discussed in Attachment 7 to the LAR. The results from these sensitivity cases are provided in Table 2.d-2.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 16 of 24 Table 2.d Sensitivity Cases Case Description B12CE The base case is quantified and compared to Rev. 6E1 results to ensure the correct model is used. B12E-SX SX LAR CDF - All Compensatory Actions The model is quantified for the configuration considering both mechanical compensatory measures and the impact from dedicated SX operators. B12E-SX01 SX LAR Sensitivity 1 - No Compensatory Actions The model is quantified for the configuration with no compensatory measures to assess the risk impact of the configuration, and to help determine compensatory measures. B12E-SX02 SX LAR Sensitivity 2 - Only Mechanical Compensatory Actions The model is quantified for the configuration considering mechanical compensatory measures to determine the risk reduction achieved with mechanical compensatory measures. B12E-SX03 SX LAR Sensitivity 3 - OA Dependency with SX Cross-tie (SX-XTIE) Operator Action The model is quantified for the configuration with dedicated SX operator as only compensatory measure to assess the impact from dedicated SX operators. The low dependency between SX Cross-tie operator action (0SX-XTIE---HMVOA) and alignment of fire protection alternate cooling to CV pumps (1FP-PRI-7X-HMVCA) is assumed, instead of high dependency as in the base model. B12E-SX04 SX LAR Sensitivity 4 - OA Dependency with CV-ALL Action The model is quantified for the configuration assuming a medium dependency between SX Cross-tie (0SX-XTIE---HMVOA) and establishment of a cool suction source for the CV pumps (1CV-ALL---- HPMOA) operator actions. The base model does not account for dependency between these actions, but the dependency between these two actions will be eliminated with dedicated SX operators. Table 2.d-2 Sensitivity Case Results Case Case Descriptions CDF(0) CDF(1) ICCDP T(ct) (days) Acceptance Criteria RIF B12CE Byron Base CDF for B12 Configuration 1.80E-05 B12E-SX SX LAR CDF - All Compensatory Actions 1.80E-05 2.59E-05 1.29E-07 6 < 5.0E-07 1.44 B12E-SX01 SX LAR Sensitivity 1 - No Compensatory Actions 1.80E-05 7.58E-05 9.50E-07 6 < 5.0E-07 4.20 B12E-SX02 SX LAR Sensitivity 2 - Only Mechanical Comp Actions 1.80E-05 6.59E-05 7.86E-07 6 < 5.0E-07 3.65 B12E-SX03 SX LAR Sensitivity 3 - OA Dependency with SX-XTIE Action 1.80E-05 3.58E-05 2.93E-07 6 < 5.0E-07 1.99 B12E-SX04 SX LAR Sensitivity 4 - OA Dependency with CV-ALL Action 1.80E-05 2.59E-05 1.29E-07 6 < 5.0E-07 1.44

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 17 of 24 2.1.3 NRC Statement: The tier 2 evaluation identifies compensatory measures in Table 3, Byron SX A Train Outage Summary of Compensatory Measures, in of the LAR as regulatory commitments, but the description of these items is vague. Question 3.a: Describe specifically what restrictions on availability are being committed by use of the term protected equipment.

Response

Equipment listed as "protected" will be subject to the following restrictions: No intrusive maintenance that would render or potentially render the equipment incapable of performing its function. Monitoring of equipment performance, such as during operator rounds, to insure reliability of the equipment is maintained and any indication of degrading performance is identified early, is allowed. Exelon has developed procedure, OP-AA-108-117, "Protected Equipment Program", that provides guidance on the protection of equipment associated with the Configuration Risk Management program. This procedure will be implemented at Byron station by the start of the B2R15 outage where the 1(2)SX001A valve replacement is scheduled. This procedure provides the guidance described below regarding "protected equipment". Step 4.4.2 of this procedure provides the following specific guidance on work activities: 4.4.2 The following evolutions should not be performed on protected equipment:  Corrective or elective maintenance,  Preventative maintenance which is intrusive in nature,  Preventative maintenance or non-critical surveillance testing where an unsatisfactory outcome could render the equipment unavailable,  Any evolution where human performance error could result in damage to or loss of the protected equipment unless the Shift Manager agrees there is reasonable assurance that no adverse effects could occur,  Equipment or system operation which renders the protected equipment unavailable, or  Work on electrical sources that could fault switchgear or load control centers. This procedure also provides the following guidance for allowed activities in step 4.4.1: 4.4.1 Generally, work on or within 2 feet of protected equipment will not be allowed.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 18 of 24 Exceptions to this rule are as follows:  Operator performing rounds, inspections, and alarm response.  Fire Brigade Members and the Medical Response Team during response to emergencies.  Personnel performing Abnormal Operating Procedures / Emergency Operating Procedures / Emergency Plan actions.  Security Officers who have received an appropriate brief from Shift Management and are performing their official rounds or alarm response.  Radiation Protection personnel performing non-intrusive radiological surveys and are responding to radiation alarms / changing plant conditions.  Fire Patrols who have received an appropriate brief from Shift Management and are performing their official duties.  Electrical and instrument maintenance activities on loads supplied by protected switchgear, load control center, or vital instrument busses provided that the load is isolated from the protected equipment by a clearance or over-current protection (e.g. fuse or breaker) is available to isolate the protected power supply from equipment fault or personnel error at an energized work location.  Changing burned out light bulbs.  Other activities as approved by the Shift Manager. Question 3.b: Identify specifically each component which is protected, without the use of undefined plant acronyms.

Response

The equipment listed in Table 3 of the LAR is repeated here with an equipment description: 0A Fire Protection Pump 0B Fire Protection Pump 1SX005 - SX Unit Cross-tie Valve 2SX005 - SX Unit Cross-tie Valve Aux Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Plenums (Unit 1) Unit 1 1A Auxiliary Feedwater Train Unit 1 1B Auxiliary Feedwater Train Unit 2 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Train Unit 1 Start-up Transformer (SAT 142) Unit 2 Start-up Transformer (SAT 242) Unit 1 Bus 141 Div 1 4160VAC ESF Bus

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 19 of 24 Unit 1 Bus 142 Div 2 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 2 Bus 241 Div 1 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 2 Bus 242 Div 2 4160VAC ESF Bus Unit 0 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Unit 2 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Unit 1 125VDC Div 1 Battery & Battery Charger Unit 1 125VDC Div 2 Battery & Battery Charger Unit 2 125VDC Div 1 Battery & Battery Charger Unit 2 125VDC Div 2 Battery & Battery Charger Unit 1 1A Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 1 1B Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 2 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 2 2B Emergency Diesel Generator Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP111 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP112 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP113 Unit 1 120VAC Instrument Power Inverter 1IP114 Unit 1 1B Essential Service Water (SX) Pump Unit 2 2B Essential Service Water (SX) Pump Unit 1 1SX033 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Unit 1 1SX034 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Unit 2 2SX033 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Unit 2 2SX034 - SX Train Cross-tie Valve Station Switchyard - Offsite Power Supplies Unit 1 1A CV Pump Alternate Cooling - Alternate Cooling to the Centrifugal Charging Water pumps from the Fire Protection system Unit 1 1B CV Pump Alternate Cooling - Alternate Cooling to the Centrifugal Charging Water pumps from the Fire Protection system Unit 2 2B Component Cooling Water train Unit 2 2A Centrifugal Charging Water (CV) train or Unit 2 2A Safety Injection (SI) train OR Unit 2 2B Centrifugal Charging Water (CV) train or Unit 2 2B Safety Injection (SI) train Unit 2 2A Residual Heat Removal train or Unit 2 2B Residual Heat Removal train Spent Fuel Pool Cooling - Maintain 1 train available Unit 1 Safety Injection (SI) signals - Prohibit surveillance testing on Solid State Protection System (SSPS) / Engineered Safeguards Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) SI logic Question 3.c: Describe the process applied and basis to determine the scope of the protected equipment.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 20 of 24

Response

The results from the previous submittal for a one-time CT extension were reviewed to capture the insights from that analysis related to equipment availability. These results were then compared against the current model results to compare insights, again related to equipment availability. The results of these reviews provided a list of equipment functions that had importance for the planned plant configuration. This list formed the basis for the equipment functions shown in Table 3 in the LAR. Question 3.d: Describe the fire zones qualitatively, and identify how these zones were selected for a compensatory measure.

Response

The following fire zones were identified as part of the insights gained from the fire PRA model to enhance defense-in-depth and improve the risk profile for the planed station configuration:  5.1-1 Division 12 ESF switchgear room (focus on switchgear 142)  11.3-0 Auxiliary building general area, elev, 364 (focus on MCC 132X1)  11.1B-0 Unit 2 auxiliary building basement (SX B Train Pump Room)  11.6-1 Division 12 containment electrical penetration area  11.6-0 Aux building general area elev. 426 (focus on SWGR 134X)  11.3-1 Unit 1 containment pipe penetration area (focus on MCC 131X1)  11.4-0 Aux building general area, elev. 383 (focus on 1AF01PA, 2AF01PA and MCC 132X3)  5.5-1 Unit 1 auxiliary electrical equipment room (focus on 1PA23J)  5.2-1 Division 11 ESF switchgear room (focus on switchgear 141) These zones contain fire scenarios which are the highest fire risk scenarios in the CT extension configuration fire PRA quantification. 2.1.4 NRC Question: In Attachment 5 of the LAR, the tier 3 evaluation identifies the plant Configuration Risk Management Program being applied to assess risk of emergent conditions. However, as identified in RG 1.177, An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications, there is no discussion of how external event risk, specifically fire risk, which comprises 90 percent of the total risk reported for this TS change, is assessed within the tier 3 evaluation. Describe how this significant risk contributor is evaluated.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 21 of 24

Response

Evaluation of risk insights from both the internal events and fire PRA results was performed with the identification of risk management actions for the planned configuration. Should there be any planned or emergent changes to the analyzed configuration, the impact of the changes will be evaluated to determine if there is any significant impact on internal events and fire PRA risk insights to confirm that appropriate risk management actions have been defined and are in place. 2.1.5 NRC Question: The LAR identifies the use of the fire protection system to maintain flow from the charging pumps to the reactor coolant pump seals, using dedicated operators and non-seismic connections. The NRC staffs understanding of the current guidance is that seal cooling cannot be restored after about 10 - 15 minutes of interruption, due to seal heatup and concerns for thermal shock of the seals. Provide a more detailed discussion of this action as to the duration of the action, and impact on interruption of reactor coolant pump seal cooling and any relevant assumptions made regarding seal performance upon restoration of cooling.

Response

The action consists of providing a connection from the Fire Protection system to the lube oil cooler for the charging pump. There are separate connections for each of the charging pumps. The hose connection from the fire protection system is staged and the connections to the SX cooling water lines use a "quick connect" style connection. The guidance to perform this action is provided in station procedure 1(2)BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 1(2)", Attachment B. It should be noted that the direction provided by this procedure does not secure the associated charging pump, so RCP seal cooling is not lost during this evolution. These steps direct the connection of the hose and manipulation of the associated manual valves to isolate the SX portion of the cooling water supply and opening of the fire protection supply. This action is routinely covered in Operations Requalification training through the Job Performance Measure mechanism to evaluate operator performance. Times to perform the action, based on input from the Operations Training organization are on the order of 10 minutes. Another method of providing cooling to the charging pumps is through the use of fire protection pumps cross-tied into the SX system as directed by procedure 0BOA PRI-7, "Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink". At the present time, this capability is not credited in the Byron PRA model. Upon Loss of Dual Unit SX system (i.e., Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink), 0BOA PRI-7 directs the operators to crosstie FP system to SX system. This crosstie is not credited in the PRA model and SX CT LAR sensitivity analysis. This is conservative where an alt ernate success path for CV Pump lube oil cooling is not credited.

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 22 of 24 2.1.6 NRC Question: Throughout the submittal, reference is made to RG 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, July 1998. However, the current version of RG 1.174 is dated November 2002. Explain why the current version of RG 1.174 was not used as a basis for this submittal.

Response

The reference to the 1998 version of RG 1.174 was a "cut and paste" error associated with the previous SX one-time CT extension. The evaluation performed to support this submittal was based on RG 1.174, Revision 1, dated November 2002. 2.1.7 NRC Statement: NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) 16.1, Revision 1, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, describes NRC staff acceptance criteria regarding defense in depth, considerations for Technical Specification (TS) changes. Criteria II.1A.(iii)(3) states that the licensee should consider, Whether the TS change specifies that voluntary removal of equipment from service should not be scheduled when adverse weather conditions or other situations that likely may subject the plant to abnormal conditions are predicted. The licensee has considered adverse weather conditions in its PRA analysis for external events, but has made no specified provision for adverse weather in its TS change in accordance with the guidelines of SRP 16.1, if adverse weather actually occurs. Explain why the TS change (specifically in Attachment 1, Table 3) does not specify that the removal of 1/2SX001A from service will not be scheduled when adverse weather conditions or other situations that likely may subject the plant to abnormal conditions are predicted. The NRC staff notes that implementation of Attachment 1, Table 3 is a regulatory commitment per Attachment 4 of the LAR. Response: Exelon will add the following information to Table 3 - Adverse Environmental Conditions - The one-time extended CT condition will not be entered should adverse environmental conditions exist or are imminent (forecast within the next 12 hours). For the purpose of Table 3 of the submittal, Adverse Environmental Conditions are defined as any of the following:  Area environmental conditions such as icing, wind, or storms causing unexpected repeated station power line trips  Tornado Warning

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 23 of 24  Actual switchyard voltage alarms or notifications indicating voltage below that required for offsite source technical specification operability limits  Predicted Unit trip contingency switchyard voltage below minimum required switchyard voltage (unless a site specific analysis has been performed).  Notified that at the current time a condition exists such that if a transmission line or other transmission facility were to trip, then site will be below voltage operability limits. Should Adverse Environmental Conditions develop after the extended CT condition has been entered, then work will proceed to complete the 1(2)SX001A valve replacement. 2.1.8 NRC Statement: The licensee has stated, in Attachment 5 in the LAR, that defense in depth is maintained, in part, because a best estimate flow analysis has shown that a single SX pump can provide cooling on both units with the exception of the Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (RCFC) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) on the unit without an SX pump and one train of RCFCs on the unit with an available SX pump. Question 8.b: If the SX pump of the operating unit were lost, all RCFCs in the operating unit would lose SX flow. With no RCFCs available in the operating unit, explain why the other means of containment heat removal, i.e., the containment spray system of the operating unit, are not on the protected system list during the extended CT.

Response

The initial premise of the statement in question 8 assumes that a loss of the remaining SX pump on the operating unit leads to a loss of SX for that unit. The Byron SX system design provides for the ability to cross-connect the unit SX supplies through the 1SX005 and 2SX005 valves. The direction to open these valves is provided in procedure 1(2)BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 1(2)". As noted in our submittal, two compensatory actions will be implemented to address this potential event and reduce its significance. The first is that one of the SX005 valves will be maintained in the open position for the duration of the 1(2)SX001A valve maintenance. This reduces the actions required to be taken to cross-tie the SX system and enhances the likelihood of successfully performing this action. The second compensatory action is that one train of RCFCs on the shutdown unit will be isolated as a means of reducing the total demand on the SX system. With the SX crosstie between units established, cooling will be provided to one train of

BY-LAR-003, REVISION 1 Page 24 of 24 RCFCs. To ensure containment cooling is maintained, the B train of RCFCs will be considered protected for the duration of the extended CT. Containment spray for Byron provides pressure reduction but does not provide a containment heat removal function. The only available means of removing heat from containment post LOCA are the RCFCs and the Residual Heat Removal System. The B Train of the Residual Heat Removal System will also be protected for the duration of the extended CT. Best estimate Thermal-Hydraulic analysis has shown that containment sprays are not required to prevent containment failure during a LOCA or Steam Line Break Inside Containment provided a train of RCFCs is available. Therefore, there is no need to protect a train of Containment Sprays during the extended CT. 3.0

SUMMARY

The above information is provided to address the request for additional information provided by the NRC in Reference 2.

4.0 REFERENCES

1)

Exelon Letter RS-09-121, dated September 24, 2009, P. Simpson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the Essential Service Water Train Completion Time" Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66, NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455

2)

NRC Letter ML93200660, dated December 18, 2009 Letter from M. J. David (U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to C. G. Pardee (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), " BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO ONE-TIME EXTENSION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER TRAIN COMPLETION TIME (TAC NOS. ME2293 AND ME2294)"

ATTACHMENT 3 Supporting Documentation List of Attached Documents 1. 1BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 1," Revision 104 2. 2BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Water Malfunction Unit 2," Revision 105 3. OBOA PRI-7, "Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Unit 0," Revision 0 4. OP-AA-108-117, "Protected Equipment Program," Revision 0

    

     

     

     

                         A. A. A. PURPOSE PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure provides actions required in the event of a This procedure provides actions required in the event of a This procedure provides actions required in the event of a malfunction of the Essential Service Water system. malfunction of the Essential Service Water system. malfunction of the Essential Service Water system. B. B. B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS 1) 1) 1) The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure: The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure: The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure: ooo SX basin level rapidly dropping. SX basin level rapidly dropping. SX basin level rapidly dropping. ooo Indications of a SX break in the Aux Bldg. Indications of a SX break in the Aux Bldg. Indications of a SX break in the Aux Bldg. ooo Indications of a SX break in the CNMT. Indications of a SX break in the CNMT. Indications of a SX break in the CNMT. ooo Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX. Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX. Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX. 2) 2) 2) The following annunciators may cause entry into this procedure: The following annunciators may cause entry into this procedure: The following annunciators may cause entry into this procedure: ooo CNMT DRAIN LEAK DETECT FLOW HIGH (1-1-A2) CNMT DRAIN LEAK DETECT FLOW HIGH (1-1-A2) CNMT DRAIN LEAK DETECT FLOW HIGH (1-1-A2) ooo SX PUMP TRIP (1-2-A1) SX PUMP TRIP (1-2-A1) SX PUMP TRIP (1-2-A1) ooo SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (1-2-A2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (1-2-A2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (1-2-A2) ooo SX PUMP DSCH HDR TEMP HIGH LOW (1-2-B2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR TEMP HIGH LOW (1-2-B2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR TEMP HIGH LOW (1-2-B2) ooo SX PUMP SUCT PRESS LOW (1-2-C1) SX PUMP SUCT PRESS LOW (1-2-C1) SX PUMP SUCT PRESS LOW (1-2-C1) ooo SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) ooo SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL HIGH (1-2-D2) SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL HIGH (1-2-D2) SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL HIGH (1-2-D2) ooo SX MAKEUP PP AUTO START (0-37-B7) SX MAKEUP PP AUTO START (0-37-B7) SX MAKEUP PP AUTO START (0-37-B7) ooo SX CLG TWR BASIN LEVEL HIGH LOW (0-37-A8) SX CLG TWR BASIN LEVEL HIGH LOW (0-37-A8) SX CLG TWR BASIN LEVEL HIGH LOW (0-37-A8) ooo SX CLG TWR LOW SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-A6) SX CLG TWR LOW SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-A6) SX CLG TWR LOW SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-A6) ooo SX CLG TWR HIGH SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-B6) SX CLG TWR HIGH SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-B6) SX CLG TWR HIGH SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-B6) Page 1 of 25 Page 1 of 25 Page 1 of 25

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                         NOTE NOTE NOTE With this procedure in effect the With this procedure in effect the With this procedure in effect the Emergency Director shall evaluate Emergency Director shall evaluate Emergency Director shall evaluate for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions. for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions. for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions. NOTE NOTE NOTE Both Units may be affected by a Both Units may be affected by a Both Units may be affected by a malfunction in one or both Essential malfunction in one or both Essential malfunction in one or both Essential *** Service Water trains. Service Water trains. Service Water trains. NOTE NOTE NOTE If a loss of SX is due to a loss of If a loss of SX is due to a loss of If a loss of SX is due to a loss of the SX MDCT, 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF the SX MDCT, 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF the SX MDCT, 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK should be ULTIMATE HEAT SINK should be ULTIMATE HEAT SINK should be referenced. referenced. referenced.           a. a.

a. SX pump(s) -

SX pump(s) - SX pump(s) - AT LEAST ONE AT LEAST ONE AT LEAST ONE a. a.

a. Perform the following to Perform the following to Perform the following to RUNNING RUNNING RUNNING start the standby pump:

start the standby pump: start the standby pump: 1) 1)

1) Manually open RCFC SX Manually open RCFC SX Manually open RCFC SX inlet and outlet valves:

inlet and outlet valves: inlet and outlet valves: ooo 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump:  1SX016A 1SX016A 1SX016A  1SX027A 1SX027A 1SX027A ooo 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump:  1SX016B 1SX016B 1SX016B  1SX027B 1SX027B 1SX027B Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 2 of 25 Page 2 of 25 Page 2 of 25

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                         Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) 2) 2)

2) Start the SX pump.

Start the SX pump. Start the SX pump. IF IF IF the pump can the pump can the pump can NOT NOT NOT be be be

started, started,

started, THEN THEN THEN 

   ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT A (Page 18). (Page 18). (Page 18). IF IF IF NO NO NO SX pump is SX pump is SX pump is available on Unit 2, available on Unit 2, available on Unit 2, THEN THEN THEN     0BOA PRI-7. 0BOA PRI-7. 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK. SINK. SINK. b. b.

b. SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) -

SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) - SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) - NOT NOT NOT b. b.

b. Locally backwash Locally backwash Locally backwash LIT LIT LIT strainer(s) per BOP SX-4, strainer(s) per BOP SX-4, strainer(s) per BOP SX-4, ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER STRAINER MANUAL OPERATION.

STRAINER MANUAL OPERATION. STRAINER MANUAL OPERATION. c. c.

c. SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW c.

c.

c. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: (1-2-A2) - (1-2-A2) - (1-2-A2) - NOT LIT NOT LIT NOT LIT 1) 1)

1) Start an additional SX Start an additional SX Start an additional SX pump.

pump. pump. 2) 2)

2) Locally verify the SX Locally verify the SX Locally verify the SX Strainers are Strainers are Strainers are NOT NOT NOT backwashing.

backwashing. backwashing. 3) 3)

3) Locally adjust SX outlet Locally adjust SX outlet Locally adjust SX outlet from CC heat exchanger from CC heat exchanger from CC heat exchanger valve(s) while valve(s) while valve(s) while maintaining outlet maintaining outlet maintaining outlet temperature(s) less than temperature(s) less than temperature(s) less than 105 105 105FFF (Normal)

(Normal) (Normal) 120 120 120FFF (RH in S/D Cooling) (RH in S/D Cooling) (RH in S/D Cooling) 130 130 130FFF (Post LOCA): (Post LOCA): (Post LOCA): ooo 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) ooo 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 3 of 25 Page 3 of 25 Page 3 of 25

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                         Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) IF IF IF SX pump discharge SX pump discharge SX pump discharge header pressure can header pressure can header pressure can NOT NOT NOT be be be

restored, restored,

restored, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following:

following: following: 1) 1)

1) Monitor temperatures to Monitor temperatures to Monitor temperatures to equipment cooled by SX.

equipment cooled by SX. equipment cooled by SX. 2) 2)

2) Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary equipment:

equipment: equipment: ooo DG(s) DG(s) DG(s) ooo MCR chiller(s) MCR chiller(s) MCR chiller(s) ooo SI pump(s) SI pump(s) SI pump(s) ooo RCFC(s) RCFC(s) RCFC(s) ooo CNMT chiller(s) CNMT chiller(s) CNMT chiller(s) 3) 3)

3) Close the SX outlet Close the SX outlet Close the SX outlet valve for ANY shutdown valve for ANY shutdown valve for ANY shutdown RCFC train(s):

RCFC train(s): RCFC train(s): ooo 1SX027A 1SX027A 1SX027A ooo 1SX027B 1SX027B 1SX027B 4) 4)

4) IF IF IF CENT CHG pump CENT CHG pump CENT CHG pump temperatures are temperatures are temperatures are approaching the limits approaching the limits approaching the limits of TABLE A (Page 25),

of TABLE A (Page 25), of TABLE A (Page 25), THEN THEN THEN align FP to CENT align FP to CENT align FP to CENT CHG pump lube oil cooler CHG pump lube oil cooler CHG pump lube oil cooler per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B (Page 23) while (Page 23) while (Page 23) while continuing with this continuing with this continuing with this procedure: procedure: procedure: ooo CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump 1A ooo CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump 1B 5) 5)

5) Shutdown any vital Shutdown any vital Shutdown any vital equipment exceeding the equipment exceeding the equipment exceeding the limits of TABLE A limits of TABLE A limits of TABLE A (Page 25).

(Page 25). (Page 25). Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 4 of 25 Page 4 of 25 Page 4 of 25

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                         Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) 6) 6)

6) At Shift Manager At Shift Manager At Shift Manager discretion align discretion align discretion align  

      SX to cool unit 1 CC SX to cool unit 1 CC SX to cool unit 1 CC loads via the Unit 0 CC loads via the Unit 0 CC loads via the Unit 0 CC HX: HX: HX: a) a) a) Open CC HX 0 SX inlet Open CC HX 0 SX inlet Open CC HX 0 SX inlet valve: valve: valve:  2SX005 (330 P19 2SX005 (330 P19 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) AB2) AB2) b) b) b) Open CC HX 0 SX Open CC HX 0 SX Open CC HX 0 SX outlet valve: outlet valve: outlet valve:  0SX146 0SX146 0SX146  0SX147 0SX147 0SX147 c) c) c) Align the Unit 0 CC Align the Unit 0 CC Align the Unit 0 CC HX to Unit 1 per BOP HX to Unit 1 per BOP HX to Unit 1 per BOP CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0 CC PUMP AND THE U-0 CC PUMP AND THE U-0 CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO A UNIT. U-0 HX TO A UNIT. U-0 HX TO A UNIT. d. d.

d. Locally check tripped SX Locally check tripped SX Locally check tripped SX d.

d.

d. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: pump(s) - pump(s) - pump(s) - NOT ROTATING NOT ROTATING NOT ROTATING 1) 1)

1) Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to energize the affected energize the affected energize the affected pump's suction valve:

pump's suction valve: pump's suction valve: ooo 1SX001A at 131X3 cub 1SX001A at 131X3 cub 1SX001A at 131X3 cub E4 E4 E4 ooo 1SX001B at 132X1 cub 1SX001B at 132X1 cub 1SX001B at 132X1 cub C1 C1 C1 2) 2)

2) Close the affected Close the affected Close the affected pump's suction valve:

pump's suction valve: pump's suction valve: ooo 1SX001A 1SX001A 1SX001A ooo 1SX001B 1SX001B 1SX001B Page 5 of 25 Page 5 of 25 Page 5 of 25

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                                              a. a.

a. Temperature -

Temperature - Temperature - GREATER THAN 50 GREATER THAN 50 GREATER THAN 50FFF a. a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) Verify SX tower hot Verify SX tower hot Verify SX tower hot water basin bypass water basin bypass water basin bypass valves for running pumps valves for running pumps valves for running pumps are OPEN:

are OPEN: are OPEN: ooo 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: ooo 0SX162A 0SX162A 0SX162A ooo 0SX162C 0SX162C 0SX162C ooo 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: ooo 0SX162B 0SX162B 0SX162B ooo 0SX162D 0SX162D 0SX162D 2) 2)

2) Stop Stop Stop ALL ALL ALL SX tower fans:

SX tower fans: SX tower fans:  0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CH 0SX03CH 0SX03CH Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 6 of 25 Page 6 of 25 Page 6 of 25

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                         Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) b. b.

b. Temperature -

Temperature - Temperature - LESS THAN 80 LESS THAN 80 LESS THAN 80FFF b. b.

b. Start Start Start ALL ALL ALL SX tower fans by SX tower fans by SX tower fans by performing the following:

performing the following: performing the following: 1) 1)

1) Open Open Open ALL ALL ALL riser valves:

riser valves: riser valves:  0SX163A through 0SX163A through 0SX163A through 0SX163H 0SX163H 0SX163H 2) 2)

2) Verify the hot water Verify the hot water Verify the hot water basin bypass valves are basin bypass valves are basin bypass valves are closed:

closed: closed:  0SX162A 0SX162A 0SX162A  0SX162B 0SX162B 0SX162B  0SX162C 0SX162C 0SX162C  0SX162D 0SX162D 0SX162D 3) 3)

3) Start Start Start ALL ALL ALL fans in high fans in high fans in high speed:

speed: speed:  0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CH 0SX03CH 0SX03CH 4) 4)

4) IF IF IF any fan fails to any fan fails to any fan fails to start in high speed, start in high speed, start in high speed, THEN THEN THEN close its close its close its associated riser valve associated riser valve associated riser valve unless needed for the unless needed for the unless needed for the running SX pump(s) running SX pump(s) running SX pump(s) return flowpath(s).

return flowpath(s). return flowpath(s). 5) 5)

5) Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec 3.7.9.

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                         Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) IF IF IF ALL SX tower fans fail ALL SX tower fans fail ALL SX tower fans fail to start, to start, to start, THEN THEN THEN perform the following perform the following perform the following to establish an alternate to establish an alternate to establish an alternate method of SX cooling: method of SX cooling: method of SX cooling: 1) 1)

1) Verify WW sand filters Verify WW sand filters Verify WW sand filters are shutdown.

are shutdown. are shutdown. 2) 2)

2) Close both SX basin CW Close both SX basin CW Close both SX basin CW makeup valves:

makeup valves: makeup valves:  0CW100A 0CW100A 0CW100A  0CW100B 0CW100B 0CW100B 3) 3)

3) Establish WW makeup flow Establish WW makeup flow Establish WW makeup flow to SX basins from the to SX basins from the to SX basins from the MCR:

MCR: MCR: a) a) a) Place WW makeup Place WW makeup Place WW makeup valves in AUTO: valves in AUTO: valves in AUTO:  0WW019A 0WW019A 0WW019A  0WW019B 0WW019B 0WW019B b) b) b) Place SX basin level Place SX basin level Place SX basin level controllers in MANUAL controllers in MANUAL controllers in MANUAL and raise demand and raise demand and raise demand until WW makeup until WW makeup until WW makeup valves indicate dual valves indicate dual valves indicate dual valve position: valve position: valve position:  0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064  0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 c) c) c) Start both WW pumps. Start both WW pumps. Start both WW pumps. 4) 4)

4) Verify SX blowdown flow Verify SX blowdown flow Verify SX blowdown flow established.

established. established.  0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL)  0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 8 of 25 Page 8 of 25 Page 8 of 25

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                         Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) 5) 5)

5) Adjust SX basin level Adjust SX basin level Adjust SX basin level controllers as necessary controllers as necessary controllers as necessary to maintain SX basin to maintain SX basin to maintain SX basin levels between levels between levels between 90%

90% 90% to to to 100% 100% 100%... IF IF IF WW makeup flow can WW makeup flow can WW makeup flow can NOT NOT NOT be established from be established from be established from the MCR, the MCR, the MCR, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following: following: following: 1) 1)

1) Dispatch an operator Dispatch an operator Dispatch an operator to locally open WW to locally open WW to locally open WW makeup valves:

makeup valves: makeup valves:  0WW019A (860 J1 0WW019A (860 J1 0WW019A (860 J1 SXCT) SXCT) SXCT)  0WW019B (860 J1 0WW019B (860 J1 0WW019B (860 J1 SXCT) SXCT) SXCT) 2) 2)

2) Start both WW pumps.

Start both WW pumps. Start both WW pumps. 3) 3)

3) Locally throttle WW Locally throttle WW Locally throttle WW makeup valve(s) as makeup valve(s) as makeup valve(s) as necessary to maintain necessary to maintain necessary to maintain basin levels between basin levels between basin levels between 90%

90% 90% to to to 100% 100% 100%... Page 9 of 25 Page 9 of 25 Page 9 of 25

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                         NOTE NOTE NOTE A loss of IA pressure will cause the A loss of IA pressure will cause the A loss of IA pressure will cause the *** SX basin levels indication to slowly SX basin levels indication to slowly SX basin levels indication to slowly *** fail low as the IA header fail low as the IA header fail low as the IA header depressurizes. depressurizes. depressurizes. NOTE NOTE NOTE The SX tower basins are crosstied The SX tower basins are crosstied The SX tower basins are crosstied above above above 64% 64% 64%. A leak from one basin . A leak from one basin . A leak from one basin will cause both basin levels to will cause both basin levels to will cause both basin levels to drop. drop. drop.  

 

 

   a. a.

a. Level -

Level - Level - LESS THAN 100% LESS THAN 100% LESS THAN 100% a. a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) Close any open SX basin Close any open SX basin Close any open SX basin CW makeup valve(s):

CW makeup valve(s): CW makeup valve(s): ooo 0CW100A 0CW100A 0CW100A ooo 0CW100B 0CW100B 0CW100B 2) 2)

2) Secure WW makeup to SX Secure WW makeup to SX Secure WW makeup to SX basins:

basins: basins: a) a) a) Stop any running deep Stop any running deep Stop any running deep well pump(s) aligned well pump(s) aligned well pump(s) aligned to a SX basin. to a SX basin. to a SX basin. b) b) b) Close associated SX Close associated SX Close associated SX basin deep well basin deep well basin deep well makeup valve(s): makeup valve(s): makeup valve(s): ooo 0WW019A 0WW019A 0WW019A ooo 0WW019B 0WW019B 0WW019B 3) 3)

3) Stop running SX makeup Stop running SX makeup Stop running SX makeup pump(s).

pump(s). pump(s). 4) 4)

4) Realign riser and bypass Realign riser and bypass Realign riser and bypass valves as necessary to valves as necessary to valves as necessary to maintain basin levels.

maintain basin levels. maintain basin levels. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 10 of 25 Page 10 of 25 Page 10 of 25

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                         Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) 5) 5)

5) Dispatch operator to Dispatch operator to Dispatch operator to check for basin check for basin check for basin overflow.

overflow. overflow. b. b.

b. Level -

Level - Level - GREATER THAN 80% AND GREATER THAN 80% AND GREATER THAN 80% AND b. b.

b. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: STABLE STABLE STABLE 1) 1)

1) Makeup to SX basin(s) as Makeup to SX basin(s) as Makeup to SX basin(s) as necessary to restore necessary to restore necessary to restore level:

level: level: ooo Establish CW makeup: Establish CW makeup: Establish CW makeup: 1) 1)

1) Place CW makeup Place CW makeup Place CW makeup valve(s) in AUTO:

valve(s) in AUTO: valve(s) in AUTO: ooo 0CW100A 0CW100A 0CW100A ooo 0CW100B 0CW100B 0CW100B 2) 2)

2) Adjust SX basin Adjust SX basin Adjust SX basin level controller(s) level controller(s) level controller(s) as necessary to as necessary to as necessary to restore level:

restore level: restore level: ooo 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 ooo 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 ooo Establish WW makeup: Establish WW makeup: Establish WW makeup: 1) 1)

1) Place WW makeup Place WW makeup Place WW makeup valve(s) in AUTO:

valve(s) in AUTO: valve(s) in AUTO: ooo 0WW019A 0WW019A 0WW019A ooo 0WW019B 0WW019B 0WW019B 2) 2)

2) Place SX basin Place SX basin Place SX basin level controller(s) level controller(s) level controller(s) in MANUAL and raise in MANUAL and raise in MANUAL and raise demand until WW demand until WW demand until WW makeup valve(s) makeup valve(s) makeup valve(s) indicate dual valve indicate dual valve indicate dual valve position:

position: position: ooo 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 ooo 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 3) 3)

3) Start WW pump(s).

Start WW pump(s). Start WW pump(s). Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 11 of 25 Page 11 of 25 Page 11 of 25

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                         Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) 2) 2)

2) Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to close SX blowdown close SX blowdown close SX blowdown valves:

valves: valves:  0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL)  0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 3) 3)

3) Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT area.

area. area. 4) 4)

4) Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer backwash isolated.

backwash isolated. backwash isolated. IF IF IF basin level continues basin level continues basin level continues to drop then start both SX to drop then start both SX to drop then start both SX makeup pumps. makeup pumps. makeup pumps. c. c.

c. Level -

Level - Level - GREATER THAN 60% GREATER THAN 60% GREATER THAN 60% c. c.

c. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to check for leaks in the check for leaks in the check for leaks in the Aux Bldg.

Aux Bldg. Aux Bldg. 2) 2)

2) Verify both SX makeup Verify both SX makeup Verify both SX makeup pumps running.

pumps running. pumps running. 3) 3)

3) Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown ANY ANY ANY equipment equipment equipment exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of TABLE A (Page 25).

TABLE A (Page 25). TABLE A (Page 25). 4) 4)

4) Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec 3.7.9.

3.7.9. 3.7.9. Page 12 of 25 Page 12 of 25 Page 12 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                             a. a.

a. CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet a.

a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: temperature(s) - temperature(s) - temperature(s) - LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN 105 105 105FFF::: 1) 1)

1) Locally throttle SX Locally throttle SX Locally throttle SX outlet from CC heat outlet from CC heat outlet from CC heat

 1TI-674 (Unit 1 CC HX) 1TI-674 (Unit 1 CC HX) 1TI-674 (Unit 1 CC HX) exchanger valve(s) to exchanger valve(s) to exchanger valve(s) to  0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) maintain CC temperature maintain CC temperature maintain CC temperature less than less than less than 105 105 105FFF::: ooo 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) ooo 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 2) 2)

2) IF IF IF RCP THERMAL BARR CC RCP THERMAL BARR CC RCP THERMAL BARR CC WTR TEMP HIGH (1-7-E3)

WTR TEMP HIGH (1-7-E3) WTR TEMP HIGH (1-7-E3) is LIT, is LIT, is LIT, THEN THEN THEN maintain seal maintain seal maintain seal injection flow between injection flow between injection flow between 8 GPM 8 GPM 8 GPM and and and 13 GPM 13 GPM 13 GPM per per per pump. pump. pump. Page 13 of 25 Page 13 of 25 Page 13 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                                         a. a.

a. Running CENT CHG pump oil Running CENT CHG pump oil Running CENT CHG pump oil a.

a.

a. Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling temperature(s) -

temperature(s) - temperature(s) - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B (Page 23). (Page 23). (Page 23). ooo 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump  Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 ooo 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump  Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 b. b.

b. Check running equipment Check running equipment Check running equipment b.

b.

b. Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown ANY ANY ANY equipment equipment equipment temperature -

temperature - temperature - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of LIMITS LIMITS LIMITS::: TABLE A (Page 25). TABLE A (Page 25). TABLE A (Page 25).  Refer to TABLE A (Page 25) Refer to TABLE A (Page 25) Refer to TABLE A (Page 25) c. c.

c. SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW c.

c.

c. Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to (1-2-A2) -

(1-2-A2) - (1-2-A2) - NOT LIT NOT LIT NOT LIT perform the following: perform the following: perform the following:  Check for leaks in the Check for leaks in the Check for leaks in the Aux Bldg. Aux Bldg. Aux Bldg.  Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT area. area. area.  Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer backwash isolated. backwash isolated. backwash isolated. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 14 of 25 Page 14 of 25 Page 14 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) d. d.

d. CNMT indications -

CNMT indications - CNMT indications - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL::: d. d.

d. Perform the following to Perform the following to Perform the following to isolate one RCFC train:

isolate one RCFC train: isolate one RCFC train:  CNMT sump flow recorders CNMT sump flow recorders CNMT sump flow recorders (1PM12J) - (1PM12J) - (1PM12J) - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL::: 1) 1)

1) Shutdown NON-running SX Shutdown NON-running SX Shutdown NON-running SX pump's train RCFCs:

pump's train RCFCs: pump's train RCFCs:  Floor Drain Sump Floor Drain Sump Floor Drain Sump (1FT-RF008) (1FT-RF008) (1FT-RF008) ooo Train 1A: Train 1A: Train 1A:  RX Cavity Sump RX Cavity Sump RX Cavity Sump  1A and 1C RCFCs 1A and 1C RCFCs 1A and 1C RCFCs (1FT-RF010) (1FT-RF010) (1FT-RF010) ooo Train 1B: Train 1B: Train 1B:  1B and 1D RCFCs 1B and 1D RCFCs 1B and 1D RCFCs 2) 2)

2) Close associated RCFC Close associated RCFC Close associated RCFC train isol valves:

train isol valves: train isol valves: ooo 1SX016A and 1SX027A 1SX016A and 1SX027A 1SX016A and 1SX027A ooo 1SX016B and 1SX027B 1SX016B and 1SX027B 1SX016B and 1SX027B IF IF IF leak is leak is leak is NOT NOT NOT stopped, stopped, stopped, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following: following: following: 1) 1)

1) Unisolate previously Unisolate previously Unisolate previously isolated RCFC train.

isolated RCFC train. isolated RCFC train. 2) 2)

2) Swap running SX pumps.

Swap running SX pumps. Swap running SX pumps. 3) 3)

3) Isolate other RCFC Isolate other RCFC Isolate other RCFC train.

train. train. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 15 of 25 Page 15 of 25 Page 15 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) e. e.

e. Aux Bldg indications -

Aux Bldg indications - Aux Bldg indications - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL::: e. e.

e. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) No report of locally observed No report of locally observed No report of locally observed 1) 1)

1) Locate and isolate the Locate and isolate the Locate and isolate the leak leak leak leak.

leak. leak. 2) 2)

2) SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL ooo IF IF IF Unit 1 CC HX must Unit 1 CC HX must Unit 1 CC HX must HIGH (1-2-D2) -

HIGH (1-2-D2) - HIGH (1-2-D2) - NOT LIT NOT LIT NOT LIT be isolated, be isolated, be isolated, THEN THEN THEN align Unit 0 CC align Unit 0 CC align Unit 0 CC 3) 3)

3) Contact Radwaste Operator to Contact Radwaste Operator to Contact Radwaste Operator to HX to cool Unit 1 HX to cool Unit 1 HX to cool Unit 1 verify following:

verify following: verify following: loads per BOP CC-10, loads per BOP CC-10, loads per BOP CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0 ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0 ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0  Leak detection sumps - Leak detection sumps - Leak detection sumps - NOT NOT NOT CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO IN ALARM IN ALARM IN ALARM A UNIT. A UNIT. A UNIT.  Aux Bldg sumps - Aux Bldg sumps - Aux Bldg sumps - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL ooo IF IF IF one SX train must one SX train must one SX train must be isolated, be isolated, be isolated, THEN THEN THEN swap running swap running swap running equipment to the equipment to the equipment to the NON-affected train. NON-affected train. NON-affected train. ooo IF IF IF a SX break beyond a SX break beyond a SX break beyond the capacity of the capacity of the capacity of system makeup can system makeup can system makeup can NOT NOT NOT be isolated, be isolated, be isolated, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following: following: following: 1) 1)

1) Stop Unit 1 SX Stop Unit 1 SX Stop Unit 1 SX pumps.

pumps. pumps. 2) 2)

2) Close the riser and Close the riser and Close the riser and bypass valves on bypass valves on bypass valves on the SX tower with the SX tower with the SX tower with the lowest level.

the lowest level. the lowest level. 2) 2)

2) Evaluate potential Evaluate potential Evaluate potential equipment damage due to equipment damage due to equipment damage due to flooding.

flooding. flooding. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 16 of 25 Page 16 of 25 Page 16 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) 3) 3)

3) WHEN WHEN WHEN SX system integrity SX system integrity SX system integrity has been restored, has been restored, has been restored, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following:

following: following: a) a) a) Vent affected Vent affected Vent affected portions of the SX portions of the SX portions of the SX system as necessary system as necessary system as necessary per BOP SX-7, FILLING per BOP SX-7, FILLING per BOP SX-7, FILLING AND VENTING THE SX AND VENTING THE SX AND VENTING THE SX SYSTEM. SYSTEM. SYSTEM. b) b) b)     Step 1 Step 1 Step 1 (Page 2). (Page 2). (Page 2).           3.5.2 3.5.2 3.5.2  3.7.8 3.7.8 3.7.8  3.7.9 3.7.9 3.7.9  Other Tech Specs as applicable Other Tech Specs as applicable Other Tech Specs as applicable                         

-END-
-END-
-END-Page 17 of 25 Page 17 of 25 Page 17 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 1 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 1 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 1 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE 

  #

  #

  #

  #               a. a.

a. Check RCFC SX isol valves for Check RCFC SX isol valves for Check RCFC SX isol valves for a.

a.

a. Manually or locally open Manually or locally open Manually or locally open standby SX pump -

standby SX pump - standby SX pump - OPEN OPEN OPEN::: valve(s): valve(s): valve(s): ooo 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: ooo 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 P-15) P-15) P-15)  2SX016A 2SX016A 2SX016A ooo 2SX027A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX027A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX027A (374 +29 RXB2  2SX027A 2SX027A 2SX027A P-14) P-14) P-14) ooo 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 ooo 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: P-7) P-7) P-7) ooo 2SX027B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX027B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX027B (401 +2 RXB2  2SX016B 2SX016B 2SX016B P-9) P-9) P-9)  2SX027B 2SX027B 2SX027B b. b.

b. Start standby Start standby Start standby  

      SX pump SX pump SX pump b. b.

b. 

   Step 3 (Next Page). Step 3 (Next Page). Step 3 (Next Page). % % % % 

  

  

  

                     a. a.

a. Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves:

Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: a. a.

a. Locally open valve(s):

Locally open valve(s): Locally open valve(s):  1SX005 1SX005 1SX005 ooo 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2)  2SX005 2SX005 2SX005 ooo 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) b. b.

b. Check SX pump crosstie valves -

Check SX pump crosstie valves - Check SX pump crosstie valves - b. b.

b. Manually or locally open Manually or locally open Manually or locally open OPEN OPEN OPEN:::

valve(s): valve(s): valve(s):  1SX033 1SX033 1SX033 ooo 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1)  1SX034 1SX034 1SX034 ooo 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2)  2SX033 2SX033 2SX033 ooo 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1)  2SX034 2SX034 2SX034 ooo 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) c. c.

c. Check Check Check  

      SX pump discharge SX pump discharge SX pump discharge c. c.

c. 

   Step 5 (Page 21). Step 5 (Page 21). Step 5 (Page 21). pressure - pressure - pressure - GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG d. d.

d. 

   Step 6 (Page 22) Step 6 (Page 22) Step 6 (Page 22) Page 18 of 25 Page 18 of 25 Page 18 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 2 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 2 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 2 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE   

    

    

    

  a. a.

a. Stop RCFCs for non-running Stop RCFCs for non-running Stop RCFCs for non-running

        SX pump: SX pump: SX pump: ooo 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump:  2A RCFC 2A RCFC 2A RCFC  2C RCFC 2C RCFC 2C RCFC ooo 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump:  2B RCFC 2B RCFC 2B RCFC  2D RCFC 2D RCFC 2D RCFC b. b.

b. Close RCFC SX isol valves for Close RCFC SX isol valves for Close RCFC SX isol valves for b.

b.

b. IF IF IF NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves non-running non-running non-running  

      SX pump: SX pump: SX pump: can be manually closed, can be manually closed, can be manually closed, THEN THEN THEN locally close the SX locally close the SX locally close the SX ooo 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve:  2SX016A 2SX016A 2SX016A ooo 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2  2SX027A 2SX027A 2SX027A P-15) P-15) P-15) ooo 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 ooo 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: P-7) P-7) P-7)  2SX016B 2SX016B 2SX016B  2SX027B 2SX027B 2SX027B c. c.

c. Stop ONE pair of UNIT 1 RCFCs Stop ONE pair of UNIT 1 RCFCs Stop ONE pair of UNIT 1 RCFCs for SX isol:

for SX isol: for SX isol: ooo 1A and 1C RCFCs 1A and 1C RCFCs 1A and 1C RCFCs ooo 1B and 1D RCFCs 1B and 1D RCFCs 1B and 1D RCFCs d. d.

d. Close associated UNIT 1 RCFC Close associated UNIT 1 RCFC Close associated UNIT 1 RCFC d.

d.

d. IF IF IF NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves train SX isol valves:

train SX isol valves: train SX isol valves: can be manually closed, can be manually closed, can be manually closed, THEN THEN THEN locally close the SX locally close the SX locally close the SX ooo 1SX016A and 1SX027A 1SX016A and 1SX027A 1SX016A and 1SX027A inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve: ooo 1SX016B and 1SX027B 1SX016B and 1SX027B 1SX016B and 1SX027B ooo 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 P-15) P-15) P-15) ooo 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 P-7) P-7) P-7) e. e.

e. Monitor CNMT temperature and Monitor CNMT temperature and Monitor CNMT temperature and pressure on both units pressure on both units pressure on both units Page 19 of 25 Page 19 of 25 Page 19 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 3 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 3 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 3 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE 

   

   

   

                     a. a.

a. Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves:

Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: a. a.

a. Locally open valve(s):

Locally open valve(s): Locally open valve(s):  1SX005 1SX005 1SX005 ooo 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2)  2SX005 2SX005 2SX005 ooo 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) b. b.

b. Check SX pump crosstie valves -

Check SX pump crosstie valves - Check SX pump crosstie valves - b. b.

b. Manually or locally open Manually or locally open Manually or locally open OPEN OPEN OPEN:::

valve(s): valve(s): valve(s):  1SX033 1SX033 1SX033 ooo 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1)  1SX034 1SX034 1SX034 ooo 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2)  2SX033 2SX033 2SX033 ooo 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1)  2SX034 2SX034 2SX034 ooo 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) Page 20 of 25 Page 20 of 25 Page 20 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 4 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 4 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 4 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE                 a. a.

a. Maintain the following:

Maintain the following: Maintain the following: a. a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following:          SX pump(s): SX pump(s): SX pump(s): ooo Isolate SX to Unit 1 Isolate SX to Unit 1 Isolate SX to Unit 1 RCFC train(s): RCFC train(s): RCFC train(s):  Motor amps - Motor amps - Motor amps - LESS THAN 180 LESS THAN 180 LESS THAN 180 AMPS AMPS AMPS a) a) a) Shutdown RCFC Shutdown RCFC Shutdown RCFC train(s): train(s): train(s):  Discharge pressure - Discharge pressure - Discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG ooo 1A and 1C RCFC 1A and 1C RCFC 1A and 1C RCFC ooo 1B and 1D RCFC 1B and 1D RCFC 1B and 1D RCFC  CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet temperature - temperature - temperature - LESS THAN 105 LESS THAN 105 LESS THAN 105FFF::: b) b) b) Close RCFC SX outlet Close RCFC SX outlet Close RCFC SX outlet valve(s): valve(s): valve(s):  1TI-674 (Unit 1 CC HX) 1TI-674 (Unit 1 CC HX) 1TI-674 (Unit 1 CC HX)  2TI-674 ( 2TI-674 ( 2TI-674 (        CC HX) CC HX) CC HX) ooo 1SX027A 1SX027A 1SX027A  0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) ooo 1SX027B 1SX027B 1SX027B c) c) c) Monitor CNMT Monitor CNMT Monitor CNMT temperature and temperature and temperature and pressure. pressure. pressure. ooo Locally throttle CC heat Locally throttle CC heat Locally throttle CC heat exchanger(s) SX outlet exchanger(s) SX outlet exchanger(s) SX outlet valve(s) as necessary: valve(s) as necessary: valve(s) as necessary: ooo 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) ooo 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) ooo 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) ooo Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary DGs. DGs. DGs. b. b.

b. Check running CENT CHG pump oil Check running CENT CHG pump oil Check running CENT CHG pump oil b.

b.

b. Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling temperature(s) on computer temperature(s) on computer temperature(s) on computer per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B group #59 -

group #59 - group #59 - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL (Page 23). (Page 23). (Page 23). ooo 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump ooo 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump ooo 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump ooo 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 21 of 25 Page 21 of 25 Page 21 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 5 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 5 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 5 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) c. c.

c. Monitor temperatures on UNIT 1 Monitor temperatures on UNIT 1 Monitor temperatures on UNIT 1 equipment cooled by SX per equipment cooled by SX per equipment cooled by SX per TABLE A (Page 25)

TABLE A (Page 25) TABLE A (Page 25) d. d.

d. Shutdown ANY equipment Shutdown ANY equipment Shutdown ANY equipment exceeding the limits of TABLE A exceeding the limits of TABLE A exceeding the limits of TABLE A (Page 25)

(Page 25) (Page 25) e. e.

e. Realign riser and bypass valves Realign riser and bypass valves Realign riser and bypass valves per BOP SX-T2, SX TOWER per BOP SX-T2, SX TOWER per BOP SX-T2, SX TOWER OPERATION GUIDELINES OPERATION GUIDELINES OPERATION GUIDELINES

                a. a.

a. Control room chillers -

Control room chillers - Control room chillers - ONE ONE ONE a. a.

a. Start one chiller per BOP Start one chiller per BOP Start one chiller per BOP RUNNING RUNNING RUNNING VC-10, STARTUP OF THE VC-10, STARTUP OF THE VC-10, STARTUP OF THE CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM.

SYSTEM. SYSTEM. b. b.

b. CNMT chillers -

CNMT chillers - CNMT chillers - ONE RUNNING ONE RUNNING ONE RUNNING b. b.

b. IF IF IF SX flowpath to one RCFC SX flowpath to one RCFC SX flowpath to one RCFC train is available, train is available, train is available, THEN THEN THEN start the associated start the associated start the associated chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC REFRIGERATION UNIT AND REFRIGERATION UNIT AND REFRIGERATION UNIT AND CHILLED WATER SYSTEM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM STARTUP.

STARTUP. STARTUP.    #& '()   #& '()   #& '()   #& '()

• +,($-
• +,($-
• +,($-
• +,($-

-END- -END- -END-Page 22 of 25 Page 22 of 25 Page 22 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT B (PG 1 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 1 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 1 OF 2) ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER NOTE NOTE NOTE Consideration should be given to Consideration should be given to Consideration should be given to aligning the standby pump to ensure aligning the standby pump to ensure aligning the standby pump to ensure cooling upon an auto start. cooling upon an auto start. cooling upon an auto start. NOTE NOTE NOTE Initiating emergency FP cooling to Initiating emergency FP cooling to Initiating emergency FP cooling to the 1B and 2B CENT CHG pump oil the 1B and 2B CENT CHG pump oil the 1B and 2B CENT CHG pump oil coolers may cause a Fire Suppression coolers may cause a Fire Suppression coolers may cause a Fire Suppression *** Alarm in Zone(s) 1S-60 and 2S-53. Alarm in Zone(s) 1S-60 and 2S-53. Alarm in Zone(s) 1S-60 and 2S-53.                  * * * * - a. a.

a. Connect FP supply hose(s).

Connect FP supply hose(s). Connect FP supply hose(s). b. b.

b. Open FP hose supply isol valve:

Open FP hose supply isol valve: Open FP hose supply isol valve: ooo 1A Cent Chg pump 0FP5170 (364 1A Cent Chg pump 0FP5170 (364 1A Cent Chg pump 0FP5170 (364 +2 V18 AB2) +2 V18 AB2) +2 V18 AB2) ooo 1B Cent Chg pump 1FP5162 (364 1B Cent Chg pump 1FP5162 (364 1B Cent Chg pump 1FP5162 (364 X13 RXB1) X13 RXB1) X13 RXB1) ooo 2A Cent Chg pump 0FP5171 (364 2A Cent Chg pump 0FP5171 (364 2A Cent Chg pump 0FP5171 (364 +3 V18 AB2) +3 V18 AB2) +3 V18 AB2) ooo 2B Cent Chg pump 2FP5162 (364 2B Cent Chg pump 2FP5162 (364 2B Cent Chg pump 2FP5162 (364 X21 RXB2) X21 RXB2) X21 RXB2) c. c.

c. Open CENT CHG pump oil cooler Open CENT CHG pump oil cooler Open CENT CHG pump oil cooler FP supply valve:

FP supply valve: FP supply valve: ooo 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2200A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2200A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2200A (364 +1 V15 RXB1) (364 +1 V15 RXB1) (364 +1 V15 RXB1) ooo 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2200B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2200B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2200B (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) ooo 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2200A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2200A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2200A (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) ooo 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2200B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2200B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2200B (364 +2 Z21 RXB2) (364 +2 Z21 RXB2) (364 +2 Z21 RXB2) Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 23 of 25 Page 23 of 25 Page 23 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT B (PG 2 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 2 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 2 OF 2) ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) d. d.

d. Close CENT CHG pump oil cooler Close CENT CHG pump oil cooler Close CENT CHG pump oil cooler SX supply valve:

SX supply valve: SX supply valve: ooo 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2199A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2199A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2199A (364 +4 V15 RXB1) (364 +4 V15 RXB1) (364 +4 V15 RXB1) ooo 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2199B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2199B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2199B (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) ooo 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2199A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2199A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2199A (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) ooo 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2199B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2199B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2199B (364 +2 Z21 AB2) (364 +2 Z21 AB2) (364 +2 Z21 AB2) e. e.

e. Place a portable fan in door Place a portable fan in door Place a portable fan in door opening as necessary to opening as necessary to opening as necessary to maintain running CENT CHG pump maintain running CENT CHG pump maintain running CENT CHG pump room(s) temperature -

room(s) temperature - room(s) temperature - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL                          -END- -END- -END-Page 24 of 25 Page 24 of 25 Page 24 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         TABLE A (PG 1 OF 1) TABLE A (PG 1 OF 1) TABLE A (PG 1 OF 1) VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS    .      .      .      .     ooo RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  RCP Mtr Radial Brng - RCP Mtr Radial Brng - RCP Mtr Radial Brng - 195 195 195FFF  RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - 195 195 195FFF  RCP Lower Radial Brng - RCP Lower Radial Brng - RCP Lower Radial Brng - 225 225 225FFF  RCP Seal Leakoff - RCP Seal Leakoff - RCP Seal Leakoff - 235 235 235FFF ooo CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - 195 195 195FFF ooo SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LIMITS LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 175 175 175FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 175 175 175FFF ooo SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LIMITS LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - 205 205 205FFF ooo Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group #74) - Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group #74) - Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group #74) - LESS LESS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 165 165 165FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 165 165 165FFF  Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - 165 165 165FFF ooo Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG ooo DGs temperature - DGs temperature - DGs temperature - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR OPERATING LOG OPERATING LOG OPERATING LOG -END- -END- -END-Page 25 of 25 Page 25 of 25 Page 25 of 25

    

     

     

     

                         A. A. A. PURPOSE PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure provides actions required in the event of a This procedure provides actions required in the event of a This procedure provides actions required in the event of a malfunction of the Essential Service Water system. malfunction of the Essential Service Water system. malfunction of the Essential Service Water system. B. B. B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS 1) 1) 1) The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure: The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure: The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure: ooo SX basin level rapidly dropping. SX basin level rapidly dropping. SX basin level rapidly dropping. ooo Indications of a SX break in the Aux Bldg. Indications of a SX break in the Aux Bldg. Indications of a SX break in the Aux Bldg. ooo Indications of a SX break in the CNMT. Indications of a SX break in the CNMT. Indications of a SX break in the CNMT. ooo Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX. Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX. Abnormal temperatures on equipment cooled by SX. 2) 2) 2) The following annunciators may cause entry into this procedure: The following annunciators may cause entry into this procedure: The following annunciators may cause entry into this procedure: ooo CNMT DRAIN LEAK DETECT FLOW HIGH (2-1-A2) CNMT DRAIN LEAK DETECT FLOW HIGH (2-1-A2) CNMT DRAIN LEAK DETECT FLOW HIGH (2-1-A2) ooo SX PUMP TRIP (2-2-A1) SX PUMP TRIP (2-2-A1) SX PUMP TRIP (2-2-A1) ooo SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (2-2-A2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (2-2-A2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW (2-2-A2) ooo SX PUMP DSCH HDR TEMP HIGH LOW (2-2-B2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR TEMP HIGH LOW (2-2-B2) SX PUMP DSCH HDR TEMP HIGH LOW (2-2-B2) ooo SX PUMP SUCT PRESS LOW (2-2-C1) SX PUMP SUCT PRESS LOW (2-2-C1) SX PUMP SUCT PRESS LOW (2-2-C1) ooo SX STRN DP HIGH (2-2-C2) SX STRN DP HIGH (2-2-C2) SX STRN DP HIGH (2-2-C2) ooo SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL HIGH (2-2-D2) SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL HIGH (2-2-D2) SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL HIGH (2-2-D2) ooo SX MAKEUP PP AUTO START (0-37-B7) SX MAKEUP PP AUTO START (0-37-B7) SX MAKEUP PP AUTO START (0-37-B7) ooo SX CLG TWR BASIN LEVEL HIGH LOW (0-37-A8) SX CLG TWR BASIN LEVEL HIGH LOW (0-37-A8) SX CLG TWR BASIN LEVEL HIGH LOW (0-37-A8) ooo SX CLG TWR LOW SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-A6) SX CLG TWR LOW SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-A6) SX CLG TWR LOW SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-A6) ooo SX CLG TWR HIGH SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-B6) SX CLG TWR HIGH SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-B6) SX CLG TWR HIGH SPEED FAN TRIP (0-37-B6) Page 1 of 25 Page 1 of 25 Page 1 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         NOTE NOTE NOTE With this procedure in effect the With this procedure in effect the With this procedure in effect the Emergency Director shall evaluate Emergency Director shall evaluate Emergency Director shall evaluate for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions. for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions. for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions. NOTE NOTE NOTE Both Units may be affected by a Both Units may be affected by a Both Units may be affected by a malfunction in one or both Essential malfunction in one or both Essential malfunction in one or both Essential *** Service Water trains. Service Water trains. Service Water trains. NOTE NOTE NOTE If a loss of SX is due to a loss of If a loss of SX is due to a loss of If a loss of SX is due to a loss of the SX MDCT, 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF the SX MDCT, 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF the SX MDCT, 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK should be ULTIMATE HEAT SINK should be ULTIMATE HEAT SINK should be referenced. referenced. referenced.           a. a.

a. SX pump(s) -

SX pump(s) - SX pump(s) - AT LEAST ONE AT LEAST ONE AT LEAST ONE a. a.

a. Perform the following to Perform the following to Perform the following to RUNNING RUNNING RUNNING start the standby pump:

start the standby pump: start the standby pump: 1) 1)

1) Manually open RCFC SX Manually open RCFC SX Manually open RCFC SX inlet and outlet valves:

inlet and outlet valves: inlet and outlet valves: ooo 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump:  2SX016A 2SX016A 2SX016A  2SX027A 2SX027A 2SX027A ooo 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump:  2SX016B 2SX016B 2SX016B  2SX027B 2SX027B 2SX027B Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 2 of 25 Page 2 of 25 Page 2 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) 2) 2)

2) Start the SX pump.

Start the SX pump. Start the SX pump. IF IF IF the pump can the pump can the pump can NOT NOT NOT be be be

started, started,

started, THEN THEN THEN 

   ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT A (Page 18). (Page 18). (Page 18). IF IF IF NO NO NO SX pump is SX pump is SX pump is available on Unit 1, available on Unit 1, available on Unit 1, THEN THEN THEN     0BOA PRI-7. 0BOA PRI-7. 0BOA PRI-7. LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK. SINK. SINK. b. b.

b. SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) -

SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) - SX STRN DP HIGH (1-2-C2) - NOT NOT NOT b. b.

b. Locally backwash Locally backwash Locally backwash LIT LIT LIT strainer(s) per BOP SX-4, strainer(s) per BOP SX-4, strainer(s) per BOP SX-4, ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER STRAINER MANUAL OPERATION.

STRAINER MANUAL OPERATION. STRAINER MANUAL OPERATION. c. c.

c. SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW c.

c.

c. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: (1-2-A2) - (1-2-A2) - (1-2-A2) - NOT LIT NOT LIT NOT LIT 1) 1)

1) Start an additional SX Start an additional SX Start an additional SX pump.

pump. pump. 2) 2)

2) Locally verify the SX Locally verify the SX Locally verify the SX Strainers are Strainers are Strainers are NOT NOT NOT backwashing.

backwashing. backwashing. 3) 3)

3) Locally adjust SX outlet Locally adjust SX outlet Locally adjust SX outlet from CC heat exchanger from CC heat exchanger from CC heat exchanger valve(s) while valve(s) while valve(s) while maintaining outlet maintaining outlet maintaining outlet temperature(s) less than temperature(s) less than temperature(s) less than 105 105 105FFF (Normal)

(Normal) (Normal) 120 120 120FFF (RH in S/D Cooling) (RH in S/D Cooling) (RH in S/D Cooling) 130 130 130FFF (Post LOCA): (Post LOCA): (Post LOCA): ooo 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) ooo 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 3 of 25 Page 3 of 25 Page 3 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) IF IF IF SX pump discharge SX pump discharge SX pump discharge header pressure can header pressure can header pressure can NOT NOT NOT be be be

restored, restored,

restored, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following:

following: following: 1) 1)

1) Monitor temperatures to Monitor temperatures to Monitor temperatures to equipment cooled by SX.

equipment cooled by SX. equipment cooled by SX. 2) 2)

2) Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary equipment:

equipment: equipment: ooo DG(s) DG(s) DG(s) ooo MCR chiller(s) MCR chiller(s) MCR chiller(s) ooo SI pump(s) SI pump(s) SI pump(s) ooo RCFC(s) RCFC(s) RCFC(s) ooo CNMT chiller(s) CNMT chiller(s) CNMT chiller(s) 3) 3)

3) Close the SX outlet Close the SX outlet Close the SX outlet valve for ANY shutdown valve for ANY shutdown valve for ANY shutdown RCFC train(s):

RCFC train(s): RCFC train(s): ooo 2SX027A 2SX027A 2SX027A ooo 2SX027B 2SX027B 2SX027B 4) 4)

4) IF IF IF CENT CHG pump CENT CHG pump CENT CHG pump temperatures are temperatures are temperatures are approaching the limits approaching the limits approaching the limits of TABLE A (Page 25),

of TABLE A (Page 25), of TABLE A (Page 25), THEN THEN THEN align FP to CENT align FP to CENT align FP to CENT CHG pump lube oil cooler CHG pump lube oil cooler CHG pump lube oil cooler per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B (Page 23) while (Page 23) while (Page 23) while continuing with this continuing with this continuing with this procedure: procedure: procedure: ooo CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump 2A ooo CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump 2B 5) 5)

5) Shutdown any vital Shutdown any vital Shutdown any vital equipment exceeding the equipment exceeding the equipment exceeding the limits of TABLE A limits of TABLE A limits of TABLE A (Page 25).

(Page 25). (Page 25). Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 4 of 25 Page 4 of 25 Page 4 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) 6) 6)

6) At Shift Manager At Shift Manager At Shift Manager discretion align discretion align discretion align  

      SX to cool unit 2 CC SX to cool unit 2 CC SX to cool unit 2 CC loads via the Unit 0 CC loads via the Unit 0 CC loads via the Unit 0 CC HX: HX: HX: a) a) a) Open CC HX 0 SX inlet Open CC HX 0 SX inlet Open CC HX 0 SX inlet valve: valve: valve:  1SX005 (330 P19 1SX005 (330 P19 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) AB2) AB2) b) b) b) Open CC HX 0 SX Open CC HX 0 SX Open CC HX 0 SX outlet valve: outlet valve: outlet valve:  0SX146 0SX146 0SX146  0SX147 0SX147 0SX147 c) c) c) Align the Unit 0 CC Align the Unit 0 CC Align the Unit 0 CC HX to Unit 2 per BOP HX to Unit 2 per BOP HX to Unit 2 per BOP CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0 CC PUMP AND THE U-0 CC PUMP AND THE U-0 CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO A UNIT. U-0 HX TO A UNIT. U-0 HX TO A UNIT. d. d.

d. Locally check tripped SX Locally check tripped SX Locally check tripped SX d.

d.

d. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: pump(s) - pump(s) - pump(s) - NOT ROTATING NOT ROTATING NOT ROTATING 1) 1)

1) Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to energize the affected energize the affected energize the affected pump's suction valve:

pump's suction valve: pump's suction valve: ooo 2SX001A at 231X3 cub 2SX001A at 231X3 cub 2SX001A at 231X3 cub E4 E4 E4 ooo 2SX001B at 232X1 cub 2SX001B at 232X1 cub 2SX001B at 232X1 cub C1 C1 C1 2) 2)

2) Close the affected Close the affected Close the affected pump's suction valve:

pump's suction valve: pump's suction valve: ooo 2SX001A 2SX001A 2SX001A ooo 2SX001B 2SX001B 2SX001B Page 5 of 25 Page 5 of 25 Page 5 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                                              a. a.

a. Temperature -

Temperature - Temperature - GREATER THAN 50 GREATER THAN 50 GREATER THAN 50FFF a. a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) Verify SX tower hot Verify SX tower hot Verify SX tower hot water basin bypass water basin bypass water basin bypass valves for running pumps valves for running pumps valves for running pumps are OPEN:

are OPEN: are OPEN: ooo 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: 2A SX pump: ooo 0SX162A 0SX162A 0SX162A ooo 0SX162C 0SX162C 0SX162C ooo 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: 2B SX pump: ooo 0SX162B 0SX162B 0SX162B ooo 0SX162D 0SX162D 0SX162D 2) 2)

2) Stop Stop Stop ALL ALL ALL SX tower fans:

SX tower fans: SX tower fans:  0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CH 0SX03CH 0SX03CH Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 6 of 25 Page 6 of 25 Page 6 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) b. b.

b. Temperature -

Temperature - Temperature - LESS THAN 80 LESS THAN 80 LESS THAN 80FFF b. b.

b. Start Start Start ALL ALL ALL SX tower fans by SX tower fans by SX tower fans by performing the following:

performing the following: performing the following: 1) 1)

1) Open Open Open ALL ALL ALL riser valves:

riser valves: riser valves:  0SX163A through 0SX163A through 0SX163A through 0SX163H 0SX163H 0SX163H 2) 2)

2) Verify the hot water Verify the hot water Verify the hot water basin bypass valves are basin bypass valves are basin bypass valves are closed:

closed: closed:  0SX162A 0SX162A 0SX162A  0SX162B 0SX162B 0SX162B  0SX162C 0SX162C 0SX162C  0SX162D 0SX162D 0SX162D 3) 3)

3) Start Start Start ALL ALL ALL fans in high fans in high fans in high speed:

speed: speed:  0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CA through 0SX03CH 0SX03CH 0SX03CH 4) 4)

4) IF IF IF any fan fails to any fan fails to any fan fails to start in high speed, start in high speed, start in high speed, THEN THEN THEN close its close its close its associated riser valve associated riser valve associated riser valve unless needed for the unless needed for the unless needed for the running SX pump(s) running SX pump(s) running SX pump(s) return flowpath(s).

return flowpath(s). return flowpath(s). 5) 5)

5) Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec 3.7.9.

3.7.9. 3.7.9. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 7 of 25 Page 7 of 25 Page 7 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) IF IF IF ALL SX tower fans fail ALL SX tower fans fail ALL SX tower fans fail to start, to start, to start, THEN THEN THEN perform the following perform the following perform the following to establish an alternate to establish an alternate to establish an alternate method of SX cooling: method of SX cooling: method of SX cooling: 1) 1)

1) Verify WW sand filters Verify WW sand filters Verify WW sand filters are shutdown.

are shutdown. are shutdown. 2) 2)

2) Close both SX basin CW Close both SX basin CW Close both SX basin CW makeup valves:

makeup valves: makeup valves:  0CW100A 0CW100A 0CW100A  0CW100B 0CW100B 0CW100B 3) 3)

3) Establish WW makeup flow Establish WW makeup flow Establish WW makeup flow to SX basins from the to SX basins from the to SX basins from the MCR:

MCR: MCR: a) a) a) Place WW makeup Place WW makeup Place WW makeup valves in AUTO: valves in AUTO: valves in AUTO:  0WW019A 0WW019A 0WW019A  0WW019B 0WW019B 0WW019B b) b) b) Place SX basin level Place SX basin level Place SX basin level controllers in MANUAL controllers in MANUAL controllers in MANUAL and raise demand and raise demand and raise demand until WW makeup until WW makeup until WW makeup valves indicate dual valves indicate dual valves indicate dual valve position: valve position: valve position:  0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064  0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 c) c) c) Start both WW pumps. Start both WW pumps. Start both WW pumps. 4) 4)

4) Verify SX blowdown flow Verify SX blowdown flow Verify SX blowdown flow established.

established. established.  0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL)  0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 8 of 25 Page 8 of 25 Page 8 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) Step 2 (continued) 5) 5)

5) Adjust SX basin level Adjust SX basin level Adjust SX basin level controllers as necessary controllers as necessary controllers as necessary to maintain SX basin to maintain SX basin to maintain SX basin levels between levels between levels between 90%

90% 90% to to to 100% 100% 100%... IF IF IF WW makeup flow can WW makeup flow can WW makeup flow can NOT NOT NOT be established from be established from be established from the MCR, the MCR, the MCR, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following: following: following: 1) 1)

1) Dispatch an operator Dispatch an operator Dispatch an operator to locally open WW to locally open WW to locally open WW makeup valves:

makeup valves: makeup valves:  0WW019A (860 J1 0WW019A (860 J1 0WW019A (860 J1 SXCT) SXCT) SXCT)  0WW019B (860 J1 0WW019B (860 J1 0WW019B (860 J1 SXCT) SXCT) SXCT) 2) 2)

2) Start both WW pumps.

Start both WW pumps. Start both WW pumps. 3) 3)

3) Locally throttle WW Locally throttle WW Locally throttle WW makeup valve(s) as makeup valve(s) as makeup valve(s) as necessary to maintain necessary to maintain necessary to maintain basin levels between basin levels between basin levels between 90%

90% 90% to to to 100% 100% 100%... Page 9 of 25 Page 9 of 25 Page 9 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         NOTE NOTE NOTE A loss of IA pressure will cause the A loss of IA pressure will cause the A loss of IA pressure will cause the *** SX basin levels indication to slowly SX basin levels indication to slowly SX basin levels indication to slowly *** fail low as the IA header fail low as the IA header fail low as the IA header depressurizes. depressurizes. depressurizes. NOTE NOTE NOTE The SX tower basins are crosstied The SX tower basins are crosstied The SX tower basins are crosstied above above above 64% 64% 64%. A leak from one basin . A leak from one basin . A leak from one basin will cause both basin levels to will cause both basin levels to will cause both basin levels to drop. drop. drop.  

 

 

   a. a.

a. Level -

Level - Level - LESS THAN 100% LESS THAN 100% LESS THAN 100% a. a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) Close any open SX basin Close any open SX basin Close any open SX basin CW makeup valve(s):

CW makeup valve(s): CW makeup valve(s): ooo 0CW100A 0CW100A 0CW100A ooo 0CW100B 0CW100B 0CW100B 2) 2)

2) Secure WW makeup to SX Secure WW makeup to SX Secure WW makeup to SX basins:

basins: basins: a) a) a) Stop any running deep Stop any running deep Stop any running deep well pump(s) aligned well pump(s) aligned well pump(s) aligned to a SX basin. to a SX basin. to a SX basin. b) b) b) Close associated SX Close associated SX Close associated SX basin deep well basin deep well basin deep well makeup valve(s): makeup valve(s): makeup valve(s): ooo 0WW019A 0WW019A 0WW019A ooo 0WW019B 0WW019B 0WW019B 3) 3)

3) Stop running SX makeup Stop running SX makeup Stop running SX makeup pump(s).

pump(s). pump(s). 4) 4)

4) Realign riser and bypass Realign riser and bypass Realign riser and bypass valves as necessary to valves as necessary to valves as necessary to maintain basin levels.

maintain basin levels. maintain basin levels. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 10 of 25 Page 10 of 25 Page 10 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) 5) 5)

5) Dispatch operator to Dispatch operator to Dispatch operator to check for basin check for basin check for basin overflow.

overflow. overflow. b. b.

b. Level -

Level - Level - GREATER THAN 80% AND GREATER THAN 80% AND GREATER THAN 80% AND b. b.

b. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: STABLE STABLE STABLE 1) 1)

1) Makeup to SX basin(s) as Makeup to SX basin(s) as Makeup to SX basin(s) as necessary to restore necessary to restore necessary to restore level:

level: level: ooo Establish CW makeup: Establish CW makeup: Establish CW makeup: 1) 1)

1) Place CW makeup Place CW makeup Place CW makeup valve(s) in AUTO:

valve(s) in AUTO: valve(s) in AUTO: ooo 0CW100A 0CW100A 0CW100A ooo 0CW100B 0CW100B 0CW100B 2) 2)

2) Adjust SX basin Adjust SX basin Adjust SX basin level controller(s) level controller(s) level controller(s) as necessary to as necessary to as necessary to restore level:

restore level: restore level: ooo 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 ooo 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 ooo Establish WW makeup: Establish WW makeup: Establish WW makeup: 1) 1)

1) Place WW makeup Place WW makeup Place WW makeup valve(s) in AUTO:

valve(s) in AUTO: valve(s) in AUTO: ooo 0WW019A 0WW019A 0WW019A ooo 0WW019B 0WW019B 0WW019B 2) 2)

2) Place SX basin Place SX basin Place SX basin level controller(s) level controller(s) level controller(s) in MANUAL and raise in MANUAL and raise in MANUAL and raise demand until WW demand until WW demand until WW makeup valve(s) makeup valve(s) makeup valve(s) indicate dual valve indicate dual valve indicate dual valve position:

position: position: ooo 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 0LK-SX064 ooo 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 0LK-SX065 3) 3)

3) Start WW pump(s).

Start WW pump(s). Start WW pump(s). Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 11 of 25 Page 11 of 25 Page 11 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) Step 3 (continued) 2) 2)

2) Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to Dispatch an operator to close SX blowdown close SX blowdown close SX blowdown valves:

valves: valves:  0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL) 0SX161A (400 C6 GL)  0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 0SX161B (400 C6 GL) 3) 3)

3) Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT area.

area. area. 4) 4)

4) Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer backwash isolated.

backwash isolated. backwash isolated. IF IF IF basin level continues basin level continues basin level continues to drop then start both SX to drop then start both SX to drop then start both SX makeup pumps. makeup pumps. makeup pumps. c. c.

c. Level -

Level - Level - GREATER THAN 60% GREATER THAN 60% GREATER THAN 60% c. c.

c. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to check for leaks in the check for leaks in the check for leaks in the Aux Bldg.

Aux Bldg. Aux Bldg. 2) 2)

2) Verify both SX makeup Verify both SX makeup Verify both SX makeup pumps running.

pumps running. pumps running. 3) 3)

3) Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown ANY ANY ANY equipment equipment equipment exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of TABLE A (Page 25).

TABLE A (Page 25). TABLE A (Page 25). 4) 4)

4) Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec Refer to Tech Spec 3.7.9.

3.7.9. 3.7.9. Page 12 of 25 Page 12 of 25 Page 12 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                             a. a.

a. CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet a.

a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: temperature(s) - temperature(s) - temperature(s) - LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN 105 105 105FFF::: 1) 1)

1) Locally throttle SX Locally throttle SX Locally throttle SX outlet from CC heat outlet from CC heat outlet from CC heat

 2TI-674 (Unit 2 CC HX) 2TI-674 (Unit 2 CC HX) 2TI-674 (Unit 2 CC HX) exchanger valve(s) to exchanger valve(s) to exchanger valve(s) to  0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) maintain CC temperature maintain CC temperature maintain CC temperature less than less than less than 105 105 105FFF::: ooo 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) ooo 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 2) 2)

2) IF IF IF RCP THERMAL BARR CC RCP THERMAL BARR CC RCP THERMAL BARR CC WTR TEMP HIGH (2-7-E3)

WTR TEMP HIGH (2-7-E3) WTR TEMP HIGH (2-7-E3) is LIT, is LIT, is LIT, THEN THEN THEN maintain seal maintain seal maintain seal injection flow between injection flow between injection flow between 8 GPM 8 GPM 8 GPM and and and 13 GPM 13 GPM 13 GPM per per per pump. pump. pump. Page 13 of 25 Page 13 of 25 Page 13 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                                         a. a.

a. Running CENT CHG pump oil Running CENT CHG pump oil Running CENT CHG pump oil a.

a.

a. Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling temperature(s) -

temperature(s) - temperature(s) - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B (Page 23). (Page 23). (Page 23). ooo 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump  Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 ooo 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump  Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 Computer Group #59 b. b.

b. Check running equipment Check running equipment Check running equipment b.

b.

b. Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown ANY ANY ANY equipment equipment equipment temperature -

temperature - temperature - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of exceeding the limits of LIMITS LIMITS LIMITS::: TABLE A (Page 25). TABLE A (Page 25). TABLE A (Page 25).  Refer to TABLE A (Page 25) Refer to TABLE A (Page 25) Refer to TABLE A (Page 25) c. c.

c. SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW SX PUMP DSCH HDR PRESS LOW c.

c.

c. Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to Dispatch operator(s) to (2-2-A2) -

(2-2-A2) - (2-2-A2) - NOT LIT NOT LIT NOT LIT perform the following: perform the following: perform the following:  Check for leaks in the Check for leaks in the Check for leaks in the Aux Bldg. Aux Bldg. Aux Bldg.  Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to Dispatch Operator to look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT look for leaks SXCT area. area. area.  Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer Verify SX strainer backwash isolated. backwash isolated. backwash isolated. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 14 of 25 Page 14 of 25 Page 14 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) d. d.

d. CNMT indications -

CNMT indications - CNMT indications - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL::: d. d.

d. Perform the following to Perform the following to Perform the following to isolate one RCFC train:

isolate one RCFC train: isolate one RCFC train:  CNMT sump flow recorders CNMT sump flow recorders CNMT sump flow recorders (2PM12J) - (2PM12J) - (2PM12J) - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL::: 1) 1)

1) Shutdown NON-running SX Shutdown NON-running SX Shutdown NON-running SX pump's train RCFCs:

pump's train RCFCs: pump's train RCFCs:  Floor Drain Sump Floor Drain Sump Floor Drain Sump (2FT-RF008) (2FT-RF008) (2FT-RF008) ooo Train 2A: Train 2A: Train 2A:  RX Cavity Sump RX Cavity Sump RX Cavity Sump  2A and 2C RCFCs 2A and 2C RCFCs 2A and 2C RCFCs (2FT-RF010) (2FT-RF010) (2FT-RF010) ooo Train 2B: Train 2B: Train 2B:  2B and 2D RCFCs 2B and 2D RCFCs 2B and 2D RCFCs 2) 2)

2) Close associated RCFC Close associated RCFC Close associated RCFC train isol valves:

train isol valves: train isol valves: ooo 2SX016A and 2SX027A 2SX016A and 2SX027A 2SX016A and 2SX027A ooo 2SX016B and 2SX027B 2SX016B and 2SX027B 2SX016B and 2SX027B IF IF IF leak is leak is leak is NOT NOT NOT stopped, stopped, stopped, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following: following: following: 1) 1)

1) Unisolate previously Unisolate previously Unisolate previously isolated RCFC train.

isolated RCFC train. isolated RCFC train. 2) 2)

2) Swap running SX pumps.

Swap running SX pumps. Swap running SX pumps. 3) 3)

3) Isolate other RCFC Isolate other RCFC Isolate other RCFC train.

train. train. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 15 of 25 Page 15 of 25 Page 15 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) e. e.

e. Aux Bldg indications -

Aux Bldg indications - Aux Bldg indications - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL::: e. e.

e. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following: 1) 1)

1) No report of locally observed No report of locally observed No report of locally observed 1) 1)

1) Locate and isolate the Locate and isolate the Locate and isolate the leak leak leak leak.

leak. leak. 2) 2)

2) SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL SX PUMP SUCT VLV PIT LEVEL ooo IF IF IF Unit 2 CC HX must Unit 2 CC HX must Unit 2 CC HX must HIGH (2-2-D2) -

HIGH (2-2-D2) - HIGH (2-2-D2) - NOT LIT NOT LIT NOT LIT be isolated, be isolated, be isolated, THEN THEN THEN align Unit 0 CC align Unit 0 CC align Unit 0 CC 3) 3)

3) Contact Radwaste Operator to Contact Radwaste Operator to Contact Radwaste Operator to HX to cool Unit 2 HX to cool Unit 2 HX to cool Unit 2 verify following:

verify following: verify following: loads per BOP CC-10, loads per BOP CC-10, loads per BOP CC-10, ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0 ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0 ALIGNMENT OF THE U-0  Leak detection sumps - Leak detection sumps - Leak detection sumps - NOT NOT NOT CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO CC PUMP AND U-0 HX TO IN ALARM IN ALARM IN ALARM A UNIT. A UNIT. A UNIT.  Aux Bldg sumps - Aux Bldg sumps - Aux Bldg sumps - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL ooo IF IF IF one SX train must one SX train must one SX train must be isolated, be isolated, be isolated, THEN THEN THEN swap running swap running swap running equipment to the equipment to the equipment to the NON-affected train. NON-affected train. NON-affected train. ooo IF IF IF a SX break beyond a SX break beyond a SX break beyond the capacity of the capacity of the capacity of system makeup can system makeup can system makeup can NOT NOT NOT be isolated, be isolated, be isolated, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following: following: following: 1) 1)

1) Stop Unit 2 SX Stop Unit 2 SX Stop Unit 2 SX pumps.

pumps. pumps. 2) 2)

2) Close the riser and Close the riser and Close the riser and bypass valves on bypass valves on bypass valves on the SX tower with the SX tower with the SX tower with the lowest level.

the lowest level. the lowest level. 2) 2)

2) Evaluate potential Evaluate potential Evaluate potential equipment damage due to equipment damage due to equipment damage due to flooding.

flooding. flooding. Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 16 of 25 Page 16 of 25 Page 16 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) 3) 3)

3) WHEN WHEN WHEN SX system integrity SX system integrity SX system integrity has been restored, has been restored, has been restored, THEN THEN THEN perform the perform the perform the following:

following: following: a) a) a) Vent affected Vent affected Vent affected portions of the SX portions of the SX portions of the SX system as necessary system as necessary system as necessary per BOP SX-7, FILLING per BOP SX-7, FILLING per BOP SX-7, FILLING AND VENTING THE SX AND VENTING THE SX AND VENTING THE SX SYSTEM. SYSTEM. SYSTEM. b) b) b)     Step 1 Step 1 Step 1 (Page 2). (Page 2). (Page 2).           3.5.2 3.5.2 3.5.2  3.7.8 3.7.8 3.7.8  3.7.9 3.7.9 3.7.9  Other Tech Specs as applicable Other Tech Specs as applicable Other Tech Specs as applicable                         

-END-
-END-
-END-Page 17 of 25 Page 17 of 25 Page 17 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 1 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 1 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 1 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE 

  #

  #

  #

  #               a. a.

a. Check RCFC SX isol valves for Check RCFC SX isol valves for Check RCFC SX isol valves for a.

a.

a. Manually or locally open Manually or locally open Manually or locally open standby SX pump -

standby SX pump - standby SX pump - OPEN OPEN OPEN::: valve(s): valve(s): valve(s): ooo 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: ooo 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 P-15) P-15) P-15)  1SX016A 1SX016A 1SX016A ooo 1SX027A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX027A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX027A (374 +29 RXB1  1SX027A 1SX027A 1SX027A P-14) P-14) P-14) ooo 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 ooo 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: P-7) P-7) P-7) ooo 1SX027B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX027B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX027B (401 +2 RXB1  1SX016B 1SX016B 1SX016B P-9) P-9) P-9)  1SX027B 1SX027B 1SX027B b. b.

b. Start standby Start standby Start standby  

      SX pump SX pump SX pump b. b.

b. 

   Step 3 (Next Page). Step 3 (Next Page). Step 3 (Next Page). % % % % 

  

  

  

                     a. a.

a. Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves:

Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: a. a.

a. Locally open valve(s):

Locally open valve(s): Locally open valve(s):  2SX005 2SX005 2SX005 ooo 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2)  1SX005 1SX005 1SX005 ooo 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) b. b.

b. Check SX pump crosstie valves -

Check SX pump crosstie valves - Check SX pump crosstie valves - b. b.

b. Manually or locally open Manually or locally open Manually or locally open OPEN OPEN OPEN:::

valve(s): valve(s): valve(s):  2SX033 2SX033 2SX033 ooo 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1)  2SX034 2SX034 2SX034 ooo 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2)  1SX033 1SX033 1SX033 ooo 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1)  1SX034 1SX034 1SX034 ooo 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) c. c.

c. Check Check Check  

      SX pump discharge SX pump discharge SX pump discharge c. c.

c. 

   Step 5 (Page 21). Step 5 (Page 21). Step 5 (Page 21). pressure - pressure - pressure - GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG d. d.

d. 

   Step 6 (Page 22) Step 6 (Page 22) Step 6 (Page 22) Page 18 of 25 Page 18 of 25 Page 18 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 2 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 2 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 2 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE   

    

    

    

  a. a.

a. Stop RCFCs for non-running Stop RCFCs for non-running Stop RCFCs for non-running

        SX pump: SX pump: SX pump: ooo 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump:  1A RCFC 1A RCFC 1A RCFC  1C RCFC 1C RCFC 1C RCFC ooo 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump:  1B RCFC 1B RCFC 1B RCFC  1D RCFC 1D RCFC 1D RCFC b. b.

b. Close RCFC SX isol valves for Close RCFC SX isol valves for Close RCFC SX isol valves for b.

b.

b. IF IF IF NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves non-running non-running non-running  

      SX pump: SX pump: SX pump: can be manually closed, can be manually closed, can be manually closed, THEN THEN THEN locally close the SX locally close the SX locally close the SX ooo 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: 1A SX pump: inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve:  1SX016A 1SX016A 1SX016A ooo 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1 1SX016A (374 +29 RXB1  1SX027A 1SX027A 1SX027A P-15) P-15) P-15) ooo 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 1SX016B (401 +2 RXB1 ooo 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: 1B SX pump: P-7) P-7) P-7)  1SX016B 1SX016B 1SX016B  1SX027B 1SX027B 1SX027B c. c.

c. Stop ONE pair of UNIT 2 RCFCs Stop ONE pair of UNIT 2 RCFCs Stop ONE pair of UNIT 2 RCFCs for SX isol:

for SX isol: for SX isol: ooo 2A and 2C RCFCs 2A and 2C RCFCs 2A and 2C RCFCs ooo 2B and 2D RCFCs 2B and 2D RCFCs 2B and 2D RCFCs d. d.

d. Close associated UNIT 2 RCFC Close associated UNIT 2 RCFC Close associated UNIT 2 RCFC d.

d.

d. IF IF IF NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves NEITHER SX isol valves train SX isol valves:

train SX isol valves: train SX isol valves: can be manually closed, can be manually closed, can be manually closed, THEN THEN THEN locally close the SX locally close the SX locally close the SX ooo 2SX016A and 2SX027A 2SX016A and 2SX027A 2SX016A and 2SX027A inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve: inlet isol valve: ooo 2SX016B and 2SX027B 2SX016B and 2SX027B 2SX016B and 2SX027B ooo 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 2SX016A (374 +29 RXB2 P-15) P-15) P-15) ooo 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 2SX016B (401 +2 RXB2 P-7) P-7) P-7) e. e.

e. Monitor CNMT temperature and Monitor CNMT temperature and Monitor CNMT temperature and pressure on both units pressure on both units pressure on both units Page 19 of 25 Page 19 of 25 Page 19 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 3 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 3 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 3 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE 

   

   

   

                     a. a.

a. Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves:

Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: Open Unit 0 CC HX inlet valves: a. a.

a. Locally open valve(s):

Locally open valve(s): Locally open valve(s):  2SX005 2SX005 2SX005 ooo 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 2SX005 (330 P19 AB2)  1SX005 1SX005 1SX005 ooo 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) 1SX005 (330 P19 AB2) b. b.

b. Check SX pump crosstie valves -

Check SX pump crosstie valves - Check SX pump crosstie valves - b. b.

b. Manually or locally open Manually or locally open Manually or locally open OPEN OPEN OPEN:::

valve(s): valve(s): valve(s):  2SX033 2SX033 2SX033 ooo 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1) 2SX033 (330 P16 AB1)  2SX034 2SX034 2SX034 ooo 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2) 2SX034 (330 P20 AB2)  1SX033 1SX033 1SX033 ooo 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1) 1SX033 (330 Q17 AB1)  1SX034 1SX034 1SX034 ooo 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) 1SX034 (330 Q19 AB2) Page 20 of 25 Page 20 of 25 Page 20 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 4 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 4 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 4 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE                 a. a.

a. Maintain the following:

Maintain the following: Maintain the following: a. a.

a. Perform the following:

Perform the following: Perform the following:          SX pump(s): SX pump(s): SX pump(s): ooo Isolate SX to Unit 2 Isolate SX to Unit 2 Isolate SX to Unit 2 RCFC train(s): RCFC train(s): RCFC train(s):  Motor amps - Motor amps - Motor amps - LESS THAN 180 LESS THAN 180 LESS THAN 180 AMPS AMPS AMPS a) a) a) Shutdown RCFC Shutdown RCFC Shutdown RCFC train(s): train(s): train(s):  Discharge pressure - Discharge pressure - Discharge pressure - GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG GREATER THAN 90 PSIG ooo 2A and 2C RCFC 2A and 2C RCFC 2A and 2C RCFC ooo 2B and 2D RCFC 2B and 2D RCFC 2B and 2D RCFC  CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet CC heat exchanger outlet temperature - temperature - temperature - LESS THAN 105 LESS THAN 105 LESS THAN 105FFF::: b) b) b) Close RCFC SX outlet Close RCFC SX outlet Close RCFC SX outlet valve(s): valve(s): valve(s):  2TI-674 (Unit 2 CC HX) 2TI-674 (Unit 2 CC HX) 2TI-674 (Unit 2 CC HX)  1TI-674 ( 1TI-674 ( 1TI-674 (        CC HX) CC HX) CC HX) ooo 2SX027A 2SX027A 2SX027A  0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) 0TI-675 (Unit 0 CC HX) ooo 2SX027B 2SX027B 2SX027B c) c) c) Monitor CNMT Monitor CNMT Monitor CNMT temperature and temperature and temperature and pressure. pressure. pressure. ooo Locally throttle CC heat Locally throttle CC heat Locally throttle CC heat exchanger(s) SX outlet exchanger(s) SX outlet exchanger(s) SX outlet valve(s) as necessary: valve(s) as necessary: valve(s) as necessary: ooo 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) 0SX007 (346 L16 AB1) ooo 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) 2SX007 (346 M20) ooo 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) 1SX007 (346 M16) ooo Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary Shutdown ANY unnecessary DGs. DGs. DGs. b. b.

b. Check running CENT CHG pump oil Check running CENT CHG pump oil Check running CENT CHG pump oil b.

b.

b. Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling Align emergency FP cooling temperature(s) on computer temperature(s) on computer temperature(s) on computer per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B per ATTACHMENT B group #59 -

group #59 - group #59 - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL (Page 23). (Page 23). (Page 23). ooo 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump 2A CENT CHG pump ooo 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump 2B CENT CHG pump ooo 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump 1A CENT CHG pump ooo 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump 1B CENT CHG pump Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 21 of 25 Page 21 of 25 Page 21 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT A (PG 5 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 5 OF 5) ATTACHMENT A (PG 5 OF 5) ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CROSSTIE Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) Step 5 (continued) c. c.

c. Monitor temperatures on UNIT 2 Monitor temperatures on UNIT 2 Monitor temperatures on UNIT 2 equipment cooled by SX per equipment cooled by SX per equipment cooled by SX per TABLE A (Page 25)

TABLE A (Page 25) TABLE A (Page 25) d. d.

d. Shutdown ANY equipment Shutdown ANY equipment Shutdown ANY equipment exceeding the limits of TABLE A exceeding the limits of TABLE A exceeding the limits of TABLE A (Page 25)

(Page 25) (Page 25) e. e.

e. Realign riser and bypass valves Realign riser and bypass valves Realign riser and bypass valves per BOP SX-T2, SX TOWER per BOP SX-T2, SX TOWER per BOP SX-T2, SX TOWER OPERATION GUIDELINES OPERATION GUIDELINES OPERATION GUIDELINES

                a. a.

a. Control room chillers -

Control room chillers - Control room chillers - ONE ONE ONE a. a.

a. Start one chiller per BOP Start one chiller per BOP Start one chiller per BOP RUNNING RUNNING RUNNING VC-10, STARTUP OF THE VC-10, STARTUP OF THE VC-10, STARTUP OF THE CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM.

SYSTEM. SYSTEM. b. b.

b. CNMT chillers -

CNMT chillers - CNMT chillers - ONE RUNNING ONE RUNNING ONE RUNNING b. b.

b. IF IF IF SX flowpath to one RCFC SX flowpath to one RCFC SX flowpath to one RCFC train is available, train is available, train is available, THEN THEN THEN start the associated start the associated start the associated chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC REFRIGERATION UNIT AND REFRIGERATION UNIT AND REFRIGERATION UNIT AND CHILLED WATER SYSTEM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM STARTUP.

STARTUP. STARTUP.    #& '()   #& '()   #& '()   #& '()

• +,($-
• +,($-
• +,($-
• +,($-

-END- -END- -END-Page 22 of 25 Page 22 of 25 Page 22 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT B (PG 1 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 1 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 1 OF 2) ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER NOTE NOTE NOTE Consideration should be given to Consideration should be given to Consideration should be given to aligning the standby pump to ensure aligning the standby pump to ensure aligning the standby pump to ensure cooling upon an auto start. cooling upon an auto start. cooling upon an auto start. NOTE NOTE NOTE Initiating emergency FP cooling to Initiating emergency FP cooling to Initiating emergency FP cooling to the 1B and 2B CENT CHG pump oil the 1B and 2B CENT CHG pump oil the 1B and 2B CENT CHG pump oil coolers may cause a Fire Suppression coolers may cause a Fire Suppression coolers may cause a Fire Suppression *** Alarm in Zone(s) 1S-60 and 2S-53. Alarm in Zone(s) 1S-60 and 2S-53. Alarm in Zone(s) 1S-60 and 2S-53.                  * * * * - a. a.

a. Connect FP supply hose(s).

Connect FP supply hose(s). Connect FP supply hose(s). b. b.

b. Open FP hose supply isol valve:

Open FP hose supply isol valve: Open FP hose supply isol valve: ooo 2A Cent Chg pump 0FP5171 (364 2A Cent Chg pump 0FP5171 (364 2A Cent Chg pump 0FP5171 (364 +3 V18 AB2) +3 V18 AB2) +3 V18 AB2) ooo 2B Cent Chg pump 2FP5162 (364 2B Cent Chg pump 2FP5162 (364 2B Cent Chg pump 2FP5162 (364 X21 RXB2) X21 RXB2) X21 RXB2) ooo 1A Cent Chg pump 0FP5170 (364 1A Cent Chg pump 0FP5170 (364 1A Cent Chg pump 0FP5170 (364 +2 V18 AB2) +2 V18 AB2) +2 V18 AB2) ooo 1B Cent Chg pump 1FP5162 (364 1B Cent Chg pump 1FP5162 (364 1B Cent Chg pump 1FP5162 (364 X13 RXB1) X13 RXB1) X13 RXB1) c. c.

c. Open CENT CHG pump oil cooler Open CENT CHG pump oil cooler Open CENT CHG pump oil cooler FP supply valve:

FP supply valve: FP supply valve: ooo 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2200A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2200A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2200A (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) ooo 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2200B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2200B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2200B (364 +2 Z21 RXB2) (364 +2 Z21 RXB2) (364 +2 Z21 RXB2) ooo 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2200A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2200A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2200A (364 +1 V15 RXB1) (364 +1 V15 RXB1) (364 +1 V15 RXB1) ooo 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2200B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2200B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2200B (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Step continued on next page Page 23 of 25 Page 23 of 25 Page 23 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         ATTACHMENT B (PG 2 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 2 OF 2) ATTACHMENT B (PG 2 OF 2) ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER ALIGNING EMERGENCY FP COOLING TO CENT CHG PUMP OIL COOLER Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) Step 1 (continued) d. d.

d. Close CENT CHG pump oil cooler Close CENT CHG pump oil cooler Close CENT CHG pump oil cooler SX supply valve:

SX supply valve: SX supply valve: ooo 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2199A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2199A 2A Cent Chg pump 2SX2199A (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) (364 +2 V21 RXB2) ooo 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2199B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2199B 2B Cent Chg pump 2SX2199B (364 +2 Z21 AB2) (364 +2 Z21 AB2) (364 +2 Z21 AB2) ooo 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2199A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2199A 1A Cent Chg pump 1SX2199A (364 +4 V15 RXB1) (364 +4 V15 RXB1) (364 +4 V15 RXB1) ooo 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2199B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2199B 1B Cent Chg pump 1SX2199B (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) (364 +2 Z15 RXB1) e. e.

e. Place a portable fan in door Place a portable fan in door Place a portable fan in door opening as necessary to opening as necessary to opening as necessary to maintain running CENT CHG pump maintain running CENT CHG pump maintain running CENT CHG pump room(s) temperature -

room(s) temperature - room(s) temperature - NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL                          -END- -END- -END-Page 24 of 25 Page 24 of 25 Page 24 of 25

STEP STEP STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED     

     

     

     

                         TABLE A (PG 1 OF 1) TABLE A (PG 1 OF 1) TABLE A (PG 1 OF 1) VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS    .      .      .      .     ooo RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  RCP Mtr Radial Brng - RCP Mtr Radial Brng - RCP Mtr Radial Brng - 195 195 195FFF  RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - 195 195 195FFF  RCP Lower Radial Brng - RCP Lower Radial Brng - RCP Lower Radial Brng - 225 225 225FFF  RCP Seal Leakoff - RCP Seal Leakoff - RCP Seal Leakoff - 235 235 235FFF ooo CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - LESS THAN LESS THAN LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - 195 195 195FFF ooo SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LIMITS LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 175 175 175FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 175 175 175FFF ooo SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LIMITS LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 205 205 205FFF  Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - 205 205 205FFF ooo Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group #74) - Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group #74) - Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group #74) - LESS LESS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - Inbd Brng - 165 165 165FFF  Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - Outbd Brng - 165 165 165FFF  Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - Thrust Brng - 165 165 165FFF ooo Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG ooo DGs temperature - DGs temperature - DGs temperature - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:::  Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR OPERATING LOG OPERATING LOG OPERATING LOG -END- -END- -END-Page 25 of 25 Page 25 of 25 Page 25 of 25

A. PURPOSE This procedure provides actions required in the event of a complete loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) cooling capability. B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS

1) The following conditions may cause entry into this procedure:

o A complete loss of SX pump capability coincident with an inability to crosstie to an alternate unit SX supply.

2) The following procedures may cause entry into this procedure:

o 1/2BOA PRI-7, ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER MALFUNCTION Page 1 of 12   

     

  CAUTION   Recovery actions in this procedure   may place a Unit in BCA-0.0, LOSS OF   ALL AC POWER, care will be required   to coordinate procedures with   abnormal entry conditions.     CAUTION   Temperatures of running equipment   cooled by SX and CC should be   monitored for overheating using   TABLE A.   NOTE

• With this procedure in effect the
• Emergency Director shall evaluate
• for EMERGENCY PLAN conditions.

NOTE

• This procedure isolates SX cooling
• to the CC HXs. Unit-1 and Unit-2
• should perform BOA PRI-6 concurrent *
• with this procedure.

    

a. Any SX pump available for

a. Perform the following for start:

each affected Unit while continuing with this o SX pump 1A procedure at Step 2 (Next o SX pump 1B Page): o SX pump 2A o SX pump 2B

1) Trip the Reactor.

2)   BEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

b.    procedure and step in effect.

Page 2 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

  CAUTION   If Alternate cooling can not be   established to the D/Gs before they   overheat, they should be secured   until cooling is established.     CAUTION   If AC power is unavailable, it will   be necessary to restore SX flow and   equipment in stages. With cooling   to the 1B D/G, bus 144 may be   energized to power additional FP   cooling using the 0A Fire pump.     Concurrently perform the  ! following without delay:  141

a. Dispatch an operator to

 142 locally crosstie FP to SX:  241  242

1) Close CC HX SX outlet isol valves:

 1SX007 (346 L16 AB1)  2SX007 (346 L20 AB2)  0SX007 (346 L16 AB1)

2) Unlock (A-2 key) and open SX to FP X-tie Isol valves:

 0SX172 (383 +2 M20 AB2)  0SX174 (346 +10 P15 AB1)

b. Isolate SX to RCFC trains by manually or locally closing:

 1SX016A (374 RXB1 P-15)  1SX016B (401 RXB1 P-7)  2SX016A (401 RXB2 P-15)  2SX016B (401 RXB2 P-7)

c. IF bus 142 is energized by a diesel, THEN energize bus 144 from bus 142:

1) Place 0B WS pump in PTL.

2) Synchronize and close ACB 1421.

Page 3 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

      

a. Check FP system - AVAILABLE:

a. IF the WS system available, THEN crosstie WS to supply o 0B FP pump - OPERABLE FP:

o 0A FP pump - OPERABLE

1) Increase WS system pressure:

o Start additional WS pump(s). o Consult TSC to throttle WS valves to increase WS header pressure.

2) WHEN WS pressure is greater than FP pressure, THEN unlock (A-2 key) and open WS to FP X-tie Isol valve:

 0FP507 (401 +20 K35 TB2) Page 4 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

  CAUTION   Minimum SX flow supplied from FP   system requires isolation of SX flow   to CC HXs and RCFC trains.         

a. Dispatch an operator to locally close CC HX SX outlet isols:

 1SX007 (346 L16 AB1)  2SX007 (346 L20 AB2)  0SX007 (346 L16 AB1)

b. Crosstie SX Train supply headers:

1) Open Unit 0 CC HX SX inlet

1) Locally open valve(s):

valves: o 1SX005 (330 +6 P19  1SX005 AB2)  2SX005 o 2SX005 (330 +4 P19 AB2)

2) Check SX train isol valves -

2) Manually or locally open OPEN:

valve(s):  Unit 1 valves: o 1SX004 (330 +11 Q17  1SX004 AB1)  1SX033 o 1SX033 (330 +5 Q17  1SX034 AB1) o 1SX034 (330 +5 Q19  Unit 2 valves: AB2) o 2SX004 (330 +6 P17  2SX004 AB1)  2SX033 o 2SX033 (330 +5 P16  2SX034 AB1) o 2SX034 (330 +5 P20 AB2) Step continued on next page Page 5 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

Step 4 (continued)

c. Minimize SX system load:

1) Isolate RCFC flow:

a) Close Unit 1 isol valves: a) Locally close valve(s).  1SX016A  1SX016B o 1SX016A (374 RXB1 P-15) o 1SX016B (401 RXB1 P-7) b) Close Unit 2 isol valves: b) Locally close valve(s).  2SX016A  2SX016B o 2SX016A (374 RXB2 P-15) o 2SX016B (401 RXB2 P-7)

2) Stop unrequired DGs and place in - PULL OUT o 2A DG o 1A DG o 2B DG o 1B DG Page 6 of 12

  

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

NOTE

• One fire pump will ONLY support one *
• DG at a reduced flow rate. Two fire *
• pumps can supply all 4 DGs.

NOTE

• 1B DG is preferred because 0A Fire
• pump is powered from 144, 2B DG can *
• be connected to 144 using jumpers.

    

a. Dispatch an operator to crosstie FP to SX - LOCALLY UNLOCK (A-2 key) AND OPEN:

 0SX172 (383 +2 M20 AB2)  0SX174 (346 +10 P15 AB1)

b. Check BOTH FP pumps - RUNNING:

b. Perform the following:

 FIRE PUMP 0A RUNNING alarm

1) Dispatch an operator to (0-38-B7) - LIT locally start pump(s).

 FIRE PUMP 0B RUNNING alarm (0-38-B8) - LIT IF power is NOT available to the 0A fire pump, THEN consult TSC to establish a power supply.

2) Stop unsupported DGs and place in - PULL OUT:

 1A DG  2A DG  2B DG

3) Monitor SX flow to 1B DG using:

 1FI-SX133, (401 P10 AB1)

4) Unlock and throttle SX to 1B DG to 600 GPM minimum:

o 1SX057B (401 +5 P10 AB1) Page 7 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

NOTE

• FP header pressures less than 70
• PSIG risk runout of pumps.

   

a. Check running CENT CHG pump(s)

a. Align emergency FP cooling oil temperature(s) - NORMAL per 1/2BOA PRI-7, SX MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT B.

o Computer Group #59

b. Check SX system pressure -

b. Consult TSC to determine GREATER THAN 80 PSIG loads available to throttle or isolate to increase system pressure:

o Establish minimum 600 GPM SX flow to running DG(s): a) Monitor SX flow:  1A DG 1FI-SX132, (401 P-10 AB1)  1B DG 1FI-SX133, (401 P-10 AB1)  2A DG 2FI-SX132, (401 N-25 AB2)  2B DG 2FI-SX133, (401 N-24 AB2) b) Obtain keys and unlock and throttle close: o 1SX057A (Key 1177) (401 +8 P10 AB1) o 1SX057B (Key 1178) (401 +5 P10 AB1) o 2SX057A (Key 2151) (401 +6 Q25 RXB2) o 2SX057B (Key 2152) (401 +5 Q25 RXB2) o Other unrequired SX system loads. Page 8 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

NOTE

• SX return flow may overflow the MDCT *
• to the storm sewer and CROP.

  !

a. Verify CROP level will remain -

a. Operate the diesel CROP LESS THAN OVERFLOW pump as required.

b. Isolate CW blowdown:

 0CW018A  0CW018B

c. Maintain CW flume level -

c. Initiate CW makeup per BOP GREATER THAN 15 FEET CW-9, CIRCULATING WATER MAKE-UP PUMP START-UP Page 9 of 12

  

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

NOTE

• SX will remain unavailable to cool
• Unit-1 and Unit-0 CC HX.

NOTE

• Installation of jumpers may be
• required to support energizing
• necessary equipment.

   

a. Monitor temperatures of running equipment cooled by SX and CC using TABLE A (Next Page)

b. Consult TSC for long term recovery plan

c. Evaluate methods to increase available SX cooling:

o Throttling excess flow to running components o Isolate SX flow to unneeded equipment o Optimize alignment of required equipment

d. Evaluate methods to crosstie Unit-2 CC system to supply cooling to Unit-1 components

e. Evaluate methods of maintaining adequate water supplies:

o Energize makeup equipment o Obtain water from outside supplies

-END-Page 10 of 12 

  

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

TABLE A (PG 1 OF 2) VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURES   &    o RCPs temperature (Computer Groups #10 and #11) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:  RCP Mtr Radial Brng - 195°F  RCP Mtr Thrust Brng - 195°F  RCP Lower Radial Brng - 225°F  RCP Seal Leakoff - 235°F o CENT CHG Pumps temperature (Computer Group #59) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:  Inbd Brng - 205°F  Outbd Brng - 205°F  Thrust Brng - 195°F o SX Pumps temperature (Computer Group #64) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:  Inbd Brng - 175°F  Outbd Brng - 175°F o SI Pumps temperature (Computer Group #52) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:  Inbd Brng - 205°F  Outbd Brng - 205°F  Thrust Brng - 205°F o Motor Driven AF Pump temperatures (Computer Group

1. 74) - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:

 Inbd Brng - 165°F  Outbd Brng - 165°F  Thrust Brng - 165°F Step continued on next page Page 11 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

TABLE A (PG 2 OF 2) VITAL EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURES Step 1 (continued) o Diesel Driven AF Pump temperatures - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:  Maximum temperatures per BOP AF-7T1, DIESEL DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP OPERATING LOG o DGs temperature - LESS THAN MAXIMUM LIMITS:  Maximum temperatures per BOP DG-11T2, DIESEL GENERATOR OPERATING LOG -END-(Final) Page 12 of 12   

      RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE STEP

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 1 of 10 Level 3 - Informational Use PROTECTED EQUIPMENT PROGRAM

1.

PURPOSE 1.1. This procedure provides guidance for protecting equipment in order to minimize plant risk. This involves limiting or prohibiting operation or maintenance of plant equipment when SSCs are made unavailable. 1.2. The intent of protecting systems and components is to provide additional administrative barriers to guard against inadvertently rendering a component or system, which is important to unit risk and nuclear safety, inoperable or unavailable. It is also applicable to those systems and activities that pose a potential risk to generation. 1.3. Protected equipment actions taken in accordance with this procedure support the Configuration Risk Management Program and are classified as risk management actions for the purpose of compliance with 10CFR50.65 (a)(4). Failure to meet the requirements of this procedure is a potential violation of 10CFR50.65 (a)(4). 1.4. This procedure applies to online and shutdown conditions. The online goal is to maintain plant risk within acceptable levels by maintaining defense in depth of key safety functions, preventing inadvertent plant trips, transients, or Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) entries. The shutdown goal is to maintain shutdown risk within acceptable levels by maintaining defense in depth of key safety functions. 1.5. It is acceptable to protect additional equipment at the discretion of the Shift Manager. The Shift Manager has final authority on what equipment will be protected and allowing work on or around protected equipment. 1.6. The intent of this procedure is not to have equipment permanently protected. If a SSC were to become unavailable and the unavailability of the SSC alone causes a red risk condition, then protecting of this equipment under normal plant conditions is not required.

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 2 of 10

2.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 2.1. Key Safety Functions: They are listed as follows: Decay Heat Removal Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (Outage) Inventory Control Electrical Power (includes both onsite & offsite power) Reactivity Control Primary Containment Integrity (Containment Isolation, Containment Pressure and Temperature Control) 2.2. Predetermined Protection Schemes: A standardized protection scheme that uses PARAGON (the Exelon Configuration Risk Management Software) for risk significant SSCs to determine what equipment to protect. Protection schemes for Technical Specifications and unit generation are determined manually by knowledge of Technical Specification requirements and plant operations. Predetermined protection schemes are maintained in either an electronic database or a site specific procedure/T&RM that can be administered by Operations. The use of standardized postings ensures a consistent application of the protected equipment program and reduces work activity conflicts associated with the protected train. 2.3. Protected Equipment: Any SSC which has been identified as being essential to ensure that either defense-in-depth of a Key Safety Function is maintained, unit generation is maintained or overall risk levels are maintained. 2.4. SSC: Structure, System, or Component

3.

RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1. Equipment Operator and / or Reactor Operator Installs protected equipment postings and barriers. Walks down protected equipment postings each shift. 3.2. Shift Supervisor Ensures protected equipment is tracked. 3.3. Shift Manager Has overall authority of the protected equipment program. Authorizes work on or within two feet of protected equipment. Communicates protected equipment status changes to the station duty team and Shutdown Safety Manager (if applicable).

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 3 of 10 3.4. Shutdown Safety Review Board Determines the protected equipment requirements for all scheduled outages based on plant configuration and planned defense-in-depth. 3.5. Work Week Manager and / or Cycle Manager In conjunction with Risk Engineers and Operations Services, determines the protected equipment requirements for all online workweek activities and unplanned outages.

4.

MAIN BODY 4.1. Development of Protected Equipment 4.1.1. The Shutdown Safety Manager or designee determines the protected equipment requirements for all scheduled outages based on plant configuration and planned defense-in-depth. 4.1.2. Outage Management and Operations determines the protected equipment requirements for all unplanned outages. 4.1.3. Online Work Management and Operations determines the protected equipment requirements for all online workweek activities. 4.1.4. Shift Management will promptly determine the systems and components to be protected for emergent issues affecting risk significant SSC availability. 4.2. When to Protect Equipment 4.2.1. When SSCs are planned to or become unavailable, then PROTECT redundant equipment if plant configuration is such that redundant equipment unavailability or manipulation would cause:

1.

An overall online or outage risk assessment change to red risk (CM-2, CM-3, CM-4),

2.

A loss of generation capability of > 20 MWe, or

3.

An entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 (3.0.1 for TMI) or a shutdown Tech Spec LCO of 12 hrs or less. 4.2.2. When SSCs are planned to or become unavailable and overall online or outage risk results in an actual orange or red risk, then PROTECT the redundant SSCs. (CM-2, CM-3, CM-4) 4.2.3. When SSCs are planned to or become unavailable and outage risk for a key safety function results in an actual orange or red risk, then PROTECT the redundant SSCs.

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 4 of 10 4.2.4. When a degrading trend in a critical plant parameter for a SSC has been identified, then PROTECT the redundant SSC if the unavailability of the redundant SSC results in an actual orange or red risk condition. For example, if a site has two fuel pool cooling pumps and the running pump is identified as having an increasing trend in outboard bearing temperature during an outage when increased fuel pool loading exists and a loss of one FPC pump would cause an orange condition, then the redundant fuel pool cooling pump (i.e., pump without the degrading condition) should be protected. 4.2.5. At a minimum, PROTECT the following during outage conditions: (CM-1) One in-service decay heat removal train and required support systems with fuel in the reactor vessel, One reactor inventory make-up train and required support systems with fuel in the reactor vessel, and One spent fuel pool cooling train once core offload starts until the time to boil in the spent fuel pool is greater than 24 hours. 4.2.6. PROTECT equipment as directed by site specific procedures. NOTE: Single components within a switchyard may be protected by locking the switchyard or by flagging off the single component. 4.2.7. When entire switchyards or areas with fences and gates are being protected, then PROTECT the equipment using one of the following two methods: A lock and/or chain different than that used for normal access. A physical barrier placed in front of the gate used for normal access. 4.2.8. When deemed prudent by the Shift Manager, then IMPLEMENT additional equipment protection. 4.2.9. The Shift Manager has final authority in determining systems and equipment to be protected. Adding additional components or modifying where signs / barriers are posted is acceptable provided a reduction in the scope of the protected equipment does not occur. Reducing the scope of protected equipment is not acceptable. 4.3. Posting of Protected Equipment Signs and Robust Barriers 4.3.1. Protected equipment and systems are to be clearly identified in the field to prevent inadvertent work on or near the protected equipment. Physical barriers are to be used whenever possible, particularly in cases where bumping into a component may cause an inadvertent trip or system transient. (CM-1) 4.3.2. Protected equipment postings are to be encompassing enough to alert personnel from all directions. (CM-1)

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 5 of 10 4.3.3. For short duration equipment unavailability, such as surveillance testing of less than one shift (typically less than 8 to 12 hrs), posting is not required. 4.3.4. Relying solely on the work schedule to prevent work on or activity around protected equipment is not acceptable. 4.3.5. PROTECT equipment using at least one of the following posting methods: (CM-1) Barrier rope, devices, or tape that establishes a boundary around the protected equipment with applicable postings to warn personnel of vital information regarding protected equipment status. Placement of highly visible reminders such as little men, orange cones, or easels that can also bear signage to delineate the protected equipment. Reusable laminated signs are also an alternative. Magnetic placards that are placed on breaker doors or panels to mark the protected equipment. Barrier rope, physical devices, tape and other similar devices or door handle covers for room doors. Protective Covers (clamshells, plastic cylinders or rings) may be placed over devices that should not be manipulated, as long as operability is not affected. 4.3.6. WHEN equipment protection is required, THEN POST the following: The equipment being protected, Main power supply feed breaker or driving force supply isolation valve, and Instrumentation, which if tripped, would render the protected equipment unavailable. Consider both the transmitters and the associated trip units. 4.3.7. The following considerations and examples should also be evaluated when protecting equipment: For extent of protection, barriers must extend back at least one component. For example:

• Concerning pumps, the local and remote control switches, the pump general area, the power supply (i.e. back to the pump feeder breaker),

specific instruments (or instrument racks as appropriate) that could cause a pump trip, and support systems (e.g. cooling water) back to the first isolation valve from the pump.

• For valves, the local and remote control switches, the valve general area, the valve driving force (i.e. main power supply feed breaker or air supply isolation valve), and interlocked valves (i.e. valves that when stroked could cause the valve being protected to change position).

During outage conditions, extent of protection for a decay heat removal train and an inventory make-up train must extend back to an available offsite feed and an available emergency feed. Additionally, a train of support systems must be protected. For example:

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 6 of 10

• For a decay heat removal pump, in addition to what is stated in the above bullet under pumps, also include the bus, one normal electrical supply feed and one emergency electrical supply feed to the bus (including the emergency diesel generator), a heat exchanger cooling water supply pump and control, associated trip instrumentation of the power supply and cooling water pump.

Concerning electrical buses, load centers and MCC's:

• When protecting a breaker on a bus, load center or MCC, protecting an entire bus, load center or MCC is an acceptable method of protection.

However, work on individual breaker compartments, when the entire bus, load center or MCC is protected, should not be allowed.

• If an entire bus, load center or MCC is protected, then racking breakers in on that bus, load center or MCC is not permitted unless step 4.4.3 is followed. Racking out or removing breakers is permitted provided a procedure is used and a pre-job brief has been performed in accordance with HU-AA-1211.
• If an entire bus, load center or MCC is not protected but a single breaker on the bus, load center or MCC is protected, then breaker compartment work that could in no way affect the entire bus is permissible when individual breakers are protected. For example, a compartment elevator inspection would be allowed, but breaker relay trip testing would not be allowed as a human performance issue could lead to a bus trip.

For large components, consider posting room doors or general area ingress. When protecting an entire system, consider placing barriers on control panel controls, in front of room/area ingress points, in front of the main load center under which a majority of the breakers are located, and around instrument racks that provide system trips. CAUTION Though a consistent list of protected equipment when taking an SSC out of service is desirable, additional SSCs that may also be out of service at the same have the potential to increase the list of protected equipment. The configuration specific results must be reviewed to validate the protected equipment list. 4.3.8. UTILIZE predetermined protection schemes (if available).

1.

Deletion of elements from the predetermined protection scheme must be approved by the Shift Manager and must be covered by another posting method.

2.

More extensive postings must include all elements of the predetermined protection scheme.

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 7 of 10 4.4. Work on or Near Protected Equipment (CM-1) 4.4.1. Generally, work on or within 2 feet of protected equipment will not be allowed. Exceptions to this rule are as follows: Operator performing rounds, inspections, and alarm response. Fire Brigade Members and the Medical Response Team during response to emergencies. Personnel performing Abnormal Operating Procedures / Emergency Operating Procedures / Emergency Plan actions. Security Officers who have received an appropriate brief from Shift Management and are performing their official rounds or alarm response. Radiation Protection personnel performing non-intrusive radiological surveys and are responding to radiation alarms / changing plant conditions. Fire Patrols who have received an appropriate brief from Shift Management and are performing their official duties. Electrical and instrument maintenance activities on loads supplied by protected switchgear, load control center, or vital instrument busses provided that the load is isolated from the protected equipment by a clearance or over-current protection (e.g. fuse or breaker) is available to isolate the protected power supply from equipment fault or personnel error at an energized work location. Changing burned out light bulbs. Other activities as approved by the Shift Manager. NOTE: It is understood that emergent equipment failures may occur and a required surveillance test may need to be performed on the protected equipment to prevent the test from becoming overdue. Planned system or component outages should take into account protected equipment requirements and the surveillance test schedule prior to removing the equipment from service. 4.4.2. The following evolutions should not be performed on protected equipment: Corrective or elective maintenance, Preventative maintenance which is intrusive in nature, Preventative maintenance or non-critical surveillance testing where an unsatisfactory outcome could render the equipment unavailable, Any evolution where human performance error could result in damage to or loss of the protected equipment unless the Shift Manager agrees there is reasonable assurance that no adverse effects could occur, Equipment or system operation which renders the protected equipment unavailable, or Work on electrical sources that could fault switchgear or load control centers.

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 8 of 10 4.4.3. If work on protected equipment is absolutely required, then COMPLY with the following: Work must be authorized by the Shift Manager, Work group will receive a protected equipment pre-job briefing from the Shift

Manager, Discuss the conditions that would make the protected equipment being worked on unavailable. Identify barriers in the planned work that will prevent the equipment from becoming unavailable, Continuous work group supervisory oversight of the work activity, Operations will consider whether additional posting is required due to work in the area, and Operations supervision will provide periodic monitoring of work in the affected area.

4.4.4. If work within 2 feet of protected equipment is absolutely required, then COMPLY with the following: Work must be authorized by the Shift Manager, Work group will receive a protected equipment pre-job briefing from the Shift

Manager, Discuss the conditions that would make the protected equipment become unavailable. Identify barriers in the planned work that will prevent the equipment from becoming unavailable, Periodic work group supervisory oversight of the work activity, and Operations will consider whether additional posting is required due to work in the area.

4.5. Protected Equipment Tracking Sheets 4.5.1. TRACK protected equipment using a tracking log. 4.5.2. The tracking log may be hard copy or electronic facsimile and has no retention requirements. 4.5.3. The tracking log will be completed by Operations and it shall contain the following minimum information: Equipment number or noun name Location and type of posting device Installation check-off information Removal check-off information

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 9 of 10 4.6. Protected Equipment Verification and Communication (CM-1) 4.6.1. WALKDOWN protected equipment postings during rounds and VERIFY the following:

1.

The postings remain properly established.

2.

No unauthorized work is being performed on or within 2 feet of the protected equipment.

3.

There is nothing in the area (e.g., scaffolding) that could interfere with the functioning of the protected equipment. 4.6.2. ENSURE frequent communications to station and supplemental workers identify the status of protected equipment and any planned protected equipment changes. 4.6.3. REVIEW protected equipment at the following meetings or briefings: Operations shift turnover meetings Daily / shiftly standard department (including contractors) briefings Daily POD meeting Shiftly Outage briefings Daily Online Work Control meetings 4.6.4. COMMUNICATE protected equipment status changes and emergent conditions requiring equipment to be protected to station and supplemental workers.

1.

Communications may include a plant PA announcement. 4.6.5. COMMUNICATE switchyard protected equipment to the Transmission Operator and INFORM them that the protected equipment is considered vital and no actions should be performed that could jeopardize power availability.

5.

DOCUMENTATION 5.1. None

6.

REFERENCES 6.1. Commitments 6.1.1. CM-1: INPO SOER 09-1, Shutdown Safety (Steps 4.2.5, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.5, 4.4, 4.6) 6.1.2. CM-2: Braidwood License Amendment #108 (Steps 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2) 6.1.3. CM-3: Byron License Amendment #114 (Steps 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2) 6.1.4. CM-4: Clinton License Amendment #141 (Steps 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2)

OP-AA-108-117 Revision 0 Page 10 of 10 6.2. Procedures 6.2.1. HU-AA-1211, Briefings - Pre-Job, Heightened Level of Awareness, Infrequent Plant Activity and Post-Job Briefings 6.2.2. OU-AA-103, Shutdown Safety Management Program 6.2.3. WC-AA-101, Online Work Control Process

7.

ATTACHMENTS 7.1. None

ATTACHMENT 4 SX System Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams List of Attached Documents 1. M*42, Sheet 1A, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AN 2. M-42, Sheet 18, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AN 3. M-42, Sheet 2A, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AW 4. M-42, Sheet 28, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AW 5. M-42, Sheet 3, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AZ 6. M-42, Sheet 4, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AN 7. M-42, Sheet 5A, "Diagram of Essential Service Water (Primary Containment Vent System)," Revision AE 8. M-42, Sheet 58, "Diagram of Essential Service Water (Primary Containment Vent System)," Revision AE 9. M-42, Sheet 6, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AZ

10. M-42, Sheet 7, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AE

11. M-126, Sheet 1, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AZ

12. M-126, Sheet 2, "Diagram of Essential Service Water," Revision AD

13. M-126, Sheet 3, "Diagram of Essential Service Water (Primary Containment Ventilation System)," Revision AE

I I I I E: I I I I I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER NOTES:

4. FLOW ELEMENT IS CLAMP MOUNTED I

I DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS I CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE I. ALL PIPING IS CATEGORY I QUALITY GROUP C. EXCEPT AS NOTED.

2. ALL PIPING IS PER PIPING' DESIGN TABLE 105B8.

EXCEPT AS NOTED.

3. SEE DRAWING 1.4-82 FOR ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP DRAINS.

5. POWER-LOCK-OUT SHALL BE IN EFFECT DURING ALL

-NORMALN O~ERATING MabES. POWER SHALL BE RECON~ECTED ONLY WHEN SUCH POWER RESTORATION IS SPECIFICALLY ALLOWED BY PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES OR TECHNICAL SPECI FI CATIONS.

6. THE PREFERRED FLOW ORIENTATION OF THIS VALVE IS TOWARDS THE STRAINER.

7. STAINLESS STEEL VALVE PER DESIGN TABLE 140BB.

CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I _____ 1 J REVR. APPR. PREP. EDSF EDSF EDSF Isxoll 2 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/21/98 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN f;D~RA~W~N~BY~:~8H~D~=1::;;::::_:::=~_:;_7:.,r.:::'::_~+~ ON THIS DRAWING -':ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

1A SIZE: F M05 I .1 ISXOI DESCRIPTION 2SX41 I UNIT 0 COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER --(r.02§S~XQ]02~DC~:3@O~~"'~*lj 2A ~ 7 E8 FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC# 357827 U N C> ><:g .12SX41 DATE EDSF 2SX40 B ron AN III N ~Ir REV 25X 005-2 E22 ~ ~ 12PM06J Me ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP-2B CUBICLE COOLER --(r;2~s~xDI6~A~B=:13)-o""::'\\J~.u 2A ~ C-B -- 3 TRAIN "B" HEAT EXCHANGER UNIT-2 20).~-h~6-1 15XOI I TRAIN lOB" HEAT EXCHANGER UNIT-I 20).~M-42-3 7 C4 .1 ISXOI EI2 TO BYPASS t 2SX036 VALV~ OSXI62B NOTE 7 s~1~1

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3 ~~

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"-f 2SX I 41 B I I 2SX I 42B ~

~ ~ '~ ~~ 2SXI39B1 ~2SX86BB I)?) E22 IISXI93B~ ~ 7 (ISXC9BB 4~~ ~~ 1 1SXOIIolB ~ = ,:;~ ~ III II) ~ ISXI398 I ~ISX86BB II?) EI2 2PI SX020 IPI SX020 1SX23 T ---... 6 I I ESSENTIAL SERVICE _ATER PUMP ISXOIPB-2 IB ESF LOGIC >>----1 ESF LOGIC a-l HsEI2 I S)(002 IPM06J I IS::~2r i 2PM06J I ~ 2S.21 I l r<~2~S~XC~6~A==~24~~) 36-X30- 'I 2SX20 II I R£D.~ / i 'f~ J' 36NX2~1 H~ REO.;;: r 1 CD ESS£NTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP' ~ 2SX~I:B-2 ~ ID In III II) ~ PS 2G--- CAL ESS. SW. SUMP "B-2~ A-703 T7 83 F2965 I 05BB ~ ~ IWE009B I -(IWE$9AB E22 Is:~~. I I 2PM06J --!:1 M 22 MO II ~ 2SX 1_ T22PPLLl05J 001 B-2 II 7 II 2SX20 I It "'1 II P.l.O. Dr I NOTE 5 I

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---

......L--------

r<ISXC6A 24) I I C.p I"'"":"':=....-ri~....- I' -T 15X22 (1SX84BB 4~ 1SX22 III / 11..- .....,/-1 J.~. _..'36-X2';::L -. \\ P.L.O. U1 I I 36-X30-~..J RED.:rr NOTE 5 I F2865 105B'B.A RED.'J I SX002B i ~ --~~I' ~~ ISXI3SB 1 ~I ID ED o II) ~ mm o V) N OPSOl38 I TURBINE BtJILDING TURBINE BUILDING BASEMENT ~ (EMBEDDED) HIGH POINT VALVE 1":'1 OUTDOORS ED V) ~ )M-68 -3 "\\....>--,r.L-I_.fA~-4-. rOPs'::. ~.~ /~ I OSXI75B J~~ ~ 1058B ~ ....--I~ ESSENTI AL SERVI CE ~ l \\ WATER COOLING T I TOWER-DB "'M-C 423-6 ~-O""'SX-O-'",-g- >- ~S-X36" / /" V RED. <TYP. ) AUXILIARY BUILDING 8 E B o c I-I I I I I I I F I I I I I I I I I A I I I I I I L

I I I I E: I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I D I I I I I I

---

l I

I I I I I F I I I I I 1 DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER NOTE: FOR GENERAL NOTES SEE M-42-IA. I I I I AI I I I SCALE

NONE CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I

1 J PREP. REVR. APPR. EDSF EDSF EDSF ISX41 I 2 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/22/98 M-42 I

EQUIPM ENT IS SHOWN ~D~RA~W~N~BY~:~BH~D=:==I;:~~:::~~~;=--r::~::-;~77;;~ ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

1B SEE: F M05 I ISX41 DESCRIPTION ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP-2A CUBICLE COOLER r-- .....~"-M~.,. 2B ~ / C8 I""l ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP-I A CUBICLE COOLER ..._---....-'-.MiJ**

• 2B

)l ~ E-8 I"'l I SX40 I SX40 I -cxtil r-- III N X I/) FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC #362876 VI -IN ~u. I ?'\\ DATE B ron AN EDSF REV MO ISX 033-1 3 TRAIN MA" HEAT EXCHANGER UNlT-2 20).~-126-1 r7 F5 TRAIN "A" HEAT EXCHANGER UNIT-I 20~SM-42-3 "7 F4 r 2SX25 2SX26 I I SX25 I SX25 l_ _____~ 1_ __ __ 2 _ B E21 8 HS 1010 ~ SX027 2SX ~ ~ 033-1 I T N 2PM06J .I ,-------... /0 ~ ( 2SX13A 36').-/' 1-VI -...;;;.;~..;;.;..;.-..-;;..;~ 'N ~u." NOTE 4 E21 E21 B NOTE 4 ,....(2SX04AA -(ISX04AA ] 1FE SX146 OTEW SX092 OTS SX092 DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING TURB. BLDG. BASEMENT 2FE SX146 8) OSXI76 h L..-...-__-I L'-"t4~ HIGH POINT f ~ VENT l(OSXB1AA 3{4 PT 28 ~~r-----....., ~ ISXI44A '":t Ell I"'l I SX04 4 4 TO BYPASS VALVE-OSXI62C <M-~22-7 ~_ PT 2A ~-- IAL AUX. BLDG. :-I-I I I I I I I I'*" -" I SX93BA 7 MO 2SX 150A 12 HVDRA -STOPt FITTING 1058B 100BB ~~ I 2SXI42A ~ I ~ I""l ~ I/) N J ~~ I~ ISXI42A ~ I"'l ~-~--...,___...J (OSX99AA AH POlS 18 POlS I--_I_A~I"-----'-1 AH I I 2WEOIOA I-I I WEOI OA 1-5 5 ~~~---. ~ ISXI41A t .... 1 2SXII 2CF6501 NPS-Ill I SX I I I CF650 I NPS-9T 2WE82BA 2 en (.) VI N

=

~ (.) VI ~ ~ ITW ~ ~ I SX025 ? Y ~ , 1--0' I SX0 I 2A ~ EI r ~ :: ~ I~ ~ MO 8 HS I/) "-{ISXC9CA 6 T ) [><...I,~'S_X_25__I-__""';"_-f,r_.....JJ__~_T""";L_T<Iill~LJ[} ""~ ~~ ISX ~. SX029 UNIT I 'I ~ 004-1 COMPONENT ~ I SX02AA 36 1 I PM06J COOLI NG WATER I ISX21 I HEAT EXCHANGER ~~eNX3'" ISXI43A ~~ ~ IRED ...__tIooo-_--4\\L ---<I~m~:::]Q}---7-----+~'\\..~U-42 - 28 ( R 3 ((NOTE 9) ~II Ell TO BYPASS r ISX02B 30 / 08 'WE 1AA ~~ T 0- ~ ~ I .J\\. VALVE-OSXI62A TEWIT OTEW OTS __ *.-J M-42-7) r I SX25 I SX2S1 ~ Q) ~ 3A i\\ SX090 SX090 I BI ESSENTIAL SERVICE ,r- ~ hAHLI \\ WATER STRAINER-IA ~ I ISXOIFA-I CD ~ A'C~ L __ ~"':;:,~:='x---l ~ 3"X2'" ~v 150A ~ RED.\\ CD \\ I ~

!W-"

r-J-(I WE82BA 2 )1----...

OB

h 90BB SODIUM (2CF53CA 4}--- HYPOCHLORITE SUPPLY /M-SI -3A7 A ,r EI

oatl~oBB SODIUM

(,...i.... CF=5~3....CA-- 4)-- HYPOCHLORITE SUPPLY ,r * (M-5~ 1-31\\( 24 J I 2SXI92A E21 I I SXI92A ~2SX86AB II?) 2SXOIFA-1 r 2SXI93A ~ -~-W (2SXC9BA 4~~ u r 2SXOIMA ~ I ISXI93A ~ - -w (ISXC9BA 4~L (.) I ISXOIMA~. 2PI SXOl9 r(2SXC5A 2SX23 ISX21 6 6 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP 2SXOIPA-1 2A ESF LOGIC >--\\ E21 I ESF LOGIC >--l Ell I ---IH~S--' 2 ESS. SW. SUMP "'AM 7 7 2WE8*9AA ESS. SW. SUMP "A" --<-I-W-E8-9-AA--2......H A-Z603 2SX 001 A-I I SX 001 A-I E21 Ell ---IH-S---' SXOl7 IPM06J 2HS SXOl7 12PM06J 1----\\1 ~Ell r IHS \\ SXOOI ~~ IPM06J I T!PL04J ~ ir------I.....-----~ f:,'SXC5A 24) CAP --11 36"'X30" -I I SX20 I (, SX84BA 4~ I SX20,- !I RED. ~ /' ..... I ....--....f~ I '--~n....' 36"X24=1 "'\\ L P. L.O. I 1 RED. ~ \\.i I SX002A NOTE 5 F286~ 1058B ~ I ~ ~ I I I -lG g I ESSENTI AL SERVI CE ~~ ~ WATER PUMP

g ISXOIPA-I-i IA

~ ISX139A 1 I ~---IS-X-13-8-A"""1 ~I SXB6AB 1/2 ) 'l L I Ell ~ PS IPI 2E SXOlg I WE:009Al CAL c( 10 C XIII 2HS ~21 SXOOI ~ 2PM06J I 1I2PL04J I II,..-------&....-.----I II 'I 2SX22 2SX22~-* ~ - ~I 36"'X30'" RED. --'1. / 1...-. ~-~--_~~~l~~I_-_~__~~--~-~~~~~ 36~24~ I I P. L. O. QI I I RED. ~ NOTE 5 I F286§ 105BB ~ ~ I"'l I I ~ GO XI/) N ~/'i 2SX139A 1 ESSENTIAL SERVICE ~Jr. WATER STRAINER-2A 10 o X VI N \\, TURBINE BUILDING 8NIMV~O ~OO~ lO~lNOJ lVJI1I~J 8 8 HIGH POINT VENT r.1~ OPSOl3A I ~~ OUTDOORS ~ VI ~ )M-~~ -:5 '\\. _I f><}:::1--~ (oPS11AA ~4~ / I OSXI75A ~~Js> ~ '05BB : .....t--- GO ~ I ESSENTJ AL SERV I CE ~..i WATER COOLING T r~ TOWER-OA ~~~~~_.....J 4e"'X36'" >M-~~-D>-<OSXOI AA 48 V RED. (TYP. ) TURBINE t AUXILIARY BUILDING BUILDING BASEMENT (EMBEDDED) A E B D c I I I I I I I I I I I L I-I I I I I I I F I I I I

I I I I E: I I I I I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I MO 2SX 136-2 E22 I S~~~1 I 2PM06J I I

---

l I

I I I I I F I I I I I I}-- N V m rrlox Vl N 1 E22 !S:~:O I 2PM06J \\OSX 242 17 I / MO --,\\.I~ \\}-1---'-2S"'--X--I 011-2 lJ) rrlax Vl N V lD N IN:i v j", DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER 36" DIA. LINE IL STOP Ii CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I 1 J I I MO 1SX 136-2 E12 ~ HS SX051 1PM06J REVR. APPR. N V X Vl ~ NOTES: I.UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ALL PIPING IS SAFETY CATEGORY I. QUALI TY GROUP C. 2.SPEC.F2865 OUTDOOR HEADERS. j.UNLESS OTHERwISE INDICATED ALL PIPING ON THIS DRAWING IS PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 105BB.

4. VALVE EQUIPPED WITH A ROTATIONAL STOP TO LIMIT FLOW. SEE DWG. F-2918-2 SD-C-109231.

5. VALVE INTERNALS REMOVED.

6. STAINLESS STEEL VALVE PER DESIGN TABLE 0140BB.

PREP. EDSF EDSF EDSF ~, NOTE 6 I~~ I 1SX266B ~ (1 SX99AB 1")- tT ~NOTE 6(}

L I

I 1SX265B V / (1SXL1AB 4" 2SX I 16B I (SEE NOTE 5) 2 I I DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS I CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/22/98 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ~D~RA~W~N~BY~:~8H~D==~~:-:;:::~~~~-r:;~~rl77;;~ ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

S040 SHEET NUMBER:

2A SIZE: F M05 I DESCRIPTION E22 EI2 2FI SX042 FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC# 367626 DATE I~ B ron AW EDSF REV v ~ 2sx046Bl ~ 2SXBIAB 3 __ _1_ __ __ 2 _ -cox III I r1 I SX046B I ~- l " 2SX200B' I ISX200D I ISX200B I 2SX94BA (l) ~ ~x (/) N I SX94BA ~SX94DA I~ 'y 2SX200D ~ 3 3 E22 EI2 2FE SX042 IFE SX042 I 1SX275B NOTE 6 EI2 G:} HS MO OSX SX094 146-12 IPM06J E22 ~ HS MO OSX 'C-..::O::.;:S:.:.X.:..:,H.:..:9::.:A..:..---:3:::.,...}-- SX095 147-22 2PM06J 1 @~~==:}Q}--r--(:O:S:x:J:1:A:::~3:}---1 t \\~ ~ OSX24A 30

OSX 241 ~

No X III C t-- 0"1 X III C B 0105BB 2TE SX181 EI2 MO OHS OSX ~- SX051 007-12 3 "X 2" ---"-0"1-' RED. ~ Vl ~ 3"X 2" RED. 2 2\\-..r::} 2 TRAIN "B" HEAT EXCHANGERS UNIT I ~- ~~ - 3 ~-~,-'1Ii5S;XXOO7i7HftlB~2i20()))-- 0140BB 4 4 SCH. 80 PIPE I ISX2179B ~ ISXA7AB 3/4~ 0105BB NOTE 4 2SX2158B I 2SXI7AB NOTE 4 2SX2158D I 2SXI7AD ISX2158B I ISXI7AB ISX2158D I ISXI7AD E12/22 12SX2i79B ~ 1~2SXA7AB 3/4 ~ I\\-{) OTEW SX045 0140BB B SCH. 80 PIPE OT! SX045 2SX991 ..-( 2SXF2AB .....c., SXF2AB ~ "ly-i ISXI16B 1 ~ 1 (SEE NOTE 5) p.--+-----'..--------~-t-f'o\\hr:_.J)--....-------~t~--L:...-;.J..----.Jtl-------(]0~S~XO~3~A~::::}3Q:0,..-- -.1 30"X 24" RED. ( TYP. 2 PLACES) 2SXOIAB ISX971 ISXOIAB OCCOIA 5 5 TRAIN '"BN HEAT EXCHANGERS UNIT 2 .t.-~ ~6 - I >t--C2~s~x:Q0117HffiBC220Q))-- II SX96 _ !2SX98 B 12SX41 ~~ IISX27 Isx021 COMPONENT CO(LI NO HEAT EXCHANGER 2TE SX180 ......I-:S'-X_F-:IA-:B,--_I../~lIi 2VAOJ S~-2BI 2~NX 2" ,2YzNX 2N RED. IIL/\\TlI RED. 01-iiiiii--_"'o(c...J:l~ LDLlJ tCJ-....---~-; 1-2-S-X4-2-" 1 1 1 I 1 2~X 2": 2~NX 2" RED. J[hB] RED. (:2~s~xII~6B~B[===2~>=""'=T'IIIIl:::::~ r-IJoo"'--_~'O 12SX41 1-----------1 2sx421 ESSENTJAL SERVICE WATER PU~ 28 CUBICLE Coa..ER IVAOISB-IB 2~NX 2N 2Y-"X 2N 2 -;.I-R_E_D........c=:D\\t{]:JRE.D... _ /2SX40: 2SX431_~ I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 2~NX 2":

2~"X 2" RED.

D\\t{]:RED' (iCl~S~XC[1~6;:;;B~B~===;:;-2=...)=.-=r-<r1-!

hl~""---",,-;' r -12SX40 1-----------1 1-2-SX-4--'31 ESSENTIAL SERYICE WATER PUM' 18 CUBICLE COOlER 2 2 OSXI67B 1 r2SX2157D r,SX2157D 3 N X 2" RED. 2SXI6BD ISXI6BD 0140BB SCH. 80 PIPE \\2SX2157B rlSX2157B 6 6 ~ISX2180B o I SXA8AB uW J", co ~ ~ co Il'la 0105BB '0 oto X Vl I

-[2SX21 80B

~@o '-t-

~2~S~XA~8~A~BC=J3~/4L~~(

::r--H02~S~X~FII A~BC=DI,.

~_--'-_~---=0:"-:1-=:0'::::-5:::':BB::...,~_1~ 0140B8 I SX6001 SCH. 80 PIPE a rrl X Vl C\\I E12/E22 ~ RESIDUAL CHLORINE ANALYZER M-51 -4:L/~--~0~s~x~cDIB~B[JIQI~ h)-- B7 OSX050B I _ II SXO I I SX27 'C( co FT! 8C 7 7 CO~ CO Il'l a I OSX050A ~ \\"X ~N RED. I ( TYP. 4 PLACES) ~ HIGH POINT VENT m ~rOPS012B ~~ SUBSTRUCTURE TURBINE BUILDING eJPI PS151 8NIMV~O ~OO~ lO~lNOJ lVJIII~J 8 12SX41 2SX411 ~ ~ !ZSX40 zsx401 OUTDOORS @2SX032SX031 ~ rl SX24 I SX241 1--~~"""\\---1::f-I~~-,-,-~--1-,-,(~1--",S_X1--,1 B TEWIT OTW r-NOTE 6 ---....r-v- ---.~ 4B \\ SX043 co d 1SX271B I r '-/ v m f-- ~ V' V' V' V' NOTE 6 TRAIN "BN ~ u ( II I 2SX266B ~r.1, X \\---.tlll----------------' ESSENTl AL ~ Vl ~ F-2865 I 05BB rrl ~ SERVICE WATER Vl I Y x 0 C\\I NOTE 6 ( ~ RETURN HEADER y I I ~ ~ ~ 2SX271 B I 2SX99AB_ 1" '\\ .~~ M-42 -7~7:-__tlt-------'-I----t'--~~-----....I.----------- ....,~...------"------- ..L ~~:::t_.:;.:=::A.::~'-...A~:;;;-;;;.A.~=:.... ~@[KQ~C3[)_--~:::.:::::.::::.-A~,,~~~~1__D__J AI.::::. OSX03CB 48 ~ I ~ AUXILIARY BUILDING 48"X 42" I I sx021 ED 1 R I 1 I 1 I,."I" ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SUPPLY >M-~~.-I~>--....,~---Q2~S~xII ~6A~BC=3D----------------------T-.J---D... -"":~o 3 N X 2" RED. C\\I C\\I X x ESSENT I AL III III I SERVICE ~ 0 WATER SUPPLY 2SX5C 1 1 12sx6c )M-:f-I~>---------------.:::=:::::[==g3=:::::=t-------------(]o~s~xQo2~DC=3~0D--------1---J ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SUPPLY >M-~~-If'>--~~---(JI]S~xII6~A~BC=3D----------------------T-...I---D---~o I 0PS350B cD (0PS37BA Y'~o I ~ o ~-~~ - 3~<~--l-....rrO)i:P;C;S:11R6AARB:3~JV4;;"\\r1 rOSX173B ( B A o E c I I I I I I I I I I I C:\\WINNl\\TEMP\\B900e54e80bfb781.dwg 8 L 4/8/2BB8 7:36 PM Plotted on 4/8/2BBB 7:36 PM I-I I I I I I I F I I I I

I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I I I E I I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I -- -- -- l I I I I I I F I I I I I MO 25X 010-2 E22 2HS SlC049 12PM06J l 1 113 ",o )( V1 N N.. i2SX62 DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ~ 7 48"X 42-REO. I I DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS I CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I

_____ 1 J MO MO REVR. APPR. I SX 011 -2 ISX 010-2 FOR NOTES SEE DWG. M-42 SHT. 2A PREP. EDSF EDSF EDSF 30 NOTE 6 =::Lr7 I 1SX265A V ~, (1 SXL1M 4" I~~ NOTE 6 I 1SX266A r---- T ( 1SX99M 1") / 2 2 EI2 ~ HS SX049 IPM06J NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/22/98 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN tD~RA~W~N~BY~:B~H~D~=1=~",,:,=~----::;i:""~~7-b';;71 ON THIS DRAWING fORGo BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

28 SIZE: F M05 I ISX03A DESCRIPTION E21 Ell 1Ft SX037 FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC# 360951 ISX046A I DATE AW EDSF REV --1-- "-.r-f ISX I 16A I .~ (SEE NOTE 5) TRAIN "A-HEAT EXCHANGERS UNIT I ~@IS~X:Q:07~H~A~]2@0)_-</ M-ri:-3< ~ \\c2SX94AA In ~ 2SX200A 1 ISX94CA 1.Ii J; ISX200A 1 ~.., ISX94AA Ih I~ Ell ~ 3 3 IFE 5X031 I 1SX275A NOTE 6 B E21. 2HS ~ SX049 ~' ~-~ -r...... lk1SX11A 3"HX~ ~r NOTE 6

• ~

1SX271A I MO 2TE SX179 MO 25)( 007-1 ISX 007-1 2 2......-- 3"X 2-REO. 0105BB 4 4 NOTE... 25X2158C I 2SXI7AC Ell 2TEW SX032 IlEW 5X032 12SX I 0 2SX24 B TRAIN "A" HEAT EXCHANGERS UNIT 2 ~- ~~6-T/>t-~2S~X~O!!7ffiHACJ2~oD~ 2T1 5)(032 ITI SX032 15)(01 AA SCH. 80 PIPE IceOIA 1 5 5 2VAOI SA-2AI 2~~X 2-2~"X 2-

J-,;;;;;;;____R_ED_.+Oc--"'

J1Ff7\\:fi ~E1>.

~~ ~r:1)oo+---~. 115X41: 25)tG21 2FI 5X031 EI2 ~ ""'~ 2SX94CA 112 ~ NOTE 4 I HS 2~"X 2 -:

2~H)( 2"

~ 25X21 58A 1 2SX200C 1 SX050 RElJ.

];L3J: RED.

I PM06J (:2~5~xII~6;:-;:B~AC~~I2""---:---i.L---< -r--i~ r-,.1'""---.(,.!,!J--C2~s~xII 7!1A~A~:12~....... ~J-....;!;;;.T"'------.::'"'I~11~,...-------D*~~~-----~~m~C=:JV---- I I- ~\\.....----. 25X81 AA 3) I I 3H X 2 H ~~ 115X41 2SX621 RED ~ ESSENTIAL SERVICE ~ E21 2SX046A 1 3Sij 16A I WATER PU~ 2A c: 2FE (SEE NOTE 5) 5X037 CuBICLE COOLER 2 1 25X2179Al"-\\ 3/4)-<::K)sXFIAA I~ N"1 fl-<2SXF2AA I -e 2SXA7AA 3/4~ ~\\ ISX991.~---.."....,"Vtt§ 0140BB 0105BB 25)(0 I AA SCH. 80 PIPE .A '8-E2I 125X2157C 2SXI6BC 0140BB 0140BB SCH. 80 PIPE SCH. 80 PIPE OSXI61A I en )( VI ...=. .F2SX2180A I o H:2SXA8AA .F I5X21 80A I I ISX21 19A ~ L~~*'-11-{jJ15~X~A~8~AAL=J:~/4~~-...:-r::: ~:JI]S~XF~I~A~A=::J)I')-H ~ ~~(JJIS~X~F!2A~AC:=JI)...... -~:.~-CDIS~X~A1:7A~AC=3~/4L~~~*~ I"X \\- \\ I"X \\.. REO. IISX94 ISX951 RED. 0140BB 0105BB 0105BB 6 6 ~-152-4 "7 A2 I .J I suol _ EII/E21 2SX050B 15)(0508 I~ oCm N)( II) j ~J,n I~ RESIDUAL CHLORINE ANALYZER M-5 1-42/;';'__(]0~S!!X£C1!]8~A:I13Ibi).... C1 ~ FTI 88 F'Tl 8A I~ N)( VI I~ -i OS)(I14 I

"~OO~S[EX!A7UAC=

II0Q)i)-

L.C 7 7 i 2SX050o\\ ~~ I ISX050A.f'-\\~ \\ .. )( ~H RED.~_ I CTYP.4 PLACES) lIlll1 \\"'X ~.. RED.~J (TYP 4 PLACES) ~ SUBSTRUCTURE c.. 1 " X 3/.." REO. HIGH POINT VENT rf'1 l( \\ - ~ OPS028 rOPS012A ~ ~OPS33A 314) TURBINE BUILDING (OPS1eAA 3/.). OPS16AA 3"'"'\\-_~ IOSX'73A~ W I~ ISX021 8NIMV~O ~OO~ lO~lNOJ lVJIII~J 0PI PS150 8 8 OUTDOORS -e ,4 1- !N N ESSENT IAL j ~: ~ SERVI CE ~ I ,r1 2CCOI AI WATER SUPPLY 2SX3CI 1. 2SX4C I L-~~_i~>-----------------~~~:::C~8:::~~~-----------<J2~S~XO~2~BC:=J3@0')_------~..:"'T~-jc....,AJ...--.-,.....,....

....----......---...-----tDF"'i.r\\'::

2SX03A

30 1

_ ~ 15X021_ ~~:::: 30"X 24.~'~R::ED:-.--------------------<ill:@C~Q)------- =~ ')( (TYP.2 PLACES) ~S.E..!.L... COMPONENT COOL INO V1 HEAT EXCHANGER -e I F 1RE PROTECTI ON C';" OSXC6A 4)-- OSX 112 SYSTEM ~L:;j

• ~ OSX! 88 1

1o....((]0~5~X~A~4AC:=JI~O~_;-- ~-(J0~F~P~O~1~A=Jl[f0D----..;~~M. ~~ -I ~ L.C. I $X33 I FP06l F1RE PROTEC'TION SYSTEM M-~~ -1~~~_---.....OO2!F!P~S5~AC:JI]0>--------1 ESSENTIAL SERVICE '( WATER SUPPLY I sX3CI 1 1 II SX4C ~M-~~-~>-----------------...::~~~c::;;;e::~~~_r~--------~OI[]S[EXQ]02[iBC:=J3@0~------;-~: ~~ ....Ir ---'-:.-::1~, o It'I 115X2S" 15X02-' 30"X 24" RED. ~ (TYP.2 PLACES) ~ 2TE B COMPONENT COOL I NG SX178.....---...., HEAT EXCHANGER TEWIT OTW 4A ~ SX042 4; c f--- I 4; TRAIN -A- ~ u ESSENTI AL C )( ~o ~o )( I II) F-2865 105BB SERVICE WATER ~ ~ N RETURN HEADER ~ I ~ ~ M-42-T~7:---tr------..l----t----:-----""*----------.a.* L.. (Q]m~c~!>_----------...---...:I:=N:.--------....:::=t.-------------- RI ~ OSX03CA 48 ~ AUXILIARY BUILDING r11 VAal SA-~I.r1SX07MBl II SX2157C~ ~a;~T$~(----------~IL'. ~~I:-::S~X2~1:-::5~8-=-C..,1 1-<I,]S!X,D6~B@c==:I2>_~~;)*--~.::~T~::;[f\\/'{]~ ..... i ISXI7AC 2 II SX40: II SX621 I I I I I I V I1SX07MA I , I I 2~")( 2"1 I r1,.....,....",.---~....,1 REl>.(TYP>' I d ~ 15X2158A (TIl5~X[1ID6B~A[==12..,.'\\.:--~i..L--.-("ri_!~ [}\\/"{] I:~ 'JJ-i I SX 11AA 115X40 .... ------- __ :.J I SX621 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP IA CUBICLE COOLER I 0PS350A (.PS37M V'~O I ~68-3/ F3 8Z 'lHS Zt-V'-J B c E o I I I I I A I I I I I I L_ I-I I I I I I I F I I I I

I I I I E: I I I I I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I

---

l I

I I I I I F I I I I I 1 TEMP. CONTROLLER DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ISXB3A 1 1SXC4AB 2 I....FOIAS ....UXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 18 OIL. COOL.5R I I DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS I CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE M.37*1 C5 1SX68BA 1 M010R DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP I'C\\

IQ Irr.ovfiffi~~~~ r.1"="s':':'x"="e7:=:&:"':B::-:'"1'" I~ )( I 11\\ '12 )1.\\,1 Reo. M IS)( 2.1ee IS 05 AIO 1SXE5A3 2 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/22/98 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN DRAWN BY:BHD I ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

3 SIZE: F M05 DESCRIPTION PREP. REVR. APPR. L*O* 1$')(0 IS" lSX242 FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC # 351970 EDSF EDSF EDSF 1SX2102 DATE B ron Ai. EDSF REV UFSAR FIGURE: 09.02-02 SHT: 06 CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I ________ 2 1 J 1"0 CONTA.INMENT e>\\JI'-OIN~ UNIT-I TO com BUILDING UNIT-I 3 3 '7 E3 'SX05D6'O 1'/2 CONN. CAPPED m~4 /':1-=:SX~F==8~8~---:-~ 1SX214 FC 1SX77BA 12 140BB 1SX0158 ___u_o_'_1.--.c1SXHie e ) lID I ~ 4 4 1SX04AB20 1SX07HA 1SX26AB10 '~X2'='MIO sx I XI L-'._S_ -r SXO!S!S Il OPM02J ESF LOGIC 1SX147B L.r.p. 1SX057A L.l.P. 1SX057B 5 5 1SX105A 1W~01CA CHILLED WTR. SYS. I PRI MARY CONT. L REFRIGERATION UNIT 1A --r:::~~ ~~~~ OPM 02J ~-_.. ~ N)( ~ SXO&04 o.. L*C* 4( CIO til )( II)... IS}C2.01~ 1SXC7AB 11 I SXl-OI B ISXC.7 B8 , SX2'SA HIGH POINT VENT VALVE 6 IS I':' 16 6 ISX Z.OIC 15>< C1Cel~ 1SX251A 1SXC7D61 1SXJ5AA ¥4 1SXJ5AB ¥4 ~ 1SX251B 7 DIESEL GENERATOR 1A JACKET WATER UPPER COOLER 1DG01 KA-X1 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B JACKET WATER UPPER COOLER 1DG01 KB-X1 1. UNLESS OTHERWI SE. INDICATED ALL PIPING DESIGN ON THIS DRAWIN G IS PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 105 BB. 2. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ALL PIPING IS SAFETY CATEGORY I, ~UALITY GROUP C. 4. VALVES 1SX057A AND 1SX0578 ARE TO BE LOCKED -IN -POSITION (L.I.P.) FOR SYSTEM FLOW PERFORMANCE.

5. VALVES 1SX173 AND 1SX178 ARE DESIGNED PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 00140BB. VALVE ENDS ARE THE PDT BOUNDARIES.

NOTES~ DIESEL GENERATOR 1A JACKET WATER LOWER COOLER 1DG01KA-X2 DIESEL GENERATOR 1B JACKET WATER LOWER COOLER 1DG01KB-X2 D. G. LOGIC 1SX250B 1SX250A 1SXJ4AB 1SXJ4AA 600# FLANGE 1SX27EA 600# FLANGE 1SX27EB El1 SX127 1PM01 J -- DG LOGIC ~~~E12 IHS lA IHS SXI26 1PMOl J o... d3o" N )( II)... 8 8 7 ISX 696 ISXI69A £ 'lHS Zt-V"J 8NIMV~O ~OO~ lO~lNOJ lVJIII~J c o B E I-I I I I I I I F I I I I I I I I I A I I I I I I L

I I I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I 1 ~---1r ISXCIA ~) I lOS X 3~e; 2 ~ CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I ___1_ __ __ 2 l-1 J 3 3 -I-4 4 5 5 ~ 1--- 6 6 > 5. VALVE 1SX2201A IS DESIGNED PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 140BB. ~) l VALVE ENDS ARE THE PDT BOUNDARIES. ~

6. PIPING DISCONNECT EVALUATED IN EC 359610.

I ~ O'T't 0&1 7 J ISX.04CA 10 ) ~ (J} CO )( If)- a.-----f~L(}I-------......--... NOTE 3 8 8- -- -- r- -- --7-- 8NIMV~O ~oo~ lO~lNOJ lVJllI~JI 11~X..7 ~ IOSX-2.I&;;J HICaH POINT VENT VALve ,"'-42.-3 >+r,l,i-D~~~----@IS~XQO~~D~~~~------------------------------1~;;;-' /FI I-l~~;' ~ L----aa~sx~~~S~~~~:~I~~~-~-----------------~~---- I~ E5SENTIAL,.l I SX 50 AA 2 ~ r / ~ I 3*"~*RE.O.-2-~ TER Irt1 N ~ III ~ ~..--r't.- 0 sx 53 B( 2)..-. (~" rr-" -)) r-5fRVICE WA

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2) CE.NT~I~. CJ1~R~'NG7 PLlMP

~---...r-,L I I ~rn ~ ~ I EI1. '11. a ~ &.11. E.12, 0~)('~b581/2J I' >( ~ r:!:..lSXK1AB 1Y2) LUBE OIL. COO~ER 15XOSAC oz.) I.r.v~ ~ ~ ~ ~* .".~W on ~ ~ 05XOb~~ I OHO EI2 ~i ~ .=:~ ~~~C IID 11 rlSX202B r1 ISX 202[j lI5X'5~882)-.."..,~~~ J~ I \\~'I..~) 5X.* S)(.O SXQell 5~ ~ 0 ~X?161 C ~ ( ~ \\ / (O';)'X~~!6.~ ?~8 OPLu OFf EI2 ~064E ~ ~ 'S~O~FC 2J p::p~_J d \\ @j<~S8Ayi)-l 2 \\..(--IS=-X"'7C#::-S=D-:-A-r.Yi~~ I J -I 1 SX089 1 Z,1!&;,('t?J. Z~ Xl. )( I IO~~Ob~8~~ 3'x_i'REo. j ~EO. {ESLD ftED. ~ ~)('Z: RE.O ~ ..........= (IS)(3888' ~ (~~~D h I'~~ 20eee ~ ~ ~~~~J1"":b~~O-'4 0 I .. R'liI. B I (O~1~~~JI6.)" ~ exwRED'-~ ~ 11SX2199B ~ L~)(20/4CP I

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('\\.t L.--.-~---i-I~L<:O L/ ~"1.1...-_~--:---~-tttll- ~--;'::::;dlA~11 F.~O. 8~'t'l*RED. ~1(I~ N~ cllSXIS IVA.O~5e ~ 1.11 I I ili r- ~ ~:: 1SX2200B CENTR\\~. C.t\\t:\\R<:,IN(, Put'? IE' \\15XI'Z.4 B ID I~ I Jl5166 1 ./ 1~"2J"" ~ ~ c..UBIC.L.E. C.OOLE.f2- ,~£E.I'2.. ~ <1> oW00 1CB ..( ~l.'l/ L-.~_l ~~_ ~corf) onl(lJ_:~ 0 N iO 0 f'() l 0SX063B CONTROL ROOM (O~X3"6" 1 Cp ~ ~ ~15)l,~I~SB r: IJS~2IaABh rISXC3'5/Y~ SXI05 I~ ~ I 105BB 140BB 105BB REF~~~ATION CfI ~ ~ .~ ~ ~X54 I V' II~IS)l.~ I OB CONDENSER I OSl<.~0{'5E!l1 x I'll' I~ III 0 'II ~ 1 111" rlS I ~ I ro 5 )( 186 B~ I...... III Id\\ 1- .::;..~ I I'Ij IS)< 2/84~ I I X 2~ 1 ~ ~~ B {OS'X.'!t.a8~1° ~_? "r' 1IS)l.S4J 1[ESLJ]1~ j I OSX890A3/4- ~~pxOC089FII ~. I ~~ I 0""'"-........... I....(ISX~b"& 2. ~_IS)c'531 OSXI86D I ~'l P-f"1 ~ ~ ~ 1112REOr k~-j 115)(.52.\\ .e:'*)(IYiR~t>. I (OSX898A OPL 3J6 ~~~~~L:","l-:P~i ~ ""1=$=X~=7::"1~ ISX_lC05A ~p~~7tUa..~IT L...{'5XC~AA~ ~ J"i'S)(.2073B I I Lrc,,'IofrV_1.1 ~~ (1~)l.95BAI~}-J PUMP' "CUk.\\.Q COOL~ ~ ..il~---Iof-- M-."*'lIl....i.LH1 -<nOO~~~)----_-----------------------..:;III""l:;~..7'II'f.;;;;l;-,~;,;.~)_..J~ .(!I~t~v~QJ&.~*~,.§.lL~-------------------- __......~ ...II '~xS'i!.1 I A3.., ~ ISX.O!>0810 '\\ DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS ESSENTIAL 5ERVIc..E I 050X 21&0 r.-"' 16't POlWT VEWT "Al.".:-l CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING A I WATER RETURN TRAIN B NOTES REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREP. REVR. APPR. I 1 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ALL PIPING IS AN EDSF FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC #359610 EDSF EDSF EDSF I SAFETY CATEGORY I GROUP C AND PER PIPING DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL DESIGN TABLE 105BB 2 REFER TO PACIFIC PUMP DWG II CW-49770 IN CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING SERVICE WATER I PUMP INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR COOLING WATER PIPING LAYOUT I 3 VALVE TO BE LOCKED IN THE FULL OPEN POSITION-FOR MANUAL SCALE

NONE OPERATION ONLY ALL ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO BE REMOVED Exelon NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/22/98 M-42 I

4 VALVES OSX066A AND OSX0668 ARE LOCKED -IN-POSITION (LI P) SM EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN DRAWN BY:BHD I FOR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE Bvron Station N6UC~~t: 1 ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

S040 SHEET NUMBER:

4 SIZE: F M051 -11SX3011SX301 t 'lHS Zt V"J o A c B I I I I E I I I I I-I I I I I I I F I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I D I I I I I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I I I I I c l I I I I I ~ co roo ~I

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I I I I I F I I I I I I I I I I E: I I I I i "- M-42-3 7 B5 t~'SX1B9B I 1 ro ~o 0:. CL IRE-PR003 ?---)-4M-~~-I4) RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM 101 1RX PR003 HIGH POINT J~ VENT VALVE "'-f 1sX220Bl ESF ( LOGI C 11SX231B I SX207B I ISX 0278-2 I Ef2 I s:~:91 T 1PM06J MO DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM) W I""l X (/) MO lHS SXI08 11 PM06J 1 ISX 016B-2 ro <{ Ul u..x Vl EI2 CD <{ I'-- I.L X (/) h-,S-X2-0-6L] I I I NOTE 2 DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS I CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE IFI SXI21 NOTE 2 EI2 I SXI2 -

TEST CONN. ISXI5 TEST CONN. B PREP. REVR. APPR. EDSF EDSF EDSF M-164 1 IRC r'.../ ORC IT1 SXI19 EI2 i ITEW SXI19 -I I SX09 2 ~I 1SX07 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

03/05/97 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN DRAWN BY:BHD ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

5A ISIlE: F M051 1 1SX258B I I SX92HA Y2 ISX92DA ~ B1C r<J IRC- ~I--.....- p -.9_......-1ik I SX07GB I 6 ~ (lSXG6e 314 )---... ~'t--.._P_-_7"'-+"""-+--l~QI~SX;XO~6~A~B=_=cDJ.i.§.6J------lIII(e~-3<: M-164 1SX220D I o ~NH flJ VENT ) VALVE 4) 4)-. L ' ExelonSM Nuclear Byron Station 6 Unit: 1 Ef2 (1 SXH4AB (1 SXH3AB CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I ___1 2 l-1 J IFE SXl21 16 ,--'...;;..SX,-0::....;.7..:...:.A;.....F__4:-.-"-' '--1_SX_0'-7c..:..: AM-'------'4J:>-- ( 1SX07BB I 0 l---. - '-'---"-..:...:....;..~--'--'/..... (, SX07BD I 0 ~ - --.:....:::..:~=--~=..;,/ 3 3 3 ISX06B8 NOTES -I-4 4 RADIOGRAPH WELDS IN CLASS "c" PIPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH "ASME" SECTION t---1f-----+-----------+-+-----l--I III REQUIREMENTS. PERFORM MAGNETIC PARTICLE EXAMINATION ON "RCFC" COIL-- NOZZLE JOINT AT WATER BOX HEADER, AND RADIOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF THE t---1f-----+-----------+-+-----l--I WELD AT THE FLANGE CONNECTION TO THE NOllLE. (REF. SER SUPPLEMENT 1 PARAGRAPH 3.2.2) VALVES ABOVE NOTED LIP ARE LOCKED-IN-POSITION FOR SYSTEM FLOW PERFORMANCE. 4. 5. NO. ~ ISX09r-' 4~"I SXD3~I~s:L/_OOJ} ~:II~S~XD[5~A;K===~3)..,.~::::::::J--}=;;;;=(IIS~X~0~7;AKg:===4;J"'9----'--* ~ ISX09'- 4~JSXD3~1~E/S/1r~ ISXD5AM ~ Isx091" 4 -e-I sX03AFt3)l1~S/1rl~~I~S~XO~5~A~H_-:::'3J~---.J.r-~1S~X~0:..'..7~AH~_4::!..):>-- ~ Isx091 4....-f_......r,-r-s-xo-~I~/J}I~G,~S1X~D~5~A~D=-==~3G...

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---

(ISX06GK

~ ~ ISX7IAD 3;4 .. I SX07 I SX09 T"" JL7 ~JL ISXI07D I ~r.I'"::"S7:'"XO:-:6::7:H::::O---:-4"\\.......

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a ~ z ~ ~ISX06GR 5 5 1SX262A l IFI SXI25 ISX92RA ~ ISX92MA NOTES o l IFE SXI25 1---- -- ('-.:.I-=-S~X0:....;:9.::.8B=---:....:1O,-,r-- (~I.=..;SXc..:...:-O:...::"9..=.B"-.O_..:...10=.-/)--.., C,--'....;;..S,-X0,--,=9,-C,-O__' O:../~ E/2 6 6 BUTIERFLY VALVES 21A, B, C, D AND

25A, B,

C, D SHALL HAVE LOCKING DEVICES FOR THE MANUAL OPERATORS, SO THAT THE VALVES CAN BE LOCKED IN ANY POSITION FROM 0 TO 100% OPEN. ISOLATION VALVES SUPPLIED WITH INSTRUMENT. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ALL PIPING IS SAFETY CATEGORY - r. QUALITY GROUP C, AND PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 105 BB. 1. 2. 3. NO. NOTES NOTES REV DATE DESCRIPTION r----.-----------------------------+--,------------------------------IAE EDSF FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC #359990 7 10 ISX06EB ~ Isx091 4~ ISXD7~I~S~ ~GJ~S:g:XD;9~A~M'~==::;38..... ~~:~--=--<=,~SX;0~9;A;M===~4).... -.::~ ~ ISX09\\- 4~ 1SXD7~I~s:L/_OOJ} 1-(r.I--::S-:;XD;::-;9::-:A:;;;R:----:;3"""-~~-L---J7:1S::-::X::::0~9A:-;R-:-----:4:""'\\~ 10) 10) ~ISX08CF ~ISX08CK ~'SX08BB I--- -- -- ~ISX08CH ~ISX08BO ---(ISX08CM ..-.(ISX08CR t '7 8 8- -- -- r- -- --7-- 8NIMV~O ~oo~ lO~lNOJ lVJI1I~Jl EI2 , ~ ISX022B I !"{LQ fr\\ o \\0/ I~~<{:II ~, __ v __-... ~ I SX09 I ~ .....(1SXDBCP 4o-t-- 1SXD7~I~Ls:L/_OOJ} ~81~S~XD~9~A~P===~3).....

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o<{ IX)ox (/) ~ ~ l SX75AD 314 ) 1SX07 I SX09 I J~~ ISXIIID

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~..r:,'"::"S7:'"X0:::':9~O::::O----:4"""-..-- ~ J I ~I SX74AD 3;4) ~ ~-, ESSENTI AL SERVICE "T ~ B~~ISXiIOD I WATER COiLS ~~ L I.P ~ ~ I I SX I 06D LJ 1VPOI AD I 0 L..~.rF* I I SX025D 1--/"""" ~ /: ~ ISX022D I J-r-lf~ A\\ ~ '0" \\~/ ~r 'V az IPI SXI14 <{ u-a> x (/) ~ ISx091-4~I sxo7~\\~s:L/_OOJ}l~~I.:::.S~X~D9~A~:f----::::3~~~-....r-"""'\\...!.I.::!..S~XO=.:.9~A~F-~4~ ~ !SX091~ .....( I SXD.C. 4~ 1SXD7~1~E/S/1 ~IHr.I--::S-:;X;::-:D9~A:-;;B~--::3:""'\\)-(J-\\~~'1.... ..../7,::-SX;-;:0;:-;:9~A:::-B----:-'\\4~ '12t 7 ~} SX75Alt ~4) di, E W 3 ~ ~ ISXII18 I ....-( 1SXD.D. 4o-t-- I SXD~I~S/1~II-(iSxEI:~I.::!..S~XE~I...::.A~B-=--=--=-~3-:r............... ~-...r-~1S~X~0~90~8~_4~)_._.. w-- J . *....-fl SX74AB 3;4) ~....... '0" ~C:.J B \\'~ J ESSENTIAL SERVICE ~ L.C*/~V L ISXIIOB I WATER COILS 5 LI P Z ~ B LJ I VPO I AB I B I Tl I ISX025B ~ ~ SX! 13 ro u Ulox (/) N X (/) uo ~ ~ I SXD2AB 3;4 I SX07 I SX09 I L__n ~ ~x I 07B 1 4...-c.... ISX04AB 3 lJ/~/lrI~'-!I.:::.S~X~D6~A~B~-----::3~ """"-~.r--~1~S~XO~7~J~B_--:4~""',,--,_--, IL ~r-IS-X-70-AB-=-3;--"'4) ESSENTI AL SERVICE "T [q) J B~~ ISXI06S WATER COILS ~~ ~ I VPOI AS 'B L.r P ~ ~ I ISX021B ~" ~ ~ CAPPED (I SX09CB I°~. (I SX07CB 10}---..... 1SX260A I NOTE 2 JSX7\\ AS ~) ~ 12 ISX92KA

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~12 I SX92GA ~2 Sx l FIE23 0 dfh Sxl F1E15 0 I SX92PA Y? E12 \\';I SX92CA Y2 ....I.;iiiiii1~S:;;.X~2ii5~3~B~l~:"{ ..=1iiiS~X~2=6iii0~B::I:--------------------------- ~~'_::_=_=___" \\L.j 1SX256A I ~ I 1SX263B 1SX256B 1SX253D I 1SX262B l NOTE 2 ~ 1SX263D I _I .L;;!~~~~.J.~~~-'--------------------------(:JI~S:KXOQ:7liEi8~:J1~4l)J-.(CJ::J~.(~:JI~SX!XO~7rrF~B=J:ti6)_-.L~~~~ A c D B I I I I I I I I I I I I L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I-I I I I I I I F I I I I I I I I I

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I I I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I N X Vl B lD-0) x Vl <-=:::::.......'"1.--J'"-=::::;~I~S~X~0~8illO~C===D4J-"" ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER COILS IVPOIAC Ie 3 3 ~ ISX061: 4~ I SXD9AJ~I~Z1}IKCI~S~XD~1~A;J===~3>...-=~.::~1.....~(~I..=.S~XO"::.:.8~C~J_~4)- I I SX022A ~ M LO_ \\/1 A o ~ SXOS Isx061 W;- o ~ 4~'" I SX09AN 3 ~Z1} 1~r.I-::S~XD~7;-:A7.N---::;3"'--...... ---.:"'L.. ~r.I-;:SX~O~8:-;:;e:7N--z7'l4)- ~ I~ 10) ~ ISX061-4 -..[:]l1li I SX09AL~1~Z"'3rIKC;-;:I~S~X~01~A~L===~3)...... =~::i-.....

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(ISX7SAA ~411 I ISXIII A~ .-( I SX090A [ ~ 4 4 I SX92NA !-'2 I 1SX259B ISX92LA ~ 7 I 1SX253A EI I I 1SX259A ISX92JA ~ IFI SXI22 I I SXO I 8C ~ ~,.--__-=-- ~ ..; """'--{ I SX06DC 10) ~. L.O. w ~oz l......I_SX_O_6_EC__1_0--'~ NOTE 2 C ......I_SX_O_6_FA__ I o.../~ (ISX10AA ~4~ I ISXI06A N~8 L:J

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II=SX=O=S"':1-* ISX 021A-1 ....-----, E\\I IHS ISXl01 IPM06J ,.....--~MO---, ~ ('--1S-X..... F1~A-A-...-...\\Y-1~ I ISX206A ~LJ TEST CONN. ,.....---....,EII IHS sxr06 ESF LOGIC t-----.. I PM06J MO 8 ~*oa:: 0... IRE-PR002 Y M-18 -14~/~1 [)7 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM B HIGH POINU~ VENT VALVE ~ I I SX220A w ~x r 1SXG6A :t4) Vl (ISXF6AA \\M~ ISX201A ~ t---:olA-~--,r----..;.a.,ri~tJ-----I1SX 2 31 A JMJ. Wm l A o I~ 1RX PR002 "'\\..M-42"3 ~-----cI11S~XQ06~A~A;::=JI~6)-1',,'J-....... p .-.'5......._ 1IIIf*t-l "-/---.;.F...;;.3----/~ M-163 ,1sx189AJl -- -- - -- -- r- -- --7-- -- -- 8g 'lHS Zt-V"J 18NIMV~O ~oo~ lO~lNOJ lVJIII~J B A o c I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L I I I I I I I I I I I I-I I I I I I I F I I I I I I I I I

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I I I I E: I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I I I I I D I I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I B 0LI SX284A HOT WATER BYPASS LINE M 7/ C1

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I I I I I F I I I I I 1 ~ M <D O'l X IIIor r-(-oSX 98AA 24 HOT WATER BYPASS LINE rOSX98AC 24><M-~~-7< 1 2-'- CHEMICAL ADDITION ~'-/ M-~12-8< ( ~ CHEMICAL ADDITION ~: IcD ~ M-;i-8< lCKAH IC~(D v ~p.., N N ~ r-ro o 0 X X III l/l o 0 u<< /' ~ ~ x ~. l/l IS! L() ~ lJ)o" DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER 0SX02AA ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER BASIN I I I DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I

1 J IOSX164A HOSX10DA 8 PREP. REVR. APPR. E12 ~ ~~~:71 r:i OPM OtJ o i c1-O~~ 157A-12 EDSF EDSF EDSF NOTES: V" V" V' V' V' ~."" V' V' V' V' V' ~

':\\

9. SUBSYSTEM CHANGE OCCURS AT THE NORTH VALVE \\ 2. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ALL PIPING IS SAFETY CATEGORY 1, QUALITY GROUP C, AND PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 105BB. 4. PTFE PIPING BY DOW CHEMICAL USA. 5. SENSING LINE LENGTH FROM ORIFICE FLANGE TO ROOT VALVE SHALL NOT EXCEED 8 INCHES. SENSING LINE LENGTH FROM ROOT VALVE TO END CAPS SHALL NOT EXCEED 8 INCHES. 6. SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED VALVE/HANDWHEEL ASSEMBLY. 7. DEEP WELL, WELL PUMP & MOTOR AND DISCHARGE PIPING FROM WELL PUMP TO ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWERS IS SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.

8. VALVE IS NOT CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS CLOSED FUNCTION

11. STAINLESS STEEL VALVE INSTALLED.

10. SUBSYSTEM CHANGE OCCURS AT THE SOUTH VALVE CHAMBER A-2 FLOOR.

IS! Xl/l IS! 2 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

09/18/96 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN DRAWN BY:ACT I ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

6 SEE: F M05 DESCRIPTION E11 IS~~~61 ~r:i OPM 01 J o I ~O~~ 158A-11 ~

• --{O SX86 BA 8

- I ~ M FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC# 366121 DATE EDSF CHEMICAL ADDITION M 8< B1 B 0WW049A Ai. B ron REV OHS OVERFLOW CHANNEL 1" SLOPE.=-\\ BASIN OVERFLOW 64% EL.874'-6"".. ro __ _1_ __ __ 2 _ 3 3 I I I 0WW048A 0WW048C OJ<< L() (!) r:io 0SX138A I CD ~ v1 0SX255A I '<t III -=- tJ0SXM2A 2 ) WW016 ~~ ESSENTIAL OPM I01J ~ ~~ SERVICE ~

I

,'----;/'7L---- 1-__-H-__---,#-____hL...-------,;S,£----#--~-AJ_~_4~_,7S~,LUM-P-S-__h'-----H-------' L-------l! / C-8 L.O. ~,~, @Ji~, DEE~N~TEELL7;UMP j~ j~ V >ME~3 ~ OWW07AA 8J ff' x6" ~ (NOTE 6) ~ IOWW019 A I ;ii IOCW100A ~ x I OCW171A ~OOBB j05BB ~ CIRCULATING ~0 ,/ WATER ~/ MAKE-UP >M-~~-3Ar ~~ OCW04DA B)J ./ 8"x6" JOSX143 A ~~_~ Jt . ~ OPM01J n 0SX02AB ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER COOLING TOWER BASIN 0SX138B I NOTE 8 CD<<..- IS! ~ ESSENTIAL IS! SERVICE Y WATER PUMPS 1L-------1!I---~'" M-42, 1A / C-8 L.O. a:> CD CD N..... Xl/lo B Ho SX 86BB8) Ho sx 10 DB 8 4 4 OHS 1 I OH ~21 ~ SX058 ~ OPMI01J r MIO .0-OSX 0LI B 158B-21 SX284B 0WW048D ro I 0WW048B I (OCW04DB 8 [OSX 143 6 WW017 OPMI01J (fl',--/-,L-- co'i\\rol L~ ,~, ~r, DEEP WE.LL PUMP ~~ ~~ V (NOTE 7) >M -83' ~ I>.:, F.C. (OW::7AB8 -z ~ 8"x6" ~ (NOTE 6) '-0-C-W-1-0-0-6-' OWW 019 B I rOCW171 B 100BB

l05BB CIRCULATING

~~ WATER ~V MAKE-UP ""'-M 3A / 65 I OSX234A J ~1 rr OSX234C NOTE 5 CTYP) 0WW049B ~OSX234D '-----!OSX2 34 B 5 5 N..... CD CDo..... r:io CO CD<<o..... Xl/lo _ I F-27391~ I F-2739 1 <D<D COCO NN I I LLLL ..... m "",M t"-t"- NN I LLLL OSX028 B ____+-=F:---:2~8::-::6::-4_:_+---iI~-F - 2739 I F -2864 F -2739 I

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~OSX04MB I ~~:t----I 0 SX 156 B I E12 uS V -w ~LL (J) LLQ ~~ NOTE 9 SO ~cn 11SX49 0~X031 (J)<< 'i. \\1 -~~ I, (- NOTE 11

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r-@ E12 HOT WATER OFE NOTE 10 BYPASS LINE SX-==2=8_1_~""'_":_-'_1~1-S_-'-X':"::48:....ct-i=-0=S:X:0=4=1::= -+-+-t~_:,-.....(r0 SX 98AD 24r< M -~; -7< I t1 0SX284B I -j 0 SX 164 B CHEMICAL (~ NOTE 11 ADDITION .....-------+-"""'II-I-----'--~~.~~I ~.....................-D'---.. I r'\\ r'\\ M 8< ,V \\J ~ 01 'D / r'\\ F'\\ D D \\.J LT S I (I // 5B ---;;::I-rr-- ICKAH D ~ 1/ /' r gg '<t N o W X X ~ l/l l/l ri 0 0 CD<< <Dm Xl/l oy 1SX100 1SX100 CO X l/l OSX168D o SX 158 B 1 OSX168F OSXA1AB 2 6 6 OSX94BA3~ CD r:01""SX"4"-;;:;-~ X l/l !------{ OSXA1AD 2 E-12 OHS I I I SX053 I OPM 01J I I ~y I I I

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CO ~o ~o C\\I .....<<coo X l/lo OSX169B ~.l-. <i$> OSXA1BD 2 OSX169D V~ 9$> OSXA1 BB 2 m X l/l ~ r-0-S-X-A-~-B-;--2 ---- OSX169 F OSX 156C o SX028 A 7 7 ~OSX155A I o SX 168A OSX168C OSX168E OSX02MA OSX02 MB I OSXC4AA 1 10x8 OSXC4AB 1) g~~~~~t:~-v~~FlC:o:sx 179 A ~!T~~~~~?i~~?~l: --losx 179 B I OSX B6 AA1 OSXB6ABn -{OSXB4AA2) 0'-:-=~:-I --{OSXB4AB2)

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JOSX178A I 1SX80

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1. 2" DRAIN TO PERMIT DRAINING OF RISER UPON CLOSING OF RISER SHUT-OFF VALVE-PIPING IS CAT IID.

2.HOT WATER BV PASS VALVES WilL BE OPtN'ED AUTOMATICAU.Y WHEl1 WATER TEMPERA1'URI IN 8A~\\NDROPS TO 50 FAND WILL 6E CLOSED AUTOMATlCAl.l'f WHEN WA1tR TENPERA1'URE IN 6I\\SlN RiSeS TO 00° F. 09.02-02 SHT: 11 CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I ____________ J DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I I I I I I I I SCALE

NONE PREP.

REVR. APPR. EDSF EDSF EDSF NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

01/22/98 M-42 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN DRAWN BY:BHD I ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

S040 SHEET NUMBER:

7 SEE: F M05 DESCRIPTION FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC #367935 DATE UFSAR FIGURE: B ron AE EDSF REV

3. UNLESS OTHERVVISE INDICATED,ALL PIPING I' SAFETY CATEGORY I QUAUTY GROuP C

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OIL SAMPLE TUBING INSERTED INTO GEAR DRIVE (APPROXIMATELY 1") - TUBING IS CAT 1, CLASS G. I I I I I I I I I I I L

I I I I E: I I I I I I I I 0 1 I I I I I I I I I C l I I I I I I I I I B I I I I I I 1 2PMOIJ 2HS SXI27 ---D G LOGIC Ell E12 I 1"- ~--DG LOGIC I 201of.s SXI2.6 DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER 2PMOIJ 2SX250A 2SX250B CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I _____ 1 J 600# FLANGE 2SX27EB 8 600# FLANGE 2SX27EA 8 2SX44 2SX46 REVR. APPR. PREP. EDSF EDSF EDSF DIESEL GENERATOR 2A JACKET WATER LOWER COOLER 2DG01KA-X2 DIESEL GENERATOR 2B JACKET WATER LOWER COOLER 2DG01KB-X2 I I I DRAWING CONTAINS lSI LAYERS CONTACT lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I ~~

~E 126 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

04/04/00 M-I EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN DRAWN BY:DLB I

ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

1 SIZE: F M05 2 I. DIESEL GENERATOR 2B JACKET WATER UPPER COOLER 2DG01KB-X1 1X¥4 I. DIESEL GENERATOR 2A JACKET WATER UPPER COOLER 2DG01 KA-X1 1X¥4 DESCRIPTION FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC 364909 2SX251A 2SX251B 1SXJ5AA DATE 2SXC7DA 3/4 2SX201D PER 2SX218A __ _1_ __ __ 2 _ 2SX20lC 3 L.C. 2SXC7BA 3/4 SX16 2SX69 2SX201B 2SX16 2SX70 2 SX I 0 4A 2.SXIOSA REV B ron Al EDSF 3 VALVES 2SX173 AND 2SX178 ARE DESIGNED PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 00140BB. VALVE ENDS ARE THE PDT BOUNDARIES. NOTES: 1 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ALL PIPING IS DESIGN TABLE 105BB. 2 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ALL PIPING IS SAFETY CATEGORY I, QUALITY GROUP C. 2.9)(2.01 A 2SXC7AA 3/4 3

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NONE SK WTW RM BHD JHl WTP BHD AGS WTP BHD DlB WTP PREP.

REVR. APPR. NOTES: I-UNLESS OTHl!'ltWISE INDICATED ALL PIPIN6 '5 SAFETY CATEGORY Z GROUP G AND PER' PIPI..G DESIGN TA6LE lose. 2.. REFER TO PACIFIC PUMP DWG.CW-"9770 IN CENTRIFUGAL CHARGIN6 PUMP INSTRUCTIOI'I MANU"L FOR C.oollN(; WATEFf PIPINc:. L..AVOuT.

3. VALVE EQUIPPED WITH ROTATIONAL STOP TO LIMIT FLOW.

~EE DWG. F-2918-2 SD-C-109230 (1~) SD-C-109231 (2") CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I 2 1 L J NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED DATE

03/23/00 M-126 I

EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN f1D~RA~WNN B)BY~:B~H~D=~--_--.:..=~---.:..~~;-----!-----, ON THIS DRAWING ORG. BY

S040 SHEET NUMBER:

2 ISEE: F M0Sli ExelonSM Nuclear Byron StatlonUDlllQ AD 07/30/01 FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF TO #1495 ItDCP #9900554) AC 01/05/01,FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF TO #1396 "DCP #9900375) AA 03/23/00 FOR RECORD INCORP. OF AS-BUILT DCR #990345 AB 09/01/00,FOR RECORD INCORP DCR #990486, "ADDED lSI INFORMATION) REV DATE DESCRIPTION ___1- __ 3 2TE B SX195 __ L 4 B 2YE SX190 we ~ 't'/~02.S~ ~'"'.~. PUMP. c.UalCL& c.oO~1t", ')(.050"-10 ~~ $)(0......... ~ 1 (ElI.50ABi) .n ~FZ. au. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:H~-----------------------------.-(<I!)(n&.""~ fA' I, 5 6 ---fo @-J B 2TE SX197 7 ~ B 2TE ~- SX1S5 '-------{ol---~ t 2,V,,",OE& 5Io.1=E'Ty I~Ec:.'TIQN PU~P 2& C:ualC..~ CCOL£R. 8 E F A o c B I I I I I I I I I I I I L I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

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4. RADIOGRAPW WELDS IN CLASS "c"PIPING IN ACCOR:>ANCE WIT~'ASME*SECTION mREQUIREMENTS.PERFORM MAGNETIC PARTiCLE E,xAMINATION ON ~~C'COI1_

NO'l~LE JOINT AT WATER BOX HEAOER,ANO RAOIOGRAP~IC EXAM INATION OF'THE WELD AT TJ.lE FLAN6E. CONNECTION TO T~E NO'lll.E. __ _1_ __ __ 2 _ DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM) I I I lSI GROUP PRIOR TO REVISING I AI I I I SCALE

NONE DATE

09/01/00 M-126 I

DRAWN BY: c502 I ORG. BY

5040 SHEET NUMBER:

3 SIZE: F M05 CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING I 1 J PREP. REVR. APPR. EDSF EDSF EDSF NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING DESCRIPTION FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF EC 354486 B ron AE EDSF REV DATE 3 4 5 6 7 8 NOT\\: :. 3. UNLt;5S OTHERWI&E INDICA.TED AL.L PIPING Ie> 5AFETY CATEGOR.Y....! QUA.LITY GROUP C AND PER EIPING DESiGN TAeLE. 105 ea. I I I I I A I I I I I I L

ATTACHMENT 5 Summary of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies commitments made in this document. (Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.) COMMITMENT TYPE COMMITMENT COMMITTED DATE OR ONE-TIME PROGRAMMATIC "OUTAGE" ACTION ACTION (Yes/No) (Yes/No) The one-time extended CT condition will not be entered should adverse environmental conditions exist or are imminent (forecast within the next 12 hours). Adverse Environmental Conditions are defined as any of the following: Area environmental conditions such as icing, wind, or storms causing unexpected repeated station power line trips; Tornado Warning; Actual switchyard voltage alarms or notifications indicating voltage below that required for offsite source Upon implementation of Technical Specifications the one-time extension operability limits; of the SX train Yes No Predicted Unit trip contingency Completion Time. switchyard voltage below minimum required switchyard voltage (unless a site specific analysis has been performed); Notified that at the current time a condition exists such that if a transmission line or other transmission facility were to trip, then site will be below voltage operability limits. Should adverse environmental conditions develop after the extended CT condition has been entered, the work will proceed to complete the 112SX001 A valve replacement. Page 1 of 2

ATTACHMENT 5 Summary of Regulatory Commitments COMMITMENT TYPE COMMITMENT COMMITTED DATE OR ONE-TIME PROGRAMMATIC "OUTAGE" ACTION ACTION (Yes/No) (YeslNo) OP-AA-108-117, "Protected Equipment Program," will be Required to be implemented at Byron Station by implemented prior to Yes No the start of the B2R15 refueling Byron Unit 2 B2R15 outage when the 112SX001 A valve refueling outage. replacement is scheduled. Any planned or emergent changes to the analyzed configuration will be evaluated for impact to determine if Upon implementation of there is any significant impact on the one-time extension Yes No internal events and fire PRA risk of the SX train insights to confirm that appropriate Completion Time. risk management actions have been defined and implemented. Page 2 of 2}}