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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 4868721 January 2013 19:55:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 15:51 CST, Waterford 3 experienced an uncomplicated automatic reactor trip from 84.5% reactor power. The actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS) resulted from Steam Generator #1 Low Level, which is at a nominal 27.4% narrow range setpoint. Safety systems responded as expected. All three (3) Emergency Feedwater Pumps started and injected into Steam Generator #1. Auxiliary Feedwater pump has been started, feeding both Steam Generators (#1 and #2) at levels above the EFAS low level setpoint. All control rods inserted by the automatic RPS actuation. Electrical power is being supplied from normal off-site power and condenser vacuum is available for Steam Generator heat removal via the Steam Dump Bypass Control system. There are no safety systems out of service or inoperable, nor any safety system TS (Technical Specification) LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) actions entered. The cause of the Steam Generator #1 Low Level condition, and associated Reactor Trip, is under investigation. This event occurred during the initial power escalation from refuel outage RF18, after attempting to place C Heater Drain Pump (HDP), the first of three, into service. After starting, C HDP tripped for a reason not yet verified. Subsequently, based on initial Control Room operator observations, the Steam Generator #1 Main Feedwater control valve position was observed to be at 10-20% open, but with an open position demand signal of 100%. Main Feedwater response to the reactor trip (Reactor Trip Override) was as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

* * * UPDATE FROM WILLIAM HARDIN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1645 EST ON 3/7/13 * * * 

The original reactor power level stated in the report should be 91% in lieu of 84.5%. This information has been changed in the event heading. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 4835728 September 2012 17:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This message is notification to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) requirements, that the Vice President Operations at Waterford 3 was notified on September 28, 2012 at 14:10 CDT of a condition which will be conservatively reported as a defect under the rule. A written report to the NRC will follow within 30 days. The basic component that is subject to reporting is the Masoneilan I/P (current to pneumatic) Transducer Model 8005N. These transducers are utilized in safety related applications at Waterford 3. This condition has been corrected in the plant. Waterford has identified that the subject transducer fails to calibrate at the high end of its span. No defective components are currently installed. Waterford 3 is operating normally at 100% power. This identified condition caused no loss of safety function and had no impact on public health and safety.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4825530 August 2012 14:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of emergency preparedness capabilities due to the effects of hurricane Isaac. At approximately 0735, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) diesel generator was discovered to be tripped and not available, leaving the primary EOF without AC electrical power and, therefore, unavailable since normal AC power was also lost due to weather conditions. Efforts to repair the EOF diesel generator have been initiated and personnel have verified the Alternate EOF is functional. State, local and federal agencies have been informed of the plan to use the alternate EOF in case of an emergency preparedness activation. With essential personnel being sequestered at the Waterford 3 power block, the critical EOF functions can be performed from the on-site Technical Support Center (TSC), which is housed within the Control Room ventilated envelope. At approximately 0620 CDT, Entergy Operations, Inc. Emergency Preparedness staff discovered that the NRC Emergency Notification Systems (ENS) was not working. NRC Headquarters was notified at approximately 0715 CDT and was given an alternate phone number to contact Waterford 3. The ENS phone had previously been verified functional at approximately 0330 CDT. The NRC Health Physics Network (HPN) telephone line was verified to be functional at 0922 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4825129 August 2012 23:15:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. At approximately 1530 CDT, Entergy Operations, Inc. was informed of a road closure which could impact the ability to perform a potential evacuation required by the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan. Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) reported that US Highway 51 to Interstate 10 was closed due to flooding from elevated water levels in Lake Pontchartrain resulting from Hurricane Isaac. Alternate evacuation routes remain available. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4819215 August 2012 10:51:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4804522 June 2012 18:38:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis report is submitted pursuant 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to a notification that was made to the National Response Center. At 1345 CDT on June 22, 2012, Waterford 3 was informed by NRC Region IV that there was a government report concerning a Waterford 3 radioactive waste shipment. A follow-up review determined that the receiver of the shipment (Energy Solutions) had notified the National Response Center of a condition stating that a shipment received at their facility in Tennessee on June 21, 2012 was spilling water. The notification was identified as Incident Report number 1015375. The container held UN 2910, Limited Quantity, low specific activity, ion exchange resin and did not exceed any reportable quantities. Waterford 3 is sending shipping personnel to Energy Solutions to validate the state of the shipment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4795724 May 2012 15:21:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn May 23, 2012, at approximately 1700 hours, a beer bottle was discovered in a trash can inside the protected area. The bottle was discovered during trash collection by housekeeping personnel who reported the discovery to their supervision. The bottle was determined to contain remnants of moisture and had an odor of beer, constituting the potential presence of alcohol. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719 (b)(1) based on the presence of alcohol in the protected area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. We do not know if it was consumed in the Protected Area. It was found in the Construction Support Building, not in a Vital Area. This has been entered into the Corrective Action Program and investigation has been in progress".
ENS 478973 May 2012 21:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This is a non-emergency 8 hour notification being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) Prevented Safety Function. Both trains of the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) were considered inoperable from 1613 to 1641 CDT on 5/3/2012. Waterford 3 was performing planned maintenance on CVAS Train A with the train declared inoperable. Operations supervision was informed by maintenance personnel that an electrical conduit near the work area and not related to the work in progress had been found with a conduit connection unthreaded and separated. The contained wires could be seen and appeared intact. Investigation by engineering personnel determined that the conduit was associated with CVAS Train B. Operations declared CVAS Train B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 at 1613 hours. Operations personnel were already restoring CVAS Train A following completion of maintenance. After performing the planned retest, Operations declared CVAS Train A operable and exited TS 3.0.3 at 1641 hours. No actions were taken to commence a power reduction or reactor shutdown. The CVAS is required following a design basis accident to draw all exhaust air from the CVAS areas of the Reactor Auxiliary Building through HEPA and charcoal filters before discharge to the atmosphere. The CVAS areas contain equipment such as the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, safety injection pumps and other areas with containment penetrations. The CVAS is credited in accident analysis for limiting the radiological release under a Loss of Coolant Accident condition. Following repair of the conduit connection, Operations declared CVAS Train B operable at 1956 hours. Waterford 3 remained stable at 100% power during the condition. Both trains of offsite and onsite electrical sources, ECCS, and Containment Cooling safety systems remained operable during the condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WILLIAM HARDIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/29/2012 AT 1515 EDT * * *

This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 retracting a previous notification. On 5/3/2012 at 2107 EDT, Waterford 3 communicated Notification Message EN 47897, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Prevented Safety Function, stating that both trains of the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) were considered inoperable from 1613 to 1641 CDT on 5/3/2012. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the as-found condition would not cause the inoperability of CVAS Train B. With one train operable, the plant remained within analyzed conditions and capable of fulfilling safety functions. As such, no condition existed which required reporting. Based on this information, Waterford 3 is retracting notification message EN 47897. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Clark).

ENS 476529 February 2012 09:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during random testing. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated and his badge deactivated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4736120 October 2011 14:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 08:00 CDT on 10/20/2011 Essential Chilled Water Loop B was declared inoperable while turbine driven Emergency Feedwater Pump AB was out of service for planned maintenance. Operability of Essential Chilled Water Loop B was restored at 08:50. During this time period, the application of cascading technical specifications rendered motor driven Emergency Feedwater Pump B inoperable. The remaining operable Emergency Feedwater Pump A is a design rated 50 percent pump; therefore, this event could have prevented fulfillment of the Residual Heat Removal safety function. Offsite power and Train A safety related equipment and systems were verified operable. Essential Chilled Water Loop B was declared inoperable because Essential Chiller B failed to automatically restart from a load recycle. The shift crew took action to align Essential Chiller AB to restore operability to Essential Chilled Water Loop B. The cause for the failure of Essential Chiller B is not yet known. Restoration of operability to Essential Chilled Water Loop B concurrently restored operability to Emergency Feedwater Pump B. No plant transient or safety system actuations occurred. Plant operation continues stable at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 468246 May 2011 04:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOperators were making preparations to fill the Containment Spray System riser to support outage activities. At 0204 CDT, when Containment Spray Riser Isolation Valve CS-125A was opened, pressurizer level began to lower. The licensee suspects leak by of a valve in the Shutdown Cooling System. At 0214 CDT, the leak was stopped. Pressurizer level was lowered by 2.6%. After reviewing the event, the licensee determined that the leak rate was greater than 25 gpm which would have resulted in a declaration of an Unusual Event under EAL CU1. Since the event had concluded, no declaration was made. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 463084 October 2010 19:40:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a Non-Emergency 4 hour notification being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an Offsite Notification. On October 4, 2010, at 1500 CDT, the Waterford 3 Operations supervision was notified by the Outside Operations watchstander that there appeared to be a diesel oil film from upstream of the Mississippi River collecting on the upstream side of the Waterford 3 non-safety related Circulating Water intake weir. The Chemistry Department environmental expert went to investigate with the Outside watch and verified that a diesel film was washed upon the north wall of the weir at the shore line forming about a 50 square foot sheen of diesel. Safety systems are not impacted by this condition. At 1609, the National Response Center was notified of the discovery of the sheen at our intake from an unknown source upstream. The incident report number was 956006. The Coast Guard was notified and the Waterford 3 environmental chemist received a call from the Coast Guard requesting information. The information was confirmed that a diesel film was washed upon the north wall of the intake structure weir at the shore line forming about a 50 square foot sheen of what appears to be red colored diesel. At 1734, Louisiana Hazardous Materials Hotline was notified (IR# 10-05779). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 460778 July 2010 12:23:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEPursuant to Fitness For Duty and Fatigue Rule reporting requirements of 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii), Entergy is making this notification associated with violation of Waterford 3 working hour policy. This is a conservative report to proactively document the identified working hour issues. The site assembled a team for the purpose of reviewing working hours within the Waterford 3 Security Department to determine if the department is in compliance with procedure EN-OM-123 (Fatigue Management Program) and 10 CFR 26 Subpart I (Managing Fatigue). While this comprehensive review is still in progress, two examples have been identified associated with supervisory violations of the Fatigue Rule 'Working Hours.' This report is intended to capture these examples and to encompass any other examples that may be identified during this review process. The two examples of procedural violations are: Security supervisor had exceeded the 26 hours maximum in any 48 hour period by working 16 hours on 6/1/2010 and 11.5 hours on 6/2/2010 with no waiver in effect (10CFR26(d)(1)(ii)). Security supervisor had exceeded a 9 day period without a 34 hour break during the period of 5/16/2010 to 5/24/2010 with no waiver in effect (10CFR26(d)(2)(ii)). Security has verified the current watch bill meets the procedural and regulatory requirements. Security has implemented interim measures for the supervisors to perform a documented validation of work hour management system (PQ&S) data. Condition Report CR-WF3-2010-4156 has been initiated and entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program. The ongoing comprehensive review will be completed. Waterford 3 has communicated this issue with the Waterford 3 NRC Senior Resident (Inspector), the NRC Region IV Security Branch Chief, and the NRC NRR Project Manager. (During) the week of July 26, a follow up call is planned with NRC Region IV associated with the working hour issues.
ENS 4593920 May 2010 20:30:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a Non-Emergency 4 hour notification being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an Offsite Notification. On May 20, 2010, at approximately 1535 CDT Waterford 3 was notified by the Louisiana (LA) State Police that a transportation accident occurred involving a low level radioactive shipping container that was being carried by a tractor trailer truck located at mile marker 22 East on interstate highway I-12 near Walker, LA in Livingston Parish. The surface contaminated object (SCO) metal shipment container was being used by Miller Transfer Houston to transport a used Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor from Waterford 3 nuclear plant in Killona, LA to Westinghouse Waltz Mill in Madison, PA. The shipment weighing approximately 145,000 pounds departed Waterford 3 at approximately 1230 CDT with identification number of 10-3044 and pre-shipment radiological survey information of contamination levels of less than or equal to 15,000 dpm/100cm2 and dose rates of less than or equal to 0.4 mR/Hr. The tractor trailer is on its side, just off the interstate, on the grass. The shipping container boxed cover lid has opened, exposing the RCP motor, showing that it is still wrapped with contamination protective covering and still fastened to the container base and trailer. The initial, basic radiological assessment performed by the LA State Police Hazmat technician supervisor resulted in no indication of hazardous levels of radiation dose rates. Waterford 3 dispatched a Radiation Protection field team who arrived at approximately 1840 CDT and surveyed the container and the contents. The survey results indicate no radiological breach, with smear results of contaminations no higher than background and radiation dose rates of no higher than 0.5 mR/Hr. There was no report of other vehicles involved. The driver was contacted by cell phone, who reported that he has been transported to the hospital emergency room for a CAT scan. The failure mode has yet to be determined. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 456722 February 2010 20:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn February 2, 2010, at approximately 1400 CST, Entergy personnel manually switched the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation System Panel to the isolation mode. This manual switching to the isolation mode will cause the isolation dampers to close and the movement of the dampers closing can normally be heard. An indication light on the ventilation panel will illuminate when the dampers close. For the manual isolation on February 2, 2010, these indications did not occur. Waterford 3 personnel have made a judgment that the isolation dampers may not be closed due the lack of the aforementioned indications. The EOF ventilation system is not able to perform its isolation function if the dampers are not closed. The ventilation system and associated dampers are designed to provide protection from radiological and toxic chemical release. This report is being made because the time to restore the ventilation system to functional status is indeterminate at this time, until the actual condition of the ventilation system can be established. The back up EOF facility is judged to be functional based on January 12, 2010 communications check and facility readiness verifications on January 28, 2010. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 456701 February 2010 21:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 4552629 November 2009 05:08:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

10CFR50 Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing determined the total 'as-found' containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves can not be tested individually. This condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The condition was discovered with the plant in Mode 5. Corrective actions have already been completed and all penetrations, as well as total containment leakage, is well within limits established by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JIM POLLOCK TO PETE SNYDER AT 1711 EST ON 12/2/09 * * * 

On November 29, 2009, Waterford 3 reported that the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves could not be tested individually. This condition was determined to be reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR72(b)(3)(ii). Subsequently, Waterford 3 has evaluated the leak rates for all three penetrations and determined that as-found leakage rates assigned to the penetrations should not have been recorded at 630,000 sccm each, but should have been recorded at lower values. After one valve was re-worked in Penetration number 48, a Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) was completed. With the new information from the second LLRT, a revised as-found leak rate of 97 sccm was assigned to the un-worked valve. For Penetration number 10, an Engineering evaluation of the test results was completed. The evaluation determined that the as-found leakage from this penetration was 191,000 sccm. This was based on calculating the maximum air flow capacity that could be obtained from the Leak Rate Monitor test equipment and using the first LLRT's penetration only reaching a test pressure of 43 psig instead of the 44 psig full test pressure. For Penetration number 11, troubleshooting activities determined that one of the valves had no detectable leakage; however, a leak rate of 9,100 sccm was assigned based on its previous as-left leakage value. With the lower leakage rates, the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate is calculated to be 230,682 sccm, which is within the limit of 630,000 SCCM. Since Waterford 3 had not exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate, EN #45526 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Deese).

ENS 454763 November 2009 23:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAn employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4544519 October 2009 14:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 0915 CDT on 10/19/09 a Waterford 3 Moisture Separator Heater shell-slide relief valve (RS-203B) inadvertently opened, causing reactor power to increase from 100% to approximately 100.27% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). Operations reduced Main Turbine-Generator load by approximately 26 megawatts to restore reactor power to less than 100% RTP. At approximately 0942 CDT, Operations commenced a rapid plant shutdown because the relief valve would not re-close. At approximately 0944 CDT, Operations manually tripped the reactor due to a low condenser hot well level, just prior to reaching the Condensate Pumps Trip setpoint, to avoid a loss of Main Feedwater event. The Plant Protection System (PPS) responded as designed, resulting in an uncomplicated reactor trip. Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) was received on low Steam Generator level as expected from reactor trip at or near full power. Steam Generator levels remained above the EFAS injection level setpoint so that actual injection of Emergency Feedwater did not occur. No other PPS actuation occurred. The plant is currently being maintained in Mode 3. Waterford 3 plans to commence refueling outage (RF16) at this time, approximately 1 - 2 days earlier than scheduled. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 444541 September 2008 00:16:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

Site declared a notification of unusual event under HU6/ EAL 7. The site is predicted to experience hurricane force winds from Gustav. As a conservative measure, the plant shutdown was completed at 2232 CDT. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local emergency management agencies. Notified DHS (Hill) and FEMA (Blankenship).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0126 ON 9/4/2008 FROM JERRY GRUBB TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The site has exited the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) at 0021 CDT because 1) grid stability has been restored, 2) HU6/EAL 7 is no longer applicable (Hurricane Gustav is no longer affecting the site), and 3) the NUE for leakage greater than 25 gpm (SU7/EAL 2) is no longer applicable (entered at 0726 on 9/1/2008 and terminated at 0729 on 9/1/2008). The reactor is in mode-4 (Hot Shutdown). Notified the R4DO (Jones), NRR (Blount), IRD (Gott), DHS (Dub), and FEMA (Casto).

ENS 4286025 September 2006 14:33:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn September 7, 2006 at about 0750 CDST, an invalid actuation of B train Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) occurred during maintenance on ESFAS relay K110 B. The following B train Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) relays de-energized: K101, K102, K103, K108 and K109. The event is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a 60 day notification and is being reported to the NRC by phone within 60 days. The invalid actuations did not occur when the systems had already been properly removed from service nor after the safety function had already been completed. The 32B buss de-energized which resulted in loss of pressurizer heaters Bank B and Containment Fan Coolers B and D actuated by shifting to slow speed. There was no actual Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) system flows actuated. All of the affected equipment functioned as designed when the relays deenergized The NRC Senior Resident was informed of the event.
ENS 4267228 June 2006 20:11:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn June 28, 2006 at approximately 1415 (CDT), power was lost to the Waterford 3 SES Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) when a tree fell onto the power line feeding the EOF. Power was automatically restored to the EOF from the EOF backup diesel generator. Several minutes later, power was lost to the EOF again when the EOF backup diesel tripped. (Normal) power was restored to the facility at approximately 1550, and the EOF is operable. The backup EOF facility was available during this event. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
ENS 4263612 June 2006 21:33:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAs part of an analysis to determine feasibility of manual actions, it was identified that three actions for Fire Area RAB 7 could not be performed within the times prescribed in the Post Shutdown Analysis. The subject fire area is subdivided by part height fire walls. Waterford 3 has an approved Appendix R deviation for the part height fire wall configuration. Assuming a fire in Fire Area RAB 7 Operator entry into that same fire area is required. Results of the analysis indicate that the conditions in Fire Zone RAB 7B rapidly exceed the habitability threshold and do not moderate before ten minutes, the time at which one of the three manual actions is required, given a fire in Fire Zone RAB 7A. Because the space becomes uninhabitable, the manual action in Fire Zone RAB 7A is not feasible. A continuous fire watch has been established within Fire Area RAB 7 as a compensatory measure. This condition is reportable within 8 hours pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4213812 November 2005 04:48:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

Waterford 3 manually tripped the reactor at 20:34 (CST) on 11/11/05 due to lowering main condenser vacuum caused by a loss of all circ water pumps. Subsequently an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) was received due to low steam generator levels. The plant is currently being maintained in mode 3 with both Steam Generators being fed from the Auxiliary Feedwater system with Steam Generator levels in the normal operational band for mode 3. The EFAS has been reset. The plant will be maintained in Mode 3 while a Post Trip Review is performed. This report is submitted as required by 10CFR50.72. All control rods fully inserted on the manual trip. The main steam isolation valves are shut and the heat sink is through the atmospheric dump valves. The electrical grid is stable and plant power is from the startup transformer. No primary or secondary relief valves or safety valves lifted. The site was able to restart the B & D circ water pumps. There is no significant steam generator tube leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PICKENS TO HUFFMAN AT 13:55 EST ON 11/14/05 * * *

This notification is an update to an immediate notification that was called into the NRC Operations Center at 04:48 (eastern time) on November 12, 2005 (Event # 42138). The event was reported as an 8-hour event. This update to the original notification is to communicate that, based on further review, the event notification should have been made within 4 hours since it was reportable within 4 hours as well as the 8-hour reporting criteria and therefore the call should have been made within the 4 hour period. The condition is reportable under four hour reporting criteria 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a manual trip of the plant in anticipation of receiving a RPS Trip with the Reactor critical. The condition is reportable within eight hour reporting criteria 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the automatic actuation of EFAS upon low steam generator levels. This update does not report a change to the event description reported. As mentioned in the original report, Waterford 3 manually tripped the reactor at 20:34 on November 11, 2005 due to lowering main condenser vacuum caused by a loss of all circulating water pumps. Subsequently an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) was received due to low steam generator levels. The plant was then maintained in Mode 3 with both steam generators being fed from the Auxiliary Feedwater System with steam generator levels in the normal operational band for Mode 3. The EFAS had been reset at the time of the original notification. The plant was maintained in Mode 3 while a Post Trip Review was performed. Further details of the event will be reported under the 60 day LER reporting criteria. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Clark) notified.

ENS 4195427 August 2005 23:22:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 2204 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to a Hurricane warning in St Charles Parish, LA. The licensee does not have any Limiting Conditions for Operation on safety related equipment. No electrical grid disturbances currently exist. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State and Local government agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM J. PIERCE TO M. RIPLEY 1144 EDT 08/28/05 * * *

Waterford 3 will commence a plant shutdown to Mode 4 on August 28, 2005 at 1100 CDT. The goal is to be approximately 325 deg F reactor coolant system temperature with both trains of Shutdown Cooling in service (expected at approximately 0100 CDT 08/29/05) . This is approximately 2 hours before hurricane force winds are expected on site. Notified R4DO (Jones), NRR EO (Kuo), IRD Mgr. (Wilson), DHS (York), and FEMA (Canupp).

  • * * UPDATE FROM J. PIERCE TO J. ROTTON 1131 EDT 08/29/05 * * *

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, all offsite power was lost at 0800 CDT. The emergency diesel generators successfully started and loaded. Notified R4DO (R. Bywater), NSIR (Leach, Wilson), NRR EO (Kuo, Jung), FEMA (Kuzia), DHS (Stransky).

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (LEWIS) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 2302 EDT ON 8/29/05 * * *

The Hurricane warning for St Charles Parish, LA, has been discontinued by the National Weather Service. Initiating condition, D UE-5, is no longer applicable. Waterford 3 remains in an Unusual Event for initiating condition C UE-1, loss of all offsite power. An agreement to relax 60 minute notification updates to State and local authorities remains in effect. The licensee has notified State and local authorities as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. Offsite power is available to the licensee switchyard. However, the voltage is too high for plant specification and the licensee remains disconnected from offsite power and on the emergency diesel generators.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (LEWIS) TO NRC (KNOKE) AT 0001 EDT ON 8/31/05 * * *

Waterford 3 remains in an Unusual Event for initiating condition C UE-1, loss of all offsite power. An agreement to relax 60 minute notification updates to State and local authorities remains in effect. The communications system for Public Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) is working internally, but not externally. Other areas where communications are lost are Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Operations hotline, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), and the Emergency Notification System (ENS). Waterford has use of an industrial hotline to a circuit in the Parish of St Charles, however, this is very limited in its capability. The Civil Defense communication system is still inoperable.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1903 ON 9/6/05 FROM WAIG TO GOULD * * *

NRC exited monitoring mode at 1800 CDT on 9/6/05. Notified R4 IRC (Waig), R4DO (Powers), IRD (Leach), DHS (Cartlidge), FEMA (Kuzia).

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (LEWIS) TO NRC (KNOKE) AT 19:12 EDT ON 09/07/05 * * *

At 17:57 CDT the licensee exited from the Unusual Event. Offsite power was restored and communications were reestablished with (1) a functional operational hotline, (2) a dedicated open line to NRC Headquarters Operations Center, and (3) having the plant PABX circuits routed through Little Rock, AK area code. The plant is holding in Mode 5 until further notice, however, this may change when the decision to (or not to) repair a check valve in the Safety Injection system is made. Notified R4DO (Powers), IRD (McGinty), NRR EO (Hackett), DHS (Sullivan), and FEMA (Kuzia).

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE AT 08:45 EDT ON 09/08/05 * * *

This report has been updated to reflect the correct time of the licensee exiting their unusual event classification. Unusual event was exited at 1740 CDT not 1757 CDT. Notified R4DO (Powers), IRD (McGinty), NRR EO (Jung).

ENS 4173328 May 2005 06:34:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

In accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), this report is being made to notify the NRC, via ENS, under a four hour report based on a planned notification to OSHA. Based on 29CFR1904.39(b)(5) and (b)(2) OSHA requirements for notification in case of a fatality at work, the below information will be provided to OSHA. At 04:00 (CDT) on 5/28105, the site decided to report the following information, although the cause of death has not yet been determined.

An employee exited the work area and was found sitting in a chair in the office area slumped over, unconscious, no pulse, no breathing. Ventilation and CPR was initiated. An AED was utilized, and one shock was advised and administered. EMT's arrived (at 21:50 CDT) and transported (the) employee (via ambulance) to the hospital (at 22:07 CDT) without incident, while still performing CPR. The employee was not contaminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4168710 May 2005 15:55:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 416592 May 2005 12:18:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn May 2, 2005, with Waterford 3 in Mode 6, it was determined that Steam Generator 1 In-Service Inspection had identified more than 1 % defective tubes. Per Technical Specification table 4.4.2-C. this percentage of defective tubes is characterized as "C-3" and should be reported to the NRC. Accordingly, this event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an 8-Hr Non-Emergency Degraded Condition. In addition, per Technical Specification 4.4.4.5, the final results of the Steam Generator tube inspection, which fall into category C-3, shall be reported in a special report within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. Defective tubes will be plugged. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4161719 April 2005 22:15:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEWaterford Unit 3 shutdown on 4/17/2005 at approximately 0047 hrs to begin refueling outage 13. During performance of the Alloy 600 Program pressurizer "bare metal" inspection, a small amount of boric acid was discovered in the annulus around Pressurizer heater sleeves C4 and D2. Entergy had already planned to weld repair/replace the Alloy 600 pressurizer sleeves and remaining Alloy 600 small bore instrument penetrations using Alloy 690 materials during this refueling outage. This condition constitutes a degradation of the RCS Pressure Boundary and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) with a required followup written Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4104014 September 2004 17:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: Waterford 3 entered Unusual Event Emergency Classification due to the National Weather Service declaring a hurricane warning for St. Charles Parish at 1600 CDT. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 09/16/04 AT 0635 EDT FROM KENNY CAMBRE TO STEVE SANDIN * * *

Waterford 3 is no longer in an unusual event (as of 0502 CDT) . Hurricane watch/warnings for St. Charles Parish has been lifted at 0400. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRC Region 4 IRC, FEMA (Kevin Biscoe), NRR (Catherine Haney), IRD (Peter Wilson), DHS (Frank Griggs).

ENS 406321 April 2004 00:44:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA new worst case single failure was identified on 03-31-04 for the small break LOCA analysis of record due to a postulated loss of a DC power bus. This condition may result in the analysis of record exceeding 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criterion of 2200 F when a small break LOCA with this failure is postulated. The current small break LOCA analysis of record assumes a single failure of one Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and credits flow from one charging pump. The peak cladding temperature for the analysis of record is 1929 F compared to the acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 2200 F. Half of the flow from a charging pump is assumed to go to the RCS and half is assumed to flow out the break. It was identified on 03-31-04 that a single failure of a DC power bus would be more limiting than the currently assumed single failure of an EDG. The DC bus failure will result in the EDG failure to start and also cause a charging loop isolation valve to the RCS to fail closed on loss of DC power. The other charging flow path to the RCS is on the assumed broken RCS leg so it is assumed to be spilled to the containment resulting in no charging flow to the RCS. Therefore, no charging flow would be delivered to the RCS as assumed in the current small break LOCA analysis of record. This condition has not been analyzed. Engineering judgment indicates that in the event of a small break accident the 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criterion of 2200 F may be exceeded if the charging flow is not credited in the analysis of record. Therefore, this condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The current conservatism in the analysis of record and previous Westinghouse SBLOCA non-design basis scoping analyses using the NOTRUMP code provide assurance the plant is operating in a safe manner and is operable. The NOTRUMP analyses included cases with no changing flow. The peak clad temperature for these analyses were significantly below the acceptance criteria of 2200 F by more than 200 F. Thus, if an analysis were performed for Waterford 3 with the NOTRUMP code there is reasonable assurance due to the large margins that acceptable results would be achieved without any charging flow. This report is based on conservative judgment and available information. This report may be retracted based on the results of further evaluation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4051913 February 2004 20:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

On February 13, 2004, Waterford 3 reactor power reached an estimated maximum reactor power level of 101.9% due to Atmospheric Dump Valve #2 (ADV#2) failing full open. ADV#2 failed open due to the control system setpoint failing low. Operations personnel promptly responded to the condition by reducing turbine load (5 megawatts per minute ) and manually closing ADV#2, to restore plant power. ADV#2 was open for less than a minute. Per the FSAR, this transient is an analyzed event and is bounded by the safety analyses. This event is being reported in accordance with Waterford 3 event notification and reporting procedure, UNT-006-010, which is more conservative than the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure 61706. This event is being reported pursuant to Waterford 3 License Condition 2.F as a 24 hour notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM R. MURILLO TO M. RIPLEY 2100 ET ON 03/15/04 * * *

On February 13, 2004, Waterford 3 provided a 24 hour notification to the NRC (reference EN# 40519) stating that due to a failed open atmospheric dump valve, plant reactor power level momentarily reached a value of 101.9%. The event was reported conservatively based on the guidance provided in the plant's event notification and reporting procedure. The procedure has been revised to incorporate the guidance provided by NRC inspection Procedure 61706, 'Core Thermal Power Evaluation.' Based on this guidance, reporting of events such as stated above (transient power increases) are not required unless reactor power level exceeds 102%. Accordingly, this event is not reportable as power level only reached 101.9% momentarily. Based on the above, the 24 hour notification made on 2/13/2004 is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (J. Clark)

ENS 4030610 November 2003 06:41:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

Discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow access to a controlled access area for which compensatory measures were not employed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. TAS notified Region IAT member who will followup for NRC. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/13/03 @ 1340 BY T. MANZELLA/ R. MURILLO TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION

After further review it was determined that there was no vulnerability that would allow access to a controlled access area, therefore the licensee is retracting this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

ENS 402954 November 2003 12:08:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 0400 CDT on November 4, 2003 with Waterford 3 refueled, steam generator inspection was being performed in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.4.2, Steam Generator Tube Sample Selection and Inspection. The results of the on-going inspection performed on Steam Generator 31 indicated that greater than 1% of the inspected tubes require repair. The number of inspected tubes for SG 31 is 8906 and to date 98 tubes require repair. Based on TS 4.4.4.2.C, this determination results in the Category C-3. The current inspection results do not meet the criteria specified for steam generator tube degradation in NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. However, for Category C-3, TS Table 4.4-2, Steam Generator Tube Inspection, requires that the results of the inspection be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2), which was superceded by an 8 hr notification in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Per TS 4.4.4.5, the final results of the SG tube inspection, which fall into Category C-3, shall be reported in a special report within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4027827 October 2003 00:21:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEInspection of the pressurizer bottom nozzles in accordance with the Alloy 600 Program during Refuel 12 identified a wet stain on heater sleeve C1, and a nozzle with a white substance extruding from a portion of the penetration on heater sleeve C3. The substance could not be verified at the time, and further investigation is required to determine if the substance is boron on heater sleeve C3. This condition constitutes a degradation of the RCS Pressure Boundary and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4027725 October 2003 07:53:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEDuring inspection of the hot leg nozzles on RCP loop #2 in accordance with the Alloy 600 Program Plan during Refuel 12, evidence of leakage was identified on nozzle RC-IPT-0106B. This constitutes degradation of the RCS pressure boundary. Corrective action is being evaluated. RC-IPT-0106B is a pressure transmitter that taps off of reactor coolant system hot leg (loop) # 2 . The location of the Pressure transmitter is found in Waterford Unit 3, FSAR Chapter 5.1, Flow Diagram Reactor Coolant System, Figure 5.1-3. The license said that the picture indicates a small amount of boric acid crystals in the area of the leakage. Licensee did not know if the leakage is from a weld, pin hole leak, etc. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.