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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 4534713 September 2009 16:12:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEThe SONGS Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped from approximately 94% power at 1243 PDT due to loss of turbine load caused by lowering main condenser vacuum. Prior to the reactor trip, personnel were attempting to conduct a heat treat on Unit 2. During this evolution, Gate 5 in the main circulating water system was being repositioned when it stopped moving at 45 percent. This resulted in a recirculation and subsequent increase in circulating water temperature, a lowering main condenser vacuum, a loss of load on the main turbine, and an associated automatic reactor trip. All rods inserted on the automatic reactor trip and the electric grid is stable. This event report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a valid Reactor Protection System actuation. Decay heat is being removed via normal feedwater to steam generators steaming through the condenser bypass valves to the main condenser. At the time of this event, SONGS Unit 3 was operating at approximately 99% power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 453283 September 2009 23:18:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On September 3, 2009, at approximately 1730 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) was notified by a metal recycling vendor that a metal recycle load that was picked up at SONGS had been rejected at Terminal Island (Long Beach, CA) because it set off a radiation portal monitor as it was being processed through. The vendor (Alpert and Alpert) was requested to immediately ship the material back to SONGS. The County of Los Angeles Public Health, Radiation Management Division (Joji Ortego) called to confirm final destination, and a Special DOT Permit was issued to return the shipment to SONGS. The truck is currently returning to San Onofre where SCE Health Physicists will evaluate the load. SCE is reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). SCE will provide an update to this report after the truck has returned to SONGS and the contents evaluated. At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 and 100 percent power respectively. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID AXLINE TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1456 ON 09/04/09 * * *

The truck returned to SONGS site and SONGS has performed surveys on the contents of the truck cargo containers. SONGS' preliminary investigation did not identify any licensed radioactive material either internal or external to the containers. Surveys indicate that the source of the radiation appears to be boxes of ceramic tiles being removed from a storage area outside the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). Gamma isotopic analysis indicate the tiles appear to contain naturally occurring radioactive material (thorium byproducts). SONGS will continue to perform additional surveys to validate our initial conclusions. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 4527419 August 2009 16:19:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEDuring an exercise, sirens for the city of San Clemente (19 of 52 total sirens) were inadvertently actuated for approximately ten seconds. The licensee made off-site notifications to California FEMA, California Dept of Health, California State Parks, Camp Pendleton, and the cities of San Clemente, San Juan Capistrano, and Dana Point. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4521220 July 2009 19:13:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4520514 July 2009 22:18:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On Monday July 13, 2009, at approximately 1100 PDT, Southern California Edison discovered a loss of the ability to activate 10 Community Alert Sirens (CAS) located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base. Prior to the discovery, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009, at approximately 1152 PDT. On July 13, 2009, at approximately 1130 PDT, SCE re-established the ability to activate the sirens. SCE is currently conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the problem, to try to ascertain the time that the loss of ability to activate the sirens occurred, and to identify the cause of the delay in reporting this event. SCE assumes the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours, and therefore, is reporting this event as a loss of emergency offsite capability, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 100 percent power, respectively. A CAS power panel was found with a tripped breaker. An investigation into the cause of the breaker trip is ongoing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1354 EDT ON 7/16/09 FROM M. MCBREATY TO CHARLES TEAL * * *

During a follow up investigation, SCE identified information to indicate the loss of the ability to activate the 10 Community Alert Sirens located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base occurred at approximately 1800 PDT on July 10, 2009. Therefore, the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours. Additionally, SCE verified that, prior to the discovery of the inoperable sirens, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009 at 1053 PDT (not 1152 PDT as initially reported). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and will be provided with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO Vincent Gaddy.

ENS 4513817 June 2009 17:10:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4498512 April 2009 13:47:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn Sunday, April 12, 2009 at about 0430 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) discovered that approximately 300 gallons of sulfuric acid had overflowed from the Unit 3 Sulfuric Acid Day Tank. The acid was contained within a berm around the tank, and there was no release to the environment. SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station) Hazardous Materials personnel are in the process of responding to this event. Once onsite they will remove the acid from the berm for disposal at a hazardous waste facility. The overflow was caused by leakage from the Bulk Acid Tank to the Acid Day Tank. At about 1004 PDT, SCE notified the San Diego County Department of Environmental Health, and at about 0940 PDT, SCE notified the California Office of Emergency Services. SCE is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At the time of the report, SONGS Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at approximately 99% power and Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report.
ENS 4498310 April 2009 18:21:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn Friday April 10, 2009, at about 0900 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) discovered that approximately 1,000 gallons of sulfuric acid had overflowed from the Unit 3 Sulfuric Acid Day Tank. The acid was contained within a berm around the tank, and there was no release to the environment. SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station) Hazardous Materials personnel responded to the event, and are in the process of removing the acid from the berm for disposal at a hazardous waste facility. The overflow was caused by leakage from the Bulk Acid Tank to the Acid Day Tank. At about 1340 PDT, SCE notified the San Diego County Department of Environmental Health, and at about 1353 PDT, SCE notified the California Office of Emergency Services. SCE is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At the time of this report, SONGS Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at approximately 99% power and Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report.
ENS 4489711 March 2009 19:49:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA non-supervisory contract employee was found using illegal drugs in the Protected Area. A for-cause fitness for duty test resulted in a confirmed positive drug test. The contract employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 444561 September 2008 17:03:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn September 1, 2008, at about 1035 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) began a planned shutdown of San Onofre Unit 3. This shutdown is in anticipation of exceeding the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) of 14 days of Technical Specification 3.8.1 Action B.4 for an inoperable Diesel Generator (Train B). The AOT is due to expire on September 2, 2008 at about 0200. If the system cannot be restored within the allowed outage time, a plant shutdown is required. The initiation of this shutdown is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). An inspection of the DG generator revealed cracks in the shorting ring, requiring replacement of the generator. Post maintenance testing performed after replacement revealed anomalous readings. SCE determined that problem identification, repair and post test could not be performed before expiration of the AOT. Consequently, shutdown has been initiated. At the initiation of the shutdown, SONGS Unit 3 was operating at full power. SONGS Unit 2 is operating at approximately 99 percent power. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been briefed on the shutdown plans and will be provided with a copy of this report.
ENS 4437429 July 2008 19:09:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn July 29, 2008, SCE issued a press release regarding the earthquake that occurred on the same day. Along with information on other facilities, the press release included information on San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant and stated: The earthquake was felt at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station site. There were no safety issues reported and no indications of any damage. The plant continues to operate normally. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4435518 July 2008 19:36:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

Southern California Edison (SCE) has scheduled maintenance for the electrical system of the San Onofre Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), for Saturday, July 19, 2008. While the maintenance is being performed, the EOF will be inoperable. The EOF outage is expected to begin at 0800 PDT and last approximately 4 hours. The alternate EOF, located in Irvine, CA, will be available should SCE need to respond to an Emergency Event. The Emergency Recall System, which is housed in the EOF, will be out of service while the maintenance is performed. Should recall of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) be necessary during the EOF outage, SCE will utilize alternate methods (contained in existing site procedures) for activating the ERO. This planned EOF outage is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 98 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this report and will be provided a copy.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY SUSAN GARDNER TO JASON KOZAL ON 7/19/08 AT 1705 * * *

The Emergency Operations Facility was returned to service on July 19, 2008 at 1240 PDT. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO (Johnson).

ENS 442736 June 2008 04:48:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEDuring the performance of stator water low flow testing a turbine trip and subsequent Reactor trip occurred on low cooling flow to the main generator rectifier. An Automatic Emergency Feedwater actuation signal occurred on low steam generator level due to unit trip. This is an expected actuation for a turbine/reactor trip from 100% power. The Engineered Safety Function Actuation operated as designed. On the Unit trip, the main feedwater pumps exhibited large rpm oscillations. Operators tripped one of the non-safety related main feed pumps, and placed the second in manual which stabilized the main feedwater system. When conditions allowed, operators placed the operating main feed pump in automatic control. All rods fully inserted successfully. All emergency systems operated as required. No PORV's or Safety valves lifted during this event. Auxiliary Feedwater system is available, but not in use at this time. RCPs are in operation transferring decay heat to steam generators. Main steam is being directed to main condenser via bypass. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4425130 May 2008 18:05:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

Southern California Edison has scheduled replacement of the backup diesel generator (DG) for the San Onofre Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), for Saturday May 31, 2008. While the new DG is being installed, the EOF will be inoperable. The EOF outage is expected to begin at about 0700 and last approximately 8 hours. The alternate EOF located in Irvine, CA, will be available should SONGS need to respond to an Emergency Event. The Emergency Recall System, which is housed in the EOF, will be out of service while the new DG is being installed. Should recall of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) be necessary during the EOF outage, SCE will utilize alternate methods (contained in existing site procedures) for activating the ERO. This planned EOF outage is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 98 percent power, respectively. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2324 ON 5/31/2008 FROM MIKE McBREARTY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Emergency Operations Facility was returned to service on May 31, 2008 at 1810 PDT. SCE is continuing to troubleshoot problems identified with the transfer switch associated with the new backup diesel generator, and will inform the NRC Resident Inspectors when the backup DG is available. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4424729 May 2008 18:06:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On May 29, 2008, at approximately 1136 PDT, the offsite power grid connected to San Onofre experienced a momentary system disturbance. Control Room indicators alerted Operators that the grid frequency dipped to approximately 59.6 Hz. Because frequency dipped below 59.7 Hz, SCE is reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The frequency dip lasted approximately 10 seconds, reportedly due to a loss of generation in the Pacific Northwest. The grid is currently operating at nominal frequency.

At the time of the event, San Onofre Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 99 percent power and Unit 3 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 80 percent power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and will be provided a copy of this report.

ENS 4422720 May 2008 18:44:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On Tuesday, May 20, 2008, at approximately 1310 PDT, the offsite power grid connected to San Onofre experienced a momentary system disturbance. Control Room indicators alerted Operators that the grid frequency dipped to approximately 59.69 Hz. Because frequency dipped below 59.7 Hz, SCE is reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The frequency dip lasted approximately 10 seconds, reportedly due to a high voltage DC transmission line disturbance in Oregon. The grid is currently operating at nominal frequency.

At the time of the event, San Onofre Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 99 percent power and Unit 3 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 80 percent power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and provided a copy of this report.

ENS 4409225 March 2008 15:26:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn March 25, 2008 at approximately 0640 PDT, SCE discovered a battery with voltage slightly below Technical Specification limits. At approximately 0840 PDT, plant operators began cooling Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSR) in preparation for a Shutdown as required by TS 3.8.4. Initiating MSR cooldown reduced reactor power by 0.1%. Although plant operators had not initiated boration or control rod insertion, SCE is, nevertheless, reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). At approximately 0850 PDT, the battery was restored to Operable status and MSR cooldown was suspended. At approximately 1112 PDT, the Unit was returned to full power. SCE is continuing to assess if additional actions are required. At the time the shutdown was initiated, Unit 2 was operating at about 100% power. Unit 3 continues to operate at about 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been briefed on the shutdown plans and will be provided with a copy of this report. Preliminary information indicates that the degraded voltage was due to loose terminal bolts.
ENS 4393325 January 2008 14:43:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On January 25, 2008, at about 0902 PST, SCE notified the City of Dana Point Emergency and Support Services of a spurious actuation of a SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station) emergency response siren located in the City of Dana Point. The actuation occurred on January 25, 2008 at about 0900 PST with a duration of approximately ten seconds. The cause of the actuation appears to be due to SCE (Southern California Edison) maintenance being performed at the time. SCE personnel notified Orange County and the State of California Office of Emergency Services regarding the inadvertent actuation of part of the public notification system.

In compliance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), requiring licensees to report any event that results in notification to other government agencies, SCE is providing this notification to the NRC.

"At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 96 percent power and Unit 3 was operating at about 100 percent power.  SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.
ENS 4392823 January 2008 21:34:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On January 23, 2008, at about 1415 PST, SONGS Unit 2 was operating at approximately 95 percent power when one of two main feed water pumps (P063/K005), tripped on low oil pressure while an adjustment was being made to the pump's lubricating oil pressure regulator. Control room operators manually actuated the emergency feedwater system in accordance with Abnormal Operating Instructions. Control room operators reduced reactor power level to about 65 percent which can be sustained with one normal feedwater pump in operation. The cause of this event is currently under investigation.

In compliance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), requiring licensees to report any event or condition that results in valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system, SCE is providing this notification to the NRC. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 3 was operating at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.

ENS 4383711 December 2007 17:53:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn Tuesday, December 11, 2007, at approximately 1105 PST, the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Control Room Red Phone and commercial telephone systems became inoperable for approximately 10 minutes. Control Room Red Phone operability was confirmed by a successful call to NRC Headquarters Operation Office about 1115 PST. Southern California Edison is reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a condition that resulted in a major loss of offsite communications capability (Emergency Notification System and offsite notification system). As part of the problem solving efforts, the Red Phone may become inoperable for brief periods of time. At the time of this report, Unit 2 is in Mode 6 in a refueling outage and Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and provided a copy of this report. The licensee still had satellite phone communications capability.
ENS 436945 October 2007 18:45:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4357919 August 2007 02:23:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On August 18, 2007, at about 1955 PDT, both of SONGS Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were found in a condition that was not seismically analyzed. At about 2015 PDT on August 18, 2007, both of SONGS Unit 2 EDGs were found to be in the same unanalyzed condition. The condition involved EDG maintenance work platforms that had not been properly restrained, and, in the position found, could potentially render the EDGs inoperable during a seismic event. SCE is reporting this occurrence as a potential loss of safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). SCE took immediate actions to properly restrain the EDG work platforms, and an evaluation will be conducted to determine the cause of this event. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 99% power and Unit 3 was operating at about 100% power. SCE has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1853 EDT ON 09/14/07 FROM SUSAN GARDNER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On August 18, 2007, SCE reported that Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) work platforms on both Units 2 and 3 had not been properly restrained. This resulted in a condition unanalyzed for seismic events. Consequently, both trains of EDGs on both Units 2 and 3 were declared inoperable. SCE evaluated configuration of the platforms for vulnerabilities to a design bases event. SCE concluded that the DGs were operable as-found. Consequently, SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC (Event Log No. 43579)." The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Jones).

ENS 4343521 June 2007 03:24:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEAt 2250 on 6/20/07, "Instrument Air header pressure failed at a brazed joint. The loss of Instrument Air pressure caused the Steam Generator (S/G) Feedwater Regulating Valves to stop controlling and S/G level, E-088, to rise uncontrolled. Control Room Operators tripped the reactor manually. Main Feedwater Pumps were manually tripped to stop excess feedwater to the S/Gs. Loss of Instrument Air failed the normal cooling to Containment. Containment Emergency Cooling units were manually started to provide containment cooling. The standard post trip actions were carried out with all safety functions satisfied." The site is proceeding with post trip recovery. The Instrument Air leak was isolated at 2321 PDT. All control rods fully inserted on the manual trip. RCPs are in operation transferring decay heat to the S/Gs. Emergency feedwater is feeding the S/Gs with steam being discharged to the condenser via the steam dumps. Atmospheric relief valves were used to discharge steam to the atmosphere initially for approximately 20 minutes following the trip. There are no primary to secondary tube leaks. Containment isolation failed closed as expected following the loss of instrument air pressure to the containment. Normal offsite power is available and the emergency diesel generators are available if needed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 432072 March 2007 17:03:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY S.GARDNER TO KOZAL ON 3/16/07 1728 EDT * * *

The licensee provided a retraction regarding the above positive alcohol fitness-for-duty test. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Shannon) notified.

ENS 4276714 August 2006 15:08:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn Monday, August 14, 2006, Southern California Edison (SCE) made a voluntary communication to California State and Local government agencies regarding water samples taken during on-going Unit 1 decommissioning activities. During the week of August 7, 2006, water samples were found to have tritium levels ranging from 50,000 -- 330,000 picoCuries/liter. No permits were violated. It was thought that the contamination may be attributed to historical events during Unit 1 operation (Unit 1 ceased commercial operation in 1992). SCE is investigating the source of the tritium and, as part of decommissioning, will remediate the contamination. The groundwater beneath SONGS is not a source of drinking water. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report.
ENS 4264415 June 2006 15:31:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop
CE

On Tuesday, June 13, 2006, at approximately 2205 PDT, an on duty SONGS security officer driving an SCE vehicle struck a pedestrian on a public road outside the Owner Controlled Area. At that time, the officer was performing routine rounds and was driving between the plant and SCE's MESA facility. SCE notified local authorities including the California Highway Patrol and the Orange County Fire Authority.

The individual sustained serious injuries and was transported to a local hospital. SCE has been notified unofficially that the individual passed away on June 14, 2006. The identity of the individual is unknown by SCE. SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). No news release is planned by SCE at this time. At the time of this report, Units 2 and 3 were operating at about 99 and 100 percent power, respectively. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report.

ENS 4245129 March 2006 06:34:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On March 27, 2006, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 while starting up from a refueling outage, (Southern California Edison (SCE)) discovered that the gasket used to seal the manway cover for Safety Injection Tank (SIT) T-008 had become partially dislodged. The gasket is a 'flexitalic' type gasket which consists of a long section of crushable wire that is coiled and compressed between the manway cover and the safety injection tank flange. For SIT T-008, the flexitalic gasket had uncoiled and extended down into the SIT and prevented SIT outlet check valve MU040 from fully sealing in the closed position. On March 28, SCE inspected the remaining three SITs (SITs # 007, 009 and 010) and found the flexitalic gaskets degraded but intact and not interfering with other components.

When this condition was discovered at Unit 2, San Onofre Unit 3 was operating at approximately 100 percent power. Similar flexitalic gaskets are also used for the manway covers on the four SITs at Unit 3. At 0001 PST on March 29, 2006, SCE conservatively declared both trains of the emergency core cooling system at Unit 3 inoperable. This placed Unit 3 in a TS 3.0.3 shutdown action statement. Plant Operators began the required Unit 3 shutdown at about 0050 on March 29, 2006. SCE is providing this phone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The electric grid in the area is stable and Emergency Diesel Generators are available on Unit 3. There is no maintenance being performed on systems required for shutdown on Unit 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 12:14 ON 5/30/2006 FROM L. CONKLIN TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On March 29, 2006, SCE reported the initiation of the shutdown to the NRC Operations Center (Event Log No. 42451). At the time, SCE was concerned that if the gaskets were uncoiled they might have interfered with operation of the ECCS. After completing the plant shutdown, SCE inspected and found the gaskets degraded but not extending into the SIT and its discharge piping. In addition, subsequent evaluations by the SONGS NSSS vendor Combustion Engineering (now Westinghouse) determined the degraded gaskets (even if uncoiled and interfering with SIT outlet check valve from fully closing) would not have prevented the ECCS from performing its required safety function. Consequently, SCE was not required to declare Unit 3 ECCS inoperable and SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC (Event Log No. 42451). SCE will submit a voluntary LER to document this condition. At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 are in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power. The San Onofre Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and will be provided with a copy of this report. Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg).

ENS 4237023 February 2006 15:07:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On February 22, 2006, at 1000 PST, two tankers containing wastewater with trace levels of radioactivity departed San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1 Industrial Site for Clive, Utah. Each truck contained about 4500 gallons of water. At about 0400 PST February 23, 2006, SCE was notified by the trucking company (Triad Transport Company) that minor leakage from a valve on top of one of the trucks had been observed. The leakage was observed while the truck was stopped in Parawan, Utah approximately 4 hours from its destination. The driver of the truck immediately notified his management who traveled to the site, identified the origin of the leak as spray from a valve on top of the truck, relieved the tank pressure from a vent valve, and stopped the leak. Dampness was observed on the ground beside the tanker. Unconfirmed measurements indicate radiation levels are near background. SCE has dispatched a team to the site to coordinate remediation efforts as necessary. The second tanker has arrived at the site in Clive, Utah and no leakage was observed during receipt inspection. The Director of the Utah's Division of Radiation Control and the NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this occurrence. At the time of this report, Unit 1 was undergoing decommissioning. The activity from the radionuclides in the entire truck totaled 70.9 mCi, and primarily consisted of Cs-137 (41 mCi), Ni-63 (15 mCi), and Co-60 (5 mCi). The transport company notified the National Response Center. The truck traveled thru 4 States: CA, NV, AZ UT.

  • * * UPDATE FROM C. WILLIAMS TO M. RIPLEY 1607 EST 03/01/06 * * *

On February 23, 2006, SCE notified the NRC that a small leak had been identified from a tanker that was transporting wastewater with trace levels of radioactivity from SONGS to Clive, Utah. That incident was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72.(b)(2)(xi) and the Utah Division of Radiation Control. SCE is updating this report to provide the NRC with the following remediation status: 1. SCE has decontaminated the tanker exterior and the leaking flange has been repaired. On February 24, 2006, the tanker completed its trip to the disposal site in Clive, Utah. Enroute, SCE personnel followed the tanker and inspected the flange at planned stops every hour. No leakage was observed and the tanker was received at the disposal facility without further incident. 2. SCE surveyed the truck stop in Parowan and identified two contaminated locations. The first was an asphalt area near the diesel pumps; the second was a gravel area where the truck had parked (about 150 yards from the diesel pumps). All contaminated materials including asphalt, concrete, dirt, and gravel were removed and shipped to the disposal site in Clive, Utah. No detectable levels of licensed material remain at the truck stop. 3. SCE surveyed personnel at the truck stop and determined that one individual had been contaminated. The pants leg of the trucking supervisor who had climbed on top of the truck to stop the leak had been contaminated (SCE took possession of the contaminated garment). There was no contamination on his skin. 4. Approval was obtained from the Utah Division of Radiation Control, the remediated areas of the truck stop were backfilled. 5. SCE is continuing to investigate the cause of the flange leak and will implement appropriate corrective actions. The NRC resident Inspectors have been notified of this update and will be provided with a copy of this update. Notified R4 DO (J. Whitten) and NMSS EO (S. Flanders)

ENS 423104 February 2006 00:46:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn February 3, 2006, at about 1646 PST the Devers-Palo Verde line relayed. This required an evaluation of grid nomograms for San Onofre. At about 1815 PST, the Grid Control Center (GCC) notified San Onofre that the grid nomograms predicted offsite power would not be within limits if San Onofre Unit 3 were to trip (San Onofre Unit 2 is currently shutdown in a refueling outage and Unit 3 is operating at about 100 percent power). Plant Operators declared offsite power inoperable at about 1815 PST. At about 1843 PST, the GCC notified San Onofre that the grid operator added generation to the grid and that offsite power was within nomogram limits. Plant Operators declared offsite power operable at that time. Consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, Southern California Edison is reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). All four San Onofre diesel generators (two per Unit) remained operable during this event. The San Onofre Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and will be provided with a copy of this report.
ENS 4225211 January 2006 20:43:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On Wednesday, January 11, 2006, at approximately 1248 PST, with San Onofre Unit 2 in Mode 5 (loops not filled), Southern California Edison (SCE) declared both trains of the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System inoperable. This action was taken following discovery and evaluation of an approximate 1.5 inch crack and minor leak (about 10 drops per minute) in a line located at the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) common discharge header (the LPSI pumps are also used as the SDC system pumps). Although both trains of the SDC system remain functional and one train is in service, SCE declared both SDC trains inoperable because the affected pipe might not be ASME Code qualified as a result of this crack. SCE is conservatively reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that could prevent the remove residual heat. SCE is continuing to evaluate this condition. SCE is following the actions required by Technical Specifications 3.4.8, and will repair the pipe crack during the current refueling outage, after the reactor core has been off-loaded to the spent fuel pool. SCE expects to place the plant in Mode 6 tomorrow. At the time of this report, Unit 2 is in Mode 5 and Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 100% power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector, NRC Region IV, and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project Manager have been briefed of this event and will be provided with a copy of this report. Shutdown cooling has been running for approximately one week and the leak was initially discovered sometime on 01/10/06 during an inspection in which Boric acid accumulation was discovered . A work request was written to perform a more thorough inspection that was performed on 01/11/06. The crack is on an 8 inch line that returns to RCS Loop 2A which is normally isolated during high pressure shutdown conditions and reactor power operation.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM C. WILLIAMS TO W. GOTT AT 2039 EST ON 3/3/06 * * *

On January 11, 2006, Southern California Edison (SCE) reported to the NRC that both trains of Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) were inoperable at San Onofre Unit 2 due to a through-wall crack in a pipe in the common discharge header. That occurrence was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for a condition that could prevent the removal of residual heat. SCE has since analyzed the pipe integrity at the design basis conditions and determined the pipe would have remained intact and that system leakage through the crack would have remained below the allowable system leak rate. Based on these results, SCE concluded that the pipe was capable of performing its safety functions under design basis conditions. Because the system was always capable of performing its safety function, SCE is retracting the January 11, 2006 report. Nevertheless, SCE plans to submit a voluntary licensee event report to document this event and inform the NRC of the corrective actions taken. At the time of this phone call, Unit 2 was in the middle of the Cycle 14 refueling outage and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this retraction and will provide them with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO (J. Whitten)

ENS 4195829 August 2005 14:18:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On August 29, 2005 at about 1045 PDT, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3, removed a portion of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) from service for a planned upgrade to ensure long-term reliability and improve the human-machine interface. This work is expected to complete within seven days. The SPDS emergency assessment function at San Onofre is implemented by a combination of the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) and the Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS). The QSPDS portion, which provides emergency assessment capability to plant operators in the control room, will remain functional. The CFMS portion, which receives input from the QSPDS, implements the ERDS and communicates data to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Offsite Facility. Only the CFMS and ERDS are impacted by this upgrade. This planned CFMS outage is being reported in accordance with10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a courtesy notification even though only a portion of the SPDS will be removed from service and preplanned compensatory measures will be in place for the duration of the work.

"At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 100 percent power, respectively.  The NRC Resident Inspectors will be notified of this occurrence and will be  provided with a copy of this report.
* * *  UPDATE ON 09/04/05 AT 0249 FROM C. WILLIAMS TO P. SNYDER  * * * 

The CFMS upgrade work was completed on September 3, 2005 at 2255 PDT. The SPDS and ERDS have been returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspectors will be notified of this occurrence. Notified R4DO (Smith).

ENS 4193520 August 2005 19:16:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

Section 4.1 of Appendix B of the Operating License for Units 2 and 3 requires Southern California Edison (SCE) to report to the NRC within 24 hours any unusual or important environmental events, which includes unusual fish kills.

Between August 19 and August 20, 2005, SCE removed an unusually large number of fish from the Units 2 and 3 intake structure. At approximately 1000 PDT on August 20, 2005, SCE estimated the quantity to be approximately 11,070 pounds (approximately 6420 pounds from Unit 2 and 4650 pounds from Unit 3). While the NRC has not specified a reporting limit for an unusual fish kill, SCE has internally defined this quantity as 4500 pounds. This unusual influx of fish is unrelated to plant operation and a heat treat of the intake structure was not being performed. However, there is a heat treat of the San Onofre Unit 2 intake structure scheduled for later today. The licensee stated that the fish kill was apparently the result of a large school of anchovies that swam to close to the intake. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4184615 July 2005 16:26:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4179826 June 2005 14:52:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

On June 25, 2005, at about 1335 PDT, during a test of Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G003, Emergency Supply Fan 3A276 did not start. SCE's investigation found a loose electrical connection at the thermal overload auxiliary switch contact for that fan. A similar condition was found on Emergency Supply Fan 3A277. SCE declared 3G003 inoperable and initiated a common cause investigation required by the EDG Technical Specifications. SCE tightened the affected electrical connections and after successfully start testing 3G003, declared 3G003 operable at 0406 PDT on June 26, 2005. On June 26, 2005, at about 0417 PDT, SCE found similar loose connections for EDG 3G002. Components affected were the EDG radiator fan and an EDG Emergency Supply Fan. Because SCE could not conclusively determine if the loose connections would have caused 3G002 to be inoperable, SCE conservatively declared 3G002 inoperable. (SCE currently plans to start test the Unit 2 EDGs today to confirm the Unit 2 EDGs remain operable.) Because it appears that both Unit 3 EDGs could have been inoperable at the same time, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 99 percent power and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (HOLT) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 1850 EDT ON 8/23/05 * * *

On June 26, 2005, SCE reported to the NRC that both Unit 3 emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were conservatively declared inoperable at the same time. SCE reported that occurrence to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the loss of a safety function. SCE has since determined that both EDGs were operable in the as found condition and that a report to the NRC was not required and SCE is retracting that report. For EDG 3G003, even though one of two emergency supply fans did not function, SCE confirmed by calculation that the remaining emergency supply fan was sufficient. That is, 3G003 was capable of performing its specified safety function with only one emergency supply fan operating. For EDG 3G002, the electrical connections that were reported to be 'loose' did not prevent circuit continuity and did not degrade the operability of the EDG. 3G002, therefore remained operable. Because the EDGs were operable, no report was required. SCE is retracting the June 26, 2005 report. SCE will, however, submit a voluntary licensee event report to document this event and inform the NRC of the corrective actions taken. At the time of this phone call, Unit 2 was operating at about 99 percent power and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this retraction and will provide them with a copy of this report. R4DO (Smith) was notified.

ENS 417453 June 2005 14:57:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop
CE
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4149214 March 2005 19:37:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of illegal drugs during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 414779 March 2005 20:36:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

The following information was obtained from the licensee via e-mail (licensee text in quotes): On Thursday, March 10, 2005 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, will remove a portion of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) from service for a planned upgrade to ensure long-term reliability and improve the human-machine interface. This work is expected to complete within seven days. The SPDS emergency assessment function at San Onofre is implemented by a combination of the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) and the Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS). The QSPDS portion, which provides emergency assessment capability to plant operators in the control room, will remain functional. The CFMS portion, which receives input from the QSPDS, implements the ERDS and communicates data to the Technical Support Center and Emergency Offsite Facility. Only the CFMS and ERDS are impacted by this upgrade. This planned CFMS outage is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a courtesy notification even though only a portion of the SPDS will be removed from service and preplanned compensatory measures will be in place for the duration of the work. At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 79 percent and 99 percent power, respectively. The NRC Resident Inspectors will be notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report. Should an emergency event occur, the licensee intends to transmit emergency response data to the NRC via facsimile and voice via the emergency notification system. No electronic data will be sent to the NRC Operations Center for the outage duration.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CLAY WILLIAMS TO HOWIE CROUCH ON MARCH 18, 2005 @ 1551 EST * * *

The CFMS upgrade work was completed on March 17, 2005 at 2310 PST. The SPDS and ERDS have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 4141015 February 2005 01:13:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via e-mail: On February 10, 2005, plant operators observed an abnormal flow condition on Unit 2 Train 'B' Component Cooling Water (CCW) from the Shutdown Cooling Heat (SDC) exchanger and, at about 2315 PST, declared Train 'B' of Containment Spray inoperable. This caused Unit 2 to enter a seven-day action statement (TS 3.6.6.1).

Although it may have been possible to correct the abnormal flow condition on-line, SCE has elected to shutdown Unit 2. Plant Operators initiated the shutdown at about 2155 PST on February 14, 2005. SCE in reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). At the time the shutdown was initiated, Unit 2 was operating at about 100% power. Unit 3 continues to operate at about 100 % power. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been briefed on the shutdown plans and will be provided with a copy of this report.

ENS 413683 February 2005 18:02:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn February 3, 2005, at about 1227 PST, SONGS Unit 2 tripped from about 100 percent power. Preliminary information indicates that the Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer tripped on high differential current, which caused the main generator to trip and caused the Reactor Protection System to automatically trip the reactor, as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed and the Unit remains stable in Mode 3 on Main Feedwater. SCE's investigation is ongoing. SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv). At the time of this event, SONGS Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. The NRC resident inspectors are aware of this event and SCE will provide them with a copy of this report. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser. All ESF systems are available and the electrical grid is stable.
ENS 4132010 January 2005 00:56:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop
CE

The following information was received from the licensee via e-mail: On January 9, 2005, at about 1945 PST, the access road to the SONGS MESA facilities became flooded after several days of rain. The San Onofre Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is located at the MESA and because of the flooding, is inaccessible to passenger vehicles. While the EOF itself is operable, in the event of an Emergency at San Onofre, SCE would direct EOF emergency responders to the alternate EOF located in Irvine, California. SCE is reporting this occurrence to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 100% power and Unit 3 was operating at about 65% power. SCE will notify the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY C. WILLIAMS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1418 EST ON 01/10/05 * * *

On January 10, 2005 at about 0143 PST, flooding had dissipated sufficiently for one lane to be passable; at 0615 PST, both lanes were passable. In the event of an Emergency at San Onofre, there is no longer a need to redirect emergency responders to the alternate EOF located in Irvine, California. This report is to advise the NRC of this change in EOF access status. Also note that it is continuing to rain at SONGS and this status is subject to change. At the time of this report, Unit 2 was operating at about 85% power and Unit 3 was at about 80% power. SCE has informed the NRC resident inspectors and will provide them with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO (Bywater).

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY C. WILLIAMS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0425 EST ON 01/11/05 * * *

On January 11, 2005, at about 0041 PST, the access road to the SONGS MESA facilities again became flooded after several days of rain (reference NRC Operations Log Number 41320). The San Onofre Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is located at the MESA and because of the flooding, is inaccessible to passenger vehicles. While the EOF itself is operable, in the event of an Emergency at San Onofre, SCE would direct EOF emergency responders to the alternate EOF located in Irvine California. SCE is reporting this occurrence to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 85% power and Unit 3 was at about 80% power. SCE will notify the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO (Bywater).

  • * * UPDATE 1430 EST ON 1/11/05 FROM CLAY WILLIAMS TO S. SANDIN * * *

On January 11, 2005, at 0125 PST, Southern California Edison (SCE) reported that the access road to the SONGS MESA facilities had again flooded after several days of rain and that the SONGS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was inaccessible to passenger vehicles (NRC Operations Log Number 41320). On January 11, 2005 at about 0535 PST, flooding had dissipated sufficiently for the road to be passable. In the event of an Emergency at San Onofre, there is no longer a need to redirect emergency responders to the alternate EOF located in Irvine California. This report is to advise the NRC of this change in EOF access status. At the time of this report, Unit 2 was operating at about 85% power and Unit 3 was at about 81% power. SCE has informed the NRC resident inspectors and will provide them with a copy of this report. Notified R4DO (Russ Bywater).

ENS 4120919 November 2004 12:25:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEThe following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: 1. SYSTEMS AFFECTED: Reactor trip, Aux feed water actuation. 2. ACTUATIONS AND THEIR INITIATING SIGNALS: Reactor trip - Loss of Load Turbine Trip, Aux Feed Water (AFW) - 21% (on the narrow range indication) in Steam Generators. 3. CAUSES: Reactor tripped due to an undetermined cause in the main generator end of the secondary plant. AFW started as expected on EFAS (Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal) at 21% from a trip at 100%. 4. EFFECT OF EVENT ON PLANT: Plant is stable at 545F (and) 2250 (psi) hot standby conditions and will remain here until cause determination made as to cause of trip. 5. ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED: Maintain hot standby conditions for post trip review. CONTINUATION SHEET: 1) Remain in Mode 3 for cause determination post-trip review to provide actual mode required. 2) Estimate restart date pending cause determination and any repairs required. 3) All rods inserted, no primary or secondary reliefs lifted, electrical grid stable, all safety systems performed as expected, no effect on Unit 3. Electrical power supplied from offsite power. Decay heat removal is via steam dump to condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4115027 October 2004 13:05:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEIllegal drug use was detected during a random drug test of a non-licensed employee. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the HOO for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
ENS 4089724 July 2004 18:20:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 24, 2004, at about 1000 PDT, SCE (Southern California Edison) personnel were tightening two seismic restraint bolts on Advanced Horizontal Storage Module (AHSM) Number 10 at the Unit 1 ISFSI (Independent Fuel Storage Installation) when one of the bolts failed. SCE had placed the storage canister into AHSM No. 10 on July 18, 2004 and was tightening the restraint as specified in the final safety analysis report, after the module had reached thermal equilibrium. SCE plans to replace the failed bolt with another bolt manufactured under the same Certificate of Compliance and will tighten the seismic restraints within the period allowed by the FSAR (one week from initial placement of the storage canister). SCE's evaluation of the failed bolt is ongoing. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.
ENS 4081814 June 2004 17:14:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEOn June 14, 2004 at 0741 PDT, the offsite power grid connected to San Onofre experienced a system disturbance. Grid frequency dipped to about 59.7 Hz or slightly lower, and then recovered about three minutes later. Plant Operators declared offsite power inoperable. Southern California Edison is conservatively reporting this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The diesel generators for both Units 2 and 3 were operable during this event. At the time of this report, Units 2 and 3 continue to operate at about 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. NOTE: see events 40814, 40815 and 40816
ENS 407914 June 2004 08:21:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CESan Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) experienced a large influx of seaweed that required securing one of the four running Circulating Water (CW) pumps. When conditions continued to degrade, the Operations Department decided to manually trip the unit. During the trip, all control rods inserted into the core. No manual or power-operated relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The Operations staff is maintaining the unit at normal operating pressure and temperature. The electrical grid is stable. Currently, only one CW pump is running. Unit 2 is unaffected and is not experiencing a seaweed influx at this time. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 4077525 May 2004 20:02:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEA licensed employee was administered a random drug test. He tested positive for an illegal substance. The Medical Review Officer reviewed the test results with the licensed employee. His access was immediately terminated for the protected area and he was placed on investigatory suspension. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details. The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed by the licensee.
ENS 4066410 April 2004 16:54:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CESan Onofre Unit 2 was manually tripped from 97% power due to the loss of feed water pumps. After both feedwater pumps tripped, the operators manually tripped the reactor. Both trains of the emergency feed water system actuated as expected due to the initial power level. The plant is stable at NOP/NOT. The cause of the feed water pump trips is being evaluated. All control rods fully inserted and all safety systems worked properly. The steam generators are discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. AFW pumps are running to maintain steam generator water levels. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4061928 March 2004 21:25:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEAt about 1349 (PST) on March 28, 2004, while a Security Offer was receiving his weapon in the armory, the weapon accidentally discharged as it was being holstered. The discharge grazed the officer's leg and the officer was treated for the resulting abrasion. At about 1425 PST, Southern California Edison notified the FBI (SONGS LLEA). SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 405043 February 2004 19:05:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CESection 4.1 of Appendix B of the Operating License for Units 2 and 3 requires Southern California Edison (SCE) to report to the NRC within 24 hours any unusual or important environmental events, which includes unusual fish kills. Between February 2 and February 3, 2004, SCE removed an unusually large number of sardines from the Units 2 and 3 intake structure. At approximately 1100 on February 3, 2004, SCE determined the quantity to be approximately 13,590 pounds (approximately 6940 pounds from Unit 2 and 6650 pounds from Unit 3). While the NRC has not specified a reporting limit for an unusual fish kill, SCE has internally defined this quantity as 4500 pounds. SCE believes the unusual influx of sardines may be related to current winter storm conditions. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified The licensee will also give a courtesy call to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board
ENS 4039617 December 2003 08:35:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEThe following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: 1. SYSTEMS AFFECTED: High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI), Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI), Recirculation Actuation (System) (RAS), Containment Spray (CS). 2. ACTUATIONS AND THEIR INITIATING SIGNALS: None 3. CAUSES: 400 (volt) Motor Control Center (MCC) 3BE deenergized due to an overcurrent condition on the 'A' train 1E bus. 'B' train equipment is cleared for maintenance causing Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry. 4. EFFECT OF EVENT ON PLANT: Both trains of Safety Injection equipment inoperable with no flow capability requiring plant shutdown. 5. ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED: Shutdown commenced at 0410 (PST). MCC 3BE is stripped and loads will be checked for faults while attempting to restore the bus. Train 'B' equipment will be restored as soon as possible. Continuation Sheet: Power/Mode will be reduced per T.S. 3.0.3 action until MCC 3BE loads restored or Tr(ain) 'B' equipment returned to service. (Plant required to be in) Mode 3 (within) 7 hrs, Mode 4 (within) 13 hrs. (and) Mode 5 (within) 37 hrs. No abnormal electrical lineups. No effect on Unit 2. LPSI pump/valves will need to be restored to allow Mode 5 entry. Plant personnel suspect a problem with the 1E bus feeder breaker. A new breaker will be installed after testing is completed. Bus loads are in the process of being checked for problems. At the time of the initial call, plant power was at 80% and decreasing at approximately 10% per hour. At 0939 PST, plant power was at 71% and decreasing. The 1E bus have been meggered with no problems found. Battery chargers are currently not operating due to loss of the buses but not expected to be a problem since DC loads are very low during mode 1 operations. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.