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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5417519 July 2019 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0945 (EDT) on July 19, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to Loop 2 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. The Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) started automatically as a result of the automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid AFW actuation from the reactor trip, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods fully inserted.
ENS 5401722 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a random test administered the next day (see EN #54018). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5401822 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE ON A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a follow-up test administered the previous day (see EN #54017).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/30/2019 AT 1642 EDT FROM KELLI ROBERTS TO BRIAN LIN * * *

On April 16, 2019, an individual was selected for a follow-up drug test. The same individual was selected again on April 17, 2019 for a random drug test. The results for both tests were ruled by the Medical Review Officer (MRO) on the same day and ruled positive for the same drug on April 22, 2019. These FFD violations were reported to the NRC on April 22, 2019, as EN #54017 and EN #54018, respectively. As allowed by 10 CFR 26.185(o), the MRO further reviewed the quantitation of the drug in both tests and determined that no further drug use had occurred since the first positive test. Therefore, the MRO concluded that this should be considered one FFD violation, and EN #54018 is being retracted. No changes are needed to EN #54017. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Heisserer) and FFD Group (email).

ENS 5396731 March 2019 00:17:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 2130 (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 30 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam isolation valve failing closed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
ENS 5383217 January 2019 16:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5378913 December 2018 14:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1700 EST on December 12, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. No work was performed on safety related equipment. The licensee has made a PADs entry.
ENS 536434 October 2018 07:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN LOWE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1408 EDT ON 10/19/2018 * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5362827 September 2018 14:42:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1000 EDT on September 27, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5361018 September 2018 08:28:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1610 (EDT) on September 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5359912 September 2018 14:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1115 EDT on September 12, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5359511 September 2018 17:53:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5356324 August 2018 15:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1034 (EDT) on August 24, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 535387 August 2018 14:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0909 (EDT) on August 7, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for alcohol during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5352827 July 2018 13:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351719 July 2018 12:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1300 (EDT) on July 18, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty process. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5351518 July 2018 19:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during an access upgrade fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the facility has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351117 July 2018 17:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1338 (EDT) on July 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 534999 July 2018 20:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1515 (EDT) on July 9, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a for cause Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 534843 July 2018 12:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0954 (EDT) on July 3, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to high steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted and Unit 1 is in an electrical shutdown lineup. The cause of the high steam generator water level transient is being investigated.
ENS 5347928 June 2018 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0902 EDT on June 28, 2018, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5346922 June 2018 15:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0900 (EDT) on June 22, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. "
ENS 533092 April 2018 18:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5327722 March 2018 09:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness For Duty test using a subversion kit on their person. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5301816 October 2017 17:59:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty (FFD) test. At 0851 (EDT) on October 16, 2017, a contractor supervisor was notified to report for a random FFD test and (the individual) did not report to the testing facility and left the premises. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5299226 September 2017 11:03:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 0543 (EDT), while (recovering from the performance of) 2B Emergency Diesel Generator and ESFAS testing, a (subsequent) valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 2B AC emergency bus (2BA03) was load shed, the 2B EDG automatically started, and tied to 2BA03. The 2BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. The actuation was identified by the Control Room operators and the 2B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling were not challenged throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the undervoltage condition is under investigation.
ENS 5296814 September 2017 09:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On September 13, 2017, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a Contractor Manager confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5276318 May 2017 15:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On May 17, 2017, at 1852 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II.
ENS 5264127 March 2017 16:02:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5261917 March 2017 17:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1517 (EDT), while restoring protective relay power to the 1B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 1B EDG automatically started and tied to the safety bus (1BA03). The 1BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. This actuation was identified by the Control Room Operators and the 1B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Containment Cooler Number 8 did not automatically start in 'Fast Speed' as expected. Containment Cooler Number 8 was successfully started in 'Fast Speed' manually by the Control Room Operators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 525343 February 2017 18:56:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1545 EST on 2/3/17, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power when loop 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) started to fail closed. Non-Safety Related 4160V bus 1NA01 failed to transfer to alternate incoming power supply automatically and was successfully manually energized. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by AFW. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5251830 January 2017 14:38:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1049 EST, an individual was discovered to be unresponsive at a site training facility outside of the Protected Area. The individual was transported via ambulance to the Burke County Hospital and was declared deceased at 1143 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State of Georgia Department of Labor - OSHA at 1414 EST.
ENS 5248211 January 2017 13:52:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated pending the results of an investigation. The licensee notified RII (Patterson) and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 524239 December 2016 23:46:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn December 09, 2016 at 1734 EST, U2 Train-A NSCW (Nuclear Service Cooling Water) Transfer Pump #8 tripped during Return To Service Surveillance testing for Train-B NSCW Transfer pump #7. Technical Spec 3.7.9 Condition E entered at 1734 with Required Actions to be in M3 (mode 3, Hot Standby) in 6 hours AND M4 (mode 4, Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. A unit shutdown was commenced at 2042 EST (as a conservative measure) to comply with TS 3.7.9 Condition E. At 1937, U2 B-train NSCW Transfer Pump #7 was declared operable and TS 3.7.9 Condition E was exited. The plant is currently raising power to 100%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 524127 December 2016 13:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (ECS System Seismic Category I Equipment Design Basis Loads) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on May 17, 2016 (reference ML 16138A080 and ML 16166A030). On November 1, 2016, it was determined by the Vogtle 3&4 Contractor that modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) breaker (i.e., switchgear) cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, 'Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The modification involves an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Breaker cabinet that function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously qualified for use in the RCP breaker cabinet assembly. Additional seismic qualification type testing and analysis of components are being performed for the added components in the RCP breaker. Update of the Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP breaker to confirm the breaker withstands seismic design basis loads and Licensee's acceptance is in progress. The revised ITAAC Completion Notice will be submitted to the NRC once all related ITAAC activities have been completed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5231926 October 2016 16:35:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuring the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The Turbine Driving Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump exhaust vent is not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, crimping the piping resulting in reduced flow capacity and rendering the TDAFW pump inoperable. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) vents are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado generated missile could strike the vent piping rendering it unable to relieve vacuum on the top of the CST and allow adequate water flow to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and rendering the CST inoperable. These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 5220830 August 2016 16:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 521472 August 2016 16:22:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A member of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) staff violated the FFD policy in December, 2014 by responding to a call-in for unscheduled work after having consumed alcohol within the prohibited 5 hour period. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 519867 June 2016 14:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5195625 May 2016 04:54:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0206 EDT 5/25/16, Vogtle Unit 2 tripped from 100% when SG (Steam Generator) #1 Level began to lower for an unknown reason. Cause for level issue is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by Aux Feedwater. Prior to the trip, I & C (Instrumentation & Calibration) was performing a loop #1 narrow range instrument calibration. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup with all source of offsite power available. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5187521 April 2016 18:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5134325 August 2015 16:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn August 25, 2015, at approximately 12:52 EDT, an unplanned loss of power to the Vogtle Meteorological Towers occurred. The loss of power was the result of an electrical disturbance in the Plant Wilson switchyard. Power was restored 14:45 EDT. The electrical disturbance impacted meteorological instrumentation only and did not impact operation of either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The TSC and EOF remained functional and compensatory measures existed within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization was notified and necessary compensatory actions were established. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5122313 July 2015 07:50:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

On July 13, 2015, planned activities will be performed to upgrade the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Meteorological Towers and its communication equipment. The emergency response data system will be affected. The work will be completed within approximately 5 days. This activity requires the meteorological tower to be out of service greater than 72 hours rendering equipment used for emergency assessment non-functional. The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data via Savannah River Site and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information will be relayed via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the upgrade and necessary compensatory actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL MONAHON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2013 EDT ON 7/18/2015 * * *

Vogtle primary and backup Meteorological Towers have been returned to service and functionality of equipment has been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (King).

ENS 512199 July 2015 18:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe Vogtle Unit-1 control room received a fire alarm from inside the containment building. Per plant requirements, verification of the fire was not obtained within 15 minutes and an Unusual Event was declared. Plant personnel were able to enter containment and verify that there was no fire present. The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event. Unusual Event entered: 1732 EDT Unusual Event exited: 1848 EDT The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, and NICC. NuclearSSA (email) and FEMA NWC (email).
ENS 5089414 March 2015 19:19:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn March 14, 2015 at 1207 EDT, operators were performing steps to disable an automatic actuation signal to the B-train Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW), when a valid actuation signal was received on B-train only. Both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were already running and feeding forward. The B-train discharge valves went from throttled to fully open. The AFW discharge valves were restored to their previous positions without any adverse impacts on the plant. Decay heat removal was still being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5089314 March 2015 08:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVogtle Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power. At 0429 EDT a Unit 2 automatic Reactor Trip and Safety Injection / Steamline Isolation occurred. All systems operated as expected and all control rods fully inserted. The Safety Injection was terminated at 0447 EDT and the emergency operating procedures were exited at 0522 EDT. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Auxiliary Feedwater system and the atmospheric relief valves. A response team is investigating the cause of the event. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event. NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and is at plant site for investigation.
ENS 508572 March 2015 18:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On March 2, 2015, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 507989 February 2015 11:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the Vogtle 3&4 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55 . The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55 (4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55 (5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 5057429 October 2014 14:08:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5052612 October 2014 12:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) Unit 2 was performing startup and had taken reactor critical at 0929 EDT. When attempting to stabilize power to collect critical data, control rods were inserted with Control Bank D the expected group to insert. Control Bank A inserted instead of Control Bank D. Power had reached 6 E-2 percent as indicated by IR (intermediate range) indication when control room crew performed a manual reactor trip. AFW (auxiliary feed water) was in service to support plant conditions prior to the trip and did not receive any actuation signal. All equipment operated as expected. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5044110 September 2014 11:24:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 503476 August 2014 05:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

This is a non-emergency notification per Vogtle U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities on the TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions, and, actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation has been prepared and approved for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RUDY JOHNSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1132 EDT ON 8/6/14 * * *

As of 1124 EDT maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 5031427 July 2014 15:22:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP (Vogtle Electric Generation Plant) Unit One was at 100 percent power, with a Main Feed Pump (MFP) Turbine A trip mechanism test in-progress, when MFP A Trip alarm was received in the Main Control Room. Control Room crew identified MFP A speed and steam generator levels lowering and initiated a manual reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the MFP A trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. The unit is in a normal shutdown electric plant lineup. No effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5022625 June 2014 11:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5021920 June 2014 16:39:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification. On June 20, 2014, at 1100 eastern daylight time (EDT), Vogtle Unit 2 identified a loss of emergency assessment capability due to both plant vent effluent monitors being out of service from March 16 to March 26, 2014. This condition was the result of an equipment failure concurrent with planned maintenance activities on the redundant monitor. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). During the time both effluent monitors were out of service Unit 2 was operating at 100% rated thermal power, steady-state conditions. Therefore, this condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 501632 June 2014 16:47:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive result for a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
ENS 5003112 April 2014 23:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2008 EDT, Vogtle Unit One was manually tripped in response to loop 1 outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and cause investigation is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. There was a normal post trip feedwater isolation due to low Tave. Offsite power remains available. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser. The plant is stable in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 2.
ENS 500068 April 2014 05:21:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP Unit 2 was at 100% power, normal activities, when digital feedwater trouble alarms were received on all 4 steam generators (SG) with level stable in all generators. Operating crew entered abnormal operating procedure for feedwater malfunction when SG #3 level began rapidly lowering. Operators attempted to take manual control of SG #3 main feedwater regulating valve and were unable to raise SG #3 level. SG #3 level lowered to the Lo-Lo Level setpoint causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and SG #3 level remained off scale low on narrow range indications. Auxiliary feedwater and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. (Unit 2) is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the low SG water level and determine restart criteria and time of restart. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feedwater to steam generators steaming to the condenser steam dumps. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4971813 January 2014 03:28:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 495952 December 2013 13:52:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582).
ENS 4946122 October 2013 13:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1144 EDT, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to lowering Main Condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 Bravo Main Feed Pump was tagged out for scheduled maintenance and the casing was being removed when condenser vacuum started lower due to isolation valve not holding pressure. Main Condenser vacuum lowered to less than procedural limits for continued plant operation. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. AFW was placed in service to control Steam Generator levels. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 while performing a cause investigation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and at plant site. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the Main Condenser.
ENS 4945319 October 2013 09:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) unit two was at 100% power, normal activities, when the unit two turbine tripped causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the turbine trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. During the transient, no relief valves lifted. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant safety loads. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4927213 August 2013 07:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 emergency response facilities action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to start of the TSC HVAC unit. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NAVEEN KOTEEL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0744 EDT ON 8/15/13 * * *

The Technical Support Center HVAC system was returned to service at 1100 EDT on August 14, 2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).

ENS 4918611 July 2013 15:26:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A Plant Vogtle employee on site complained of medical issues while performing work inside Unit 2 containment at 1127 EDT. After being transported offsite to Burke County Hospital, Plant Vogtle was notified at 1426 EDT that the individual was deceased. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. The death was not known to be related to work performed at the site, and the employee was not contaminated when transported offsite. The licensee will notify OSHA.

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/11/13 AT 1655 EDT FROM NAVEEN KOTEEL TO DONG PARK * * *

The licensee notified OSHA at 1625 EDT and will also be making a media/press release. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 4914424 June 2013 04:49:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on the backup diesel generator that supplies TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MATT HORN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2015 EDT ON 6/27/13 * * *

The backup diesel generator was returned to service at 1641 EDT on 6/27/13 which restored the TSC to functional status. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Franke).

ENS 4914021 June 2013 10:50:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1444 EDT ON 06/21/13 FROM THOMAS BUSSIERE TO S. SANDIN * * *

Exit TRM 13.3.1: The functionality of the TSC has been restored and scheduled maintenance activities performed complete and satisfactory at 1410 EDT on 6/21/13. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Desai).

ENS 489881 May 2013 10:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee anticipates the maintenance will be complete at 1630 EDT on 5/1/13.

* * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1702 EDT ON 5/1/13 * * * 

The TSC was returned to service at 1607 EDT on 5/1/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ASHTON PARKER TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1123 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * *

The TSC has been taken out of service to perform planned maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

* * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1747 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * * 

The TSC was returned to service at 1733 EDT on 5/2/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

ENS 4898530 April 2013 13:15:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA condition is being reported per TRM (Technical Requirements Manual) 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. At 102 EDT on 4/30/13, the "TSC has been restored to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4890610 April 2013 09:47:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP100050.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear). This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of Southern Company for Vogtle 3&4, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by Southern Company. This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 488803 April 2013 07:32:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Vogtle Unit 1 has declared an NOUE based on a fire within the protected area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. At 0632 (EDT) Unit 1 received a fire alarm in the Unit 1 control building. A systems operator was dispatched to investigate and reported back that a small flame was visible inside 1ND3I1, computer inverter. Fire brigade was dispatched in accordance with fire response procedures. No other systems or parameters affected. At 0651 (EDT) fire brigade captain reported that the fire had been extinguished. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the state and local authorities. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL PARKER TO DONG PARK AT 0811 EDT ON 3/31/13 * * *

The licensee terminated the NOUE at 0745 EDT based on the fire being extinguished. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (McCoy), NRR EO (Chernoff), and IRD (Harris) notified. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

ENS 4883220 March 2013 03:15:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The licensee declared a Unusual Event based on EAL HU-2 due to indication of a fire in the Protected Area for greater than 15 minutes. The licensee received initial indication of a fire alarm and startup of fire water pumps. The alarm was located in the vicinity of the Auxiliary Building Unit 2 HVAC supply unit. The licensee declared an unusual event at 0246 EDT. Upon investigation, it was determined that the heater strips in an HVAC unit were overheated and caused a fire alarm and no fire actually existed. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0409 EDT ON 3/20/13 FROM BISHOP TO CROUCH * * *

The licensee terminated its unusual event at 0341 EDT on 3/20/13 after confirming there was no fire within the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building HVAC supply unit. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Rich) and NRR EO (Lund) notified. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

ENS 4878827 February 2013 02:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2302 EST, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to excessive Reactor Coolant Pump #4, seal #1 leakoff flow. Seal leakoff flow exceeded the procedural limits for continued operation of the pump. Following the reactor trip, RCP #4 was shutdown per procedure guidance. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. The Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) system automatically actuated as expected. System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. The plant is stable in Mode 3 during cause investigation. The NRC Senior Resident was notified and is enroute to the plant for investigation. AFW is supplying the steam generators and decay heat removal is to the condenser via steam dumps. No safety valves or relief valves lifted during the transient. The unit is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. There was no impact on Unit One.
ENS 4851216 November 2012 15:35:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe licensee received a fire alarm in an auxiliary building tunnel (Zone 146) that could not be verified within 15 minutes. An unusual event was declared (EAL HU2) at 1500 EST. At 1505 EST the licensee fire responders were able to reach the location of the alarm and confirmed that there was no fire. The licensee has performed inspections of the area and do not yet know the cause of the fire alarm but are certain that it was not caused by an actual fire. The cause of the fire alarm is still under investigation. No offsite assistance was summoned for this event. Following restoration of fire protection system to a normal status the licensee terminated the unusual event at 1550 EST. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. No press release is planned at this time. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
ENS 4846131 October 2012 09:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements ManuaI13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) Evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERIC TEW TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1452 EDT * * *

TSC maintenance is complete. The TSC has been returned to operable status at 1445 EDT on 10/31/12. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper).

ENS 483855 October 2012 12:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn October 5, 2012 at 05:14 EDT, restoration of steam generator narrow range level instrumentation from a bypassed condition was in progress when a valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal was received due to steam generator levels being below the Lo-Lo Level setpoint. As a result, both motor driven auxiliary feedpumps automatically started and two turbine driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves automatically opened. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves had been previously removed from service under administrative controls. The system was aligned per procedure so that water injection into the steam generators did not occur and the motor driven pumps were operated on mini-flow. Unit 1 is off line for a planned refueling and maintenance outage. There were no adverse impacts on the plant. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with RHR in service and preparations for Mode 4 entry in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4813626 July 2012 14:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4783614 April 2012 16:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1346 EDT, Vogtle Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped from 100% power due to Main Feedwater Pump 'B' discharge flow lowering unexpectedly. All control rods fully inserted. AFW system automatically actuated as expected. System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 during cause investigation. The electrical lineup remained normal. No safety valves lifted due to the trip. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the main condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 4776523 March 2012 14:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000

On March 9, 2012, Shaw's Vogtle 3&4 Construction Contractor FFD program manager notified SNC (Southern Nuclear Operating Company) FFD program manager of his discovery of anomalies in their random pool while preparing to perform the weekly random pool generation. At that time, approximately 20 people were identified as not being in the pool that had active badges. Corrective actions were implemented to update the pool and provide additional verification of any changes made to the pool. Subsequently discussions with licensing resulted in the conclusion that there was not an indication that there was a programmatic issue and thus was reportable under a 30 day report to the NRC. The NRC was informed of this decision and has been at Vogtle collecting data regarding this event. Since that time, Shaw has been checking past months to determine the extent of condition. On March 22, at 21:01, Shaw notified SNC that the October - December results of personnel who had active badges but was not in the pool was significantly higher than the January through March results, developed earlier. On the basis of this information, SNC has determined that this now rises to the level of a programmatic vulnerability and is subject to a 24-hour report to the NRC. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) and 26.417(b)(1) as a discovered vulnerability of the FFD program. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MAHAN TO HUFFMAN AT 1700 EDT ON 3/26/12 * * *

The licensee noted that this event is also being reported under 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1). R2DO (Haag) has been notified.

ENS 477237 March 2012 16:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On March 01, 2012, it was discovered that a (Contractor) program manager intentionally failed to implement a procedure change as instructed by management. An initial investigation has determined that interim compensatory actions were in place prior to this pending procedural change. The involved manager's access authorization has been revoked. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) was notified by (the Contractor) of this discovery on March 06, 2012 at 19:00 EST. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3) as an intentional act that casts doubt on the integrity of the FFD program. At the time of this report, no regulatory barriers for individuals assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program have been breached regarding this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4728722 September 2011 10:29:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a trip of the TSC Chiller System supply breaker. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BILL DUNN TO CHARLES TEAL ON 9/22/11 AT 2039 EDT * * *

The TSC has been returned to service at 2000 EDT. Notified R2DO (Lesser).

ENS 472404 September 2011 13:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to pass a required surveillance of the backup diesel generator for TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL MONAHON TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/9/2011 AT 1418 EDT* * *

The licensee has declared the TSC Operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rich).

ENS 4722431 August 2011 12:02:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopWhile preparing Loop 2 Main Feed Reg Valve (MFRV) for maintenance, it was placed on its 'air gag' that maintained the MFRV in position, while any small changes in feed flow would be modulated by the associated Bypass Feed Reg Valve (BFRV). Approximately 5 minutes after the MFRV was placed on the air gag, with Steam Generator (S/G) level stable, control room operators observed S/G level start to increase. The operators observed for a short time to see if the associated BFRV would control the level change. When it became apparent that level was not being controlled automatically, the operators took manual control of the BFRV, eventually closing it all the way, and observed that S/G level was then increasing very slowly. While level was still slowly rising, two hi-hi level bistables actuated, generating a P-14 (hi-hi S/G level trip) signal which tripped the main turbine, which then caused an automatic reactor trip. As a result of the reactor trip, all systems functioned as required and there was nothing unusual or not understood. During the transient, no safeties, primary relief valves or secondary relief valves lifted. All control rods inserted into the core. Auxiliary Feed Water automatically initiated and is supplying the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser. The grid is stable with all safety buses powered from offsite power via a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 2 was unaffected by the trip. The licensee will be issuing a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4708722 July 2011 12:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 470327 July 2011 11:11:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0900 EDT, the Shift Manager was notified that all off site notification sirens were discovered inoperable during the daily maintenance checks due to a loss of power supply. Upon discovery by the technicians of the loss of power supply, the backup power supply was energized and all sirens were tested and returned to operable status. The time of power loss is unknown at this time and the reason for the failure of the transfer to the backup power supply appears to be a bad solder joint. The backup power supply has been verified SAT." The sirens were last tested satisfactorily on Tuesday, 7/5/11. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4677220 April 2011 20:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1734 EDT, (Vogtle) unit one automatically tripped from 100% power. No significant activities were in progress that should have challenged the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted. AFW system actuated as expected on S/G Lo-Lo-Level and AMSAC (ATWS Mitigation System Actuation). System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable and will remain in Mode 3 during cause investigation. Cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Decay heat is being sent to the main condenser through the turbine bypass valves. The steam generators are being fed from auxiliary feedwater. There was no effect on unit two. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4675213 April 2011 17:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4657126 January 2011 09:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2245 EST ON 1/26/11 FROM WESLEY GRANT TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

TSC maintenance has been completed and testing was performed. The TSC has been returned to service. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Desai).

ENS 4655820 January 2011 15:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A discovered vulnerability in the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) program has resulted in contractor personnel being granted unescorted access to Vogtle 3&4 construction site without meeting all the requirements of the FFD Program. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for more details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 465258 January 2011 15:29:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the 480V Motor Control Switchgear ANBL. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with a high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. Normal power is still available but may be lost during a loss of offsite power. Contingency plans are in place to restore backup power if necessary. Expected return to service is Tuesday, January 11, 2011. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CARL GRANT TO JOE O'HARA AT 1505 ON 1/9/11 * * *

TSC returned to service at 1430 EST. Normal power supply is aligned and the temporary modifications have been removed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO(Vias)

ENS 4649120 December 2010 01:09:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Smoke and sparks were identified as coming from a level 4 Control Building Normal Fuel Handling Building HVAC Heater Control Panel. The heater control panel was deenergized. The fire team was dispatched. The fire was contained in the heater control panel. Smoke removal is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM HANS BISHOP TO PETE SNYDER AT 0219 EST ON 12/20/10 * * * 

At 0218 the licensee terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. Notified R2DO (Henson), NRR EO (Evans), DHS (Strangfeld), and FEMA (Hollis).

ENS 4644229 November 2010 19:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1612 today, November 29, 2010 Unit 2 Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) was shutdown for upgrade work. This includes the SPDS (Safety Parameter Display) system which is a function of the IPC. The IPC will be returned to service in approximately two weeks and SPDS function will be restored at that time. In addition, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) is out of service and will be restored in the same time frame. Per the 50.54.Q that was prepared by our Emergency Preparedness group, notification has been made to the NRC ERDS group (Roger Chow) of the unavailability of the ERDS. While the IPC is out of service, control board indications are being utilized by the control room crew. In addition, the safety-related Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS) is operable. Restoration of SPDS and ERDS functions have been given the highest priority during restoration of the system. Both the NRC Ops Center and the NRC ERDS group will be notified when SPDS and ERDS capability have been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4633514 October 2010 16:55:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 463218 October 2010 13:54:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 1100, October 8, 2010, Unit 1 Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) was shutdown for upgrade work. This includes the SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) system which is a function of the IPC. The IPC will be returned to service in approximately two weeks and SPDS function will be restored at that time. In addition, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) is out of service and will be restored in the same time frame. Per the 50.54.Q that was prepared by our Emergency Preparedness group, notification has been made to the NRC ERDS group of the unavailability of the ERDS system. While the IPC is out of service, control board indications are being utilized by the control room crew. In addition, the safety-related Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS) is OPERABLE. Restoration of SPDS and ERDS functions have been given the highest priority during restoration of the system. Both the NRC Ops Center and the NRC ERDS group will be notified when SPDS and ERDS capability have been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/9/2010 AT 1555 EST FROM CECIL WILLIAMS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On Oct 8, 2010, EN# 46321 was made for notification that the Unit 1 Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) was shutdown for upgrade and that the SPDS function was out of service until the upgrade was completed. The IPC has been returned to service sufficiently to support SPDS Functionality. All data points have been verified and associated Control Room annunciator tested. Therefore, at this time SPDS is considered returned to service. The ERDS function has previously been tested with the NRC ERDS Group and returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 461609 August 2010 04:23:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, 'Emergency Response Facilities', Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURWINKEL TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/9/10 AT 1438 EDT * * *

The planned maintenance of the TSC HVAC was completed and the Technical Support Center was returned to functional status as of 8/9/10 at 1153 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 4609615 July 2010 12:59:00VogtleNRC Region 2

On July 2, 2010, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) provided a non-emergency event notification (EN# 46067) for an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 26.61 relating to self-disclosure requirements. During implementation of corrective actions for that event, Shaw Nuclear Services Inc. (Primary Construction Contractor for Vogtle 3&4) personnel identified that several of the self-disclosure forms received from a sub-contractor had very similar handwriting. An incident investigation was initiated to ascertain the relevant facts. During that investigation, Shaw identified two supervisory personnel from the sub-contractor organization who apparently provided the suspect self-disclosure documents for other employees from their company. Unescorted access for the two supervisory personnel was suspended and they were removed from the site pending completion of the investigation. All suspect self-disclosure forms were removed from the files, and the affected individuals have completed and submitted new self-disclosure forms. No other evidence of policy violations has been identified during this process. The investigation into the FFD event continues. On July 14, 2010, Shaw notified SNC that sufficient indication exists that the actions of the sub-contractor supervisory personnel may have violated the Shaw FFD policy. As such, this issue is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii), which requires a non-emergency event notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1446 ON 10/12/2010 FROM JIM DAVIS TO CHARLES TEAL * * *

On July 15, 2010, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) provided a non-emergency event notification (EN# 46096) for an apparent violation of the Shaw Fitness for Duty (FFD) policy by two subcontractor supervisory personnel who provided suspect self-disclosure documents for other employees from their company. On October 11, 2010, SNC was notified by Shaw that a third sub-contractor supervisory individual was identified as being involved in the original event reported on July 15, 2010. This supervisory individual has been relieved of duty and removed from Vogtle 3&4 site. The documents affected by this individual were part of the documents identified in the original notification (EN# 46096) made on July 15, 2010. As part of the corrective actions from the root cause investigation into the previously reported events, Shaw has verified that a self-disclosure form has been completed by each individual as required by 10 CFR 26. This notification is being made as an update to EN# 46096 to identify that a third individual was involved in violating the Shaw FFD policy. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (McCoy).

ENS 4608412 July 2010 03:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD COTTY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2100 EDT ON 07/14/10 * * *

The licensee has completed the required maintenance on the TSC HVAC. The Technical Support Center is now fully functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 460672 July 2010 14:40:00VogtleNRC Region 2An internal audit of a contractors Fitness for Duty program revealed potential non-compliances with elements of 10 CFR 26.61 related to self disclosure requirements. The investigation into the extent of the potential noncompliance continues including whether associated elements of 10 CFR 26.63 are in compliance. Safety related construction activities will be suspended pending resolution and completion of corrective actions. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR26.719(b)(4). The licensee will notify the Public Service Commission of Georgia and the NRC Construction Inspection Staff.
ENS 458082 April 2010 16:59:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant was not granted. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4558823 December 2009 17:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1525 EST, Vogtle Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to a loss of instrument air to the turbine building. System operators were releasing a tagout and restoring one of two instrument air dryers that had been isolated for maintenance. Instrument air low pressure alarms were received in the control room and secondary side valves were responding to the loss of instrument air. Control room operators responded according to procedures. Main feed pump 'B' tripped on a loss of suction pressure and operators manually tripped the reactor. The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of a loss of feed water to the steam generators. All systems responded as required. AFW (Auxiliary Feed Water) actuated as required for loss of feed water. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Instrument air has been restored to the turbine building and steam dumps are controlling RCS temperatures. Cause of the loss of instrument air is being investigated. (The NRC) Senior Resident (Inspector) was notified.
ENS 4555710 December 2009 01:38:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2310 EST, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 24% reactor power while the main turbine was rolling at 1800 rpm, preparing for synchronization to the grid. As Vogtle 1 was preparing to bring the Unit 1 generator on line following a forced outage, high vibration levels were experienced on the HP turbine bearings while the Turbine was at rated speed and synchronization preparations were in progress. The Turbine was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. Vibrations continued to increase as the Turbine began to coast down, warranting that vacuum be broken in accordance with procedures. The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of trip of the main feedwater pump (due to loss of condenser vacuum) and condenser vacuum was broken to slow the turbine. When condenser vacuum was broken, the in-service Main Feedwater Pump auto tripped as expected, causing an automatic actuation of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater system. The cause of high vibrations on the Turbine is being investigated. All systems responded as expected on the trip. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. Atmospheric relief valves are being used to remove decay heat. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 455477 December 2009 20:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVogtle Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a (turbine trip/ reactor trip) RPS (reactor protection system) actuation. The turbine tripped due to low condenser vacuum. Initial investigation indicates that a loss of a non-1E electrical switchgear initiated the event. All systems responded as expected. The AFW (auxiliary feedwater) systems responded as required. Reactor temperature (and decay heat removal) is being maintained on SG (steam generator) ARVs (atmospheric relief valves). Both NRC Resident Inspectors were notified of the trip. There were no complications. All rods inserted during the trip and there was no primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 2.
ENS 4545221 October 2009 21:21:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed contractor supervisor refused to take a random drug and alcohol test. The individual's unescorted access was immediately terminated and the individual removed from the site. Contact the HOO for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4544316 October 2009 15:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed contract employee supervisor failed to disclose derogatory information as required by the fitness-for-duty program. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4539230 September 2009 04:30:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn Sunday September 20, 2009 @ 1800 hrs EDT the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and performing testing for Containment Ventilation Isolation. A jumper was installed per operations procedure 14238-1 for this testing. The jumper was inadvertently dislodged resulting in a B Train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). There was not a valid radiation alarm signal present; only a test signal. Per Technical Specification 3.3.8 this function is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The actuation occurred during a maintenance activity and was not from a valid signal. This is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) based on the following: Per 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid and: (i) Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii) Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.' The event occurred during a surveillance activity and resulted in an invalid actuation from a test signal. The actuation was invalid and the system was not removed from service during this activity. The actuation was considered complete and successful. The CVI signal for Train B automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4537221 September 2009 12:54:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopEarlier this morning, a contract worker fell from a ladder inside the Unit One Containment. The distance fallen is estimated to be eight and one half feet. First Responders arrived at the individual and after examining him secured him to a backboard, after which he was carried from (the) containment. Health Physics Technicians were not able to survey the individual's back since he was strapped to the back board. The ambulance containing the individual exited the PA (Protected Area) at 0551 and a Health Physics Technician accompanied the individual to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital and examination by a physician, the Health Physics Technician was allowed to fully check the individual and determined that there was no contamination present. This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) since it could not be positively determined that the injured individual was not contaminated when he was transported off site. The individual has been released from the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4535617 September 2009 14:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirement Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The backup power supply functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) will be out of service due to planned maintenance on the SAS Battery. Pre job briefings and steps for restoration in case of emergency have been included in the work plan. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned Maintenance activity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0355 EDT ON 9/18/09 FROM SWEAT TO HUFFMAN * * *

In reference to EN# 45456, Plant Vogtle Technical Requirement Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 has been exited. The backup power supply for the Technical Support Facilities (TSC) has been returned to service and Is now fully functional. R2DO (Bonser) notified.

ENS 4530026 August 2009 09:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The TSC Air Handling Unit will be taken OOS to repair one of the two compressors. In order to perform this corrective maintenance, the TSC HVAC will be removed from service for (approximately) 1 hour to disconnect the compressor to be repaired and in doing so will render the TSC HVAC inoperable which renders the TSC as non-functional. The TSC HVAC will be restarted to return the TSC to an operable and functional status. The work to repair or replace the compressor is planned to be completed within (1-3 days). After the work is completed, the system will be taken out of service again to reconnect the compressor ((approximately) 1 hr) and return the TSC HVAC to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM J.W. COVINGTON TO V. KLCO AT 1045 ON 8/28/2009 * * *

Maintenance was completed and the TSC was restored to operable status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO(Widmann).

ENS 4517329 June 2009 20:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any system in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) ' General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is identified in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). Although the Containment Ventilation Isolation signal affects multiple containment isolation valves in several systems, at the time of the invalid actuation, only containment isolation valves associated with the containment area radiation monitor were open. Therefore, this notification is being conservatively made. NUREG 1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below. (A) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated. On June 6, 2009 at 2246 hours, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, a containment area radiation monitor failed high, resulting in an invalid A and B train automatic Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). Four containment isolation valves, associated with a containment radiation air monitor, that was in-service at the time of the actuation, closed. Additionally, valves (non-containment isolation valves) in the Auxiliary building closed in response to the actuation. (B) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial. The actuation was considered complete. The CVI signal automatically isolated all valves that were open at the time of the actuation. (c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully. The Containment Ventilation Isolation signal automatically actuated and functioned successfully. The CVI signal was not in response to actual plant conditions and is therefore considered invalid. In reviewing this CVI actuation it was also discovered that on July 6, 2007 a similar CVI had occurred on Unit 1 when a circuit board associated with the containment vent radiation monitor failed. The failure resulted in an actuation of CVI train A and Train B. The actuation was considered complete since all valves that were open at the time of the actuation isolated as required. The CVI was not in response to actual plant conditions and was therefore considered invalid. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4512813 June 2009 09:19:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Planned maintenance activities are being performed today (June 13, 2009) on the Vogtle Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC) power sources. This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within approximately 3 days (78 hours). This maintenance activity is to perform a transformer replacement, perform preventative maintenance on several circuit breakers, perform preventative maintenance on the TSC HVAC unit, repair a leak on the Back-Up D/G (diesel generator) which provides a back-up power supply to the TSC HVAC, and other minor maintenance activities. If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center during this work activity, contingency plans are in place to restore the TSC to fully functional status, with the time to restoration dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time the emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the Shift Manager's Office in the Control Room as the Backup TSC for any declared emergency during the time the work activity is being performed. Procedure 91201-C, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC. At the beginning of the TSC outage, the ENN (Emergency Notification Network) and ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) will not be available until temporary power is being provided. This outage for the communications equipment will last from 2-4 hours, at which time they will be available. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee provided notification of this issue prior to initiation of the maintenance per the licensee's 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation for the activity. The licensee intends to update this report when the temporary modification is completed such that the ERDS system is returned to service.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HENRY TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0735 EDT ON 6/15/09 * * *

The licensee has returned the ERDS system to service using temporary power. Preventive maintenance still continues on the TSC. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

  • * * UPDATE ON 6/19/2009 AT 1153 FROM RICHARD COTTY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The ventilation system has been returned to its normal power supply at 1121 on 6/19/2009. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).

ENS 4507517 May 2009 14:29:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Required Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to failure of the Backup Diesel Generator (which provides backup power to TSC related equipment) to pass a required surveillance. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector Tim Chandler has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/19/09 AT 1615 FROM ROBERT ROWLAND TO VINCE KLCO * * *

At 1559 the Backup Diesel Generator was declared operable. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Henson).

ENS 4502427 April 2009 17:34:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 448419 February 2009 04:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity and has determined that this work may be performed without prior NRC approval. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee stated that the planned maintenance on the TSC HVAC and return to service of the TSC should be completed within 12 hours.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1446 EST ON 02/09/09 FROM HANS BISHOP TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

TSC HVAC maintenance is complete and the TSC was restored to service at 1441 EST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rudisail).

ENS 446489 November 2008 20:44:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The TSC Normal HVAC (A-1563-A7-001) and Normal Chilled Water Pump (A-1564-P7-001) tripped for unknown reasons after approximately 10 minutes of operation following restoration to normal from surveillance 14400A-1. This report is being made per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, action B.2. With the TSC Normal HVAC and Chilled Water Pump inoperable, the Functionality of the TSC has been lost due to inability to maintain proper climate control. The alternate TSC facility is available and actions are being taken to return the TSC to Functional status with a high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/11/2008 AT 1534 FROM STEPHEN HARRIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The TSC Emergency Response Facility was restored to Operable status on 11/11/2008 at 1442. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 4456816 October 2008 03:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuring normal surveillance testing of the U1 Control Room radiation monitors, the Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration Unit did not automatically start as required upon initiation of a High CR Radiation Signal. Additionally, the filtration unit could not be manually started from the TSC HVAC Control panel. This report is being made per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, action B.2. With the Technical Support Center Emergency Filtration Unit inoperable, the functionality of the Technical Support Center has been lost. The alternate TSC facility is available and actions are being taken to return the TSC to Functional status with a high priority. The NRC resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4448010 September 2008 19:30:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center has been lost due to the failure of the TSC HVAC emergency backup power source. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with a high priority. The NRC resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4422620 May 2008 17:40:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to the failure of the TSC Chiller to maintain chilled water within the normal control band. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4391417 January 2008 23:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At approximately 1800 EST, a controlled substance and paraphernalia were discovered by a supplemental employee, who then reported the discovery to his supervision. Plant Security was contacted, who then notified Local Law Enforcement. All supplemental personnel who were in-processing in the area at the time of discovery were interviewed and sent for FFD testing. All immediate results were negative; lab results are still pending. A drug detection dog was brought in by the Local Law Enforcement Agency to clear the area where the substance was found and nothing additional was found. This notification is being made as a courtesy as a result of the potential newsworthiness of the event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (POPE) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 0925 EST ON 01/18/08 * * *

The building in which the substance was found was located outside the Plant Vogtle Protected Area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Moorman) notified.

ENS 438792 January 2008 10:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Required Action B.2. The functionality of the TSC was lost due to inadvertent removal of electrical power from the radio system that provides the communication function between the TSC and Field Monitoring Teams. Normal power supply was authorized to be removed at 0331 on 01/02/2008 and condition was discovered when battery power depleted. Electrical power has been restored as of 0956 on 01/02/2008 and operability of communication capability has been verified.

NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 438213 December 2007 17:58:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed supervisor in the corporate office had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random examination. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 4357718 August 2007 00:02:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn the evening of 8/17/07 several light(n)ing strikes were noted in the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant area during a rain storm. Information Technology (IT) personnel were dispatched to check for proper operations of IT equipment and found the primary transmitter for the offsite public alerting sirens to be damaged and out of service. IT personnel swapped the offsite public alerting sirens over to a secondary transmitter and verified that they were operable and returned them to service @ 22:01 hrs on 8/17/07. The primary transmitter will be repaired next week. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (8 hour notification) The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4356413 August 2007 20:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported as a conservative measure regarding a situation involving potential fire induced circuit failures on associated circuits. Plant Vogtle is considered to be in compliance with its current fire protection licensing basis, Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5.1 as endorsed by UFSAR Appendix 9B, however, this condition is being reported as the generic industry issues associated with multiple spurious circuit failures have not been resolved to date. A potential hot short issue exists involving Containment Spray Sump Suction valves 1(2)HV-9002A, 1(2)HV- 9003A, 1(2)HV-9002B, and 1(2)HV-9003B. If a fire were to occur in a location where the control circuit cables for those valves run in the same electrical raceway, a credible condition exists where either flowpath could spuriously open which would cause the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to drain down to the containment sumps. The fire zones where associated cables are located were placed under a compensatory hourly fire watch until compensatory measures were established. As an interim corrective action, operator manual actions have been specified and incorporated into plant procedures to deenergize and verify closed one valve in the series flowpath upon determination that a credible fire exists. These manual actions are in accordance with RIS 2006-10 for plants which are licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. Southern Nuclear will determine long term corrective actions for this condition. The effects of a fire sufficient to cause a spurious operation of multiple valves is not expected to be immediate and thus will allow sufficient time to perform the manual actions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY G. SAXON TO J. KOZAL ON 8/15/07 AT 1522 * * *

An eight hour report (EN#43564) per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported based on a fire-induced hot short issue (multiple-spurious) which could result in the spurious opening of Containment Spray Sump Suction valves 1(2)HV-9002A, 1(2)HV-9003A, 1(2)HV-9002B, and 1(2)HV-9003B. HV-9002 and HV-9003 are two valves in series between the containment emergency sump and the containment spray pumps. If a fire were to occur in a location where the control circuit cables for those valves run in the same electrical raceway, it is postulated a condition may exist where either flowpath could spuriously open which would cause the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to drain down to the containment sumps. The VEGP design basis defines a spurious control signal action/inaction as being caused by a single hot short, open circuit, or short-to-ground for a single component. Since all three conditions are postulated, the assumption that all adverse conditions will happen to the subject component(s) yields a conservative evaluation. Where a hi/low pressure interlace (fire-induced LOCA) is involved, an unlimited number of spurious control signal actions/inactions are postulated. Calculations have been reviewed to ensure these design criteria have been met. At this time, there is no definitive new guidance (Generic Letter, etc.) by the NRC on how licensees are to handle analysis of multiple spurious shorts. The status and history of misunderstanding and confusion relative to the regulatory and design requirements is well documented in NRC EGM 98-002 Rev. 2 and EGM 07- 004. The NRC staff and the industry are currently working to resolve questions raised by the industry about the adequacy of the existing staff guidance concerning fire-induced circuit failures and the consistency of staff interpretations of both the guidance and the underlying regulatory requirements. In summary, VEGP is in conformance with the current design basis. However, as defense-in-depth, actions have been taken that include implementation of hourly fire watches in the affected zones until procedural guidance for performance of manual actions were added to the Annunciator Response Procedures for the Fire Alarm Computer. The manual actions consist of opening the breakers for one of the emergency sump-to containment spray pumps suction isolation valves and then verifying the valves are closed. Based on the above discussion, SNC is retracting EN#43564. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ogle).

ENS 4345427 June 2007 18:44:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 15:55 ET on 6/27/07 - notified by the Vogtle Emergency Preparedness that the limit switch full closed indication on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC Outside Air Damper not being functional (which) impacted habitability of the TSC. This is due to the full closed limit switch providing a signal to inflate the sealing boot on the associated damper. This is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (8 hour notification) At 6:53 ET on 6/27/07 - TSC HVAC was placed in service in the filtration mode with the damper limit switch manually adjusted to provide full closed indication. The TSC HVAC is fully functional and supporting TSC habitability at this time. TSC HVAC will remain in service in the filtration mode until the repair plan for the damper is implemented. The licensee notified the Region 2 Duty Officer (Ayres).

* * * UPDATE AT 1037 0N 6/29/07 FROM C. WILLIAMS TO P. SNYDER * * * 

A plan has been created to repair the limit switch on the TSC HVAC Outside Air Damper. This will require securing the TSC HVAC for a period of time, thus rendering the TSC non functional. A plan has been written to cover required actions to be taken in the event of a plant event, in accordance with 10CFR50.54(q). Estimated outage time is four hours, it may be shorter depending on actions required to adjust limit switch to return full functionality to the TSC HVAC. You will receive a follow-up call when full TSC functionality has been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayers).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1249 EDT 0N 6/29/07 FROM C. WILLIAMS TO W. HUFFMAN * * *

The TSC HVAC outside air damper limit switch has been repaired and the TSC has been returned to functional status. The TSC HVAC was non-functional from 11:24 to 12:17 EDT." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ayres) notified.

ENS 4331323 April 2007 11:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVogtle Unit 2 tripped from 53% power due to a turbine trip /P9 reactor trip RPS actuation during power ascension following completion of refueling outage 2R12. Initial investigation indicates that a generator neutral ground relay actuated causing an automatic main generator turbine trip. No visual damage is apparent on any plant equipment. All systems responded as expected. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven started on lo-lo steam generator level and AMSAC. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. All control rods fully inserted upon RPS actuation, the atmospheric relief valves lifted momentarily and reseated as expected, and no safety valves lifted. After the trip, steam generator level was being maintained with auxiliary feed pumps and steam was being dumped to the condenser. The plant was placed in the normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 432269 March 2007 14:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A Notification of Unusual Event has occurred on Unit 2 due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute. The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified USDA (Brzostels).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1754 ON 3/9/06 FROM T. PETRAK TO P. SNYDER * * *

No actual RCS leakage occurred and the RCS always remained intact. The additional water injection occurred and the RCS always remained intact. The additional water injection into the Reactor Coolant System was required to makeup for gases that came out of solution and accumulated in the reactor vessel head and were being vented from the RCS during a planned drain down. The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1751 on 3/9/07. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local government agencies. The licensee will remain in Mode 5 for their planned outage. Notified R2DO (G. Hopper), NRR EO (M. Case), IRD (T. Blount), NRR (J. Dyer), DHS (McKentry), FEMA (Biscoe), DOE (Wyatt), EPA (Burgess), HHS (Dalviel), USDA (Giles).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1531 EDT ON 5/11/07 FROM ROBERT DORMAN TO GERRY WAIG * * *

This report is retracted based on the following: On 3/9/07, an NOUE was declared while Unit 2 was in Mode 5, draining the RCS to support Rx Vessel disassembly, due to what was then diagnosed as an RCS Unidentified Leak greater than 10 gpm. Subsequent review of the event revealed that no leak existed and the mismatch between charging and letdown, which was the basis of the leak determination, was caused by a nitrogen bubble being vented from the Rx Vessel Head and the additional charging volume was displacing the nitrogen volume as it was being vented. As a result, Vogtle Unit 2 is retracting the NOUE classification that was made on 3/9/07. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes).

ENS 4318726 February 2007 09:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

During the performance of rounds by a System Operator it was noticed that area temperatures in the TSC seemed higher than normal. The Control Room was notified and after investigating found that the TSC chiller was not running. An attempt was made to reset the freeze protection relay per the annunciator response procedure. The chiller would not start. Maintenance has been notified to investigate and repair the chiller. The importance of returning the chiller to service in a timely manner has been communicated to maintenance personnel and they will they will restore the chiller to operational status as soon as practical. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY THOMAS PETRAK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1524 EST ON 02/27/07 * * *

One of two TSC Chiller compressors had failed. The failed compressor has been disabled and the chiller package returned to service on 2/26/2007 @ 13:24. The capacity of one compressor is sufficient to handle the design heat load. Ventilation, filtration and pressurization of the TSC HVAC were not affected by the failed compressor. A replacement compressor and fan are expected on-site by 3/1/2007 and repairs should be complete by 3/2/2007. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour)

ENS 4294228 October 2006 16:02:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

During plant cooldown/depressurization in Mode 3, an Over Temperature (OT) Delta Temperature reactor trip signal was generated. The reactor Trip Breakers opened as designed (all rods were previously inserted). Additionally, a low Tavg/P-4 Feedwater Isolation Signal was generated and all Bypass Feedwater Regulation Valves closed (open for long-cycle recirculation operation). No Feedwater Isolation Valves were open at the time. All systems performed as designed. Actual loop Delta T's (Th - Tc) never exceeded 3.3 degrees F, well below the calculated OT Delta T setpoint. But plant Delta T calculations are based on narrow range Th and Tc instruments with scaling to low limits. When actual plant temperature was lowered to the lower limits of each instrument, calculated Delta T increased to the OT Delta T setpoint causing the reactor trip signal. Existing procedure guidance did not adequately ensure that the reactor trip breakers are open prior to initiating a partial plant cooldown. The plant was stabilized. The long-cycle recirculation was re-established and plant cooldown/depressurization was recommenced, as originally planned to 340 degrees F and 925 psig. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/9/2006 AT 12:19 FROM THOMAS G. PETRAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Alvin W. Vogtle, Unit 1, Operating License no. NPF-68, Event Notification #42942 is retracted. The event reported in the notification which occurred during the Unit 1 cooldown in Mode 3 was not representative of the conditions under which the Over Temperature Delta Temperature (OTDT) setpoint is intended to operate. The setpoint is intended to provide protection while the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. As the cooldown progressed from Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature (NOPT), eventually the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hot and cold leg temperature indications reached the low end of their ranges or scales. Further reductions of temperature resulted in artificial indications of core power (delta-T) that cannot be relied upon as a valid input to the OTDT protective function. The actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is not considered to be a valid actuation. As such, this is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 Feedwater Isolation caused from the OTDT reactor trip is not a function is listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3)(iv)(B) as a system whose actuation is required to be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4291617 October 2006 18:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1430 CDST on 10/17/2006 the Control Room was notified by the Site HVAC engineer that a condition existing in the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC called into question the habitability of the TSC under accident conditions. Specifically, the TSC HVAC Supply fan was noted on the previous shift to be putting out less air than normal. Engineering was asked to look into it and discovered that the fan belts were slipping and that the fan was currently running at approximately half normal speed. While this was sufficient to maintain the required positive pressure in the TSC at the present time, they were not confident of it's ability to maintain it long-term under accident conditions. Receipt of this information and consultation with Southern Nuclear Company Emergency Preparedness employees has led the Control Room staff to the decision to make this notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the uncertainty of the long-term habitability of the TSC. Preparations are underway for the repair of the affected fan, which is expected to be completed tonight. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4280627 August 2006 09:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn Sunday, August 27, 2006 at 0631 EDST, Unit Two was at 99.7% RTP when RCP #4 tripped generating a Low Flow Reactor Trip. All systems functioned as required. AFWAS (Aux Feedwater Actuation Signal) was actuated as expected due to lo-lo Steam Generators levels. RCS Letdown isolated on a momentary low level signal on one channel of Pressurizer level, and has since been restored. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 while the cause of the trip of the RCP is investigated. Decay heat is being rejected to the condenser via the steam dumps. ESF systems remain operable and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4250617 April 2006 01:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopUnit 1 reactor was manually tripped from 33% RTP due to the Loop 3 Main Feed Regulating Valve (MFRV) 1LV-0530 not controlling steam generator level in manual or AUTO. A unit shutdown was in progress at the time of the trip due to concerns with the Loop 3 MFRV. The unit shutdown had commenced from 100% power on 04/16/2006 at 1603 hrs. All systems functioned as required on the reactor trip including a feedwater isolation and the Loop 3 MFRV closing as expected. The unit is presently in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. An investigation team is being assembled concerning the Loop 3 MFRV. All control rods fully inserted. No primary or secondary reliefs/safeties lifted during the transient. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 Hot Standby controlling Steam Generator Water Level using Auxiliary Feedwater supplied by both Motor Driven and the Steam Driven pumps. Decay Heat is being removed via the Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser. Offsite power is stable and all EDGs are available, if necessary. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4243420 March 2006 15:51:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 03:56 on 03/20/2006 an intermediate radiation alarm was received on Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radiation Monitor, 2RE-2562A. A review of other containment parameters, such as containment pressure, moisture, temperature, sump levels and other containment radiation monitors were all stable. Chemistry was notified of the increasing particulate radiation levels in containment and immediately pulled the filter paper from radiation monitor 2RE-2562A. A gross count of the filter paper revealed the presence of Na-24 and Co-58. The presence of these two isotopes indicated the possibility of an active RCS leak. An RCS leakrate measurement was initiated. The results of the leakrate measurement showed no measurable change in leakrate. The total leakrate was calculated to be 0.13 gpm. At 06:03 on 03/20/2006 a high radiation alarm was received on Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radiation Monitor, 2RE-2562A. Preparations were begun to make a containment entry to walkdown outside the bio-shield and to take a robot, equipped with a camera, to inspect inside the bio-shield. At 13:00 personnel from the Unit 2 containment reported that a leak was visible from inside the bio-shield in the area of RCS Loop #1. Based on reports from personnel in containment, the leakage in containment was determined to be pressure boundary leakage and Tech Spec 3.4.13, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE," was entered. As required by TS 3.4.13, at 13:52 on 03/20/2006 a unit shutdown to Mode 3 was initiated to allow further investigations and repair of the leak inside containment. Abnormal Operating Procedure 18004-C, "RCS Leakage" was also entered at this time due to increasing radiation levels on, radiation monitor 2RE-2562A. Per Tech Spec 3.4.13, Mode 3 entry (is) required by no later than 19:00 on 3/20/2006 and Mode 5 entry no later than 01:00 on 3/22/2006. The Unit shutdown is currently in progress. This is the third shutdown at the Unit for a leak in this vicinity. See similar event reports #42309 dated February 3, 2006, and #42194 dated December 9, 2005. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 423093 February 2006 23:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2124 hrs on 2/3/06, a containment leak inspection team reported pressure boundary leakage (RCS) at a welded connection on a 3/4" bypass line around the RHR loop suction valve 2HV8701B. Presently the unit is in Mode 3. Preparations are being made to commence cooldown to Mode 5 for repair of the leak. Unit 2 was taken from 100% RTP to approximately 30% RTP beginning at 1200 hrs on 2/01/06 for repairs of an EHC leak on the main turbine front standard. The EHC leak was repaired and power ascension to 100 % RTP commenced at 2213 hrs on 2/01/06. Approximately 100 % RTP was reached on 2/3/06 at 0600 hrs. Between 1900 hrs on 2/01/06 and 1600 hrs on 2/02/06, radiation monitor 2RE2562A went into Intermediate Alarm for short durations on three different occasions. Due to moving the plant, an accurate RCS leak rate could not be performed. A containment entry was performed on the night shift 2/2/06 and again on dayshift 2/3/06. Utilizing a robot and camera, leakage was observed inside the bioshield in the area of RCS Loop #1. The source of the leak on both containment entries was inconclusive. At 1412 hrs on 2/3/06, a shutdown of Unit 2 was initiated to allow further investigation/repair of the leak inside containment. Unit 2 was placed in Mode 3 at 1807 hrs on 2/3/06. See also EN# 42194 for a similar incident. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 421949 December 2005 18:11:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 1450 hours on 12/5/05, Unit 2 entered abnormal operating procedure 18004-C 'RCS Leakage' due to increasing containment atmospheric radiation levels as identified on 2RE2562A. Per procedure, an RCS leak rate determination was commenced and completed as of 1629 hours, 12/8/05 (identified = 0.032gpm, unidentified = 0.254gpm, total = 0.286gpm). While making preparations for a containment entry for leakage inspection, a second leak rate (determination) was completed at 2020 hours, 12/8/05 (identified = 0.070gpm, unidentified = 0.267gpm, total = 0.337gpm). At 2240 hours, 12/8/05, the team performing the containment leak inspection reported no leakage identified outside the bioshield. Another leak rate (determination) was completed at 0245 hours, 12/9/05, the team performing the containment leak inspection reported that by using a robotic camera, water was observed coming down the inside wall of the bioshield in the area of loop 2. At 0433 hours, 12/9/05, a shutdown of Unit 2 was initiated to allow further investigation / repair of the RCS leak inside containment. Unit 2 was placed in Mode 3 at 1313 hours, 12/9/05. At 1544 hours, 12/9/05, the containment leak inspection team reported pressure boundary leakage at a welded connection where a 3/4 inch bypass line is welded to the RCS loop upstream of the RHR loop suction valve 2HV8701B. (Plant Vogtle personnel are) presently preparing to commence shutdown to Mode 5 for repair of the leak. Technical specification 3.4.14 applies and requires no pressure boundary leakage. The plant is currently removing decay heat by steaming from the steam generators through the steam dump valves to the condenser. All safety related electrical buses are available. Emergency diesel generators are available and in standby. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE RECEIVED BY PHONE ON 12/12/2005 AT 13:50 FROM JIM POLICKOSKI TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Two corrections were communicated. The date of the initial event was "at 1450 hours on 12/8/05." The technical specification quoted is changed to 3.4.13. Notified the R2DO (Henson).

ENS 4205817 October 2005 19:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1816 EDT on 10/17/2005 Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to lowering Steam Generator level on Loop 2. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for Loop 2 failed closed and operator attempts to re-open it were unsuccessful. The operators initiated a manual reactor trip when it was apparent that Steam Generator level would not be restored. Following the manual reactor trip, an automatic actuation of the Motor Driven and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps occurred due to low level in the Steam Generators. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for Loop 1 did not close as expected for the feedwater isolation signal (P-4 / Tavg 564 degrees F) that resulted from the manual trip. The Loop 1 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve was manually closed by the operators. All control rods are fully inserted. This incident did not affect Unit 2. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and removing heat by dumping steam to the condensers. All safety related systems or equipment are available and functioning as required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4193419 August 2005 20:32:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Item 2.H of the (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) VEGP Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating licenses, (Southern Nuclear Company) SNC is notifying the NRC of overpower events in violation of the maximum core power level of 3565 MWt authorized by Item 2.C.(1) of the licenses. Based on a review of operating data dating back to January 2, 2002, SNC has identified occurrences where the daily average core power exceeded 3565 MWt by as much as 0.4 MWt for Unit 1 and 0.9 MWt for Unit 2. The temperature signal from the steam generator blowdown, used as input into the computer calorimetric, was determined to be out of calibration in each unit. The licensee is evaluating this situation for a causal effect. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1434 EDT ON 9/2/05 FROM STEVE WALDRUP TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On 8/19/05, VEGP notified the NRC Operations Center (Notification # 41934) of overpower events in violation of the maximum core power level of 3565 MWt authorized by Item 2.C.(1) of the Unit 1 and Unit 2. operating licenses. The non-conservative measurement of a plant parameter used in the calorimetric heat balance resulted in underestimating the calculated reactor thermal power. Correcting the calculated reactor thermal power for non-conservatism resulted in the conclusion that the licensed power level was exceeded. This led to the notification described above. Further engineering evaluation identified conservatisms in the heat balance calculation that were demonstrated to more than offset the non-conservatism discussed above. It was therefore concluded that the maximum core power level did not exceed the power level authorized by Item 2.C.(1) of Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating licenses. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Mark Lesser).

ENS 4181330 June 2005 11:52:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuring daily maintenance check of alert notification siren system, a siren technician discovered that the radio transmitter used to communicate with the sirens was not available. Investigation revealed that an encoder that utilizes a T1 phone line to send signals from a siren encoder to the transmitter had failed. This failure produced a signal to key the transmitter. After the transmitter is keyed for approximately 15 seconds the transmitter will lock out and therefore not be available for use. Since the transmitter was unavailable this rendered all offsite sirens inoperable. This notification is made under 10CFR50.72(b) because of a significant loss off offsite public notification capability. This failure was promptly diagnosed, corrected, and the system tested satisfactorily within approximately 62 minutes from time of discovery of 0800 Eastern Time. The tone alert radio portion of the alert notification system was available for notification during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector and Burke County was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4165330 April 2005 00:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2155 EDT on 4/29/2005, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to lowering steam generator level on loop #1. The main feedwater regulating valve was in manual control and a repair plan was in progress to replace a controlling card which failed earlier in the day. The manual reactor trip caused an automatic aux. feedwater actuation of the motor driven and turbine driven feedwater pumps. All other equipment responded as expected on the trip. At approximately 1600, the loop #1 main feed regulating valve had failed shut while in the automatic mode of operation. The operator shifted control to manual and opened the valve, preventing a reactor trip. At 2155 the recovery plan was being implemented using a plant procedure. While performing the procedure, the loop #1 feed regulating valve shut. The reactor was manually tripped on lowering steam generator level. All rods fully inserted after the manual reactor trip. Decay heat removal is to the main condenser with steam generator level being maintained using the motor driven aux. feedwater pumps. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4149816 March 2005 10:22:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The licensee provided the following information about the event via facsimile (licensee test in quotes): On 3/16/2005 at approximately 0540 preparations were being made to drain down the RCS. A tagout needed to be released to support aligning the RCS for drain down. The tagout was not completely released prior to opening the intermediate leg loop drain valves. When the intermediate leg loop drain valves were opened, a flow path was created which resulted in draining the RCS. The Control Room noted approximately 70 gpm mismatch between letdown flow and charging. Personnel in containment manipulating the valves discovered that water was flowing unexpectedly to a trough in containment when they went to position the last set of intermediate leg loop drain valves and they quickly isolated the flow path. The time frame that the flow path existed was approximately 10 minutes. When the Shift Manager evaluated the event for Emergency classification the flow path had been isolated. The Shift Manager was not clear on if this event met the guidance for an NOUE declaration and asked for assistance from the Outage Control Center. Corporate licensing and Emergency preparedness were contacted for additional assistance. At 0930 it was decided to report the event per 50.72 (a) General Requirements even though it is not clear that the threshold for an EAL was met. Per NUREG-1022 the NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the Emergency Class to be necessary when the event has rapidly terminated and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists. The licensee stated that the threshold for an Unusual Event declaration per the Vogtle EALs is 25 gpm identified RCS leakage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified as well as courtesy notifications to state and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE TO NRC (HUFFMAN) FROM LICENSEE (DORMAN) AT 10:58 ON 3/16/05 * * *

After further consideration, the licensee decided that this event should have been classified as an Unusual Event at the time of the occurrence. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this classification.

ENS 4132311 January 2005 09:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0719 EST, Vogtle Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a Turbine Trip/P9 Reactor Trip, RPS actuation. Initial investigation indicates that Generator relaying was involved. The investigation is ongoing. As expected for the trip, both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps and the Turbine Driven pump started on Lo-Lo Steam Generator level and AMSAC. All equipment actuated as expected except the Group A Pressurizer Heaters tripped. Technical Specification 3.4.9 Condition B was entered. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the main condenser. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 4126415 December 2004 11:15:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopIssue: By letter dated October 26, 2004, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) notified affected members in accordance with 10 CPR 21.21(b), of a non-conservatism in the (software product of) EPRI Motor Operated Valve Performance Prediction Methodology (PPM), Versions 1.0 through 3.2, to predict total required dynamic torque under compressible flow conditions for actuators for butterfly valves with single disc offset designs. As explained in the error notice, the non-conservatism could be as much as 45 percent. This non-conservatism could potentially jeopardize the design basis operation of associated safety related applications. Southern Nuclear Company (SNC) subsequently performed an engineering evaluation based on the EPRI notification as it related to Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP). The assessment did not identify any instances where the PPM had actually been used for such purposes at VEGP. Corrective Action: This issue has been entered into the SNC Corrective Action Program. SNC will evaluate the restrictions, adjustments, and recommendations regarding use of the EPRI MOV PPM, Versions 1.0 through 3.2, that were communicated in EPRI PPM Software Error Notice 2004-2.
ENS 4121320 November 2004 14:56:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn 11/20/2004 at 1140 EST during the performance of 14421-2 'Solid State Protection System And Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test' an automatic Reactor Trip occurred and a Safety Injection occurred a short time thereafter. The Reactor Trip was caused by an error made in the performance of the 14421-2 procedure. The operator working with a peer checker mistakenly placed the 'A' train multiplexer test switch in the 'A + B' position instead of the 'B' train one. The 'B' train multiplexer test switch was still in the inhibit position. When the 'A' Train multiplexer switch went through the inhibit position, it caused the second general warning which tripped the reactor. The Safety Injection is believed to have been caused by a failure of the loop 2 Reactor Coolant Average Temperature which impacted the Steam Dump control system. The Steam Dumps did not close as expected during the Reactor Trip response and Pressurizer pressure lowered below the Safety Injection System setpoint and a Safety Injection was actuated. All systems operated as expected during the Safety Injection and Reactor Trip. All the Control Rods fully inserted on the Reactor Trip. The Main Steam Lines were isolated by the operator due to the lower than expected decrease of the Reactor Coolant System Average Temperature. Both Motor Driven AFW pumps started as expected as did the Turbine Driven AFW pump. All ECCS pumps started as expected on the Safety Injection. The Containment Coolers all started in low speed on the Safety Injection as expected. Both Diesel Generators started on the Safety Injection actuation. The Containment Isolation systems isolated containment as expected. During the recovery from the Safety Injection pressurizer level did reach 100%, but the Pressurizer PORVs were not required to open to control Pressurizer pressure. Unit 2 is currently stable in mode 3 removing decay heat via the Atmospheric Steam Dumps. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4119915 November 2004 21:22:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn 11/08/04, a contractor on his last day of work at the site was given a random drug test. November 15, at 1611 EST a confirmed positive drug screen results for the contractor was received. The contractor worked at the Vogtle site from 07/15/04 through 11/08/04. He held unescorted access for inside the Protected are but as far as the licensee knows this person never entered any vital areas. No action taken since his badge was terminated on his last day of work which was 11/08/04. This information will be entered into the PAD system. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4068218 April 2004 15:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAn Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) actuation occurred with the plant in Mode 3, Main Feedwater out of service and a cooldown in progress. An AFW actuation was received when both main feed pumps tripped due to low condenser vacuum. AFW was already in service with both motor-driven pumps running and discharge valves throttled to maintain steam generator level. A surveillance to test AFW actuation on the trip of main feedwater pumps was in progress. The main feed pump trip signal was generated when condenser vacuum was broken prior to completing the test and blocking the actuation signal from the main feed pumps to AFW. Steam generator blowdown and sample valves isolated and MDAFW (Motor Driven AFW) discharge valves opened as expected. Operators took action to throttle AFW feed to the steam generators. No adverse affects on the plant occurred. The AFW actuation signal from the trip of main feed pumps has been blocked as allowed by plant conditions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4062129 March 2004 14:08:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopNotification was received at 1030 EST on March 29, 2004 of a confirmed positive (random test) FFD result for a Controlled Substance for a Licensed Operator. This individual's unescorted access authorization has been suspended pending investigation. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4061528 March 2004 00:30:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn 3/27/2004, the Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped when the 1B Main Feedwater Pump speed could not be controlled in automatic or manual. An unexpected increase in Main Feedwater Pump speed was observed which increased the Main Feedwater header pressure to higher than expected values. An attempt was made to manually control the speed of the 1B Main Feedwater Pump from the various controllers in the Main Control Room. Preparations to start the 1A Main Feedwater Pump were initiated. The speed of the 1B Main Feedwater Pump continued to increase to a point where level control of the Steam Generators and overspeed of the 1B Main Feedwater Pump became a concern. At this point the Reactor was manually tripped and the 1B Main Feedwater Pump was tripped. An Auxiliary Feedwater System automatic actuation occurred on the trip a the 1B Main Feedwater Pump as expected because the 1A Main Feedwater Pump was also tripped at the time due to being at a low power level. All systems responded as expected on the Reactor Trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. An Event Review Team will be performing a review of the event and making recommendations related to restarting the Reactor. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed using the steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater. Plant pressure is 2235 psig and temperature is 557 degrees F. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4026822 October 2003 02:56:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopManually initiated a steam line isolation signal upon report of a failed connection on a high pressure hose being used to vent a main steam isolation valve bonnet cavity (to open pressure locked valves). The manual isolation resulted in closure of the four open main steam isolation valves (Train "A"). The isolation was conducted as a preventative measure for personnel protection (three people were in the South Main Steam Valve Room when the fitting failed). No personnel were injured. Plant conditions remained stable. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.