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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5429930 September 2019 01:22:00FermiNRC Region 3On September 29, 2019 at 2228 EDT, during a planned swap of Reactor Building HVAC trains, the exhaust fan discharge damper for the train being removed from service failed to close when the train was shutdown, which resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure not being met for approximately 2 minutes and 15 seconds. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.1 inches of water gauge (positive). Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by restarting the train of RBHVAC. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 2235 EDT. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5429325 September 2019 15:30:00FermiNRC Region 3

At 1203 EDT, on September 25, 2019, during a Division 2 Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) pump and valve surveillance test, the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Temperature Control Valve was found to be approximately 80 percent open rather than in its required full open position during fail safe testing. The Division 2 EESW system is required to support operability of the Division 2 EECW system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. An investigation is underway into the cause of the failure. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee is in 72-hour shutdown action statement.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/21/19 AT 1547 EST FROM PAUL ANGOVE TO BRIAN LIN * * *

Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the EECW TCV was capable of passing sufficient flow to perform its design basis functions, including supporting the HPCI room cooler, while approximately 80% open. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). EN 54293 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5418830 July 2019 15:42:00FermiNRC Region 3On July 30, 2019, at 1014 EDT, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan D was declared inoperable due to a trip of the fan while placing in it high speed. The MDCT Fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation revealed that a high speed breaker control power fuse had blown. The control power fuse was replaced, the MDCT Fan D was tested satisfactorily, and HPCI was declared operable at 1431 EDT. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector
ENS 5416816 July 2019 17:34:00FermiNRC Region 3At 1445 EDT, on 7/16/2019, during routine maintenance activities on the sanitary sewage system, a leak from an overflow line to a parking lot was discovered. The total amount leaked is estimated to be 20 gallons. Approximately 2 gallons reached gravel in an excavated section of the parking lot. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The cause of the leak is under investigation. As a result of some of the sewage reaching gravel, environmental reports are being made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the Monroe County Health Department, and the local news media. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5416315 July 2019 16:30:00FermiNRC Region 3At 1335 EDT on 7/15/2019, during dredging activities in Fermi 2's General Service Water (GSW) intake canal, a hydraulic line on the dredging machine became disconnected and approximately one quart of hydraulic oil spilled into Lake Erie. The oil leak to navigable waters has been stopped. The oil was contained within a boom, cleanup activities commenced immediately, and cleanup was completed at 1500 EDT. The cause of the oil leak is under investigation. Environmental spill reports were made to local, state, and federal government agencies. This is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State agencies notified were Michigan Department of Environmental Protection and the Michigan Pollution Emergency Alerting System. The licensee also notified the National Response Center.
ENS 5409430 May 2019 00:10:00FermiNRC Region 3On May 29, 2019, at 2210 EDT, plant personnel notified the Main Control Room that both doors in the Secondary Containment Airlock on the Reactor Building First Floor were opened simultaneously for a period of approximately two seconds. This resulted in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 not being met. Secondary Containment pressure observed during that time remained unchanged and within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring Secondary Containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5409227 May 2019 11:53:00FermiNRC Region 3On May 27, 2019 at 0940 EDT, a portable chemical toilet was found tipped over. Approximately one gallon of contents spilled to the gravel only and did not reach any waterways or storm drains. Cleanup efforts are in progress. A notification to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and local health department is required, as well as a press release. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 539825 April 2019 12:19:00FermiNRC Region 3

EN Revision Text: FITNESS-FOR-DUTY: FALSIFIED PRE-EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION A non-licensed employee falsified pre-employment information. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ETHAN HAUSER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1456 EDT ON 5/21/2019 * * *

The following event notifications are retracted: EN 53822 reported on 1/11/2019 and EN 53982 reported on 4/5/2019. Subsequent to the initial notification, further investigation revealed that no new information was discovered that would meet the criteria for reporting under RG 5.62 or NUREG-1304. Further the events were also determined to be limited to an act of personal deception by those applying for unescorted access, without intent to commit or cause events identified in paragraphs I (a) and (d) of Appendix G to Part 73, and is not a programmatic breakdown. Based on this information, and consistent with the NRC memorandum dated May 19, 1995, 'Access Authorization Reportability and Enforcement Issues,' this event does not meet the threshold for reporting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron) and via E-mail the FFD E-mail group.

ENS 5388319 February 2019 15:19:00FermiNRC Region 3On February 19, 2019, at 1307 EST, with the reactor at 100 percent Core Thermal Power and steady state conditions, plant personnel notified the Main Control Room that both doors in the Secondary Containment Airlock on the Reactor Building Fifth Floor were opened simultaneously for a period of approximately five minutes (i.e., from 1253 to 1258 EST). The failure of this interlock, which is intended to prevent both doors from being opened simultaneously, resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 not being met. The maximum Secondary Containment pressure observed during that time remained within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring Secondary Containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The repair to the failed interlock is in progress. As a compensatory measure signs are posted on the doors to notify personnel to not access the Reactor Building via those doors.
ENS 5383016 January 2019 18:38:00FermiNRC Region 3At 0900 EST on 01/16/2019, it was discovered that a licensee manager intentionally failed to re-approve the list of individuals granted unescorted access to verify each individual was subject to a behavioral observation program. Compensatory actions have been taken in response to this event. Personnel affected have had their access authorization suspended. This is reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3) as an intentional act that casts doubt on the integrity of the Fitness-For-Duty program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5382514 January 2019 13:12:00FermiNRC Region 3

On 01/11/2019 at 0958 EST, the Fermi 2 Active Seismic Monitoring system was taken out of service for planned maintenance. During the maintenance activity, the Active Seismic Monitoring System failed a planned surveillance test and was not restored to operability within 72 hours. Compensatory measures to provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event were implemented in accordance with the Fermi 2 Emergency Plan procedures prior to the start of the planned maintenance outage. The planned outage time to restore operability exceeded 72 hours on January 14th, 2019, at 0958 EST. Repairs have been completed, the Active Seismic Monitoring System has been declared Functional at 1037 EST, January 14th, 2019, and declared Operable at 1109 EST, January 14th, 2019.

The loss of the Active Seismic Monitoring System is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the United States Geological Survey (USGS) recorded no seismic activity in the area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Femi 2 has two seismic monitors, one on the Reactor Pressure Vessel Pedestal and one in the High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) room. Only the HPCI room monitor was inoperable.

ENS 5382211 January 2019 10:07:00FermiNRC Region 3

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY A non-licensed employee disclosed that he had previously used illegal drugs. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ETHAN HAUSER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1456 EDT ON 5/21/2019 * * *

The following event notifications are retracted: EN 53822 reported on 1/11/2019 and EN 53982 reported on 4/5/2019. Subsequent to the initial notification, further investigation revealed that no new information was discovered that would meet the criteria for reporting under RG 5.62 or NUREG-1304. Further the events were also determined to be limited to an act of personal deception by those applying for unescorted access, without intent to commit or cause events identified in paragraphs I (a) and (d) of Appendix G to Part 73, and is not a programmatic breakdown. Based on this information, and consistent with the NRC memorandum dated May 19, 1995, 'Access Authorization Reportability and Enforcement Issues,' this event does not meet the threshold for reporting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron) and via E-mail the FFD E-mail group.

ENS 538111 January 2019 11:02:00FermiNRC Region 3On January 1, 2019 at approximately 0454 EST, while performing planned maintenance activities on the Feedwater Distributed Control System (FW DCS), it was discovered that the automatic trip instrumentation of the Gland Seal Exhauster (GSE) was inoperable. The automatic GSE trip is assumed in the safety analysis for the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) and is required when Thermal Power is less than or equal to 10%. The automatic trip function of the GSE was inoperable for 1 minute, 19 seconds. No Control Rod movement occurred while the automatic trip of the GSE was inoperable. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees and there was no radiological release. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 537724 December 2018 13:35:00FermiNRC Region 3

EN Revision Text: HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER FAN BRAKE INVERTER FAILURE At 0935 EST on December 4, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Fermi 2 is in a 14-day LCO for inoperability of HPCI and a 72-hour LCO for UHS inoperability.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/30/19 AT 1605 EST FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 53772 made on December 4, 2018. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and site Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed further. An evaluation determined that TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.9 for barriers could be applied to the MDCT fan brakes. As a result of applying TS LCO 3.0.9 to the MDCT fan brakes, it was not necessary to declare the UHS inoperable. With the Division 2 UHS operable on December 4, 2018, the HPCI system was also operable. With HPCI operable, there was no event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Therefore, EN 53772 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 537121 November 2018 20:10:00FermiNRC Region 3

EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO MODIFICATION NOT ADDED TO PROCEDURE On November 1, 2018, at approximately 1300 EDT, Fermi 2 identified that a Station Blackout (SBO) procedure was deficient as a result of a modification installed during a recent refueling outage. A review identified that the performance of the SBO procedure could have resulted in a challenge to having an alternate AC source available within one hour as outlined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) 8.4.2. The alternate AC source was always available to be manually aligned in accordance with other standard operating procedures. The modification did not affect the function for Appendix R alternative shutdown. Immediate actions are underway to revise the impacted procedure. The health and safety of the public was not affected as offsite power has remained available since the modification was installed. Investigation into the cause and corrective actions is ongoing. Fermi 2 is reporting this event as an unanalyzed condition pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 12/28/18 AT 1228 EST FROM JEFFREY MYERS TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on November 1, 2018 (EN 53712) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Subsequent to the initial notification, the event, site procedures, and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) were reviewed further. The evaluation determined that at the time of the event, there were multiple methods defined in existing station procedures to establish an available alternate AC source within one hour as outlined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) 8.4.2. Under these circumstances, the event does not represent an unanalyzed condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Therefore, EN 53712 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer).

ENS 5367419 October 2018 10:00:00FermiNRC Region 3On 10/19/2018, at approximately 0400 EDT, during an investigation into a failed surveillance test for a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) coincident with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), it was identified that the Engineered Safety System Bus degraded voltage relay scheme contained a time delay setting that could inhibit all Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) pumps from automatically starting and operating during a LOP/LOCA, thus making LPCI incapable of meeting its functional requirement of automatic startup and operation regardless of the availability of offsite power supply (UFSAR Section 6.3.1.4 and Tech. Spec. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.17). The condition was identified during the first-time performance of a revised surveillance procedure for a LOP coincident with a LOCA signal. Fermi is currently in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) and LPCI auto start on a LOP/LOCA signal is not required. However, the initial investigation identified the condition likely existed in the past during modes of operation where LPCI auto start on LOP/LOCA was required. Investigation into the cause and corrective actions is ongoing. Since LPCI auto start is not required at the time of discovery (Mode 4), this event is being reported pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5356224 August 2018 15:01:00FermiNRC Region 3

At 0745 EDT on August 24, 2018, the Active Seismic Monitoring System failed a planned surveillance test and was declared inoperable. Compensatory measures to provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event have been implemented in accordance with the Fermi 2 Emergency Plan procedures. The compensatory measures include the use of information provided by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to confirm if an earthquake has occurred within a 100 mile radius. The loss of the Active Seismic Monitoring System is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the USGS recorded no seismic activity in the area. The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF GROFF TO VINCE KLCO ON SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 AT 1524 EDT * * *

After further review the Active Seismic Monitoring system was removed from service for planned maintenance for a duration less than 72 hours with appropriate compensatory measures established. Therefore, no major loss of emergency assessment capability occurred. In addition, the surveillance tests were re-performed and the Active Seismic Monitoring System was declared Operable. Therefore, no reportable condition existed and EN 53562 reported on August 24, 20I8 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Hanna).

ENS 5355421 August 2018 12:25:00FermiNRC Region 3At 08/20/2018 at 1856 (EDT), it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a test specified by the FFD (fitness for duty) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 535373 August 2018 14:10:00FermiNRC Region 3At 0940 EDT on August 3, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5342927 May 2018 12:42:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On May 27, 2018 at 0630 EDT, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation Differential Flow - High function was declared inoperable as a result of indicating downscale. This condition would have prevented the primary containment isolation valves for the RWCU system from automatically isolating on a high differential flow instrumentation signal. At 0753, RWCU was shutdown and the affected penetration flow paths were isolated in accordance with station procedures per Fermi Technical Specifications. The cause of the event is under investigation. There was no radiological release associated with this event. All other RWCU primary containment isolation instrumentation functions remained operable and the associated RWCU system primary containment isolation valves were capable of being remotely closed by the control room operators throughout the event. However, the condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 533854 May 2018 16:20:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1412 EDT, a portable chemical toilet was found tipped over. Approximately 1 gallon of contents spilled to gravel only. A notification to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and local health department is required, as well as a press release. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5333614 April 2018 14:34:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1040 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed on RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) Level 3 following a loss of the Division 1 Station System Transformer (SST) #64. All control rods fully inserted. HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) automatically started as designed on Reactor Water Level (RWL) 2 and restored RWL. The lowest RWL reached was 101.8 inches (above Top of Active Fuel). HPCI injected for approximately 35 seconds. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with RCIC. No Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of SST #64 continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in the actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Following the loss of power and reactor scram, the Division 2 EECW (Emergency Equipment Cooling Water) Temperature Control Valve (TCV) controller was in Emergency Manual and maintaining max cooling. Operators placed the controller in Auto and the TCV is controlling normally. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via Division 2 steam dumps to the condenser. The plant is in a modified shutdown electric lineup with offsite power available and stable. Emergency diesel generators did automatically start and load.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/14/2018 AT 1838 EDT FROM JEFF MYERS TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

This update provides additional clarification of the applicable reporting criteria for this event associated with Primary Containment Isolation Actuations. All isolations and actuations for RWL (Groups 4, 13, and 15) and RWL 2 (Groups 2, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18) occurred as expected. This report is also being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B): RPS, HPCI, and RCIC. RPV pressure is being maintained by the bypass valves to the main condenser. All actuations that occurred were fully completed and restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/15/2018 AT 1950 EDT FROM KELLEY BELENKY TO DAVID AIRD * * *

This update provides additional information regarding the specified system actuations and an additional applicable reporting criteria. The loss of Division 1 Station System Transformer (SST) #64 at 1040 EDT on 4/14/2018 resulted in the automatic initiation of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 11 and 12. The EDGs started as expected and continue to supply their associated busses. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that resulted in a valid actuation of any system listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), including EDGs. In addition, the loss of the Division 1 SST #64 resulted in the expected transfer from the normal to alternate power source for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) swing bus, rendering LPCI loop select inoperable. The alternate power source continued to energize the LPCI swing bus throughout the event until the system was realigned to the normal power source at 1239 EDT on 4/14/2018. This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 532361 March 2018 13:53:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A non-licensed, supervisory employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random test. The employee's unescorted access was terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5321415 February 2018 17:36:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A can of alcohol (8.4 ounces) was discovered unopened in a refrigerator inside the protected area. Site security took possession of the can of alcohol. The owner of the can of alcohol is unknown. This report is being made under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) as a 24 hour telephone notification. The can had an expiration date of April 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Regional Inspector.
ENS 5317822 January 2018 15:09:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1115 EST, on 1/22/18, Fermi 2 determined that the site was in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit due to an oil sheen being observed in a overflow canal that had breached the installed oil booms and entered navigable waterways. Approximately 5-10 gallons of oil has reached navigable water, which resulted in exceeding State limits. The oil is currently contained with no additional leakage to navigable waters and cleanup is in progress. The cause of the oil entering the overflow canal is under investigation. Reports will be made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and other local agencies. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee has notified the National Response Center.
ENS 5316511 January 2018 16:06:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On January 11, 2018, at 1041 EST, a planned train swap of the Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (RBHVAC) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for less than one minute. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.117 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge per TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) in addition to the RBHVAC system already in operation. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 1045 EST. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 529589 September 2017 15:04:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1000 EDT on September 9, 2017, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on a loss of a single train safety system. The licensee entered two (2) LCO Action Statements (AS); 14-day LCO AS 3.5.1 for ECCS (HPCI Inoperable) and 72-hour AS 3.7.2 for UHS. The licensee has two spare inverters on-site. After replacement and successful post-maintenance testing the licensee expects to exit both AS before 72-hours. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5285914 July 2017 15:45:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4This telephone notification, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/24/2017, at approximately 1548 EDT, when synchronizing an emergency diesel generator (EDG) to the grid during testing, an electrical perturbation occurred. Further investigation found that the EDG was slightly out of phase when it was attempted to be synchronized to the grid. The electrical perturbation resulted in an unexpected half-scram of Reactor Protection System (RPS) A and actuation (closure) of some containment isolation valves. The actuations were invalid as they were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Fermi 2 was shut down for a refueling outage at the time, and therefore, the half-scram of RPS A occurred after the safety function had already been completed. Containment isolation valves actuated (closed) in Division 1 of the Torus Water Management, Drywell Pneumatics, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps systems. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this perturbation, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 528371 July 2017 17:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1420 EDT on 7/1/17, Fermi 2 determined that the site was in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit due to chemical addition pumps (for the cooling tower reservoir) being out of service for approximately seventeen hours. This resulted in sodium hypochlorite concentrations exceeding state limits. As of 0855 EDT (on) 7/1/17, the levels of sodium hypochlorite were restored to less than measureable values. Reports will be made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and other local agencies. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified Monroe County.
ENS 527242 May 2017 18:34:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On May 2, 2017, while performing a past operability review associated with Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1, it was determined that a past configuration of CTG 11-1 could not have assured all of the applicable Appendix R success criteria under all of the postulated scenarios described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). From November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 when Mode 4 was entered, CTG 11-1 was in a configuration where it could not be started from the dedicated shutdown panel, although it could be started locally. One of the specific scenarios for Appendix R in the UFSAR credits CTG 11-1 to support a safe shutdown based on an assumed time required to start CTG 11-1 and then provide flow to the reactor pressure vessel using the Standby Feedwater System. During the time period where CTG 11-1 could only be started locally, this assumed time would have been exceeded. Therefore, this event is being reported as an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, CTG 11-1 was fully operable and the described condition had already been corrected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY GREG MILLER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1532 EDT ON 05/19/2017 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on May 2, 2017 (EN 52724) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The notification to the NRC involved an event where Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1 could only be started locally such that required operator actions during an Appendix R safe shutdown scenario could be delayed. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event, additional site documentation, and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) were reviewed further. lt was verified that Fermi 2 procedures contained actions to ensure Appendix R safe shutdown capability under the plant conditions during the relevant time period. A time validation study was performed (May 9, 2017) which verified that the operator actions could have been completed within the time described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for initiating Standby Feedwater flow to the reactor pressure vessel. In addition, a review of the supporting design calculation identified margin in the required time described in the UFSAR. Based on this information, the condition of CTG 11-1 during the time period from November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 would not have prevented compliance with the Appendix R safe shutdown requirements. Under these circumstances, the event does not represent an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52724 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5265130 March 2017 20:05:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On March 30, 2017 at 1710 EDT, with Reactor Building HVAC in service maintaining normal building pressure, Reactor Building pressure began to rise for an unknown reason. The Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met for approximately 50 seconds. Division 1 Standby Gas Treatment System was started and returned Secondary Containment pressure to the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). The highest pressure observed on the Main Control Room indications was 0.105 inches of vacuum water gauge. During the event, Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) were in progress. Actions to immediately suspend OPDRVs were taken. Investigation of the cause of the event is in progress. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1652 EST ON 5/15/17 FROM JEFF YEAGER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on March 30, 2017 (EN 52651). The notification to the NRC involved an event where secondary containment momentarily exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) requirements during refueling activities which had been designated as operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel (OPDRVs). The notification was made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an 'event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to ... control the release of radioactive material.' Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) were reviewed further. At the time of the event, Fermi 2 was shutdown (Mode 5. Refueling). In Mode 5, the pressures and temperatures that could cause a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are not present. No movement of fuel was in progress such that the fuel handling accident (FHA) was also not applicable. Thus secondary containment was only required per TS 3.6.4.1 due to the ongoing OPDRVs. The Fermi 2 UFSAR does not describe OPDRVs as an accident that secondary containment is required to mitigate. Based on this information, secondary containment was not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident as described in the UFSAR during the event on March 30, 2017. Under these circumstances, the momentary exceedance of TS requirements for secondary containment is not considered a loss of safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52651 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) is required to be submitted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5248110 January 2017 22:50:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On January 10, 2017, at approximately 2040 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned. The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 2040 EST. The quantity of the spill is estimated to be five gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways or storm drains. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5243715 December 2016 11:47:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On December 15, 2016, at 1010 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.044 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4. 1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5243415 December 2016 03:40:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On December 14, 2016, starting at 2345 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0300 EST on December 15, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5243214 December 2016 15:10:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On December 14, 2016, at 1314 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.07 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5243014 December 2016 11:20:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0945 EST on 12/14/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sanitary sewer system leaking through a covered manhole in the Owner Controlled Area. Approximately 100 gallons of the sewage has entered the storm drain system. The sewage leak was stopped at 1030. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The cause and extent of the sewage teak is under investigation. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5239829 November 2016 01:41:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On November 28, 2016, starting at 2105 hrs. EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0055 EST on November 29, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS MCALLISTER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1027 EST ON 11/29/16 * * *

On November 29, 2016, at 0242 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times following the initial event notification. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure to within TS limits. High wind conditions are expected to decrease throughout the day. If additional instances are identified that require entry into the Technical Specifications (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met, another follow up notification will be performed. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5238020 November 2016 04:56:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On November 19, 2016, starting at 2150 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0430 EST, high wind conditions have subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 1416 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On November 20, 2016, starting at 0654 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met on multiple different occasions as of event notification update time. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. Fermi 2 continues to remain in a gale force wind advisory for the local area of Lake Erie. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 2104 FROM GREG MILLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On November 20, 2016, at 1426 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second. The Fermi 2 local area of Lake Erie is no longer in a gale force wind advisory and the high wind conditions have subsided. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5236414 November 2016 14:01:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1106 EST on 11/14/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sewage leak from a temporary restroom trailer that had reached a permeable gravel surface. The majority of the spill was confined to the impermeable surface below the restroom trailer. lt was estimated that the quantity of the spill which reached the permeable gravel surface was less than approximately 5 gallons. None of the sewage entered the storm drain system. The source of the sewage leak was eliminated by 1126 EST. A local sanitary contractor will be contacted to respond to the site to clean the affected areas. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environment.al Quality, the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 523422 November 2016 15:05:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On November 2, 2016, while performing a re-evaluation of the radiological consequences of the Fermi 2 control rod drop accident (CRDA), DTE Electric Company (DTE) identified a non-conservatism in the current Fermi 2 design and licensing basis of the CRDA. As described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 15.4.9, the current design and licensing basis assumes that the post-CRDA release pathway consists of carryover with steam to the turbine condenser. The re-evaluation has identified that a forced release from the gland seal exhausters (GSEs) could also occur which could result in post-CRDA radiological consequences that exceed the current 10 CFR 100.11 offsite dose limits and Standard Review Plan 6.4 (General Design Criterion 19) main control room dose limits when operating at low power conditions. The unanalyzed condition described above only applies to low power operating conditions (i.e. less than 10% power) since the fuel damage postulated as a result of a CRDA is only credible under low power operating conditions when an individual control rod worth is high. Fermi 2 is currently at 97% power and, therefore, the plant condition is currently bounded by the design and licensing basis such that the condition currently does not exist and no immediate actions are required. However, Fermi 2 has operated at low power levels several times in the past three years. Those periods of operation at low power represent unanalyzed conditions that significantly degraded plant safety since the occurrence of a CRDA during those periods could have resulted in offsite and main control room doses exceeding regulatory limits. Therefore, this 8-hour notification is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5233128 October 2016 21:58:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On October 28, 2016, at 1500 EDT, the Standby Liquid Control system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.7 Condition B was entered due to sodium pentaborate concentration not within limits. Standby Liquid Control sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be low outside of the acceptable region following a Standby Liquid Control system tank high level alarm in the Main Control Room. Sodium pentaborate was added to the Standby Liquid Control tank by chemistry personnel and the concentration was then verified to be acceptable. Standby Liquid Control was declared Operable on 10/28/16 at 1935 EDT. The cause of the out-of-acceptable concentration was due to make-up water leaking by a closed valve. (The licensee cycled this valve and closed an upstream valve.) Declaring the Standby Liquid Control system inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (C), and (D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5232027 October 2016 00:49:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On October 26, 2016, at 2300 EDT, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 2300 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. A review indicates that this condition occurred earlier this shift during the high wind condition. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector .

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5221431 August 2016 23:32:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

In Event Notification (EN) 52202 on August 25, 2016, Fermi 2 identified an unanalyzed condition related to the inoperability of Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans due to nonfunctionality of the associated brakes that occurred on April 6, 2016. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) reservoir and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The EN noted that a past operability review was in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional resulted in additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the: three years prior to August 25, 2016. On August 31, 2016 at 1950 EDT, the past operability review identified five additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the past three years. These five instances are being reported in one EN since they are related and were all discovered and reported within 8 hours. Although these instances are related to the one previously reported in EN 52202, they are being reported in a new EN due to the time elapsed since EN 52202. The MDCT fans and fan brakes are currently operable. 1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2. 2) March 2015 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1000 EDT on March 23, 2015, until 1447 EDT on April 9, 2015. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 systems, structures, or components (SSCs) out of service during a forced outage. 3) February 2014 - The Division 2 MDCT fan 'B' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1118 EST to 1529 EST on February 20, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'B' brake coincided with various Division 1 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage. 4) February 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1747 EST on February 14, 2014, until 1514 EST on February 24, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage. 5) January 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0915 EST on January 24, 2014, until 1537 EST on January 31, 2014. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with approximately 30 hours where various Division 2 safety-related SSCs were inoperable. The occurrences discussed above resulted in unanalyzed conditions because the plant configuration when equipment in one division was inoperable while a MCDT fan brake was nonfunctional in the opposite division would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF YEAGER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1508 EDT ON 10/20/2106 * * *

The licensee is RETRACTING item 1 only of the 5 events listed above: 1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2. Fermi 2 is retracting item 1 of the 8-hour event notification made on August 31, 2016, at 2332 EDT, (EN #52214). EN #52214 originally reported a non-functionality of the Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake on February 25, 2016, as an unanalyzed condition due to it coinciding with a Division 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that although the intermediate nitrogen bottle pressure was below its required limit, the pressure in the main nitrogen bottle was sufficient to ensure that the MDCT fan 'A' brake could have performed its intended function in the event of a tornado. Since the MDCT fan 'A' brake was determined to be functional, the MDCT fan 'A', the associated Division 1 UHS reservoir, and the Division 1 EDGs were all operable at that time. Therefore, no unanalyzed condition existed on February 25, 2016. The other four items (2-5) included in EN #52214 are not being retracted and are still considered unanalyzed conditions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth).

ENS 5220527 August 2016 17:48:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On August 27, 2016, at 1500 EDT a severe thunderstorm occurred in Monroe County, including the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 1540 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5220225 August 2016 21:39:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1629 EDT on August 25, 2016, it was determined that a Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fan should be declared inoperable if its associated fan brake is nonfunctional. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). Currently, the MDCT fans and fan brakes are operable. A past operability evaluation is being performed and has initially identified that from 0855 EDT to 1738 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 1 'A' fan brake was nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Additionally, from 0856 EDT on April 6, 2016, to 1641 EDT on April 7, 2016, the Division 1 'C' fan brake was also nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Therefore, the Division 1 UHS and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) would have been inoperable. During this time, at 1347 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 2 EDG 14 was inoperable for 22 seconds for a planned testing. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition because the plant configuration during the 22 seconds when EDG 14 was inoperable would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. A past operability review is in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional results in any additional instances of unanalyzed condition within the past three years. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521492 August 2016 20:33:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1612 EDT on 08/02/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sanitary sewer system leak from underground lines beneath the parking lot near Warehouse B. Some of the sewage has entered the storm drain system. The sewage leak was stopped at approximately 1730 EDT. The duration and quantity of the spill is unknown. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521462 August 2016 14:42:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On August 2, 2016 at 1015 EDT, while restoring the east train of Reactor Building HVAC (RBHVAC) after a surveillance test on Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met for a duration time of approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.120 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit by RBHVAC and SGTS already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The cause of the event is under investigation. The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment vacuum greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident lnspector.
ENS 5208514 July 2016 13:01:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0915 EDT on July 14, 2016, Fermi 2 Environmental Engineering determined that a notification to the State of Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Bureau of Fire Services, Storage Tank Division is required regarding discovery of a leaking underground fuel oil storage tank. The underground fuel oil storage tank was unearthed while excavating for 120kv switchyard cable replacements. This is an underground fuel oil storage tank from the 1950s or earlier was not in service at the site, and it is unknown when the tank was last used. The size of the tank is estimated at 2,250 gallons. An unknown quantity of oil has leaked into the immediate surrounding ground and is currently contained in the soil. There is currently no indication of any of the leakage flowing beyond the site boundary or reaching any waterways. Fermi 2 is conducting an investigation to determine the appropriate steps to address the storage tank and impacted soil. A notification to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is not required. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency will be made. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5208413 July 2016 22:43:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On July 13, 2016, at 19:50 EDT a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 20:40 EDT secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 520768 July 2016 23:14:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On July 8 2016, at 19:09 (EDT) a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to the high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for the secondary containment pressure boundary was not met two times during the storm for a duration time of 2 seconds total (one second for each event). At 20:05:21 Secondary Containment pressure went positive (0.22 inches of water gauge) and at 20:05:22 returned back below plant TS limits (-0.35 inches of water gauge). At 20:06:33 Secondary Containment pressure went greater than TS limits (-0.10 inches of water gauge) and at 20:06:34 returned below TS limits (-0.28 inches of water gauge). All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned the secondary containment pressure below the TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The severe thunderstorm warning for the area was cancelled at 20:30. The TS requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5200213 June 2016 13:21:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A non-licensee employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5175525 February 2016 16:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On January 6, 2016, at approximately 1514 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) automatically opened for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) drifting from full open to 25 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.0 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valves closed. Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were not declared inoperable since the functions were verified to remain enabled. Since the RPS functions were not declared inoperable, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, after further evaluation, it was determined that this event met the reporting criterion. Accordingly, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve drifting was due to an actuator malfunction that has since been corrected. This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51756 for a similar event that occurred on 02/21/16.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO STEVEN VITTO ON 03/02/2016 AT 1530 EST * * *

Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (01/06/2016). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos).

ENS 5175625 February 2016 16:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On February 21, 2015, at approximately 0030 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the West Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV) automatically opened in response to the number two High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) cycling from full open to closed and then to 22 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.5 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valve closed. Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were declared inoperable. The Limiting Condition for Operation was exited at 0031 EST following TBV closure. Since the RPS functions were verified to remain enabled, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, this event was subsequently determined to meet the reporting criterion and is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve cycling was due to a communication card failure that has since been corrected. This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51755 for a similar event that occurred on 01/06/16.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO STEVEN VITTO ON 03/02/2016 AT 1530 EST * * *

Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (02/21/2015). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos).

ENS 5167623 January 2016 00:20:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4While performing a Technical Specification surveillance functional test of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump and valve surveillance, the Division 1 LPCI outboard Isolation Valve E1150F017A was closed for stroke time testing and would not reopen. Not being able to be open this valve renders the LPCI Loop Select function inoperable. Time of the event was 1935 (EST). This inoperability of LPCI loop Select results in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. Power reduction activities were briefed at time 2020, however, no power reduction commenced due to resolving the issue with the LPCI outboard Isolation Valve E1150F017A. During the investigation there was a loose screw found preventing the close contactor from fully releasing and allowing the open contactor to engage. No other abnormalities were found during this investigation. This screw was removed and the close contactor functioned normally and the valve was opened. The valve was retested satisfactory and the station exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 2145. This report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5153512 November 2015 18:59:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 11/12/2015 at approximately 1500 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to the state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned. The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 1440 EST. The contents and exact quantity of the spill are unknown but the toilet has a capacity of 60 gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.
ENS 515165 November 2015 10:32:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On November 5, 2015 at approximately 1000 EST, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service for planned maintenance on the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) vital bus power supply. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) resides on the IPCS platform and will be out of service and unavailable to Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) during the time that IPCS is removed from service. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored, including SPDS to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the IPCS and SPDS unavailability. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, as described in NEI 13-01. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514494 October 2015 14:16:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On October 4th, at approximately 0956 EDT, 'Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Pressure Vessel' (OPDRV) was unintentionally initiated without secondary containment operable. Operators promptly identified the condition and immediately initiated actions to identify and suspend the source of the drain path. At approximately 1120 EDT the source of the OPDRV was isolated. Reactor cavity water level and spent fuel pool level remained constant throughout the event. An investigation is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514402 October 2015 14:50:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On October 2nd, at approximately 0825 EDT, maintenance technicians were performing as-found torque checks on the discharge flange of the 'B' Safety Relief Valve (SRV). 12 of the 16 bolts were not adequately torqued. The 'B' Safety Relief Valve is credited for Remote Shutdown. The as-found condition of inadequate torque potentially impacts the seismic qualification of the 'B' SRV. An investigation and extent of condition review is ongoing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Before the outage, there were no abnormal indications of leakage as indicated by a rise in drywell temperature or pressure. The SRVs had been cycled under pressure with no abnormal indications. The four bolts that were tight were in a diagonal pattern. The looses bolts were described as "finger tight." The licensee is determining the actions to take regarding the remaining 14 SRVs.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE WARD TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1552 EST ON 11/20/2015 * * *

As part of the event investigation and extent of condition review, the as-found torque values of the inlet and outlet Safety Relief Valve (SRV) flange connections were measured and an engineering evaluation of the as-found condition was performed. The evaluation confirmed that all 15 SRVs would have remained operable during a design basis earthquake. Any potential discharge flange connection leakage during SRV operation would be bounded by the design basis Loss of Coolant Accident analysis described in the UFSAR. Subsequent investigation activities of the as-found condition of SRV 'B' determined that the four tight bolts were not oriented in a diagonal pattern across the discharge flange as originally reported. This information is provided only to clarify previously reported information and does not affect the original basis for reporting or the current basis for retraction. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (McCraw).

ENS 5139114 September 2015 02:46:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 2305 EDT on September 13, 2015, a manual scram was initiated in response to a loss of all Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW). All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 137 inches. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 occurred as expected. Decay heat was initially being removed through the Main Turbine Bypass System to the Main Condenser, however, as a result of the loss of TBCCW, the Main Feed Pumps lost cooling and had to be secured. At 2310, Standby Feedwater was initiated and Main Feedwater was secured. The loss of TBCCW also caused all Station Air Compressors (SACs) to trip on loss of cooling. The loss of SACs caused the Instrument Air header pressure to degrade to the point at which the Secondary Containment isolation dampers drifted closed. This resulted in the Reactor Building vacuum exceeding the Technical Specification limit. At 2325, operators started the Standby Gas Treatment system and manually initiated a Secondary Containment isolation signal. Secondary Containment vacuum was promptly restored to within Technical Specification limits. Additionally, Operators were monitoring for expected MSIV drift due to the degraded Instrument Air header pressure. When outboard MSIVs were observed to be drifting, Operators closed the outboard and inboard MSIVs at 2345. At 2352, Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) reached the Low-Low Setpoint and began cycling to control reactor pressure. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with the Standby Feedwater and Control Rod Drive systems. Reactor Pressure is being controlled with Safety Relief Valves. Operators are currently in the Emergency Operating Procedure for Reactor Pressure Vessel control. Investigation into the loss of TBCCW continues. No safety-related equipment was out of service at the time of the event. All offsite power sources were adequate and available throughout the duration of the event. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0555 EDT AT 09/14/15 FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

At 0409 EDT the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was placed in service due to identification of an unisolable leak in the Standby Feedwater System. Reactor water level and pressure is now being controlled though the RCIC system and Safety Relief Valves. This event update is reportable as a valid manual initiation of a specified safety system under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The leak rate was reported as approximately 5-10 gallons per minute from a weld on the standby feedwater pump header drain valve F326. The licensee reported the leak stopped once RCIC was placed into service. The licensee is still investigating the issue. Notified the R3DO (Pelke), IRD Manager (Grant), NRR EO (Morris).

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CHRIS ROBINSON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2135 EDT ON 09/14/2015 * * *

At 1847 EDT on September 14, 2015, a valid automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred due to Reactor Water Level 3 while shutdown in MODE 3. Operators were manually controlling Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level and pressure with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and Safety Relief Valves (SRV). While operators were cycling SRVs, the RPV level went below the Level 3 setpoint. Operators promptly restored RPV level by manual operation of RCIC. The Level 3 actuation and associated isolations were verified to operate properly. The scram signal has been reset. Fermi 2 remains in MODE 3 controlling RPV Level and Pressure through manual operation of RCIC and SRVs. This is the second occurrence of a valid specified safety system actuation reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for this ongoing event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Riemer), IRD Manager (Grant), and NRR EO (Morris)

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1446 EST ON 2/27/16 * * *

This update provides clarification of the applicable reporting criteria for this Event associated with primary containment isolation actuations. Upon the manual reactor scram at 2305 EDT on September 13, 2015, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Level 3 actuated and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 4, 13 and 15 actuated as expected. The applicable reporting criterion for these actuations is 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The applicable reporting criterion for the manual closure of the inboard and outboard main steam isolation valves at 2345 EDT on September 13, 2015, is also 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the manual closures of all MSIV lead to a loss of condenser vacuum which resulted in the actuation of PCIS Group 1 at 0001 EDT on September 14, 2015, as expected. The applicable reporting criterion for this actuation is also 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Upon reaching Level 3 at 1847 EDT on September 14, 2015, PCIS Groups 4, 13 and 15 actuated as expected. The applicable reporting criterion for this actuation is 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Stone).

ENS 5131312 August 2015 13:31:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1007 (EDT) on August 12, 2015, while restoring Reactor Building (RB) HVAC (RBHVAC) after surveillance testing, an equipment malfunction resulted in improper damper alignment resulting in Secondary Containment Technical Specifications (TS) to not be met. The plant TS require Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained for five seconds and the highest pressure observed was -0.095 inches of vacuum water gauge. This value was observed on only one of two installed recorders, of the Secondary Containment pressure recorders. The highest observed pressure on the other recorder was -0.14 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary Containment was restored by the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) already in operation and shutting down the affected train of RBHVAC. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1159 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is updating this report to delete the minus sign for all references to inches of vacuum water gauge. FOLLOW UP - CORRECTED INFORMATION: At 1007 (EDT) on August 12, 2015, while restoring Reactor Building (RB) HVAC (RBHVAC) after surveillance testing, an equipment malfunction resulted in improper damper alignment resulting in Secondary Containment Technical Specifications (TS) to not be met. The plant TS require Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to .125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained for five seconds and the highest pressure observed was .095 inches of vacuum water gauge. This value was observed on only one, of two installed recorders, of the Secondary Containment pressure recorders. The highest observed pressure on the other recorder was .14 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary Containment was restored by the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) already in operation and shutting down the affected train of RBHV AC. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to .125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)c as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. the licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).

ENS 512027 July 2015 16:07:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On 7/7/2015 at approximately 1435 EDT, the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment Pressure Boundary was not met when vacuum could not be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of water gauge for approximately 41 seconds. As part of post-maintenance testing for the non-safety related Reactor Building HVAC Center Exhaust Fan, the fan was started while the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment system was also in operation. Shortly after the fan was started, operators observed degrading vacuum in secondary containment and subsequently secured the center exhaust and supply fans. Vacuum continued to degrade momentarily after the fans were secured, and then returned to a Technical Specification allowable value. Subsequent inspections discovered that the affected fan was operating in the reverse direction. This is believed to have caused Secondary Containment pressure to increase. Since vacuum could not be maintained with the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment system operating, the plant operated in an unanalyzed condition. The cause of the reverse rotation is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/7/2015 AT 2153 EDT* * *

Based on plant configuration at the time of the event and further review of the Fermi 2 UFSAR, the plant did not operate in an unanalyzed condition. The Reactor Building HVAC fans would have tripped, as designed, upon receipt of a safety-related Standby Gas Treatment actuation signal during the time of the event. Therefore, the fans' pressurizing effect on secondary containment would have ceased within the time limits assumed in the existing accident analysis. The reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) remains valid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Stone).

ENS 5118627 June 2015 13:19:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 6/27/2015 at 1100 EDT, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to the state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned. The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 0925 EDT. The contents and exact quantity of the spill are unknown, but the toilet has a capacity of 60 gallons. The spill flowed to nearby gravel and two storm drains; one of which discharges to navigable state waters. Rainfall was present when the spill was identified. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 511285 June 2015 14:19:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4The following was received via phone call and email: This 60-day report, as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves. At 1930 EDT on May 24, 2015, a loss of power to Reactor Protection System (RPS) Train B occurred. Initial investigation found the RPS Motor Generator (MG) Set B not running, with its Motor Off light illuminated caused by both Normal EPA breakers and MG Set B output breaker being tripped. Visual inspection at the distribution cabinet was inconclusive at the time and revealed no abnormalities and no abnormal odors in the area. Further investigation of the RPS MG Set B verified normal voltages on all fuse clips, and all power and control power fuses were operational. As a result of the loss of RPS B, the following containment isolation valves closures occurred: Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Outboard Isolation valves, Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard Isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Purge Flow Outboard Isolation valves, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Inboard Isolation Valves. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5108019 May 2015 15:22:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At approximately 1130 EDT on May 19, 2015, Fermi-2 determined that a sanitary sewer system leak had occurred from underground lines beneath the parking lot near Warehouse E. Some of the sewage entered the storm sewer. The leak has been secured. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The duration and quantity of the spill is unknown, however, current estimates of the sewage entering the storm sewer are less than 200 gallons. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department and the local news media are required in accordance with Michigan Act 451, Public Acts of 1994, as amended, Part 31, Section 342.3112a. Since reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency, and therefore is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The release was onsite only and did not reach navigable waters.
ENS 5090319 March 2015 10:51:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0702 EDT on March 19, 2015, Fermi 2 received an automatic scram due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function of Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale. The plant had recently transitioned to Single Loop Operation after securing the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Pump due to loss of normal and emergency cooling water supply. The lowest reactor water level was 134 inches above top of active fuel. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal band by the Feedwater and Control Rod Drive Systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor pressure is being maintained via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and Main Condenser. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level 3 isolation occurred. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All off-site power sources were available throughout the event. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and in a stable condition. Investigation into the cause of the event is ongoing. This event is being reported under the four hour Non-Emergency reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 508749 March 2015 17:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

While performing a Technical Specification surveillance functional test of the (Low Pressure Coolant Injection) LPCI swing bus automatic throwover scheme, the throwover function failed, rendering LPCI Loop Select inoperable. Time of (the) event was 1521 (EDT). Inoperable LPCI Loop Select results in entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Power reduction activities were briefed and power reduction commenced at 1615. Maintenance is currently implementing a contingency work order to correct the auto throwover failure. This report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), initiation of plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications; and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Offsite and Emergency power remain available. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KELLEY BELLENKY TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0123 EDT ON 3/10/2015 * * *

On March 9, 2015, at approximately 1521 (EDT), while performing a functional test of the LPCI swing bus automatic throwover scheme, the throwover function failed, rendering LPCI Loop Select inoperable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was entered and power reduction commenced at 1615 (EDT). Power was lowered to approximately 80%. Maintenance led a troubleshooting process that found and corrected the equipment problem. At approximately 2311 (EDT), the limiting condition for operating was cleared and LPCI Loop Select was declared operable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 was exited at that time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The plant has returned to 100% power. Notified R3DO (Orth).

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID COSIO TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1253 EDT ON 3/10/15 * * *

The LCO and LPCI operability declared was at 2211 EDT NOT 2311 EDT. Notified R3DO (Orth).

ENS 5083119 February 2015 09:55:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation (a freeze protection feature). The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *

After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System. The Fermi 2 accident analysis for a LOCA does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum throughout the duration of an accident and contains conservative leakage assumptions to bound the effects of a postulated ground level release. The accident analysis credits the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS); both divisions of SGTS were operable at the time of the event. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable due to exceeding the Technical Specification value for secondary containment vacuum, the structural integrity of the secondary containment was not degraded at the time. Upon receipt of an accident signal, SGTS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment vacuum to within the bounding analyses of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

  • * * UPDATE FROM WARREN PAUL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/15/15 AT 1348 EDT * * *

Upon further review of NUREG-1022 section 3.2.7, the original Non-Emergency Event Notification, 50831, remains valid. The NRC Resident Inspect has been informed. Notified R3DO (McCraw).

ENS 502648 July 2014 14:26:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1148 EDT, Fermi-2 Environmental Engineering identified that approximately 2500 gallons of Diesel Fuel Oil was noted to be in a secondary containment collection basin. The Control Room Staff was subsequently notified. Michigan Pollution Control (MPC) has been contacted for cleanup. DTE Energy notified Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) of the condition. Fermi-2 is making this 4-hour report to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) and NUREG-1022 (rev 3) Section 3.2.12. Investigation regarding the cause is currently in progress. No fuel oil was released to the ground or navigable waters. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5011213 May 2014 14:40:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/18/2014, at approximately 1930 EST, shortly after transferring Division 2 Reactor Protection System (RPS B) from the alternate to the normal power supply, Operations personnel noted that an unexpected half-scram occurred. Initial investigation found a fuse in an RPS Power Distribution Panel had blown. Further investigation found that a power contactor had failed causing the fuse to blow. The contactor failure resulted in an invalid half scram and actuations (closure) of Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard containment isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard containment isolation valves and the Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps Inboard containment isolation valves. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this failure, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 4993720 March 2014 14:15:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1405 EDT on 3/20/14, Fermi Nuclear Station declared an Alert due to a fire in the lagging of an Emergency Diesel Generator Turbo Charger. The Alert notification was based on EAL HA02, fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. The fire in the EDG-11 turbocharger lagging occurred during testing. The fire was extinguished using handheld CO2 fire extinguishers and a reflash watch was set. EDG-11 has been removed from service and damage is minimal. The plant is shutdown in Mode 4 for Refueling Outage 16. All parameters associated with the reactor are stable. RHR Pump D remains in service in Shutdown Cooling and is unaffected by the EDG-11 fire. There has been no other impact on the plant electrical systems or shutdown cooling and Fermi Nuclear Station remains in an Alert pending further evaluation. The NRC remained in Normal Mode. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, and FDA. Notified NuclearSSA via email only.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SAM HASSOUN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1535 EDT ON 3/20/13 * * *

At 1359 (EDT on 3/20/14), with the plant in Mode 4, a fire was confirmed on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-11 turbocharger. At 1402, the fire was extinguished with a CO2 extinguisher. An ALERT was declared at 1405 and Assembly and Accountability was ordered by the Emergency Director. The Assembly and Accountability was completed satisfactorily by 1441. The fire was from oil soaked lagging on the engine turbocharger. The insulation was removed and the engine exhaust header was inspected. The damage was limited to only the lagging. The room has been ventilated using the Engine room fans and has been cleared of all of the smoke. The Emergency Director terminated the event at 1532 (EDT on 3/20/14). The Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3RA (Pederson), NRR (Dorman), R3DO (Lara), IRD (Grant), IRD (Morris), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Tennant). Notified NuclearSSA via email only.

ENS 4985123 February 2014 12:23:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

(On) February 23, 2014, at approximately 1200 (EST), the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service outside of the Control Room to support planned system maintenance. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and (was rendered) out of service when the IPCS (was) removed from Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). These systems will be unavailable to all Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 50 hours. During this time, dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The SPDS indications and Raddose remain available to the plant staff in the Control Room, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0905 EDT ON 03/15/14 FROM PAUL GRESH TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following update was received from the licensee: On February 23, 2014, at approximately 1200 (EST), the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service to support planned system maintenance. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and were out of service when IPCS was removed from service. On March 15, 2014 at approximately 0800 (EDT), planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full Emergency assessment capabilities to the control room and all onsite emergency response facilities. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 498016 February 2014 19:17:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1254 (EST) on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM PAUL GRESH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0931 EDT ON 4/4/14 * * *

The Fermi 2 Engineering staff has completed a comprehensive evaluation of the momentary mispositioning of the Division 2 EECW system overide switch initially reported on February 6, 2014. The evaluation determined that HPCI room temperature would remain below the HPCI room steam leak detection isolation logic setpoint in the unlikely event that the momentary mispositioning resulted in the temporary interruption of the cooling water flow to the HPCI system room cooler. Over the brief period of time for which EECW would have been unavailable to support the effective operation of the room cooler, its function was not necessary for HPCI to perform its required safety functions. Therefore, event notification 49801 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 4957524 November 2013 02:54:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 11/24/2013 at 00:00:54 seconds (EST), Reactor Building ventilation tripped due to low outside air temperature. At 00:01:42 seconds, Secondary Containment Differential pressure went positive, with a maximum of +0.08 inches WC (water column). This is a loss of Secondary Containment function. At 00:02:30 seconds, Standby Gas Treatment System was started and Secondary Containment pressure then decreased to <0 inches WC at 00:03:18 seconds. All the above data parameters were taken from the Division 2 Reactor Building Differential pressure recorder. Secondary Containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative <-0.30 inches WC. The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. Technical Specification requirement are to maintain secondary containment pressure <-0.125 WC. No actual radiation release occurred during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4945118 October 2013 15:52:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1505 EDT on October 18, 2013, Fermi 2 experienced an oil spill to navigable waters, requiring notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Pollution Emergency Alert System, Detroit Edison Corporate Environmental Management and Resources, and the Primary Public Safety Answering Point. The spill has not left site. Oil leaked from a fitting on a pump during the performance of fire truck testing. It is estimated that the volume of the overflow was less than four gallons. The overflow entered the on-site quarry. The source of the spill has been terminated. Media interest is anticipated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM DEREK ETUE TO PETE SNYDER ON 10/21/13 AT 1445 EDT * * * 

In the first sentence of the second paragraph in the original report above the words 'fire truck' were replaced with 'FLEX pump.' Additionally, "as of 10/18/2013 at 1820 EDT the oil cleanup was completed with no waste generated due to oil dissipation." The licensee also notified the Michigan State Police, Monroe County Sheriff, and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).

ENS 488874 April 2013 08:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 0406 (EDT) on April 4, 2013, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). While IPCS and SPDS are not fully functional, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented if a plant emergency does occur, as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. Investigation is in progress. A follow up message will be made when IPCS and SPDS are restored to fully functional status. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM GREG MILLER TO VINCE KLCO AT 1636 EDT ON 4/5/2013 * * *

At 1627 (EDT) on April 4, 2013, plant personnel were able to restore full functionality of IPCS and SPDS. This restored full assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response faculties. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Daley).

ENS 488863 April 2013 16:51:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1053 (EDT) on April 3, 2013, during the performance of a surveillance test on the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system the EECW system was declared inoperable due to the Division 2 EECW makeup pump failing to start during the surveillance. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via (Technical Specification) LCO 3.5.1. Investigation into why the makeup pump did not start is currently in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/28/13 AT 1613 EDT * * *

An evaluation of Event 48886 has determined that the Division 2 Emergency Cooling Water (EECW) system was capable of supporting HPCI Room Cooler and HPCI operation for a period of time in excess of that required to perform the required safety functions as assumed in the accident analysis. Therefore, this event is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Orth).

ENS 4868922 January 2013 08:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 01/22/2013 at 00:30 Reactor building HVAC tripped due to low outside air temperature and Standby Gas Treatment system was manually started and maintained Reactor Building differential pressure negative. At 01:13 secondary containment pressure went positive during restart of the Center Reactor Building HVAC Train. This is a loss of secondary containment function. In a 12 second time span secondary containment pressure went above 0 inches WC (Water Column) to +0.17 inches WC and then decreased to < 0 inches WC remaining stable during the Reactor Building HVAC restart. The Center Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper opened after the Supply Fan discharge damper; this condition would produce the indications noted. The System was returned to normal with two Reactor Building HVAC trains running and the Standby Gas Treatment System shutdown and in standby. Reactor building pressure is stable with differential pressure negative < - 0.30 inches WC. The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 484877 November 2012 12:39:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 09:21 EST 11/7/12, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods, except one, fully inserted into the core. One control rod stopped at position 02 and was manually inserted. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 125 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram, all Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 484711 November 2012 15:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At approximately, 1215 EDT, November 1, 2012, Fermi 2 experienced an oil spill to navigable waters, requiring notification of National Response Center, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS), and Primary Public Safety Answering Point (911). The spill has not left site. A fuel oil and water mixture overflowed from a tank onto the ground during the performance of station fire header flushing. It is estimated that the volume of the overflow was less than ten gallons. A portion of the overflow entered the site storm drains. The source of the spill has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 484681 November 2012 08:20:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Beginning November 01, 2012, at approximately 1000 (EDT), the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service outside of the Control Room to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service when the IPCS is removed from Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). These systems will be unavailable to all Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 196 hours. By 1600 (EDT) on November 9, 2012 it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. During this time dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The SPDS indications and Raddose remain available to the plant staff in the Control Room, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. ERDS previously reported out of service under event number EN 48451 . The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/9/12 AT 2056 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451. On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC. On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC. On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

ENS 4845129 October 2012 18:15:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1700 EDT on October 29, 2012, Fermi 2 discovered a failure occurred with a data server within the Process Computer system at 0115 EDT on October 28, 2012. The failure of the data server affects data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC when ERDS is returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/9/12 AT 2056 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451. On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC. On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC. On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

ENS 4833824 September 2012 11:23:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 04:07 EDT on September 24, 2012, Fermi 2 experienced a failure of a data server within the Process Computer system. The failure of the data server does affect data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK EGHIGIAN TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1435 EDT ON 10/6/12 * * *

On September 24, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and report #48338 was made to the NRC. On October 6, 2012, corrective maintenance is complete, which repaired the data server and ERDS functionality is restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos).

ENS 4830914 September 2012 19:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1603 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed due to onsite loss of 120 kV switchyard. All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 98 inches. Division I diesels, EDG-11 and EDG-12, automatically started and loaded. HPCI and RCIC automatically started and restored RWL. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with Condensate/Feed and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of 120 kV switchyard continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable with the exception of EDG-11 which was available vice operable due to ventilation work, and no other safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. EDG-11 and EDG-12 are performing all of their functions and providing power to the Division I AC buses. Temperatures are being monitored in the room containing EDG-11 and the room is not approaching any temperature limits. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4819716 August 2012 21:02:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At approximately 1458 EDT on 8/16/12, a portion of the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). While IPCS and SPDS are not fully functional, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented if a plant emergency does occur, as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. Repairs are in progress. A follow up message will be made when IPCS and SPDS are restored to fully functional status. This notification is being made pursuant to the requirements 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM GROFF TO KLCO ON 8/17/12 AT 0429 EDT* * *

At approximately 1458 EDT on 8/16/12, a portion of the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). At 2340 (EDT), plant personnel were able to restore full functionality of IPCS and SPDS, restoring full Emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Giessner).

ENS 481583 August 2012 15:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4812320 July 2012 22:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Beginning July 20, 2012, at approximately 2230, troubleshooting of MUX A components and fiber optic cables on the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be performed. A loss of IPCS during the troubleshooting is possible. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service if IPCS is lost. These systems would be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). During this time dose assessment capability would only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications will remain available to the plant staff, and would be used for emergency response, if needed. Information would be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS troubleshooting is complete. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/24/2012 AT 2243 EDT * * *

Troubleshooting and repairs have been completed to the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) as of July 24, 2012 at 1855 (EDT). No loss of communication ability occurred from initial notification while repairs and restoration were in progress. Event 48123 is retracted. (The initial anticipatory) notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Bloomer).

ENS 4810614 July 2012 08:59:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At approximately 0206 EDT on July 14, 2012, the Femi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform. At 0525 EDT, plant personnel were able to reboot IPCS and restore the system to normal with prime and backup CPUs. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilitates. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 hour non-emergency notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 480663 July 2012 13:21:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0940 hours on July 3, 2012, Detroit Edison notified the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA) that an employee had suffered a fatality. On July 2, 2012, at 1504 hours, a Detroit Edison employee reported to the nurse's office with symptoms of shortness of breath and chest pain. The individual was transported offsite via ambulance to a local hospital for care. At approximately 1700 hours on July 2, 2012, notification was received that the individual had passed away. There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. The licensee has not notified any other government agencies besides MIOSHA. This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 480612 July 2012 08:25:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Beginning July 2, 2012, at approximately 0800, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service when the IPCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 20 hours. By 0300 on July 3, 2012, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. During this time dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/03/12 AT 0113 EDT FROM GROFF TO HUFFMAN * * *

On July 3, 2012, at 01:00, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) has been returned to service. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilities. Due to equipment problems, the Cyber Security Modification was not installed and the original IPCS configuration was restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/03/12 AT 0556 EDT FROM GROFF TO HUFFMAN * * *

At approximately 02:04 on July 3, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform. IPCS had previously been removed from service on 7/2/12 for a Cyber Security Modification and restored at 0100 on 7/3/12. At 0354, plant personnel were able to reboot IPCS and restore the system to normal with a Prime and Backup CPUs. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilities. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified.

ENS 4804725 June 2012 16:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1330 EDT on June 25, 2012, while restoring the Main Turbine Generator (MTG) to service after repairs to Main Unit Transformer 2B (MUT2B), Main Control Room (MCR) staff manually initiated a reactor scram in response to trip of both Reactor Feed Pumps (RFP). All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 154 inches and, as expected, HPCI and RCIC did not actuate. RWL was restored to normal using the Standby Feedwater (SBFW) system. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with SBFW and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 occurred as expected. Investigation into the trip of RFPs continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4786826 April 2012 14:55:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1012 EDT on April 26, 2012, during the Reactor Pressure Vessel Hydrostatic Test, a valid high pressure reactor scram occurred due to issues related to controlling pressure near rated values. This actuation of the Reactor Protection System was not part of the pre-planned testing sequence. All control rods were fully inserted at the time of the scram. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' The reactor scram was reset after reactor pressure was lowered. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4782611 April 2012 22:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 4/11/12 at 1807 EDT, with the plant shutdown in Mode 5 during Refueling Outage 15, the 'A' Residual Heat Removal pump tripped while operating in the Shutdown Cooling Mode. The pump trip was due to an isolation of the E1150F009 'Division 1 RHR Shutdown Cooling Inboard Isolation Valve.' This resulted in an interruption of primary decay heat removal for approximately 11 minutes. Approximate calculated time to boil was 23.1 hours. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.' At the time of the pump trip, the station was attempting to restore power to Division 2 Bus 65E from the 64T cross tie bus. A voltage transient occurred due to a fault and caused a Group 4 (Shutdown Cooling/Head Spray) isolation signal. Abnormal Operating Procedure 20.205.01 'Loss of Shutdown Cooling,' was entered, the Group 4 isolation was reset and Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1818 EDT. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the bus fault. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 478003 April 2012 05:57:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On 4/03/12 at 0524 EDT, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 80 hours. During this time, the majority of the control room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Follow up notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE PICCARD TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/6/2012 AT 1227 EDT * * *

At 0702 EDT on April 6, 2012, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were restored, following restoration of the associated power bus. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Bloomer)

ENS 4759414 January 2012 10:18:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 0700 EST on January 14, 2012, Fermi 2 removed the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) from service to facilitate planned maintenance on the associated power bus. The Technical Support Center (TSC) will also be unavailable during the planned power outage. The duration of the outage is expected to be 11 hours. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Center. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) remains functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. In the event TSC activation is required, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Use of the EOF as the backup TSC is part of Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Callout System (ECOS) is designed to, facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. In the event of a plant emergency, the Emergency Plan can be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL HIMEBAUCH TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/14/12 AT 2245 EST * * *

At 1835 EST, during restoration from planned maintenance, a failure of an electrical auto throwover device occurred, preventing restoration of power to ERDS and the TSC. Investigation of the failure and necessary repairs are in progress. At this time, it is unknown when availability of ERDS and the TSC will be restored. An update will be made to the NRC Operations Center when ERDS and the TSC are restored. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Orth).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0127 EST ON 1/16/2012 FROM MICHAEL HIMEBAUCH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

At 0127 EST on January 16, 2012 the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was restored and the Technical Support Center (TSC) is available as an emergency response facility, following restoration of the associated power bus. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Orth).

ENS 4753016 December 2011 16:37:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1017 EST on December 16, 2011, a loss of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) occurred due to a process computer malfunction. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variable are available in the Main Control Center. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) remains functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available and tested functional. In the event of a plant emergency, the Emergency Plan can be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0022 EST ON 12/17/11 FROM GROFF TO HUFFMAN * * *

At 2235 EST on December 16, 2011, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were restored following the correction of the process computer malfunction. This loss in capability was reported under a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Dickson) notified.

ENS 4738327 October 2011 19:08:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At approximately 1715 EDT on 10/27/11, a Security Officer accidentally discharged his weapon and wounded himself in the foot. An ambulance and Monroe County Sheriff reported to the site. The officer was transported offsite to a local hospital. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The officer was clearing his weapon following his shift when the accident occurred. No other individuals were hurt. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 472426 September 2011 05:54:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On September 6, 2011 at approximately 0104 EDT during surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, control room position indication was lost on the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve, E4150F012 as the valve was stroking closed following shutdown of HPCI. The Minimum Flow Valve main power fuses were checked (found blown) and replaced in accordance with plant procedures. During stroke time testing of E4150F012, control room position indication was again lost when the operator depressed the open pushbutton. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 2219 EDT September 5, 2011. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 0104 EDT when position indication was lost on the Minimum Flow Valve during system shutdown. The valve was locally verified closed to comply with the action of LCO 3.6.1.3 to isolate the penetration. A 14-day LCO was entered and back dated to the time that HPCI was removed from service for surveillance testing. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. RCIC was and has remained operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The failure is currently under investigation.
ENS 4696015 June 2011 11:10:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A deceased individual was discovered this morning along the shoreline of the Fermi-2 property, outside of the Protected Area. Specifically, at 0835 (EDT), the Main Control Room was notified by Security that a body had been found on the shoreline, north of the cooling towers. The Monroe County Sheriff and the US Coast Guard were notified and were on-site. The identity of the body has not yet been determined. The body has been removed from site by the US Coast Guard helicopter, and all local law enforcement officials have left site. A press release is not planned at this time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4687423 May 2011 17:03:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On May 22, 2011, at 1444 hours, the Fermi 2 Control Room was notified by the Central System Supervisor that the switchyard voltage for both the 345kV (Division II) and 120kV (Division I) offsite power circuits following a generator trip would not be sufficient to sustain operability of the safety-related loads. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 'AC-Sources Operating,' Condition E was entered at 1444 hours. At 1535, both offsite power circuit voltages were at acceptable levels and the offsite circuits were declared operable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition E was exited at 1535 hours. Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 20.300 GRID was entered. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) remained operable during the degraded voltage condition. The ability of the EDGs to fulfill their design function was not affected by this condition. The event is being reported per 50.72(b)(3)(V)(A), as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF GROFF TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1458 EDT ON 6/7/2011 * * *

This event is retracted. The original report was based on calculated unit trip voltage drop results reported to Detroit Edison by ITC Transmission Company that exceeded acceptance criteria. ITC has subsequently informed Fermi 2 that this notification was in error due to a software feature of their real time contingency analyzer that resulted in inappropriately high results. Based on the results of other similar real time contingency analyzers employed at that time, without the problematic software feature, none of the acceptance criteria were exceeded and both divisions of offsite power were capable of supporting operability of safety-related loads. Additionally, Fermi 2 has determined that even at the inappropriately high voltage drop originally reported, the Division II system could have performed its safety related functions. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara).

ENS 468256 May 2011 10:11:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4651528 December 2010 16:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On December 28, 2010 at approximately 1220 hours, during surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, abnormal control room position indication was observed on the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve, E4150F012 as the valve was stroking closed. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0950 hours. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1220 hours when position indication was lost on the minimum flow valve. The valve was manually closed to comply with the action of LCO 3.6.1.3 to isolate the penetration. A 14 day LCO was entered and back dated to the time that HPCI was removed from service per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. RCIC was and has remained operable. The failure is currently under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4651327 December 2010 16:18:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On December 27, 2010, at 1537, a report was made to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment for exceeding the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit limits to outfall 011A. The limits were exceeded due to the General Service Water (GSW) traveling screens being in continuous operation and the back wash being aligned to outfall 011A which resulted in exceeding the maximum discharge limit of 1.8 million gallons per calendar day as a result of a fish intrusion event occurring at the GSW intake. The GSW traveling screens have been in continuous operation since 2100 on December 25 and the daily discharge limit was reached at 1700 on December 26. The condition was necessary to maintain safe and reliable operations of the plant in response to the fish intrusion. The GSW traveling screens are being continuously monitored in order to limit unnecessary discharge into outfall 011A and restore full compliance with the NPDES permit as conditions improve. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) 'Any event or situation. Related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4643825 November 2010 09:01:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4No reactor systems were impacted, no initiations of any safety systems or any plant events occurred. Report is for transportation of contaminated fingers with an injured non-contaminated person to a hospital for potential reattachment. Fermi 2 is currently in a refueling outage. At 0300, the control room was informed that an individual, who was assisting in rigging of a Reactor Shield Block ((approximately) 100 tons), received an injury when his fingers were pinched between the Reactor Cavity wall and the Reactor Shield Block severing portions of two fingers. The portions of the fingers remained in PC Clothing (gloves) and decontamination was unsuccessful. The fingers were treated as contaminated material and transported to the hospital by radiation protection personnel. This material (contaminated fingers) was deemed unusable and at 0540 all bio-hazard/contaminated material was returned to the Fermi site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4643624 November 2010 16:00:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On 11/24/10 at 1515 EST, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 4, and will remain in Mode 4, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Followup notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1850 EST ON 11/26/10 FROM JIM KONRAD TO S. SANDIN * * *

Update to Event #46436: On 11/26/10 at 1733 EST, regarding Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) systems removed from service to support planned maintenance on the UPS vital bus power supply. Planned work which resulted in the loss of SPDS and ERDS is complete. All Emergency Assessment Capabilities have been restored. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Dickson).

ENS 4643323 November 2010 14:53:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 11/23/10 at 1145 EST, a verbal report to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources & Environment (MDNRE) was made relating to a sewage leak to the ground from the Training Building restrooms. The onsite Facilities Maintenance Journeyman discovered mud and stones while clearing a drain to relieve a blockage. An immediate repair of the broken drain is being implemented. The plant is currently in Mode 4, in Refueling Outage 14 (RF14). Since a verbal report was made to the MDNRE, this is considered a News Release / Notification of Other Government Agency, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the Monroe County Health Department.
ENS 463883 November 2010 13:15:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On 11/3/10 at 1235 EDT Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Follow-up notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored.

* * * UPDATE TO PETE SNYDER FROM MARK EGHIGIAN AT 1414 EDT ON 11/6/2010 * * *

Update to event # 46388: on 11/6/2010 at 1000 EDT, regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply. Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. All emergency assessment capabilities have been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner).

ENS 4635924 October 2010 18:09:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1641 EDT 10/24/10, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown following an automatic scram due to a main turbine trip, caused by a loss of (condenser) vacuum. The scram was uncomplicated, Control Rod 10-35 did not fully insert on scram and was manually inserted from position 38. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 137 inches, and as expected, HPCI, RCIC. & SRVs did not actuate. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the CRD (Control Rod Drive) and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The loss of condenser vacuum is under investigation. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and EDG's (Emergency Diesel Generators) were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Decay heat is being removed through the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Electrical offsite power lineups are normal. Reactor pressure is 882 psig and reactor temperature is 515 degrees F (NOP and NOT). The reactor is stable in mode 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4604424 June 2010 12:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random drug/alcohol test. Unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the HOO for further details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 459796 June 2010 03:10:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Reactor shutdown. All control rods inserted. Maintaining reactor vessel level with reactor core isolation cooling. Maintaining reactor vessel pressure with reactor core isolation cooling. (Automatic) Reactor scram due to loss of division 2 offsite power. Classification code: Unusual Event (HU1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area. The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 0253 EDT. All rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed by the main condensers. Division 1 buses are being powered by 1 of 3 offsite feeds and division 2 buses are being powered by the Emergency Diesel Generators. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO DONG PARK AT 0425 EDT ON 6/6/2010 * * *

Division 2 power provided by Emergency Diesel Generators number 13 and 14. Classification Alert Code: (HA1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area. Main condenser is the heat sink. The licensee declared an Alert at 0417 EDT. The reactor remains stable in Mode 3. Physical damage to the auxiliary and the turbine buildings were noticed after an initial inspection. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Guy), DOE(Morrone), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Standifer), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO DONG PARK AT 0603 EDT ON 6/6/2010 * * *

At 0238 (EDT), severe weather caused a loss of 345KV (switchyard power). Reactor scrammed from a turbine trip. Plant is stabilized with RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level in normal band and RPV pressure at 820 psig. RPV Pressure is being controlled on turbine BPV (By Pass Valve). Division 2 EDG's (Emergency Diesel Generator) are supplying power to division 2 buses. Plant is currently in Alert due to physical damage to plant due to severe weather. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site. Notified IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ED KOKOSKY TO DONG PARK AT 0247 EDT ON 6/7/2010 * * *

There is no release of radiological materials. No further potential exists for uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment. The Reactor is shut down. Reactor pressure and temperature are within normal bands. Offsite electrical feeds to the site have been restored. An overall damage assessment has been prepared and reviewed to ensure no conditions exist that would create an entry condition to the Emergency Plan. Plant repairs will be accomplished through site processes. At 0220 EDT on 6/7/10, the licensee has terminated from the Alert classification. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Grant), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Blankenship), DOE(Bailey), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Peagler), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs).

ENS 459005 May 2010 05:07:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On May 5, 2010, at 0500 hours EDT, Fermi 2 removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) from operation to facilitate routine preventive maintenance on the facilities' heating ventilation and air-conditioning system. During this work, which is expected to last approximately 12 hours, the TSC will be unavailable. In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Call Out System (ECOS) is designed to facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF in the event of an emergency. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Fermi 2 will notify the NRC upon completion of this work. Fermi 2 has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM JIM KONRAD TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/5/10 AT 1725 EDT * * * 

Maintenance to restore ventilation has been completed. The TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response Facility. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 4578925 March 2010 18:18:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1627 EDT on 3/25/10, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown following an automatic scram due to a main turbine trip. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 136 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The cause of the Main Turbine Trip is under investigation. At the time of the scram all Emergency Core Cooling Systems and (Emergency Diesel Generators) EDGs were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 455301 December 2009 11:08:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Beginning December 1,2009, at approximately 1200, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the PCS platform and will be out of service when the PCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately six hours. By 1800, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, and the Technical Support Center. The IPCS will remain unavailable to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as well as alternate EOF. On December 2, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored to the EOF but will remain unavailable to the alternate facilities. On December 3, 2009, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored, including alternate facilities. During this entire duration dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the PCS is completely restored. For the first six hours of the PCS outage, the emergency assessment capability of all Fermi 2 ERFs will be degraded by the loss of IPCS and SPDS. During this period the ERDS function will also be lost. For the following 24 hrs., the EOF will have no IPCSs capability, which includes the SPDS function. Based on the aggregate effect of these losses, this notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR,50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1753 EST ON 12/3/09 FROM MATUSZAK TO HUFFMAN * * *

On December 3, 2009, at 1530, emergency assessment capability has been restored to all on site emergency response facilities. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Riemer) notified.

ENS 4551221 November 2009 05:58:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On November 21, 2009, Fermi 2 (removed) the Technical Support Center (TSC) from operation to facilitate maintenance on the facilities' 480-volt AC power supply. This work affects TSC lighting, computers, and ventilation. During this work, which is expected to last over 8 hours, the TSC will be unavailable. In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Call Out System (ECOS) is designed to facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF in the event of an emergency. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Fermi 2 will notify the NRC upon completion of this work. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM GREG MILLER TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/22/2009 AT 0036 EST * * *

The planned maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4539430 September 2009 14:11:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 11:09 EDT 09/30/09, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 122 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram all Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable, and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4528724 August 2009 13:01:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On August 24, 2009 at 0900 EDT the Fermi 2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was declared unavailable due to failure of the EOF backup diesel generator to start during weekly testing. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event that EOF activation is necessary, the alternate EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the alternate EOF is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The alternate EOF has been verified available. Investigation into the failure of the EOF backup diesel generator start failure is in progress. Fermi will notify the NRC when EOF availability is restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM GREG MILLER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1534 ON 8/25/09 * * *

Repairs have been made to the EOF backup diesel generator and it was successfully tested. The EOF is now available for use. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Orth).

ENS 4523027 July 2009 10:39:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On July 27, 2009, Fermi 2 is removing the Technical Support Center (TSC) from operation to facilitate maintenance activities for furniture and facility upgrade. During this work the facility will not be available for use. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a back up for the TSC is included in Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Call Out System (ECOS) is designed to facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF in the event of an emergency. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC upon completion of this work which is expected to be July 31, 2009. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO JOE O'HARA AT 1414 EDT ON 7/31/09 * * *

Update to Event #45230 regarding unavailability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) for planned furniture and facility upgrade. The work to upgrade the facility has been completed satisfactorily. The TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response facility. The facility had been removed from operation on July 27, 2009 at 0935 EDT. The TSC was restored to operation at 1330 EDT on July 31, 2009. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO(Daley).

ENS 4503530 April 2009 17:39:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

During plant startup on 4/29/09 at 2239 (EDT), the startup had progressed to the point where plant conditions were adequate to allow performance of SR 3.5.1.9, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System flow testing against system head corresponding to reactor pressure. A Note to SR 3.5.1.9 allows 12 hours to perform this test after adequate reactor steam dome pressure and flow have been established for test performance. During the test performance, the test line pressure control valve did not properly operate to establish the required system head. The HPCI system was shutdown and returned to Standby. Earlier, on 4/29/09, SR 3.5.1.10, low pressure HPCI flow testing was successfully completed. Troubleshooting of the test line pressure control valve was begun. At 1039 (EDT) on 4/30/09, the 12 hour allowance of the Note to SR 4.5.1.9 expired and the HPCI system was declared inoperable for failure to complete the required surveillance. The HPCI system remains in Standby and is configured to perform its safety function. However, this event represents a potential loss of a single train safety system pending repair of the test line pressure control valve and completion of flow testing. With HPCI inoperable, the Unit is in the 14-day Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.5.1. The licensee is revising their surveillance procedure to allow for manual operation of the failed control valve and estimates that the required testing will be completed within 4 hours. The Unit will remain in Mode 2 pending completion of this test. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY D. DUNCAN TO JASON KOZAL 05/01/09 AT 1128 * * *

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.9, HPCI system flow testing against system head corresponding to reactor pressure, was satisfactorily completed and HPCI declared OPERABLE May 1, 2009 at 0221 hours. There was no loss of HPCl safety function. Therefore this event is retracted. Notified R3DO (Hills).

ENS 4499919 April 2009 23:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On 4/19/09 at 2315 EDT, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 24 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HIMEBAUCH TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 4/20/09 @ 2301 EDT * * *

Update to Event #44999 regarding SPDS and ERDS being removed from service to support planned maintenance on the UPS vital bus power supply. Maintenance is complete, and SPDS and ERDS were returned to service on 4/20/09 at 2230 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 4498411 April 2009 14:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Notified by Engineering that Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency charcoal sample failed acceptance criteria. Declared TSC ventilation unavailable at 12:10 PM EDT, 4/11/09. TSC ventilation supports RERP radiological habitability function and as such represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Notified all Shift Managers if an emergency event is declared (Alert or higher), Shift Managers will need to modify emergency call out service so that TSC staffing report to Emergency Operating Facility (EOF). The use of the EOF as a backup facility for the TSC is included in Fermi's RERP Plan. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of corrective maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT MATUSZAK TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 5/1/09 AT 1621 EDT * * *

Regarding Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation unavailability: Corrective maintenance to restore HVAC system has been completed satisfactorily. TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response facility. The TSC was declared operable at 1457 EDT. Corrective maintenance included replacing the out-of-spec charcoal filters and satisfactory follow-up tests. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills).

ENS 449683 April 2009 17:07:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1630 hours on 04/03/2009, the SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 24 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY J. GROFF TO J. KOZAL ON 04/09/09 AT 1257 * * *

Update to event #44968 regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply. Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).

ENS 4494228 March 2009 03:45:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0146 EDT 3/28/09, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown in response to high vibration levels on the Main Turbine #1 bearing. Reactor power was at its reduced level in preparation for entry into Refueling Outage #13 which was scheduled to begin at 0300 EDT. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 162 inches. HPCI & RCIC did not initiate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. All isolations and actuations for reactor vessel water level 3 occurred. The cause of the high main turbine vibrations is currently under investigation. There was no maintenance or testing in progress that would explain the high turbine vibration levels. At the time of the scram all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 448242 February 2009 16:21:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On February 2, 2009, at 1400, the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system was discovered to be nonfunctional. Initial investigation revealed an electrical fault in the supply fan motor. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event that TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) will be used. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup facility for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of corrective maintenance. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KONRAD TO CROUCH @1609 EST ON 02/04/09 * * *

Corrective maintenance activities on the TSC HVAC system are complete and the TSC is now available for use. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Ring).

ENS 4481128 January 2009 12:16:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On January 28, 2009 at 0730 the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System (EECW) was declared inoperable due to a blown control power fuse in the bucket for the P4400F604 - Div 2 EECW Supply to Control Rod Drive (CRD) pumps. This is a normally open valve and is required to close upon EECW initiation to remove non-essential loads. The blown control power fuse would have prevented this action from occurring. The ECCW System cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Area Cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability based on a loss of the HPCI System Area Cooler. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. The control power fuse was replaced, EECW and HPCI were declared operable, and LCO 3.5.1 exited on January 28, 2009 at 1025. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JIM KONRAD TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1449 ON 3/11/09 * * *

The As-Found condition of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump Supply Valve and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Room Cooler were evaluated. The HPCI System Room Cooler was operable with P4400-F604, Division 2 EECW to the CRD supply valve open. Based on an Engineering evaluation of EECW flow during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Non-LOCA conditions with the valve open, there is adequate flow margin in the EECW system. The HPCI Room Cooler had adequate cooling flow to perform its design function. The HPCI room temperature would have been maintained below the HPCI equipment room high temperature isolation setpoint. Additionally, plant procedures provide directions for bypassing the HPCI equipment room high temperature trip. Consequently, there was no loss of HPCI safety function. Declaring HPCI inoperable was conservative and based on initial considerations. Therefore, event notification 44811 is retracted. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara).

ENS 446985 December 2008 00:21:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On December 4, 2008 at 1735 during steam line warming as part of a planned HPCI pump and valve surveillance, a 4 hour Limiting Condition for Operation was entered for the HPCl Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve Bypass Valve (E4150F600) per LCO 3.6.1.3 with the action being to isolate the penetration. This was due to abnormal indications observed from the Main Control Room during movement of the valve. On December 4, 2008 at 2118, unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to isolating the HPCI Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve (E4150F002) to satisfy LCO 3.6.1.3 1 for the HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve Bypass Valve (E4150F600) inoperability. A 14 day LCO was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4461029 October 2008 17:03:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On October 29, 2008 at 1500 EDT, eight ounces of biodegradable hydraulic fluid (product name EnviroLogic 132) was spilled into the water outside the General Service Water (GSW) intake from Lake Erie. Cleanup activities were initiated immediately, and the spill was cleaned up within 20 minutes. All of the fluid was cleaned up. Reports were made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) Pollution Emergency Alert System and the Primary Public Safety Answering Point (9-1-1). Media interest may be expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4456514 October 2008 05:12:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Fermi 2 is removing, on October 14, 2008, the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate maintenance activities. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work which is expected to be approximately one day. The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM G. MILLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1616 EDT ON 10/14/08 * * *

Preventative Maintenance Activities on the TSC HVAC system have been completed. The TSC is now available for use. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Phillips).

ENS 4429313 June 2008 02:14:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

The licensee is investigating a loss of greater than 75% of their annunciator indications. The annunciators lost include alarms for ECCS divisions 1 & 2, Reactor Control Panels, and electrical panels. "All normal methods of monitoring plant systems are available." Compensatory measures are being initiated. The plant is stable at 100% power and all maintenance has been stopped. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM RALPH KOMBOL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 0612 ON 6/13/08 * * * 

Troubleshooting revealed the "C" MUX to be the cause of the problem. "C" MUX was removed from service and the redundant unit is now supplying input. Based on satisfactory testing the Shift Manager terminated the Unusual Event. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Louden), IRD (McDermott, Gott), DHS (J. Craig), FEMA (J. Dunker), DOE (R. Foot), USDA (R Leadbetter), HHS (Y. Mammarelli), Canada (L. Colligan).

ENS 4428010 June 2008 01:52:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) became unavailable when a storm took down the power line supplying the building that houses the EOF. The emergency diesel generator failed to start, leaving the EOF without power. Notification being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). If EOF actuation is necessary, the alternate EOF will be utilized. The licensee is investigating the failure of the backup emergency diesel generator to start. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0335 ON 6/12/2008 FROM JIM KONRAD TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Power had been restored to the EOF at the time of the initial notification. Power was unavailable on 6/9/2008 from 2007 to 2312, a period of three hours and five minutes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Louden).

ENS 441906 May 2008 12:12:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4The purpose of this report is to notify the NRC of discovery of a deceased individual along the shoreline of Detroit Edison Fermi 2 property. Specifically, at 0900 (EDT), the Fermi Control Room was notified that a deceased individual was discovered along the shore of Fermi property located outside of the Protected Area but in the Owner Controlled Area. The deceased individual is not believed to be a Fermi employee. Local Law Enforcement was notified. Michigan State Police have arrived on site. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of the report, the body had not been moved and the area has been restricted as a crime scene while the investigation is ongoing.
ENS 4418130 April 2008 18:41:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4Environmental received a call regarding an unknown substance spilled in the south east corner of the site. Environmental personnel responded and discovered approximately 300 pounds of calcium chloride, commonly known as 'Ice Melt.' The Ice Melt was on the side of the road with approximately 25% of the substance in the water of the wetlands. Clean up efforts are underway. The following local government agencies were notified: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality District Office (MDEQ), National Response Center, 911 Local Emergency Planning Committee, Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS). The Ice Melt had been emptied from a facility truck onto the side of the road. The wetland empties into Lake Erie. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4409926 March 2008 15:45:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1045 EDT, it was recognized that Auxiliary Building Door R5-6 is a Control Center Pressure Boundary door. The door was blocked open at approximately 1400 on 3/24/2008 to support draining for on going maintenance on Division 1 CCHVAC Chiller. Upon recognizing this condition, Tech Spec 3.7.3 Action B.1 was entered for an inoperable Control Center Pressure Boundary at 1045 EDT (03/26/2008), with a 24 hour action to restore the boundary to operable status. Actions were taken to close Door R5-6 at 1120 hours (03/26/2008), and Tech Spec 3.7.3 Action B.1 was exited. This event is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system. The accident mitigation function of CREF could not be assured during the time Door R5-6 was open without administrative controls to close it, if necessary. The licensee notified the site NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4406414 March 2008 18:06:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the protected areas was suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Greg Hansen in Region III.
ENS 4406213 March 2008 18:24:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4March 13, 2008 at 1445 hours, engineering analysis identified that the pressure switches that operate to open the Reactor Building (RB) to Suppression Chamber (Torus) vacuum breaker isolation valves would not perform their design function. The condition impacted the function of both RB to Torus vacuum breaker isolation valves. One vacuum breaker isolation valve has been opened to maintain the function of the vacuum breaker in that line. A plan is being implemented to correct the deficiency and is expected to be completed within the required 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation expiration time for the current condition. This is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4394831 January 2008 18:06:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1544 EST 01/31/2008, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown in response to the trip of both reactor recirc pumps. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 157 inches. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using CRD. The cause of the reactor recirc pump trips are under investigation at this time. There was no maintenance or testing in progress that would explain the pump trips. At the time of the scram all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable with the exception of Division 1 RHR. Division 1 RHR Surveillance testing was in progress. Surveillance testing is complete. Division 1 RHR is available with administrative activities remaining before it will be declared operable. Isolations and actuations occurred as expected. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical." Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The electric plant is a normal shutdown lineup. No SRVs lifted during the reactor scram. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4385018 December 2007 10:43:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification under 10 CFR 5O.73(a)(l) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of a 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system. NUREG 1022, Revision 2, identifies the information that is to be reported as discussed below. On October 22. 2007, at 1830 hours, Division 2 of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was being placed in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) following completion of a SDC outage. The plant was in Mode 5, Refueling. Reactor Protection System (RPS) A was deenergized for maintenance. RPS B was being supplied by the alternate supply because the B RPS Motor Generator was removed from service for maintenance. Upon start of the RHR D pump motor the RPS B Alternate Supply Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers tripped due to sensed undervoltage. The loss of the power supply to RPS B resulted in the following: A reactor scram (all rods were already fully inserted), RHR SDC outboard valve isolation, trip of the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU), outboard valve isolation of the Torus Water Management System (TWMS). A secondary containment isolation also occurred resulting in a trip of Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), auto start of Division 2 of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), and shift of the Control Center HVAC system to recirculation mode. All actuations and isolations were as expected for existing plant conditions. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual plant parameter, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of a safety function. Due to the actuation of equipment in multiple systems that were not removed from service or otherwise prevented from changing states, this event is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an invalid actuation of one of the specified systems. The reactor scram actuation was complete because a half scram was already present due to RPS A being deenergized for maintenance. The Division 2 SGTS system automatically started, secondary containment fully isolated, Reactor Building HVAC system tripped, and the Control Center HVAC fully shifted into the recirculation mode. The following were partial isolations due to loss of RPS B, Division 2: RHR SDC isolation and TWMS isolation. All systems functioned properly in response to the RPS power loss based on refuel outage system configurations. The licensee believes that the cause of the undervoltage was a result of the start of the RHR pump which caused an in-rush current. The licensee is considering a design change, and captured this event in their corrective action program system as CARD 07-26537. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4384012 December 2007 17:02:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4This 60-day optional telephone notification as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) is being made in lieu of an LER submittal. This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On October 14, 2007, at approximately 0200 hours EST with the plant in Mode 5, Refueling, while performing ECCS Start and Load Reject surveillance testing on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 14, the EDG unexpectedly auto-started. Investigation revealed that the auto-start was caused by a faulty test switch. The test switch had been tested multiple times prior to performing the surveillance with no abnormalities noted. EDG 14 is one of two EDG's in Division II of the Onsite Emergency Power system. The EDG responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDG started and ran unloaded. The surveillance testing was immediately stopped upon receipt of the inadvertent actuation. In accordance with the EDG operating procedure, the EDG was synchronized, loaded for about an hour, shut down and returned to standby status. Since no actual plant condition existed that required the EDG to auto-start, the actuation was invalid. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered in the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this report.
ENS 4378415 November 2007 06:34:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 03:13 EST 11/15/2007, a reactor scram occurred due to initiation of ARI caused by a Level 2 signal from Div 1 level instrumentation. The reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown in response to the trip of the recirc pumps initiated by ARI as directed by our Abnormal Operating procedures. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 183 inches. The MSIV's were manually closed to control cooldown rate. Reactor water level is being controlled by CRD and reactor water cleanup blowdown. At the time of the scram, protective tagging was being hung on the Division I Reference Leg Backfill system. At the time of the scram all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The licensee is investigating the cause of the scram. There was no ECCS injection. Primary plant pressure is 400 psig, and primary plant temperature is 335 degrees Fahrenheit. The scram is uncomplicated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 437683 November 2007 17:26:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1722 hours, on 11/3/2007, the SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will he unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1715 ON 11/7/2007 FROM SUE REITH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Maintenance activities are continuing on the power supply for the SPDS and ERDS systems. Current estimate will restore the computer systems by 2000 on 11/08/07. An update will be provided once SPDS and ERDS are restored." R3DO (M. Phillips) notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1234 ON 11/8/2007 FROM DAVID HEMMELE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of SPDS and ERDS has been completed. SPDS and ERDS have been restored to service as of 1115 11/8/2007. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Phillips).

ENS 436997 October 2007 05:56:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0114 EDT on 10/7/07, Fermi 2 feed water line check valves, B2100-F010B and B2100-F076B, failed their local leak rate tests. The leakage rate of the inboard check valve (B2100-F010B) was 297.3 SCFH and the leakage rate of the outboard check valve (B2100-F076B) was indeterminate due to leakage exceeding the capability of the leak rate monitor. Thus, the minimum path leakage through penetration X-9B is 297.3 SCFH. This leak rate exceeds the Primary Containment allowable leakage rate (1.0 La) of 296.3 SCFH per Tech. Spec. 5.5.12. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The licensee is reporting a degraded safety function associated with the primary containment barrier. The licensee intends to repair the leaking valve and retest it prior to any mode change. There is no LCO associated with this condition because the licensee is in mode 5.
ENS 4356514 August 2007 13:22:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Fermi 2 removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating ventilation and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate preventive maintenance activities on August 14, 2007. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work, which is scheduled for Wednesday August 15, 2007. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JEFF GROFF TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2342 EDT ON 08/14/07 * * *

Preventive Maintenance activities on the TSC HVAC system have been complete. The TSC is now available for use. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (J. Cameron)

ENS 4317821 February 2007 20:37:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4While the normal Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was unavailable due to modification, the space that is utilized for the Alternate EOF was in a locked condition and it is normally not locked. This condition was discovered during the dayshift and was readily corrected. However, had the facility been required during off hours it would have delayed activation of the Alternate EOF. Additionally, activation of the Alternate EOF would have been hampered by key availability to the facility storage room and supply cabinet. Access to Alternate EOF and equipment has been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4317119 February 2007 10:14:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

Fermi 2 commenced an upgrade to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) on February 19, 2007 at 0800. The upgrade consists of furniture replacement and rearrangement of the seating layout. During this work, some floor panels will be removed for cable routing and accordingly the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event EOF activation is necessary, the Alternate EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the alternate EOF is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work, which is scheduled for Friday February 23, 2007. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

      • UPDATE FROM KONRAD TO KNOKE AT 17:55 EDT ON 02/23/07 ***

This is a follow-up to NRC Event No. 43171. The upgrades to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), which caused it to be unavailable for emergency use, have been completed and the EOF is now available for use. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4278318 August 2006 01:00:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1900 hrs on 8/17/06, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared INOPERABLE. The inoperability is a result of undersized control transformers for each of the Emergency Diesel Generator Service Water (DGSW) Pumps. The concern is that the DGSW pump contactors will not receive adequate voltage at the starters to ensure the starters pickup under degraded voltage conditions. A 2 hour Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) was entered per LCO 3.8.1 to restore both EDGs in one division to OPERABLE status. At 2100 hours on 8/17/06 the two hour time requirement expired and a 12 hour LCO to place the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) was entered. At 0042 hrs on 8/18/06, compensatory measures have been put in place to restore operability to both division 2 EDGs. The compensatory measures include placing the local control switch for both division 2 DGSW Pumps in run. Placing the local control switches in run ensures sufficient voltage will be available at the starters to ensure the starters pickup following a loss of offsite power, load shed, and restoration of power to the applicable busses. With operability restored to division 2 EDGs, the new expiration time for the LCO has been revised to 72 hours based on discovery of one or both EDGs in one division inoperable concurrent with CTG 11-1 (station blackout Combustion Turbine Generator 11-1) not available. After 72 hours, if operability is not restored to either CTG 11-1 or both division 1 EDGs, the plant will be required to enter Mode 3 within the following 12 hours. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove Residual Heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The licensee stated that the current 72 hour LCO will expire at 1900 EDT 08/20/06.
ENS 4274331 July 2006 14:04:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1326 on 7/31/06 there was a discharge of CO2 to the cable tray room. This is not a normally accessible room. Plant personnel verified no smoke, no fire. At 1340 the order was given to evacuate all personnel from the Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings as a precautionary measure. An Unusual Event was declared (HU3) at 1344 due to the affect on normal operation of the plant. The CO2 has been isolated, the buildings are being walked down and atmospheric testing is underway in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Canada, State and County officials.

  • * * UPDATE ON 07/31/06 AT 15:17 FROM B. WALLAND TO A. COSTA * * *

At 1344 an Unusual Event was declared due to a toxic release into the Auxiliary Building (HU3). Release was due to a CO2 initiation, and has been isolated. Reactor building and Auxiliary building have been evacuated. Air sampling of the affected areas is underway. Notified R3 DO (O'Brien).

  • * * UPDATE ON 07/31/06 AT21:44 FROM N. MAJOR TO M. RIPLEY * * *

Walk downs for atmospheric conditions are complete and satisfactory for all areas of the Auxiliary Building. Normal access to Auxiliary building has been restored. This restores access to all affected areas. Unusual Event is terminated at 2133. Notified IRD (T. Blount), R3 DO (K. O'Brien), NRR EO (M. Tschiltz), DHS (Biasco) and FEMA (Kimbrell).

ENS 4273829 July 2006 19:19:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 15:50 EDT on 7/29/06, a Level 3 reactor scram occurred due to a loss of feedwater. The loss of feedwater was caused by a loss of Division 1 electrical power. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 110 inches. HPCI and RCIC auto initiated on Level 2 and injected into the reactor pressure vessel. The Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generators auto initiated and supplied the Division 1 ESF buses. Level 3 and Level 2 isolations occurred as expected. Reactor water level is now being controlled in the normal water level band using Standby Feedwater. No SRVs lifted and RPV pressure is being controlled by the Turbine Pressure Regulator with the main condenser available as the heat sink. At the time of the scram, work was being performed on the 120kV mat which resulted in a loss of Bus 101. Group 13 (Drywell Sumps) isolated on Reactor Water Level 3. Group 10 (Reactor Water Cleanup Inboard), Group 11 (Reactor Water Cleanup Outboard), Group 12 (Torus Water Management System), Group 17 ( Reactor Recirc Pump Seals and Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring), and Group 18 (Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply) isolated on Reactor Water Level 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee stated that HPCI injected for 2 minutes and was then secured as Standby Feedwater was started. At the time of the notification, Bus 101 had been re-energized, and preparations were being made to restore normal power to the Division 1 buses and return the Emergency Diesel Generators to standby. The licensee is investigating the exact cause of the loss of power.

  • * * UPDATE FROM R. JOHNSON TO M. RIPLEY 1821 EDT 07/31/06 * * *

The purpose of this report is to update the information provided at 19:19 ET on 7/29/2006. This event was originally reported under reporting criteria 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) as an ECCS injection. It has subsequently been determined that both the HPCI and RCIC systems auto-started in response to a reactor low water level 2 (Level 2) injection signal, however, only the RCIC system injected into the vessel. The Level 2 signal was only present for about 2.7 seconds until reactor water level recovered above Level 2. The HPCI injection logic is such that the Level 2 signal must be present until HPCI startup has completed. This includes time for the hydraulic pressure from the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump to develop enough pressure to open the HPCI turbine steam isolation valve (E4100F067) and time to stroke open the motor operated HPCI turbine steam isolation valve (E4100F001). It took about 12 seconds before steam was admitted to the HPCI turbine. Thus, the HPCI main pump outlet valve (E4150F006) did not open due to the short duration of the Level 2 signal. This is consistent with the HPCI system design. Therefore the event was not reportable as an event that resulted in or should have resulted in an ECCS injection into the reactor vessel. The event remains reportable under criteria 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Additional clarification of the cause of the scram is also provided. The loss of bus 101 resulted in the loss of power to the operating south reactor feed pump (SRFP) turbine lube oil pump resulting in a loss of feedwater flow from the SRFP. The north reactor feed pump continued to operate. The plant is designed with an automatic runback of the recirculation system to allow continued operation following the loss of a single feed pump. However, the loss of bus 101 also resulted in the locking of the reactor recirculation pump speeds (scoop tube lock), disabling the runback feature. This led to a reactor scram on reactor low water level 3 (Level 3) since a single feed pump is not able to maintain reactor water level at 100% power operation. When south reactor feed pump lubrication pressure recovered, feedwater flow from the SRFP recovered. Recovering feedwater injection from the SRFP following the scram caused a rapid increase in reactor water level and a high reactor water level 8 (Level 8) shutdown of the HPCI, RCIC and reactor feedwater pumps. The standby feedwater system was subsequently started and used to maintain reactor level.

Based on this update, ECCS injection was removed from CFR Section of the report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3 DO (K. O'Brien)

ENS 4273327 July 2006 11:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On July 27, 2006 a licensee (DELETED) supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a for-cause fitness for duty test. The individual's unescorted access was suspended (pending review by the Medical Review Officer and the Employee Assistance Program supervisor). This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR26.73(a)(2)(ii). A work investigation is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4264315 June 2006 13:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 10:53 on 6/15/06, a reactor scram, occurred due to a Turbine/Generator Trip. All control rods fully inserted into core. The lowest vessel water level reached was 134 inches. Water level is now being controlled in the normal water level band using Condensate/Feedwater system. No SRVs lifted. RPV pressure is being controlled by the Turbine Pressure Regulator. At the time of the scram, 2B Main Transformer cleaning was taking place. The initial alarm was 'Main Transformer 2B Oil Temp Hi' followed by Generator Differential Relaying and a Turbine Trip. Transformer Deluge also initiated. An investigation is in progress to determine the specific cause for the initiating event. Group 13 'Drywell Sumps' isolated on Level 3 as expected. At the time of the scram, all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were Operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 426226 June 2006 23:09:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On June 6, 2006 at 1600 EDT the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Service Water System (EESW) was in service for a planned surveillance test when the system failed to achieve required flows as specified in the surveillance. These flow rates are acceptance criteria and therefore resulted in system inoperability. EESW cools the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System which in turn cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Area Cooler. Unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW/EESW inoperability based on loss of the HPCI System Area Cooler. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 08:14 ON 6/15/2006 FROM JEFF GROFF TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On June 6, 2006 at 1600 EDT, during the performance of the quarterly pump and valve operability surveillance test on Division 2 of the Emergency Equipment Service Water System (EESW), the minimum pump flow required by the procedure to perform the test could not be established. Because minimum pump flow could not be established, Division 2 of EESW was declared inoperable. EESW cools the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) System which in turn cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Area Cooler. HPCI was declared inoperable based on loss of the HPCI System Area Cooler due to the Division 2 EECW/EESW inoperability. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI per LCO 3.5.1. A report was made to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. On June 7, 2006, the test was re-performed with the valve in the bypass line around the heat exchanger Temperature Control Valve (TCV) throttled open. The required pump flow was established and the surveillance was successfully completed at 1815 EDT. Further Engineering evaluation concluded that minimum pump flow could not be established on June 6, 2006 due to normal pump wear and heat exchanger fouling. The pump flow required for performing the pump and valve operability surveillance test was established to monitor pump degradation and is higher than the flow required for the EESW system to perform its safety function. It has been verified that the measured flow exceeds the system design basis required flow with an adequate margin and that the pump and heat exchanger remain adequate to support the HPCI room cooling operation. The HPCI safety function was maintained throughout this period; therefore, this event is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Louden).

ENS 424827 April 2006 17:07:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service for planned Preventive Maintenance on the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system. SPDS and ERDS are scheduled to be restored on 4/9/2006. During this period any out of service indication on the SPDS can be obtained from control board indications. The Emergency Notification System will remain operable. These conditions are reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Reactor is currently defueled while in a refuel outage. Reactor Coolant Temperature is 87 degrees and Div 2 RHR is in shutdown cooling. The licensee maintains secondary indication capability via control panel indicators.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN DAHM TO HUFFMAN AT 1152 EDT ON 4/12/06 * * *

SPDS and ERDS are now fully functional and have been returned to service as of 1130 EDT on 4/12/06. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Phillips) notified.

ENS 424651 April 2006 02:45:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0039 hours on 4/01/2006, Fermi 2 feed water line check valves, B2100-F010A and B2100-F076A, failed their LLRT test. The leakage rate of the inboard check valve B2100-F010A was 324.21 SCFH and the leakage rate of the outboard check valve, B2100-F076A was above the measurement capability of the leak rate monitor. The combined penetration (X-9A) leakage value was thus 324.21 SCFH which is greater than the allowable containment leakage rate (La) value of 296.3 SCFH per Tech Spec 5.5.12." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4242817 March 2006 14:34:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of a 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below. (a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: On February 10, 2006, at 1120 EST, a surveillance was in progress to calibrate the Division 2 Fuel Pool Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor D11-K611D. During jumper removal an adjacent terminal was contacted by the jumper while still connected to a 24 VDC power source resulting in a blown power supply fuse. The loss of the power supply resulted in the following automatic actions: Primary Containment Isolation Valve Group 14; Drywell and Suppression Chamber Ventilation System; and Group 16, Nitrogen Inerting System received an isolation signal. All primary containment isolation valves in both groups were previously in their safety function position (closed). Secondary containment isolated resulting in a trip of the Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System and Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System automatically started. The Control Center Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System automatically shifted into the Recirculation mode. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual high radiation condition, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of the safety function, such as a downscale or inoperable trip, for example. (b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial. The Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System automatically started, secondary containment fully isolated, Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System tripped, and the Control Center Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System automatically shifted into the Recirculation mode. These were complete actuations. The primary containment isolation valves Group 14 and 16 remained in their safety function (closed) position. This was a complete actuation. (c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully. The above systems functioned successfully. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4224610 January 2006 15:51:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At approximately 1100 EST on 1/10/06, the capability of the ENS and commercial telephones to communicate with offsite authorities was found to be not functioning. In addition, the capability of the ERDS system to communicate with the NRC is not functioning. Communications to offsite authorities have been verified using microwave communications (RERP phone lines). The cause of the problem has been determined to be an offsite cable break within the telecommunication provider's network. All onsite communications (including onsite telephones) are functioning properly. Offsite telecommunication company personnel are working to repair the broken cable. Currently, repairs are estimated to be complete by 1800 EST. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capabilities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HIMEBAUCH TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1753 ON 01/10/06 * * *

This is a follow-up to NRC Event No. 42246: Offsite repairs of the broken telecommunications cable which caused a loss of capability to communicate with offsite authorities using ENS, commercial telephones and ERDS has been completed. Proper operation of ENS, commercial telephone lines and ERDS to communicate with offsite authorities has been verified. All offsite communication systems have been returned to normal. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (O'Brien)

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM JEFF YEAGER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2050 EST ON 01/10/06 * * *

At 1850 on 1/10/06, the capability of the ENS and commercial telephones to communicate with offsite authorities was again found to be not functioning. Discussion with telecommunication personnel indicate that troubleshooting and repair to the broken cable is continuing and will take approximately 4 hours. During this time, the communications with outside authorities will be intermittent. Therefore, this report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of off-site communications capabilities. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and state and local emergency response organizations. Notified R3DO (O'Brien)

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM JEFF YEAGER TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 0406 EST ON 01/11/06 * * *

Offsite repairs of the broken telecommunications cable which caused a loss of capability to communicate with offsite authorities using ENS, commercial telephones and ERDS has been completed. Proper operation of ENS, commercial telephone lines and ERDS to communicate with offsite authorities has been verified. All offsite communication systems have been returned to normal." State and Local governments notified. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. R3DO (O'Brien) notified.

ENS 4222423 December 2005 02:22:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

While performing Div. 1 & 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW)/Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) Valve Lineup Verification surveillance on 12/22/05, the temperature control valve (TCV) on both divisions of EECW were found to be approximately 95% open rather than their required full open position. The system design requires that the TCV, or the associated TCV bypass valve, be in the full open position during system startup to avoid a potentially damaging pressure transient from occurring. Both divisions of EECW and all supported systems (including HPCl, both divisions Core Spray, and both divisions of RHR) were declared INOPERABLE at 2225 EST. Multiple LCO Required Actions were entered, including entry into LCO 3.0.3. At 2250 EST, Div. 1 EECW was restored to OPERABLE status by fully opening the TCV bypass valve and isolating the TCV, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. At 2252 EST, Div. 2 EECW was restored to OPERABLE status by fully opening the TCV bypass valve and isolating the TCV, and all associated LCO Required Actions were exited. Reactor power remained at 100% throughout the event. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee is investigating the cause of the valve not being fully open. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY YEAGER TO ROTTON AT 1524 ON 01/05/06 * * *

This is a retraction of NRC Event #42224. Based on further engineering review, it is concluded that no potential damage from a pressure transient would occur as a result of the TCV being approximately 95% open. System startup pressure transient concerns reflected in the operating procedures originated from a previously-experienced pressure transient resulting from void collapse against a closed TCV. System startup with the as-found TCV position still provides a sufficiently-open flow path to preclude void collapse against a closed boundary. Additionally, Engineering has determined that system operation with a 90% open TCV would have no significant impact on total system flow and the cooling function. Therefore, both divisions of EECW and all other supported systems (including HPCI, both divisions of Core Spray, and both divisions of RHR) were operable with the TCV in the approximately 95% open position. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Ring).

ENS 418893 August 2005 12:51:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On August 3, 2005, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individuals unescorted access was suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4184718 July 2005 00:18:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4During review of 10CFR50 Appendix R, III.G.2 compliance, it was discovered that a fire in a divisional switchgear room affecting maintenance tie breakers 64T or 65T, may result in the opposite division diesels (tripping). The postulated fire could affect cables associated with a maintenance tie breaker which could in turn cause associated bus tie breakers in the opposite division to close (B9, C9, E9, F9). The III.G.2 scenario would also include a Loss of Offsite Power event which would require the (Emergency Diesel Generators) (EDG's) to be running. Postulating multiple hot shorts could result in both 9 breakers in a single division closing and paralleling the EDG's out of synch resulting in potential damage to the EDG's. Compensatory action: Eliminated this failure mechanism by racking out the four tie breakers (B9, C9, E9, F9) that could be affected. This does not affect operability of the EDG's. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 418161 July 2005 00:08:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4During an NRC Triennial Fire Protection Audit the Inspector identified a fuse coordination issue between 130VDC supply circuit and breaker trip circuit fuses for the Standby Feedwater (SBFW) Pump switchgear. The coordination ratio was found to be too low to support requirements for fire related safe shutdown equipment under Generic Letter 81-12. Impacted equipment is SBFW Pumps A & B and control circuits required for Appendix R Alternative Shutdown auxiliary equipment. This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The impacted equipment has been declared inoperable and a team is currently working on design changes to change fuse sizes for the breaker trip circuit/supply circuit to meet the requirements of Generic Letter 81-12. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4178016 June 2005 13:44:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On June 16, 2005 at 0923 EDT, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% reactor power, both divisions of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) were declared inoperable for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of operation due to a failure of E1150-F017B, Division 2 LPCI Outboard Injection Valve. While performing the Division 2 RHR Pump & Valve Operability Surveillance following a planned Division 2 RHR system outage, E1150-F017B closed properly but failed to open during its required stroke time test. With this valve closed and unable to automatically open, LPCI injection into the RPV from both divisions of RHR would be prevented if LPCI Loop Select Logic selected the Division 2 loop for injection. Therefore, this failure rendered both divisions of RHR inoperable for the LPCI function. LCO 3.5.1.J was entered, which requires immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. The cause of the failure was subsequently identified and E1150-F017B was returned to its normally open position. At 1146 EDT, Division 1 RHR was declared operable for the LPCI function, and LCO 3.5.1.J and LCO 3.0.3 were exited. The plant remained at 100% power throughout the event. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
ENS 4171418 May 2005 19:27:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4During a review of the dedicated shutdown procedure (20.000.18), several possible design and operating procedure deficiencies were identified affecting Appendix R events. BOP Battery Charger 2C-1 is relied upon to feed post fire emergency shutdown loads. It was determined that although a circuit breaker supplying power to battery charger 2C-1 was re-closed by procedure, an additional action was required to place the battery charger in service. The BOP battery charger 2C-1 contactor circuit logic requires the control switch first be returned to the off-reset position, before the contactor can be re-energized. That control switch and associated control wiring is located in the control room envelope that is evacuated in an Appendix R fire scenario. Furthermore, the dedicated shutdown logic does not isolate this control switch circuitry from cables in the fire affected zone which is a requirement of the Appendix R circuit design. In addition to the same issues identified for battery charger 2C-1, it was determined that the dedicated shutdown procedure did not provide for closure of the circuit breaker feeding power to battery charger 2C1-2. Battery charger 2C1-2 is required to power 260VDC motor operated valves used by the standby feedwater system to provide reactor cooling water and to control reactor water level after a shutdown due to an Appendix R fire. For both of these problems, power would be initially supplied by the associated batteries, but the batteries are not sized to provide power for the entire duration of the Appendix-R event. Therefore, when the plant must be shutdown from outside of the control room, a safe shutdown cannot be assured using the dedicated shutdown panel. This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The affected Appendix R equipment was declared inoperable, and procedure changes to address this issue are being considered to address these conditions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4155130 March 2005 18:13:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee (licensee text in quotes): On March 7, 2005, a condition assessment and resolution document was initiated to document several possible design and operating procedure deficiencies affecting Appendix R and Station Blackout (SBO) events. The deficiencies were identified during development of a proposed modification affecting existing Appendix R and SBO power supplies. On March 30, 2005, it was determined that the applicable Appendix R success criteria could not be assured under all of the postulated scenarios described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Specifically, during the scenarios where Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1 (the dedicated Appendix R alternate power source) or other station CTGs are operating in parallel with the grid, availability of the alternate power source under Appendix R and SBO scenarios cannot be assured. Therefore, this event is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Actions to address the potentially affected Appendix R and SBO scenarios were put in place on March 7, 2005, when the deficiencies were identified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 413807 February 2005 19:46:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1734 on 2/7/2005, received an Area Radiation Monitor alarm in the reactor building basement airlock area at approximately 75Mr/hr. The valid alarm caused entry into EOP flowcharts for High Radiation in the Secondary Containment. Check of the relay room monitor showed 100 Mr/hr. Investigation showed that a failed open main steam line drain valve combined with placing hydrogen water chemistry in service caused the increasing radiation levels. A downstream steam line drain isolation valve was closed to isolate the steam flow path past the monitor. Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection rate was lowered. The Rad levels returned to about 4 Mr/hr (normal levels) following valve closure (at 1745). The EOPs were exited at 1755. After review of the event it was determined that an unusual event should have been entered at the time of the EOP entry (EAL AU2, Unexpected Increase of Plant Radiation Levels), 1734 and exited at 1745 when area radiation levels returned to normal values. This is an after the fact notification of a missed emergency classification. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 2/10/05 AT 1907 HRS. EST BY CROUCH * * *

This event notification reporting criteria has been changed to comply with the guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR 50.72 and 50.73". There is specific discussion that states (in part) that if a licensee discovers that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery, an actual declaration of the emergency class is not necessary. An ENS notification of the missed classification is an acceptable alternative. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified R3DO (Duncan).

ENS 4135424 January 2005 16:28:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

The licensee reported that it had indications of unidentified reactor coolant leakage greater than 10 gpm which placed the licensee into an unusual event emergency action level (EAL). Indication of drywell sump level increase and pump out rate gave an approximate leak rate of 30 gpm. The licensee also indicated that drywell pressure was above the normal range. The unusual event declaration was made at 1610 EST.

At 1619 EST, the licensee manually scrammed the reactor.  The scram was uncomplicated with all rods fully inserting and all systems functioning as required.   Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser.  There has been no ECCS injection actuation and reactor water level is being maintained by feed pumps.   The licensee has no significant safety related equipment out of service.

The licensee stated that there is no indication of further degradation of the leak rate and the source of the leak is still under investigation The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector along with State, Local, and other government agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (SKORBEK) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 1640 EST ON 1/24/05 * * *

At 1640 EST, the licensee upgraded to an ALERT following additional leak rate calculations that indicated the leak rate was approximately 75 - 80 gpm based on drywell sump pump out rate. The licensee's EAL for an alert is RCS leakage greater than 50 gpm. The NRC entered the monitoring mode at 1653 EST. The licensee stated that there has been no increase in drywell radiation levels and that sump water chemistry analysis is in progress. In addition to the normal government agencies notified, the NRC also notified the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Duty Officer (R. Chamberlaine).

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (VIA MANAGEMENT BRIEFING) AT 1930 EST ON 1/24/05 * * *

The licensee has indications that the leakage may not be reactor coolant leakage. Chemistry results show that the sump water radiation levels are at a level less than would be expected for RCS leakage. In addition, a secondary cooling system was found in a lineup configuration that could have masked leakage from the system. The licensee is waiting to get additional chemistry results on the presence of corrosion inhibitors in the sump water to provide additional confirmation that the leakage is not from the RCS.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (VIA MANAGEMENT BRIEFING) AT 2200 EST ON 1/24/05 * * *

The licensee confirmed the presence of corrosion inhibitors in the drywell sump. In addition, based on manipulations of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water system and the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water system the licensee believes that the leakage is from the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water system and not RCS leakage. The plant is stable and the licensee is continuing to cool down with pressure now at 180 psi and decreasing.

  • * * UPDATE FROM THE LICENSEE (STROBEL) TO NRC (VIA R3 IRC BRIEFING) AT 22:30 EST ON 1/24/05 * * *

The licensee terminated its Alert and Unusual Event at 22:28 EST based on sump water chemistry, activity, and Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System manipulations that indicate the leakage is secondary cooling water and not from the RCS. The NRC secured from the monitoring mode at 22:36 EST. Notified DHS (Belt), FEMA (Caldwell), DOE (Dasilva), EPA (Baumgartner) USDA (Sykes), and HHS( Pyles). The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Duty Officer (R. Chamberlaine) was also notified.

ENS 412434 December 2004 05:07:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On December 4, 2004 at 0417 (EST), the Reactor Scrammed as the result of an AVR (Automatic Voltage Regulator) trip. AVR Channels A and B were both operating at the time. The AVR trip caused a Main Generator trip which caused a Main Turbine trip. The Main Turbine trip causes a direct Reactor SCRAM on Turbine Valve position. RPS functioned properly and all rods inserted (fully). MSIVs remain open with Reactor Level being maintained in the normal band of 173 to 214 inches. Reactor Pressure is being maintained with the Main Turbine Bypass valves. Isolations expected for Reactor Level 3 occurred and have been reset. Previous to the reactor scram, the AVR alarm was being monitored. All other safety systems functioned as required. Similar event occurred 09/04/04 (EN#41017). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 411777 November 2004 06:20:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service while implementing a planned modification to replace the Visual Annunciator System, Iso-Mimic display system, and support planned maintenance on uninterruptible power supplies. SPDS and ERDS will be returned to service in approximately 14 days. During this period, any out of service indication on the SPDS can be obtained by control board indications. The Emergency Notification System will remain operable. These conditions are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. The plant is in Mode 4, Reactor Coolant Temperature is 115 deg and Div. 1 RHR is in shutdown cooling.

  • * * UPDATE 1340 EST ON 11/29/04 FROM DAVID COSEO TO S.SANDIN * * *

This is an update to Event No. 41177. ERDS and SPDS have been restored following design change implementation on the Annunciator System. The plant remains in Mode 4 completing outage activities to support startup. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Ken O'Brien).

ENS 410174 September 2004 02:05:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On September 3, 2004, at 2345, the Reactor Scrammed as the result of an (Automatic Voltage Regulator) AVR trip relay. AVR Channel A was not operating at the time due to an earlier fault (0541, 9/3/04). The AVR trip relay caused a Main Generator trip which caused a Main Turbine trip. The Main Turbine trip causes a direct Reactor SCRAM on Turbine Valve position. RPS functioned properly and all rods inserted. MSIVs remain open with Reactor Level maintained in the normal band of 173 to 214 inches. Reactor Pressure is being controlled with the Main Turbine Bypass valves at 600 to 1050 psig. Isolations occurred as expected for Reactor Level 3. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 409328 August 2004 22:15:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On August 2, 2004, at 0200, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 12 was removed from service for scheduled maintenance. During surveillance testing, the EDG scavenging air blower failed on this Fairbanks Morse diesel. Repairs will not be completed within the 7 day LCO, which expires at 0200 on August 9, 2004. A plant shutdown commenced at 2200 hours on August 8, 2004, per TS 3.8.1, Condition C.1. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4089927 July 2004 14:37:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4This 60-day optional verbal report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Primary Containment Isolation System. Since this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation, this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report. On May 30, 2004, at approximately 10:40 am EDT, while the plant was operating at 100% power, a voltage regulator failed on Division 2 120 VAC Modular Power Unit No. 2 (MPU-2) which resulted in blown fuses and the loss of a number of loads from one of the three MPU-2 distribution cabinets. Since only one of the three distribution cabinets was lost, the isolations that occurred were only a portion of the isolations that would have occurred if all of the MPU-2 loads had been lost. This caused containment isolations by Division 2 Drywell Pneumatic supply valves (Primary Containment Isolation Group 18) and by Torus Water Management system outboard isolation valves (Primary Containment Isolation Group 12). Division 2 Secondary Containment Isolation Logic was also actuated, and the reactor building ventilation isolated. The Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System automatically started. All equipment controlled by the affected circuits was determined to have responded to the loss of MPU-2 Cabinet 2 power as expected. Operators implemented applicable response procedures. The MPU was returned to service, and isolation signals were reset. Reactor power was not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4035425 November 2003 20:10:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On November 25, 2003 at 1730, offsite notification was made regarding a 692 pound leak of ethylene glycol from the north cooling tower de-ice system. The de-ice system was shutdown after the event. The National Spill Response Center, EPA Regional Response Center, the Michigan Stale Police Operations Center, State of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and US Coast Guard were notified. Site permit requires state notification of any leak above 500 pounds. The material leaked into the cooling pond associated with the cooling tower and the cooling pond water will be slowly decanted into Lake Erie per normal procedure. The cause of the leak is being investigated. There is currently no affect to the plant due to loss of the de-icing system. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4027022 October 2003 18:58:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4Today at 1623, a report was received in the Control Room of a medical emergency involving a plant employee at the power plant. Onsite personnel responded and paramedics/ambulance arrived onsite. We have been informed that the individual died from an apparent heart attack. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CPR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The local news media has broadcasted the event and the licensee does not intend to issue a press release at this time. The employee was not working in a radioactive contaminated area at the time of the event.
ENS 402152 October 2003 16:48:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On October 2, 2003, Detroit Edison received verbal confirmation from General Electric of a potential Non-Conservative Analysis of OPRM Period Tolerance and Corner Frequency. All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1 Action J requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods have been established to monitor for instability when operating in the Stability Awareness region, thus we are in compliance with the Technical Specifications. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. The Licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 402101 October 2003 00:43:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

With the plant in Mode 1 and 100% reactor power at 2043 (EDT) on September 30, 2003, while shifting divisions of Control Center HVAC (CCHVAC), the Division 1 chiller failed to start and Division 1 CCHVAC was declared INOPERABLE. At 2050, a restart of Division 2 CCHVAC was attempted and the Division 2 chiller failed to start. Division 2 CCHVAC was declared INOPERABLE, and the plant entered LCO 3.0.3 as required by LCO 3.7.4 Condition D. Plant shutdown was initiated at 2146. Division 1 CCHVAC was declared OPERABLE at 2315, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Plant shutdown was terminated at 2315 with the reactor at 84% power. Division 2 CCHVAC remains INOPERABLE and under investigation, with plant operating under LCO 3.7.4 Condition A. Plans are to return to 100% reactor power. All ECCS systems remained OPERABLE during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

  • * * UPDATE 1428 EDT ON 10/20/03 FROM JEFF YEAGER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting the notification required per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) based on the following: At 2050 hours on September 30,2003 with the plant operating at 100 percent reactor power air conditioning chillers for both divisions of the Control Center Air Conditioning System failed to start. Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.0.3 was entered as directed by LCO 3.7.4, Control Center Air Conditioning System, Condition D.1 and a plant shutdown initiated at 2146 hours. Notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), a Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications. The chiller for Division 1 Control Center Air Conditioning System was started after approximately one hour and subsequently declared operable at 2315 hours. TS 3.0.3 was exited and power reduction was terminated at 84 percent reactor power. Notification was also made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Investigation revealed an oil pressure permissive was not met for start of the chiller due to a small amount of air leaking into a pressure switch while shutdown. This delayed meeting the oil pressure permissive for starting the chiller. Subsequent start attempts removed the air, allowing the pressure permissive to be met and the chiller to be restarted. This restart of the chiller was accomplished from the main control room in accordance with plant procedures. Therefore, Division 1 Control Center Air Conditioning was capable of performing its intended function. This condition is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The original notification, Event Number 40210, is retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Jim Creed).

ENS 4007515 August 2003 01:08:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

The reactor scrammed from 100% power due to fluctuations occurring on the main generator and a loss of off site power. All rods fully inserted and all MSIV's closed. Reactor level is being maintained in the normal band of 173 to 214 inches using RCIC. Reactor pressure is being controlled via SRV's in lo-lo set mode between 905 and 1017 psig. Isolations occurred as expected for level 2 and level 3. HPCI and RCIC started on level 2 signal. HPCI has been shutdown but is available. All 4 EDG's started and loaded. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 08/15/03 AT 1754EDT BY ERIC SORG TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

Unusual Event terminated at 1348 EDT on 08/15/03. R3DO (Sonia Burgess), NRR EO (Stu Richards) & FEMA (Bob Caldwell) notified.