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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5413727 June 2019 16:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1At 0937 EDT on 6/27/19, Susquehanna Unit 2 had a control power fuse fail that caused a loss of power to one of two power distribution systems of the Reactor Protection System. This loss of power resulted in a valid isolation signal and actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System that affected multiple systems, and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The situation has been resolved and the plant is currently using an alternate power source. Offsite power and the Emergency Diesel Generators are still available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 541036 June 2019 12:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). On April 18, 2019 at approximately 0110 EDT, during performance of an ASME reactor vessel leak check, all four inboard MSIVs closed as a result of actuation of the Main Steam Line (MSL) high flow instrumentation. The high flow signal was spurious on the 'D' channel with no flow in the MSLs. Since an actual high flow condition did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation was considered invalid. The MSIVs functioned as designed on actuation of the MSL high flow instrumentation. All outboard MSIVs were closed at the time of the actuation in accordance with the vessel leak check procedure. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5407822 May 2019 06:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1

On 5/22/2019, the 'A' Control Structure Chiller (Div I) tripped due to a loss of (motor control center) MCC 0B136. The 'B' Control Structure Chiller was already inoperable due to Div II (Emergency Service Water) ESW being out of service for planned maintenance. With the loss of Control Structure HVAC System the ability to maintain temperatures in various spaces including relay rooms, Control Room Floor Cooling and Emergency Switchgear rooms was lost. The 'B' Control Structure Chiller was restarted at 0251 EDT and cooling was reestablished to the required areas, however the 'B' chiller is not considered operable at this time. Units 1 and 2 entered (Technical Specification) TS 3.0.3 at 0256 EDT and a controlled shutdown of both units commenced, Unit 2 at 0340 EDT and Unit 1 0350 EDT. This constitutes a TS required shutdown and requires a 4 hour (Emergency Notification System) ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The failure also requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to the loss of a safety function. The licensee needs to restore the 'B' loop of ESW to exit the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO). The licensee is currently performing a flow surveillance, once complete and assuming the data is acceptable, the licensee will be able to exit the LCO. The units are in a normal electrical lineup. The licensee will be notifying the state of Pennsylvania FEMA Operations Center. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 05/22/2019 AT 1302 FROM SCOTT MYRTHEL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

On 5/22/2019 at 0601 EDT Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 0340 EDT for Unit 2 and 0350 EDT for Unit 1 due to inoperability of both control structure chillers. Power has been restored to MCC 0B136, and at 0901 EDT the 'A' control structure chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both units was halted at 0901 EDT and preparations for power restoration initiated. As of 1255 EDT on 5/22/2019, Unit 1 power is 94% and Unit 2 power is 92%. Notified the R1DO (Arner).

ENS 540559 May 2019 13:51:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5335220 April 2018 16:05:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A non-licensed supervisory contract worker was found in violation of the Fitness for Duty Program. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 533103 April 2018 02:53:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On April 3, 2018 at 0019 (EDT), the Susquehanna control room received indication that a loss of Secondary Containment Zone 3 differential pressure had occurred. Control room operators noted the loss following completion of surveillance testing. The cause is under investigation. Zone 3 differential pressure was restored to greater than 0.25 inches WC (water column) at 0145 (EDT). Zone 3 differential pressures being less than 0.25 inches WC constitutes a loss of Secondary Containment based on not meeting requirements of SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5325612 March 2018 14:34:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during pre-access screening. The individual's access to the plant was denied. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5320211 February 2018 23:36:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On February 11, 2018 at 2203 (EST), the Susquehanna Control Room received indication that a loss of Secondary Containment Zone 2 differential pressure (DP) had occurred. Control Room operators noted a differential pressure of <.25" WC (inches Water Column) for several seconds. System DP was restored to normal in 1 minute. The cause of the pressure swings is under investigation. Zone 2 differential pressures being less than 0.25" WC constitutes a loss of Secondary Containment based on not meeting requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.1. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5309830 November 2017 16:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On November 30, 2017 at 1026 EST, the Susquehanna Control Room received indication that a loss of Secondary Containment Zone 2 differential pressure had occurred. Control Room operators noted a differential pressure of 0.0 inch WC (water column) for several seconds, followed by a high DP of 0.5 inch WC. System DP was restored to normal in 3 minutes. The cause of the pressure swings is under investigation. Zone 2 differential pressures being less than 0.25 inch WC constitutes a loss of Secondary Containment based on not meeting requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.1. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 530036 October 2017 21:46:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On October 6, 2017 at 1945 EDT, a loss of Control Room Habitability Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failing to meet the requirements of SR 3.7.3.4 during 72 month surveillance testing. Measured in-leakage exceeded the SR acceptance value. The CRE is required to be maintained such that occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The station remains in compliance with Technical Specification required action statements. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Control Room Habitability Envelope. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5297316 September 2017 15:53:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On September 16th, 2017 at 1330 hrs. (EDT), a loss of secondary containment differential pressure (D/P) occurred due to an equipment failure. This caused a reduction in Reactor Building Zone 2 (Unit 2) D/P to less than the required 0.25 inches WC per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1. 2V206B, Reactor Building Zone 2 Equipment Compartment Exhaust Fan, was manually started and Reactor Building Zone 2 D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 inches WC by 1333 hrs. Reactor Building Zone 1 (Unit 1) and Zone 3 (Units 1&2) ventilation remained in service and stable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 528928 August 2017 22:33:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On August 8th, 2017 at 2044 hrs. (EDT) a loss of secondary containment differential pressure (D/P) occurred due to an apparent equipment failure. This caused a reduction in Reactor Building Zone II (Unit 2) D/P to less than the required 0.25 inch WC (water column) per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1. Reactor Building Zone II Exhaust Fans were manually swapped and Reactor Building Zone II D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 inch WC by 2112 hrs. Reactor Building Zone 1 (Unit 1) and Zone 3 (Units 1&2) ventilation remained in service and stable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5284410 July 2017 07:35:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On July 10th, 2017 at 0250 hrs. (EDT) a loss of secondary containment differential pressure (D/P) occurred due to failure of a non-safety related discharge damper associated with 2V205B Reactor Building Zone II Exhaust Fan. This caused a reduction in Reactor Building Zone II (Unit 2) D/P to less than the required 0.25 inches WC (Water Column). 2V205A Reactor Building Zone II Exhaust Fan was manually started and Reactor Building Zone II D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 inches WC by 0301 hrs. Reactor Building Zone 1 (Unit 1) and Zone 3 (Units 1&2) ventilation remained in service and stable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5282624 June 2017 15:42:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On June 24, 2017 at 1028 (EDT), a loss of secondary containment occurred due to trip of 2V217A Zone III Filtered Exhaust Fan causing a reduction in D/P (differential pressure) to less than the required 0.25 WC (water column). 2V217B Zone III Filtered Exhaust Fan started on low flow in AUTO as designed and secondary containment D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 WC by 1029 hours. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7 as a loss of a safety function. There is no redundant Susquehanna secondary containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 527979 June 2017 12:51:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On June 9, 2017 at 0509 (EDT), Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0 (inches) WG (water gauge) during a routine restoration due to equipment failure. One of the two Unit 1 Zone 3 exhaust fan breakers experienced a failure that during procedural restoration caused Secondary Containment Zone 3 to experience a positive differential pressure. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 3 differential pressure was recovered to (greater than) 0.25 (inches) WG following restart of Unit 2 Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. All other Zones of Secondary Containment were unaffected by this event. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 527958 June 2017 19:10:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1527 hrs (EDT) on June 8, 2017, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a loss of Main Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) logic power causing a High Flux Reactor Power RPS (Reactor Protection System) trip. All control rods (fully) inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped due to reaching reactor water level 2. Reactor water level lowered to -49 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) and Level 2 (-38 inches) isolations. HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) automatically initiated and were overridden by control room operators after RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level was restored to the normal band with feedwater. HPCI and RCIC injected to the Reactor Coolant System during reactor level stabilization. All isolations and initiations occurred as expected. No main steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via main turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. Secondary Containment Zone 1, 2, and 3 differential pressure lowered to 0 inch WG (Water Gauge) due to a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation system that resulted from Unit 1 Level 2 isolation. Differential pressure was restored to Zones 1, 2, and 3 by the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment System on the Unit 1 Level 2 initiation. Unit 1 reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the loss of Main Turbine EHC logic power is underway. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA and press release will occur. The suspected cause of the loss of power to the EHC logic circuit is ongoing maintenance on the system.
ENS 5277226 May 2017 13:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). On April 2, 2017 at approximately 2127 Eastern Daylight Time, during performance of a reactor vessel leak check, all four inboard MSIVs closed as a result of actuation of the Main Steam Line (MSL) high flow instrumentation. The high flow signal was spurious on two channels with no flow in the MSLs. Since an actual high flow condition did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation was considered invalid. The MSIVs functioned as designed on actuation of the MSL high flow instrumentation. All outboard MSIVs were closed at the time of the actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 526583 April 2017 11:37:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This is being reported under 10CFR20.1906(d)(1,2). At 1045 hours (EDT), the SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) Radwaste shipper was notified by the RP (Radiation Protection) shipping technician performing a receipt survey of an open transport vehicle shipped exclusive use carrying an empty radwaste liner exceeded the 10CFR71.47(b)(1) vehicle contact dose rates of 200 mR/hr. Per NDAP-QA-0720 (Nuclear Department Administrative Procedure) Attachment E, contaminated /radioactive shipments this is a 1 hour notification for exceeding the radiological receipt survey requirements of 200 mR/hr at any point on the outer surface of the vehicle. The vehicle was from Energy Solutions. The licensee will be using the vehicle to transport radwaste from the facility. The licensee has notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 525998 March 2017 08:49:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 08, 2017 at 0239 hours (EST), Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0 (inches) WG due to a trip of the running Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. The fan trip was caused by a human performance error during a Unit 2 outage related activity. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 3 differential pressure recovered to (greater than) 0.25 (inches) WG at 0255 hours after restart of Zone 3 Secondary Containment fans. All other Zones of Secondary Containment were unaffected by this event. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5255215 February 2017 18:10:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On February 15, 2017 at 1337 (EST), Secondary Containment Zone 1 (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0 inches WG (Water Gauge) due to a trip of the running Unit 1 B Filtered Exhaust Fan. Required differential pressure per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 1 differential pressure recovered to greater than 0.25 inches WG less than one minute later after start of the standby Zone 1 Filtered Exhaust Fan. Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and Zone 3 (Common Areas of Unit 1&2 Reactor Buildings) ventilation remained in service and stable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022, Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. Post-maintenance testing was underway when the fan tripped. While the investigation is on-going to determine the cause, the licensee does not believe the maintenance or testing caused the fan to trip The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD FRY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0833 EDT ON 4/12/2017 * * *

The Unit 1 B Filtered Exhaust Fan trip that resulted in loss of secondary containment differential pressure occurred during post maintenance testing (PMT). The PMT was being performed following replacement of a flow controller associated with the Unit 1 B Filtered Exhaust Fan. In support of the PMT, Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 Condition A had been entered and was in effect at the time of the fan trip. The maintenance and the associated PMT were performed in accordance with approved work instructions/procedure. Subsequent to the initial report, Susquehanna troubleshooting determined that the fan trip was the result of an internal leak in the newly installed controller that prevented the new controller from functioning properly. The condition was therefore determined to have been the result of the completed maintenance. NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, includes the following guidance: '...reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).' Following completion of the troubleshooting, Susquehanna determined that, per NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, the event was not reportable. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable as a part of a planned evolution for maintenance which was done in accordance with an approved procedure and the Susquehanna TS. The discovered condition was not a pre-existing condition that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the planned maintenance activity. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson).

ENS 5236916 November 2016 17:13:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On November 16, 2016 at 1045 (EST), Unit 2 B ESS (Engineered Safeguards System) Bus Sync Selector switch failed and was unable to be switched out of the ON position. The failure rendered all other sync selector switches associated with Emergency Diesel Generators and Off-Site supplies to the ESS buses unable to fulfill their intended function of allowing manual transfer between power supplies to the ESS buses. This resulted in the inability of Unit 1 and Unit 2 to comply with SR (Surveillance Requirements) 3.8.1.8 and 3.8.1.16 thus requiring declaration of Operating AC Sources inoperable. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems required to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Subsequent actions were taken in accordance with station procedures to remove fuses for the affected sync circuit, restoring the manual transfer function to all but the Unit 2 B ESS bus. One Emergency Diesel and one offsite source remain inoperable with the fuses removed. At no time were any ESS buses disconnected from offsite power. All ESS buses remained capable of being automatically energized from their respective emergency diesel in an emergency. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5226627 September 2016 22:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On September 27, 2016 at 1644 (EDT), damaged ductwork was identified in the secondary containment boundary associated with reactor building zone 3 (Units 1 and 2) recirculation plenum. The size of the hole in the secondary containment boundary was determined to be 22.5 square inches. Due to exceeding allowable total leakage in the current secondary containment isolation configuration, a violation of SR 3.6.4.1.5 (occurred). Action to establish a tested configuration with sufficient inleakage margin to restore compliance with SR 3.6.4.1.5 was completed September 27, 2016 at 2115 hrs. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev 3, Section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1444 EST ON 11/23/2016 FROM MANU SIVARAMAN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Following the 8 hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on September 27, 2016 (EN 52266), further engineering analysis determined that the as-found tear in the Zone 3 ductwork did not impact the ability of Secondary Containment to perform its safety function and that Secondary Containment was not inoperable as a result of the condition. To support the determination, a drawdown test was conducted in a limiting configuration (i.e. least inleakage margin). No substantial change in drawdown testing results were observed over the last three tests. These tests spanned over seven years. Additionally, repairs were promptly made to the affected area. As a result, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Dwyer).

ENS 5225522 September 2016 10:58:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On September 22, 2016, at 0320 (EDT), Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0.15 (inch) WG due to a stuck non-safety related exhaust damper on the in service Zone 2 exhaust fan. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 2 differential pressure recovered to greater than 0.25 (inch) WG on September 22, 2016 at 0342 (EDT) by starting the standby Zone 2 exhaust fan. Zone 1 (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and Zone 3 (Unit 1&2 Reactor Buildings) ventilation remained in service and stable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 519878 June 2016 07:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Susquehanna Unit 1 identified RPV (reactor pressure vessel) pressure boundary leakage from (local power range monitor) LPRM 24-09 housing above the flange during an under vessel leak inspection on 06/08/2016 at 0226 EDT. The leakage point is a through wall indication on the ASME Class 1 LPRM stub tube. The leakage is not isolable from the reactor vessel. The reactor was in Mode 4 at the time of discovery. This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). A repair plan is being formulated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 519836 June 2016 08:13:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Susquehanna Unit 1 commenced a manual shutdown on 06/05/2016 for a maintenance outage. At 2202 hours (EDT) on 06/05/2016, operators began reducing power in accordance with plant procedures. At 0352 hours on 06/06/2016, the Main Turbine was tripped with reactor power at approximately 15%. The Mode switch was taken to 'STARTUP/HOT STANDBY' (Mode 2) at 0515 hours on 06/06/2016. Manual insertion of control rods was paused as scheduled for entry into the drywell for inspections. There were no ESF actuations. At 0556, the licensee identified leakage from a weld on seal water line piping connected to the 1B reactor recirculation pump seal area. The location is within the reactor recirculation loop isolation valves, therefore is isolable from the reactor vessel. The piping is ASME Class 2 and is reactor coolant pressure boundary. The reactor was in Mode 2 at the time of discovery. This event is being reported as a plant shutdown required by technical specifications pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) and degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Activities are continuing to achieve cold shutdown. The licensee informed the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5192513 May 2016 05:00:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 0110 hours (EDT) on May 13, 2016, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor was manually scrammed by plant operators due to a sustained loss of AC power to essential plant loads. Power to MCC 2B246 was lost at 2355 on May 12, 2016, resulting in a loss of Drywell cooling. Drywell pressure increased to 1.3 psig when operators placed the mode switch to the shutdown position to manually SCRAM the reactor. All rods inserted as expected. Reactor water level lowered to -27 inches and was immediately restored by normal feedwater level control. Level 3 (+13 inch) PCIS isolations occurred, along with an initiation of the RCIC system (-30 inches). Once adequate level was verified, RCIC was overridden. Pressure was controlled with turbine bypass valves, and subsequently main steam line drains. All safety systems functioned as expected. The power loss also tripped Reactor Building HVAC, causing a loss of secondary containment differential pressure resulting in a loss of safety function. Due to the loss of drywell cooling, high drywell pressure actuations and a second reactor SCRAM signal, this signal was automatic, occurred at 0314 hours. HPCI (which automatically initiated on high drywell pressure) was subsequently overridden and declared inoperable, resulting in a loss of safety function. (HPCI did not inject into the vessel). The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Initial reports from the field indicate a phase to phase fault on the MCC 2B246 bus bars. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be issuing a press release.
ENS 5187220 April 2016 01:52:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On April 19th, 2016 at 2159 (EDT), Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.1) on Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inoperability was caused when Reactor Building differential pressure was discovered to be less than Technical Specification requirements (-0.25 inches of water gauge). Secondary Containment was restored April 19, 2016 at 2222 by adjusting intake louvers in accordance with off normal operating procedure ON-RBHVAC-201. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 518516 April 2016 17:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On April 6th, 2016 at 1337 (EDT) and 1343 (EDT) Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.3) on Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inoperability was caused when two separate sets of Reactor Building airlock doors were sequentially opened during a medical emergency to transport an individual. Each set of airlock doors was opened momentarily to allow passage. Secondary Containment was restored April 6, 2016 at 1344 (EDT) when the transport evolution was complete. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5183831 March 2016 12:45:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 31, 2016 at 0603 (EDT), with Susquehanna Unit 1 in its 19th Refueling and Inspection Outage, Unit 1 received a valid isolation signal. Preliminary investigation indicates the isolation signal was the result of a human performance error. The systems affected by the isolation signal responded as designed for the current shutdown plant conditions. This isolation of multiple primary containment isolation systems is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.6 as a system actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5183030 March 2016 02:13:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 29, 2016 at 2256 (EDT), Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0.0 (inches) WG (water gauge) due to a failed closed discharge damper on the in service Zone 2 exhaust fan. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained. Zone 2 ventilation was restored by starting the standby Zone 2 exhaust fan. Zone 2 differential pressure recovered to (greater than) 0.25 (inches) WG at 2321 hours. Zone 3 (Unit 1&2 Reactor Buildings) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone 1(Unit 1 Reactor Building) ventilation remained in service however it is not required in this mode of Operation. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 517778 March 2016 09:37:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 8, 2016 at 0232 hours (EST), Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1&2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0.16 inches water gauge when securing Unit 1 Zone 3 HVAC for planned maintenance. Required differential pressure per SR 3.6.4.1.1 could not be maintained in the intended alignment. Zone 3 ventilation was restored to the original alignment and Zone 3 differential pressure recovered to greater than 0.25 inches water gauge at 0335 hours. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) ventilation remained in service and stable. Station engineering and maintenance are investigating the Zone 3 HVAC system to determine the cause. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 517642 March 2016 17:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 2, 2016 at 1330 hrs. (EST), Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.3). The inoperability was caused when Unit 2 Reactor Building Airlock doors were inadvertently opened simultaneously. Secondary Containment was restored March 2, 2016 at 1331 hrs. when the doors were closed. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5175022 February 2016 18:47:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On February 22, 2016 at 1345 (EST). Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.3) on Unit 1. The inoperability was caused when Unit 1 Reactor Building Airlock doors were inadvertently opened simultaneously. Secondary Containment was restored February 22, 2016 at 1346 when the doors were closed. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 515886 December 2015 09:58:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On December 06, 2015 at 0546 (EST), Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure lowered to less than 0.25 inch Water Column (WC) (degrading vacuum) when the running Reactor Building Zone 1 exhaust fan tripped. This required a TS 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The standby fan automatically started, restoring of Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure to greater than -0.25 inch WC. Field operators confirmed proper system response at 0553 (EST) December 06, 2015. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. " The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 515876 December 2015 05:28:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On December 06, 2015 at 0350 (EST), Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure lowered to less than 0.25 inch Water Column (WC) (degrading vacuum) when the intake supply plenum screens were found to be iced over. This required a TS 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

Snow melt heaters were manually started to melt the ice allowing restoration of Reactor Building Zone 1 Secondary Containment differential pressure to greater than 0.25 inch WC at 0434 on December 06, 2015. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 515761 December 2015 16:07:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On December 1, 2015 at 1245 EST, Secondary Containment became inoperable due to the failure to meet a Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.3) on Unit 2. The inoperability was caused when RB (Reactor Building) airlock doors were inadvertently opened simultaneously. Secondary Containment was restored December 1, 2015 at 1246 EST when the doors were closed. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev 3, section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5153814 November 2015 00:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 11/13/15 at 1745 EST, Unit 1 drywell entry was performed during an unplanned Unit 1 outage. The licensee identified leakage from a weld on the 3/4 inch lower seal vent piping connected to the 1B reactor recirculation pump lower seal area. The location is within the reactor recirculation loop isolation valves, therefore isolable from the reactor vessel. The piping is ASME Class 2 and is a reactor coolant pressure boundary. The reactor was in mode 3 at the time of discovery. Control Room determined at 2110 EST on 11/13/15, that requirements for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) were not met. This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5153312 November 2015 17:47:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On November 12, 2015 at 1132 hrs. (EST), Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 requirements on Unit 2.

The inoperability was caused when RB (Reactor Building) Zone II differential pressure (D/P) oscillated between 0.23 and 0.43 inches WG (water gauge) (less than SR 3.6.4.1.1 requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches WG). The oscillations subsided at 1501 (EST) and RB Zone II D/P continues to be maintained at approximately 0.35 inches WG. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5153212 November 2015 15:15:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1132 hours (EST) on November 12, 2015, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to one Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) unanticipated closure causing a High Pressure RPS (Reactor Protection System) trip. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped due to reactor water level 2. Reactor water level lowered to -37 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) and level 2 (-38 inches) (Division 2 only) isolations. RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) automatically initiated and was overridden by control room operators after RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level was restored to the normal band with feedwater. All isolations and initiations occurred as expected. No main steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via main turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. The Unit 1 reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the cause of the MSIV closure is underway. Unit 2 was unaffected and continues power operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) and press release will occur. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 5143229 September 2015 14:56:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 9/29/15 at 1020 EDT, the 'B' train of Standby Gas Treatment System was declared inoperable for planned testing. On 9/29/15 at 1030 EDT, during performance of a surveillance on Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel water level instrumentation, one channel was found to not meet acceptance criteria. The failed level channel is part of the initiation logic for the 'A' train of Standby Gas Treatment. This resulted in a loss of safety function for the Standby Gas Treatment System. On 9/29/15 at 1145 EDT, the 'B' train of Standby Gas Treatment was restored to operable by restoring from the planned testing. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 513757 September 2015 11:32:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This report is made due to notification from Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a bypass of the sewage treatment plant at the plant property. The notification was approved at 0925 (EDT) and completed at 0940 (EDT) hours on 09/07/15. The sewage treatment plant operator reported excessive influent which led to an unanticipated bypass of the sewage treatment plant. The influent was returned to normal values by isolating the domestic water filter backwash line. No bypass leakage is occurring at this time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5135527 August 2015 20:39:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On 8/27/2015 at 1347 (EDT), a cart and personnel were being traversed through an airlock in the Unit 2 reactor building and both airlock doors were inadvertently opened at the same time for a brief period of time (approximately one minute). Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the doors were opened. The doors serve as a Secondary Containment boundary and at least one in series is required to be closed at all times for Secondary Containment Operability. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTED ON 10/22/15 AT 1645 EDT FROM ALEX MCLELLAN TO DONG PARK * * *

NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Section 3.2.7, 'Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' states, in part, that 'events covered in paragraph (b)(3)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies.' The level of judgment for reporting an event or condition under this criterion is a reasonable expectation of preventing fulfillment of a safety function. A SSC (System, Structure, and/or Component) that has been declared inoperable is one in which the SSC capability has been degraded to the point where it cannot perform with reasonable expectation or reliability. For SSCs within the scope of this criterion, a report is required when: - There is a determination that the SSC is inoperable in a required mode or other specified condition in the TS (Technical Specification) applicability, -The inoperability is due to one of more personnel errors, including procedure violations; equipment failures; inadequate maintenance; or design, analysis, fabrication, equipment qualification, construction, or procedural deficiencies, and -No redundant equipment in the same system was operable. Subsequent to the reporting of this condition, Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC performed an investigation of the event. Below are the results. When the airlock doors were opened at the same time, they were being operated as designed. Each individual had a 'green' light, which allowed them to open each door. Based on the investigation, the doors were open at the same time for approximately one second. In summary, the inoperability of Secondary Containment was not due to personnel error or a procedure violation. At the time of the event, both airlock doors were operable. No equipment failures, inadequate maintenance, or design, analysis, fabrication, equipment qualification, construction, or procedural deficiencies were identified. In summary, based on the above, the identified condition is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), for an event or condition, that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. As such, this 8-hour event notification is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).

ENS 5126927 July 2015 17:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On July 27, 2015 at 1118 (EDT), Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The inoperability was caused by Zone 2 differential pressure lowering to less than 0.25 inches WC when a secondary containment door was opened without appropriate authorization. The secondary containment door was closed at 1149 and secondary containment D/P verified greater than 0.25 inches WC at 1205. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The loss of secondary containment occurred due to multiple openings of Door 104R which provides access to area of the building that provides alternate access to the building roof, but this door is not the normal access to the building roof The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 510404 May 2015 21:44:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On May 4, 2015 at 1439 (EDT), during maintenance activities on Unit 2 Zone 3 fan discharge exhaust dampers, the control room received a low DP (Differential Pressure) alarm and other confirmatory indications of a loss of building DP. Secondary Containment DP was restored after approximately 2 minutes. The fan exhaust dampers are outside the isolation dampers, therefore, there was no impact on the SGTS (Standby Gas Treatment System) ability to drawdown secondary containment. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3. section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5101727 April 2015 15:46:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 4/27/2015 at 0850 (EDT), Secondary Containment (Unit 1 Reactor Building) Boundary Door-721 was found ajar. The door was closed by operators. A status walkdown was performed and no other doors were found in this condition. Although, Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the door was not fully closed and latched. The door serves as a Secondary Containment boundary and is required to be closed for Secondary Containment Operability. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. This door is in the railroad bay and was posted as a containment boundary door. Investigation into why this door was not closed and latched is continuing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5101426 April 2015 01:37:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2125 (EDT) on 4/25/15 the control room was notified of a medical emergency in the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). The individual was considered potentially contaminated since a complete frisk could not be performed prior to transport. An ambulance entered the Susquehanna Owner Controlled Area and the Protected Area at 2154 and exited at 2210 to transport the individual to the hospital. Radiological survey performed during transport by an SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) RP (Radiation Protection) Technician verified at 2255 the individual was not contaminated. The ambulance was verified not contaminated at 2303. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii). An Event of Potential Public Interest (EPPI) was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) due to an emergency vehicle accessing company property. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5100122 April 2015 01:58:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On April 21, 2015 at 2258 (EDT), Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inoperability was caused by Zone 3 differential pressure lowering to less than 0.25 (inches Water Column) when Zone III fans tripped during 30mph wind gusts. Fans were restarted and differential pressure restored to greater than 0.25 (inches Water Column) at 2314 hrs. April 21, 2015. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5097611 April 2015 11:23:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 4/11/15, Unit 2 drywell entry was performed during a planned Unit 2 refueling inspection outage. At 0958 EDT, the licensee identified leakage from a weld on the 3/4 inch seal vent piping connected to the 2A reactor recirculation pump seal area. The location is within the reactor recirculation loop isolation valves, therefore it is isolable from the reactor vessel. The piping is ASME Class 2 and is a reactor coolant pressure boundary. The reactor was in mode 3 at the time of discovery. This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5097411 April 2015 05:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On April 11, 2015 at 0051 EDT, Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2, loss of required differential pressure.

The inoperability was caused by a loss of normal Zone 2 differential pressure due to loss of running fans and failure to start of standby fans. The cause is being investigated. Engineering and maintenance personnel implemented a Temporary Engineering Change, which allowed restoration of one set of fans and dampers. Normal secondary containment differential pressure was restored. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 was exited at 0320 EDT. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Temporary Engineering Change consisted of removing air to a previously running fan discharge damper so it would close and allow standby fans to start.

ENS 5097311 April 2015 01:52:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2346 EDT on April 10, 2015, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed due to a main turbine trip caused by loss of turbine steam seals and degrading main condenser vacuum. Unit 2 reactor was being shutdown for a refueling outage. At approximately 37 percent power, turbine steam seals were lost resulting in a degrading vacuum. The vacuum degraded quickly, resulting in a main turbine trip before the reactor operator could insert a manual scram. At 37 percent power, the turbine trip caused an automatic scram. This occurred during a transfer from normal steam seal supply to the auxiliary boiler supply. All control rods (fully) inserted. Reactor water level lowered to +2 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolation. No ECCS actuations occurred. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling). No steam relief valves opened. The reactor recirculation pumps tripped on EOC-RPT due to the turbine trip at power. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the cause of the loss of turbine steam seals is underway. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) and press release will occur. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Turbine steam seals were restored to the normal steam supply and condenser vacuum was restored. Decay heat is being removed via the steam bypass valves to the condenser. Unit 2 is proceeding with their cooldown to support the scheduled refueling outage.
ENS 5088513 March 2015 12:56:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On March 13, 2015 at 0919 (EDT), Secondary Containment became inoperable, requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The inoperability was caused by Zone 2 differential pressure lowering to less than 0.25 inches WC (water column) when an air handling plenum door was opened for an extended period. The plenum door was closed and differential pressure restored to greater than 0.25 inches WC at 0930 on March 13, 2015. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 Section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5069017 December 2014 15:07:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This report is made due to notification from PPL Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a sewerage leak at the plant property. The notification was made at 1335 EST hours on 12/17/14. During a routine inspection by a contractor who performs checks for PPL Susquehanna, an area was identified as a potential leak location. When the sewerage grinder pump was run, there was visible evidence in the soil that a leak existed. Extent and duration of the leak is not know at this time. This event requires notification to Pennsylvania DEP. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5068616 December 2014 17:31:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 12/13/14 at 1700 (EST) hours, during a planned Unit 1 maintenance outage the licensee identified leakage from a weld on the (.75 inch) lower seal vent piping connected to the 1B reactor recirculation pump lower seal area. The location is within the reactor recirculation loop isolation valves, therefore isolable from the reactor vessel. The piping is ASME Class 2 and is a reactor coolant pressure boundary. The reactor was in mode 3 at the time of discovery. Control Room notified at 1345 (EST) on 12/16/14, that requirements for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) were not met. This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The unit was taken to Mode 4 and the seal vent piping repair was completed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 505955 November 2014 17:17:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On November 5, 2014 at 1115 (EST), Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Building) was unintentionally crosstied to Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) for several seconds during passage of personnel through a personnel airlock. Secondary Containment Zone 2 & Zone 3 ventilation remained in service and stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered and exited based on the prohibited crosstie of Secondary Containment Zones. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires that at least one door remain closed for airlocks where two doors are provided when an access opening between Secondary Containment Zones is being used for exit and entry. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5020013 June 2014 11:54:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 6/13/2014 at 0417 (EDT), Limiting Conditions of Operation were entered on SSES Units 1 and 2 for an inoperable Train of Control Structure Chilled Water for planned maintenance. During clearance order application at 0452 on 6/13/2014, a switching move caused the in service (Division 1) Control Structure Chilled Water Train to trip and be declared inoperable. It was realized that a prior switching move had already rendered the standby train (Division 2) inoperable. There was no equipment failure or misoperation associated with this event. The trip of the running Control Structure Chiller was in accordance with its control logic scheme. This was not identified during the planning phase of this evolution. During this time both divisions of Control Structure Chillers were inoperable and were not available to perform the required safety function. This condition also resulted in the inoperability of Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System due to the relationship between some of the equipment. This is a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented fulfillment of Safety Functions and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 8 hour notification. The loss of safety functions are based on 1) the SSC is inoperable in a required mode of operation, 2) the inoperability is due to procedural deficiency, and 3) there was no redundant equipment in the same system that was operable. One Train of Control Structure Chilled Water and Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System were restored to operable status at 0503 on 6/13/2014. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5019812 June 2014 18:29:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 6/12/2014, (multiple Limiting Condition of Operations) LCOs were entered on SSES Units 1 and 2 for an inoperable Division 2 train of Control Structure Chilled Water starting at 1344 EDT for the planned performance of a flow surveillance. During restoration steps at 1444 EDT on 6/12/2014, a Division 1 Control Structure Chilled Water control switch was mistakenly manipulated which caused the redundant operable train to be declared inoperable. During this time both divisions of Control Structure Chillers were inoperable and were not available to perform the required safety function. This is a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function and is reportable under (10 CFR) 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 8 hour notification. The loss of safety function is based on 1) the SSC is inoperable in a required mode of operation, 2) the inoperability is due to personnel error, and 3) there was no redundant equipment in the same system that was operable. The Division 1 train of Control Structure Chilled Water was restored to operable status at 1446 EDT on 6/12/2014. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5006127 April 2014 01:45:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On 4/26/14 at 2322 EDT it was determined that the combined leakage for Main Steam Isolation Valves (including MSIV's, Main Steam Line Drains, HPCI Steam Supply and RCIC Steam Supply) per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.1.3.12 exceeded the minimum pathway limit of 300 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour). The MSIV Combined leakrate of 309 scfh exceeded the limit of 300 scfh with the Local Leak Rate Test failure of the HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve. This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), as it was discovered that the required leakage limits were exceeded. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1415 EDT ON 05/14/14 FROM JAY BARNES TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: Subsequent engineering review identified an administrative error with procedures used to calculate MSIV leakage. Recalculation using revised procedures resulted in a MSIV Combined leakrate of 129 scfh, which is below the associated minimum pathway limit of 300 scfh specified in SR 3.6.1.3.12. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and EN 50061 is being retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson).

ENS 5005524 April 2014 07:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On April 24, 2014 at 0230 (EDT), Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1&2 Reactor Building) differential pressure lowered to 0.10 (negative inches) WG (Water Gauge) when restoring Unit 1 Zone 3 HVAC during a routine swap of RPS power supplies, due to a trip of the Unit 1 Zone 3 Supply fan. Zone 3 differential pressure was restored to > 0.25 (negative inches) WG at 0243 hours. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) ventilation is isolated with secondary containment relaxed for refuel outage on Unit 1. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone 3 differential pressure recovered to SR 3.6.4.1.1 requirements of 0.25 WG (negative inches) at 0243 hours and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0230 hours and exited at 0313 hours. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 (negative inches) WG for all three Reactor Building Ventilation Zones when secondary containment is required. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022,Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5004017 April 2014 06:00:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On April 17, 2014 at 0335 EDT, Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1&2 Reactor Building) differential pressure went to 0.15 inches WG (negative) following securing Unit 1 Zone 3 HVAC in preparation for a LOCA/LOOP test. Zone 3 HVAC was restored at 0420 EDT. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) ventilation is isolated with secondary containment relaxed for refuel outage on Unit 1. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone 3 differential pressure recovered to SR 3.6.4.1.1 requirements of 0.25 inches WG (negative) at 0420 EDT and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0335 EDT and exited at 0420 EDT. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge (WG) for all three Reactor Building Ventilation Zones. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 498848 March 2014 10:25:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 8, 2014 at 0325 (EST), Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure went to 0.0 inches WG (water gauge) following a routine transfer of Unit 2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power supplies. Upon restoration from the RPS power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Exhaust Fans tripped due to a malfunction of its discharge damper. Zone 2 HVAC was restored at 0335 by placing the other train of fans in service. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone 2 differential pressure recovered to SR 3.6.4.1.1 requirements of 0.25 inches WG within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0325 and exited at 0354. Tech Spec for Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge for all three Reactor Building Ventilation Zones. There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a safety function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 498674 March 2014 01:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On March 4, 2014 at 0025 EST, Secondary Containment drawdown testing surveillance failed to meet acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.4.1.5 due to maximum flow rate exceeding the allowable value. Secondary Containment drawdown testing was being performed on Reactor Building Zone 1 and Zone 3 with Zone 2 HVAC shutdown. Upon failure of the surveillance, Secondary Containment ventilation was realigned to a previous successfully tested and known operable alignment for Zones 1, 2 and 3. This alignment consists of all Reactor Building Zones in service and Zone 3 aligned to the Railroad Bay. Upon restoration of Secondary Containment ventilation to a known operable alignment, operability was restored and Secondary Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 0128 EST on March 4, 2014. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, Section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4982112 February 2014 14:18:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On February 12, 2014 at 0711 EST, secondary containment (Unit 1 reactor building) boundary door-612 was found propped ajar with a secondary containment boundary sign stuck in the door jam, holding the door open. Upon discovery, the sign was removed from the door jam and the door was verified closed. A status walk down was performed and no other doors were found in this condition. Although secondary containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the door was open, the door serves as a secondary containment boundary and is required to be closed for secondary containment operability. Secondary containment alignment for removal of the 818 foot elevation (refuel floor) hatch removal had been performed at 0105 EST, February 12, 2014 and the last record of access to the area by security card reader occurred at 0044 EST by the operator performing the ventilation alignment. The potential duration of inoperability based on the available information is approximately 6.5 hours. Past operability evaluation is being performed. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a safety function. There is no redundant Susquehanna secondary containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4975321 January 2014 21:14:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1340 (EST) on 1/21/2014, Susquehanna Control Room Operators received an alarm due to the lockup of a monitoring panel utilized for Vent Stack Radiation Monitors (known as SPINGs - System Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas). There are two monitor panels, one in the control room and one in the Technical Support Center (TSC). Both panels are fully redundant. At the time, the control room panel was out of service for maintenance. This event rendered all five SPINGs inoperable. Additionally, control room alarm capability was not available. The associated Technical Requirement (TROs) were entered for this inoperability. In order to clear the lockup, the TSC terminal needed to be powered down and rebooted. The TSC monitoring terminal was restored to operable status at 1352 and the associated TROs were cleared. The SPING function and control room alarm functions were inoperable for a total of 12 minutes. In accordance with the guidance of NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Item 3.2.13, this event is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. The loss of the Stack Monitoring System was not part of a pre-planned evolution. This equipment is relied upon by control room operators and emergency response personnel to implement procedures addressing classification, assessment, and protective actions associated with the emergency plan. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 496147 December 2013 17:31:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On December 7, 2013 at 0950 (EST), Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Secondary Containment drawdown testing failed to meet acceptance criteria of Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement SR 3.6.4.1.5 due to inleakage flow rate exceeding the allowable value. SSES previously entered SR 3.0.3 at 0900 (EST) on 11/15/2013, due to not meeting the requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5 because of an untested alignment of the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay (101 bay). Corrective maintenance was performed on several boundary components (doors and hatches) along with multiple inspections. The test being performed on 12/7/2013 was to be a retest for the previously failed surveillance (performed on 11/20/13). LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0950 (EST) in support of this test. During the test, it was determined that the maintenance performed did not produce the desired outcome. As a result, the retest was not successful. The 101 Bay ventilation was realigned to the previously known operable configuration. Upon completion of this realignment, LCO 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 1349 (EST) and operability restored. Note that SR 3.0.3 remains in effect for the unsuccessful, untested configuration. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. See EN #49565 for the previous surveillance test failure, performed on 11/20/13. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 496136 December 2013 17:52:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1248 EST, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was being tested for routine quarterly flow verification using surveillance test procedure SO-252-002. When HPCI turbine speed was lowered to approximately 2400 RPM, oscillations on turbine speed, flow and discharge pressure were observed. HPCI turbine speed was raised to approximately 2700 RPM and the oscillations stopped. Unit 2 HPCI system had been declared inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 entered at 1200 EST for the surveillance test. (This is a 14 day LCO.) Review by Engineering determined that cause of the oscillations warrant further evaluation and HPCI remains inoperable. HPCI is a single train Emergency Core Cooling Safety system. This event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).

There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DARVIN DUTTRY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1201 EST ON 1/17/14 * * *

NUREG-1022, Revision 3, states, 'if the retraction or cancellation of a report under this criterion is due to a revised operability determination, the retraction or cancellation should discuss the basis for why the operability determination was revised, and why it is believed that system operability was never lost (i.e., in lieu of the initial determination).' As indicated in the initial report, Engineering determined that the cause of the oscillations required further evaluation and HPCI remained inoperable. Additional evaluation by Engineering resulted in a conclusion that HPCI was OPERABLE with the observed oscillations at the low flow conditions. Details are as follows: HPCI speed/flow oscillations at low flow conditions can occur due to inherent instability at these conditions. This phenomenon is understood and documented in industry OE (Operating Experience), EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) maintenance guidelines, and station procedures. HPCI system operation and control during the surveillance were as expected and demonstrated proper response and stable operation, with the only exception being the described oscillations at the low flow condition. This was confirmed by a review of the system response on the start-up traces. A system walkdown confirmed no abnormality with the control system equipment or governor setting. No tuning adjustments were considered to be necessary based on the low magnitude of the oscillations and their negligible impact on system operation. Unit 2 HPCI was declared OPERABLE and LCO 3.5.1 was cleared at 2308 (EST) on December 6, 2013. Based on the above additional information, PPL (Pennsylvania Power and Light) is retracting this report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Rogge).

ENS 4958827 November 2013 14:58:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On November 27, 2013 at 1001 (EST), Susquehanna Steam Electric Station operators observed secondary containment differential pressure was at 0.04 inches water gauge for Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building). Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone I differential pressure was impacted due to equipment malfunction. The inservice reactor building exhaust fan discharge damper developed an air leak at the solenoid operator. Zone 1 Building D/P was restored to within the required band at 1111 (EST) by placing the standby train exhaust fan, which was out of service for maintenance, in operation and verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 1001 (EST) and exited at 1131 (EST). This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4956521 November 2013 04:23:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On November 20, 2013 at 2240 (EST), secondary containment drawndown testing surveillance failed to meet acceptance criteria SR 3.6.4.1.5 due to maximum flow rate exceeding the allowable value. SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) previously entered SR 3.0.3 at 0900 on 11/15/2013 due to not meeting SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 because of an untested alignment of the 101 bay with ventilation aligned as a no zone during past performances of the drawdown testing surveillance. The surveillance being performed on 11/20/2013 was testing this previously unsurveilled alignment. Upon failure of the surveillance, secondary containment ventilation was realigned to the previously tested 818 hatch alignment. Upon restoration of secondary containment ventilation to a known operable alignment, secondary containment LCO 3.6.4.1 was cleared and operability restored. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has placed administrative controls on the 101 bay doors to prevent loss of secondary containment during the investigation to determine the reason for the surveillance test failure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4953113 November 2013 09:53:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On November 13, 2013 at 0226 (EST), Secondary Containment Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost during restoration of a ventilation drawdown test. During restoration Unit 2 'A' Train Reactor Building Ventilation fans tripped. The 'B' Train fans were placed in service and secondary containment was restored. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone II differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was exited for both units at 0257 (EST). Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The cause of the Unit 2 "A" Train Reactor Building ventilation fans tripping is still under investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/10/14 AT 1657 EST FROM DOUG LAMARCA TO NESTOR MAKRIS * * *

NUREG-1022, Revision 3 states, ' reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).' The event reported in this event notification occurred during a pre-planned evolution for surveillance testing that was done in accordance with an approved procedure and the Susquehanna Technical Specifications. The loss of differential pressure occurred during restoration from the surveillance test and occurred prior to completing the planned evolution and declaring the system OPERABLE. Specifically, the trip of the fans occurred when restoring the Reactor Building normal ventilation after a Zone 1, 2, and 3 isolation (returning back to normal ventilation from the Standby Gas Treatment System). The secondary containment boundary and standby gas treatment system were unaffected. This event occurred as a result of the testing process and would not have occurred during normal operation of the system. There was no discovered condition that would have resulted in the safety function of the system being declared inoperable under normal, non-testing conditions. Based on the above additional information, PPL is retracting this report. Susquehanna was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Schmidt).

ENS 494921 November 2013 09:51:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On November 1, 2013 at 0309 EDT, Secondary Containment Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost following a routine transfer of Reactor Protection System Power supplies. Upon restoration from the power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Exhaust Fans tripped. There were no obvious malfunctions associated with the equipment and fan was able to be restarted. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone I differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0309 EDT and exited at 0315 EDT. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See similar event number #49489.
ENS 4948931 October 2013 05:00:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On October 31, 2013 at 0251, Secondary Containment Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost following a routine transfer of Reactor Protection System Power supplies. Upon restoration from the power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Equipment Compartment Exhaust Fans tripped. There were no obvious malfunctions associated with the equipment and fan was able to be restarted. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone I differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0251 and exited at 0255. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4946523 October 2013 10:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On October 23, 2013 at 0620, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station operators observed secondary containment differential pressure was at negative 0.17 inches water gauge for Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building). Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone II differential pressure was restored to within the required band by manual damper adjustment in about 15 minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0620 and exited at 0635. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4943213 October 2013 09:11:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On October 13, 2013 at 0420 (EDT), Susquehanna Steam Electric Station control room operators received an alarm for a local secondary containment ventilation control panel. Investigation revealed that Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) secondary containment differential pressure was at zero inches water gauge. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge. All fans and dampers appeared to be operating normally and there was no apparent equipment malfunction. Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable. Zone II differential pressure recovered within five minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0420 and exited at 0425. There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4935116 September 2013 21:11:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1455 EDT, (on 91/16/13), (Susquehanna) Engineering determined the leakage from the 2B RHR Pump Suction Relief valve caused the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Leakage to exceed the 2.5 gpm which was provided to the NRC during the implementation of the Alternate Source Term (AST) submittal. The calculated leakage rate was 7.5 gpm. This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). Unit 2 is currently in Mode 4 (cold shutdown) for a maintenance outage. This leaking RHR pump suction relief valve, previously identified in EN #49344, is being evaluated and repaired. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state.
ENS 4934415 September 2013 11:52:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1123 EDT, (on 9/15/13), Susquehanna Unit 2 received a Division 2 RHR (Residual Heat Removal) room Flooded alarm. Plant operators reported 3 inches of water in the room with water coming from the 2B RHR pump suction relief valve. The Suppression Pool Isolation valve was closed to isolate the leaking relief valve from the Suppression Pool. This action stopped Suppression Pool level from lowering. The Leak is isolated at this time. Further water is being added to the room as the system piping is being drained. The cause of the relief valve lifting is unknown at this time and is under investigation. At the time of the event, Division 2 RHR system had been declared inoperable for unrelated equipment issues. At 1222 EDT, the licensee confirmed that leakage from the 2B RHR pump suction relief valve had stopped. Susquehanna Unit 2 remains stable and there was no impact on Susquehanna Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and Local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (email only).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARTIN LICHTNER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1641 EDT ON 9/15/13 * * *

U2 SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) has exited the Unusual Event for Division 2 RHR room flooded as of 1552 EDT. The leak has been isolated, water removed from the room and Division 1 RHR is operating in shutdown cooling proceeding to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown). A press release for this event was authorized at 1613 and issued at 1628 (on 9/15/13). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cahill), NRR (Dorman), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (email only).

ENS 4934214 September 2013 05:15:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 0330 hours on September 14, 2013, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammed while transitioning the 'A' reactor feed pump from flow control mode to discharge pressure mode. Reactor water level rose to +54 inches causing a trip of reactor feedpumps. Subsequently the mode switch was taken to shutdown to manually scram the Unit 2 reactor. All control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to approximately +18 inches. There were no automatic emergency core cooling system initiations. No steam relief valves opened during the event. No containment isolations occurred. All safety systems operated as expected. RCIC system was manually initiated for level control until a reactor feedpump was recovered, then RCIC was manually shutdown. The cause of the feedwater flow transient and trip of the reactor feedwater pumps is under investigation. This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a 4 hour report, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8 hour report. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valve to the condenser. Offsite power remains stable, and there was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency will be notified, and the licensee will be making a press release.
ENS 490997 June 2013 13:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 1203 (EDT) on June 7, 2013, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One reactor was manually scrammed during reactor startup. Pressure setpoint was being adjusted to the normal operating setpoint, from 750 psig to 934 psig, when all turbine bypass valves unexpectedly opened. Reactor Feed Pumps, Main Turbine, HPCI and RCIC tripped on the high level setpoint Level 8 (+54 inches) due to the resultant reactor level swell. The reactor operator then inserted a manual scram. All control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to approximately -10 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. There were no automatic emergency core cooling system initiations. No steam relief valves opened during the event. All safety systems operated as expected. The cause of the Turbine Bypass valve opening is under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 488117 March 2013 03:36:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0135 EST, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable, and LCO 3.5.1 entered, due to its turbine steam exhaust valve failing in the closed position during the quarterly valve exercising surveillance. The supply breaker tripped when the opening stroke was attempted. The valve was verified to have remained fully closed via the manual operator. HPCI will not automatically start with this valve closed. HPCI is a single train Emergency Core Cooling Safety (ECCS) system. This event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2. There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM TODD CREASY TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/3/13 AT 1401 EDT * * * 

The reported condition, described above, was further evaluated by PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL). The following is additional information concerning the condition: The HPCI Turbine Exhaust valve (HV255F066): 1) is a DC motor operated valve with no design features which cause automatic valve actuation, 2) is manipulated by remote Operator action to open or close the valve, 3) is designed as a normally open valve to support the HPCI function, and 4) is manually closed for long-term containment isolation. When the HPCI turbine exhaust valve was stroked, the valve successfully closed; however, position indication was lost when attempting to re-open the valve. Troubleshooting identified a faulty relay contact that in conjunction with the operator repositioning the key lock switch from CLOSE to OPEN caused a direct short in the circuit. NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Section 3.2.7, provides the following example of a condition that is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v): Removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function). When the failure of the HV255F066 occurred, HPCI was properly removed from service for planned quarterly valve exercising in accordance with an approved surveillance procedure and LCO 3.5.1. Since HV255F066 is a normally open valve, a failure to open does not impact the safety function to provide a flow path for HPCI exhaust since routine valve stroking or maintenance that might close the valve would not be conducted in an accident scenario where HPCI would be required to start and closure associated with long-term containment isolation would only occur after the HPCI function is complete (i.e., the failure to open was introduced by the testing activity and would not occur in a scenario in which the valve is required to perform its safety function to open). With regard to the long-term containment isolation function, the faulty relay contact failed in a manner that prevented the valve from opening but did not prevent the valve from closing. Based on closure of the valve during the test, there was no pre-existing operability issue associated with its safety function to close. Furthermore, even without credit for HV255F066, the containment isolation safety function would be maintained by Check Valve 255F049 and Drain Isolation Valve 255F013. Based on the above additional information, PPL is retracting this report. Susquehanna was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Hunegs).

ENS 4877722 February 2013 20:13:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On February 22, 2013 at approximately 1430 (EST), Susquehanna identified a computer program error that affected the Susquehanna Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Specifically, two Behavioral Observation Program (BOP) inquiries were accepted without proper documentation of the required need to continue unescorted access authorization (UAA) and without verification of an actual observation within the required thirty day timeframe. The computer error resulted in answers for two of the three questions on the Behavior Observation Inquiry form not being recorded when the form was submitted by the supervisor. This resulted in the two security accounts being re-zeroed and allowing UAA for an additional 15 days. The BOP supervisor was contacted and verified that these individuals were intended to continue with UAA. At no time were these individuals removed from the FFD or Behavior Observation Program. In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this report is being made based on being a potential programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The (NRC Resident Inspector) and the Branch Chief for the Region I Division of Reactor Safety were notified.
ENS 4863629 December 2012 01:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On December 28, 2012 at approximately 1100 (EST), Susquehanna discovered a computer program error that affected the Susquehanna Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Specifically, thirty-nine Behavioral Observation Program (BOP) inquiries were without proper documentation of the required need to continue unescorted access (UA) and without verification of an actual observation within the required thirty day timeframe. The computer error resulted in answers for two of the three questions on the Behavior Observation Inquiry form not being recorded when the form was submitted by the supervisor. This resulted in the thirty-nine security accounts being re-zeroed and allowing UA for an additional thirty days. All thirty-nine BOP supervisors were contacted, and it was determined that thirty-six of the individuals were intended to continue with UA. The remaining three accounts should have terminated to prevent UA; however, none of these three individuals gained unauthorized access to the Protected Area after their UA should have been terminated. Seven of the thirty-six intended to continue with UA did access the Protected Area, but per follow-up with the Behavior Observation Supervisors, these individuals were in compliance with the BOP. In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this report is being made based on being a potential programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The (NRC) Resident Inspector and the Branch Chief for the Region I Division of Reactor Safety were briefed.
ENS 4860719 December 2012 20:29:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 17:31 hours on December 19, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor automatically scrammed on low RPV level (Level 3, +13 inches) while transitioning the 'A' reactor feed pump from discharge pressure mode to flow control mode. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to approximately -29 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. An automatic trip of the reactor recirculation pumps occurred, but is not expected at this RPV level. There were no automatic emergency core cooling system initiations. No steam relief valves opened during the event. All safety systems operated as expected. The cause of the loss of feed water flow and trip of the reactor recirculation pumps is under investigation. This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a 4 hour report, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8 hour report. Decay heat is removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves . On-site electrical power is in the normal configuration. The Unit 2 reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Unit 1 was not affected and operates at 99% power. The licensee will inform the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and make a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4859816 December 2012 04:39:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 01:56 hours on December 16, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed while performing testing of the number 2 control valve per the station surveillance testing program. The number 2 control valve closure initiated a 1/2 scram in the reactor protection system as designed; specifically the 'B1' channel. Evaluation of plant data indicates that an 'A' scram channel signal was activated during the time period the number 2 control valve scram signal was active, thereby causing a full reactor scram. The cause of the 'A' scram channel signal is not understood at this time and is under investigation. A second reactor scram signal was received at approximately 02:10 hours due to reactor water level lowering to 13 inches. Reactor water level was restored above the trip setpoint. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped at -38 inches. Reactor water level lowered to -48.5 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) and level 2 (-38 inches) isolations. HPCI and RCIC both automatically initiated and were overridden by control room operators after water level was restored. All isolations and initiations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4 hour reports, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8 hour report. The unit 2 reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the reactor scram is underway. Unit 1 continued power operation. The NRC resident inspectors were notified. A press release will occur." The licensee will be notifying the State authorities.
ENS 4859514 December 2012 15:00:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1350 on 12/14/2012, both Control Structure Chillers at Susquehanna were rendered inoperable. This event required entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both Units. Per Susquehanna procedures, after 1 hour, a power reduction must be commenced. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires that action be taken within one hour to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 13 hours and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Physical power reduction commenced at 1453 for Unit 1 and 1459 for Unit 2. The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was previously inoperable for routine maintenance. The system was in service for post maintenance testing and activities were underway to swap to the opposite train to allow removal of test instrumentation and fan belt tensioning for equipment associated with the 'A' Control Structure HVAC system. At 1350, the 'B' Control Structure loop circulating pump tripped, rendering the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable. This condition requires immediate entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Both Control Structure Chillers are inoperable and this report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a shutdown required by Tech Specs, and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of a Safety Function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Efforts are underway to restore at least one system to operable status in parallel with Unit shutdown activities. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State of Pennsylvania.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ALEX MCLELLAN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2228 EST ON 12/14/12 * * *

On 12/14/12 at 1500 EST Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 1453 EST for Unit 1 and 1459 EST for Unit 2 due to inoperability of both Control Structure Chillers. At 1750 EST the 'A' Control Structure Chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both Units was halted at 1750 and preparations for power restoration initiated. On 12/14/12 Unit 1 power was restored to 98% at 1819 EST and Unit 2 power was restored to 98% at 1943 EST, the maximum power output possible based on grid conditions for Unit 1 and thermal limits for Unit 2. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified.

ENS 4854027 November 2012 18:40:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1720 hours on November 27, 2012 PPL SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) notified the Occupational Safety and Health Administration that an employee had suffered a fatality. On November 27, 2012 at 1313 hours, a PPL employee suffered an apparent heart attack while at the Luzerne County Community College (LCCC) Public Safety Training Institute while performing SCBA (Self Contained Breathing Apparatus) training. The employee was transported to the Geisinger Wyoming Valley hospital and pronounced dead. PPL was notified at 1432 of the fatality. The LCCC training facility is not located on PPL owned property. This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee has also notified the Commonwealth.
ENS 4852520 November 2012 12:30:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Susquehanna Unit 2 discovered a condition that could have prevented the primary containment isolation valves for the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system from automatically isolating on a high differential flow instrumentation signal. The RWCU system high differential flow signal was found to be indicating downscale due to an instrument failure. Both divisions of the RWCU high differential flow isolation logic utilize the same differential flow instrument loop. Thus, this single instrument failure would have prevented automatic isolation of the RWCU inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves on a high differential flow signal. The other RWCU primary containment isolation instrumentation functions remained operable and the associated RWCU system primary containment isolation valves were capable of being remotely closed by the control room operators. At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in Mode 2 due to an unplanned shutdown and all control rods had already been fully inserted as part of a soft shutdown sequence. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DUTTRY TO KLCO ON 1/11/13 AT 2155 EST * * *

Following the ENS report (EN 48525), Susquehanna determined that although the RWCU high differential flow isolation instrumentation would have prevented automatic isolation of the RWCU inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves on a high differential flow signal, the RWCU high flow isolation instrumentation would detect a high flow condition and generate an isolation signal that would close the isolation valves. The RWCU high differential flow instrumentation is downstream of the RWCU pumps and it calculates the difference (delta) in flow between the inlet and the outlet of the RWCU heat exchangers. The SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) Technical Specification (TS) Bases Section 3.3.6.1 states that the RWCU Differential Flow signal is to detect a break in the RWCU system (pipe severance and separation). Engineering analysis determined that the RWCU pumps would run-out if a break occurs downstream of the pumps and the RWCU system flow rate would be approximately 1000 gpm, with one RWCU pump in operation. The flow rate would be higher for two RWCU pumps in operation. Therefore, RWCU isolation would occur from the RWCU Flow - High isolation signal due to a flow rate that is greater than 472 gpm (TS Table 3.3.6.1-1). This high flow isolation does not rely on the RWCU high differential flow instrumentation. The above analysis is consistent with the FSAR discussion in section 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.9.3. Based on the above, Susquehanna has determined that the RWCU isolation function would still be completed if a pipe break occurred downstream of the RWCU heat exchangers and the RWCU high differential flow instrumentation is inoperable. Since there was no loss of safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material, this ENS report is retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4850010 November 2012 16:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 04:20 hours on November 9, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor received a subsequent scram due to low reactor water level during recovery from the scram (EN# 48496) that occurred at approximately 01:18 hours due to a loss of ICS (Integrated Control System; which controls the reactor feed and reactor recirculation systems). Reactor water level was +15 inches at the time of the trip. All isolations and initiations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Unit One continued power operation. The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified." The licensee will notify the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 484969 November 2012 03:03:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 0118 hours (EST) on November 9, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor was scrammed by plant operators due to a loss of ICS (Integrated Control System; which controls the reactor feed and reactor recirculation systems). The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown when reactor water level reached +25 inches and lowering. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped at -38 inches. Reactor water level lowered to -52 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) and level 2 (-38 inches) isolations. HPCI and RCIC both automatically initiated. HPCI was overridden prior to injection and RCIC was utilized to restore reactor water level to the normal band. All isolations and initiations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. The (Unit 2) reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the loss of ICS is underway. Unit One continued power operation (at 78% power). The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. A press release will occur. The licensee will inform the State of Pennsylvania. Decay heat removal is being maintained through the main condenser. On-site electrical power is in the normal configuration.
ENS 4829310 September 2012 17:15:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both Control Structure (CS) chillers 'A & B' concurrently inoperable. At 1025 (EDT), the control room was notified that the 'B' CS Chiller was not running. There were no control room alarms due to this condition. Review of indications on control room panel 0C681 noted that the loop circ pump and all three CS fans remained in service. Indication of CS loop flow and loop temperature remained normal, approximately 600 gpm and 44 degrees. The 'B' CS Chiller restarted at 1027 (EDT) and normal system parameters were observed. Work on the 'A' CS Chiller was released at 0928 (EDT) on 9/10/2012 for scheduled maintenance, LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered, however no work had actually commenced or was performed. The 'A' CS Chiller remained available and in standby during the entire evolution. Since the cause of the 'B' CS Chiller to shutdown has not been determined, the 'B' CS Chiller was declared inoperable. Inoperability of both CS chillers 'A & B' required immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 per TS 3.7.4 Condition D. Both chillers were inoperable from 1025 (EDT) until 1042 (EDT) (17 minutes), when the 'A' CS Chiller was restored to operable status. This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM LICHTNER TO CROUCH AT 2008 EDT ON 10/08/12 * * *

This event was reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the 'A' Control Structure (CS) chiller was released for scheduled maintenance (LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered), although no physical work had begun on the 'A' CS chiller. Concurrent with the 'A' chiller being in the aforementioned status, the 'B' CS chiller shutdown for approximately 2.5 minutes before automatically restarting. Following the ENS report, Susquehanna determined that although it had shutdown, the 'B' CS chiller remained operable and capable of fulfilling all its design functions. The chiller shutdown was not due to operation of a safety trip. Under safety trip conditions, automatic restart of the chiller would have been prevented and alarms would have been received in the control room. Rather, the event was due to chiller load recycle operation during which the chiller is designed to shutdown at approximately 5 degrees F below the normal operating chilled water temperature and automatically restart. Troubleshooting did not detect any faulty components and the chiller has remained in operation for greater than 48 hours since the shutdown, without a repeat event. Additionally, although the 'A' CS chiller was declared inoperable due to entry into LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 to perform routine maintenance, no physical action had been taken to disable the 'A' chiller. Therefore, the 'A' CS chiller was capable of auto-starting and performing its safety function for all design conditions while in the LCO's. Based on the above information, Susquehanna has determined that since both the 'A' and the 'B' CS chillers were available and capable of performing their design safety functions, there was no loss of safety function therefore this ENS report is retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Trapp).

ENS 4821120 August 2012 18:21:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1106 EDT, on August 20, 2012 Computer Engineering personnel discovered a computer component failure which would have prevented the transmission of Emergency Response Data (ERDS) to the NRC if the system were to be activated. The actual component failure was determined to have occurred at approximately 2000 EDT on 8/19/12. This resulted in an out of service duration of greater than 8 hours, which was not discovered until after the fact. The system was repaired and returned to service at 1720 EDT on 8/20/12. Since Unit 1 and Unit 2 ERDS was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4817810 August 2012 17:13:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On Aug 7, 2012 at 1734 EDT, PPL Susquehanna personnel were in the process of releasing the Dry Fuel Storage Transfer Trailer from the Unit 1 Reactor Building 101 rail bay and detected removable contamination on the trailer. PPL Susquehanna Health Physics personnel identified removable surface contamination up to 30,000 dpm/100 sq cm on the transfer trailer. Gamma spectroscopy performed on smears identified the presence of Cs-137. No other radionuclides were identified on any of the analyzed smears. Cs-137, by itself, is not a nuclide characteristic to Susquehanna due to Susquehanna's high fuel integrity performance. In addition, no loose surface alpha contamination was identified. The area around the trailer, located in the 101 bay, has been posted and controlled as a contaminated area. Decontamination of the transfer trailer is in progress. Onsite surveys of areas that were occupied by the transfer trailer, indicate no removable surface contamination. In addition, no Susquehanna personnel contamination events have been attributed to the contamination found on the transfer trailer. Although the receipt of this transfer trailer was not identified as an incoming radioactive shipment to Susquehanna from its' supplier, this event is immediately reportable to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1906(d), since the Department of Transportation acceptance limits identified in 49 CFR 173.433 for this type of container are 22,000 DPM/100 sq. cm and PPL Health Physics personnel identified removable radioactive surface contamination in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 71.87(i) which refer to the DOT limits of 49 CFR 173.433. The final delivery carrier and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified." The licensee will be notifying the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
ENS 4809211 July 2012 12:26:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0928 EDT on May 14, 2012, the 'B' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel (RSP). The likely cause of the start was either human error in performing continuity checks or inadvertent contact with the manual start circuit in the RSP. Based on the likely cause, this was an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. This 60-day telephone notification is being made to meet the reporting requirements instead of submitting an LER since the actuation was invalid and was not an RPS actuation with the reactor critical. The following additional information is being provided as specified in NUREG-1022: The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' ESW pump inadvertently started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel. Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: This was a partial actuation (one of four ESW pumps). Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' ESW pump started successfully, operated properly, and continued running until manually secured via normal controls. At the time of the event, the licensee was performing a surveillance where control was shifted from the control room to the remote shutdown panel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4805528 June 2012 20:44:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1353 EDT on 06/28/2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station experienced a loss of power from one of two offsite power sources when transformer 20 shutdown automatically. All ESS (Engineered Safeguards System) electrical busses fed by this transformer automatically transferred to the other offsite power source (transformer 10). Additionally, startup bus 20, which is normally fed from transformer 20, automatically transferred to transformer 10. On each unit, multiple system containment isolation valves closed as a result of the electrical transient. Operators were able to reset and restore each system. On unit one, residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling ceased operation during the transient. Shutdown cooling was restored within one hour by control room operators in accordance with off-normal procedures. Unit two remained at 100% power throughout the event. This incident is being reported as an unplanned actuation of systems that mitigate the consequences of significant events per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee is in a 72 hour LCO on Unit 2 as a result of the loss of offsite power. All emergency diesels generators are available. The licensee is investigating the cause of the transformer 20 shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) have been notified.
ENS 4803619 June 2012 19:48:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On June 19, 2012, Unit 1 was shut down due to increasing drywell unidentified leakage. At 1720 EDT on June 19, 2012, the leakage location was discovered to be a welded joint on the 'A' reactor recirculation piping where a 4 inch blank-flanged pipe for chemical decontamination connects to the 28 inch pipe. This constitutes pressure boundary leakage. The location is within the recirculation loop isolation valves on the suction side of the recirculation pump, therefore isolable from the reactor vessel. The reactor was in mode 3 at the time of discovery and LCO 3.4.4 requires entry into mode 4 within 36 hours. As such, the change in modes is required by Technical Specifications, therefore reportable within 4 hours under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). In addition, the pressure boundary leakage at a welded joint is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)A) and is therefore 8 hour reportable as well. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. A press release is planned by the licensee.
ENS 4802013 June 2012 12:44:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1032 (EDT), on June 12, 2012, the Unit 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) system ceased valid data transmission to the control room computer terminals. Remote terminals were unaffected. The loss was discovered on the morning of 6/13/12 and the connection was restored at 0945 (EDT) on 6/13/12. This was a duration of greater than 8 hours which was not discovered until after the fact. This condition affected unit 2 only. ERDS was unaffected. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4797027 May 2012 15:45:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2130 EDT on 5/26/2012, a condition was reported identifying that the 10 CFR Part 26 requirement for performing waiver evaluations was not met for three security officers held over for compensatory measures after lightning strikes impacted security equipment at PPL Susquehanna, LLC. Granting a waiver under Subpart I, 'Managing Fatigue,' of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 26, 'Fitness for Duty Programs,' involves a process that, once completed, allows individuals who are subject to the Subpart I work hour controls to not meet one of the work hour requirements. Contrary to the above, waivers were not processed for three security officers as required by the regulation and the officers worked hours exceeding the 16 hour limit. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) requiring a 24-hour ENS notification. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4791911 May 2012 21:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 16:03 hours on 5/11/12, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3 due to two control room floor cooling systems being inoperable. A discharge damper for the 'A' train of control room floor cooling had failed earlier during the same day at 05:23 hours, rendering the associated 'A' fan inoperable. The redundant 'B' train fans and associated Control Structure Chiller automatically started as a result of a fan low flow interlock. The 'A' train logic was left in 'Start' and the 'B' train logic was left in 'Auto' as directed by an alarm response procedure. During application of a clearance order for repair of the failed 'A' fan damper, the 'A' control room cooling fan switch was placed in 'Stop' position. This resulted in an automatic start of the 'A' Control Structure Chiller and all the associated 'A' fans except for the control room cooling fan, and a trip of the 'B' train fans and chiller. This condition caused a loss of both control room cooling fans. The control room operators immediately recognized the loss of cooling and took manual action to restart the 'B' train. LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 16:18 hours without a reactor power reduction. This condition is reportable as loss of entire safety function under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) & (vi). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4784417 April 2012 21:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1540 (EDT) on 4/17/12, with Unit 1 in mode 5 and Unit 2 in mode 1, the Work Control Center was notified that the U1 #2 Main Stop Valve (MSV) was disassembled. The U1 #2 MSV was required to be intact to maintain Unit 1 Secondary Containment. Ongoing work on the D Main Steam Line Outboard Valve created a pathway that violated Unit 1 secondary containment integrity. Unit 1 Secondary Containment is required to be operable for Unit 2 while Unit 1 Zone 1 is aligned to the Recirculation Plenum. Unit 1 Zone 1 was isolated from the recirculation plenum and Unit 2 Secondary Containment was restored at 1643 (EDT) on 4/17/12. Unit 2 Secondary Containment differential pressures were maintained throughout the event. This is considered a loss of an entire safety function and requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee is still investigating the cause but it appears to be associated with recent administrative changes to the Reactor Vessel draining definition and work process procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

      • RETRACTION FROM RON FRY TO S. SANDIN ON 6/7/12 AT 0205 EDT ***

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On April 17, 2012, work on the Unit 1 'D' Main Steam Line Outboard Valve with the Unit 1 #2 Main Stop Valve disassembled created a pathway that violated Unit 1 secondary containment integrity. Since Unit 1 Secondary Containment is required to be operable for Unit 2 while Unit 1 Zone 1 would be aligned to the Recirculation Plenum in the event of a secondary containment isolation signal, the condition impacted Unit 2 Secondary Containment. Susquehanna considered the impact a loss of safety function and reported the impact in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Following the ENS report, Susquehanna analyzed the impact of the opening. Calculations were performed that show secondary containment would have maintained the dose consequences to the public and control room operators within regulatory limits (10 CFR 50.67) assuming a Unit 2 design basis accident (Unit 1 was in a refueling outage at the time of the condition). Based on the above information, Susquehanna has determined that there was no loss of safety function and this ENS report is retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Cahill).

ENS 4782011 April 2012 01:18:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 2148 EDT, on April 10, 2012 the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support a planned maintenance outage on the 1A Engineered Safeguards System (ESS) Bus as part of the U1 17th Refueling and Inspection outage. The Bus Outage is expected to have a duration greater than 8 hours, but less than 72 hours. During this time, required control room hardwire indications will be available from the unaffected ESS buses. An update will be provided when SPDS/ERDS becomes available. Since the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SPDS/ERDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RON FRY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2313 EDT ON 04/14/12 * * *

As of 1800 hours EDT on 04/13/12, Unit 1 and Unit 2 ERDS and SPDS were restored to normal operation. Operation of these systems has been monitored since that time and operation has been determined to be reliable. The licensee has not notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Blake Welling)

ENS 478169 April 2012 02:07:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On 4/9/2012, starting at 0102 EDT, the 'A' and 'C' Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were sequentially and briefly declared inoperable to switch their DC control power back to their normal supplies. Switching power to the normal supply is required by Unit 2 technical specification 3.8.4 following maintenance work on the U1 power supplies. Previously, at 18:35 EDT on 4/4/2012, the 'B' Control Structure Chiller was declared inoperable due to an unrelated problem. With the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable coincident with the 'A' EDG or 'C' EDG inoperable, neither Control Structure Chiller would be available to perform its design function on a loss of offsite power. This is a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 8 hour notification. Switching the power supplies was a planned evolution. The duration of the loss of safety function was a total of eight minutes. As a mitigating action, operators were continuously available with communication to the control room. The associated diesel generator could have been returned to an operable condition promptly if required. Note that Technical Specifications allows four hours to correct the condition before further actions are required, i.e. declare the features ('A' Control Structure Chiller) supported by the inoperable diesel inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

      • RETRACTION FROM RON FRY TO S. SANDIN ON 6/7/12 AT 0205 EDT***

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On April 9, 2012, Susquehanna reported that the 'A' and 'C' Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were sequentially and briefly declared inoperable to switch their DC control power back to their normal supplies while the 'B' Control Structure Chiller was inoperable. The basis for the 8 hour notification, which was reported under Reporting Requirement 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), was the conclusion that neither Control Structure Chiller would be available to perform its design function on a loss of offsite power. The reporting guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 2 identifies events or conditions that are generally not reportable in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v). One of the identified conditions is 'removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function).' After further review, Susquehanna has determined that an ENS report was not required for this event since the EDGs and the associated 'A' Chiller were removed from service as part of a planned evolution in accordance with approved procedures and the plant Technical Specifications and no condition was discovered that could have prevented the EDGs and associated 'A' chiller from performing their function. Based on the above information, this ENS report is retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Cahill).

ENS 478147 April 2012 15:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On 04/07/2012 at 1354 (EDT), Susquehanna Steam Electric Station requested an offsite ambulance via the 911 system for medical assistance. The individual was in the radiologically controlled area and was treated as contaminated. An offsite ambulance arrived on site at 1413 hrs. and the ambulance departed the site at 1424 hrs. enroute to the Berwick Hospital. This is considered a transport of a contaminated individual requiring an 8 hour ENS Notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii). Licensee health physic technicians accompanied the individual to the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DARVIN DUTTRY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/2012 AT 1522 EDT * * *

On 04/07/2012, PPL Susquehanna reported that a potentially contaminated individual was transported offsite via ambulance for medical assistance. The individual had been in the radiologically controlled area when the event occurred, and for medical reasons could not be completely surveyed for radioactive contamination prior to transport to the hospital. Therefore the event was considered transport of a contaminated individual. Health Physics personnel accompanied the individual to the hospital and conducted surveys of the individual, ambulance and hospital equipment and facilities. The results of these surveys indicated that no contamination was detected and the individual, ambulance and all hospital facilities and equipment were non-contaminated. Based on the above information, reporting pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) described in the referenced Event Notification is retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Joustra).

ENS 478126 April 2012 20:33:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Appendix J local leak rate testing has determined that secondary containment bypass leakage (SCBL) has been exceeded for Unit 1. During performance of leak rate test SE-159-026 for X-9A penetration it was determined the combined SCBL limit of 15 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour) for as-found minimum pathway was exceeded as specified in Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.3.11. Acceptance criteria test results were within acceptance criteria for the 10CFR50 Appendix J limits of 0.6 La. This event is being reported as a degraded or unanalyzed condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). Licensee corrective actions are to repair the identified valve seats. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 478074 April 2012 22:59:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 4/4/2012 at 1517 EDT, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was declared inoperable for performance of a maintenance surveillance. At 1835 EDT on 4/4/2012 the 'B' Control Structure Chiller was declared inoperable due to an unrelated problem. (With) the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable coincident with the 'A' EDG inoperable, the 'A' Control Structure Chiller would not be available to perform its design function on a loss of offsite power. This is a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function and is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(v) as an 8 hour notification. Note that Technical Specifications allows four hours to correct the condition before further actions are required, i.e. declare the features ('A' Control Structure Chiller) supported by the inoperable diesel inoperable. The 'A' EDG was restored to operable at 2200 which restored safety function capability for the 'A' Control Structure Chiller. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4737224 October 2011 20:14:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1715 hours on 10/24/2011, replacement of a router and circuit at the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) commenced. This action will cause a temporary outage of network devices such as personal computers, telephones, printers, routers, switches, alarm panels, and wireless communications. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 8 hours. If use of the EOF is subsequently required, this condition may delay activation of the EOF until equipment is restored. Restoration of the equipment will take less than one hour. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the State of Pennsylvania, Luzerne and Columbia Counties and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBINSON TO KLCO ON 10/24/2011 AT 2252 * * *

Systems have been restored and the EOF is operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 4736722 October 2011 01:56:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0857 on 10/21/2011 a condition was reported identifying that 10CFR Part 26 requirement for the FFD Lab Director to be subject to the FFD Rule was not met for the period of 12/12/2010 to 4/28/2011. 10CFR 26.4(g), 'FFD program applicability to categories of individuals,' provides specific requirements for FFD program personnel. Contrary to the above, the FFD Lab Director was not included in the (licensee's) random drug testing program as required by the regulation. This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4 requiring a 24 hour ENS notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 473286 October 2011 16:47:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 10/06/2011 the control room was notified of an oscillation occurring on the output of Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump electronic governor. These oscillations are occurring while the system is in standby and is an early indication of potential governor failure. The governor oscillations were discovered on 10/06/2011 at 1140 EDT by the system engineer while performing system trending analysis via plant computer points. HPCI was declared inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 was entered at 1140 EDT on 10/06/2011. An investigation is in progress. Unit 1 HPCI and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) systems are unaffected as the electronic governor outputs for this equipment is stable and trending as expected. This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(V)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 472341 September 2011 17:37:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1600 on 9/1/11 the control room was notified that the 10CFR Part 26 requirement for the Medical Review Officer (MRO) and Substance Abuse Expert (SAE) to be subject to the FFD Rule has not been met. 10CFR 26.4 (g), 'FFD program applicability to categories of individuals', states that 'All FFD program personnel who are involved in the day-to-day operations of the program, as defined by the procedures of the licensees and other entities in 26.3(a) through (c), and, as applicable, (d), and whose duties require them to have the following types of access or perform the following activities shall be subject to an FFD program that meets all of the requirements of this part, except subparts I and K of this part, and, at the licensee's or other entity's discretion, subpart C of this part: (1) All persons who can link test results with the individual who was tested before an FFD policy violation determination is made, including, but not limited to the MRO; (2) All persons who make determinations of fitness;' Contrary to the above, the SSES MRO (who is also an SSES SAE) is not included in the SSES random drug testing program as required by the regulation. This individual is also not included in the documented Behavior Observation Program. This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4 requiring a 24 hour ENS notification. This deficiency has existed since December of last year and was identified during a routine on-going QA Audit. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4722130 August 2011 12:34:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1319 (hrs. EDT on) 8/29/2011, a programmatic deficiency was reported involving the SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) Fitness For Duty (FFD) program and compliance with 10CFR26. Current contractual agreement with PPL vendor to perform Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counseling and treatment for self referrals does not require appropriate reporting to the utility as mandated by 10CFR26. This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4, 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The licensee has obtained an informal agreement by the vendor to report appropriate information until the contract can be amended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4718623 August 2011 14:58:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1355 hrs. EDT, an event was recorded by the seismic monitoring system. The seismic monitoring system classified the event as less than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and less than Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). The seismic monitoring system additionally classified the event as Seismic: NO At 1405 hrs., SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) declared an Unusual Event (under EAL OU5) after confirmation by outside agencies that an actual seismic event had occurred and reports from numerous personnel that they had detected ground motion. At time of transmittal there is no indication of equipment damage, personnel injuries and no automatic initiations of any ECCS or ESF systems or RPS actuations occurred. Assessment of any equipment damage is ongoing. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM FRITZ OHLSEN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2110 EDT ON 8/23/11 * * *

The licensee has terminated the Notification of Unusual Event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Krohn), IRD (Morris), DHS (Bean) and FEMA (Via).

ENS 4717219 August 2011 14:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1046 hours on August 19, 2011, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor scrammed while (operators were) performing a quarterly functional test of reactor water high level trip channels for feedwater / main turbine. The main turbine tripped when a single channel high reactor water level signal was inserted, which was unexpected. Actual water level was within the normal band when the main turbine tripped. The main turbine trip resulted in a reactor scram. Reactor recirculation pump trips as designed and all control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to +2 inches causing Level 3 (+ 13 inches) isolations. Reactor water level was restored to the normal operating band using the feedwater system. Six main steam relief valves opened for a short duration, as expected, due to the turbine trip transient. Subsequently, reactor pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. No ECCS or RCIC initiations occurred or were required. The reactor recirculation pumps were subsequently restarted to re-establish forced core circulation. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the scram is underway. Unit 1 was unaffected and continued power operation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A press release will occur.
ENS 469254 June 2011 23:05:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On 06/04/2011, personnel observed the temperature control valve for the 'B' control structure chiller not operating properly. To investigate control valve operation, the controller was taken to the manual mode (from automatic) at 1614 (EDT). The control valve stem was lubricated, and the valve was operated with the controller in the manual mode. The 'B' control structure chiller was inoperable in this condition until control valve responsiveness was validated (total of 35 minutes, until 1649 (EDT)). The 'B' chiller continued to operate during this period. The 'A' control structure chiller was out of service during this timeframe to perform maintenance activities. Hence, neither chiller was operable. The control structure chillers provide control building habitability during unit operation. The control structure chillers also provide cooling water for emergency switchgear room cooling on unit one only. This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 7/22/2011 AT 1519 FROM LONNIE CRAWFORD TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On June 4, 2011, Susquehanna reported the simultaneous inoperability of both control structure (CS) chillers as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). After further investigation, Susquehanna has concluded that the 'A' and 'B' CS chillers were not inoperable at the same time. On June 3, 2011 at 1608, fluctuating amperage was observed on the 'A' CS chiller and the chiller was declared inoperable. As a result, the 'B' CS chiller was placed in service with the 'A' CS chiller placed in standby. Subsequent troubleshooting of the 'A' CS chiller included replacing the chiller temperature controller with a spare while the original controller was evaluated in the shop. The original controller was re-installed on June 4, 2011 at approximately 1030 but did not resolve the issue. The 'A' CS chiller was later shutdown and removed from standby on June 4, 2011 at 1727. Originally, Susquehanna believed that the fluctuating amperage on the 'A' chiller was an operability issue. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the observed oscillations were not rapid enough and did not have sufficient amplitude to cause damage to the chiller motor and were within design limits. The conclusion is that the 'A' control structure chiller was operable and would continue to operate for its 30 day mission time with the observed current oscillations. Although the 'A' chiller was inoperable as a result of troubleshooting at various times on June 3 and 4, the 'A' chiller was available and operable during the short period of time on June 4 when the 'B' chiller was inoperable. . Based on the above information, this ENS report is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Dentel).

ENS 466543 March 2011 23:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2259 EST, Susquehanna Unit 1 commenced a TS Required shutdown for High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) T.S. 3.5.1. Due to a suspected steam leak, the HPCI Inboard Steam Supply Valve HV155F002 was closed to attempt to identify and isolate an unknown drywell leakage condition. After closing the HV155F002, a detectable change in drywell leak rate occurred, therefore, HV155F002 was left closed. Closing HV155F002 makes HPCI INOP and UNAVAILABLE. TS 3.5.1 was entered for this condition on 2/25/2011 at 2136 EST. LCO completion time for T.S. 3.5.1 entry is 3/11/2011 at 2136 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. The licensee also anticipates issuing a press release.
ENS 4664425 February 2011 23:12:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2027 EST, Unit 1 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to a steam leak on HV155F002, HPCI Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve. Engineering evaluation determined that the valve actuator will not close the valve fully under design basis conditions, due to the impingement of steam from the valve packing region on the valve stem. The penetration flow path has been isolated and the outboard isolation valve has been deactivated. HPCI is a single train ECCS safety system, This event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2. There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service. Unit 1 is in a 14 day LCO 3.5.1. EDG's are operable, and offsite power is normal. There is no increase in plant risk, and the licensee will notify the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4656925 January 2011 08:12:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0610 EST hours on January 25, 2011, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor was manually scrammed due to an unisolable extraction steam system leak in the 1C Feed Water Heater Bay area. At 0517 EST reactor operators commenced lowering reactor power from 98.4% to 65%. Attempts to isolate the source of the leakage were unsuccessful. Based on continued indications of unisolated steam leakage, operations decided to shut down the plant. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown. All control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to -31 inches causing Level 3 (+ 13 inches) isolation and RCIC initiation. The operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using FW (feedwater). No steam relief valves opened. All safety systems operated as expected. RCIC automatically initiated on a -30 inch level signal and was manually secured. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the cause of the extraction steam system leakage is underway. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA and press release will occur. The steam leak was isolated after the turbine was tripped. The plant is stable at normal temperature and pressure. Decay heat is being removed via the condenser steam dumps to the main condenser. The electrical lineup is in a normal configuration. Estimated time to restart is not known.
ENS 465193 January 2011 21:09:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On Monday, January 3, 2011, at 1344 EST, it was discovered by engineering that a single point of vulnerability exists at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station affecting both Unit 1 and Unit 2. A potential single HVAC control component has been discovered whose failure could result in a spurious Steam Leak Detection (SLD) isolation causing a loss of generation, loss of the normal heat sink (main condenser) and a loss of HPCI and RCIC. The SLD delta temperature (delta T) instrumentation is dependent on proper operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB (Reactor Building) HVAC heater temperature controller during cold weather operation. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 RB HVAC heaters are controlled by a single temperature controller which sends a signal to multiple step controllers. Failure of the temperature controller could cause the heaters to turn off. This would cause a significant decrease in RB HVAC supply temperature which results in a significant increase in measured SLD delta T during cold winter months. This could cause an isolation of the MSIVs, HPCI, RCIC and RWCU within a short period of time. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for and event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TODD CREASY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1310 ON 2/28/11 * * *

On January 3, 2011, SSES reported the discovery of a single point vulnerability that affected both Unit 1 and Unit 2 (EN # 46519). The vulnerability involved failure of a temperature controller that had the potential to result in a Steam Leak Detection (SLD) isolation causing a loss of generation, loss of the normal heat sink (main condenser), and a loss of HPCI and RCIC. The condition was reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition. SSES has further evaluated the condition and determined that the condition did not meet reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The level of judgment in reporting under this criterion Is a reasonable expectation of preventing fulfillment of a safety function. Alternately stated, the condition is reportable if there was reasonable doubt that the safety function would have been fulfilled if the system had been called upon to perform it. Technical evaluation of the condition concluded the following: there is reasonable assurance (high degree of confidence) that the HPCI, RCIC, Main Steam Isolation and RWCU systems will remain operable. The identified condition does not adversely affect the operability of the affected systems. The identified condition increases the probability that a failure of the Reactor Building HVAC temperature controller TC-17589 or TC-27589 could cause the MSIV's, HPCI and RCIC to isolate during cold weather operation. However, this increase in probability is very small and is not sufficient to erode the confidence in the reasonable expectation of operability. For a system isolation to occur, the heater controller had to fail and concurrently the outside air temperature had to be below approximately 10?F. The Reactor Building HVAC temperature controllers are highly reliable and the outside air temperatures required for this event occur infrequently (there have only been 11 instances of temperatures at Susquehanna dropping below 10 deg F in the past two years). Since both infrequent conditions have to occur concurrently, it is unlikely that this postulated failure would occur. As a result, reporting pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) is retracted; however, the condition remains reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)b)(3)(ii) as an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (T.Dimitriadis)

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVE BORGER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1220 EDT ON 6/7/2011 * * *

On January 3, 2011, SSES reported the discovery of a single point vulnerability that affected both Unit 1 and Unit 2 (EN #46519). The vulnerability involved failure of a temperature controller that had the potential to result in a Steam Leak Detection (SLD) isolation causing a loss of generation, loss of the normal heat sink (main condenser), and a loss of HPCI and RCIC. The condition was reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that at discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an event that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition. On February 28, 2011, SSES retracted the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) portion of the report on the basis that there was reasonable assurance that the HPCI, RCIC, Main Steam Isolation and RWCU systems would remain operable. The reasonable assurance was based on the very small probability of system isolation that required failure of the highly reliable heater controller had to fail concurrent with outside air temperature below approximately 10?F. This notification is intended to revise the basis for retraction of the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) portion of the report. The revised basis is that the conditions required to prevent fulfillment of a safety function did not exist at the time of discovery. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Rogge).

ENS 4626822 September 2010 15:09:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0830 (EDT) on 09/22/2010, the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was determined to be inoperable due to a minor lube oil leak on the 'A' supply filter. LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system was entered at 0830 (EDT) on 09/22/2010. The leak on the 'A' filter could not be immediately corrected. The 'B' filter was placed in service and leak checked satisfactorily. The LCO 3.5.1 action statements were closed at 1454 (EDT) on 09/22/2010. This incident is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD FRY TO DONG PARK AT 1609 EST ON 11/18/10 * * *

At 1501 on September 22, 2010, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported that the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was inoperable due to a minor lube oil leak on the 'A' supply filter. Subsequent investigation and evaluation determined that HPCI was capable of performing all of its safety functions with the identified oil leak. The operability determination was based on the following: Investigation of the leak identified that the installed filter housing cover o-ring was undersized and had to be inappropriately stretched to fit in the o-ring groove in the housing cover. The cover is torqued to 75 ft-lbs by four bolts on the outer diameter of the cover, enclosing the o-ring in a metal to metal connection. There is no concern for the o-ring to extrude from the cover under this configuration. The worst case that can be postulated as a result of the undersized o-ring is a leak in which the drops break into a small stream. This type of leak is expected to result in less than 10 gallons of oil loss during the system's 6 hour mission time. The vendor recommended oil reserve level is approximately 124 gallons. The lube oil sump has a 155 gallon capacity and the remaining oil (approximately 145 gallons) is sufficient to support operability. As a result, the worst case leakage is not expected to affect operability of HPCI or result in system failure during the HPCI mission time. Operations verifies oil level weekly and prior to any planned run. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).

ENS 4616410 August 2010 10:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0911 EDT, the Susquehanna LLC Shift Manager was notified that a member of the SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) work force was feeling ill effects from a Freon-12 leak located in a plant vital area. This met the declaration criteria for an Alert under (EAL) OA-7 of the emergency plan which was declared at 0922 EDT. The affected area has been evacuated and recovery actions are in progress to isolate the leak. No personnel were injured or medical attention was required. The leak is in the 1A Reactor Building chiller unit. At the time of notification, the leak was still active. The licensee is preparing a team to enter the area to investigate. No outside assistance is required. Notified DHS (Hill), FEMA (Heyman), DOE (Smith), USDA (Mitchell) and HHS (Rolle).

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARVIN DUTTRY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0044 EDT ON 8/11/2010 * * *

At 2335 EDT on 8/10/10, the Alert was terminated. The Chiller has been evacuated of Freon-12. Freon detectors show no presence of Freon-12 on U1 Reactor Building Elevation 749 (feet), except in the immediate vicinity from the leak site with temporary ventilation in service. All state and local agencies have been advised, the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and a press release will be made. Agencies that the licensee notified included the Columbia County Emergency Management Agency, the Luzerne County Emergency Management Agency, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Notified R1DO (Ferdas), NRR EO (Nelson), IRD Manager (Gott), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (O'Connell), DOE (Morrone), HHS (White), and USDA (Timmons).

ENS 4613528 July 2010 17:45:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A licensed operator was determined to have violated the licensee's Fitness for Duty Policy related to self-reporting a legal action. The employee's access to the Protected Area has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 4610719 July 2010 15:16:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4PPL Susquehanna LLC personnel notified the PA DEP Bureau of Water Quality Management that Susquehanna Unit 1 experienced a large leak of river water in the turbine building on 7/16/2010 (reported under EN#46103). Efforts are currently underway to process that water prior to its return to the river. The NRC Resident Inspectors have also been notified. This notification is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), in that an offsite notification has been completed regarding an event related to the protection of the environment. The licensee reported to the PA DEP since the water that is being processed for return to the river contains less than EPA reportable quantities of tritium.
ENS 4610316 July 2010 20:03:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 1641 EDT on July 16, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor was manually scrammed due to a large unisolable circulating water system leak in the main condenser area. Attempts to isolate the source of the leakage were unsuccessful. During these attempts, reactor operators lowered reactor power from approximately 90% to about 39%. Based on rising water level in the condenser area and unsuccessful isolation of the source of the leakage, Operations decided to shut down the plant. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown. All control rods (fully) inserted. Reactor water level lowered to -28 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC. No steam relief valves opened. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed and the circulating water system was shut down. Pressure control was initiated using HPCI in the pressure control mode. All safety systems operated as expected. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Actions to isolate and investigate the cause of the circulating water system leakage are underway. Unit 2 continued power operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be issuing a press release.
ENS 4605730 June 2010 16:03:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0955 on June 30, 2010, the Control Room was notified that sulfuric acid was leaking from a temporary acid containment berm onto a gravel surface area adjacent to the containment berm. The quantity of this leak was <5 gallons of approximately 93% concentrated sulfuric acid. The leak was in the non-radiologically controlled area of the plant, associated with a temporary acid injection system for cooling tower water treatment. Spill response personnel responded to contain and neutralize the leakage. No material was directly released to any waterway or offsite area. The quantity of material released is below any environmental regulatory limits. Actions are ongoing in removal of the acid from the leaking tank inside the containment berm area. An offsite company with expertise in the handling of this material has been contacted and will be providing assistance with the response efforts. A courtesy call was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency for an event of potential public interest at 1530 on June 30, 2010. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4593015 May 2010 01:17:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 2301 hours EDT on May 14, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One reactor scrammed while performing a condensate pump trip test. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown when reactor water level reached +51 inches and rising. The main turbine tripped due to high reactor water level. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -30 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew restored reactor water level to the normal operating band using RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) and subsequently the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit Two continued power operation. The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. A press release will occur. The licensee was performing testing on the digital feedwater control system which was installed during their recent refueling outage when the loss of level control occurred. It appears that the control system did not respond fast enough to control water level. This resulted in the reactor operator inserting a manual scram at +51 inches prior to reaching the reactor automatic scram setpoint of +54 inches for water level. Currently, the plant is removing decay heat via main steam line drains to the condenser. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safety equipment available. The licensee has notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 4586622 April 2010 13:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 10:51 on 4/22/10, Susquehanna Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor SCRAM on reactor low level, +13", during the initial testing of the Feedwater Integrated Control System. Following the SCRAM, reactor water level dropped to approx. -30", and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system initiated and injected into the vessel. Level was recovered by the Feedwater System and the RCIC system. Division 2 Alternate Rod Insertion unexpectedly initiated during the level transient. Due to scheduled maintenance activities, the 11B Aux Bus did not transfer to the off site power supply post SCRAM. The 11B Aux bus was restored at 12:17. There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to containment. This event is a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation when the reactor is critical, and is reportable as a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also an unplanned actuation of a system used to mitigate the consequences of a significant event and is reportable as an eight hour ENS notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The scram was described as uncomplicated. All rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as required. The initiation of the alternative rod insertion should not occur unless level drops below -38" but the initiation did not result in any complications. The offsite supply breaker to Aux bus 11B was under maintenance when the scram occurred and so the loss of power was expected. This bus supplies some balance of plant loads which were lost (recirculation pump, condensate pump, and circulating water pump) but the loss of these components had no impact on the transient. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify State authorities and also plans a press release.
ENS 4576715 March 2010 12:51:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing has determined that Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) has been exceeded for Unit 1. During performance of leak rate test SE-159-045, the combined SCBL limit of 15 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour) for as-found minimum pathway was exceeded as specified in Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.3.11. Acceptance Criteria Test results were within Acceptance Criteria for the 10CFR50 Appendix J limits of 0.6 La (maximum allowed leakage rate). This event is being reported as a degraded or unanalyzed condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The RHR system containment spray penetration isolation valve was being tested when the failure occurred. The valve will be repaired and re-tested. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4572625 February 2010 16:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This 60-day notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states that in case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than the actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. Because plant conditions necessary to prompt a containment isolation were not present, this event constitutes an invalid system actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The condition meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) because the loss of the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. On 1/4/2010 at 1418 hours, the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus was lost. This event resulted in a half scram and primary containment isolations. By design, when the RPS MG set output breaker trips, all EPA breakers downstream of the MG set also trip resulting in a half scram and primary containment isolation signals. An event investigation found the Unit 1 'B' RPS MG set running with its output breaker tripped. The output voltage was indicating 120VAC, which indicates that the voltage regulator was operating properly. Upon removal of the MG set cover, the underfrequency relay (UFR) contacts were found to be chattering, with frequency steady at approximately 60 Hz. A review of plant drawings indicated that a chattering UFR could cause the MG set output breaker to trip. Voltage readings were taken and no additional electrical problems (other than the UFR) were identified. The affected RPS loads were subsequently powered from their alternate source and all actuations and isolations were reset. Inspection and test of the failed UFR found that one leg of a capacitor on the UFR electronic board had broken adjacent to its solder joint connection on the board. It is suspected that the capacitor lead may have been flawed during manufacture of the board. The failure was accelerated by the constant vibration that the connection is subjected to, as the UFR is mounted on the MG set. The failed UFR electronic board was subsequently replaced and successfully passed all functional tests. There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. Valves affected by the invalid signal fulfilled their isolation function by successfully closing. The RPS loads were transferred to their alternate power supply and the trips and isolations were reset. In addition, the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus did not experience an underfrequency condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4570617 February 2010 16:24:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following is a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification. At 1420, February 17, 2010, Susquehanna LLC notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) of an issue with the domestic water supply system at the Susquehanna facility. This notification was made via telephone. The notification to Pennsylvania DEP was in accordance with 25 PA Code 109.1307 due to circumstances that exist that adversely affect the quality of drinking water. Specifically, no residual chlorine was detectable in the domestic water system. The Pennsylvania DEP contact was the Pennsylvania DEP Sanitarian. Required compensatory actions have been initiated, including planned repairs of the domestic water chlorination system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 4563820 January 2010 12:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 0900 on December 16, 2009, a PPL employee, located within the Susquehanna protected area, received a gift package from a vendor that contained a bottle of an alcoholic beverage. The individual immediately notified his supervision and Susquehanna Security personnel who took possession of the bottle. The bottle was still sealed with the original seal. The NRC (Resident Inspector) and Regional Security Inspectors were informed on the day of the event. The individual who received the package was a non-licensed employee. This event was originally not recognized as being reportable as a 24 hour call.
ENS 455341 December 2009 21:53:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following transmission was made as a voluntary notification at 1800 EST: On 12/01/09 at 1410 (EST), due to a Unit 2 cooling tower make-up supply line failure, a valve vault was flooded and overflowed at several thousands of gallons per minute flow. The local fire company was contacted to provide equipment assistance in pumping out the vault. The river water overflowing the vault entered nearby storm drains and a nearby building housing non-safety related equipment. There are no injuries or an emergency of any kind. The water entering the storm sewer does not constitute a reportable spill. Unit 2 reactor power was reduced to 80% to minimize cooling tower impact. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was notified at 1800 EST. Various other local and state agencies have been advised of the event. Subsequently, notifications were made to the following agencies: Salem Township Supervisor Chairman State Senator Baker State Rep. Boback Columbia County Commissioner Soberick Federal Affairs to notify US Rep. Kanjorski's staff. Although the impact of this make-up supply line failure to the environment is insignificant (Radiological levels are less than lower limit of detection), its occurrence coupled with subsequent notifications to aforementioned agencies is likely to cause heightened public or government concern. Thus, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station is making a four hour ENS notification pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). A press release is not planned at this time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 453369 September 2009 16:40:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On Wednesday, Sept. 9 at 9:30 am EDT, all 76 emergency sirens that serve the communities within a 10-mile radius of the PPL Susquehanna nuclear power plant failed during their bi-weekly silent test. The failed siren test was initiated by Columbia County at 9:30 am; Luzerne County was then asked to complete the test from its controller, but it experienced a similar failure. The vendor that services the system was called in and is working to fix the problem, which is believed to be a fault in the system radio repeaters. A backup emergency notification plan is in place with local emergency agencies. A voluntary notification will be made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO VINCE KLCO AT 1847 ON 09/09/2009 * * *

All emergency sirens were restored to service and tested successfully as of 1742 on 09/09/2009. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Powell).

ENS 4528020 August 2009 20:14:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0950 the Plant Integrated Computer System started to fail as indicated by a loss of computer link to Generation. Investigation by computer maintenance personnel was initiated. The failure mode of the computer precluded accessing screens to allow use of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Computer core thermal power indication remained available to the control room operators. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators. At 1217 hours on 08/20/09, a planned loss of computer core thermal power indication occurred due to ongoing computer maintenance activities. At 1458 hours on 08/20/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System was fully restored to service, including the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions. At 1643 hours on 08/20/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System started to fail again as indicated by loss of computer link to Generation. This problem with the computer again precluded accessing Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Core thermal power indication remained available via the plant computer system. However, anticipated troubleshooting actions will require a reduction in power by approximately 0.25-0.33% by reducing core flow. Due to the cumulative impacts of the loss of the plant computer system, this notification is being communicated ahead of the 8 hour unavailability of the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS computer system. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD KLINEFELTER TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1222 EDT ON 8/25/2009 * * *

As of 1200 hours, Unit 2 ERDS and SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) were restored to normal operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (White).

ENS 4527318 August 2009 15:08:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0920 on 08/18/2009, the Unit 1 HPCI turbine stop valve (FV15612) showed dual indication following performance of the weekly functional test of the HPCI lube oil system. Subsequent investigation revealed that the valve stem was not in the full closed position. LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system was entered at 0920 on 08/18/2009. An investigation is in progress to determine the nature of the problem. This incident is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI pump was declared inoperable. This is a 14 day LCO. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4527018 August 2009 02:00:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1210 hours on 08/17/09, reactor operators noticed (the) Plant Integrated Computer System was beginning to fail. This computer system also performs the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions. Investigation by computer maintenance personnel was initiated. It was determined that (the) Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were not reliable. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators. At 1955 hours on 08/17/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System was restored to service, including the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions. A few hours later at 0004 hours on 08/18/09, the Plant Integrated Computer System failed, including loss of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Reactor power was lowered by 0.3% from the initial authorized limit of 94.4% to 94.1% due to the loss of the core thermal power heat balance provided by the computer system. Since the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS computer systems were not available for greater than an 8 hour time period, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1321 ON 8/17/2009 FROM JIM HUFFORD TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *

As of 1336 hours on 08/18/09, Unit 2 ERDS and SPDS were restored to normal operation. Unit 2 reactor power was returned to full power of 94.4% shortly thereafter." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Conte).

ENS 451156 June 2009 08:16:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The NRC Operations Center was pre-notified of the following activity: The following was determined to be an Event of Potential Public Interest (EPPI) and required reporting to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). On Saturday, 06/06/09 and Sunday, 06/07/09, Susquehanna will be moving an irradiated steam dryer from the reactor building to an onsite storage area. The dryer will be in a shielded container to minimize personnel dose during the move. In addition, access to the owner controlled areas near the site will be restricted. The presence of these controls may result in public inquiries about this planned activity. If onsite emergency response is required during the move, offsite agencies that support Susquehanna will not be impacted. Susquehanna will maintain the ability of Fire and Emergency Medical personnel to access the site. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4507316 May 2009 20:04:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1801 on 5/16/2009, the HPCI turbine steam supply valve (HV255F001) failed to close during shutdown of the system following performance of its quarterly flow surveillance. The auxiliary oil pump was de-energized to prevent an inadvertent start of HPCI and the HPCI system was declared inoperable. LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system being inoperable was entered at 1720 on 5/16/2009 at the start of the HPCI surveillance. An investigation is in progress to determine the nature of the problem. This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 7/16/09 AT 1543 FROM TODD CREASEY TO CHARLES TEAL * * *

On May 16, 2009, the HPCI system was declared inoperable at 1720 hours and LCO 3.5.1 was entered to support the planned quarterly HPCI flow surveillance test. During the surveillance test, at 1801 hours, the HPCI turbine steam supply valve (HV255F001) failed to close during shutdown of the system. It was also identified that neither the open nor closed indication lamp in the control room were lit. Troubleshooting was performed by cycling the valve's breaker in an attempt to restore power to the HPCI steam supply valve. No movement of the valve was observed. Because the position of the HPCI steam supply valve was unknown, Operations secured HPCI by opening the auxiliary oil pump breaker for the purpose of conducting additional troubleshooting (maintenance) of the failure of the HV255F001 valve to close. On 5/16/09 at 2004 hours EDT, Susquehanna made an 8-hour ENS notification (45703) to the NRC, due to HPCI being declared inoperable when HV255F001 failed to close during performance of the quarterly surveillance. Subsequent investigation concluded that the HPCI turbine steam supply valve (HV255F001) did close as expected, but did not indicate closed due to a loss of position indication. It was determined that the closed indicating lamp had burned out. Upon replacement of the lamp, the valve was successfully stroked open and closed and HPCI was declared operable at 0800 EDT 5/17/2009. Because a condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), EN #45073 is hereby being retracted. It should be noted that the subsequent action to disable HPCI by opening the auxiliary oil pump break does not preclude retraction of the ENS notification. This action did not create a new reportable condition since HPCI was already inoperable for planned surveillance testing. This action was taken as part of troubleshooting activities (maintenance) on the HV255F001 valve and to prevent an inadvertent start of HPCI. The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R1DO (Gray)

ENS 4460327 October 2008 12:53:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1206 on 27 October 2008 PPL Susquehanna, LLC, declared an Alert (classification OA7) for an oxygen deficient atmosphere for a room in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The oxygen deficient atmosphere occurred in the Unit 2 RHR Division 2 Pump Room during maintenance activities. Personnel evacuated this room. Activation of the Emergency plan is reportable under 10CFR50.72(a)(3). The licensee made all notifications as required to state and local responders. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHARLIE RIGSBY TO JOE O'HARA AT 1741 ON 10/27/08 * * *

The ALERT was terminated at 1726 EDT based upon re-establishment of a suitable atmosphere. The licensee notified the State, local agencies, and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO(Cobey), NRR EO(Giitter), and IRD(McDermott) notified. Notifications to DHS, FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS were also made by the NRC Operations Center.

ENS 4451323 September 2008 07:34:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

PPL Susquehanna is installing a backup diesel to supply power to the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) during loss of power conditions. A power outage is required to tie-in the transfer switch for the new power supply. The scope of work includes connection of offsite power to a new transformer, connection from the transformer to the transfer switch and connection of power from the transfer switch to the building's distribution panel. This power outage, which is expected to be approximately 3 hours, is required to make final connections and to test the new service. During the outage, temporary power will be supplied to the phone lines only. HVAC, lighting and computer terminals will be without power. This condition is a loss of emergency response capability and is reportable to the NRC as an 8 hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee contacted the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM R. KLINEFELTER TO J. KNOKE AT 1303 EDT ON 09/23/08 * * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44513. As of 12:20, on 09/23/08, power has been restored to the Susquehanna Emergency Operating Facility (EOF). Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state. Notified R1DO (Conte)

ENS 4450318 September 2008 21:11:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1848 on 09/18/2008, the control room was notified by system engineering that insulation was missing from the bottom of the HPCI turbine that could result in nearby electronic components being subjected to higher than design temperatures. This could challenge the ability of the HPCI system to perform its design function for the prescribed mission times. The condition does not prevent the high pressure coolant injection system from automatically starting and injecting during an accident. The longer term ability of the system to continue to inject is challenged by the existing condition. The HPCI system was immediately declared inoperable while engineering continues to evaluate the condition to determine if an actual loss of design function has occurred. This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/12/2008 AT 1616 FROM MARTIN LICHTNER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On September 18, 2008, PPL Susquehanna LLC reported a potential loss of the HPCI safety function under the provisions of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The report was made when it was discovered that insulation was missing from the bottom of the Unit 2 HPCI turbine. This situation raised concerns that increased area temperatures could adversely affect nearby electronic equipment needed to support long-term HPCI operation. A subsequent investigation has determined that all potentially affected components were rated for operation at temperatures greater than those anticipated during HPCI operation with the missing insulation. An additional physical inspection confirmed that there was no abnormal discoloration or visible signs of accelerated thermal aging on the components and wires in question. It has therefore been concluded that HPCI operability had not been impacted by the missing insulation. Accordingly, the loss of safety function reported on September 18th under ENS # 44503 is being retracted. The insulation has since been restored to the HPCI turbine. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Trapp).

ENS 4434210 July 2008 16:18:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0738 hours on 07/10/08, reactor operators noticed that information on displays of the Plant Integrated Computer System were not periodically updating. Investigation by computer maintenance personnel was initiated. Reactor power was reduced 1 % to ensure compliance with license limits. As of 1538 hours, reliable operation of the computer was not restored. This computer system also performs the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators. Since the Unit 1 SPDS and ERDS computer system were not reliable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Prior to this event, plant personnel were performing plant computer modifications. Compensatory measures are in place to provide emergency assessment data should an event occurs that requires it. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JIM HUFFORD TO JOHN KNOKE AT2052 EDT ON 07/10/08 * * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44342. As of 2017 on 07/10/08, Unit 1 ERDS and PICSY were fully restored to normal operation. Unit 1 reactor power was returned to full power of 94.4% as of 2042 on 7/10/08. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Art Burritt)

ENS 442572 June 2008 17:17:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following is a 4 Hr Non-Emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification. At 1440, June 2, 2008, Susquehanna LLC was notified by the Barnwell South Carolina waste disposal facility, of an issue with a shipping cask containing irradiated hardware shipped from Susquehanna LLC. The cask was received at the facility on 5/31/08 and the incoming radiological survey was completed with no out of specification values. On June 2, 2008, the cask had the impact limiter removed and was in the process of being offloaded when it was discovered that one of the twelve bolts that secure the cask base plate to the cask body was found hand tight. The remaining eleven bolts were not loose, There was no radiological safety concern associated with the bolting condition as survey results confirmed that no radioactivity leaked from the cask. The waste facility will issue a condition report for Susquehanna's response. The site South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Controls (SC DHEC) Inspector was notified by Barnwell facility personnel of the issue. The licensee's QC inspector is required to verify bolt torque before the cask leaves the site. This will be confirmed by the licensee. The licensee will be notifying PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4408722 March 2008 11:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1035 hours, on 03/22/2008, the Unit 1 SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to disconnect and remove a temporary power supply to support a planned maintenance outage on the PICSY computer normal power supply. The disconnection and removal of temporary power is expected to have a duration greater than 8 hours, but less than 24. During this time, control room hardwire indications will be available. An update will be provided when SPDS/ERDS becomes available. Since the Unit 1 SPDS/ERDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * UPDATE FROM JIM HUFFORD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0423 EDT ON 3/23/08 * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44087. As of 0213 EDT, on 03/23/08, Unit 1 ERDS and PICSY are now fully restored. The planned outage activities are now complete. No further maintenance scheduled. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4407017 March 2008 11:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At approximately 1200 hours, on 03/17/2008, the Unit 1 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service to connect a temporary power supply to support a planned maintenance outage on the PICSY (Plant Indication Computer System) computer normal power supply. The installation of temporary power is expected to have a duration greater than 8 hours, but less than 24. During this time, control room hardwire indications will be available. An update will be provided when SPDS/ERDS becomes available. Since the Unit 1 SPDS/ERDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1222 HRS. EDT ON 03/18/08 * * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44070. Unit 1 ERDS has been restored as PICSY is now on temporary power. Restoration to normal power is expected to occur on 3/21/08. SPDS remains out of service due to other planned outage activities. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Perry).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JIM HUFFORD TO JOHN KNOKE @ 0530 HRS. EDT ON 03/21/08 * * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44070. As at 0513, on 03/21/08, Unit I ERDS and PICSY are now fully restored. The planned outage activities are now complete. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Neil Perry)

ENS 439635 February 2008 21:07:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On February 5, 2008 EST at 1845 hours it was discovered that irradiated fuel moves had been performed during the previous shift with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 refuel floor high exhaust radiation monitors bypassed. The condition affected both Susquehanna Units. The radiation monitors are required to be operable for conditions noted in footnotes (a) and (b) in Technical Specification Tables 3.3.6.2-1 and 3.3.7.1-1 (i.e. operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment). The function of these instruments is to initiate systems that limit fission product release during and following certain postulated fuel handling accidents and to minimize the consequences of radioactive material in the control room environment. No movement of irradiated fuel assemblies was in progress when the issue was discovered. The event has been determined to be reportable within 8 hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The radiation monitors were bypassed on 1/31/08, as allowed, during a fuel pool activity NOT involving fuel movement. Approximately one hour of fuel movement occurred during the time the radiation monitors were bypassed. The oncoming shift manager identified the discrepancy during the shift turnover prior to assuming the shift. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4391818 January 2008 17:54:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1703 EST on 1/18/2008, Susquehanna LLC personnel became aware that a shipment received from GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy exceeded the allowable limit of 200 mr/hr contact dose rate. The external radiation limit of 200 mrem/hr was exceeded on one of the two boxes comprising the shipment. The limit per NDAP-QA-0648 is 200 mrem/hr on contact for a shipment type for a transport vehicle which is not designated exclusive use. The actual value was determined to be 350 mrem/hr, therefore reportable per the requirements of 10CFR20.1906(d)(2). The NRC Resident Inspector and the Shipper (GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy) were notified. The transport vehicle left Wilmington NC on 1/17/2008 at 1435 and was received by SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) on 1/18/2008 at 0800. There was no surface contamination noted on the shipment. The original survey completed prior to shipment noted the highest on contact dose rate was 170 mr/hr. This item is reportable under 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for offsite notification of an event of public interest. The boxes contained various pieces of equipment that GE uses to support refueling. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 4372213 October 2007 05:15:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Susquehanna Unit 1 was being manually shutdown on 10/13/2007 for a planned maintenance outage to address control cell friction. Prior to the shutdown five control rods had been declared inoperable due to control cell friction. When reactor power was lowered to 10% at 0220, entry into Tech Spec 3.1.3 was required for 'One or more BPWS groups with four inoperable control rods'. The completion time for this specification is 4 hours. The inoperability of the control rods condition cannot be cleared in the specified time. This condition results in the unit being in a 'Shutdown Required By Technical Specifications'. The required action is to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours. The Shutdown required by Technical Specifications is reportable as a 4 hour Non-Emergency report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). Manual insertion of control rods will continue until all rods are fully inserted. Hot Shutdown is expected by 0800, 10/13/07. Shutdown activities will continue to place the unit in cold shutdown. A Press Release will be made concerning the planned maintenance outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1438 ON 11/7/2007 FROM TODD CREASY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On October 13, 2007, Susquehanna operators began the process of shutting down Unit 1 for a planned maintenance outage to address known control cell friction issues. Because four of five control rods declared inoperable during the operating cycle were located in the same Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) group, station personnel realized that conditions for entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3 'Control Rod Operability' Condition E would already be met when thermal power reached 10% rated thermal power during the shutdown. (NOTE: TS 3.1.3 Condition E is not applicable when thermal power is > 10%). With power less than or equal to 10%, TS 3.1.3 Condition E mandates restoration of control rods to operable status within 4 hours. If this 4 hour completion time is not met, TS 3.1.3 Condition F mandates that the plant enter Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) within the next 12 hours. At 0220 hours on October 13, power was lowered to 10% power and TS 3.1.3 Condition E was entered. Control Room personnel, anticipating that the 4 hour restoration window allowed by Condition E would expire before the LCO could be cleared, reported the shutdown as a shutdown required by Tech Specs per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The ENS report was made proactively before the 4 hour restoration window had expired. Subsequently, the Unit 1 mode switch was placed to Shutdown (Mode 3) at 0610 hours on October 13. Because the timing of this mode change was within the 4 hour restoration window provided by TS 3.1.3 Condition E and because TS 3.1.3 is no longer applicable once Mode 3 is attained, the Condition requiring shutdown (Condition F) was never entered as a result of the inoperable BPWS rods as was initially reported via EN #43722. However, TS 3.1.3 Condition F can also be directly entered if nine or more control rods become inoperable. As the controlled shutdown Progressed, four additional control rods had been conservatively declared inoperable because they failed to settle at latched position '00' in a reasonable period of time. (Note: LER reports 50-387/2005-002-00 and 50-387/2006-001-00 have previously discussed control rod friction experienced at Susquehanna.) Accordingly, TS 3.1.3 Condition F was entered at 0343 hours on October 13, 2007. This TS entry constitutes the initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications and is thus reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). Sufficient compensatory measures had been enacted such that TS 3.1.3 Condition F was no longer applicable by the time the controlled plant shutdown was completed. Therefore, the 60-day reporting that is necessary when a nuclear plant shutdown is completed per a plant's Tech Specs does not apply. (Reference: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)) The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Miller).

ENS 4358923 August 2007 15:54:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On August 23, 2007, at 1300 EDT, the Susquehanna Control Room was notified of a diesel fuel oil spill from a ruptured saddle tank on a tanker truck. The truck was located within 1 mile of the site boundary, on company property, NOT within the plant protected area. Approximately 70 gallons of diesel fuel oil was spilled in the immediate vicinity of the parked truck and did not get into any waterway. The remainder of the fuel oil was pumped from the ruptured tank into a 55 gallon drum. The event did not meet thresholds for reporting to the state of Pennsylvania. However, the contractor (Rizzo Associates) performing the work made a courtesy call to the Department of Environmental Protection with subsequent notifications made to the Susquehanna control room. This 4 hour notification is made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The clean-up plan was discussed with the DEP and is currently in progress. This incident had no impact to SSHS or its operating units. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4356313 August 2007 19:49:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On August 13, 2007 at 14:20 (EDT), the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that during review of calculations for the Secondary Containment Radiation Monitor Setpoints errors were identified in Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints that rendered them non-conservative. The affected instruments are Refuel Floor Wall, Refuel Floor High, and Railroad Access radiation monitors. The condition affects both Susquehanna Units. The radiation monitors are required to be operable for conditions noted in footnotes (a), (b), and (c) in Tech Spec tables 3.3.6.2-1 and 3.3.7.1-1 (i.e. operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within or above the Railroad Access Shaft). The function of these instruments is to initiate systems that limit fission product release during and following certain postulated accidents and to minimize the consequences of radioactive material in the control room environment. The radiation monitoring instruments were declared inoperable. All movement of irradiate fuel assemblies was halted (dry fuel storage activities were in progress at the time of notification). Based on this action, these monitors are no longer within the specified Applicability, and are therefore not currently required to be operable. The event has been determined to be reportable within 8 hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM G. ROBINSON TO J. KNOKE AT 1222 EDT ON 10/03/07 * * *

On August 13, 2007 PPL Susquehanna reported that during a review of calculations for the Secondary Containment Radiation Monitor Setpoints, errors were identified in Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints that rendered them non-conservative. The affected monitors were declared inoperable and the required LCO & TRO Actions entered. A subsequent engineering review determined that the values used to establish the Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints were based on a Realistic Source Term, not a Design Basis Source Term. These values were sufficiently conservative to compensate for the errors in the calculations and the dose release limits from a Design Basis Accident would not have been challenged. It was concluded that the existing Tech Spec values and setpoints remained valid and the monitors were operable in their original condition. Based on this conclusion Event Notification EN# 43563 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO ( Powell) was notified.

ENS 435558 August 2007 13:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This 60-day notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states that in case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than the actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. On 6/9/07 at approximately 0511 hours, the 'C' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and associated 'C' Emergency Service Water pump unexpectedly started while performing procedure TP-024-147, Diesel Generator 'C' Restoration after being out of service for scheduled overhaul and corrective maintenance activities. The EDG inadvertently started in response to an invalid emergency start signal that occurred when the incorrect states ink (SL-8) was opened in panel 0C521C. The cause of this event was due to a human performance error. The EDG was subsequently shutdown following the inadvertent start. Post- maintenance testing of the 'C' EDG was successfully completed. The consequences of this event are limited to the unplanned start of the 'C' EDG. The EDG started and functioned in accordance with its design. Since no actual plant condition existed which required the EDG to start, and since the start occurred inadvertently as a result of human error, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4323914 March 2007 22:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 2300 hours, on 03/14/2007, the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service to support restoration activities from a planned maintenance outage on the power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 20 hours. (Scheduled for completion at 1900 hours on 03/15/2007). During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM HUFFORD TO HUFFMAN AT 2336 EDT ON 3/15/07 * * *

The SPDS and ERDS systems were returned to service at approximately 2230 EDT on 3/15/07. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Hott) has been notified.

ENS 4322810 March 2007 00:14:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0030 hours, on 03/10/2007, the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service for planned maintenance outage on the power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 12 hours. (Scheduled for completion at 1230 hours on 03/10/2007). During this time, control room hardwire indications will be available. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has redundant indication in the control room and will notify the Operations Center when the planned maintenance work is complete. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/10/07 AT 2019 EST FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO MACKINNON * * *

This is a followup courtesy notification to EN # 43228. The Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS systems, as noted (above), have been restored to normal as of 19:50 on 03/10/2007. NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. NRC R1DO (Neil Perry) notified.

ENS 432259 March 2007 14:32:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing has determined that Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria for Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage has been exceeded. During the performance of SE-259-044 the combined SCBL limit of 9scfh was exceeded. Test results were within Administrative and Acceptance Criteria for the 10CFR50 Appendix J limits of 0.6La. The leakage limit is 9scfh. The identified degraded condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4306021 December 2006 14:46:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A Press Release will be issued for an inadvertent actuation of the Emergency Sirens during testing. This item is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an offsite notification of an event of public interest. Following maintenance on a single siren, Columbia County emergency management personnel were requested to test it. The County inadvertently activated all 112 sirens within 10 miles of the plant. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.
ENS 4305518 December 2006 13:55:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A press release issued for an inadvertent actuation of the emergency sirens. This item is reportable under 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as offsite notification as an event of public interest. The licensee was performing scheduled silent testing of the off-site emergency sirens. During the test a signal for the sirens to sound was sent in error, and the sirens sounded. There was no emergency. Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4301125 November 2006 22:48:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2042 on 11/25/06, Susquehanna Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to an apparent generator load reject. All rods fully inserted, and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to approximately +13" inches causing level 3 (+13") isolations, and was restored to normal level (+35") by the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. Five steam safety relief valves opened then reclosed. Pressure was subsequently controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. The 'A' reactor recirculation pump was restarted to re-establish forced core recirculation. Reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system has been restarted and placed in service. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is underway. Unit Two continued power operation. The NRC resident inspector was notified. A press release will occur. Decay heat is being removed by normal feedwater to the reactor vessel and steaming through the steam bypass valves to the condenser. The licensee intends to notify the State of Pennsylvania EOC.
ENS 428296 September 2006 12:17:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A non- licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 428241 September 2006 12:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1115 EDT on 9/01/2006, Susquehanna LLC personnel became aware that a shipment received from another site exceeded the 10CFR71.47(b)(2) limit of 200 mr/hr contact dose rate. Contact dose rates on the bottom of the shipment are 820 mr/hr, and therefore reportable per the requirements of 10CFR20.1906(d)(2). There is no identified surface contamination on the shipment, and the shipment only exceeded the dose rate limit on the bottom once it was lifted off the transport trailer. Doses under the trailer prior to lifting the shipment did not exceed the limit The transport company and the originating site have been notified. The transport vehicle left the Vermont Yankee facility on 8/31/06 and was received by SSES on 9/1/06 at 0805." . . . The driver has been contacted by the transport company. The vehicle made two stops during transport. The first was at the first rest stop traveling west on the Massachusetts Turnpike. The second was at the first rest stop on I-87 south after exiting I-90. No one to the knowledge of the driver came in contact with the shipment. The driver arrived at Susquehanna on 8/31/06 at 2045, and slept in the truck. The driver was wearing dosimetry (TLD). The licensee will notify State of Pennsylvania Emergency Management and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4281731 August 2006 14:26:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1111, on August 31, 2006, during performance of SO-152-006 HPCI was declared inoperable when the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve FV-15612 had dual position indication. Local observation of the stop valve by plant operators and a report from the system engineer verified the valve was closed, and the problem appears to be a limit switch problem. With the lower limit switch not responding correctly the system engineer informed the control room the HPCI Ramp Generator is not reset, which will result in an over speed condition of the HPCI turbine if an actuation signal is received. To prevent possible damage to the HPCI turbine, control room personnel overrode HPCI injection in accordance with plant operating procedures. Plans are being developed to investigate the problem, and adjust the limit switch if required. This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has entered the provisions of TS 3.5.1 for this condition. No other accident mitigation systems are currently inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4264215 June 2006 05:05:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 0300 hours on 15 June, the Susquehanna Unit One reactor automatically scrammed due to an apparent neutron monitoring trip while transferring Reactor Protection System power supplies. All rods (fully) inserted, and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -38" causing level 3 (+13") and level 2 (-38")isolations, and was restored to normal level (+35") by RCIC and subsequently the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. A reactor recirculation pump was restarted to re-establish forced core circulation. The reactor is currently stable in condition 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit Two continued power operation. The NRC resident inspectors were notified. A press release will occur. After the scram, HPCI automatically started but was manually shut down with RCIC maintaining vessel level. Decay heat removal is being maintained with main feedwater and the turbine steam dumps. The electrical grid is stable. No major LCOs were in affect at the time of the event.
ENS 4248911 April 2006 09:35:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 03/11/06 at approximately 0432 hours, with Susquehanna Unit 1 in the Refueling Mode (0% power), the Unit experienced a partial isolation of Primary Containment isolation valves. The actuation occurred when a blown fuse disrupted power to a containment isolation logic relay. The inboard isolation valve to the 'B' Drywell Floor Drain Sump and the Containment Instrument Gas purge supply valve to the TIP indexer both closed. The 'A' Standby Gas Treatment system fan and the 'A' Reactor Building Recirculation fan successfully auto started during the event. This event constitutes an invalid system actuation and is reportable under 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The condition meets the criteria of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) because a general containment isolation signal affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. This notification is being provided via a 60-day optional phone call as permitted under 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of a written LER. As stated above, both valves affected by the invalid signal fulfilled their isolation function by successfully closing. At the time of the event, no other Primary Containment isolation valve was being maintained in a manner that required re-positioning. There were no challenges to the Reactor as a result of this event. The plant responded as expected. Following replacement of the subject fuse, the isolation logic was successfully reset and affected equipment was restored to the desired status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4242315 March 2006 09:41:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 for the planned 14th Refuel and Inspection Outage. At 05:57 on March 15, 2006 the Unit 1 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was deenergized during planned refuel outage activities. It has been determined that it will not be restored within the required eight hours. Currently, restoration is scheduled for March 17, 2006 at 00:01. All required instrumentation is available in the control room. ERDS will remain operable during the work window but several points will not be available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points will be unavailable while SPDS is out of service. However, the ERDS system will still be operable and transmit the remaining points. Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the Emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Since the Unit 1 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM J. HUFFORD TO J. KNOKE AT 10:41 EST ON 03/18/06 * * *

Licensee has restored the Unit 1 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), which was deenergized during planned refuel outage activities for scheduled maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Krohn).

ENS 4240712 March 2006 09:12:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

While performing local leak rate testing (LLRT) during a planned refueling outage, Susquehanna discovered a Type C penetration on Unit 1 with a leak rate of 12,700 sccm. The limit for this penetration, which can bypass secondary containment, is 4,247 sccm or 9 scfh. Even with this leak rate, the combined leak rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests meets the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix J, which is 190,744.7 sccm. This condition seriously degrades the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1015 EDT ON 4/18/06 FROM JIM HUFFORD TO S. SANDIN * * *

THE FOLLOWING IS A RETRACTION OF ENS NOTIFICATION #42407 On March 12, 2006, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported that a Type C penetration valve on Unit 1 experienced a leak rate of 12,700 sccm during testing. This leakage rate exceeded the TS allowed limit of 4,247 sccm (9 scfh) for Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) valves. Although a non-intrusive investigation determined that a significant amount of the leakage was past a non-Technical Specification test boundary valve, workers were unable to immediately quantify the exact amount of leakage attributable to this valve. Susquehanna conservatively assigned all leakage experienced during the test to the primary containment isolation valve being tested and reported the situation as a condition that seriously degraded the nuclear power plant per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). Subsequently, Susquehanna successfully re-worked the test boundary valve that was adversely affecting the leak rate test results. With no other changes in test conditions beyond this improvement in the test boundary, the test was re-performed with 464 sccm leakage observed. Total calculated leakage for SCBL amounted to 1306 sccm, well within Tech Spec limits. These results indicate that the excessive leakage was leakage past the test boundary valve and not the tested PCIV. As such, the SCBL limit was never exceeded and the ENS notification (#42407) is, therefore, being retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dan Holody).

ENS 423854 March 2006 05:34:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 03/03/06, Susquehanna Unit 1 operators began the process of shutting down the unit for the 14th Refueling and Inspection Outage. It was expected that during this evolution, 'slow to settle' control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL believes that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests. Accordingly, at 0517 EDT, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 12 hours when nine or more control rods are inoperable. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted and disarmed, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function. At the time when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit One was operating at 0% Power. Unit Two is continuing operation at 100% power. PPL is reporting this event as a Technical Specification Required Shutdown per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
ENS 423791 March 2006 22:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 21:27 on March 1, 2006, a Susquehanna security officer evacuated the security control center and notified the control room of a fire alarm and actuation of the Halon fire suppression system. The actuation of this system resulted in a potential atmosphere immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) of personnel in a plant vital area. The fire brigade responded to the event, donning respirators to enter the building, but saw no visible smoke or flames. As a result of an IDLH atmosphere in a plant vital area, Susquehanna entered the emergency plan at the Alert level. The NRC Resident Inspector was informed and responded to the site. The licensee notified state, local and other government agencies. The licensee plans on issuing a press release. Notified DHS (Hill), FEMA (Liggett), DOE (Bailey), EPA (National Response Center, Baumgartner), HHS (Riggs), and USDA (D. Timmons).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0530 EST ON 3/2/06 FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee terminated the Alert 0433 EST based on the following: Habitability was restored to the security control center by 1. Stopping the Halon discharge 2. Ventilating the affected area 3. Restoring access 4. Isolating Halon sources in the adjacent area to prevent a recurrence and, 5. Posting Fire Watches. The licensee informed State/local agencies and the on-site NRC Resident Inspector. Notified Region I (Perry), NRR EO (Calvo), IRD (Leach), DHS (Hill), FEMA (Liggett), DOE (Pauley), EPA (National Response Center, McCrossen), HHS (H. Peagler), and USDA (D. Timmons).

ENS 4234216 February 2006 03:38:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This is a voluntary notification. 10CFR50.72 is not applicable. At 0235 on February 16, 2006, an operator informed the Control Room that a Health Physics Technician had fallen and received a cut to the head. The site first aid team and Field Unit Supervisor were dispatched and they determined the individual needed to be transported to an off site medical facility. An ambulance arrived on site at 0300 and transported the individual to a local hospital. However, the ambulance never entered the protected area. The individual was not contaminated as determined by Health Physics. A courtesy call was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency due to an emergency vehicle entering the site. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4233413 February 2006 17:18:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 09:33 on February 13, 2006, a Susquehanna field operator inadvertently tripped an essential instrument AC panel breaker, while applying an energy control tag. He immediately communicated this condition to the control room, and then closed the breaker to restore power. During the subsequent investigation to determine applicable technical specifications, control room operators discovered that the tripped breaker resulted in a momentary loss of both battery room exhaust subsystems. To comply with the required actions for a loss of both battery room exhaust subsystems, Susquehanna declared all Unit 1 and Unit 2 DC subsystems inoperable, which resulted in LCO 3.0.3. Although the entry into LCO 3.0.3 is not reportable, Susquehanna did discover an unanalyzed condition on both units that significantly degrades plant safety, which is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The loss of a single power supply could result in the loss of ventilation and cooling for all DC subsystems on both units, leading to degradation of essential DC power sources. This condition does not meet single failure criteria for safety-related equipment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE 1342 EST ON 2/21/06 FROM GORDY ROBINSON TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: At 0933 hours on February 13, 2006, a Susquehanna field operator inadvertently tripped an essential instrument AC panel breaker while applying an energy control tag. The field operator immediately communicated this condition to the control room and was directed to close the breaker to restore power. The breaker trip resulted in a momentary loss of exhaust flow from the Class 1E 125 VDC and 250 VDC battery rooms. In response, operators declared all Unit 1 and Unit 2 batteries inoperable. An ENS notification (# 42334) was initiated in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition that Significantly Affects Plant Safety, because the loss of a single power supply rendered the status of all station essential DC power sources (Batteries) indeterminate and, thus, inoperable. It was believed that this condition did not meet single failure criteria for safety-related equipment. Subsequent analysis of this event has revealed that the battery room exhaust system acted per design. The system's design is consistent with intended logic that ensures single failure proof isolation of the system, in compliance with the single failure criterion, in response to a toxic gas release. The single failure proof design of the battery exhaust system ensures isolation, not continued operation, in the presence of a single failure. The analysis further concluded that a short term loss of battery room exhaust does not compromise a battery's ability to function. The insights obtained through this analysis provide the basis for retraction of the ENS report of February 13, 2006. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Henderson).

ENS 4229027 January 2006 14:15:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

`AT 0800 ON 01/27/2006 the Unit 2 ERDS modem failed its testing criteria. The modem will not transmit any of the Unit 2 ERDS data. At 1234, the determination was made that repairs will exceed 8 hours. The data points transmitted by ERDS are operable. Only the transmission of the Unit 2 data to the NRC is inoperable. Unit 1 ERDS remains operable. A review of the ability of the Emergency organization to function without ERDS was performed. The NEP (Nuclear Emergency Planning) Duty Planner has established another data line. In response to a Unit 2 event, the affected NERO (Nuclear Emergency Response Organization) positions will verbally transmit the Unit 2 data to the NRC. All affected NERO positions have been notified. Since the Unit 2 ERDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Offsite Communications Capability and reportable under 10 CFR 50/72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee

  • * * UPDATE RECEIVED BY JOE O'HARA FROM RON FRY AT 1316 ON 2/6/06 * * *

This is a followup to EN# 42290, which documented a loss of emergency response capability. The Susquehanna computer group replaced the Unit 2 ERDS modem power supply with an identical component then completed the quarterly functional check as of 10:37 on 02/06/2006. As of 10:37 on 02/06/2006, the Unit 2 ERDS modem is operable and will transmit Unit 2 data to the NRC. All affected NERO positions have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO(Gray) has been notified.

ENS 421832 December 2005 05:05:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0049 hours on 12/2/2005 the Unit 2 (safety parameter display system) SPDS system failed. The cause of the failure is under investigation and is expected to exceed 8 hours. ERDS remains operable but several points are not available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points are unavailable while SPDS is out of service, The ERDS system can transmit the remaining points. Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the Emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE (Gordy Robinson verbal notification to Joe O'Hara at 0719 EST on 12/2/2005): * * *
As of 0530 EDT on 12/02/05, Unit 2 SPDS was restored to Operable status following replacement of the CPU Board for the Remote Data Concentrator (RDC).  NRC Resident was notified."  R1DO (Todd Jackson) notified.
ENS 4209329 October 2005 01:44:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

On 10/28/2005, Susquehanna Unit 1 operators began the process of shutting down the unit for a maintenance outage to address control cell friction. It was expected that during this evolution, "slow to settle" control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL (Pennsylvania Power and Light) believes that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests. Accordingly, at 2332 EDT, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 12 hours when nine or more control rods are inoperable. Entry into this specification was also required per 3.1.3.e when it was determined that four inoperable rods resided within one Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) group. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted and disarmed, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function. At the time when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit One was operating at 18% power. Unit Two is continuing operation at 100% power. PPL is reporting this event as a Technical Specification required shutdown per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. Unit 2 is not affected by this problem and will continue to operate at 100% power.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (ILLIADIS) TO NRC HUFFMAN AT 1011 EDT ON 10/29/05 * * *

At 0744 the plant reached All Rods In and at 0805 entered Mode 3 in accordance with plant procedures to fulfill the requirement of Technical Specification 3.1.3. As stated in the original EN# 42093, it was expected that during this evolution, "slow to settle"' control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. This action was taken on a total of 41 control rods that failed to settle at position 00 during the shutdown. There are 4 additional control rods that were declared inoperable previously during the cycle and subsequently settled to 00. Of the 41 control rods that failed to settle at the time of the shutdown, 6 have settled to 00 at the time of this update. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL continues to believe that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function. There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to containment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified.

ENS 4208126 October 2005 12:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Due to an electrical fault in the Susquehanna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the power to the building has been removed. Testing and repairs are underway and expectations are that power will be restored in approximately 6 hours. The EOF is located approximately 30 miles from the Susquehanna plant and the loss of power does not effect plant operation. Until repairs are complete communications and accident assessments will be made in the on site Technical Support Center (TSC). The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Luzerne and Columbia Counties have been notified by the Susquehanna Emergency Planning Organization. The NRC and PEMA will be notified upon power restoration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/26/05 AT 1500 EDT FROM JIM HUFFORD TO ARLON COSTA * * *

As of approximately 1300 hours on 10/26/2005, power was restored to the Susquehanna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the facility is considered operable. The NRC Resident Inspector will be updated. Notified the R1DO (Silk).

ENS 420343 October 2005 14:34:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 12:48 PM EST, the Main Control Room was notified that an individual needed medical assistance at the South Building. The individual was experiencing chest pains. An ambulance was requested to the site, and arrived on site at 13:17 PM. The individual is not contaminated and was transported offsite to a local hospital at 13:35 PM. PEMA was notified of the incident. This requires a voluntary report due to the offsite notification on an emergency vehicle responding to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this voluntary notification.
ENS 4191814 August 2005 20:42:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This is a Voluntary Report based on a State Notification that does not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At approximately 19:10 hours, the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that offsite fire departments had responded to the Susquehanna Learning Center. This was due to a fire alarm received by the corporate office from the building due to a loss of power to the facility. Offsite fire department personnel along with our Training department inspected the building and found no indications of fire. The Susquehanna Learning Center is located outside of the protected area and approximately one eighth mile from the main access road on State Route 11. Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was advised. The loss of power to the training building was the result from lightning in the area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 417466 June 2005 15:44:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 1233 hours, the Susquehanna Unit Two reactor automatically scrammed due to an apparent generator load reject. All rods inserted, and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -6" causing level 3 (setpoint +13") isolations, and was restored to normal level (+35") by the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. Two steam relief valves opened, then reclosed. Pressure was subsequently controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. Some balance of plant loads shutdown apparently due to a voltage perturbation. A reactor recirculation pump was restarted to re-establish forced core circulation. The reactor is currently stable in condition 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit One continued power operation. The NRC resident inspectors were notified. A press release will occur. The licensee will be notifying the State of Pennsylvania.
ENS 4164628 April 2005 09:18:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At approximately 0700 U2 B Main Transformer cooling was lost. Unit 2 reactor power was reduced from 100% to 75%. Attempts to restore the 2B Main Transformer cooling were unsuccessful, and Unit 2 was manually scrammed from 75% reactor power. RPV water level decreased to -30" due to the SCRAM and was restored by normal Feedwater and RCIC injection. The Main Condenser remained available as a heat sink and there were no SRV lifts. The low water level did result in receiving the Level 2 Division 2 containment isolation signal (-38"), and all expected isolations and initiations did occur. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for an RPS actuation when critical, and an 8 hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the injection from RCIC and receipt of the level 2 Containment Isolation signal. Additionally, a press release to the public will be issued, and requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). All rods fully inserted during the manual scram. The electrical system is in a normal shutdown lineup. Secondary containment ventilation was momentarily disrupted in unit-1 and successfully restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the state and media concerning this event.
ENS 4164026 April 2005 07:41:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0731 hours (EDT) on 04/26/2005 the Unit 2 SPDS system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The duration of work is expected to be 48 hours (scheduled for completion at 0700 hours (EDT) on 04/28/2005). ERDS will remain operable during the work window but several points will not be available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points will be unavailable while SPDS is out of service. However, the ERDS system will still be operable and transmit the remaining points. Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/28/05 AT 1412 EDT FROM RON FRY TO A. COSTA * * *

This is a followup courtesy notification to EN#4160. The Unit 2 SPDS system as noted below (above) has been restored to normal at 13:52 (EDT) on 4/28/05 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Barkley).

ENS 4163124 April 2005 21:39:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2130 hours on 04/24/2005 the Unit 1 SPDS system will be removed from service for planned maintenance (cable rework). The duration of work is expected to be 32 hours (scheduled for completion at 0530 hours on 04/26/2005). ERDS will remain operable during the work window but several points will not be available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points will be unavailable while SPDS is out of service. However, the ERDS system will still be operable and transmit the remaining points. Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the Emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Since the Unit 1-SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4158510 April 2005 12:08:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0352 the 2C 125VDC battery charger failed. Fuses internal to the charger were found blown. Technical Specifications require restoration of the charger within 2 hrs or enter Mode 3 within the next 12 hrs and Mode 4 within the next 36 hrs. Investigation has not been able to restore the charger, and therefore the shutdown of the unit has commenced. Loads are currently being carried by the batteries, and personnel are monitoring battery voltage. Initial investigation has not identified any generic issues or any indication of tampering. This event is a Technical Specification required shutdown, and is reportable as a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). Additionally, this is a voluntary notification due to an anticipated press release associated with the downpower towards unit shutdown. There is evidence of degraded insulation on wires inside the affected battery charger. Battery loads are very small with an initial estimate of battery life at 80 hours. All safety systems are operable. There is no impact on Unit 1. Unit 2 is expected to reach Mode 3 at 1720 on 4/10/05. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. State (FEMA) will be notified.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY LICENSEE (HUFFORD) TO NRC (HELD) AT 2030 ON 4/10/05 * * *

At 17:28 the plant completed a normal reactor shutdown and entered Mode 3 in accordance with plant procedures to fulfill the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.4. There were no ECCS initiations and lowest water level was approximately -4 inches. The licensee reported that the 2C battery charger was back in service but remained in the LCO due to battery requirements. They are also completing engineering evaluations for extent of condition. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. R1DO (Noggle) notified.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY LICENSEE (KLINEFELTER) TO NRC (HELD) AT 1710 ON 4/12/05 * * *

At 16:28 on April 12th, 2005 Susquehanna Unit 2 entered Mode 2 (Start-up) following the completion of repairs to the failed 125VDC battery charger and inspection to the remaining 3 Unit 2 125VDC battery chargers. A courtesy call was made (to) the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. An informational press release will be made. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. R1DO (White) was notified.

ENS 4150621 March 2005 03:35:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was obtained from the licensee via fax (licensee text in quotes): At 22:30 on 3/20/2005, the Control Room was notified by the test director that ASME CLASS I Boundary System Leakage Hydrostatic Pressure Test (SE-200-002) had failed. The reason was a leak identified on Reactor Recirc Pump B Discharge Valve, HV243F031B. The leak is coming from the Stub Tube Weld Leakoff Connection for the valve. It is leaking approx. 10 drops per minute. Technical Requirement 3.4.2 was entered. It was determined to be unacceptable under the ASME Section XI Code. Based on guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, this material defect in the primary coolant boundary constitutes a seriously degraded condition and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). A final evaluation of the flaw and a repair plan is being developed. The NRC Resident was notified.
ENS 414636 March 2005 15:25:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes): At 1500, on March 6, 2005, the Control Room declared both required divisions for three functions (Primary Containment Pressure, Primary Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Analyzer, and Drywell Atmosphere Temperature) of Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (a Safety System) inoperable. The control room was notified of 'Non Quality' (non-Q) parts installed in both required divisions of a Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Recorder. The appropriate LCO Conditions were entered for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable. This equipment has passed all surveillance requirements and has been functional since installation. Plans are being developed to replace the non-qualified parts. This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/30/05 @ 1128 BY JIM HUFFORD TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes): On March 6, 2005, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported a perceived loss of safety function for three functions of Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation on Unit 1. The notification was made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50,72(b)(3)(v)(d). Engineering analysis has subsequently determined that the use of non-Q fuse holders in the Quality application did not adversely affect the safety-related functions which they supported. The fuse holders were removed, subjected to testing, and determined to be electrically and functionally equivalent 'to Quality fuse holders maintained at the station. This analysis conclusion provides the basis for retraction of the ENS report of March 6. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 1 RDO (Jim Trapp) was informed.

ENS 414624 March 2005 15:44:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes): At 3:10 PM EST PPL Susquehanna, LLC, declared a Notification of Unusual Event (classification OU4) for a Fire within Protected Area Boundary not Extinguished within 15 Minutes of Detection. The fire occurred in the turbine building of unit 2 which is currently in a refueling outage. Activation of the Emergency plan is reportable under 10CFR50.72(a)(3). There were no open flames observed, only smoke. The source of the smoke was weld slag that fell into a bucket of material. Due to the temporary ventilation system installed, the smoke spread throughout the turbine building prompting the licensee to call away a fire. The licensee is investigating the area at this time. There are no personnel injuries or equipment damage at this time. The licensee will inform the NRC Operations Center when the NOUE is terminated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PRESTON PRATT TO MIKE RIPLEY @ 1614 EST ON 3/4/05 * * *

The licensee has terminated the Unusual Event. The source of the smoldering material was discovered and extinguished. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified DHS (Frost), IRD (Wilson), NRR (Reis), FEMA (Sweitzer), and R1DO (Holody).

  • * * UPDATE FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 2015 EST 03/04/05 * * *

At 16:30 PM EST PPL Susquehanna, LLC, authorized a press release as a result of a Notification of Unusual Event (classification OU4) for a Fire within Protected Area Boundary not Extinguished within 15 Minutes of Detection. The fire occurred in the Turbine Building of Unit 2 which is currently in a refueling outage. The press release was issued at 17:15 EST. Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1 DO (D. Holody)

ENS 413909 February 2005 14:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 09:20 am, on February 9th, the control room declared both trains of Control Structure Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS) inoperable. The control room was notified of an inoperable boundary door that was not closed and latched and therefore would not have allowed CREOASS to perform its safety function of maintaining the Control Structure at a positive pressure if required. The door was closed and locked (at 11:15) to restore the habitability boundary. The door has since been repaired (adjustment of latch mechanism). Initial investigation determined that the door had been unlocked at approximately 09:20 this morning by an elevator vendor to perform maintenance. This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. CREOASS was not called upon to function during the period that the door was not operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (ROBINSON) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) @ 1328 EDT ON 4/8/05 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee (licensee text in quotes): On 2/9/2005, PPL Susquehanna LLC reported a loss of safety function for the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS) based on one of the Control Structure Habitability boundary doors being found partially open. Positive air pressure generated by the Control Structure HVAC System prevented the door closure mechanism from maintaining the door closed. The door was closed to restore the habitability boundary. The event was reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Safety Function of the CREOASS is to provide adequate radiation protection to permit occupancy of the Control Room under accident conditions for the duration of the accident. The CREOASS accomplishes this by: 1) filtering the outside make-up air supply and 2) maintaining a positive pressure in the control structure habitability boundary to limit unfiltered air in leakage into the boundary. A subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that with the door closure mechanism providing a resistive force, CREOASS would have been able to maintain a positive pressure within the boundary and perform its safety function as described above. In conclusion, the reported condition did not result in a loss of safety function under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) and is therefore being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector and R1DO (Noggle) have been notified.

ENS 4128122 December 2004 15:45:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4An ambulance was called to the site because a plant employee, not in the power plant but in an onsite office building, complained of chest pains. The individual was taken by the ambulance to Berwick Hospital. PEMA was notified of this by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
ENS 4121522 November 2004 18:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 15:10 on 11/22/2004 Operations was notified of a condition that could have prevented the ability of Secondary Containment to control and monitor the release of radioactive material. Three primary system instrument lines have approximately a 20-foot run in an area that is not normally aligned to Secondary Containment. This area has been realigned to Secondary Containment until an analysis of this design can be completed. This has been determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Unit 1 is at 15% power with the main generator off line for unrelated repairs. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 410299 September 2004 09:31:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 04:24 EDT, the Control Room Super Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING), Stack Monitoring System, terminal and the associated terminal in the Technical Support Center (TSC) began printing transmit and receive errors. As a result, all SPINGs were declared inoperable and associated Technical Requirements actions entered for alternate sampling. Review by Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Shift Supervisor considers the occurrence a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and is therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Licensee is taking samples every 4 hours.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

ENS 4097020 August 2004 17:48:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 12:15 PM on 8/20/04, it was discovered that actions performed on 7/16/04 in support of Dry Fuel Storage activities to defeat the Railroad Access Area Radiation Monitor alarm horn had also defeated the actuation capability of the Railroad Access Process Radiation monitors. Per Technical Specifications, the process monitors are required to be operable "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the Railroad Access Shaft, and above the Railroad Access Shaft with the Railroad Access Shaft Equipment Hatch open." Contrary to the Tech Spec requirement, two loaded Dry Fuel Storage Casks were lowered in the Railroad Shaft, one on 8/2/04 and the second on 8/16/04, with the radiation monitors inoperable. During this period the automatic isolation and re-alignment of Reactor Building Zone lll, automatic start of Reactor Building Recirculation Fans, and the automatic starts of SGTS and CREOASS would not have actuated from a HI-HI Radiation condition in the Railroad Access Shaft. Actual radiological conditions observed during the transfer of the casks in the railroad shaft would not have resulted in the need for system actuation. All other instruments in the Reactor Building ventilation system which actuate these systems were operable as required by Tech Specs. The jumpers which defeated the actuation capability were removed on 8/20/04 at 1400 (hrs.). This event is considered reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a loss of safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4095614 August 2004 21:41:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2045 (EDT) on 08/14/2004, Computer Maintenance personnel discovered the Unit 2 SPDS computer was not updating properly. A review of history identified that the SPDS computer had stopped updating at 1109 (EDT) on 8/14/2004. The Control Room was notified. Computer Maintenance was successful in resetting the SPDS computer at 2100 (EDT), and it is now properly operating. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4094813 August 2004 11:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 08:00 on 8/13/04 Computer Maintenance personnel discovered the Unit 1 SPDS computer was not updating properly. A review into the history identified that the SPDS computer had stopped updating at 21:00 on 8/12/04. The Control Room was notified. The computer group was successful in resetting the SPDS computer and is now properly operating. Since the Unit 1 SPDS computer system was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4077726 May 2004 17:55:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an item of public interest and an event for which other government agencies have been notified. At 1600 on 5/26/2004, the operations Shift Manager was notified by the Security Shift Supervisor that an individual (truck driver) had been arraigned by a LLEA (Local Law Enforcement Agency) judge for prohibited items (drug paraphernalia) which were discovered during a routine entrance search of personnel and vehicles. The items were discovered outside the protected area (and) were determined to not pose a threat or attempted threat. The LLEA was called and responded to the site access area and removed the individual to the local barracks, where he was subsequently arraigned on a misdemeanor. The individual's name has been removed from the Susquehanna LLC visitors list. The Manager of Nuclear Security briefed NRC Region #1 Inspector, Dana Caran, concerning the incident. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4076621 May 2004 15:58:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 04/04/04 at 14:57 hours, the "E" Emergency Diesel Generator unexpectedly started in the emergency mode of operation during performance of Unit 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. The diesel generator started in response to a false loss of offsite power signal that occurred after an electrical test jumper was incorrectly installed in panel 1A201. While the procedure directed installation of the jumper across the field side of states links T5-10 and T5-12, the jumper was instead installed across the panel side of the links. When link T5-10 was opened per procedural direction, a false LOOP signal was sent to the "E" diesel generator start circuit. The "E" emergency diesel generator successfully started and properly responded to the complete train actuation signal. The diesel was shutdown following the incident. No other plant equipment was affected by this jumper use error. At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and Unit 2 was in Mode 1. Both Units continued in Modes 5 and 1, respectively. Surveillance testing was successfully completed on 04/05/04. The consequences of this event were limited to the unplanned start of the "E" emergency diesel generator. The diesel generator started and functioned in accordance with its design. This event comprises an invalid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system and is therefore being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a 60- day telephone notification per the provision of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the 60- day report notification by the licensee.
ENS 407337 May 2004 15:42:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: On 03/21/04 at 12:32 hours (EST), a JLG Manlift working on the Unit 1 Cooling Tower came into contact with a 230 KV transmission line, causing the loss of one of two off-site power supplies to the plant (Startup Transformer T-10 and its associated loads). The other Startup Transformer (T-20) assumed the extra electrical load, as designed, and restored power to the station. At the time of this event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and Unit 2 was in Mode 1. Both Units continued in Modes 5 and 1, respectively. As a result of the loss of the T-10 transformer, the following Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation (Valves)(PCIVs) closed on loss of logic power: Containment Atmosphere Control PCIVs HV-25740A, HV-25750A, HV-25776A, HV25780A, HV-25736A, and HV-25742A, HV-25752A, HV-25774A, HV-25782A, HV-25734A. Drywell Sump PCIVs HV-261108 A1 and A2 closed. Reactor Building Chilled Water PCIVs HV-28791 A1 and A2 and HV-28792 A1 and A2 closed. Recirculation Sample PCIV HV-243F019 closed. All isolation signals were successfully reset and the T-10 line was subsequently restored. The Unit 2 electrical transient event resulted in general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system and is therefore being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). A voluntary ENS Phone Notification to the NRC, related to this event, was previously made on 03/21/04, due to notification of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), because an emergency vehicle entered plant property. The above listed systems' Division 1 containment isolation valve actuations were completed and functioned successfully on loss of logic power. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification.
ENS 4071128 April 2004 13:55:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 04/28/04 at 1325 EDT, Susquehanna declared an Unusual Event due to an electrical failure in a power distribution panel at a non-vital load center located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The affected load center supplies electrical power to the Main Condenser Vacuum system causing plant operations to be reduced to 80% reactor power. Unit 1 has not been affected by this incident and Unit 2 remains stable at 80% reactor power. The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1552 and is investigating the cause of the incident which appears to have been a phase-to-phase fault on the 13.8 KV load center feeder cable. Currently, load center 2B250 is being fed through an alternate feeder so that associated systems can be placed back in service. Unit 2 is making preparations to return to full power. There were no personnel injuries nor radioactive releases as a result of this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Luzerne and Columbia county emergency management agencies, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and has issued a press release. Notified the following of the termination of the Unusual Event: R1DO(Barkley), DIRO (Frant), NRR (Marsh), DHS (E. McDonald) and FEMA (D. Barden).
ENS 4069521 April 2004 18:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1635 on 04/21/2004, Susquehanna Unit 1 was returning to service from its 13th Refueling and Inspection Outage which included main turbine replacement. During start-up turbine testing with the generator off line, several main turbine bearings experienced high vibration. In response to these high vibrations, the reactor was manually scrammed from approximately 17% power. The main steam line isolation valves were manually closed and main condenser vacuum was broken in order to more rapidly slow the main turbine speed. All control rods fully inserted on the SCRAM, a level 3 containment isolation signal was received as expected. RCIC was manually initiated to control reactor water level. Lowest reactor water level reached was approximately 3" narrow range. There were no radioactive releases. This RPS actuation is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an 'Unplanned RPS Actuation with the Reactor Critical.' The RPS Actuation and the RCIC injection are reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Unplanned Actuations of Systems that Mitigate the Consequences of Significant Events.' Investigation into the high main turbine bearing vibrations is ongoing. The main turbine was tripped prior to the manual scram and no SRVs have lifted due to low decay heat level. The electric plant is in a normal lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the PEMA representative.
ENS 406465 April 2004 18:19:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 1040 hrs during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the 'E' (Substituting for 'A') and 'C' Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 1140 hrs. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 1206 hrs. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 requiring only 2 diesel generators operable, therefore not impacted by the Loss of Power instrumentation inoperability. Also during the surveillance, two pump start timers failed to meet the required acceptance criteria. The 'A' ESW Pump timer actuated at 47.86 seconds (criteria; 36 sec. to 44 sec) and the 'C' ESW Pump timer actuated at 50.38 seconds (criteria: 39.6 sec. to 48.4 sec). With failure of the timers, proper loading on the Diesel Generators is not assured, and they were declared inoperable until the associated pump control breakers were opened. The 'E' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1448 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'A' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'E' Diesel Generator was returned to operable at 1453 hrs when the DC Knife switches for the 'A' ESW pump were open. The 'C' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1524 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'C' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'C' Diesel Generator was restored to operable at 1706 hrs after supported systems were realigned to prevent further loss of safety function and the DC Knife switches for the 'C' ESW pump were open. The Susquehanna safety analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown the plant. Therefore with only two operable Diesel Generators, the condition requires an 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)and (vi). All times referenced above are EDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *

The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2. Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (R. Conte)

ENS 406425 April 2004 04:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 0030 (ET) during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the associated Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 0130. The Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown. Therefore, this condition is reportable for Unit 2 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Unit 1 is in Mode 5 and therefore not impacted. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 0223. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *

The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2. Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (R. Conte)

ENS 4061628 March 2004 08:25:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 3/28/04 at 0637, Plant Security was notified of a three car accident at the entrance to the site involving 1) an employee leaving the site, 2) a south bound vehicle on US Route 11, and 3) an employee entering the site. There were no reported injuries. Local law enforcement (LLEA) was contacted and investigated the incident. Because of the involvement of a LLEA and potential media or general public interest in the event, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 0812 hours. Based on the notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4060523 March 2004 11:00:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage in Mode 5. During a routine inservice inspection of the reactor vessel, an indication was discovered on the N1B penetration. This is associated with the suction for B Loop of Reactor Recirculation. At 0746 on 3/23/2004, the Control Room was notified that the evaluation was completed and the indication was determined to be unacceptable under the ASME Section XI Code. Based on guidance provided in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, this material defect in the primary coolant boundary constitutes a seriously degraded condition and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). A final evaluation of the flaw and a repair plan is being developed. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

          • RETRACTED ON 4/29/04 AT1018 FROM HUFFORD TO LAURA*****

On March 23, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported a material defect discovered on the N1B penetration associated with the suction for the B Loop of Reactor Recirculation. The defect was discovered during routine inservice inspection of the reactor vessel. At the time of the report, the indication was believed to exceed the acceptability standards of ASME Section XI, IWB-3640. Accordingly, an ENS call was made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Engineering analysis subsequently determined that the dimensional characteristics of the flaw were within the acceptability requirements of ASME Section Xl. This analysis conclusion provides the basis for retraction of the ENS report of March 23. Although hypothetical flaw growth calculations demonstrated that the flaw size would remain within the allowable envelope of ASME Section Xl, IWB-3641-1 over the next operating cycle, and continued operation without repair of the observed flaw was justified, PPL Susquehanna, LLC performed a weld repair of the defect during the recently completed refueling outage. Notified the R1DO (R. Barkley)

ENS 4060221 March 2004 16:03:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 3/21/04 at 12:32 hrs a bucket truck working at the Unit 1 Cooling Tower came in contact with a 230KV transmission line causing the loss of one off site power supply to the plant. The 500 KV offsite circuit remained energized during the event. A contract employee at the base of the truck was thrown due to the electrical short. A contract employee in the bucket of the truck was able to lower the bucket to the ground. A first aid crew was dispatched to the location and an Ambulance was requested. The Ambulance entered the site at 12:50 and at 13:02 the individuals were transported to the local hospital. Due to the electrical transient in the plant, a contract employee performing grinding activities lost control of the grinder and injured his middle finger. This individual received first aid and was transported to the local hospital by his supervisor. The individual injured in the plant was surveyed by Health Physics prior to leaving the site and no contamination was found. The Local Law Enforcement Agency was notified of the Emergency vehicle being dispatched to the site. The State Emergency Operations Center will be notified of the Emergency vehicle entering the site. The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified and the state will be notified.
ENS 405747 March 2004 09:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0201 on 03/07/2004, with Susquehanna Unit 1 in its 13th Refueling and Inspection Outage, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator auto started during preparations for a scheduled 1A ESS(Emergency Service Supply) Bus outage. While performing the procedure for removal of the ESS Bus from service, two incorrect fuses were removed. This caused the normal supply breaker to open on sensed undervoltage deenergizing the 1'A' ESS Bus. The alternate breaker also attempted to close as designed, but tripped open immediately due to the sensed undervoltage. With all breakers open, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator auto started and loaded onto the bus. All leads had previously been removed from the bus per the procedure. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator is operating as designed and is available to supply Unit 2 'A' ESS Bus if required. The auto start of a Emergency Diesel Generator is reportable as an event that results in the valid actuation of a system designed to mitigate the consequences of significant events per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 405737 March 2004 04:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 22:10 on March 6, 2004 the Unit 1 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was deenergized during planned refuel outage activities. It has been determined that it will not be restored within the required eight hours. Currently, restoration is scheduled for March 7, 2004 at 17:00. All required instrumentation is available in the control room. Since the Unit 1 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore reportable under 10CFR50,72(b)(3)(xiii). Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 for the planned 13th Refuel and Inspection Outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

        • Update at 2219 EST on 03/07/04 by Gordon Robinson taken by MacKinnon ****

SPDS is still out of service and it will be restored to service by 0600 EST on 03/08/04. R1DO (M. Shanbaky) notified. NRC Resident has be notified of the update by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/09/04 @ 1122 BY GRANT FERNSLER TO C. GOULD* * *

As of 1117 the SPDS was energized and restored to service. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Reg 1 RDO(Cobey) was notified.

ENS 405716 March 2004 08:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 3/06/04 at 0528 Plant Security was notified of an accident at the entrance to the site involving an employee leaving work and a south bound vehicle on PA Route 11. There were no reported injuries. Local law enforcement was contacted and investigated the incident. Because of the involvement of a LLEA and potential media or general public interest in the event, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident at 0812 hours. Based on the notification to a government agency and possible public interest, this event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 405664 March 2004 10:51:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of the RCIC Steam Supply failed the Combined Main Steam Isolation Valves leakage limit of 300 scfh. The Combined MSIV leakage limit includes MSIV'S, MSL Drains, HPCI Steam Supply and RCIC Steam Supply. The volume between RCIC Steam Supply valves could not be pressurized therefore, the Minimum Pathway leakage limit is considered to be exceeded. This is also considered a failure of the Primary Containment Air Leakage Minimum Pathway leakage limit of 1.0 La. The identified degraded condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) requiring an 8-hr ENS notification. The RCIC Steam Supply line was tested successfully approximately two years ago during the last refueling outage. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

            • RETRACTED ON 4/14/2004 AT 1610 EST FROM FRY TO HEISSERER*****

At the time the original 8-hour ENS notification was made, it was declared that the Appendix J Local Leak Rate Test of the RCIC Steam Supply had failed the combined Main Steam Isolation Valves Minimum Pathway leakage limit of 300 scfh. The combined MSIV leakage limit includes MSIVs, MSL Drains, HPCI Steam Supply and the RCIC Steam Supply. The volume between the inboard and outboard RCIC Steam Supply valves could not be pressurized, therefore the Minimum Pathway leakage limit was considered to be exceeded. Subsequent to this event, during performance of an additional Local Leak Rate Test of the RCIC Steam Supply Penetration, it was demonstrated that the as-found Appendix J and combined MSIV Minimum Pathway leakage and the Primary Containment Air Leakage Minimum Pathway of 1.0 La were not exceeded as previously reported. The original Local Leak Rate Test was performed between the combination of two parallel inboard valves and the outboard valve. The subsequent test determined that the outboard isolation valve did not exceed Minimum Pathway criteria. The majority of the leakage was from the smaller inboard RCIC warm-up line isolation valve of the three RCIC Steam Supply valves. The post-maintenance test of the penetration measured leakage that was within acceptable limits. As such, the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle barriers, was not significantly degraded. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (B. McDermott).

ENS 405643 March 2004 14:03:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 12:45 PM EST, the Main Control Room was notified that an individual needed medical assistance at the South Building. The individual was light headed and nauseous. An ambulance was requested to the site, and arrived on site at 01:04 PM. The individual was not contaminated and was transported to a local hospital at 01:12 PM. Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified of the incident. This requires a voluntary report due to the offsite notification on an emergency vehicle responding to the site. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4055428 February 2004 02:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 00:54 AM EST, the Main Control Room was notified than an individual had fallen approx. 12 feet from scaffolding. An ambulance was requested to the site, and arrived on site at 01:20. The individual is not contaminated and was transported to a local hospital at 01:40. PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) was notified of the incident. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4053521 February 2004 12:06:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 10:05 AM PST, the Susquehanna LLC Shift Manager was notified that a member of the general public required medical assistance. The individual was at a company owned public recreation area adjacent to the Susquehanna LLC River Intake access road. The recreation area is outside the protected area. An ambulance was called to the scene, arriving at 10:28 and leaving at 10:52. The individual was transported to a local hospital. The LLEA and PEMA were notified of the incident. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4053118 February 2004 17:47:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1500 on 2/16/2004, a tractor trailer with two intermodals (sea land containers) arrived at SSES (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) from Race, LLC placarded radioactive 'empty'. Upon inspection it was determined that one of the intermodals had equipment in it contrary to the bill of lading and DOT regulations. This equipment was surveyed and found to be non-contaminated and non-radioactive. There was no radioactive exposure to any individuals as a result. Operations personnel were made aware of this event at 1630 on 2/18/2004. It was determined that this event may be of public significance and is reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) is being notified of this incident. The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 405099 February 2004 19:52:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On 2/9/04 PPL issued a Press Release concerning the NRC decision to send an Inspection team to investigate the cause of the loose bolts found on one of the Emergency Diesel Generator and two other events involving Emergency Diesel Generators at the Susquehanna site. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 404982 February 2004 17:33:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A contractor foreman/supervisor was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a pre-access FFD test as part of processing for unescorted access. The supervisor was denied unescorted access to the protected area. Contact the HOO for additional details The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4048629 January 2004 00:05:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2018 hrs, the Control Room was notified of smoke coming from the Unit 2 Vital UPS room. The Field Unit Supervisor (FUS) was dispatched to the room to investigate. At 2026 hrs, the Fire Brigade was activated. When the FUS arrived at the Vital UPS Panel he reported that there was smoke coming from the panel. He opened the panel and observed smoke coming from the transformer in the panel. He did not observe any flames at any time while dealing with the event. At 2029 hrs, Security was notified and subsequently notified the State Police at 2033 hrs. At 2033 hrs, the transformer was deenergized and the smoke began to dissipate. Entry into the Emergency Plan was evaluated and it was determined that no entry conditions exists at this time. Due to the notification of the Local Law Enforcement Agency, this event constitutes an Offsite Notification and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) requiring a 4 hr ENS notification. When the transformer was deenergized, all loads were automatically transferred to the alternate power supply. The loss of this transformer did not affect any safety related equipment and does not require entry into any TS LCO Action Statements. The licensee notified state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. No press release is planned.
ENS 4044915 January 2004 13:03:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: On 1/14/2004 at 19:56 hours, the Shift Manager was notified by the Clinton County, PA Emergency Management Agency of vehicle accident involving trucks that were carrying a shipment from Susquehanna. The trucks were carrying empty shipping boxes from a shipment of new fuel that had previously been delivered to Susquehanna. These empty boxes were being shipped in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations (49CFR173.428 Empty Class 7 (Rad Mat)). On 1/15/2004 at 10:20 hours, additional information was provided to the control room indicating that this accident could cause increased public interest due to the severity of the accident. The two tractor trailers involved in the shipment were amongst the vehicles in the accident. One of the truck drivers was seriously injured. The trucks were severely damaged. Clinton County, PA, Emergency Management Agency was called to the scene by initial responders as well as the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Both surveyed the boxes and found no indication of radiation/contamination. The shipping boxes and vehicles are being held by the towing company until the shipping company can provide replacement vehicles. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4044113 January 2004 14:27:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4A contract employee tested positive for illegal drugs during Pre-Access testing for unescorted access. The employee's access to the plant was denied. Contact the HOO for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 403672 December 2003 15:55:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1230 hrs, with both units at 100% power the Control Room was notified of a Medical Emergency at the Access Processing Facility on the Owner Controlled Area outside of the Protected Area. The affected individual was a contract employee working for Site Access Services. An ambulance and paramedics arrived on site at 1242 hrs. First Aid and CPR were initiated at the scene. The individual was transported offsite at 1257 hrs to the local Hospital. At 1415 hrs the control room was notified that the individual had passed away. This constitutes an event of public significance and therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(XI) as a 4 hour ENS notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 4027223 October 2003 21:30:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

During routine monitoring, Control Room personnel noted control structure pressure differential was below the 1/8" (inches of water pressure) required to maintain the Control Structure Habitability Envelope. A walkdown of the Control Structure and initial investigation has revealed no obvious problems that would cause the low positive pressure condition. Due to the inability of the Control Structure HVAC to maintain a positive pressure, both trains of Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply system were declared inoperable. This is considered a Loss of Safety Function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * * RETRACTION FROM A. FITCH TO M. RIPLEY 1343 ET 12/12/03 * * * *

At the time of the original 8-hour ENS notification was made, both trains of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) system were declared inoperable due to the failure of the Control Structure HVAC system to maintain the control structure habitability envelope at a pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. (water gauge) with respect to outside atmosphere. Subsequent to this event, an evaluation was performed which determined that the requirement to maintain the control structure habitability envelope at a pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. is only applicable during emergency operating conditions. Under emergency conditions, the CREOAS system, in conjunction with the Control Structure HVAC system, is required to maintain control structure pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.3. However, during normal plant operation, the design function of the Control Structure HVAC system is to maintain the habitability envelope at a positive pressure above atmospheric. No specific value is required. Differential pressure readings for the control structure indicated that pressure was maintained above atmospheric at the time of this event. On October 24, 2003, surveillance testing successfully demonstrated that the Control Structure HVAC and CREOAS systems were capable of maintaining the control structure habitability envelope at a pressure greater than + 1/8" w.g. As such, there was no loss of safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (A. Della Greca)

ENS 4019624 September 2003 03:20:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0053 hours on September 24, 2003 with Susquehanna Unit 1 operating at 100% power an automatic reactor scram occurred due to low water level. At the time of the scram, reactor feed pump testing was in progress and the 'C' reactor feed pump tripped. The reactor recirc pumps runback initiated as expected when water level reached 30" with the feed pump tripped. Level continued to drop and reached the Level 3 auto scram setpoint. Level continued to drop and reached a low level of approximately -48" wide range. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High Pressure Coolant Injection auto started at their initiation setpoints and injected to the vessel to recover level. All level 2 and 3 containment isolations occurred as expected. The reactor recirc pumps tripped as expected when level 2 was reached. Reactor Pressure was controlled with bypass valves, there were no Safety Relief Valve lifts. There are no challenges to containment. Unit 1 is currently stable in Mode 3 with both reactor recirc pumps restarted. A human performance error was the cause of the reactor feed pump trip. Investigation is continuing into the plant response to the reactor feed pump trip. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
ENS 4018219 September 2003 17:54:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At approximately 1535 (ET) on 9/19/03 the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that the 7.2 Kv supply line to the Tank Mountain repeater for activation of all emergency sirens was unavailable (approximately 121 sirens in Lucerne and Columbia Counties). The backup batteries for the repeater were reported to be supplying power for repeater activation. Following further discussion with Emergency Planning personnel, Susquehanna LLC could not determine how long the battery supply would be available. At 1600 the ability to activate the emergency sirens was declared inoperable due to the inability to determine the status of the power source. Loss of ability to activate the emergency sirens is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, as an eight hour notification. The Susquehanna LLC Emergency Plan incorporates alternate means, i.e. Route Alert Teams, to notify the public during an emergency situation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying State and local agencies.

  • * * * UPDATE FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 2105 ET 09/19/03 * * * *

As of 2010 hours (ET) on 9/19/2003, power was restored to the repeater that is used for emergency siren activation and the emergency sirens are considered operable. The NRC resident inspector has been updated. The licensee will be notifying State and local agencies. Informed R1DO (H. Gray)

ENS 4017319 September 2003 01:07:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4On August 29th, 2003 at approximately 1025 EDT, an electrical perturbation affecting both Unit 1 & 2 at PPL Susquehanna LLC resulted in a partial isolation of Primary Containment Isolation valves on Division 1, specifically A & B Containment Radiation Monitors and the Containment Instrument Gas Purge supply valve. This event is being reported as an invalid system actuation and is reportable under 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The condition meets the criteria of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) due to a general containment isolation signal that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. This notification is being provided via 60 day optional phone call as permitted under 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of a written LER. The event was initiated when Operators were returning a Unit 1 13.8 KV Non-ESS breaker back in service following routine maintenance. When the breaker was restored to its closed position, a fault downstream of the breaker caused it to immediately re-open. The 13.8 Kv system supplies power to both unit's Division 14kV ESS busses. The perturbation was sufficient to cause several 'fail closed' containment isolation valves to actuate and close. The transient caused other non-safety related plant equipment to trip/auto-start, no other safety-related equipment or functions were lost. There also were no challenges to the reactor systems or containments. All plant equipment and/or systems were capable of being restored to their original alignment. The fault that caused the electrical perturbation originated at a non-ESS transformer and is currently being replaced. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4014711 September 2003 07:40:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 2314 EDT on 9/10/03 a fire was reported at the Unit 1B Reactor Feed Pump. The Fire Brigade was activated and the fire was extinguished at 2322 (8 minutes after identification). To support removal of the feed pump from service reactor power was reduced to 63%. Due to notifying the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and other outside agencies, this event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the Licensee.
ENS 401345 September 2003 11:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4

At 09:30 EDT, Unit 1 was performing the HPCI Quarterly Flow verification surveillance. Shortly after the initiation of the system an abnormally loud bang was heard. System flow of approximately 5200 gpm and discharge pressure of approximately 1300 psi was achieved at approximately 09:33. Approximately 4 seconds after reaching rated system flow HPCI discharge pressure increased to approximately 1675 psi and system flow dropped to approximately 2700 gpm. HPCI had been declared inoperable at 08:35 EDT to perform the surveillance and will remain inoperable until the cause of the loss of system flow is corrected. Because HPCI is a single train ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) safety system, this event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2. There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is fully operable and HPCI entered Tech Spec 3.5.1 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other ECCS systems are fully operable. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WALSH TO CROUCH ON 10/02/03 @ 1548 EDT* * *

On 09/05/2003, PPL Susquehanna LLC made an ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to an apparent loss of the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) safety function. In the event, results of HPCI Quarterly Flow Surveillance testing did not meet acceptance criteria established for the system. Investigation into the cause of the failed HPCI surveillance revealed a 360-degree weld crack on the HPCI Test Line to Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Valve, HV155F008. HV155F008 is not in the reactor vessel injection flowpath. The impact of this crack, which was located between the valve seat cage assembly and the valve body, was that the HPCI Test Line to CST valve was not capable of throttling over the full range of HPCI system flows. Valve performance became erratic at higher flows because the valve seat cage was lifted out of the valve body into the flow path, increasing system resistance, and preventing attainment of design flow in the HPCI test loop. While the ability to effectively test the HPCI system using the test return path to the CST was compromised, the HPCI injection flowpath to the reactor vessel was not adversely affected by the damaged valve. Accordingly, the HPCI system maintained full capability for providing sufficient coolant to the reactor vessel in the event of a small break loss-of-coolant accident. Because the HPCI safety function was not compromised by the identified test path obstruction, this ENS notification is being retracted. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cobey).