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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5417519 July 2019 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0945 (EDT) on July 19, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to Loop 2 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. The Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) started automatically as a result of the automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid AFW actuation from the reactor trip, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods fully inserted.
ENS 5401722 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a random test administered the next day (see EN #54018). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5401822 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE ON A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a follow-up test administered the previous day (see EN #54017).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/30/2019 AT 1642 EDT FROM KELLI ROBERTS TO BRIAN LIN * * *

On April 16, 2019, an individual was selected for a follow-up drug test. The same individual was selected again on April 17, 2019 for a random drug test. The results for both tests were ruled by the Medical Review Officer (MRO) on the same day and ruled positive for the same drug on April 22, 2019. These FFD violations were reported to the NRC on April 22, 2019, as EN #54017 and EN #54018, respectively. As allowed by 10 CFR 26.185(o), the MRO further reviewed the quantitation of the drug in both tests and determined that no further drug use had occurred since the first positive test. Therefore, the MRO concluded that this should be considered one FFD violation, and EN #54018 is being retracted. No changes are needed to EN #54017. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Heisserer) and FFD Group (email).

ENS 5396731 March 2019 00:17:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 2130 (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 30 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam isolation valve failing closed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
ENS 5383217 January 2019 16:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5378913 December 2018 14:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1700 EST on December 12, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. No work was performed on safety related equipment. The licensee has made a PADs entry.
ENS 536434 October 2018 07:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN LOWE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1408 EDT ON 10/19/2018 * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5362827 September 2018 14:42:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1000 EDT on September 27, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5361018 September 2018 08:28:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1610 (EDT) on September 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5359912 September 2018 14:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1115 EDT on September 12, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5359511 September 2018 17:53:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5356324 August 2018 15:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1034 (EDT) on August 24, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 535387 August 2018 14:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0909 (EDT) on August 7, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for alcohol during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5352827 July 2018 13:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351719 July 2018 12:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1300 (EDT) on July 18, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty process. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5351518 July 2018 19:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during an access upgrade fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the facility has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351117 July 2018 17:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1338 (EDT) on July 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 534999 July 2018 20:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1515 (EDT) on July 9, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a for cause Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 534843 July 2018 12:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0954 (EDT) on July 3, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to high steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted and Unit 1 is in an electrical shutdown lineup. The cause of the high steam generator water level transient is being investigated.
ENS 5347928 June 2018 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0902 EDT on June 28, 2018, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5346922 June 2018 15:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0900 (EDT) on June 22, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. "
ENS 533092 April 2018 18:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5327722 March 2018 09:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness For Duty test using a subversion kit on their person. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5301816 October 2017 17:59:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty (FFD) test. At 0851 (EDT) on October 16, 2017, a contractor supervisor was notified to report for a random FFD test and (the individual) did not report to the testing facility and left the premises. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5299226 September 2017 11:03:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 0543 (EDT), while (recovering from the performance of) 2B Emergency Diesel Generator and ESFAS testing, a (subsequent) valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 2B AC emergency bus (2BA03) was load shed, the 2B EDG automatically started, and tied to 2BA03. The 2BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. The actuation was identified by the Control Room operators and the 2B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling were not challenged throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the undervoltage condition is under investigation.
ENS 5296814 September 2017 09:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On September 13, 2017, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a Contractor Manager confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5276318 May 2017 15:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On May 17, 2017, at 1852 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II.
ENS 5264127 March 2017 16:02:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5261917 March 2017 17:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1517 (EDT), while restoring protective relay power to the 1B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 1B EDG automatically started and tied to the safety bus (1BA03). The 1BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. This actuation was identified by the Control Room Operators and the 1B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Containment Cooler Number 8 did not automatically start in 'Fast Speed' as expected. Containment Cooler Number 8 was successfully started in 'Fast Speed' manually by the Control Room Operators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 525343 February 2017 18:56:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1545 EST on 2/3/17, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power when loop 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) started to fail closed. Non-Safety Related 4160V bus 1NA01 failed to transfer to alternate incoming power supply automatically and was successfully manually energized. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by AFW. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5251830 January 2017 14:38:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1049 EST, an individual was discovered to be unresponsive at a site training facility outside of the Protected Area. The individual was transported via ambulance to the Burke County Hospital and was declared deceased at 1143 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State of Georgia Department of Labor - OSHA at 1414 EST.
ENS 5248211 January 2017 13:52:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated pending the results of an investigation. The licensee notified RII (Patterson) and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 524239 December 2016 23:46:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn December 09, 2016 at 1734 EST, U2 Train-A NSCW (Nuclear Service Cooling Water) Transfer Pump #8 tripped during Return To Service Surveillance testing for Train-B NSCW Transfer pump #7. Technical Spec 3.7.9 Condition E entered at 1734 with Required Actions to be in M3 (mode 3, Hot Standby) in 6 hours AND M4 (mode 4, Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. A unit shutdown was commenced at 2042 EST (as a conservative measure) to comply with TS 3.7.9 Condition E. At 1937, U2 B-train NSCW Transfer Pump #7 was declared operable and TS 3.7.9 Condition E was exited. The plant is currently raising power to 100%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 524127 December 2016 13:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (ECS System Seismic Category I Equipment Design Basis Loads) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on May 17, 2016 (reference ML 16138A080 and ML 16166A030). On November 1, 2016, it was determined by the Vogtle 3&4 Contractor that modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) breaker (i.e., switchgear) cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, 'Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The modification involves an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Breaker cabinet that function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously qualified for use in the RCP breaker cabinet assembly. Additional seismic qualification type testing and analysis of components are being performed for the added components in the RCP breaker. Update of the Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP breaker to confirm the breaker withstands seismic design basis loads and Licensee's acceptance is in progress. The revised ITAAC Completion Notice will be submitted to the NRC once all related ITAAC activities have been completed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5231926 October 2016 16:35:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuring the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The Turbine Driving Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump exhaust vent is not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, crimping the piping resulting in reduced flow capacity and rendering the TDAFW pump inoperable. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) vents are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado generated missile could strike the vent piping rendering it unable to relieve vacuum on the top of the CST and allow adequate water flow to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and rendering the CST inoperable. These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 5220830 August 2016 16:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 521472 August 2016 16:22:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A member of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) staff violated the FFD policy in December, 2014 by responding to a call-in for unscheduled work after having consumed alcohol within the prohibited 5 hour period. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 519867 June 2016 14:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5195625 May 2016 04:54:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0206 EDT 5/25/16, Vogtle Unit 2 tripped from 100% when SG (Steam Generator) #1 Level began to lower for an unknown reason. Cause for level issue is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by Aux Feedwater. Prior to the trip, I & C (Instrumentation & Calibration) was performing a loop #1 narrow range instrument calibration. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup with all source of offsite power available. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5187521 April 2016 18:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5134325 August 2015 16:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn August 25, 2015, at approximately 12:52 EDT, an unplanned loss of power to the Vogtle Meteorological Towers occurred. The loss of power was the result of an electrical disturbance in the Plant Wilson switchyard. Power was restored 14:45 EDT. The electrical disturbance impacted meteorological instrumentation only and did not impact operation of either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The TSC and EOF remained functional and compensatory measures existed within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization was notified and necessary compensatory actions were established. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5122313 July 2015 07:50:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

On July 13, 2015, planned activities will be performed to upgrade the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Meteorological Towers and its communication equipment. The emergency response data system will be affected. The work will be completed within approximately 5 days. This activity requires the meteorological tower to be out of service greater than 72 hours rendering equipment used for emergency assessment non-functional. The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data via Savannah River Site and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information will be relayed via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the upgrade and necessary compensatory actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL MONAHON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2013 EDT ON 7/18/2015 * * *

Vogtle primary and backup Meteorological Towers have been returned to service and functionality of equipment has been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (King).

ENS 512199 July 2015 18:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe Vogtle Unit-1 control room received a fire alarm from inside the containment building. Per plant requirements, verification of the fire was not obtained within 15 minutes and an Unusual Event was declared. Plant personnel were able to enter containment and verify that there was no fire present. The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event. Unusual Event entered: 1732 EDT Unusual Event exited: 1848 EDT The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, and NICC. NuclearSSA (email) and FEMA NWC (email).
ENS 5089414 March 2015 19:19:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn March 14, 2015 at 1207 EDT, operators were performing steps to disable an automatic actuation signal to the B-train Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW), when a valid actuation signal was received on B-train only. Both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were already running and feeding forward. The B-train discharge valves went from throttled to fully open. The AFW discharge valves were restored to their previous positions without any adverse impacts on the plant. Decay heat removal was still being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5089314 March 2015 08:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVogtle Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power. At 0429 EDT a Unit 2 automatic Reactor Trip and Safety Injection / Steamline Isolation occurred. All systems operated as expected and all control rods fully inserted. The Safety Injection was terminated at 0447 EDT and the emergency operating procedures were exited at 0522 EDT. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Auxiliary Feedwater system and the atmospheric relief valves. A response team is investigating the cause of the event. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event. NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and is at plant site for investigation.
ENS 508572 March 2015 18:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On March 2, 2015, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 507989 February 2015 11:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the Vogtle 3&4 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55 . The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55 (4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55 (5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 5057429 October 2014 14:08:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5052612 October 2014 12:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) Unit 2 was performing startup and had taken reactor critical at 0929 EDT. When attempting to stabilize power to collect critical data, control rods were inserted with Control Bank D the expected group to insert. Control Bank A inserted instead of Control Bank D. Power had reached 6 E-2 percent as indicated by IR (intermediate range) indication when control room crew performed a manual reactor trip. AFW (auxiliary feed water) was in service to support plant conditions prior to the trip and did not receive any actuation signal. All equipment operated as expected. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5044110 September 2014 11:24:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 503476 August 2014 05:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

This is a non-emergency notification per Vogtle U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities on the TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions, and, actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation has been prepared and approved for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RUDY JOHNSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1132 EDT ON 8/6/14 * * *

As of 1124 EDT maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 5031427 July 2014 15:22:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP (Vogtle Electric Generation Plant) Unit One was at 100 percent power, with a Main Feed Pump (MFP) Turbine A trip mechanism test in-progress, when MFP A Trip alarm was received in the Main Control Room. Control Room crew identified MFP A speed and steam generator levels lowering and initiated a manual reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the MFP A trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. The unit is in a normal shutdown electric plant lineup. No effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5022625 June 2014 11:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5021920 June 2014 16:39:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification. On June 20, 2014, at 1100 eastern daylight time (EDT), Vogtle Unit 2 identified a loss of emergency assessment capability due to both plant vent effluent monitors being out of service from March 16 to March 26, 2014. This condition was the result of an equipment failure concurrent with planned maintenance activities on the redundant monitor. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). During the time both effluent monitors were out of service Unit 2 was operating at 100% rated thermal power, steady-state conditions. Therefore, this condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 501632 June 2014 16:47:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive result for a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
ENS 5003112 April 2014 23:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2008 EDT, Vogtle Unit One was manually tripped in response to loop 1 outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and cause investigation is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. There was a normal post trip feedwater isolation due to low Tave. Offsite power remains available. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser. The plant is stable in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 2.
ENS 500068 April 2014 05:21:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP Unit 2 was at 100% power, normal activities, when digital feedwater trouble alarms were received on all 4 steam generators (SG) with level stable in all generators. Operating crew entered abnormal operating procedure for feedwater malfunction when SG #3 level began rapidly lowering. Operators attempted to take manual control of SG #3 main feedwater regulating valve and were unable to raise SG #3 level. SG #3 level lowered to the Lo-Lo Level setpoint causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and SG #3 level remained off scale low on narrow range indications. Auxiliary feedwater and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. (Unit 2) is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the low SG water level and determine restart criteria and time of restart. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feedwater to steam generators steaming to the condenser steam dumps. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4971813 January 2014 03:28:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 495952 December 2013 13:52:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582).
ENS 4946122 October 2013 13:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1144 EDT, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to lowering Main Condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 Bravo Main Feed Pump was tagged out for scheduled maintenance and the casing was being removed when condenser vacuum started lower due to isolation valve not holding pressure. Main Condenser vacuum lowered to less than procedural limits for continued plant operation. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. AFW was placed in service to control Steam Generator levels. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 while performing a cause investigation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and at plant site. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the Main Condenser.
ENS 4945319 October 2013 09:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) unit two was at 100% power, normal activities, when the unit two turbine tripped causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the turbine trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. During the transient, no relief valves lifted. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant safety loads. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4927213 August 2013 07:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 emergency response facilities action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to start of the TSC HVAC unit. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NAVEEN KOTEEL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0744 EDT ON 8/15/13 * * *

The Technical Support Center HVAC system was returned to service at 1100 EDT on August 14, 2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).

ENS 4918611 July 2013 15:26:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A Plant Vogtle employee on site complained of medical issues while performing work inside Unit 2 containment at 1127 EDT. After being transported offsite to Burke County Hospital, Plant Vogtle was notified at 1426 EDT that the individual was deceased. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. The death was not known to be related to work performed at the site, and the employee was not contaminated when transported offsite. The licensee will notify OSHA.

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/11/13 AT 1655 EDT FROM NAVEEN KOTEEL TO DONG PARK * * *

The licensee notified OSHA at 1625 EDT and will also be making a media/press release. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 4914424 June 2013 04:49:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on the backup diesel generator that supplies TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MATT HORN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2015 EDT ON 6/27/13 * * *

The backup diesel generator was returned to service at 1641 EDT on 6/27/13 which restored the TSC to functional status. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Franke).

ENS 4914021 June 2013 10:50:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1444 EDT ON 06/21/13 FROM THOMAS BUSSIERE TO S. SANDIN * * *

Exit TRM 13.3.1: The functionality of the TSC has been restored and scheduled maintenance activities performed complete and satisfactory at 1410 EDT on 6/21/13. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Desai).

ENS 489881 May 2013 10:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee anticipates the maintenance will be complete at 1630 EDT on 5/1/13.

* * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1702 EDT ON 5/1/13 * * * 

The TSC was returned to service at 1607 EDT on 5/1/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ASHTON PARKER TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1123 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * *

The TSC has been taken out of service to perform planned maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

* * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1747 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * * 

The TSC was returned to service at 1733 EDT on 5/2/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

ENS 4898530 April 2013 13:15:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA condition is being reported per TRM (Technical Requirements Manual) 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. At 102 EDT on 4/30/13, the "TSC has been restored to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4890610 April 2013 09:47:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP100050.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear). This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of Southern Company for Vogtle 3&4, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by Southern Company. This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 488803 April 2013 07:32:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Vogtle Unit 1 has declared an NOUE based on a fire within the protected area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. At 0632 (EDT) Unit 1 received a fire alarm in the Unit 1 control building. A systems operator was dispatched to investigate and reported back that a small flame was visible inside 1ND3I1, computer inverter. Fire brigade was dispatched in accordance with fire response procedures. No other systems or parameters affected. At 0651 (EDT) fire brigade captain reported that the fire had been extinguished. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the state and local authorities. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL PARKER TO DONG PARK AT 0811 EDT ON 3/31/13 * * *

The licensee terminated the NOUE at 0745 EDT based on the fire being extinguished. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (McCoy), NRR EO (Chernoff), and IRD (Harris) notified. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

ENS 4883220 March 2013 03:15:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The licensee declared a Unusual Event based on EAL HU-2 due to indication of a fire in the Protected Area for greater than 15 minutes. The licensee received initial indication of a fire alarm and startup of fire water pumps. The alarm was located in the vicinity of the Auxiliary Building Unit 2 HVAC supply unit. The licensee declared an unusual event at 0246 EDT. Upon investigation, it was determined that the heater strips in an HVAC unit were overheated and caused a fire alarm and no fire actually existed. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0409 EDT ON 3/20/13 FROM BISHOP TO CROUCH * * *

The licensee terminated its unusual event at 0341 EDT on 3/20/13 after confirming there was no fire within the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building HVAC supply unit. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Rich) and NRR EO (Lund) notified. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

ENS 4878827 February 2013 02:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2302 EST, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to excessive Reactor Coolant Pump #4, seal #1 leakoff flow. Seal leakoff flow exceeded the procedural limits for continued operation of the pump. Following the reactor trip, RCP #4 was shutdown per procedure guidance. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. The Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) system automatically actuated as expected. System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. The plant is stable in Mode 3 during cause investigation. The NRC Senior Resident was notified and is enroute to the plant for investigation. AFW is supplying the steam generators and decay heat removal is to the condenser via steam dumps. No safety valves or relief valves lifted during the transient. The unit is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. There was no impact on Unit One.
ENS 4851216 November 2012 15:35:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe licensee received a fire alarm in an auxiliary building tunnel (Zone 146) that could not be verified within 15 minutes. An unusual event was declared (EAL HU2) at 1500 EST. At 1505 EST the licensee fire responders were able to reach the location of the alarm and confirmed that there was no fire. The licensee has performed inspections of the area and do not yet know the cause of the fire alarm but are certain that it was not caused by an actual fire. The cause of the fire alarm is still under investigation. No offsite assistance was summoned for this event. Following restoration of fire protection system to a normal status the licensee terminated the unusual event at 1550 EST. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. No press release is planned at this time. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
ENS 4846131 October 2012 09:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements ManuaI13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) Evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERIC TEW TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1452 EDT * * *

TSC maintenance is complete. The TSC has been returned to operable status at 1445 EDT on 10/31/12. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper).

ENS 483855 October 2012 12:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn October 5, 2012 at 05:14 EDT, restoration of steam generator narrow range level instrumentation from a bypassed condition was in progress when a valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal was received due to steam generator levels being below the Lo-Lo Level setpoint. As a result, both motor driven auxiliary feedpumps automatically started and two turbine driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves automatically opened. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves had been previously removed from service under administrative controls. The system was aligned per procedure so that water injection into the steam generators did not occur and the motor driven pumps were operated on mini-flow. Unit 1 is off line for a planned refueling and maintenance outage. There were no adverse impacts on the plant. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with RHR in service and preparations for Mode 4 entry in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4813626 July 2012 14:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4783614 April 2012 16:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1346 EDT, Vogtle Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped from 100% power due to Main Feedwater Pump 'B' discharge flow lowering unexpectedly. All control rods fully inserted. AFW system automatically actuated as expected. System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 during cause investigation. The electrical lineup remained normal. No safety valves lifted due to the trip. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the main condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 4776523 March 2012 14:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000

On March 9, 2012, Shaw's Vogtle 3&4 Construction Contractor FFD program manager notified SNC (Southern Nuclear Operating Company) FFD program manager of his discovery of anomalies in their random pool while preparing to perform the weekly random pool generation. At that time, approximately 20 people were identified as not being in the pool that had active badges. Corrective actions were implemented to update the pool and provide additional verification of any changes made to the pool. Subsequently discussions with licensing resulted in the conclusion that there was not an indication that there was a programmatic issue and thus was reportable under a 30 day report to the NRC. The NRC was informed of this decision and has been at Vogtle collecting data regarding this event. Since that time, Shaw has been checking past months to determine the extent of condition. On March 22, at 21:01, Shaw notified SNC that the October - December results of personnel who had active badges but was not in the pool was significantly higher than the January through March results, developed earlier. On the basis of this information, SNC has determined that this now rises to the level of a programmatic vulnerability and is subject to a 24-hour report to the NRC. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) and 26.417(b)(1) as a discovered vulnerability of the FFD program. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MAHAN TO HUFFMAN AT 1700 EDT ON 3/26/12 * * *

The licensee noted that this event is also being reported under 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1). R2DO (Haag) has been notified.

ENS 477237 March 2012 16:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000On March 01, 2012, it was discovered that a (Contractor) program manager intentionally failed to implement a procedure change as instructed by management. An initial investigation has determined that interim compensatory actions were in place prior to this pending procedural change. The involved manager's access authorization has been revoked. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) was notified by (the Contractor) of this discovery on March 06, 2012 at 19:00 EST. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3) as an intentional act that casts doubt on the integrity of the FFD program. At the time of this report, no regulatory barriers for individuals assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program have been breached regarding this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4728722 September 2011 10:29:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a trip of the TSC Chiller System supply breaker. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BILL DUNN TO CHARLES TEAL ON 9/22/11 AT 2039 EDT * * *

The TSC has been returned to service at 2000 EDT. Notified R2DO (Lesser).

ENS 472404 September 2011 13:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to pass a required surveillance of the backup diesel generator for TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL MONAHON TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/9/2011 AT 1418 EDT* * *

The licensee has declared the TSC Operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rich).

ENS 4722431 August 2011 12:02:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopWhile preparing Loop 2 Main Feed Reg Valve (MFRV) for maintenance, it was placed on its 'air gag' that maintained the MFRV in position, while any small changes in feed flow would be modulated by the associated Bypass Feed Reg Valve (BFRV). Approximately 5 minutes after the MFRV was placed on the air gag, with Steam Generator (S/G) level stable, control room operators observed S/G level start to increase. The operators observed for a short time to see if the associated BFRV would control the level change. When it became apparent that level was not being controlled automatically, the operators took manual control of the BFRV, eventually closing it all the way, and observed that S/G level was then increasing very slowly. While level was still slowly rising, two hi-hi level bistables actuated, generating a P-14 (hi-hi S/G level trip) signal which tripped the main turbine, which then caused an automatic reactor trip. As a result of the reactor trip, all systems functioned as required and there was nothing unusual or not understood. During the transient, no safeties, primary relief valves or secondary relief valves lifted. All control rods inserted into the core. Auxiliary Feed Water automatically initiated and is supplying the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser. The grid is stable with all safety buses powered from offsite power via a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 2 was unaffected by the trip. The licensee will be issuing a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4708722 July 2011 12:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 470327 July 2011 11:11:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0900 EDT, the Shift Manager was notified that all off site notification sirens were discovered inoperable during the daily maintenance checks due to a loss of power supply. Upon discovery by the technicians of the loss of power supply, the backup power supply was energized and all sirens were tested and returned to operable status. The time of power loss is unknown at this time and the reason for the failure of the transfer to the backup power supply appears to be a bad solder joint. The backup power supply has been verified SAT." The sirens were last tested satisfactorily on Tuesday, 7/5/11. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4677220 April 2011 20:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1734 EDT, (Vogtle) unit one automatically tripped from 100% power. No significant activities were in progress that should have challenged the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted. AFW system actuated as expected on S/G Lo-Lo-Level and AMSAC (ATWS Mitigation System Actuation). System responses allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable and will remain in Mode 3 during cause investigation. Cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Decay heat is being sent to the main condenser through the turbine bypass valves. The steam generators are being fed from auxiliary feedwater. There was no effect on unit two. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4675213 April 2011 17:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4657126 January 2011 09:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2245 EST ON 1/26/11 FROM WESLEY GRANT TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

TSC maintenance has been completed and testing was performed. The TSC has been returned to service. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Desai).

ENS 4655820 January 2011 15:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A discovered vulnerability in the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) program has resulted in contractor personnel being granted unescorted access to Vogtle 3&4 construction site without meeting all the requirements of the FFD Program. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for more details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 465258 January 2011 15:29:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the 480V Motor Control Switchgear ANBL. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with a high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. Normal power is still available but may be lost during a loss of offsite power. Contingency plans are in place to restore backup power if necessary. Expected return to service is Tuesday, January 11, 2011. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CARL GRANT TO JOE O'HARA AT 1505 ON 1/9/11 * * *

TSC returned to service at 1430 EST. Normal power supply is aligned and the temporary modifications have been removed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO(Vias)

ENS 4649120 December 2010 01:09:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Smoke and sparks were identified as coming from a level 4 Control Building Normal Fuel Handling Building HVAC Heater Control Panel. The heater control panel was deenergized. The fire team was dispatched. The fire was contained in the heater control panel. Smoke removal is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM HANS BISHOP TO PETE SNYDER AT 0219 EST ON 12/20/10 * * * 

At 0218 the licensee terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. Notified R2DO (Henson), NRR EO (Evans), DHS (Strangfeld), and FEMA (Hollis).

ENS 4644229 November 2010 19:20:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1612 today, November 29, 2010 Unit 2 Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) was shutdown for upgrade work. This includes the SPDS (Safety Parameter Display) system which is a function of the IPC. The IPC will be returned to service in approximately two weeks and SPDS function will be restored at that time. In addition, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) is out of service and will be restored in the same time frame. Per the 50.54.Q that was prepared by our Emergency Preparedness group, notification has been made to the NRC ERDS group (Roger Chow) of the unavailability of the ERDS. While the IPC is out of service, control board indications are being utilized by the control room crew. In addition, the safety-related Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS) is operable. Restoration of SPDS and ERDS functions have been given the highest priority during restoration of the system. Both the NRC Ops Center and the NRC ERDS group will be notified when SPDS and ERDS capability have been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4633514 October 2010 16:55:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 463218 October 2010 13:54:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 1100, October 8, 2010, Unit 1 Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) was shutdown for upgrade work. This includes the SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) system which is a function of the IPC. The IPC will be returned to service in approximately two weeks and SPDS function will be restored at that time. In addition, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) is out of service and will be restored in the same time frame. Per the 50.54.Q that was prepared by our Emergency Preparedness group, notification has been made to the NRC ERDS group of the unavailability of the ERDS system. While the IPC is out of service, control board indications are being utilized by the control room crew. In addition, the safety-related Plant Safety Monitoring System (PSMS) is OPERABLE. Restoration of SPDS and ERDS functions have been given the highest priority during restoration of the system. Both the NRC Ops Center and the NRC ERDS group will be notified when SPDS and ERDS capability have been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/9/2010 AT 1555 EST FROM CECIL WILLIAMS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On Oct 8, 2010, EN# 46321 was made for notification that the Unit 1 Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) was shutdown for upgrade and that the SPDS function was out of service until the upgrade was completed. The IPC has been returned to service sufficiently to support SPDS Functionality. All data points have been verified and associated Control Room annunciator tested. Therefore, at this time SPDS is considered returned to service. The ERDS function has previously been tested with the NRC ERDS Group and returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 461609 August 2010 04:23:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, 'Emergency Response Facilities', Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURWINKEL TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/9/10 AT 1438 EDT * * *

The planned maintenance of the TSC HVAC was completed and the Technical Support Center was returned to functional status as of 8/9/10 at 1153 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 4609615 July 2010 12:59:00VogtleNRC Region 2

On July 2, 2010, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) provided a non-emergency event notification (EN# 46067) for an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 26.61 relating to self-disclosure requirements. During implementation of corrective actions for that event, Shaw Nuclear Services Inc. (Primary Construction Contractor for Vogtle 3&4) personnel identified that several of the self-disclosure forms received from a sub-contractor had very similar handwriting. An incident investigation was initiated to ascertain the relevant facts. During that investigation, Shaw identified two supervisory personnel from the sub-contractor organization who apparently provided the suspect self-disclosure documents for other employees from their company. Unescorted access for the two supervisory personnel was suspended and they were removed from the site pending completion of the investigation. All suspect self-disclosure forms were removed from the files, and the affected individuals have completed and submitted new self-disclosure forms. No other evidence of policy violations has been identified during this process. The investigation into the FFD event continues. On July 14, 2010, Shaw notified SNC that sufficient indication exists that the actions of the sub-contractor supervisory personnel may have violated the Shaw FFD policy. As such, this issue is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii), which requires a non-emergency event notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1446 ON 10/12/2010 FROM JIM DAVIS TO CHARLES TEAL * * *

On July 15, 2010, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) provided a non-emergency event notification (EN# 46096) for an apparent violation of the Shaw Fitness for Duty (FFD) policy by two subcontractor supervisory personnel who provided suspect self-disclosure documents for other employees from their company. On October 11, 2010, SNC was notified by Shaw that a third sub-contractor supervisory individual was identified as being involved in the original event reported on July 15, 2010. This supervisory individual has been relieved of duty and removed from Vogtle 3&4 site. The documents affected by this individual were part of the documents identified in the original notification (EN# 46096) made on July 15, 2010. As part of the corrective actions from the root cause investigation into the previously reported events, Shaw has verified that a self-disclosure form has been completed by each individual as required by 10 CFR 26. This notification is being made as an update to EN# 46096 to identify that a third individual was involved in violating the Shaw FFD policy. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (McCoy).

ENS 4608412 July 2010 03:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD COTTY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2100 EDT ON 07/14/10 * * *

The licensee has completed the required maintenance on the TSC HVAC. The Technical Support Center is now fully functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 460672 July 2010 14:40:00VogtleNRC Region 2An internal audit of a contractors Fitness for Duty program revealed potential non-compliances with elements of 10 CFR 26.61 related to self disclosure requirements. The investigation into the extent of the potential noncompliance continues including whether associated elements of 10 CFR 26.63 are in compliance. Safety related construction activities will be suspended pending resolution and completion of corrective actions. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR26.719(b)(4). The licensee will notify the Public Service Commission of Georgia and the NRC Construction Inspection Staff.
ENS 458082 April 2010 16:59:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant was not granted. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4558823 December 2009 17:18:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1525 EST, Vogtle Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to a loss of instrument air to the turbine building. System operators were releasing a tagout and restoring one of two instrument air dryers that had been isolated for maintenance. Instrument air low pressure alarms were received in the control room and secondary side valves were responding to the loss of instrument air. Control room operators responded according to procedures. Main feed pump 'B' tripped on a loss of suction pressure and operators manually tripped the reactor. The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of a loss of feed water to the steam generators. All systems responded as required. AFW (Auxiliary Feed Water) actuated as required for loss of feed water. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Instrument air has been restored to the turbine building and steam dumps are controlling RCS temperatures. Cause of the loss of instrument air is being investigated. (The NRC) Senior Resident (Inspector) was notified.
ENS 4555710 December 2009 01:38:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2310 EST, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 24% reactor power while the main turbine was rolling at 1800 rpm, preparing for synchronization to the grid. As Vogtle 1 was preparing to bring the Unit 1 generator on line following a forced outage, high vibration levels were experienced on the HP turbine bearings while the Turbine was at rated speed and synchronization preparations were in progress. The Turbine was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. Vibrations continued to increase as the Turbine began to coast down, warranting that vacuum be broken in accordance with procedures. The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of trip of the main feedwater pump (due to loss of condenser vacuum) and condenser vacuum was broken to slow the turbine. When condenser vacuum was broken, the in-service Main Feedwater Pump auto tripped as expected, causing an automatic actuation of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater system. The cause of high vibrations on the Turbine is being investigated. All systems responded as expected on the trip. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. Atmospheric relief valves are being used to remove decay heat. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 455477 December 2009 20:07:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopVogtle Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a (turbine trip/ reactor trip) RPS (reactor protection system) actuation. The turbine tripped due to low condenser vacuum. Initial investigation indicates that a loss of a non-1E electrical switchgear initiated the event. All systems responded as expected. The AFW (auxiliary feedwater) systems responded as required. Reactor temperature (and decay heat removal) is being maintained on SG (steam generator) ARVs (atmospheric relief valves). Both NRC Resident Inspectors were notified of the trip. There were no complications. All rods inserted during the trip and there was no primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 2.