Semantic search

Jump to: navigation, search
Search

Edit query Show embed code

The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Reactor type::GE-5]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.0359 seconds.


Results 1 – 100    (Previous 100 | Next 100)   (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)   (JSON | CSV | RSS | RDF)
 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5341018 May 2018 13:27:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 0651 (PDT) on May 18th, 2018, Columbia Generating station experienced a Main Transformer trip, that caused a Reactor Scram. Reactor Power, Pressure and Level were maintained as expected for this condition. MS-RV-1A (Safety Relief Valve) and MS-RV-1B (Safety Relief Valve) opened on reactor high pressure during the initial transient. MS-RV-1B appeared to remain open after pressure lowered below the reset point. The operating crew removed power supply fuses for MS-RV-1B and it currently indicates intermediate position. SRV (Safety Relief Valve) tail pipe temperatures indicate all valves are closed. Suppression pool level and temperature have remained steady within normal operating levels. All control rods inserted and reactor power is being maintained subcritical. RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level is being maintained with condensate and feed system with startup flow control valves in automatic. Reactor Pressure is being maintained with the Turbine Bypass valves controlling in automatic. The main condenser is the heat sink. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) systems actuated or injected; the EOC-RPT (End of Cycle-Recirculation Pump Trip) and RPS (Reactor Protection System) systems actuated causing a trip of the RRC pumps and a reactor scram. Core recirculation is being maintained with RRC-P-1A (Reactor Recirculation Pump) running. No release has occurred. At this time there will be no notifications to state, local or other public agencies. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The cause of the event is currently under investigation. Plant conditions are stable. The plant is in its normal electrical alignment and offsite power is available to the site.
ENS 5339510 May 2018 08:59:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 0248 (EDT), with the plant shutdown in Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a partial loss of off-site power during relay testing that resulted in an automatic start of the Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generator. All systems responded as expected for the event. The cause is being investigated. The station responded in accordance with appropriate Special Operating Procedures and restored impacted systems. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) At the time of the report, the emergency diesel generators are loaded and supplying plant safety equipment. The licensee has notified the state of New York Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5327622 March 2018 07:07:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), Plant Shutdown required by Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)A, Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition. At 0300 CDT on 3/22/18, on LaSalle Unit 1, a through-wall (welded joint) leak was identified on a 3/4 inch vent line off of the bonnet of the 1B33-F067B, 1B Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve. This condition qualifies as pressure boundary leakage, which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, Required Action C, to be in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, by 1500 on 3/22/18 and Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, by 1500 on 3/23/18. This leakage is significantly less than 10 gallons per minute and therefore, does not meet the threshold for entry into the Emergency Action Plan. At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 - Run. Shutdown began at 0500 CDT and the estimated completion to cold shutdown is 2000 CDT. All necessary shutdown equipment is available. There is no impact to Unit 2. NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5321917 February 2018 10:29:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. While troubleshooting an issue with the Unit 1B Diesel Generator Oil Circulating pump, damage of a bus bar was identified at the breaker that supplies the Unit 1B Diesel Generator Auxiliaries. One of the loads fed from this breaker is the Division 3 DC Battery Charger. It has been determined that the degradation of the bus bar may have prevented the Division 3 DC Battery Charger from performing its function which could have prevented the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) from performing its design safety function. Since HPCS is a single train safety system, it has been determined that this failure could potentially affect the safety function of this system, and is reportable as an 8 hour notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5321315 February 2018 13:39:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5On February 15, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, LaSalle Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the components supporting the operation of Control Room (VC) and Auxiliary Electric Room (VE) ventilation. This could result in inoperable VC/VE systems, which provide a protected environment for occupants to control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke if a tornado were to occur. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, Revision 1, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' and DSS-ISG-2016-01, Revision 1, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion' per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance.' Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 531901 February 2018 11:59:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5

Nine Mile Point unit 2 experienced an unusual event due to a small fire in the turbine building that was immediately extinguished and then reflashed. The fire was declared out at 1119 (EST), 2/1/18. The fire was caused when steam leak repair injection equipment failed and leaked onto hot piping. There was no equipment damage or impact to plant operation. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade. Offsite assistance was not required. The fire resulted from Furmanite repair of a Moisture Separator Reheater inlet flow control valve. The unusual event will be terminated when sufficient lagging is removed to verify the extent of leaked fluid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1240 EST ON 2/1/2018 FROM ANTHONY PETRELLI TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The unusual event was terminated at 1211 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Janda), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

ENS 5308321 November 2017 14:22:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5On October 6, 2017 at 0910 CDT hours, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), the 1A Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) automatically started. The cause was the misoperation of the 1B/C RHR (Residual Heat Removal) Room Cooler Fan (1VY03C) control switch, which was placed in the start position instead of the intended pull-to-lock position. The start of the 1VY03C fan resulted in the automatic actuation of the 1A DGCWP. This system actuation is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The invalid actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The 1A DGCWP, an emergency service water system that does not normally run and that serves as an ultimate heat sink, responded satisfactorily. This call is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), which states that in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than an actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5306813 November 2017 17:26:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol. The employee was escorted offsite and their plant access has been terminated and a five year denial placed in Personnel Access Data System (PADS). This is being reported per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 529993 October 2017 16:58:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On October 3, 2017, at 0800 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure momentarily rose above the Technical Specification (TS) limit. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was entered. The pressure rise was due to unexpected isolation of an exhaust valve in the Reactor Building ventilation system during electrical switchgear inspections. The cause of the closure is still under investigation. The Control Room operators reopened the Reactor Building exhaust valve and pressure returned to within limits automatically. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 0802 PDT and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was exited. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5299630 September 2017 09:06:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 0134 (EDT) on September 30, 2017, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 when secondary containment was declared inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being above the Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement of -0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. The Division II Standby Gas Treatment System was started to restore differential pressure at 0135 (EDT) on September 30, 2017 the differential pressure was restored, the secondary containment was declared operable and the Tech Spec3.6.4.1 exited. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The cause of this condition is being investigated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also inform the State of New York.
ENS 5296612 September 2017 19:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On September 12, 2017, at 1228 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure momentarily rose above the Technical Specification (TS) limit. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was entered. The pressure rise was due to unexpected isolation of the supply and exhaust valves in the Reactor Building ventilation system due to an electrical transient on the power panel feeding the valve operators' solenoid pilot valves during maintenance. The cause of the electrical transient is under investigation. The Reactor Building differential pressure controller restored the building pressure to within limits. The Control Room operators reopened the Reactor Building ventilation supply and exhaust valves. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 1228 PDT and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was exited. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5291820 August 2017 22:46:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

On August 20, 2017 at 1605 PDT, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100 percent power due to a rise of Main Condenser back pressure. Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon a loss of Main Condenser back pressure. Preliminary investigations indicate that the Main Condenser air removal suction valve (AR-V-1) closed, resulting in the Condenser back pressure rising to within 1.0 inch Hg of the setpoint with reactor power greater than 25 percent. Further investigations continue. All control rods fully inserted. In addition to the closure of the air removal suction valve, one of two Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valves did not adequately operate to control Reactor vessel level and resulted in a high-level (Level-8) actuation tripping the Reactor Feedwater System. All other systems operated as expected. Reactor water level is currently being controlled manually with the start-up level control isolation valve. AR-V-1 has been manually opened with a jumper and temporary air supply. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser. This event is being reported under the following: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), which requires a four-hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee plans to issue a press release.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/24/17 AT 1937 EDT FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK * * *

The licensee is updating the notification to include an 8 hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation due to a Level 3 isolation signal which occurred approximately 20 minutes after the scram. The licensee is currently in cold shutdown to repair the Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valve. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 5291317 August 2017 17:55:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Energy Northwest concerning a defect in General Electric (GE) Nuclear HMA124A2 relays received at Columbia Generation Station. On August 12, 2017, Energy Northwest completed a 10 CFR 21 evaluation of a condition associated with GE Nuclear HMA124A2 relays supplied by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC, and intended for use at Columbia Generating Station. The evaluation was performed to determine the applications where the relays were approved for installation, and where they were installed in the plant, and to determine if the failure of the relays could result in a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined In 10 CFR 21.3. Two of the HMA124A2 relays received had back plates that were mounted upside down, causing the terminals to not match the standard configuration. Although the internal wiring to the physical stud locations was correct, the numbering scheme embossed on the back plate did not match the correct configuration. With the incorrectly mounted back plate, the internal coil of the energizing circuit could be wired to the incorrect portion of the control circuitry, which would not energize when required and could result in the failure of a safety function. This deviation presents a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined In 10 CFR 21.3, as these relays were approved for use in safety related applications; however, there was no actual risk to plant safety since this deviation was recognized and resolved by station craft prior to installation of the relays. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1) as a defect as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. The defective HMA124A2 relays were installed in the plant in the correct configuration with post-maintenance testing performed to ensure operability of the relays. The remaining HMA124A2 relays were examined and no additional defects were identified. GE Hitachi has been notified of the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 528896 August 2017 00:26:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 2235 (EDT) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure. Turbine stop valve testing was in progress at the time of the scram. All control rods inserted. Pressure control is via the turbine bypass valves. The cause of the scram is being investigated. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS (Reactor Protection System) Actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reactor water level is being maintained with normal feedwater flow. No safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 5286924 July 2017 13:36:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 1647 (PDT) on May 25, 2017, during the performance of a post-maintenance test for replacement of a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) low water level 3 indicator switch (MS-LIS-24A), a pressure perturbation in the common pressure reference line resulted in tripping of the RPV Level 2 instruments and an unplanned start of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump (HPCS-P-1) and its supporting emergency diesel (DG3). The Reactor Pressure Vessel was flooded up during the refueling outage, thus, the actuations of the HPCS pump and its supporting emergency diesel (DG3) were unplanned and invalid. The HPCS pump did not inject into the RPV due to the RPV level being above Level 8 which is an interlock to close the HPCS RPV injection valve (HPCS-V-4). During the event, the single train HPCS system initiated normally but did not inject into the reactor pressure vessel as expected due to flooded-up conditions of the reactor pressure vessel for refueling outage activities. The emergency diesel generator started normally in response to the initiation signal of HPCS. Both HPCS and the emergency diesel generator functioned successfully. All systems responded in conformance with their design and there was no safety significance associated with this event. At the time of the event, the licensee notified the NRC Resident (Inspector).
ENS 5284811 July 2017 17:45:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. On July 11th, 2017, it was discovered that the flow indicating switch for the high pressure core spray (HPCS) minimum flow valve was providing unreliable indication. There was no flow through the line at the time the condition was discovered. This switch provides the flow signal to the HPCS minimum flow valve logic. The switch was declared inoperable and the required actions of Technical Specification 3.3.5.1 were entered. This condition could have prevented the HPCS system, a single train safety system, from performing its specified safety function. Troubleshooting is underway to determine the cause of and correct the condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAN SHARPE TO KARL DIEDERICH AT 1710 EDT ON 9/20/17 * * *

The condition reported in Event notification #52848 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) has been evaluated, and determined not to have met the threshold for classification as an Event or Condition the Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Engineering analysis has concluded that the affected switch was capable of performing its required support function to provide the flow signal to the HPCS minimum flow valve logic. Thus, the HPCS system remained capable of performing its specific function for the identified condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (G. Miller).

ENS 5283027 June 2017 01:05:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On June 26, 2017 at 1756 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure rose above the Technical Specification (TS) requirement multiple times from 1756 to 1800. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and entry into Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was made. There was a significant change in average wind speed and barometric pressure occurring at that time. At 1800 PDT, Secondary Containment pressure was restored to within limits and TS 3.6.4.1.A was exited. Environmental conditions have stabilized. The Reactor Building Differential Pressure controllers are working as designed. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5282123 June 2017 01:00:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Unit 1 Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Pump Injection System was declared inoperable at 2043 (CDT) due to a loss of corner room area cooling and loss of motor cooling. The common diesel generator cooling water pump received an auto trip signal while being secured. The LPCS pump remained in standby during the event. This condition prevents LPCS, a single train safety system, from performing its design function. This is a reportable condition as an 8 hour ENS notification. The required action of Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1, 'ECCS - Operating,' was entered on June 22, 2017 at 2043 CDT when the condition was identified and the LPCS system was determined to be inoperable. Investigation into the cause of the condition is in progress. The Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Pump Injection System was declared operable, and the TS LCO was exited at 2112 CDT.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD IMMKE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1518 EDT ON 6/23/2017 * * *

Update to previous ENS notification at 0100 EDT on 6/23/17. The last statement was revised to say the Low Pressure Core Spray System remains Inoperable. The Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Injection System remains inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

ENS 5276117 May 2017 12:29:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Pump Injection HI Flow alarm was received at 09:08 CDT on May 17, 2017, at which point the minimum flow valve was observed to go closed. The LPCS pump remained in standby during the event. To prevent damage if the pump were to auto start, the control switch for the LPCS pump was placed in pull to lock. This condition prevents LPCS, a single train safety system, from performing its design function. This is a reportable condition as an 8 hour ENS notification. The required action of Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1, 'ECCS - Operating,' was entered on May 17, 2017 at 09:08 CDT when the condition was identified and the LPCS system was determined to be inoperable. Investigation into the cause of the condition is in progress. There were no related work activities in progress at the time the condition was identified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5261516 March 2017 15:07:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Energy Northwest concerning a defect in Size 1 Freedom Series Starters with nominal 120 VAC coils manufactured by AZZ/NLI (Nuclear Logistics Inc.) used at Columbia Generating Station. On February 8, 2017 Energy Northwest was notified by NLI of a deviation associated with starter contactors used at Columbia that failed to close due to overheating of the starter coil. The coils that were provided were determined to not meet specified voltage ratings. The evaluation completed by Energy Northwest on March 14, 2017 concluded that the deviation did create a Substantial Safety Hazard, and is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1) as a defect. A 30 day report will be issued by April 13, 2017 per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4). The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment for the two starters currently installed. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5256418 February 2017 02:58:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). On February 17, 2017 at 2353 CST, Unit 1 Reactor Automatic Scram signal was received due to Turbine Control Valves Fast Closure. The turbine trip was due to receipt of Level 8 Trip due to a failure of the Feedwater Regulating Valve to Full open. Plant is in a stable condition with reactor pressure being maintained by the Turbine Bypass valves. Reactor water level is being controlled with Feedwater thru the Low Flow Feedwater Regulating Valve. Further investigation into the cause of the event is in progress. All control rods fully inserted, and decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using bypass valves. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BROCK POLLMANN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1721 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *

Upon further review of the event data, it was determined that the Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) had initiated a manual scram, which was followed by a Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure automatic scram when the turbine tripped. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Jeffers).

ENS 5255616 February 2017 13:54:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An employee entered a secondary containment airlock and identified that both doors of the airlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the airlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the airlock were open for approximately 5 seconds. With both doors open, Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable in accordance with TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained more negative than -0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5254714 February 2017 02:40:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This notification is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). On February 13, 2017 at 2309 CST, a Unit 1 Reactor Automatic Scram signal was received due to Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure. The turbine trip was due to the main generator trip on Differential Current. The 'U' safety relief valve actuated in the relief mode on the turbine trip, and has subsequently reset with tailpipe temperature returning to normal. The plant is in a stable condition with reactor pressure being maintained by the Turbine Bypass valves. Reactor water level is being controlled with feedwater. Investigation into the cause of the event is in progress. All control rods fully inserted on the scram. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electric plant alignment. Unit 2 was not affected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5251930 January 2017 23:34:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During routine surveillance testing of the Unit 2 Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (LOS-DG-M3), the Cooling Water Strainer Backwash Valve, 2E22-F319, was identified to have stem/disk separation and could not be opened. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water system has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water system is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The required actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 were entered on 1/30/17 at 1908 CST when the HPCS system was determined to be inoperable. This condition could have prevented the HPCS, a single train safety system, from performing its design function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5251026 January 2017 03:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On January 25, 2017, at 1836 PST, smoke was detected in the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) diesel room with no indication of a fire. Investigation found the motor starter coil for DMA-FN-32 (Diesel Mixed Air Fan 32), HPCS diesel generator room normal cooling fan, failed. This fan is required for operability of the switchgear that powers the HPCS pump. The HPCS pump is currently inoperable due to maintenance being performed on other support systems. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5250523 January 2017 10:34:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This notification is being provided pursuant with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). (On January 23, 2017) at 0806 (CST), Unit 2 Manual Scram was inserted due to a Stator Water Cooling runback signal and a Turbine Bypass Valve opening. The Plant is stable, reactor pressure is being maintained with Bypass valves. Reactor water level is being controlled with feedwater. Investigation into the cause of the event is in progress. All control rods fully inserted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5249619 January 2017 00:39:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock (airlock) and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately five seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room has remained less than -0.25 in. H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (McCraw).
ENS 524722 January 2017 17:49:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5At approximately 1403 (CST) on January 2, 2017, LaSalle County Station was informed by the LaSalle County Sheriff that two warning sirens had malfunctioned at approximately 1252 earlier this afternoon. The warning sirens had inadvertently operated for nearly 3 minutes during maintenance at the LaSalle County 911 Communications Center. The warning sirens have been restored to standby and are fully functional. No other emergency notification systems or sirens were affected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the issue.
ENS 5244319 December 2016 07:39:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

On December 18, 2016 at 2320 (PST), a leak was discovered on the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system minimum flow line. The leak is located at a bolted flange downstream of the manual isolation valve HPCS-V-53. The location of the leak is not isolable from the suppression pool. This provides a direct path from inside the Primary Containment to the Reactor Building. High Pressure Core Spray system is a single train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) system, therefore inoperability is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Based on the location of the leak, Primary Containment integrity is compromised. Primary Containment was declared inoperable and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The cause of the leak is under investigation. Actions are underway to cool down and enter MODE 4. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATT HUMMER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2245 EDT ON 5/24/17 * * *

Engineering evaluations indicate that there was neither a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperability nor a condition that resulted in a significantly degraded principal safety barrier (Primary Containment). Therefore, this event does not meet the reporting criteria in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), and Event Notification# 52443 is being retracted. Bases for the retraction are: (1) Extent or accumulation of water flooding the HPCS room would not have prevented the system from fulfilling any of its designated safety functions, if the system had received a starting signal due to an emergency; and (2) the consequences of the HPCS Minimum Flow Line leak into the Reactor Building were within the dose limits and did not have a significant effect on Primary Containment integrity; therefore, the Primary Containment was degraded but operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Groom).

ENS 5244218 December 2016 18:13:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On December 18, 2016 at time 1124 PST the plant experienced a full reactor scram. Preliminary investigations indicate that the scram was caused by a load reject from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Ashe substation. Further investigations continue. The following conditions have occurred: Turbine Governor valve closure Reactor high pressure trip +13 inches reactor water level activations E-TR-B (backup transformer) supplying E-SM-7/SM-8 (vital power electrical busses) Complete loss of Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC) E-TR-S (Startup transformer) supplying SM-1/2/3 (non-vital power electrical busses) E-DG-1/2/3 (emergency diesel generators) auto start Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A/B/C initiation signals Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) are closed Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) RCIC and High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) were manually activated and utilized to inject and maintain reactor water level. Pressure control is with Safety Relief Valves (SRV) in, manual. Level control is with RCIC and Control Rod Drive (CRD). RCIC has experienced an over speed trip that was reset so that level control could be maintained by RCIC. This event is being reported under the following: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) which requires a 4 hour notification for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) which requires a 4 hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) which requires an 8 hours notification for actuation of ECCS systems. All control rods fully inserted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee indicated that no increase in radiation levels were detected.
ENS 5238220 November 2016 18:53:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On November 20, 2016 at 1402 PST, Reactor Building Exhaust Air Fan 1B, REA-FN-1B, failed to start in manual which caused the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary to not be met. The duration of the time that the secondary containment TS was not met was approximately less than one minute. REA-FN-1B was being started in manual during a shift of Reactor Building Ventilation to support a post-maintenance support task on REA-FN-1B. Secondary containment differential pressure was restored within the TS requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge by restarting Reactor Building HVAC Train A. The cause of REA-FN-1B failing to start is currently under investigation. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 522763 October 2016 16:49:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On October 3, 2016, at 1008 PDT a Reactor Building Exhaust Valve (REA-V-1) unexpectedly closed, which caused the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary to not be met. The duration of time that the secondary containment TS was not met was approximately 4 minutes. Secondary containment differential pressure was restored within TS requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge at approximately 1012 PDT by manually starting Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system (SYS) A. The cause of the REA-V-1 closure is currently under investigation. This condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 522278 September 2016 14:50:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5On July 11, 2016, at approximately 0430 CDT, while Unit 1 was operating at 100% power, the 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (M/G) set tripped causing a loss of the A RPS bus. This caused the complete actuation of the Division 1 (outboard) primary containment isolation logic. The isolation logic actuation resulted in successful closure of the Division 1 primary containment isolation valves. This was an event that resulted in the actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. However, as this event meets the definition of an invalid actuation (i.e., not a response to an actual plant parameter exceeding a trip set-point), this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in lieu of a Licensee Event Report. In response to the trip of the 1A RPS M/G Set, operators swapped the A RPS bus to the alternate power supply using the applicable response procedure. The containment isolation signal was reset and the systems were restored to their normal lineup. Reactor power was not affected by this event. All safety related equipment controlled by the affected primary containment isolation circuits operated as designed. The 1A RPS M/G Set trip was due to a blown power fuse for the 1A RPS M/G Set. This was the result of worn insulation on one of the generator output leads. The generator output leads were repaired and rerouted to prevent future problems on 07/15/16. Restoration of the normal power supply to the 1A RPS function was completed on 7/19/16. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5210418 July 2016 23:29:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This telephone notification is provided in accordance with the Exelon Reportability manual, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On July 18, 2016 at 1500 CDT, it was determined during testing of the Everbridge ERO (Emergency Response Organization) notification system that the system would not notify the corporate EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) individuals if the system had been activated. This constitutes a loss of offsite communication capability. Exelon and Everbridge have identified and corrected this issue. A follow-up test of the LaSalle Everbridge ERO notification system was completed satisfactorily on July 18, 2016 at 2100. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was not lost. The licensee has notified the (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector of the issue. Compensatory measures were in place during this event.
ENS 5209618 July 2016 14:48:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5

This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' On 07-18-2016 at 0730 (EDT), both Control Rooms were notified by the Emergency Preparedness Manager, that the Everbridge Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification System may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. This constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability. The Everbridge vendor is working to resolve the issue. Compensatory measures are in place. All ERO personnel received the page but not all received the notification within the required ten minutes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1728 EDT ON 7/20/2016 FROM CLARK WILLETT TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Everbridge System was restored and retested at 1930 EDT on 7-19-2016 to provide offsite communications capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 518961 May 2016 12:25:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
On May 1, 2016, at 0847 (EDT), an individual experienced a personal medical emergency during a break. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. The station was notified at 1008 that the hospital has declared the individual deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and not contaminated. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is shut down for the scheduled refueling outage. The individual was a contractor employee. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The State of New York will be notified.
ENS 518567 April 2016 22:32:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building (RB) airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1730 (EDT) on 04/07/16, both RB airlock doors were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This resulted in Secondary Containment being declared Inoperable (TS 3.6.4.1). Secondary Containment was restored to Operable when the doors were closed. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There is no interlock on these doors, just lights to verify the opposite door is open or shut. An Operator was entering secondary containment as another Operator was leaving.
ENS 5182628 March 2016 19:44:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 1322 PDT on Monday, March 28, 2016, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100% thermal power due to the loss of Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC). Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon loss of RCC. The cause of the loss of RCC is being investigated. Regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours of any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical. All control rods were fully inserted. Valve RWCU-V-4 automatically closed upon high water temperature due to loss of RCC flow. No other safety system actuations were reported. All systems operated as expected. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser. The station is in normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. No safety/relief valves lifted and no emergency core cooling systems injected following the reactor scram.
ENS 5174117 February 2016 17:05:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 5 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25 inches H20 at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5173313 February 2016 14:45:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On 2/10/2016 at 1000 PST, Columbia entered a planned evolution to perform channel functional tests on the RadWaste Building noble gas monitor (WEA-RIS-14). Compensatory measures were implemented per station procedures. The station is experiencing equipment issues and the monitor has not been restored within 72 hours (2/13/2016 at 1000 PST) from the start of the outage. The extended outage of this radiological monitoring instrument is, therefore, being reported as a major loss of radiological assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures will remain in place until the WEA instrument is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Note: Reactor Power is 75 percent due to a planned plant downpower for unrelated scheduled work with a planned return to 100 percent at 1900 PST on 2/14/16.
ENS 5172511 February 2016 01:20:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. LaSalle Station's Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1. At 2207 (CST) (on 2/10/16), Secondary Containment Differential Pressure dropped below the Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 minimum of 0.25 inches water vacuum. The initial indications are a failure of one Unit 1 Reactor Building Exhaust Isolation Damper, which resulted in a trip of the Unit 1 Reactor Building Exhaust Fans. At 2245, Secondary Containment Differential Pressure was restored to within the TS 3.6.4.1 limits by securing and isolating the Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation System. Troubleshooting plans are being developed to determine cause of the damper failure and to correct the deficient condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5172310 February 2016 06:29:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
At approximately 0354 (EST) on 2/10/2016, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Control Room was notified by Exelon Emergency Preparedness of the inadvertent actuation of one Oswego County Notification Siren at approximately 0247 on 2/10/2016. It is unknown at this time why the inadvertent alarm occurred. Siren repair personnel (ANS Services) have been dispatched to isolate the siren and begin repair work. The siren has been silenced. Alternate notification of the public in the area is through Hyper Reach. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office has issued a news release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5156223 November 2015 17:50:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At approximately 1100 PST, Columbia Generating Station (CGS) planned to make a non-required notification to Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC) regarding indications of two fuel defects. This condition has not affected full power operation at CGS, and there is no impact to the health and safety of the public or to the environment. CGS plans on making this notification to EFSEC on November 24, 2015 at 1330 PST. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5153011 November 2015 19:40:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5At 1344 CST on 11/11/15, the seismic monitor was found inoperable. The seismic monitor was inoperable such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (The NRC) Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5152610 November 2015 04:15:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 2040 PST on 11/9/2015, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge for approximately seven minutes. Operators took action to manually start Standby Gas Treatment System to restore Reactor Building pressure. This event is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The cause of the event is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5131813 August 2015 16:52:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5A licensed, non-supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the NRC Region 3 Office Safeguards Inspector.
ENS 513007 August 2015 19:58:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This notification is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)A, Degraded Condition. At 1340 CDT on 8/7/15, on LaSalle Unit 2, a through-wall (welded joint) leak was identified on a 3/4 inch vent line off of the bonnet of the 2B33-F067B, 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve. This condition qualifies as pressure boundary leakage, which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, Required Action C, to be in Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, by 0140 on 8/9/15. This leakage is significantly less than 10 gpm (leak rate is 0.2 gpm) and therefore, does not meet the threshold for entry into the Emergency Action Plan. At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in Mode 3 - Hot Shutdown, heading into Cold Shutdown for a planned maintenance outage. This event does not affect Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5124722 July 2015 07:08:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5(At) 0013 CDT, (on) 7/22/15, the seismic monitor was found inoperable. The seismic monitor was inoperable such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (The NRC) Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5122814 July 2015 05:37:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge for approximately 2 minutes during a planned surveillance test due to a subsequent failure of REA-FN-1A (Exhaust Fan) to manually start during restoration from the surveillance test. This event is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Prior to taking test data the surveillance test directs declaring Secondary Containment inoperable in anticipation of potentially exceeding 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge reactor building pressure during the conduct of the surveillance. Consequently Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1.A was entered with a 4 hour completion time to restore Secondary Containment to an operable state. Upon failure of REA-FN-1A to start immediate actions were taken to close reactor building ventilation dampers and secure ROA-FN-1A (Supply Fan). Following closure of ventilation dampers and stopping ROA-FN-1A reactor building pressure was quickly restored to less than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge with Standby Gas Treatment that was already in operation as part of the surveillance test. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Maximum Secondary Containment pressure noted was 0.1 inches positive water gage.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1351 EDT ON 8/25/2015 FROM MATT HUMMER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Subsequent to the initial report, Columbia has since determined that per NUREG-1022 3.2.7 the event was not reportable as Secondary Containment was 'declared inoperable as a part of a planned evolution ... in accordance with an approved procedure and (Columbia's) TS (Technical Specifications).' No condition has been discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the surveillance. Therefore, this event is not considered to be a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function or a condition prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LEA) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified the R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 512138 July 2015 21:53:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportability manual SAF 1.10, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On July 8th 2015 at 1837 (CDT), it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System Supply Fan belts had failed, resulting in loss of ventilation for the facility. Repairs were not completed within the time required had the TSC needed to be staffed. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO (Emergency Response Organization) activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The licensee has notified the (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector of the issue.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TODD CASAGRANDE TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1510 EDT ON 7/11/15 * * *

After repairs were completed, the TSC Ventilation was restarted on 7/9/15 at 0625 EDT for a maintenance run, the TSC Ventilation was restored to operable status at 1500 EDT on 07/11/2015. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 512058 July 2015 07:04:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5At 0130 (CDT) on 7/8/15, the seismic monitor was found inoperable. The seismic monitor was inoperable such that emergency classification at the Alert level could not be obtained with site instrumentation. The seismic monitor was restored to operable status within 11 minutes. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 512016 July 2015 20:41:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A recent review of Fire Protection and Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSS) Programs at Columbia Generating Station (CGS) identified a potential unanalyzed condition with Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Scenario 2x. Review of the circuit design for High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) HPCS-V-10, HPCS-V-11 and HPCS-V-15 identified that fire-induced circuit failure (hot shorts) on the OPEN function control circuits for each valve would create the flow path to potentially drain inventory from the suppression pool (SP). The normal operation of HPCS-P-3 (keep-fill pump) would allow additional inventory from the SP to be transferred to the CSTs (Condensate Storage Tank). If a fourth hot short is postulated, HPCS-P-1 would transfer inventory from the SP to the CST at a much faster rate. HPCS-V-11 was deactivated on 6/12/2015 due to a maintenance repair issue and will be left in the fully closed position. This plant alignment resolves current concern for MSO scenario 2x as fire-induced circuit damage cannot cause spurious opening of HPCS-V-11. However, with an incomplete analysis for MSO scenario 2x, compliance with PFSS MSO requirements would have been challenged from the completion of the MSO project (October 2012) up to June 2015. CGS is reporting this event as an unanalyzed condition in conformance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Further analyses are being implemented to confirm the condition and to develop appropriate remedial actions. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5118226 June 2015 04:38:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 2200 PDT during startup from refueling outage 22, it was discovered that both level instruments used in reactor protection system (RPS) trip system 'A' for initiation of a reactor scram on low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level were observed to have failed high. This resulted in the inability to generate a full reactor scram on low level (+13 inches). All remaining RPV level indications demonstrated that level was being maintained within normal operating bands. This constitutes a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor. The RPS trip logic at Columbia consists of two trip systems, RPS trip system 'A' and RPS trip system 'B'. There are two level instrument channels in each trip system. Columbia utilizes a 'one-out-of-two taken-twice' trip logic to generate a full scram signal. At least one channel in both trip systems must actuate to generate a full scram signal. With both level instruments in RPS system 'A' failed high, the RPS trip logic was unable to generate a full scram. At 2246 (PDT) and in accordance with TS LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition C, a half scram was generated on RPS trip system 'A' to restore full scram capability. The cause of the failure of the two level instruments associated with RPS Trip system 'A' is under investigation. The level channels are being calibrated prior to changing to mode 1 (power operations). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5116417 June 2015 23:39:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

On June 17th, 2015 at 1841 CDT, it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System return damper 0VS119Y was failed closed, the failed closed damper affects the TSC Emergency Makeup Train filtration efficiency. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO (Emergency Response Organization) activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The licensee has notified the (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector of the issue.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1700 EDT ON 06/18/15 FROM TODD CASAGRANDE TO S. SANDIN * * *

After repairs were completed, the TSC Ventilation was restored to service at 1650 EDT on 06/18/2015. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

ENS 511336 June 2015 17:22:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

The following was received via fax and phone: This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportabllity manual SAF 1.1 0, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On June 6th 2015 at 12:13 (CDT), it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System Supply Fan belts had failed, resulting in loss of ventilation for the facility. Repairs were not completed within the time required had the TSC needed to be staffed. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The licensee has notified the Senior Resident Inspector of the issue.

      • UPDATE PROVIDED BY TODD CASAGRANDE TO NESTOR MAKRIS AT 2305 EDT ON 06/06/2015 ***

After repairs were completed, the TSC ventilation was restored to service at 2300 (EDT) on 06/06/2015. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl) via email

ENS 5109428 May 2015 03:35:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A planned outage of the Division 2 medium voltage switchgear (SM-8) was initiated at 22:17 PDT on 5/27/15. The bus outage results in all area radiation monitors required for emergency classification being non-functional. Compensatory measure monitoring equipment has been established prior to the loss to provide alternate means of monitoring area radiation levels. The SM-8 outage window is scheduled to last 124 hours. Although the monitoring function is maintained by the compensatory monitoring equipment, the planned loss of area radiation monitors for greater than 72 hours is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5108622 May 2015 10:43:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 0014 PDT on 05/22/2015, Columbia experienced an unexpected momentary loss of SM-7, a Division 1 4.16 kV vital bus, resulting in a start of Emergency Diesel DG-1 . Additionally, under voltage circuitry prevented Standby Service Water pump 1A from starting to support DG-1 in response to the valid under voltage condition, and operators tripped the diesel at 0016 PDT. The SM-7 bus was reenergized by a 115 kV offsite source through backup transformer TR-B. The cause of this event was an inadvertent trip of under voltage circuitry while connecting test equipment in preparation for Diesel and Loss of Power logic testing. Division 1 was inoperable due to ongoing maintenance during the current refueling outage and was not being relied upon for decay heat removal or core circulation. Columbia is in Mode 5 with a coolant temperature of 96 degrees F, water level is at the normal refueling flooded level with fuel pool cooling gates removed. Division 2 is providing required electrical power and supporting components required for decay heat removal and inventory control. There was no impact to Shutdown Safety Assessment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5106812 May 2015 22:13:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On 4/21/2015, during performance of source check surveillance on the liquid effluent radiation monitor for the Plant Service Water (TSW), a non-radioactive system, it was discovered that the instrument was determined to be nonfunctional. It was determined on 4/25/15 that the failure was due to an incorrect 'as left' setting from testing conducted on 4/3/2015. The instrument was determined to be non-functional from the period 4/03/15 to 4/25/15 when the setting was corrected. On 5/12/15 it was recognized that because no compensatory measures were implemented during the time the instrument was non-functional that this condition constituted a major loss of radiation assessment capability which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 510547 May 2015 17:51:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. Operations received a report from Security that a fishing boat has capsized on the station cooling lake. At 1530 (CDT) the LaSalle County Operating Department was notified that the LaSalle County Coroner confirmed that there was a fatality. The Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR), LaSalle County Sheriff, Seneca Rescue Team, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified.
ENS 5102730 April 2015 21:24:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 1811 PDT on 04/29/2015, the station declared the RPIS system inoperable when a Control Room panel alarmed the loss of indication. The cause of the equipment loss is under investigation. This unplanned equipment outage is being conservatively reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No other safety equipment has been impacted by this event and the plant continues normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5092626 March 2015 15:19:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

LaSalle Station has completed a review of seismic monitor performance. The seismic monitor is currently operable; however, this review identified 6 times in the past 3 years that the seismic monitor was inoperable such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation. The seismic monitor was determined to be inoperable on the following dates:

 1) January 28, 2015
 2) May 28, 2014
 3) January 1, 2014
 4) August 5, 2013
 5) April 17, 2013
 6) April 10, 2012

These unplanned inoperable conditions of the seismic monitor were entered into the LaSalle Corrective Action Program when they occurred. While Exelon procedural direction allowed the use of offsite sources to obtain seismic data when the seismic monitor is incapable of assessing emergency plan Emergency Action Levels (EALs), this was not explicitly referenced in the approved EALs. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5083018 February 2015 16:01:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 1406 (EST) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 inserted a manual scram due to rapidly rising reactor water level. The cause of the rapidly rising water prior to the manual scram is unknown and under investigation. Reactor water level is currently being maintained in normal control band post scram. The reactor scram is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as, 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' The NRC Resident has been notified. All rods fully inserted. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is in a normal electrical shutdown configuration. The licensee reported no impact on Unit 1. The New York State Public Service Commission was also notified.
ENS 5082717 February 2015 15:35:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. LaSalle's Station Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and Unit 2 was in Mode 5 for its scheduled refuel outage. There was no movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS at the time. OPDRVs (Operations with Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel) were in progress in the secondary containment on Unit 2. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the main control room supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for somewhere between 5-10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met and this rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, in the main control room, was never observed to be less than -0.25 inches of water column. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5073212 January 2015 23:17:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 1939 (EST) on January 12, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 when secondary containment was declared inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being above the Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement of -0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. This condition is related to sustained high winds. At 1956 on January 12, 2015 the differential pressure was restored, the secondary containment was declared operable and the Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 exited. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident'. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 5070730 December 2014 03:51:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During routine surveillance testing of the Unit 2 Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (LOS-DG-M3) a small pinhole leak was identified in the pump casing of the Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The required actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 were entered on 12/29/14 at 2330 (CST) when the HPCS system was determined to be inoperable. This condition could have prevented the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), a single train safety system, from performing its design function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5067512 December 2014 21:15:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5Engineering identified fuse and breaker coordination issues with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) valves operated at the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSDP). The coordination issues are such that, given a fire in the main control room, it is possible that RCIC valve power supply breakers could trip prior to tripping control power fuses. Operation of RCIC from the RSDP could be impaired in this scenario without compensatory actions to reset breakers. RCIC is the single credited source of makeup to the reactor pressure vessel during this scenario. The current licensing basis (Fire Protection Report) does not identify the compensatory actions required to reset breakers prior to RCIC operation at the RSDP. This condition is applicable to Unit 1 and Unit 2. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Event or Condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. Actions are being taken to amend the appropriate operating procedures to take the required steps to ensure proper operation of RCIC in the postulated scenario. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5067412 December 2014 18:20:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material' and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.' Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 and no movement of irradiated fuel, core alterations, or OPDRVs (Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel) were in progress in the secondary containment. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25 inches of water column at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls (barricades and signs) have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5060612 November 2014 14:42:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. His access to the facility was terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5056925 October 2014 23:41:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A planned outage for the Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TEA-RIS-13) and the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) for health inspection was initiated at 1046 PDT on 10/23/14. Due to maintenance retests taking longer than expected and in anticipation of possibly exceeding 72 hours for the planned outage, this event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability under regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway during the outage. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. The Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 5046417 September 2014 09:21:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.' On September 17th, 2014, at 0800 (CDT), the Exelon LaSalle Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 4 hours. The licensee has notified the (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector of the issue.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY WAYNE CLAYTON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1741 EDT ON 09/17/2014 * * *

The scheduled TSC ventilation system maintenance is expected to be out of service for approximately an additional 7 hours. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector of the issue. Notified R3DO (Dickson)

ENS 5041328 August 2014 18:26:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. While the 'B' train of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC was inoperable and out of service for emergent repairs due to an oil leak, the 'A' train of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC became inoperable due to a failure of the liquid line solenoid valve. The Main Control Room Envelope consists of the Main Control Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room. Both the Control Room HVAC and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC systems are required to be operable in the current mode. This is a loss of safety function for a system that is intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is discussed in chapter 6 of the UFSAR and is Tech Spec required and is safety related. Also, the system, structure, or component (SSC) is inoperable in a required mode in the Tech Spec applicability and there is no redundant equipment in the same system that is operable. The required actions of Tech Spec 3.7.5 were entered for this event. Online Risk remains Green. The station is currently pursuing repairs to both trains. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5039825 August 2014 09:51:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

At 0757 CDT on 8/25/14, LaSalle Main Control Room received a fire alarm from the Unit 2 Reactor Building 807 foot elevation. Operators dispatched and confirmed no fire at 0817 CDT (20 min). At 0812 CDT (15 min) an unusual event (HU3) was declared due to not having verified no fire within 15 minutes of the alarm. No fire was confirmed and plans are in progress to terminate event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operation Center, FEMA National Watch Center, NICC, Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ALAN MCLAUGHLIN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1046 EDT * * *

At 0915 CDT on 8/25/2014, the LaSalle Shift Emergency Director terminated the Unusual Event (HU3) which had been declared at 0812 CDT. No fire present was verified at 0817 CDT and required hourly firewatch is in place. Maintenance Department has begun efforts to locate and replace faulted detector or other degraded component. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Notified R3DO(Passehl), NRREO (Hiland), IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operation Center, FEMA National Watch Center, NICC, Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 5038019 August 2014 14:14:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0733 (PDT), on 08/19/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - low and high range detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 503465 August 2014 22:20:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5

This notification is being provided pursuant with SAF 1.6 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and SAF 1.7 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). At 1734 CDT on August 5, 2014, LaSalle Unit 2 automatically scrammed due to an RPS actuation. The MSIVs isolated on a Group 1 signal, the cause is under investigation. The reactor water cleanup system isolated during the transient. The plant is stable with Reactor Pressure Control being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System and SRVs and level being controlled by the Low Pressure Core Spray System. The plant is planned to remain in hot shutdown pending investigation of the trip." The Unit 2 electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup. All control rods inserted fully on the scram. Unit 1 was not affected by the Unit 2 transient. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MICHAEL FITZPATRICK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1650 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *

The initial notification to the NRC stated that the reactor water cleanup system had isolated during the transient. The actual status is being corrected to state that the reactor water cleanup pump tripped during the transient. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 503415 August 2014 00:57:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 1701 hours PDT on August 4, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared nonfunctional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Field team assessment function is unaffected and remains available if required. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NICHOLAS RULLMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1501 EDT ON 8/8/14 * * *

At 1501 PDT on 8/7/14, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitor sample rack was declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 5029622 July 2014 21:36:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5

This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During the conduct of the Unit 2 Division 3 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator (DG) surveillance test, one of 2 Cooling Water Outlet Valves failed to automatically open. The Division 3 Diesel is supplied by two redundant trains of cooling water one from each Service Water Divisional Header. Although the redundant cooling water supply was fully available and supplied adequate cooling to the diesel generator, the DG was at reduced margin to have adequate cooling water supply, if required during a loss of offsite power. Due to this loss of margin and inoperable condition, it has been determined that this failure could potentially affect the safety function of this system, and is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification. The licensee has attributed the failure to high resistance in a relay which is currently being replaced. This places Unit 2 in the Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1, which requires restoration of Diesel Generator within 72 hours or commence a Reactor Shutdown. All other ECCS Systems have been verified operable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the State of New York.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1940 EDT ON 9/2/2014 FROM ANTHONY PETRELLI TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This update retracts Event Notification #50296, which reported an event or condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, it was determined that the ability of the HPCS system (single supported train) remained operable and capable of performing its safety function as evaluated by the NMP Unit 2 Safety Function Determination Process (TS 5.5.11). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Ferdas).

ENS 5029422 July 2014 16:57:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0635 hours PDT on July 22, 2014, Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TEA-RIS-13) and the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) were declared non-functional. The cause of the malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DUANE SALSBURY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2018 EDT ON 7/28/2014 * * *

At 1351 PDT on 7/28/2014, Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TES-RIS-13) and Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TES-SR-26) were declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).

ENS 5029221 July 2014 17:30:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 502594 July 2014 08:22:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 0233 PDT on July 4, 2014, TEA-RIS-13 and the Turbine Building process radiation monitoring sample rack were declared non-functional. The cause of the malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5021620 June 2014 07:31:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5

At 0110 (EDT) on June 20, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 lost communication to the DRMS (Digital Radiation Monitor System Computer). The DRMS provides the Control Room alarm functions for Offgas Pretreatment Process Radiation Monitors 2OFG-CAB13A/13B and Cooling Tower Blowdown Effluent Radiation Monitor 2CWS-CAB157. Due to the loss of the Control Room alarm function, 2OFG-CAB13A, 2OFG-CAB13B, and 2CWS-CAB157 have been declared non-functional. Compensatory measures (i.e. collect and analyze grab samples) have been implemented per the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The non-functional radiation monitors are necessary for accident assessment and are credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification. The inability to classify an EAL due to the out of service radiation monitors is considered a loss of assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has notified the State.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CHRIS SKINNER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1313 EDT ON 06/24/2014 * * *

At 1208 (EDT) on June 21, the DRMS was declared functional. With the alarm functions restored, radiation monitors 2OFG-CAB13A, 2OFG-CAB13B, and 2CWS-CAB157 were declared functional and compensatory actions per the ODCM have been discontinued. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York. Notified R1DO (Bickett).

.. .  .
ENS 5018711 June 2014 00:23:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Secondary Containment was declared inoperable on 6/10/14 from 2032 EDT until 2036 EDT during the restoration of Reactor Building Ventilation System to a normal lineup. While performing actions to restore ventilation fans the Above Refuel Floor Exhaust Fan, 2HVR-FN5A, tripped when started resulting in building differential pressure becoming less negative than -0.25 inches. Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment, Action A.1 to restore within 4 hours was entered at 2032 EDT on 6/10/14. The standby Above Refuel Floor Exhaust Fan, 2HVR-FN5B, was started per procedure and building differential pressure was restored. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 2036 EDT on 6/10/14 and Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 action was exited. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State of New York.
ENS 5018310 June 2014 16:25:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Regional Safeguards Inspector.
ENS 501829 June 2014 18:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0715 hours PDT on June 9, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures were implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY QUOC VO TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2019 EDT ON 06/14/2014 * * *

At 1255 PDT on 06/13/2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 5013022 May 2014 09:31:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 0210 (EDT) on May 22, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2, the reactor building vent radiation monitor (Vent WRGMS) was removed from service due to a problem with the check source. The unplanned isolation of Vent WRGMS is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Until the equipment is restored, Chemistry will perform sampling requirements per the ODCM. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 500843 May 2014 03:42:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1920 (PDT), on 05/02/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Low and High Range Detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1754 EDT ON 05/08/14 FROM JASON LOVEGREN TO DONG PARK * * *

Following completion of maintenance activities PRM-RE-1B, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector was returned to operable status at 0810 PDT on 05/08/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Whitten).

ENS 5007630 April 2014 17:36:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. Unit 1 was in mode 1 and in a condition of moving irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. Unit 2 was in mode 5 and in the condition of moving irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, core alterations, and operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock (Unit 2) and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the auxiliary building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 5 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 (Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement) was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less that -0.25 inches of water column at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 499964 April 2014 08:58:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Ventilation Wide Range Gaseous Monitoring System was removed from service on 4/1/2014 at 1140 EDT to support isolation of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation during a Division 2 electrical bus outage. The monitoring system will be out of service for greater than 72 hours due to the planned maintenance window. NMP2 is in Mode 5, refueling. Compensatory actions remain in effect in accordance with the Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual. Expected return to service is 4/5/14. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 499852 April 2014 08:42:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 0123 EDT on April 2, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Refueling, and in the other specified condition of Operations with Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel. During this condition both redundant personnel airlock doors were open at the same time in an airlock penetration of the reactor building. This condition represents a loss of Secondary Containment safety function. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Action A.1 was entered for the loss of Secondary Containment and was promptly exited when the doors were closed. Secondary containment being inoperable is an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4997329 March 2014 23:49:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to SAF 1.8, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During steady state operations on Unit 1 at 1620 (CDT) hrs. on 3/29/14, the Division 3 Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) Pump Room, SWGR Room, and Battery Room Ventilation failed in such a manner that heat could not be removed from the rooms. These Division 3 systems supply power and cooling water to the High Pressure Core Spray system (HPCS), which is a single-train system. The HPCS system and its associated power supplies were declared inoperable based on long-term temperature considerations. The system remains available due to manual damper adjustments that than can be made per an approved procedure. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4994824 March 2014 05:14:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 0031 (EDT) on March 24, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was lowering power for the planned refueling outage. The loss of reactor building heating resulted in the isolation of the reactor building to maintain building temperature. Isolation of the reactor building resulted in the isolation of the reactor building vent radiation monitor (Vent WRGMS) which is a loss of emergency assessment capability. The isolation of the reactor building also resulted in declaring secondary containment inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being positive. Secondary containment was declared operable at 0034 (EDT) when differential pressure was restored to greater than negative 0.25 inches water gauge. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The unplanned isolation of Vent WRGMS is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 4990612 March 2014 21:18:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 1422 EDT on March 12, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 declared secondary containment inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being positive. The positive differential pressure was related to sustained high winds from the northeast associated with Winter Storm Vulcan. The reactor building was isolated at 1630 EDT and secondary containment declared operable at 1700 EDT when Secondary Containment Vacuum was restored to greater than 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The isolation of the reactor building resulted in the isolation of the reactor building vent rad monitor (Vent WRGMS (Wide Range Gas Monitors)) which is a loss of emergency assessment capability. Secondary containment being inoperable is an 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control radioactive release.' The unplanned isolation of the Vent WRGMS is an 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee will notify the state.
ENS 4989811 March 2014 18:27:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5An extent of condition review of all unfused ammeters circuits in Direct Current (DC) distribution systems at Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) identified areas in the plant which may be susceptible to secondary fires due to hot shorts from these unfused ammeters. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4988810 March 2014 19:20:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 1628 EDT Nine Mile Point (NMP) Unit 2 experienced an actuation of the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) system which resulted in a reactor scram. Coincident with the scram, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system initiated. Prior to the event, maintenance personnel were working in the vicinity of a reactor vessel level instrumentation rack and may have agitated the common drain line of the transmitters. A prompt investigation is underway to investigate the incident. The actuation signal for the RCIC system was invalid because reactor vessel level did not reach level two and the actuation was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters. The reactor scram is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as, 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' The event has been entered into the NMP corrective action program as CR-2014-001963. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has notified the State of New York. The reactor is shutdown with all rods inserted. Decay heat is being rejected to the condenser and reactor water level is being maintained by condensate, feedwater, reactor water clean up, and control rod drive systems.
ENS 498684 March 2014 05:05:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5At 0137 EST Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a loss of an uninterruptible power supply 2VBB-UPS3B which resulted in a half scram and half isolations. This caused a loss of cooling water to the Reactor Recirculation Pumps and other indications for the loss of power. At 0143 EST a Manual Reactor Scram was inserted due to the rise of temperatures on the Reactor Recirculation Pump seal cavity temperature and motor winding temperature. The reactor building ventilation radiation monitor went non-functional when the reactor building isolated on the loss of UPS power. The standby gas treatment system was started as required and restored the reactor building differential pressure. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation and 8-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. All systems functioned as required following the manual scram. All control rods fully inserted. The cause of the loss of the UPS is under investigation.
ENS 4985927 February 2014 03:37:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5

On February 24th at 0400 (EST), the Division 3 diesel (HPCS diesel) was declared inoperable for planned maintenance. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 condition B was entered with a required action to restore the diesel to operable status within 72 hours. Shortly after starting the diesel for post maintenance testing, operations observed erratic voltage regulator operation. The diesel was secured at 1621 on 2/24/14 before completing the required post maintenance operability test and troubleshooting is ongoing. At 0330 on 2/27/14, the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was declared inoperable and TS 3.5.1 condition B was entered. With the HPCS system declared inoperable, TS 3.8.1 condition B was exited in accordance with the following note modifying TS 3.8.1: 'Division 3 AC electrical power sources are not required to be OPERABLE when High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is inoperable.' The HPCS system is a single train system that is discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. The unplanned inoperability of the HPCS system is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.' The condition has been entered into the NMP corrective action program as CR-2014-001623. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RODGER ORZELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1210 EST ON 2/27/14 * * *

The NMP Unit 2 Division 3 diesel testing was completed satisfactorily. The licensee declared the Division 3 diesel and HPCS systems operable at 1013 EST on 2/27/14 and exited TS 3.8.1 and 3.5.1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 4984119 February 2014 14:29:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0829 (PST), on 2/19/2014 the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NICHOLAS RULLMAN TO VINCE KLCO AT 1400 EST ON 2/20/2014 * * *

Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 1037 PST on 2/20/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Allen).

ENS 4984018 February 2014 22:15:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material. An employee entered a secondary containment (airlock) interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 3 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25 inches H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4983417 February 2014 10:42:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure rose above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge multiple times from 0044 (PST) to 0305 (PST) on 2/17/14. The alarm was received in the control room at 0305 (PST). This is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Reactor Building pressure has been restored to normal (greater than 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge), returning Secondary Containment to operable status. Highest actual value indicated was +0.21 inches pressure water gauge. The cause of the event is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4983216 February 2014 18:21:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5

An automatic initiation of Emergency Diesel Generators was received due to a loss of one of two off-site power sources. On February 16, 2014 at 1216 (EST), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic initiation of the Division 1 and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) due to a loss of Line 5. Line 5 is one of the two 115KV offsite power sources. Line 5 was lost due to an offsite event that is currently being evaluated by the grid operator. During the electrical transient, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 also experienced a feedwater level control lockup, requiring manual control. No Emergency Core Cooling Systems actuated, and feedwater level control was returned to automatic. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 remained at 100% power during the loss of Line 5, one of the offsite power sources. The NRC resident has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of New York. Unit 2 is currently in a 24-hour Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) Action Statement 3.8.1.A3. Once Division III is realigned to the "B" side Line 6 offsite power, Unit 2 will be in a 72-hour LCO. Both EDGs are currently running. There was no effect on Unit 1.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MARK GREER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1727 EST ON 2/17/2014 * * *

In addition to the initiation of Division 1 and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators, Service Water Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE146A and Radwaste/Reactor Building Vent Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems were also lost. Compensatory actions were established as required by station procedures and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. The loss of these instruments is reportable as a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Service Water Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE146A was restored to service on February 16, 2014 at 1450 EST. The Radwaste/Reactor Building Vent Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems were restored to service on February 17, 2014 at 0240. It is recognized that this notification is not within eight hours of the event. Line 5 is restored to OPERABLE February 17, 2014 at 1628. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this additional reportable condition (and the update on the lost off-site power source). The condition has been entered into the corrective action program. The licensee also notified the State of New York Public Service Commission. The licensee exited the 72-hour LCO for the lost off-site power at 1628 on February 17, 2014. Notified R1DO(Krohn), NRREO (Monninger) and ILTAB (Whitney).

ENS 497955 February 2014 15:28:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2
GE-5
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, at 1130 EST, Oswego County notified Nine Mile Point (NMP) of a loss of the tone alert system at approximately 1000. The loss of the tone alert was identified by the National Weather Service - Binghamton forecast office when it was determined that the phone line to the site was out of service. Site Emergency Procedures define a loss of the tone alert system for greater than one hour as a significant loss of emergency communications. This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the NMP and JAF (James A. FitzPatrick) nuclear power plants. This failure meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. The county alert sirens, which also function as part of the public prompt notification system, remain operable. At 1328 on February 5, 2014, Nine Mile Point was notified by Oswego County that the tone alert system was returned to service, effective as of 1325. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.