Semantic search
Entered date | Event description | |
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ENS 53040 | 28 October 2017 13:29:00 | A patient receiving treatment for a liver disease was prescribed 60 milliCuries of Y-90 SIR-Spheres. The delivered dose was calculated to be 11 milliCuries and stasis was not achieved. The patient was notified of the misadministration and is scheduled to receive the fully prescribed dose. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
ENS 53037 | 26 October 2017 17:00:00 | The following information was received by facsimile from the vendor: Component: Speed switch P/Ns ESl50267C, ESl50267E, ESl50267H, and ESl50267K. Summary: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on September 12, 2017 upon notification of a potential issue with speed switch P/N ESl50267K supplied to Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The speed switch had reportedly failed in service which resulted in a failure to start of the emergency diesel generator (EDG). An analysis performed by Exelon Powerlabs determined the failure was due to a shorted capacitor that is installed on the speed switch's relay output contacts to ground. The evaluation was concluded on October 25, 2017 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. The speed switch output contacts are utilized in the engine's start circuitry and failure to function properly could adversely affect the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set. Impact on Operability: If the resistance path to ground were sufficiently low, the ability of the relay output contacts to pick-up and/or drop-out associated components would be compromised. The speed switch relays are used in safety-related EDG start circuitry to control various electrical relays. Failure to properly control any of these components could adversely affect the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator. Root cause evaluation: The root cause of the failure is a deficiency in the design and selection of the EMC (Electromagnetic compatibility) mitigating components. Consideration was not given for the impact of voltage transients imparted on the capacitors during coil de-energization. For customers without suppression from the inductive kick, the magnitude of voltage transients may be sufficient to damage and ultimately degrade the capacitors to the point of failure. Affected nuclear plants include Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities, Dresden, Davis Besse and Hope Creek. |
ENS 53016 | 16 October 2017 08:36:00 | The following information was received from the State of California: The Licensee discovered at approximately (1700 PDT) on 10/15/17 that two 3 Ci Am-241Be well logging sources had been stolen from their storage area at Weller Ranch in Kern County. Locks had been cut and the sources were removed from the approximate 12-foot storage pipe. Additionally, an approximate 2500 (pound) calibration water tank was also missing. The FBI was notified by CA Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) at approximately (2030 PDT) on 10/15/17. RHB will be onsite 10/16/17. California 5010 Number: 101517
The two well logging sources have been accounted for. An unauthorized individual had accessed the sources, removing them from their storage location on his father's ranch land and discarding them a short distance away without any knowledge of what they were. The unauthorized individual also took the water calibration tank for his personal use. The well logging sources are back in the possession of the licensee. Notified R4DO (Vasquez) , NMSS Events Notification, CNSNS (MEXICO) and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52991 | 25 September 2017 14:04:00 | The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email: Notifications: On September 25, 2017, the licensee informed the Department (PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection) of a failure of an electronic component of a fixed gauge. It is reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)(i). Event Description: The electronic component of the automatic shutter on an IMS Model 5301-01 gauge containing approximately 20 curies of Cesium-137 failed to close on its own. The licensee immediately notified the RSO, as per their emergency procedure, who was able to remotely log in to the computer software system and bypass the automatic mode to close the shutter. The gauge is housed in a secure and entry restricted enclosure and instructions have been given to all operators to ensure that the shutter is closed while not in use. The manufacturer, IMS, was notified and is scheduled to make repairs on September 26, 2017. All regulatory precautions were taken and no overexposures have occurred. Cause of the Event: Equipment failure. ACTIONS: The Department will perform a reactive inspection. The manufacturer has already been scheduled to correct the problem. More information will be provided upon receipt. PA Event Report ID No.: PA170014 |
ENS 53017 | 16 October 2017 11:08:00 | The following information was received from the State of New York via facsimile: On September 21, 2017 the Department (New York State Department of Health) was notified that a Best Medical International, Inc., Model #2301 lodine-125 seed used for localization of non-palpable lesions and lymph nodes was lost. On September 18, a patient was implanted with a 125.2 microCurie lodine-125 seed. The seed was verified to be implanted by use of a survey meter. When the patient returned for explant three days later, the iodine-125 seed could not be detected. The licensee surveyed the patient's vehicle, house, laundry, and trash and no radioactivity was detected. The licensee reported placing the seed 'superficially' within the patient and the licensee speculates that the seed may have become dislodged from the patient at some point between the implant and explant. New York Report ID No.: NYDOH-NY-17-08 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52974 | 17 September 2017 16:49:00 | On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control. The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred. These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed. This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation. |
ENS 52969 | 14 September 2017 16:38:00 | The following information was received from the State of California via email: On September 14, 2017, (The RSO) of Southwest Calibration & Training notified the RHB Brea office that United Inspection & Testing, Inc., RML # 4788-33, had a Troxler, 3411B, serial #6644 radioactive gauge run over and damaged. On September 14, 2017, RHB Brea contacted (The RSO) of United Inspection & Testing, Inc. (The RSO of United Inspection & Testing, Inc.) informed our office that the radioactive gauge had been run over by a backhoe on the afternoon of September 13, 2017 at approximately 1400 (PDT), at the intersection of Banana Street and Daurin Street at a construction site in Fontana, CA. As a result of the accident the radioactive gauge had the handle broken off. The RSO was able to return the Cs-137 source to its shielded position, but it could not be locked in the shielded position due to the damage to the gauge. The authorized user of the gauge was also struck by the backhoe and died of his injuries. (The RSO of the United Inspection & Testing, Inc.) retrieved the gauge from the accident site and transported it to Southwest Calibration & Training to be inspected. (The RSO) of Southwest Calibration & Training reported that the Troxler radioactive gauge read 0.9 mR/hr at 1 foot. The gauge was extensively damaged and may not be repairable. California 5010 Number: 091417 |
ENS 52971 | 15 September 2017 15:17:00 | The following information was received by the State of Illinois by email: IEMA (Illinois Emergency Management Agency) was notified at (1353 CDT) on 9/8/17 that a load of ferrous metal was being rejected from a scrap metal recycling facility (Omnisource in Indiana) back to Gaby Iron in Chicago Heights. The max exposure rate was reported at 20 microR/hour (4 microR/hour background). The load is being returned under DOT SP IN-IL-17-010. The suspect load was inspected Monday, September 11th. An Alnor dew pointer device with an intact 7 microCurie Ra-226 source was recovered. No removable contamination was identified. The device was impounded by IEMA and is pending return to an appropriate entity. No additional radiation sources were discovered and the remainder of the load was released without further restriction. Pending appropriate disposal or return to the manufacturer, this matter is being considered closed. The device was an Alnor Instrument portable gauge; Model 7350; Serial Number 230667. The Amersham sealed source was a model RAM.X452; Ra-226; 7 microCurie activity. NMED Report: IL177030 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 53062 | 8 November 2017 15:06:00 | The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email: A local Health District employee had a Niton Xlp 300 XRF with a 50 mCi Cadmium-109 source stolen overnight on Saturday, September 2, 2017. It was in the car in their garage and someone came in and took it. The employee had worked late at a job site that day and brought the gauge home instead of returning to the office. Employee's garage door did not close for some reason that night and they were unaware that it was open when they went to bed. There were several other cars broken into that night in employee's neighborhood. A report was filed with local police department. Device has not yet been recovered. Source/Radioactive Material: Sealed Source; Radionuclide: Cd-109; Activity: 50mCi; Device Name: X-RAY Fluorescence (XRF); Model Number: Niton XLp 300; Manufacturer: Thermo Scientific Analytical; Serial Number: 98149. Ohio Item Number: OH170007
The following report was received via e-mail: Note: According to device owner, the manufacturer told them that this incident was NOT reportable to their regulatory agency. The owner reported the event on 11/6/17 as a result of more research on their part. UPDATE: The gauge was found by a member of the public in their yard, where it had apparently been abandoned. The local health district was notified based on contact information on case. The case was still locked when found. The device is now back in the possession of the local health district as of 11/27/17. Notified the R3DO (Duncan), NMSS Events Resources and CNSC (via e-mail) . THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52909 | 16 August 2017 15:41:00 | On 8/16/2017, at 1039 (EDT), an un-planned trip of the Peach Bottom Station Blackout Transformer 34.5 kV feeder breaker 1005 and a loss of the 191-00 line occurred causing a loss of power to Unit 1 and the TSC. Power was not restored to the TSC or the ventilation system within 1 hour. Power was subsequently restored to the TSC at 1207 hours (EDT) and the ventilation system was restored to available. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. |
ENS 52905 | 15 August 2017 14:07:00 | On August 15, 2017, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Callaway Plant identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific Technical Specification equipment is considered not to be adequately protected from tornado missiles. The recirculation lines for all three independent trains of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) connect to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) inside the CST Valve House, which is not a tornado missile-resistant structure. The direct impact by a design basis missile could result in crimping of the recirculation lines, thereby creating the potential to cause damage to the Train A and B Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFPs) and the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) by restricting recirculation flow to less than the design requirements. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) remove residual heat, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident. These conditions are being addressed in accordance with NRC's Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 and Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52907 | 15 August 2017 16:52:00 | The following information was provided by the State of California via email: On 08/14/17, RHB (California Radiation Health Branch) received an incident report from Office of Emergency Services regarding a damaged moisture density gauge. A CPN gauge, Model MC-3, S/N M380108935, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241 was run over by a heavy construction equipment at a job site in the city of Santa Clara, CA. The top of the gauge housing was damaged with a broken rod, however, the user managed to retrieve the source back into shielded position. The damaged gauge was placed in the transport case and taken to the licensee's facility for disposal. Fire department was at the incident site, performed surveys using a survey meter (no survey meter information available) and the readings did not indicate any contamination. According to the gauge user, Fire Department readings indicated 500 uR/hr at the damaged gauge and 6 uR/hr at 15 feet from the gauge. The gauge will be transported to CPN for leak testing and disposal on 08/15/17. RHB will be following up on this incident. California 5010 Number: 081417 |
ENS 52906 | 15 August 2017 14:24:00 | Following a panoramic irradiator two day shutdown, a restart with three source racks commenced. Air pressure was applied to raise the source racks. During the restart, two source racks (racks 1 and 3) did not descend into the irradiator pool as designed. During an investigation, two release valves associated with the two source racks did not operate properly. Operators manually released air pressure and all source racks descended into the irradiator pool. The deficient release valves were replaced and the source racks were satisfactorily retested. The source racks all properly descended into the pool. The time the source racks were inoperable for approximately 1.5 hours. |
ENS 52891 | 8 August 2017 20:22:00 | On August 8, 2017, at 1554 hours (EDT), during restoration from testing of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Suppression Pool Level High Instrumentation, unexpected as-left indications were found that impacted both of the required channels of instrumentation. Subsequent venting of the instrumentation lines was completed and both channels of instrumentation are reading consistent with previously taken as-found data. The instrumentation was declared OPERABLE at 1635. The initial cause of the unexpected as-left indications appears to be the introduction of air into the instrumentation lines during the calibration activities. This is considered a loss of safety function based on both of the HPCS Suppression Pool Level High Instrumentation channels being declared INOPERABLE and the loss of the automatic HPCS suction swap to the Suppression Pool on a high level. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The (NRC Resident Inspector) has been notified. |
ENS 52876 | 28 July 2017 15:22:00 | Containment atmosphere oxygen level was measured at 18.4 percent. This is below normal habitability level. The cause of the low oxygen level is a nitrogen leak inside containment Nitrogen has been isolated from containment and operators are preparing to purge containment. The licensee notified the State of California, local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, USDA OPS, HHS OPS, DOE OPS, DHS NICC, EPA EOC. Notified FDA EOC, NuclearSSA, FEMA NWC and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.
The ALERT was terminated on 7/28/17 at 1819 PDT. The containment atmosphere was restored to normal conditions. The nitrogen source was isolated. The cause of the nitrogen leak into containment is under investigation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee has notified the State of California and the local authorities. The licensee plans to issue a press release. Notified the R4DO (Hay), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant). Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, USDA OPS, HHS OPS, DOE OPS, DHS NICC, EPA EOC. Notified FDA EOC, NuclearSSA, FEMA NWC and FEMA NRCC SASC via email. |
ENS 52874 | 27 July 2017 18:54:00 | (Unit 2) HPCI was declared inoperable due to improper valve alignment stemming from an incorrect sequence directed from a work order. (Unit 2) HPCI was inoperable for 20 minutes and was manually re-aligned to an operable status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52872 | 25 July 2017 11:07:00 | On July 25, 2017, at 0428 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in Mode 3, beginning a Reactor Startup. While in the initial phase of withdrawing the first of four Control Rod banks, the two associated group demand position indicators deviated greater than 2 steps from each other. In accordance with Technical Requirement 3.1.7, Position Indication System, Shutdown, with one or more group demand position indicators inoperable, the reactor trip breakers are to be opened immediately. Operations personnel opened the reactor trip breakers immediately by initiating a manual trip of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The Auxiliary Feedwater system was in service and controlling Steam Generator water levels at the time of the event and did not receive any valid actuation signals. No other system actuations occurred as a result of this reactor trip and all systems operated as designed. The cause of the position indication system inoperability is currently under investigation. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52871 | 24 July 2017 23:50:00 | |
ENS 52867 | 21 July 2017 10:40:00 | The following information was received by the licensee via email: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC concerning a defect in an Eaton/Cutler Hammer A200 series starter that failed while in service at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. The failed starter was manufactured by Eaton Corporation in 2014 and purchased by Susquehanna from AZZ/NLI as part of an MCC bucket assembly. The starter failed with its contacts stuck in the energized state when it was de-energized. A failure analysis identified the contactor sticking to be due to the pole faces of the coil laminations and those of the armature laminations adhering to one another at normal operating temperatures. There was residue/material on the pole faces which closely matched Polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) and silicone grease. One of the characteristics of PDMS is that at cooler temperatures it is more of a solid consistency, and at higher temperatures it becomes more viscous and tacky. A previous Part 21 report submitted by Curtiss-Wright QualTech NP (Event Notification Number 51611) in December 2015 provided notification of Eaton/Cutler Hammer A200 series starters failures due to silicon based mold release that remained on the molded parts and would come between the moving (magnet) and fixed armatures. The Part 21 stated that when heated for extended period of time, the material would become sticky causing anywhere from a minor delay in opening to a frozen closed condition. Eaton/Cutler Hammer determined that the silicone mold release was first introduced into the manufacturing facility in May 2008 and used periodically until October 2012. According to Eaton/Cutler Hammer, any starters manufactured after January 1, 2013 should be silicon mold release free. Following the failure of the 2014 starter at Susquehanna, Eaton Corporation performed an investigation and reconfirmed that silicon mold release was banned from molding production in October 2012 and has not been used since that time. Eaton concluded that the contamination does not appear to be systemic, but rather random and intermittent and that the contamination was most likely introduced either by operators and assemblers on the manufacturing lines, or by others who disassemble and inspect the product after shipment from their plant. Susquehanna does not take the components apart during receipt for testing or visual inspection. Eaton concluded that there is no evidence that the issue is systemic and considers it a random event. Susquehanna has evaluated the condition and has concluded that the condition could create a substantial safety hazard. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52858 | 14 July 2017 11:13:00 | The following information was received from the State of Arizona via email: This First Notice constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received WITHOUT verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Agency (Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency) Staff at this time. During an inspection of the licensee on July 13, 2017, an inspector found one portable gauge where the radiation source exposure shutter would not close when moved to the closed position. The inspector's dose measurement at contact with the device was approximately 100 mR/hr. The gauge is a Troxler model 3430, Serial Number 30302, containing 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of Americium-241. The licensee has contacted a repair company to fix the gauge as soon as possible. The Agency is investigating the event. The Governor's office and U.S. NRC are being notified of this event. Arizona First Notice: 17-009 |
ENS 52851 | 13 July 2017 10:33:00 | The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email: This is an initial report regarding a misadministration event in Colorado. University of Colorado Hospital (License Number: CO 828-01) had a misadministration of Y-90 microspheres (SIRTex SIRSpheres) on Wednesday, July 12, 2017. At approximately 11 (MDT), the post administration measurements of the waste from the SIRSpheres Administration indicated that the activity administered to segment 2/3 of the patient's liver was only 68.7 percent of the prescribed activity. The written directive called for an activity of 0.24 GBq and residual waste activity measurements indicated that 0.165 GBq was delivered. The physician indicated that stasis was not reached during the administration to this segment. There was a separate administration to segment (four) of the liver in which stasis was reached. Follow-up information will be provided after they are available. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
ENS 52829 | 26 June 2017 18:39:00 | On June 26, 2017, at 1531 (EDT), Indian Point Unit 2 inserted a manual reactor trip prior to Steam Generator levels reaching the automatic reactor trip setpoint. Steam Generator water level perturbation resulted from a loss of 22 Main Boiler Feed Pump. All Control Rods verified inserted. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started as designed and supplied feedwater to the Steam Generators. Heat removal is via the Main Condenser through the High Pressure Steam Dumps. Offsite power is being supplied through the normal 138kV feeder 95332. The cause of the 22 Main Boiler Feed Pump loss is currently under investigation. Entergy is issuing a press release/news release on this issue. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 3. The licensee notified the State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52826 | 24 June 2017 15:42:00 | On June 24, 2017 at 1028 (EDT), a loss of secondary containment occurred due to trip of 2V217A Zone III Filtered Exhaust Fan causing a reduction in D/P (differential pressure) to less than the required 0.25 WC (water column). 2V217B Zone III Filtered Exhaust Fan started on low flow in AUTO as designed and secondary containment D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 WC by 1029 hours. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7 as a loss of a safety function. There is no redundant Susquehanna secondary containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52822 | 23 June 2017 11:37:00 | The following information was received from the State of North Carolina via email: On June 22, 2017 at (1130 EDT), North Carolina Radiation Protection Section (RPS) was informed by the Radiation Safety Officer for Hospira, Inc. (Pfizer), Rocky Mount, NC (License 064-0969-1) that they were experiencing an issue involving their Wet Shielded Irradiator (Nordion Model JS-8900, Serial Number IR-183, approved for 4,800,000.00 Ci of Co-60). RSO stated that during routine maintenance checks the Source 1 Rack of the irradiator would not trip the down switch to confirm the source rack was in the down position on the control panel and that they were following emergency procedures. Nordion was then contacted by the licensee to obtain assistance. RPS inspectors were immediately dispatched to the licensee's site. Once on site, RSO informed RPS that visual confirmation was made of source position via hydraulic cylinders that were fully extended, comparison of cable tightness on roof was observed, and that no indication of radiation in the vault was detected; all leading to the unconfirmed indication that the source rack had moved to the down position. With the assistance from Nordion, Hospira staff were able to initiate bypass procedures and gain access to the vault where confirmation was made that the source racks were in the down position. Nordion advised that a faulty down position switch was the cause for the failure. Switch was repaired on site by Hospira engineers, same day. Following repair, Hospira personnel cycled the sources which were brought up into position for one sterilization cycle and then the sources were brought down to test the position sensor. The test was successful, as indicated by the down position indicator lamps and screen on the operator's panel. Nordion staff was informed of the successful test and Hospira staff continued procedural tests to confirm full functionality. After confirming cycling up and down of the source racks, Hospira personnel performed full monthly QA check before resuming operations. 30-Day report is pending to RPS.
The following information was received from the State of North Carolina via email: We have completed our investigation and have no further information to provide in this event report. We would like to request (NMED) Event 170315 be Closed & Complete. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl) and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
ENS 52823 | 23 June 2017 16:13:00 | The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email: The licensee reported on June 23, 2017 that licensee learned from its licensed leak test service provider on June 21, 2017 that one 6 millicurie, cobalt-57 sealed source out of 25 sources received in a package on June 16, 2017 from the source manufacturer, Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products, tested positive for leakage. The leakage was reported as being 4.2 times the limit of 0.005 microCuries (0.021 microCuries). The other 24 sources showed no contamination. The leaking sealed source is an Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products Model 3901-2 source, serial number P6-883. The licensee reported that the leaking source was contained and secured in an individual zip lock type plastic bag; that there is no facility contamination based on area surveys performed; that the external surfaces of the package received, that had contained all of the 25 source, had been wipe tested and that the package was not contaminated; and that the sources were not used pending leak test results. The licensee reported that it notified the source manufacturer on June 21, 2017, received a return authorization number from the manufacturer, and shipped the source back to the manufacturer on June 22, 2017. The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) considers this event to be open. |
ENS 52820 | 22 June 2017 20:33:00 | On June 20, 2017, at 1444 hours (EDT), with the reactor at 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, plant personnel identified that both doors in one of the secondary containment airlocks (Door #58 and Door #85) were open briefly as part of normal passage of personnel. The Technical Specification definition of SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY states 'At least one door in each access opening is closed.' Actions were taken to immediately close both doors and restore operability of secondary containment. PNPS (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. |
ENS 52792 | 7 June 2017 12:13:00 | The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email: During routine shutter checks performed by the licensee on June 6, 2017, the licensee noted that the shutter would not close. The gauge is identified as Berthold Model LB 300 L source holder containing 0.189 milliCuries of Cobalt-60. The gauge remains operational in the normal use location and the RSO will place additional signs in the area. No maintenance is planned in the area that would require closing of the shutter. The RSO has performed a radiation survey to ensure that radiation exposure is maintained at less than 2 mR/hr in the vicinity of the gauge. The licensee has contacted the technical representative who was expected to be at the facility on July 6, 2017, for other maintenance and will examine this gauge. In accordance with RH-1502.f.2 (10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)) the malfunctioning shutter is reportable within 24 hours. The State of Arkansas is awaiting a written report from the licensee and final disposition information for the gauge. The State's event number is AR-2017-003.
The following was received via e-mail: A report submitted on July 3, 2017, indicated that the cause of the shutter failure was the exposure to alkaline pulp material and the carbon steel construction of the source holder. The source holder was replaced on January 9, 2018 with a comparable source holder constructed of stainless steel. The Department (Arkansas Department of Health) considers this event to be closed. Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
ENS 52770 | 24 May 2017 12:20:00 | The following information was received from the State of Texas by email: On October 16, 1998, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified that a Humboldt model 5001 moisture/density gauge containing a 10 millicurie cesium - 137 and a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source was lost during transport from San Antonio to Laredo, Texas. The gauge was to be delivered to the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT). A search of the transportation companies warehouses and delivery locations along the transportation route did not find the gauge. The investigation was placed in "Inactive" status. On May 17, 2017, the Agency received an email string showing that a moisture/density gauge was for sale on the internet site 'eBay'. A search of the eBay site found that the gauge serial number matched the serial number of the gauge reported missing in 1998. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was contacted and a request was made for assistance in gathering information on the seller. Using the information gathered by the Agency and the FBI, the Agency was able to contact the seller. The seller removed the posting off of eBay immediately. The seller stated they purchase materials from companies who are going out of business and resell them. The seller stated they did not remember when or where the gauge was purchased. The seller stated they had just moved all the materials they store in a large warehouse into two smaller warehouses and that is when they discovered the gauge. They did some research on the use for the gauge online and decided to sell it. The seller turned the gauge over to TXDOT on May 24, 2017. Dose rates taken on the gauge by TXDOT were normal. The gauge will be leak tested and returned to the manufacturer. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Event #35040 initially reported the event on 11/16/1998 as a lost source while in transit. Texas Incident: I-7394 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52760 | 16 May 2017 23:40:00 | The Midwest Inspection Services building has been severely damaged by a tornado storm. All radiography cameras have been accounted for and are stored in a safe location. The vault is intact. Tornados are forecasted to continue throughout the evening.
The following update was received from the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality via email: Shortly after 22:30 (CDT) on the evening of May 16th, Oklahoma DEQ (Department of Environmental Quality) verbally notified the HOO (NRC Headquarters Operations Officer) of an event affecting an Oklahoma radiography company. This is a follow-up report to confirm the verbal report and provide more details. Facility Name: Desert NDT, LLC dba Shawcor (note) the facility was historically known as Midwest Inspections, and was accidentally referred to by that name in the initial report. Facility license number: OK-32104-01 Because of concern generated by news reports, DEQ (Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality) contacted the facility at about 22:00 (CDT) and over the following few minutes, we were able to reach the facility manager. (The facility manager) reported that their licensed facility at Elk City had been largely destroyed by the tornado reported in the media. He indicated that the vault was mostly intact, but had damage to the ceiling. All power at the facility was out. (The facility manager) indicated they (Desert NDT) had fifteen cameras in the vault, and others were out in trucks on jobs around the region. (The facility manager) reported that they (Desert NDT) had done an inventory on the fifteen cameras in the vault, and confirmed that they were accounted for. (The facility manager) had no reports of problems with any sources dispatched on jobs. (The facility manager) explained that they (Desert NDT) did not regard the damaged vault as suitable for secure storage, but they (Desert NDT) had one radiography truck that was largely intact, and they (Desert NDT) were storing the fifteen cameras in one truck, and keeping the truck under constant surveillance by an employee who was authorized unescorted access. Media reports indicated that another storm, weaker than the first, but still having potential tornadoes was headed for the area. In a second call, the facility manager reported that because of concerns about further storms, they had moved the cameras into a storm shelter in (a secure location). (The facility manager) indicated that the storm shelter was under surveillance, and was lockable, and would remain locked unless being directly accessed. In view of the remarkable circumstances, (Oklahoma) DEQ approved this arrangement as an interim measure. About 8:20 (CDT) on the morning of the 17th, (Oklahoma) DEQ contacted the manager again. (The facility manager) indicated that the fifteen cameras were still secured in the storm shelter. (The facility manager) reported that there was no known further damage during the night, and that the company would be conducting a confirmatory inventory of the fifteen cameras, and conducting an inventory to ensure that cameras out on jobs were safe and under control. (The facility manager) will report the results of this to (Oklahoma) DEQ when available. (The facility manager) explained that they were doing an assessment of undamaged trucks that were suitable for secure storage under Part 37, and that they planned to retain some sources at the Elk City facility using the trucks that were suitable. (The facility manager) indicated that excess sources would be moved to a licensed company facility out of state. (The facility manager) will follow up with (Oklahoma) DEQ later today. (Oklahoma) DEQ has used GIS (Geographic Information System) to identify seven other licensed facilities that are near the storm track, and are not considered as having as much concern. We (Oklahoma DEQ) contacted all of them by phone this morning and confirmed that all is well. Notified the R4DO (Miller) and NMSS via email. |
ENS 52753 | 14 May 2017 21:27:00 | On May 14, 2017 at time 1823 (CDT), Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station notified St. Charles Parish Emergency Services via 911 of a fire in the Generation Support Building (GSB), the Hahnville, Luling and Killona Fire Departments were dispatched. The GSB is an Administrative and Engineering Building outside the Protected Area and on the Owner Controlled Area. The fire was reported out at 1841. No personnel were injured due to the fire. The fire appeared to be from an external building exhaust fan. There was no internal or structural damage to the building. There was no radiological release. No Safety Related Systems were required to function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52752 | 14 May 2017 16:09:00 | At 0730 (CDT) on 5/14/2017, a visitor was working in the Protected Area (PA) on the turbine building roof and discovered a blue 12 ounce can of beer in their cooler. This was discovered when the visitor was removing items from their cooler into a larger community cooler. The visitor immediately notified their escort of the prohibited item. The escort then notified Security of the event. Security took possession of the item and the individual was escorted offsite. The individual stated when they packed their cooler at home they thought they had picked up a blue can of soda and did not notice it was a blue can of beer. This event is being reported per 10CFR26.719(b). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52749 | 11 May 2017 18:11:00 | A can of alcohol (16.9 ounce foreign beer) was discovered unopened in an administration building refrigerator. Site security took possession of the can of alcohol. The owner of the can of alcohol is unknown. This licensee is making this 24 hour notification in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(1). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52748 | 11 May 2017 15:24:00 | On Wednesday May 10, 2017 at approximately (1700 EDT), the Reactor Operator (RO) that was signed in on the reactor console logbook completed a ('key on') checklist in preparation for a routine reactor startup. The RO left the control room and brought the log book to the reactor bridge for the Designated Senior Reactor Operator (DSRO) to sign off for the ('key on') startup. The RO immediately realized his mistake concerning the procedural requirement for a reactor operator to be present in the control room at all times when the reactor is not secured (procedure OP-103), and returned to the control room. The DSRO followed the RO to the control room and observed that the reactor key was in the on position, the control rods were all fully inserted, and reactor power was at residual levels. The reactor was shutdown, but was not secured. The DSRO determined that this constituted a violation of procedure OP-103 and could be a Reportable Occurrence as defined under Technical Specification 1.2.24 h. The DSRO reviewed Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.2, Action to be Taken in the Event of a Reportable Occurrence. The DSRO determined that under TS 6.6.2a that reactor conditions had been returned to normal by the presence of the licensed operator in the control room. The DSRO then signed the Key On checklist authorization for reactor startup and the reactor was started. The DSRO spoke with the Manager of Engineering and Operations (MEO) by telephone about this matter at approximately 1800 on May 10, 2017. The MEO concurred that procedure OP-103 was violated and would be reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The DSRO and MEO agreed to discuss this matter with the Director, Nuclear Reactor Program and the Reactor Health Physicist on May 11, 2017. The MEO stated on May 11, 2017 that TS 6.1.3a, the specification implemented by procedure OP-103, was not met. It was agreed that required notifications to NRC would be made by (1700) on May 11, 2017 to meet the 24 hour notification requirement. |
ENS 52993 | 26 September 2017 15:39:00 | An endocrinologist specified a therapy dose of 20 milliCuries of I-131. An authorized dose directive was incorrectly written for 30 milliCuries of I-131. The patient was administered the initially determined dose of 20 milliCuries of I-131. Medical personnel determined that there was no impact on the patient. Hospital supervision notified the on-site Authorized User, the Radiation Safety Officer and the Medical Physicist. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The actual event date was May 1, 2017, and the discovery date was September 25, 2017, at approximately 1500 MDT. Notified R4DO (Proulx) and NMSS Events Notification (via email). |
ENS 52720 | 1 May 2017 11:30:00 | The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile: KY RHB (Kentucky Radiation Health Branch) Inspector, Christopher Keffer, was performing a routine health and safety inspection of the licensee when the RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) discovered that a stored device was missing. According to the RSO, the laboratory where the device was stored was cleaned out the week before; it is currently believed that the device has been thrown away and is now in a landfill. The sealed source identification number is NR-536-D-808-B associated with a Perkins Elmer Clarus Model 500. The source is a Ni-63, 15 microCurie source. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52746 | 11 May 2017 12:16:00 | The following information was received from the State of New Jersey via facsimile: Notifications: Phone call was made to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) Bureau of Environmental Radiation on 5/10/17. The event occurred on 4/26/17. Event Description: PADEP (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection) staff notified NJDEP staff of a package that was transported by a (New Jersey) pharmacy from a (Pennsylvania) nuclear medicine office. It appears that the package was accompanied by an inaccurate bill of lading and package label/(Transport Index). and brought to the licensee's (Somerset, New Jersey) facility. Investigation is ongoing. |
ENS 52686 | 18 April 2017 10:17:00 | The following information was received from the State of New Jersey via facsimile: The RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) for this cardiology office called to report a lost/missing Cs-137 dose calibrator vial source. Control of this facility was recently transferred to a medical center. When the new RSO visited the cardiology office to become familiar with it, it was discovered that the Cs-137 source was missing. The source, as listed on the cardiology office's inventory, contained 199.04 uCi (microCuries) of activity as of its calibration date of 9/1/2005. The decayed source would contain approximately 152.2 uCi (microCuries) of activity as of the date of this notification. The manufacturer and model # of the source were not immediately available. The RSO will follow-up with a written report within 30 days. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52673 | 11 April 2017 14:28:00 | The following information was received from the State of Utah via email: (University) Radiological Health personnel responded to an incident involving a damaged tritium exit sign at the University Guest House. It was determined the damaged exit sign was leaking tritium and the licensee notified the (Utah) Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control. This incident report is the initial notification of the NRC Operations Center. Utah Event Report: UT170003 |
ENS 52778 | 31 May 2017 07:50:00 | This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT). The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52655 | 31 March 2017 19:14:00 | On March 31, 2017 at 1155 hours (EDT), with the reactor at 97% core thermal power and steady state conditions, operators inadvertently caused water level to rise in the Pressure Suppression Pool (TORUS). Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was restoring normal system valve line-ups after performing flushing of the suction piping of the Core Spray system in accordance with station procedures. During the process of restoring the appropriate valve line-ups, water was inadvertently transferred to the TORUS from the Condensate Storage Tank. The cause of the event is understood. The Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.A.5 was entered. The LCO AS was exited at 1540 when TORUS water level was restored to the limits specified in LCO's 3.7.A.1.b and 3.7.A.1.m. Because the TORUS was declared inoperable, PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This was a case of the water level in the TORUS being above the TS limit. The TORUS was potentially available to provide cooling to the reactor if required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Plymouth County. |
ENS 52652 | 30 March 2017 21:58:00 | At 1630 PDT on March 30, 2017, a non-work related fatality occurred on the Diablo Canyon Power Plant property. The individual's work location was outside of the Protected Area. The fatality was not related to the health and safety of the public. Specifically, a contractor for Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) was found in the Security Training Building unresponsive. The individual was promptly attended to by Diablo Canyon personnel. The individual was subsequently pronounced dead by the San Luis Obispo County Paramedics. PG&E has not observed any heightened public, media, or government concerns as a result of the fatality. Because the fatality is unrelated to Diablo Canyon Power Plant industrial or radiological health and safety, no news release is planned. Because the fatality was not work related, nor the result of an accident, no notification to other government agencies was made at the time. However, PG&E will make a notification to the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Thus this ENS notification is in response to a notification to another government agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and Resident Inspector have been notified. |
ENS 52654 | 31 March 2017 16:15:00 | The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile: On 3/28/2017 the licensee left a Cs-137 brachytherapy sealed source at (address provided). On 3/30/2017 the licensee discovered the source was not in its shielded container and immediately determined the location of the source and took steps to retrieve and secure it. This event is actively being investigated by the licensee. Kentucky Event: KY170003 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
ENS 52555 | 16 February 2017 13:03:00 | On February 15, 2017 at 1515, it was discovered by corporate Fitness for Duty (FFD) personnel that an unescorted access reactivation feature in the security database (Illuminate) does not reset the flag to include an individual in the random FFD pool due to a database coding error. The Illuminate database was implemented fleet-wide 1/3/17. Review by corporate FFD personnel found one individual currently badged at Clinton Power Station was affected by the coding error. The individual was not in the FFD random pool from 1/3/17 until 2/15/17. Corporate security personnel found no other individuals to be affected by this issue. Affected individual was added to the FFD random pool. Corporate security personnel notified all Exelon sites of the issue. Sites were notified that the ability to use the re-activation feature in Illuminate would be removed from use by site personnel. Pending removal, a daily query would be run in the database to assure the re-activation feature had not been used by site personnel. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52437 | 15 December 2016 11:47:00 | On December 15, 2016, at 1010 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.044 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4. 1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter). |
ENS 52432 | 14 December 2016 15:10:00 | On December 14, 2016, at 1314 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.07 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter) |
ENS 52433 | 14 December 2016 16:12:00 | On 12/13/2016 at approximately 1500 (PST), the AREVA Nuclear Criticality Safety Staff was notified that an administrative IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) control had not been performed in the ELO raffinate treatment process. The ELO raffinate treatment process requires the sampling of a favorable geometry process tank (IROFS 306) that is discharged to one of two sets of favorable geometry quarantine tanks. When one of the two sets of quarantine tanks is full, the input is diverted to the other set of tanks and the set that is full is recirculated and sampled for U (Uranium) concentration (IROFS 307). When both sample results have been confirmed to be acceptable the discharge valve on the transfer line may be unlocked and the raffinate solution transferred to a filter press. Sampling of the process tank was completed as required, however; the quarantine tank transfer line was unlocked and contents were pumped to the filter press without completing the required independent sampling of the quarantine tank. AREVA is conservatively reporting this plant condition under 10CFR70 Appendix A, because an accident sequence that could result in accidental nuclear criticality may not have remained highly unlikely in the absence of IROFS 307. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2. |
ENS 52356 | 8 November 2016 17:36:00 | At 1331 (CST) on November 8, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 manually tripped from 32% reactor power. The plant was ramping down to remove the main generator from service due to an unrelated issue. 1A SGFP did not respond to control Steam Generator (SG) level as expected when the miniflow was opened per procedure. SG levels lowered due to lower feed flow and the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) auto started as expected. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed to minimize the cool-down. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. All other systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The failure of the 1A SGFP control is under investigation. Unit 2 was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There is no primary to secondary leakage. |
ENS 52351 | 7 November 2016 16:50:00 | The following was excerpted from information received from the State of New Jersey by email: Event Narrative: On November 7, 2016, during the six-month shutter checks, the pneumatically operated shutter on the Vega source holder Phillips 66-Bayway Tag # PBL002 (source capsule S/N 0321CG) failed to close when tested. Several attempts were made wherein the shutter position indicator seemed to move slightly. It was concluded that the issue was not a failure of the air system controlling the pneumatic shutter actuator. The manufacturer was contacted to assess the problem. Root cause(s) and contributing factors: The source remained in the holder attached to the vessel in its normal operating position. The integrity of the source holder remains intact so there should be no exposures. Source/Radioactive Material/Devices: radioactive level gauge Isotope and activity; manufacturer, model and serial number, leak test results as applicable: The source is a 50 mCi Cs-137 solid sealed source, S/N 0321CG. The last leak test was 10/19/15. The equipment is an Ohmart/Vega model SH-F1A source holder mounted to a vessel. New Jersey Case Number: 161107162023
The following update was received from the State of New Jersey via email: Vega serviced the unit on November 11, 2016, with lubrication. It was considered to work properly after service. Phillips 66 notified NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) on November 30, 2016, that a new unit will be purchased to replace the old unit. Event status is 'closed'. Notified R1DO (Bower) and NMSS_Events_Notification via email. |
ENS 52410 | 7 December 2016 09:15:00 | Agilent Technologies is a manufacturer of a part containing an electron capture detector (ECD) that fits into a gas chromatograph. The ECD contains an embedded sealed source (Ni-63; 15 milliCuries) and is manufactured in Shanghai, China and is transferred into the United States through the JFK Airport Worldwide Flight Services Warehouse. When the licensee's Philadelphia truck shipping service attempted to retrieve the two ECD sources at the JFK warehouse, the sources were discovered missing. The warehouse was searched without success. The ECD source serial numbers are U30355 and U30356. The model number is 62397AECD. Agilent Technologies holds an NRC license and is located at 2850 Centerville Road, Wilmington, DE 19808.
As a corrective action, the licensee has changed warehouse operations to a different warehouse used to receive devices manufactured in China. Notified R1DO (Welling) and NMSS Events Notification via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 52359 | 9 November 2016 17:50:00 | The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received by SOR: Pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21, this letter notifies the NRC of a Part 21 condition. Irradiation testing performed since 1984 did not take into account all of the uncertainties associated with reported doses of gamma radiation to nuclear test specimens for qualification testing. SOR contracted services with lsomedix in 1992 for the radiation aging that was performed per SOR nuclear qualification report 9058-102 Revision 1. Although SOR imposed Part 21 reporting requirements, lsomedix did not include SOR as part of their Part 21 notification. The Part 21 was brought to SOR's attention through an inquiry by a nuclear power station. SOR requested a conference with Steris lsomedix which occurred on November 3, 2016. The teleconference confirmed that the subject radiation aging test results report would be affected by the Steris lsomedix Part 21. As a result, corrections are underway per qualification test report 9058-102 regarding the uncertainty calculations. SOR does not have the capability to perform further evaluations to determine if a safety hazard exists as the specific customer application is unknown. The end user must confirm for each application that the qualified life dose + accident dose + 10% of accident dose is less than or equal to the corrected values. SOR is currently identifying all customers potentially affected by this deviation. At the conclusion of this activity, SOR will notify the customers and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
The following is an excerpt of an updated Part 21 received via email: Corrections are now complete to test report 9058-102 regarding the uncertainty calculations. The calculations changed from 8% uncertainty to 9.6% uncertainty for the minimum irradiation aging. SOR does not have the capability to perform further evaluations to determine if a safety hazard exists as the specific customer application is unknown. The end user must confirm for each application that the qualified life dose + accident dose + 10% of accident dose is less than or equal to the above noted values. Should you have any additional questions regarding this matter, please contact: Linda Coutts Inside Sales Representative Email: lcoutts@sorinc.com Tel 91.3�-956�-3071 Charles Lautner Customer Service Manager Email: clautner@sorinc.com Tel 913-956-3070 Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Stoedter), R4DO (Haire), NMSS_Events_Notification, and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email. |