Semantic search
Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
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ENS 53479 | 28 June 2018 13:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0902 EDT on June 28, 2018, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53469 | 22 June 2018 15:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 0900 (EDT) on June 22, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
ENS 53403 | 16 May 2018 16:51:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | At 1133 EDT on May 16, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company determined a non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53309 | 2 April 2018 18:33:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53277 | 22 March 2018 09:31:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness For Duty test using a subversion kit on their person. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53221 | 20 February 2018 15:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | At 0925 (EST) on February 20, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 53018 | 16 October 2017 17:59:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty (FFD) test. At 0851 (EDT) on October 16, 2017, a contractor supervisor was notified to report for a random FFD test and (the individual) did not report to the testing facility and left the premises. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 52992 | 26 September 2017 11:03:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 0543 (EDT), while (recovering from the performance of) 2B Emergency Diesel Generator and ESFAS testing, a (subsequent) valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 2B AC emergency bus (2BA03) was load shed, the 2B EDG automatically started, and tied to 2BA03. The 2BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. The actuation was identified by the Control Room operators and the 2B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling were not challenged throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the undervoltage condition is under investigation. |
ENS 52968 | 14 September 2017 09:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On September 13, 2017, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a Contractor Manager confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52763 | 18 May 2017 15:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On May 17, 2017, at 1852 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II. |
ENS 52641 | 27 March 2017 16:02:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52619 | 17 March 2017 17:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 1517 (EDT), while restoring protective relay power to the 1B Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The 1B EDG automatically started and tied to the safety bus (1BA03). The 1BA03 bus was loaded by the automatic load sequencer. This actuation was identified by the Control Room Operators and the 1B EDG was locally monitored while in service. This actuation is reportable due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The reactor was not critical at the time of the event and not challenged throughout the event. Containment Cooler Number 8 did not automatically start in 'Fast Speed' as expected. Containment Cooler Number 8 was successfully started in 'Fast Speed' manually by the Control Room Operators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52534 | 3 February 2017 18:56:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1545 EST on 2/3/17, Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power when loop 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) started to fail closed. Non-Safety Related 4160V bus 1NA01 failed to transfer to alternate incoming power supply automatically and was successfully manually energized. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by AFW. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52518 | 30 January 2017 14:38:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 1049 EST, an individual was discovered to be unresponsive at a site training facility outside of the Protected Area. The individual was transported via ambulance to the Burke County Hospital and was declared deceased at 1143 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State of Georgia Department of Labor - OSHA at 1414 EST. |
ENS 52482 | 11 January 2017 13:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated pending the results of an investigation. The licensee notified RII (Patterson) and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52423 | 9 December 2016 23:46:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On December 09, 2016 at 1734 EST, U2 Train-A NSCW (Nuclear Service Cooling Water) Transfer Pump #8 tripped during Return To Service Surveillance testing for Train-B NSCW Transfer pump #7. Technical Spec 3.7.9 Condition E entered at 1734 with Required Actions to be in M3 (mode 3, Hot Standby) in 6 hours AND M4 (mode 4, Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. A unit shutdown was commenced at 2042 EST (as a conservative measure) to comply with TS 3.7.9 Condition E. At 1937, U2 B-train NSCW Transfer Pump #7 was declared operable and TS 3.7.9 Condition E was exited. The plant is currently raising power to 100%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52412 | 7 December 2016 13:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (ECS System Seismic Category I Equipment Design Basis Loads) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on May 17, 2016 (reference ML 16138A080 and ML 16166A030). On November 1, 2016, it was determined by the Vogtle 3&4 Contractor that modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) breaker (i.e., switchgear) cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, 'Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The modification involves an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Breaker cabinet that function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously qualified for use in the RCP breaker cabinet assembly. Additional seismic qualification type testing and analysis of components are being performed for the added components in the RCP breaker. Update of the Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP breaker to confirm the breaker withstands seismic design basis loads and Licensee's acceptance is in progress. The revised ITAAC Completion Notice will be submitted to the NRC once all related ITAAC activities have been completed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52319 | 26 October 2016 16:35:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment, it was concluded that the following SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) were vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The Turbine Driving Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump exhaust vent is not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, crimping the piping resulting in reduced flow capacity and rendering the TDAFW pump inoperable. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) vents are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. A tornado generated missile could strike the vent piping rendering it unable to relieve vacuum on the top of the CST and allow adequate water flow to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and rendering the CST inoperable. These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified. |
ENS 52208 | 30 August 2016 16:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. |
ENS 52147 | 2 August 2016 16:22:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A member of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) staff violated the FFD policy in December, 2014 by responding to a call-in for unscheduled work after having consumed alcohol within the prohibited 5 hour period. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51986 | 7 June 2016 14:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51956 | 25 May 2016 04:54:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 0206 EDT 5/25/16, Vogtle Unit 2 tripped from 100% when SG (Steam Generator) #1 Level began to lower for an unknown reason. Cause for level issue is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and AFW (Auxiliary Feedwater) and FWI (Feedwater Isolation) actuated as expected. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 and stable with decay heat being removed by Aux Feedwater. Prior to the trip, I & C (Instrumentation & Calibration) was performing a loop #1 narrow range instrument calibration. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup with all source of offsite power available. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51875 | 21 April 2016 18:18:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
ENS 51343 | 25 August 2015 16:01:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On August 25, 2015, at approximately 12:52 EDT, an unplanned loss of power to the Vogtle Meteorological Towers occurred. The loss of power was the result of an electrical disturbance in the Plant Wilson switchyard. Power was restored 14:45 EDT. The electrical disturbance impacted meteorological instrumentation only and did not impact operation of either Unit 1 or Unit 2. The TSC and EOF remained functional and compensatory measures existed within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization was notified and necessary compensatory actions were established. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51223 | 13 July 2015 07:50:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On July 13, 2015, planned activities will be performed to upgrade the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Meteorological Towers and its communication equipment. The emergency response data system will be affected. The work will be completed within approximately 5 days. This activity requires the meteorological tower to be out of service greater than 72 hours rendering equipment used for emergency assessment non-functional. The TSC and EOF remain functional during the outage. Compensatory measures exist within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data via Savannah River Site and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information will be relayed via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the upgrade and necessary compensatory actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Vogtle primary and backup Meteorological Towers have been returned to service and functionality of equipment has been restored. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (King). |
ENS 51219 | 9 July 2015 18:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The Vogtle Unit-1 control room received a fire alarm from inside the containment building. Per plant requirements, verification of the fire was not obtained within 15 minutes and an Unusual Event was declared. Plant personnel were able to enter containment and verify that there was no fire present. The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event. Unusual Event entered: 1732 EDT Unusual Event exited: 1848 EDT The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, and NICC. NuclearSSA (email) and FEMA NWC (email). |
ENS 50894 | 14 March 2015 19:19:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On March 14, 2015 at 1207 EDT, operators were performing steps to disable an automatic actuation signal to the B-train Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW), when a valid actuation signal was received on B-train only. Both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were already running and feeding forward. The B-train discharge valves went from throttled to fully open. The AFW discharge valves were restored to their previous positions without any adverse impacts on the plant. Decay heat removal was still being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50893 | 14 March 2015 08:07:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Vogtle Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power. At 0429 EDT a Unit 2 automatic Reactor Trip and Safety Injection / Steamline Isolation occurred. All systems operated as expected and all control rods fully inserted. The Safety Injection was terminated at 0447 EDT and the emergency operating procedures were exited at 0522 EDT. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Auxiliary Feedwater system and the atmospheric relief valves. A response team is investigating the cause of the event. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event. NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and is at plant site for investigation. |
ENS 50857 | 2 March 2015 18:31:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On March 2, 2015, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. |
ENS 50798 | 9 February 2015 11:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the Vogtle 3&4 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55 . The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55 (4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55 (5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
ENS 50574 | 29 October 2014 14:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50526 | 12 October 2014 12:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) Unit 2 was performing startup and had taken reactor critical at 0929 EDT. When attempting to stabilize power to collect critical data, control rods were inserted with Control Bank D the expected group to insert. Control Bank A inserted instead of Control Bank D. Power had reached 6 E-2 percent as indicated by IR (intermediate range) indication when control room crew performed a manual reactor trip. AFW (auxiliary feed water) was in service to support plant conditions prior to the trip and did not receive any actuation signal. All equipment operated as expected. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50441 | 10 September 2014 11:24:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50347 | 6 August 2014 05:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification per Vogtle U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities on the TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions, and, actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation has been prepared and approved for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
As of 1124 EDT maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease). |
ENS 50314 | 27 July 2014 15:22:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generation Plant) Unit One was at 100 percent power, with a Main Feed Pump (MFP) Turbine A trip mechanism test in-progress, when MFP A Trip alarm was received in the Main Control Room. Control Room crew identified MFP A speed and steam generator levels lowering and initiated a manual reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the MFP A trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. The unit is in a normal shutdown electric plant lineup. No effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50226 | 25 June 2014 11:48:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 50219 | 20 June 2014 16:39:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification. On June 20, 2014, at 1100 eastern daylight time (EDT), Vogtle Unit 2 identified a loss of emergency assessment capability due to both plant vent effluent monitors being out of service from March 16 to March 26, 2014. This condition was the result of an equipment failure concurrent with planned maintenance activities on the redundant monitor. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). During the time both effluent monitors were out of service Unit 2 was operating at 100% rated thermal power, steady-state conditions. Therefore, this condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50163 | 2 June 2014 16:47:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive result for a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50031 | 12 April 2014 23:20:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 2008 EDT, Vogtle Unit One was manually tripped in response to loop 1 outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and cause investigation is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. There was a normal post trip feedwater isolation due to low Tave. Offsite power remains available. Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser. The plant is stable in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 2. |
ENS 50006 | 8 April 2014 05:21:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP Unit 2 was at 100% power, normal activities, when digital feedwater trouble alarms were received on all 4 steam generators (SG) with level stable in all generators. Operating crew entered abnormal operating procedure for feedwater malfunction when SG #3 level began rapidly lowering. Operators attempted to take manual control of SG #3 main feedwater regulating valve and were unable to raise SG #3 level. SG #3 level lowered to the Lo-Lo Level setpoint causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and SG #3 level remained off scale low on narrow range indications. Auxiliary feedwater and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. (Unit 2) is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the low SG water level and determine restart criteria and time of restart. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feedwater to steam generators steaming to the condenser steam dumps. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49718 | 13 January 2014 03:28:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49595 | 2 December 2013 13:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582). |
ENS 49461 | 22 October 2013 13:18:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1144 EDT, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to lowering Main Condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 Bravo Main Feed Pump was tagged out for scheduled maintenance and the casing was being removed when condenser vacuum started lower due to isolation valve not holding pressure. Main Condenser vacuum lowered to less than procedural limits for continued plant operation. All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. AFW was placed in service to control Steam Generator levels. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 while performing a cause investigation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and at plant site. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the Main Condenser. |
ENS 49453 | 19 October 2013 09:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) unit two was at 100% power, normal activities, when the unit two turbine tripped causing an automatic reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted and nothing unusual was noted. Auxiliary feed water and feedwater isolation actuated as expected. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. A forced outage response team has been formed to determine the cause of the turbine trip and determine restart criteria and time of restart. During the transient, no relief valves lifted. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant safety loads. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49272 | 13 August 2013 07:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 emergency response facilities action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to start of the TSC HVAC unit. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Technical Support Center HVAC system was returned to service at 1100 EDT on August 14, 2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser). |
ENS 49186 | 11 July 2013 15:26:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A Plant Vogtle employee on site complained of medical issues while performing work inside Unit 2 containment at 1127 EDT. After being transported offsite to Burke County Hospital, Plant Vogtle was notified at 1426 EDT that the individual was deceased. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. The death was not known to be related to work performed at the site, and the employee was not contaminated when transported offsite. The licensee will notify OSHA.
The licensee notified OSHA at 1625 EDT and will also be making a media/press release. Notified R2DO (Nease). |
ENS 49144 | 24 June 2013 04:49:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on the backup diesel generator that supplies TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The backup diesel generator was returned to service at 1641 EDT on 6/27/13 which restored the TSC to functional status. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Franke). |
ENS 49140 | 21 June 2013 10:50:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54 (q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Exit TRM 13.3.1: The functionality of the TSC has been restored and scheduled maintenance activities performed complete and satisfactory at 1410 EDT on 6/21/13. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Desai). |
ENS 48988 | 1 May 2013 10:41:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee anticipates the maintenance will be complete at 1630 EDT on 5/1/13. * * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1702 EDT ON 5/1/13 * * * The TSC was returned to service at 1607 EDT on 5/1/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).
The TSC has been taken out of service to perform planned maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). * * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1747 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * * The TSC was returned to service at 1733 EDT on 5/2/13. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
ENS 48985 | 30 April 2013 13:15:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition is being reported per TRM (Technical Requirements Manual) 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. At 102 EDT on 4/30/13, the "TSC has been restored to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |