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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 567795 October 2023 12:29:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1439 EDT on August 7, 2023, a spurious level spike on the unit 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) level instrument (4-RCS-LT160A, 'Hot Leg 1 Level') caused actuation of containment isolation, reactor trip, automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4, and in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) isolation signals. The spurious level changes caused an invalid signal based on the incidental response of the 4-RCS-LT160A instrumentation due to water spray that was being used for reactor vessel cleaning (being performed prior to initial fuel loading). The level fluctuations resulted in engineered safety features actuation signals (containment isolation, ADS stage 4, and IRWST isolation signals) and a reactor trip signal, with the reactor trip signal already present. Three containment isolation valves closed due to the containment isolation signal that was generated. These valves were: 4-CAS-V014, 'instrument air supply containment isolation, air-operated valve,' 4-SFS-V034, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve,' and 4-SFS-V035, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve.' The other automatic containment isolation valves were either already closed at the time of the event or properly removed from service. All affected equipment functioned properly. The other actuation signals that were observed during this event (ADS stage 4, IRWST isolation, and reactor trip) did not result in any equipment changing position or automatically operating (i.e., the actuation signals occurred while the systems were properly removed from service). Units 1, 2, and 3 were not affected. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 566481 August 2023 11:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1506 EDT on July 31, 2023, it was determined that a contractor supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5663221 July 2023 15:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1148 EDT on 07/21/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 32 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on low reactor coolant pump (RCP) speed due to decaying RCP motor voltage during power ascension testing. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 566149 July 2023 16:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1328 EDT on 07/09/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 45 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during power ascension testing due to low reactor coolant flow from decaying voltage to the reactor coolant pumps. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 564972 May 2023 07:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0423 EDT on 05/02/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 14 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to securing all main feed pumps, due to sudden high differential pressure on their suction strainers. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dumps, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5646010 April 2023 04:34:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0048 EDT on 4/10/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 18 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to low reactor coolant flow due to voltage decaying to the reactor coolant pumps during main generator testing activities. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to atmosphere. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5641516 March 2023 13:23:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0845 EDT on March 16, 2023, it was determined that a contract employee supervisor failed a for-cause FFD test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5641416 March 2023 01:26:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2157 EDT on 03/15/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 18 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the loss of two reactor coolant pumps when their electrical buses failed to transfer after a main generator excitation protective relay tripped. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator power operated relief valves. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5636716 February 2023 15:52:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0743 EST on February 16, 2023, it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5631114 January 2023 14:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0721 EST on 01/14/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power and reactor trip breakers open, a manual actuation of the RPS occurred while conducting pre-criticality testing. The RPS manual actuation was procedurally driven in response to low gland steam pressure, resulting in the necessity to break condenser vacuum following a trip of the auxiliary boiler. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562944 January 2023 06:08:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2259 EST on 1/3/2023, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems, as well as an actuation of the associated auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems on each unit occurred. The reason for the EDG auto-starts was due to a loss of an offsite power source (loss of one of the two reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT) on each unit) to the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A safety related buses. The EDG and AFW systems automatically started as designed when the valid undervoltage signal on the affected safety related bus was received. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5623117 November 2022 20:23:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5617523 October 2022 11:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 EDT on 10/23/2022, with (Vogtle) Unit 3 in Mode 6 and the reactor subcritical for greater than 28 hours, it was discovered that all three required flow paths for the stage four ADS were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The diverse actuation system was operable for manual stage four ADS during this time period. At 0432 EDT on 10/23/2022, two of the three required flow paths were restored to operable status, which exited the reportable condition. All required flow paths were operable at 0447 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 561476 October 2022 10:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0244 EDT on 10/06/2022, with Unit 3 Defueled at 0 percent power, an actuation of the RPS occurred during restoration of Division B Class 1E DC and uninterruptible power supply system. The reason for the RPS actuation was due to the opening of the Division B passive residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchanger outlet flow control valve. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event when the RPS signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5611517 September 2022 13:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56114.
ENS 5611417 September 2022 13:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56115.
ENS 558753 May 2022 18:44:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1541 EDT on May 3, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of one of the main feed pumps. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the scram. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by Auxiliary Feedwater through the steam dumps to the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) also occurred. The AFW auto-start is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 557357 February 2022 15:49:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the licensee via telefone: A non-licensed contractor superintendent had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5555229 October 2021 14:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000At 1010 EDT on October 29, 2021, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5532825 June 2021 15:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: The individual informing the Commission is Michael J. Yox, 7825 River Road, Waynesboro, GA 30830. The activities which fail to comply include construction processes including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment at the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. The primary construction firm for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project is Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). This report is being provided based on construction nonconformances including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances affect cable separation and other raceway structural elements. The extent of condition for the measuring and test equipment issue is under evaluation and may impact additional safety-related work. The identified construction nonconformances are a small fraction of the overall structures and components. There is no specifically identified substantial safety hazard (SSH) for these nonconformances. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that the issues could be related to an SSH. These issues were discovered while the facility is under construction. The identified conditions will be corrected prior to completion of the facility. The evaluation for this report was completed on June 24, 2021. As stated above, there are no specifically identified basic components that have been identified to contain a defect for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that these conditions involve a failure to comply that could be related to an SSH. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken include: Comprehensive extent-of-condition reviews and correction of identified conditions are being conducted. The actions to identify and resolve the nonconforming conditions are in process and will be completed in accordance with the site corrective action program. Bechtel, and other subcontractors as needed, will implement actions to correct the identified conditions and ensure that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is the organization responsible for ensuring Bechtel and the other subcontractors complete the required actions to correct the nonconforming conditions and ensuring that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences.
ENS 551859 April 2021 16:08:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant had been terminated.
ENS 550553 January 2021 08:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1414 EST on 12/31/2020, a planned maintenance outage commenced on the Vogtle 1and 2 Seismic Monitoring System. The work was to address abnormal indications on the uninterruptable power supply, and was scheduled for an eight (8) hour duration. During the restoration activities, the system did not respond properly and has remained Non-Functional. Compensatory measures for seismic event classification were implemented in accordance with Vogtle procedures prior to removing the system from service. Based upon the troubleshooting conducted, the system is not expected to be restored within 72 hours from the start of the planned outage. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Seismic Monitoring System is the method for evaluating that an Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event in accordance with Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Compensatory measures implemented include having a phone number to call to verify if an earthquake has occurred.
ENS 5499512 November 2020 21:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1732 EST on November 12, 2020, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators through the steam dumps into the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) also occurred. The AFW auto-start is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as well as in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5496321 October 2020 14:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) as described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.3.05.13a.ii (Index No. 344) for Unit 4 requires additional actions to restore the completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for Unit 4 ITAAC 344 was submitted on July 22, 2020 (ML20204B029). On October 19, 2020, it was determined that maintenance activities for the Unit 4 Polar Crane auxiliary hoist holding brake used a different approach for Post Work Verification (PWV) than the original test described in the ICN (ITAAC Closure Notification) for ITAAC 344. The alternate PWV used a test method that is standard industry practice and in accordance with ASME B30.2 to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria was met. An ITAAC Post Closure Notification will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) and NEI 08-01. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All lTAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5486428 August 2020 00:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), as described in NEI 08-01, 'Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52,' Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.5.02.07a (Index No. 534) and ITAAC 2.5.02.07e (Index No. 538) for both units require additional actions to restore their completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 534 were submitted on March 31, 2017 (Unit 3 ML17093A286, Unit 4 ML17093A535). The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 538 were submitted on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334). On August 26, 2020, it was determined that a design change, issued for several Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) isolation barrier assemblies (ISBs), materially altered the basis for determining that the ITAAC 534 and ITAAC 538 Acceptance Criteria were met. The modified ISBs will require testing per IEEE 384-1981, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria is met. System function is not required while the plant is under construction. ITAAC Post Closure Notifications in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) will be submitted following completion of corrective actions. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All ITAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP ((Vogtle Electric Generating Plant)) 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/22/21 AT 1534 EDT FROM NICK KELLENBERGER TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

Upon successful completion of the work to correct the identified impact to ITAAC 534, it has been determined there was no material impact to ITAAC 538. Confirmation was made that the credible fault only affected PMS to PLS analog ISBs and not PMS to PLS relay isolation ISBs. It was also confirmed that the relay isolation ISB testing and qualification summary information was unaffected by the modifications made to the analog ISBs to correct the credible fault scenario condition. Resolution of the credible fault scenario did not result in modifications to the relay isolation ISBs which are the subject of ITAAC 538. Therefore, the ITAAC Closure Notifications submitted for ITAAC 538 on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334) continue to be valid and ITAAC Post Closure Notifications are not required. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Miller) and NRR Vogtle Project Office (via email).

ENS 5477613 July 2020 17:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2On July 13, 2020 at 0831 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined an SNC supervisory personnel failed their fitness for duty test. The employee has been removed from the site and their access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 546508 April 2020 17:03:00VogtleNRC Region 2A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5459621 March 2020 23:46:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1644 EDT with Unit 1 in Mode 6 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 Bravo Train Emergency Diesel Generator system (EDG) occurred during Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) testing. The reason for the EDG auto-start signal was a loss of voltage on the Bravo train safety related electrical bus due to the EDG output breaker opening. The EDG was already running at the time of the loss of voltage on the bus. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDG system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to Unit 2.
ENS 5435929 October 2019 13:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 543189 October 2019 12:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1023 EDT, on October 9, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems occurred. The reason for the Emergency Diesel Generator auto-start was the loss of power to the 4160V 1E electrical bus 2AA02 due to a fault at an offsite electrical switchyard. The Emergency Diesel Generator started and energized the 4160V safety bus, and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems automatically started as designed when the undervoltage condition on the safety bus was detected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified.
ENS 5417519 July 2019 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0945 (EDT) on July 19, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to Loop 2 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. The Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) started automatically as a result of the automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid AFW actuation from the reactor trip, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods fully inserted.
ENS 5401822 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE ON A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a follow-up test administered the previous day (see EN #54017).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/30/2019 AT 1642 EDT FROM KELLI ROBERTS TO BRIAN LIN * * *

On April 16, 2019, an individual was selected for a follow-up drug test. The same individual was selected again on April 17, 2019 for a random drug test. The results for both tests were ruled by the Medical Review Officer (MRO) on the same day and ruled positive for the same drug on April 22, 2019. These FFD violations were reported to the NRC on April 22, 2019, as EN #54017 and EN #54018, respectively. As allowed by 10 CFR 26.185(o), the MRO further reviewed the quantitation of the drug in both tests and determined that no further drug use had occurred since the first positive test. Therefore, the MRO concluded that this should be considered one FFD violation, and EN #54018 is being retracted. No changes are needed to EN #54017. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Heisserer) and FFD Group (email).

ENS 5401722 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a random test administered the next day (see EN #54018). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5396731 March 2019 00:17:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 2130 (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 30 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam isolation valve failing closed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 5383217 January 2019 16:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5378913 December 2018 14:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1700 EST on December 12, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. No work was performed on safety related equipment. The licensee has made a PADs entry.
ENS 536434 October 2018 07:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN LOWE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1408 EDT ON 10/19/2018 * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5362827 September 2018 14:42:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1000 EDT on September 27, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5361018 September 2018 08:28:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1610 (EDT) on September 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5359912 September 2018 14:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1115 EDT on September 12, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5359511 September 2018 17:53:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5356324 August 2018 15:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1034 (EDT) on August 24, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 535387 August 2018 14:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0909 (EDT) on August 7, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for alcohol during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5352827 July 2018 13:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5352626 July 2018 17:51:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1040 (EDT) on July 26, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty program. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351719 July 2018 12:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1300 (EDT) on July 18, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty process. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5351518 July 2018 19:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during an access upgrade fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the facility has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351117 July 2018 17:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1338 (EDT) on July 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 534999 July 2018 20:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1515 (EDT) on July 9, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a for cause Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 534843 July 2018 12:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0954 (EDT) on July 3, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to high steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted and Unit 1 is in an electrical shutdown lineup. The cause of the high steam generator water level transient is being investigated.