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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 537197 November 2018 17:28:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky by email: On 11/6/2018, a former licensee (formerly licensed as Wickliffe Paper Co.) reported discovery of a nuclear gauging device (TN (Texas Nuclear) model 5036 originally containing 200 mCi assayed 12/94) that it was unaware it possessed. The license was terminated on August 9, 2016 and at that time, the former licensee provided information related to the disposition of all devices the licensee was aware it possessed. License termination was due to plant closure. During engineering surveys to assess plant conditions for restart, personnel discovered the device still mounted on plant equipment. The former licensee is taking steps to have the device transferred to a licensed manufacturer for disposal. There is no reason to believe any individuals received any exposure at levels which would exceed the regulatory limits." Kentucky Event: KY180004 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 537165 November 2018 11:26:00The following information was received via email: When conducting the annual reconciliation, Karcher North America, INC. reported eleven lost static eliminators. Static Eliminators: Model: P-2021 8101. Isotope/units: PO-210, 10 mCi ea. Serial Numbers: A2JZ217, A2KH719, A2CP799, A2DM543, A2DT589, A2DU443, A2DU444, A2EZ668, A2GS233, A2JD061, A2JD062. Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO180027 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 537207 November 2018 15:44:00The following information was received by the State of Florida: At noon (on 11/7/18), (Akumin) called (the State of FL Bureau of Radiation Control) to report that both Akumin Hollywood and Akumin Aventura View ordered F-18 Fluciclovine, and received packages that were labeled as F-18 Fluciclovine, but were subsequently notified by their radiopharmaceutical vendor PET NET Solutions-Ft Lauderdale, on Thursday, November 1, 2018 that due to a 'batch error,' the packages actually contained F-18 FDG (Fludeoxyglucose). Three patients were reported as receiving the incorrect radiopharmaceutical. Activity reported as approximately 10 mCi. Florida Incident: FL18-137 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5370530 October 2018 16:33:00

Replacement camera sources were properly delivered by the common carrier to St. Mary's Hospital located in Jefferson City, Missouri. The sources were received by the Biomed Hospital Imaging Specialist and placed in the biomed office. Currently, the package containing the sources is missing. The licensee investigation continues. Sources are two Gd-153 (10 mCi each) and two Co-57 (0.5 microCi each).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 10/31/2018 AT 1425 EDT FROM KEN WOHLT TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

This event is being retracted. The sources were discovered to be delivered to SSM Hospital's biomed office instead of nuclear medicine. The sources were secured and in control of the SSM Hospital at all times. There were no exposures to personnel. The licensee notified NRC Region 3 (Warren). Notified R3DO (Stoedter) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5370028 October 2018 21:44:00

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. At 1435 CDT on October 28, 2018, troubleshooting of the Seismic Monitoring Panel resulting from the receipt of Control Room annunciator 47023-0603 (Seismic Monitor Panel) determined that the '(Operational Basis Earthquake) OBE Exceedance' alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel will not alarm and determined the panel is non-functional. The Seismic Monitoring Panel system functions to provide indication that the OBE threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2.1. Station personnel are monitoring the seismic recorders for event alarms on a 15 minute frequency due to alarm function failure. The station is developing repair plans for restoration of the alarm function. This event does not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5369526 October 2018 12:11:00A patient was prescribed 200 mCi of Lutetium-177. Due to dose administration issues, a delivered dose of 135 mCi was received by the patient. The licensee notified the NRC Region 3 contact (Gattone). A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 536465 October 2018 09:52:00

EN Revision Text: MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES EXCEEDED PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA At 0520 (CDT), on October 05, 2018, it was discovered that a Primary Containment local leak rate test performed on Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) exceeded its acceptance criteria.

During Mode 1, 2, and 3, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 requires MSIV leakage for a single MSIV line to be less than or equal to 106 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) when tested at 29 psig and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 requires the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths to be less than or equal to 212 scfh when tested at 29 psig.

As-found for the 'C' MSIV line leakage results were unquantifiable and gave a (minimum) path value greeter than 160 scfh. This leakage rate lead to Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits to be exceeded. This event is being reported as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the Primary Containment Isolation Valves leakage limits for MSIVs were exceeded. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 2320 EDT ON 10/24/2018 FROM THOMAS FORLAND TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 5, 2018 at 0520 CDT (EN# 53646). Subsequent evaluation concluded that overall as-found 'C' MSIV leakage rate was not at a level that exceeded the surveillance requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits and thus the Primary Containment Isolation Valve leakage rate limits for the MSIVs were not exceeded. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Drake).

ENS 536434 October 2018 07:57:00

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN LOWE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1408 EDT ON 10/19/2018 * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5362326 September 2018 15:10:00At 0946 CDT on 9/26/2018, a disruption in power to the offsite 138 kV line and the subsequent trip of the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) Static VAR Compensator (SVC) resulted in a degraded voltage signal on the Division 1- 4.16 kV safety bus. The degraded voltage signal resulted in a trip of the ERAT feed to the bus, blocking closure of the 345 kV Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) feed to the bus and auto start of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The Division 1 EDG successfully started and re-energized the Division 1- 4.16 kV bus as designed. The unit is stable with the Division 1 EDG carrying the Division 1- 4.16 kV bus. The Ameren Transmission System Operator in St. Louis, MO informed the station that they had received a report that a 138 kV to 13.8 kV transformer at Clinton Route 54 substation was on fire and the South feed to the Tabor substation cycled as a result of this fault. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector have been notified.
ENS 5362626 September 2018 23:25:00

On September 26, 2018 at 1908 CDT. an automatic scram was received on U1 following main generator 345 kV output breaker 7-8 trip with 345 kV output breaker 6-7 already opened for maintenance on line 0401. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and Group Ill isolations (expected response). Reactor pressure rose to approximately 1083 psig, and the 3B and 3C low set relief valves opened briefly to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level and reactor pressure have been restored to their normal bands. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with reactor pressure being controlled on the turbine bypass valves. The cause and details of the event are under investigation.

Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)." All control rods inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5362526 September 2018 21:43:00

On 9/26/2018 at 1530 EDT, it was discovered that the HPCI system was inoperable due to a blown fuse in the 10C617 Panel, E21-F15A. Therefore, this condition Is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The blown fuse also impacts 'A' channel Residual Heat Removal (RHR) subsystem and 'A' Core Spray (CS) subsystem. These Emergency Core Cooling subsystems have been declared inoperable. Remaining Emergency Core Cooling subsystems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain OPERABLE.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local authorities.

ENS 5361924 September 2018 14:06:00On September 22, 2018, at approximately 0050 (CDT), Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Security was contacted by a site assigned contractor that they had located what appeared to be drug paraphernalia inside the Protected Area. Local Law Enforcement was contacted and responded to DAEC. The Linn County Sheriff's office took the items into evidence for testing to determine if there was any presence of a controlled substance. On September 24, 2018, at 1013, the Linn County Sheriff's office notified DAEC that the items tested positive for the presence of a controlled substance. Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719. DAEC Site security is working with NextEra Corporate security regarding the investigation into this incident. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5366916 October 2018 10:12:00The Clorox Company discovered a missing fixed gauge containing radioactive material. The gauge was a Filtec, model FT-2 containing 100 microCuries of Americium-241. Gauge S/N: 105382; Source S/N: 1786. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5360915 September 2018 15:45:00

EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SITE CONDITIONS PREVENTING PLANT ACCESS A hazardous event has resulted in on site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles due to flooding of local roads by Tropical Storm Florence. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSCOK TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/28/2018 AT 1414 EDT * * *

On 9/18/2018 at 1400 EDT, the Unusual Event at Brunswick was terminated due to the ability to transport personnel to the site. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie), NRR EO (Miller) and the IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

ENS 5366011 October 2018 09:39:00

The following information was received by from ABB INC by facsimile: 1. This letter provides a notification of a defect associated with dry type transformer serial # 24-26458. The failure was caused by the breakdown of layer to layer insulation within the 4160 volt winding due to dielectric stress. Deterioration of the insulation resulted in an internal fault within the bravo phase 4160 volt winding, triggering a ground fault trip shutdown of equipment. This failure was reported by Exelon's Clinton Nuclear Station and it is the only known reported occurrence of safety related transformer failure caused by the breakdown of layer to layer insulation. Information is provided as specified in 10 CFR 21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4). 2. Notifying individual: Joey Chandler, Plant Manager, ABB ((PGTR) Power Grids Transformer Division, US), 171 Industry Drive, Bland, VA 24315. 3. Identification of the Subject component: ABB P/N 24-26458 dry type transformer. This transformer is used for stepping down voltage and was intended for providing power to safety related electrical equipment. 4. Nature of the deviation: The Exelon Clinton Nuclear Generating Station shut down due to a ground fault alarm on the 4160 volt side of the stepdown transformer that provides power to numerous safety-related components at the plant. Subsequent troubleshooting of the problem revealed that the dry-type transformer supplying 480 volt power had dielectrically failed due to apparent internal fault within the Bravo phase. Further investigation of this failure revealed an operational voltage design stress on the Nomex 410 insulation between the 4160 volt winding's layers of conductor of greater than recommended by the manufacturer (DuPont) for a 40 year design life. At the time of failure, the subject transformer had been in operation for approximately 33.5 years and had progressed 37 years and two months into its intended 40 year life given the 10/1980 ship date. ABB has no knowledge of any adverse operational variances over the course of the approximate 33.5 year life of operation to be able to assess or comment on this potential impact in terms of life. 5. The function of this dry type transformer is to step voltage down from 4160 volts to 480 volts while providing transfer of power to safety related components. Exelon's Clinton Nuclear Power Station has identified this transformer's power transfer to feed safety related equipment. An interruption of this transfer in power would result in a loss of power to the safety related equipment downstream and could potentially result in a compromise in safety. 6. ABB was notified of this transformer failure on 12/9/2017. This notification was delayed while the failure was being investigated. This investigation is documented in report: Exelon Clinton Failure Analysis_26458_011218 rev5.doc.pdf dated 09/10/2018. 7. Corrective actions include:

  a. Reviewed and verified current electrical engineering safety related design standard for allowable design stress on insulation per DuPont's recommendation for 40 year life. (Complete.)
  b. Reviewed the material used for transformer 24-26458. Found only affected safety related product to be isolated to Clinton Nuclear Station, though records may be incomplete as these records have been archived for over 35 years. (Complete.)
  c. Re-trained all involved personnel of the 10 CFR 21 reporting requirements, and the need to provide an interim report within 60 days of discovery. 
  d. ABB worked directly with Clinton Nuclear to ensure all transformers of respective design was replaced with new transformers following ABB's Technical Evaluation for Nuclear 1E Transformer, Rev. 18 which documents operational design stresses be less than or equal to 30 volts / mil of Nomex 410 insulation between layer to layer of conductor for 40 year life.

8. Recommendation: Because of the possible existence of additional affected transformers, ABB (PGTR) cannot determine the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any other licensee's facility. Licensees are requested to evaluate any Gould-Brown Boveri/ITE dry type transformer with the following nameplate identification below. Transformers associated with this identification are recommended to be replaced. kVA: 750AA/ 1000 FA

HV: 4160 Delta Connected
LV: 480 Wye Connected
Class: AA/ FA
Type: Vent
Frequency: 60 Hz
Temp Rise: 80 degrees C
Date of Manufacture: 10/1988 and older models

Questions concerning this notification should be directed to the Quality Manager (Rick Kinder) at the ABB transformer plant in Bland, VA at (276) 688 -3325.

ENS 535771 September 2018 10:43:00While filling up a licensee company truck at a gas station located in Ripley, West Virginia, an individual stole the company truck and its associated radiography camera (QSA 880; S/N 677846;108 Ci; Iridium-192 source). The licensee notified LLEA (West Virginia State Police) and the vehicle was recovered. The licensee inspected the properly secured equipment and observed no impact to the radiography camera. The licensee stated there was no radiological impact to the public or employees. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5354913 August 2018 12:05:00

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On August 12, 2018 at approximately 1135 (CDT)., the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) that one of its radiography crews had experienced a source disconnect. The event occurred on August 11, 2018, at approximately 1200 (CDT) at a temporary job site near Whitsett, TX. The device involved was an INC IR-100 (SN: 6792) containing a 91 curie iridium-192 source (SN: ZH0109). The crew had set up the device and performed a procedure shot and everything functioned properly. They performed the first shot of the job and the source would not retract into the device--it felt as though it had stuck on something. After a second unsuccessful attempt, the source was cranked back out into the collimator, boundaries set, and an authorized person came to the site and performed the retrieval. The drive cable and source were both new. There was no observable cause for the failure. The device and associated equipment will be sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. Per readings from all three individuals' self-reading pocket dosimeters, there were no overexposures. The source retriever's dosimetry badge is being sent for processing. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/13/18 AT 1559 EDT * * *

The following update information was received from the State of Texas via email: Clarification: The source assembly (never disconnected) from the drive cable. (The licensee was) unable to retract it back into the exposure device. Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email. Texas Incident: I-9606

ENS 535373 August 2018 14:10:00At 0940 EDT on August 3, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 535352 August 2018 16:46:00The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email: On 07/26/2018, (the) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for ExxonMobil Chemical Co. (ExMCo) reported a multi-source gauge failure to the Department (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality), LDEQ by e-mail. On 07/25/2018 during routine annual maintenance and pm (preventative maintenance) checks it was discovered the level/density gauge had several shutters stuck in the open position. Three sources would not retract into the shielded position. However, the remaining four sources are functioning properly. The gauge is a Berthold Technologies USA multi-source device, Model LB 300 IS, utilizing AEA Technologies, Model CKC.P4 sources. There are seven (nominal) 50 mCi Co-60 sources in the device. The sources involved in this malfunction are source #1 s/n 1369-08-02, source #2 s/n 1370-08-02, and source #6 s/n 1374-08-02. All three sources will not retract into the shielded position. The device has a SS&D Registration # TN-1031-D-801-S. Only one device was manufactured and is no longer being manufactured. The manufacturer is Berthold Technologies GmbH & Co. KG, D-75323 Bad Wildbad Germany. The Berthold Model LB300 IS level density gauge is installed on G-Line High Pressure Reactor Vessel, V5300 and G-Line high pressure separator production line. ExMCo engineers and Flowmaster/Berthold engineers & service company have been contacted to fix the problem by repairing the source holders or replace the device with other comparable technology. Event type: The gauge is installed on processes and does not pose a health and safety threat to the general public or the ExMCo employees. The gauge will remain on the operational process until the repair is made to the device. This is considered an equipment failure for reporting requirements. Event Location: ExxonMobil Chemical Co. Baton Rouge Plastics Plant 11675 Scotland Avenue, (Hwy 19) Baton Rouge, LA 70807, Event description: Shutters stuck in the open position or difficult to operate shutters were detected on a level/density gauge installed on processes at ExMCo. A service company has been contacted to make the repair or replace the device. The Department will be provided a final report with corrective actions. The Department was notified and the incident was reported to the NRC Operation Center. The report to the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 30.50 (b) (2) and required by LAC 33:XV.341.B.2.b. Louisiana Event: LA 180015
ENS 5352224 July 2018 00:57:00The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS (Emergency Notification System) or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2. On July 23, 2018, at approximately 1631 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Unit 2 control room experienced an unplanned loss of Steam Generator #1 steam line monitor (RU-139), channels A and B. This monitor is used to assess dose projections for Main Steam line exhaust while in Modes 1-4 and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Conditions 'RS1' and' RG1' and Emergency Action Levels (EALs) 'RS1.2' and 'RG1.2'. The PVNGS Emergency Plan does have two additional EALs that can be assessed for each Initiating Condition. The loss of this monitor constitutes a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.
ENS 5360313 September 2018 14:38:00The following information was received by the State of Texas: On 09/13/2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by a licensee that an employee received a personnel dosimetry report of 16.0 rem for the second quarter of 2018. The employee had received a report of a 3.3 rem exposure for the previous quarter. The licensee suspects that someone tampered with the dosimeter. The employee works in the nuclear medicine department and always leaves the badge attached to the lab coat on the door to the hot lab. Other employees performing similar work only received minimal exposures. Due to the amount of the reported exposure, the agency will conduct an investigation on site. Texas Incident: I-9613
ENS 5350011 July 2018 03:58:00On July 11, 2018, as part of pre-planned maintenance, the site meteorological tower will be removed from service. The tower will be out of service for approximately 11 days. As a result, this is reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). During the time the data is not available from the meteorological tower; compensatory measures will be in place to obtain the data from the National Weather Service if necessary. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 534853 July 2018 19:07:00

EN Revision Text: DISCOVERY OF AN UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADES PLANT SAFETY On July 3, 2018, while performing a review of Emergency Operating Procedures, a concern was identified regarding the potential for excessive loss of ultimate heat sink inventory (UHS) through the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system mini-flow recirculation pathway. This condition would have the potential to prevent the ultimate heat sink from providing an adequate inventory of water for a 30-day mission time.

The normal water supply for the Callaway AFW system is the condensate storage tank (CST). The CST is a non-safety grade component. The safety-grade supply for AFW is the essential service water (ESW) system. The ESW system is supplied by the UHS. The UHS thermal performance analysis accounts for a loss of UHS inventory to the AFW system up until the point of the accident sequence that the AFW pumps would be secured. The analysis did not include an allowance for loss of UHS inventory through the AFW mini-flow recirculation pathway following the AFW pumps being secured. The EOP guidance that secures the AFW pumps does not isolate the mini-flow recirculation pathway.

Initial estimates indicate that loss of UHS inventory through the mini-flow recirculation pathway, if not isolated, would preclude the UHS from completing its 30-day mission time. This potential for depletion of the UHS placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded safety.

Callaway has issued interim guidance to the on-shift personnel regarding this concern to ensure that the ultimate heat sink water level is maintained at a level that will be adequate to mitigate the potential loss of inventory.

This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades safety. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this condition.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 07/31/2018 AT 1430 EDT FROM LEE YOUNG TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Event Notification (EN) 53485, made on July 3, 2018, is being retracted because re-evaluation performed subsequent to the notification has demonstrated, based on actual plant equipment and environmental conditions, that the unanalyzed inventory losses previously reported by EN 53485 would not have depleted the UHS inventory to an unacceptable level during its 30-day mission time. The re-evaluation has led to the conclusion that the previously unanalyzed losses of UHS inventory would not have prevented the UHS from performing its specified safety functions and meeting its 30-day mission time requirements. With the UHS capable of performing its specified safety functions and meeting its 30-day mission time requirements, the systems supported by the UHS would have remained capable of performing their specified safety functions. Based on these considerations, it has been determined that the condition reported in EN 53485 did not result in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded safety. Consequently, the condition did not meet the criteria for an 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the Event Notification retraction. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

ENS 534874 July 2018 23:19:00The following information was received from the State of Texas by email: On July 4, 2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of their crews has experienced a source disconnect. The crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 70 Curie Iridium - 192 source. The licensee did not have a lot of details on the event, but stated the source had been recovered and that no over exposures had occurred. The licensee stated the connector ball on the drive cable was tested after the event and failed the test. The RSO stated they would provide additional information on July 5, 2018. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident- I-9591
ENS 534843 July 2018 12:00:00At 0954 (EDT) on July 3, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to high steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted and Unit 1 is in an electrical shutdown lineup. The cause of the high steam generator water level transient is being investigated.
ENS 5347828 June 2018 10:10:00The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On June 27, 2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's corporate radiation safety officer (CRSO) that one of his radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect. The crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 113.1 Curie iridium - 192 source. After completing the first shot on a new location on the pipeline, the crew could not get the source to return to the exposure device. The crew contacted the CRSO and set up new barriers at 2 millirem. The CRSO and a second individual qualified for source retrieval arrived at the site at 1743 hours. The retrieval team (RT) surveyed the guide tube and determined the source was in the collimator. The RT removed the guide tube from the exposure device and removed the camera from the area. Using a set of long tongs, the guide tube was removed from the pipe and the source slid down the guide tube until the connector was exposed. They could see the drive cable had broken near the connector. The source was shielded with bags of lead shot. The CRSO disconnected the broken drive cable from the source pigtail and connected the pigtail to a new drive cable that had been installed on the camera. The source was retracted to the shielded position in the camera. The camera and crank out device and drive cable will be sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No overexposures occurred as a result of this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident # - 9590
ENS 5346922 June 2018 15:12:00At 0900 (EDT) on June 22, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5328725 March 2018 23:43:00

On March 25, 2018 at 1616 hours (EDT), with the reactor in cold shutdown condition, two control rod drive piping lines were determined to be potentially inoperable in the event of a design basis earthquake due to support defects. The control rod drive piping forms a portion of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and primary containment boundary. The supports will be repaired prior to plant startup. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JOE FRATTASIO TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1500 EDT ON 4/13/18 * * *

The purpose of the notification is to retract ENS notification 53287 made on 03/25/18 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The previous notification reported that control rod drive (CRD) piping could be potentially inoperable in the event of a design basis earthquake, at the time of discovery, due to piping support defects. Subsequent evaluation has demonstrated that the piping was not inoperable. Specifically, after an engineering evaluation, it has been determined that the CRD Hydraulic System operability was never lost and the system was operable, although non-conforming, based on the support configuration not conforming to the pipe support drawings. The affected pipe supports have been restored or reworked to the proper design condition in accordance with the design drawings. The CRD System has subsequently been restored to a fully operable status. Notified R1DO (Jackson) and IRD MOC (Pham).

ENS 5326515 March 2018 22:08:00At 1524 (EDT) on Thursday, March 15, 2018, Operations was notified of a failure to meet Appendix R requirements for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Unit 2 and Unit 3. Valves associated with the feedwater system for both units were not properly considered as Hi-Lo Pressure interface valves as required by the Appendix R program. This results in the susceptibility to a hot short condition that could open valves, diverting flow from the reactor, damage piping and prevent injection. U3 (Unit 3) Fire Safe Shutdown Credited Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System is affected. U2 (Unit 2) is affected by a potential leak path through the Reactor Water Cleanup system. This event is being reported as an occurrence of an event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). The Station (PBAPS) is performing hourly fire watches for the impacted areas and is also evaluating this condition for corrective action. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 532423 March 2018 02:19:00At 2315 EST on March 2, 2018, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) determined, based on information received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that there may be a potential loss of offsite response capabilities due to ongoing severe natural hazard conditions (i.e., major winter storm) along the coast of Massachusetts. According to information received by PNPS, towns within the 10 Mile EP Radius could be hampered in implementing some protective actions specified in the emergency plan in the unlikely event an emergency were to occur. There is no condition at the Station that would warrant implementation of any emergency plan at this time. PNPS continues to operate safely and is monitoring the weather conditions closely. The Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability. This report is being made conservatively in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As stated previously, the Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5320211 February 2018 23:36:00On February 11, 2018 at 2203 (EST), the Susquehanna Control Room received indication that a loss of Secondary Containment Zone 2 differential pressure (DP) had occurred. Control Room operators noted a differential pressure of <.25" WC (inches Water Column) for several seconds. System DP was restored to normal in 1 minute. The cause of the pressure swings is under investigation. Zone 2 differential pressures being less than 0.25" WC constitutes a loss of Secondary Containment based on not meeting requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.1. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 531921 February 2018 14:23:00

At 1057 CST on February 1, 2018 with the unit in Mode 1 at approximately 27% power, a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was initiated due to an unexpected trip of the B Recirc Pump with A Recirc Pump in fast speed. B Recirc Pump tripped during transfer from slow to fast speed resulting in single loop operation. Operators were unable to reconcile differing indications of core flow. This resulted in a conservative decision to initiate a manual scram. The cause of the B Recirc Pump trip and the apparent issues with core flow indication are under investigation. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. The plant response to the scram was as expected. All control rods (fully) inserted as expected; the feedwater system is maintaining reactor vessel water level in the normal control band and reactor pressure is being maintained with steam line drains and main turbine bypass valves. The NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1015 EDT ON 03/22/2018 FROM DAVID DABADIE TO OSSY FONT * * *

This event was initially reported under 10 CFR 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a manual actuation of the RPS due to an unexpected trip of the B Reactor Recirculation Pump with the A Reactor Recirculation Pump running in fast speed (Single Loop Operations). Operations was unable to reconcile differing indications of core flow and made the conservative decision to perform a planned shutdown in accordance with normal operating procedures. Therefore, this event 'resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation' as specified in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.6. Consequently, this event is not reportable as an actuation of RPS. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R4DO (Groom) has been notified.

ENS 531911 February 2018 13:50:00A non-licensed (employee) supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been (terminated). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5318023 January 2018 05:02:00

At 0400 (CST) on 1/23/2018 the Braidwood Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) Emergency Makeup Air Filter train was taken out of service to perform a planned Makeup Air Filter charcoal replacement. The TSC HVAC Makeup Air Filter train will be rendered nonfunctional during the charcoal replacement. Subsequent charcoal and HEPA filter testing will restore functionality of the TSC HVAC Makeup Air Filter train. The expected duration of the charcoal replacement and subsequent testing is 30 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC HVAC is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a major loss of emergency preparedness capability. An update will be provided once the TSC HVAC Emergency Makeup Air Filter train functionality has been restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1645 EST ON 01/26/2018 FROM PAUL ARTUSA TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

On 1/26/18 at time 1539 EST, the TSC HVAC Emergency Makeup Air Filter train was returned to service following the planned Makeup Alr Filter charcoal replacement. Functionality was verified by charcoal and HEPA filter post maintenance testing. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 531536 January 2018 06:05:00

Oyster Creek Declared an Unusual Event HU 6 Hazardous Event for an Abnormal Intake Structure Level Less than or equal to -3.0 feet MSL (Mean Sea Level) on points 23 and 24 in the Main Control Room at time 0524 (EST). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 1/6/18 AT 2325 EST FROM JAMES RITCHIE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Oyster Creek Terminated Unusual Event HU 6 Hazardous Event for an Abnormal Intake Structure Level at time 2308 (EST). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), NRR EO (King), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5313220 December 2017 18:18:00On December 20, 2017, at 1040 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) 1B-B 6.9kV Shutdown Board (SDBD) normal feeder breaker opened. The loss of voltage to the 1B-B SDBD resulted in the start of the 1B-B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump, the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump, and the start of all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). Power was restored to the 1B-B 6.9 kV SDBD when it loaded on to its associated EDG. Following initial investigation, the 1B-B 6.9 kV SDBD was transferred to its alternate offsite power source, Common Station Service Transformer (CSST) C at 1217 EST. At 1230 EST, the 1B-B 6.9 kV SDBD alternate feeder breaker opened. The loss of voltage to the 1B-B SDBD did not result in the restart of the 1B MDAFW pump, the Unit 1 TDAFW pump, or EDGs; this equipment remained running from the earlier event. Power was restored to the 1B-B 6.9 kV SDBD when it loaded on to its associated EDG. Restoration of normal offsite power to the 1B-B SDBD was completed at 1654. Other than several common Unit Technical Specifications having not been met, Unit 2 was not operationally impacted by the transfer of the 1B-B Shutdown Board to onsite power and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. This report is made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee investigation continues for the cause of the event.
ENS 5312819 December 2017 17:17:00

During regular power operations at 100% power, DG#1 and DG#2 were declared inoperable due to a common issue associated with indicating lights and the associated sockets installed in various control and auxiliary circuits for both DG's. The indicating lights in question are incandescent 120V AC style 120MB bulbs in a socket with a 550 ohm resistor. Style 120MB light bulbs have a failure mechanism where the bulb can cause a short circuit rather than the more common open circuit that is expected when an incandescent bulb filament fails. Cooper originally believed that the socket's integral resistor was sufficient to protect the circuit. In testing performed by an outside laboratory and confirmed on-site using warehouse stock, it was determined that the integral resistor may not have the power dissipation capability to protect the circuit ln which the light and socket are installed if a bulb fails in short circuit. This condition resulted in both DG's being declared inoperable at 1340 (CST) due to a loss of reasonable expectation that they would meet their safety function required action to start, load and run to support loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This is a loss of safety function under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) subject to an 8 hour report. As a result of both DG's being inoperable, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System is also inoperable. This is also a loss of safety function subject to an 8 hour report for the same criterion. The Senior Resident has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0942 EST ON 02/14/2018 FROM DAVID VAN DERKAMP TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on December 19, 2017 at 1340 CST (EN# 53128). Subsequent evaluation concluded a postulated lamp short circuit failure in any of the affected circuits would not impact the ability of the Diesel Generators to perform their safety function and therefore, were operable. With DG operability not affected, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System also remained operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Werner).

ENS 5312719 December 2017 17:05:00The following information was received from the State of Illinois: The University of Chicago Medical Center reported an underdose of Y90 Theraspheres today (12/19/17) to a patient. 53.4 % of dose was delivered with 46.6% stuck in catheter. 21 mCi was ordered and 11.21 was delivered. CT scan verified dose administered in correct location. On 12/18/17, it was still undetermined why remaining dose hung up in catheter. Additional dose (is) being ordered to complete the therapy as a fractionated dose. The licensee is investigating why the catheter became blocked. A 15 day written report will follow. Illinois Incident: IL177059 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5311411 December 2017 16:29:00

The following information was received from the State of South Carolina by email: On Monday, December 11, 2017 at (1100 CST), the Department (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) was notified by (the) Corporate RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) of STERIS Isomedix Services that one of the source racks had been stuck in the 'up' position. The incident happened at (0328 CST) on Saturday, December 8, 2017. The worker saw that there was an unload fault on the system indicating that the rack was stuck so he called maintenance to try to correct the problem. At (0340 CST) the Radiation Safety Officer (and then the corporate RSO were notified) about the event. (The RSO) called and left a message on an employee voicemail rather than calling the 24 hour emergency phone number.

The workers were able to go into the penthouse to correct the problem and lower the source rack back into the pool. The workers found that a carrier had a cracked hinge. They checked all of their other carriers and replaced a total of two carrier doors. The RSO informed the CRSO (Corporate Radiation Safety Officer) that the situation was resolved at (0724 CST). The licensee stated that a written report will be sent within 30 days of the event.

ENS 531098 December 2017 17:26:00The following information was excerpted from an email received from the State of Kansas: The licensee is reporting that an ionizer containing a radioactive source (Model Number P-2063-1000) was lost. The licensee currently has 3 other ionizers of the same model. The device radioactive source was Polonium-210 (SN: A2KT674) with an activity of 31.5 mCi and was last leak tested on 9/20/2016. The device was checked out by the licensee and placed within the secure test floor while testing electrical devices at the Integra Technologies facility. The missing device use was last logged on 8/25/2017. The licensee believes that their maintenance department mistakenly threw the device away. Upon discovering that the device was missing, the licensee searched their facility several times over without finding the device. The prevention for further loss is that the remaining 3 units will be mounted in permanent locations using security screws so they cannot be removed by unauthorized personnel. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 531088 December 2017 17:25:00U/2 HPCI (Unit 2/High Pressure Coolant Injection) was declared inoperable due to leak by of the pump discharge check valve after pump shutdown from flow testing. This resulted in cycling of the minimum flow valve. The discharge valve was closed to prevent the continued cycling of the minimum flow valve. This condition was identified during normal surveillance testing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 531077 December 2017 15:03:00This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. Dominion Energy is in the process of informing the Virginia Department of Health, Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Emergency Management, and the Surry County Administrator of recent groundwater monitoring results at Surry Power Station in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI). On December 6, 2017 at 1138 EST, Surry Power Station received analysis results of recent samples from the on-site groundwater monitoring program. As part of the program, 10 new groundwater monitoring wells were recently placed in service within the Protected Area to provide early detection, to better define the site's hydrology, and if necessary, to mitigate any potential leaks. The analysis results from one of the new wells indicated tritium activity level above the GPI communication threshold. Samples were re-analyzed, resulting in different values, with the highest result of 59,300 picoCuries per liter. Since each result was above the voluntary reporting threshold, Surry stakeholder communication was implemented in accordance with the NEI GPI Voluntary Communication Protocol, Criterion 2.2. There are no known active leaks at this location; however, Dominion Energy is continuing to investigate the source of the tritium and the reason for the variability in the sample results. Tritium was not detected in the on-site monitoring locations outside of the Protected Area. No tritium has been detected in the on-site and off-site drinking water wells. Since the activity is contained within the site restricted area, the health and safety of on-site personnel and members of the public are not affected. A 30-day report will be submitted to the NRC in accordance with NEI 07-07. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5347426 June 2018 17:30:00The following information was received from the State of Texas: During the review of an event, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) found a letter from a licensee reporting the shutter on a Ohmart model SHD-45 containing a 50 millicurie cesium - 137 source had failed in the closed position. The report was dated November 29, 2017. The shutter did not pose an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee has worked with the manufacturer and the gauge was scheduled to be replaced on June 21, 2018. The Agency has not been able to confirm if the gauge was repaired/replaced. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: I-9588
ENS 5312619 December 2017 12:46:00The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received from Crane Nuclear: This letter provides notification of a defect in a Weak Link Analysis provided to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) by Crane-Aloyco, Inc. (CAI), a Crane Nuclear, Inc. (CNI) predecessor business unit, for a Chapman Gate Valve, Figure L900, Item # 18, Drawing CC05307, Revision B for the Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) plant. The subject valve was originally procured from Crane Chapman in 1968. In 1988, TVA requested Crane to supply a Weak Leak Analysis for the original valve. A Weak Link Analysis (OTC-258 Rev.0) was developed by CAI, which identified a maximum thrust capacity of approximately 112,000 lbf. In November 2017, Crane Nuclear, Inc. developed a new Weak Link Analysis for the valve. Crane Nuclear, Inc. provided the new Weak Link Analysis (WL-103 Rev. 0) to TVA on November 17th, 2017. Crane Nuclear. Inc. identified in the new Weak Link Analysis a maximum thrust capacity of approximately 96,000 lbf. CNI is reviewing our records to determine if the maximum thrust rating in any other Weak Link Analyses provided by CNI for gate valve designs with an SMB-4T or SMB-5T actuator exceeds the rating for the thrust bearings. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983.
ENS 5307416 November 2017 08:17:00At 0008 CST on 11/16/2017, Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was notified by Omaha Weather that the NOAA broadcast and the Shubert radio tower for this area is off. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The transmission outage actually began at 2007 (CST), 11/15/2017, but CNS was not notified until 0008 (CST), 11/16/2017. Backup notification methods remained available throughout the period. At time 0447 CST on 11/16/2017, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified that the NOAA broadcast and Shubert radio transmission tower was returned to service. Nemaha County, NE, Richardson County, NE, and Atchison County, MO authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified by Cooper Nuclear Station of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios at 0642 (CST), 11/16/2017. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a 4 hour report. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed.
ENS 5312919 December 2017 18:28:00The following information was excerpted from an email received from the State of Florida: The State of Florida received a notice on 11/15/17 that a Troxler Gauge and a company vehicle was stolen from the licensee by an employee. A City of Orlando Police report was issued (2017-442672). On 12/7/2017, a notice was received from the licensee to inform State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control that the gauge was found intact and undamaged. The Troxler moisture density gauge is a model number 3440; serial number 27931; Cs-137/AmBe; 8mCi/40mCi. Florida Incident Number: FL17-298. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5306713 November 2017 03:57:00At 2119 (CST) on 11/12/2017 a Control Room board walk down discovered that both of the Unit 2 Containment Spray Pump control switches were in pull-out. With the control switches in pull-out, the pumps would not automatically start as required. Unplanned TS (Technical Specifications) 3.0.3 was entered at 2119 as a result of not complying with TS 3.6.5, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, which requires both trains of Containment Spray to be Operable while in Mode 4. Unit 2 had entered Mode 4 at 0303 on 11/12/2017. TS 3.0.3 was exited at 2127 on 11/12/2017 when both Containment Spray Pump control switches were placed in Automatic restoring Operability. Preliminary investigation determined that while Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Surveillance SP 2099, Main Steam Isolation Valve Logic Test, had taken the Containment Spray Pump control switches to pull-out but did not re-align the control switches to automatic after the test was complete. This 8-hour Non-Emergency report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Accident Mitigation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5313019 December 2017 17:40:00The following was excerpted from an email received from the State of Florida: The State of Florida received a notice of an over-exposure from the licensee. An employee received a whole body dose of 5019 mR read on her dosimeter on 10/10/2017. The investigation determined that the most likely cause of the over-exposure was due to an unusual number of equipment failures with the synthesis units requiring employee intervention to correct the issues. Dose rates and doses to the employee were not being monitored real time. The employee has been retrained on the standard operating procedures. Alarming personal electronic dosimeters have been purchased and are in use to alert personnel of the radiation fields. Florida Incident Number: FL17-299
ENS 530597 November 2017 22:09:00On November 7, 2017 at 1810 (CST), Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), was manually isolated following failure of the remote turbine trip pushbutton to function. Unit 1 HPCI Operability Testing was in progress to the point of securing the HPCI turbine with the remote manual pushbutton. The pushbutton failed to trip the turbine resulting in operator action to lower the flow controller setpoint and isolating the HPCI steam line. HPCI remains isolated and is Inoperable pending resolution of the Turbine Trip circuitry. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530556 November 2017 13:21:00The following information was received from the State of Texas by email: On November 6, 2017, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee that a shutter was stuck in the closed position. The Ronan SA1 shutter was closed for maintenance on a hopper and failed to reopen. The gauge contains a 50 millicurie Cesium-137 source. The Licensee stated a service company has been contacted to repair the gauges in the next few days. No individual received significant exposure to radiation due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: I-9519
ENS 5304028 October 2017 13:29:00A patient receiving treatment for a liver disease was prescribed 60 milliCuries of Y-90 SIR-Spheres. The delivered dose was calculated to be 11 milliCuries and stasis was not achieved. The patient was notified of the misadministration and is scheduled to receive the fully prescribed dose. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5303726 October 2017 17:00:00The following information was received by facsimile from the vendor: Component: Speed switch P/Ns ESl50267C, ESl50267E, ESl50267H, and ESl50267K. Summary: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on September 12, 2017 upon notification of a potential issue with speed switch P/N ESl50267K supplied to Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The speed switch had reportedly failed in service which resulted in a failure to start of the emergency diesel generator (EDG). An analysis performed by Exelon Powerlabs determined the failure was due to a shorted capacitor that is installed on the speed switch's relay output contacts to ground. The evaluation was concluded on October 25, 2017 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. The speed switch output contacts are utilized in the engine's start circuitry and failure to function properly could adversely affect the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set. Impact on Operability: If the resistance path to ground were sufficiently low, the ability of the relay output contacts to pick-up and/or drop-out associated components would be compromised. The speed switch relays are used in safety-related EDG start circuitry to control various electrical relays. Failure to properly control any of these components could adversely affect the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator. Root cause evaluation: The root cause of the failure is a deficiency in the design and selection of the EMC (Electromagnetic compatibility) mitigating components. Consideration was not given for the impact of voltage transients imparted on the capacitors during coil de-energization. For customers without suppression from the inductive kick, the magnitude of voltage transients may be sufficient to damage and ultimately degrade the capacitors to the point of failure. Affected nuclear plants include Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities, Dresden, Davis Besse and Hope Creek.
ENS 5301616 October 2017 08:36:00

The following information was received from the State of California: The Licensee discovered at approximately (1700 PDT) on 10/15/17 that two 3 Ci Am-241Be well logging sources had been stolen from their storage area at Weller Ranch in Kern County. Locks had been cut and the sources were removed from the approximate 12-foot storage pipe. Additionally, an approximate 2500 (pound) calibration water tank was also missing. The FBI was notified by CA Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) at approximately (2030 PDT) on 10/15/17. RHB will be onsite 10/16/17. California 5010 Number: 101517

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT GREGER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1511 EDT ON 10/16/2017 * * *

The two well logging sources have been accounted for. An unauthorized individual had accessed the sources, removing them from their storage location on his father's ranch land and discarding them a short distance away without any knowledge of what they were. The unauthorized individual also took the water calibration tank for his personal use. The well logging sources are back in the possession of the licensee. Notified R4DO (Vasquez) , NMSS Events Notification, CNSNS (MEXICO) and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5299125 September 2017 14:04:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email: Notifications: On September 25, 2017, the licensee informed the Department (PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection) of a failure of an electronic component of a fixed gauge. It is reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)(i). Event Description: The electronic component of the automatic shutter on an IMS Model 5301-01 gauge containing approximately 20 curies of Cesium-137 failed to close on its own. The licensee immediately notified the RSO, as per their emergency procedure, who was able to remotely log in to the computer software system and bypass the automatic mode to close the shutter. The gauge is housed in a secure and entry restricted enclosure and instructions have been given to all operators to ensure that the shutter is closed while not in use. The manufacturer, IMS, was notified and is scheduled to make repairs on September 26, 2017. All regulatory precautions were taken and no overexposures have occurred. Cause of the Event: Equipment failure. ACTIONS: The Department will perform a reactive inspection. The manufacturer has already been scheduled to correct the problem. More information will be provided upon receipt. PA Event Report ID No.: PA170014
ENS 5301716 October 2017 11:08:00The following information was received from the State of New York via facsimile: On September 21, 2017 the Department (New York State Department of Health) was notified that a Best Medical International, Inc., Model #2301 lodine-125 seed used for localization of non-palpable lesions and lymph nodes was lost. On September 18, a patient was implanted with a 125.2 microCurie lodine-125 seed. The seed was verified to be implanted by use of a survey meter. When the patient returned for explant three days later, the iodine-125 seed could not be detected. The licensee surveyed the patient's vehicle, house, laundry, and trash and no radioactivity was detected. The licensee reported placing the seed 'superficially' within the patient and the licensee speculates that the seed may have become dislodged from the patient at some point between the implant and explant. New York Report ID No.: NYDOH-NY-17-08 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5297417 September 2017 16:49:00On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control. The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred. These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed. This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation.
ENS 5296914 September 2017 16:38:00The following information was received from the State of California via email: On September 14, 2017, (The RSO) of Southwest Calibration & Training notified the RHB Brea office that United Inspection & Testing, Inc., RML # 4788-33, had a Troxler, 3411B, serial #6644 radioactive gauge run over and damaged. On September 14, 2017, RHB Brea contacted (The RSO) of United Inspection & Testing, Inc. (The RSO of United Inspection & Testing, Inc.) informed our office that the radioactive gauge had been run over by a backhoe on the afternoon of September 13, 2017 at approximately 1400 (PDT), at the intersection of Banana Street and Daurin Street at a construction site in Fontana, CA. As a result of the accident the radioactive gauge had the handle broken off. The RSO was able to return the Cs-137 source to its shielded position, but it could not be locked in the shielded position due to the damage to the gauge. The authorized user of the gauge was also struck by the backhoe and died of his injuries. (The RSO of the United Inspection & Testing, Inc.) retrieved the gauge from the accident site and transported it to Southwest Calibration & Training to be inspected. (The RSO) of Southwest Calibration & Training reported that the Troxler radioactive gauge read 0.9 mR/hr at 1 foot. The gauge was extensively damaged and may not be repairable. California 5010 Number: 091417
ENS 5297115 September 2017 15:17:00The following information was received by the State of Illinois by email: IEMA (Illinois Emergency Management Agency) was notified at (1353 CDT) on 9/8/17 that a load of ferrous metal was being rejected from a scrap metal recycling facility (Omnisource in Indiana) back to Gaby Iron in Chicago Heights. The max exposure rate was reported at 20 microR/hour (4 microR/hour background). The load is being returned under DOT SP IN-IL-17-010. The suspect load was inspected Monday, September 11th. An Alnor dew pointer device with an intact 7 microCurie Ra-226 source was recovered. No removable contamination was identified. The device was impounded by IEMA and is pending return to an appropriate entity. No additional radiation sources were discovered and the remainder of the load was released without further restriction. Pending appropriate disposal or return to the manufacturer, this matter is being considered closed. The device was an Alnor Instrument portable gauge; Model 7350; Serial Number 230667. The Amersham sealed source was a model RAM.X452; Ra-226; 7 microCurie activity. NMED Report: IL177030 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 530628 November 2017 15:06:00

The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email: A local Health District employee had a Niton Xlp 300 XRF with a 50 mCi Cadmium-109 source stolen overnight on Saturday, September 2, 2017. It was in the car in their garage and someone came in and took it. The employee had worked late at a job site that day and brought the gauge home instead of returning to the office. Employee's garage door did not close for some reason that night and they were unaware that it was open when they went to bed. There were several other cars broken into that night in employee's neighborhood. A report was filed with local police department. Device has not yet been recovered. Source/Radioactive Material: Sealed Source; Radionuclide: Cd-109; Activity: 50mCi; Device Name: X-RAY Fluorescence (XRF); Model Number: Niton XLp 300; Manufacturer: Thermo Scientific Analytical; Serial Number: 98149. Ohio Item Number: OH170007

  • * * UPDATE AT 0919 ON 11/29/17 FROM STEPHEN JAMES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via e-mail: Note: According to device owner, the manufacturer told them that this incident was NOT reportable to their regulatory agency. The owner reported the event on 11/6/17 as a result of more research on their part. UPDATE: The gauge was found by a member of the public in their yard, where it had apparently been abandoned. The local health district was notified based on contact information on case. The case was still locked when found. The device is now back in the possession of the local health district as of 11/27/17. Notified the R3DO (Duncan), NMSS Events Resources and CNSC (via e-mail) . THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5290916 August 2017 15:41:00On 8/16/2017, at 1039 (EDT), an un-planned trip of the Peach Bottom Station Blackout Transformer 34.5 kV feeder breaker 1005 and a loss of the 191-00 line occurred causing a loss of power to Unit 1 and the TSC. Power was not restored to the TSC or the ventilation system within 1 hour. Power was subsequently restored to the TSC at 1207 hours (EDT) and the ventilation system was restored to available. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5290515 August 2017 14:07:00On August 15, 2017, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Callaway Plant identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific Technical Specification equipment is considered not to be adequately protected from tornado missiles. The recirculation lines for all three independent trains of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) connect to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) inside the CST Valve House, which is not a tornado missile-resistant structure. The direct impact by a design basis missile could result in crimping of the recirculation lines, thereby creating the potential to cause damage to the Train A and B Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFPs) and the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) by restricting recirculation flow to less than the design requirements. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) remove residual heat, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident. These conditions are being addressed in accordance with NRC's Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 and Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01 (enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5290715 August 2017 16:52:00The following information was provided by the State of California via email: On 08/14/17, RHB (California Radiation Health Branch) received an incident report from Office of Emergency Services regarding a damaged moisture density gauge. A CPN gauge, Model MC-3, S/N M380108935, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241 was run over by a heavy construction equipment at a job site in the city of Santa Clara, CA. The top of the gauge housing was damaged with a broken rod, however, the user managed to retrieve the source back into shielded position. The damaged gauge was placed in the transport case and taken to the licensee's facility for disposal. Fire department was at the incident site, performed surveys using a survey meter (no survey meter information available) and the readings did not indicate any contamination. According to the gauge user, Fire Department readings indicated 500 uR/hr at the damaged gauge and 6 uR/hr at 15 feet from the gauge. The gauge will be transported to CPN for leak testing and disposal on 08/15/17. RHB will be following up on this incident. California 5010 Number: 081417
ENS 5290615 August 2017 14:24:00Following a panoramic irradiator two day shutdown, a restart with three source racks commenced. Air pressure was applied to raise the source racks. During the restart, two source racks (racks 1 and 3) did not descend into the irradiator pool as designed. During an investigation, two release valves associated with the two source racks did not operate properly. Operators manually released air pressure and all source racks descended into the irradiator pool. The deficient release valves were replaced and the source racks were satisfactorily retested. The source racks all properly descended into the pool. The time the source racks were inoperable for approximately 1.5 hours.
ENS 528918 August 2017 20:22:00On August 8, 2017, at 1554 hours (EDT), during restoration from testing of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Suppression Pool Level High Instrumentation, unexpected as-left indications were found that impacted both of the required channels of instrumentation. Subsequent venting of the instrumentation lines was completed and both channels of instrumentation are reading consistent with previously taken as-found data. The instrumentation was declared OPERABLE at 1635. The initial cause of the unexpected as-left indications appears to be the introduction of air into the instrumentation lines during the calibration activities. This is considered a loss of safety function based on both of the HPCS Suppression Pool Level High Instrumentation channels being declared INOPERABLE and the loss of the automatic HPCS suction swap to the Suppression Pool on a high level. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The (NRC Resident Inspector) has been notified.
ENS 5287628 July 2017 15:22:00

Containment atmosphere oxygen level was measured at 18.4 percent. This is below normal habitability level. The cause of the low oxygen level is a nitrogen leak inside containment Nitrogen has been isolated from containment and operators are preparing to purge containment. The licensee notified the State of California, local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, USDA OPS, HHS OPS, DOE OPS, DHS NICC, EPA EOC. Notified FDA EOC, NuclearSSA, FEMA NWC and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ALLEN DURACHER TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/28/17 AT 2142 EDT * * *

The ALERT was terminated on 7/28/17 at 1819 PDT. The containment atmosphere was restored to normal conditions. The nitrogen source was isolated. The cause of the nitrogen leak into containment is under investigation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee has notified the State of California and the local authorities. The licensee plans to issue a press release. Notified the R4DO (Hay), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant). Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, USDA OPS, HHS OPS, DOE OPS, DHS NICC, EPA EOC. Notified FDA EOC, NuclearSSA, FEMA NWC and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.

ENS 5287427 July 2017 18:54:00(Unit 2) HPCI was declared inoperable due to improper valve alignment stemming from an incorrect sequence directed from a work order. (Unit 2) HPCI was inoperable for 20 minutes and was manually re-aligned to an operable status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5287225 July 2017 11:07:00On July 25, 2017, at 0428 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 was in Mode 3, beginning a Reactor Startup. While in the initial phase of withdrawing the first of four Control Rod banks, the two associated group demand position indicators deviated greater than 2 steps from each other. In accordance with Technical Requirement 3.1.7, Position Indication System, Shutdown, with one or more group demand position indicators inoperable, the reactor trip breakers are to be opened immediately. Operations personnel opened the reactor trip breakers immediately by initiating a manual trip of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The Auxiliary Feedwater system was in service and controlling Steam Generator water levels at the time of the event and did not receive any valid actuation signals. No other system actuations occurred as a result of this reactor trip and all systems operated as designed. The cause of the position indication system inoperability is currently under investigation. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5287124 July 2017 23:50:00
ENS 5286721 July 2017 10:40:00The following information was received by the licensee via email: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC concerning a defect in an Eaton/Cutler Hammer A200 series starter that failed while in service at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. The failed starter was manufactured by Eaton Corporation in 2014 and purchased by Susquehanna from AZZ/NLI as part of an MCC bucket assembly. The starter failed with its contacts stuck in the energized state when it was de-energized. A failure analysis identified the contactor sticking to be due to the pole faces of the coil laminations and those of the armature laminations adhering to one another at normal operating temperatures. There was residue/material on the pole faces which closely matched Polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) and silicone grease. One of the characteristics of PDMS is that at cooler temperatures it is more of a solid consistency, and at higher temperatures it becomes more viscous and tacky. A previous Part 21 report submitted by Curtiss-Wright QualTech NP (Event Notification Number 51611) in December 2015 provided notification of Eaton/Cutler Hammer A200 series starters failures due to silicon based mold release that remained on the molded parts and would come between the moving (magnet) and fixed armatures. The Part 21 stated that when heated for extended period of time, the material would become sticky causing anywhere from a minor delay in opening to a frozen closed condition. Eaton/Cutler Hammer determined that the silicone mold release was first introduced into the manufacturing facility in May 2008 and used periodically until October 2012. According to Eaton/Cutler Hammer, any starters manufactured after January 1, 2013 should be silicon mold release free. Following the failure of the 2014 starter at Susquehanna, Eaton Corporation performed an investigation and reconfirmed that silicon mold release was banned from molding production in October 2012 and has not been used since that time. Eaton concluded that the contamination does not appear to be systemic, but rather random and intermittent and that the contamination was most likely introduced either by operators and assemblers on the manufacturing lines, or by others who disassemble and inspect the product after shipment from their plant. Susquehanna does not take the components apart during receipt for testing or visual inspection. Eaton concluded that there is no evidence that the issue is systemic and considers it a random event. Susquehanna has evaluated the condition and has concluded that the condition could create a substantial safety hazard. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5285814 July 2017 11:13:00The following information was received from the State of Arizona via email: This First Notice constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received WITHOUT verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Agency (Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency) Staff at this time. During an inspection of the licensee on July 13, 2017, an inspector found one portable gauge where the radiation source exposure shutter would not close when moved to the closed position. The inspector's dose measurement at contact with the device was approximately 100 mR/hr. The gauge is a Troxler model 3430, Serial Number 30302, containing 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of Americium-241. The licensee has contacted a repair company to fix the gauge as soon as possible. The Agency is investigating the event. The Governor's office and U.S. NRC are being notified of this event. Arizona First Notice: 17-009
ENS 5285113 July 2017 10:33:00The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email: This is an initial report regarding a misadministration event in Colorado. University of Colorado Hospital (License Number: CO 828-01) had a misadministration of Y-90 microspheres (SIRTex SIRSpheres) on Wednesday, July 12, 2017. At approximately 11 (MDT), the post administration measurements of the waste from the SIRSpheres Administration indicated that the activity administered to segment 2/3 of the patient's liver was only 68.7 percent of the prescribed activity. The written directive called for an activity of 0.24 GBq and residual waste activity measurements indicated that 0.165 GBq was delivered. The physician indicated that stasis was not reached during the administration to this segment. There was a separate administration to segment (four) of the liver in which stasis was reached. Follow-up information will be provided after they are available. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5282926 June 2017 18:39:00On June 26, 2017, at 1531 (EDT), Indian Point Unit 2 inserted a manual reactor trip prior to Steam Generator levels reaching the automatic reactor trip setpoint. Steam Generator water level perturbation resulted from a loss of 22 Main Boiler Feed Pump. All Control Rods verified inserted. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started as designed and supplied feedwater to the Steam Generators. Heat removal is via the Main Condenser through the High Pressure Steam Dumps. Offsite power is being supplied through the normal 138kV feeder 95332. The cause of the 22 Main Boiler Feed Pump loss is currently under investigation. Entergy is issuing a press release/news release on this issue. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 3. The licensee notified the State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5282624 June 2017 15:42:00On June 24, 2017 at 1028 (EDT), a loss of secondary containment occurred due to trip of 2V217A Zone III Filtered Exhaust Fan causing a reduction in D/P (differential pressure) to less than the required 0.25 WC (water column). 2V217B Zone III Filtered Exhaust Fan started on low flow in AUTO as designed and secondary containment D/P was restored to greater than 0.25 WC by 1029 hours. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.7 as a loss of a safety function. There is no redundant Susquehanna secondary containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5282223 June 2017 11:37:00

The following information was received from the State of North Carolina via email: On June 22, 2017 at (1130 EDT), North Carolina Radiation Protection Section (RPS) was informed by the Radiation Safety Officer for Hospira, Inc. (Pfizer), Rocky Mount, NC (License 064-0969-1) that they were experiencing an issue involving their Wet Shielded Irradiator (Nordion Model JS-8900, Serial Number IR-183, approved for 4,800,000.00 Ci of Co-60). RSO stated that during routine maintenance checks the Source 1 Rack of the irradiator would not trip the down switch to confirm the source rack was in the down position on the control panel and that they were following emergency procedures. Nordion was then contacted by the licensee to obtain assistance. RPS inspectors were immediately dispatched to the licensee's site. Once on site, RSO informed RPS that visual confirmation was made of source position via hydraulic cylinders that were fully extended, comparison of cable tightness on roof was observed, and that no indication of radiation in the vault was detected; all leading to the unconfirmed indication that the source rack had moved to the down position. With the assistance from Nordion, Hospira staff were able to initiate bypass procedures and gain access to the vault where confirmation was made that the source racks were in the down position. Nordion advised that a faulty down position switch was the cause for the failure. Switch was repaired on site by Hospira engineers, same day. Following repair, Hospira personnel cycled the sources which were brought up into position for one sterilization cycle and then the sources were brought down to test the position sensor. The test was successful, as indicated by the down position indicator lamps and screen on the operator's panel. Nordion staff was informed of the successful test and Hospira staff continued procedural tests to confirm full functionality. After confirming cycling up and down of the source racks, Hospira personnel performed full monthly QA check before resuming operations. 30-Day report is pending to RPS.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/2/2017 AT 1042 EDT FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO DONG PARK * * *

The following information was received from the State of North Carolina via email: We have completed our investigation and have no further information to provide in this event report. We would like to request (NMED) Event 170315 be Closed & Complete. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5282323 June 2017 16:13:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email: The licensee reported on June 23, 2017 that licensee learned from its licensed leak test service provider on June 21, 2017 that one 6 millicurie, cobalt-57 sealed source out of 25 sources received in a package on June 16, 2017 from the source manufacturer, Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products, tested positive for leakage. The leakage was reported as being 4.2 times the limit of 0.005 microCuries (0.021 microCuries). The other 24 sources showed no contamination. The leaking sealed source is an Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products Model 3901-2 source, serial number P6-883. The licensee reported that the leaking source was contained and secured in an individual zip lock type plastic bag; that there is no facility contamination based on area surveys performed; that the external surfaces of the package received, that had contained all of the 25 source, had been wipe tested and that the package was not contaminated; and that the sources were not used pending leak test results. The licensee reported that it notified the source manufacturer on June 21, 2017, received a return authorization number from the manufacturer, and shipped the source back to the manufacturer on June 22, 2017. The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) considers this event to be open.
ENS 5282022 June 2017 20:33:00On June 20, 2017, at 1444 hours (EDT), with the reactor at 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, plant personnel identified that both doors in one of the secondary containment airlocks (Door #58 and Door #85) were open briefly as part of normal passage of personnel. The Technical Specification definition of SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY states 'At least one door in each access opening is closed.' Actions were taken to immediately close both doors and restore operability of secondary containment. PNPS (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
ENS 527927 June 2017 12:13:00

The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email: During routine shutter checks performed by the licensee on June 6, 2017, the licensee noted that the shutter would not close. The gauge is identified as Berthold Model LB 300 L source holder containing 0.189 milliCuries of Cobalt-60. The gauge remains operational in the normal use location and the RSO will place additional signs in the area. No maintenance is planned in the area that would require closing of the shutter. The RSO has performed a radiation survey to ensure that radiation exposure is maintained at less than 2 mR/hr in the vicinity of the gauge. The licensee has contacted the technical representative who was expected to be at the facility on July 6, 2017, for other maintenance and will examine this gauge. In accordance with RH-1502.f.2 (10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)) the malfunctioning shutter is reportable within 24 hours. The State of Arkansas is awaiting a written report from the licensee and final disposition information for the gauge. The State's event number is AR-2017-003.

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/20/2018 AT 1520 EDT FROM STEVE MACK TO DONG PARK * * *

The following was received via e-mail: A report submitted on July 3, 2017, indicated that the cause of the shutter failure was the exposure to alkaline pulp material and the carbon steel construction of the source holder. The source holder was replaced on January 9, 2018 with a comparable source holder constructed of stainless steel. The Department (Arkansas Department of Health) considers this event to be closed. Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5277024 May 2017 12:20:00The following information was received from the State of Texas by email: On October 16, 1998, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified that a Humboldt model 5001 moisture/density gauge containing a 10 millicurie cesium - 137 and a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source was lost during transport from San Antonio to Laredo, Texas. The gauge was to be delivered to the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT). A search of the transportation companies warehouses and delivery locations along the transportation route did not find the gauge. The investigation was placed in "Inactive" status. On May 17, 2017, the Agency received an email string showing that a moisture/density gauge was for sale on the internet site 'eBay'. A search of the eBay site found that the gauge serial number matched the serial number of the gauge reported missing in 1998. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was contacted and a request was made for assistance in gathering information on the seller. Using the information gathered by the Agency and the FBI, the Agency was able to contact the seller. The seller removed the posting off of eBay immediately. The seller stated they purchase materials from companies who are going out of business and resell them. The seller stated they did not remember when or where the gauge was purchased. The seller stated they had just moved all the materials they store in a large warehouse into two smaller warehouses and that is when they discovered the gauge. They did some research on the use for the gauge online and decided to sell it. The seller turned the gauge over to TXDOT on May 24, 2017. Dose rates taken on the gauge by TXDOT were normal. The gauge will be leak tested and returned to the manufacturer. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Event #35040 initially reported the event on 11/16/1998 as a lost source while in transit. Texas Incident: I-7394 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5276016 May 2017 23:40:00

The Midwest Inspection Services building has been severely damaged by a tornado storm. All radiography cameras have been accounted for and are stored in a safe location. The vault is intact. Tornados are forecasted to continue throughout the evening.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 05/17/17 FROM MICHAEL BRODERICK TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was received from the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality via email: Shortly after 22:30 (CDT) on the evening of May 16th, Oklahoma DEQ (Department of Environmental Quality) verbally notified the HOO (NRC Headquarters Operations Officer) of an event affecting an Oklahoma radiography company. This is a follow-up report to confirm the verbal report and provide more details. Facility Name: Desert NDT, LLC dba Shawcor (note) the facility was historically known as Midwest Inspections, and was accidentally referred to by that name in the initial report. Facility license number: OK-32104-01 Because of concern generated by news reports, DEQ (Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality) contacted the facility at about 22:00 (CDT) and over the following few minutes, we were able to reach the facility manager. (The facility manager) reported that their licensed facility at Elk City had been largely destroyed by the tornado reported in the media. He indicated that the vault was mostly intact, but had damage to the ceiling. All power at the facility was out. (The facility manager) indicated they (Desert NDT) had fifteen cameras in the vault, and others were out in trucks on jobs around the region. (The facility manager) reported that they (Desert NDT) had done an inventory on the fifteen cameras in the vault, and confirmed that they were accounted for. (The facility manager) had no reports of problems with any sources dispatched on jobs. (The facility manager) explained that they (Desert NDT) did not regard the damaged vault as suitable for secure storage, but they (Desert NDT) had one radiography truck that was largely intact, and they (Desert NDT) were storing the fifteen cameras in one truck, and keeping the truck under constant surveillance by an employee who was authorized unescorted access. Media reports indicated that another storm, weaker than the first, but still having potential tornadoes was headed for the area. In a second call, the facility manager reported that because of concerns about further storms, they had moved the cameras into a storm shelter in (a secure location). (The facility manager) indicated that the storm shelter was under surveillance, and was lockable, and would remain locked unless being directly accessed. In view of the remarkable circumstances, (Oklahoma) DEQ approved this arrangement as an interim measure. About 8:20 (CDT) on the morning of the 17th, (Oklahoma) DEQ contacted the manager again. (The facility manager) indicated that the fifteen cameras were still secured in the storm shelter. (The facility manager) reported that there was no known further damage during the night, and that the company would be conducting a confirmatory inventory of the fifteen cameras, and conducting an inventory to ensure that cameras out on jobs were safe and under control. (The facility manager) will report the results of this to (Oklahoma) DEQ when available. (The facility manager) explained that they were doing an assessment of undamaged trucks that were suitable for secure storage under Part 37, and that they planned to retain some sources at the Elk City facility using the trucks that were suitable. (The facility manager) indicated that excess sources would be moved to a licensed company facility out of state. (The facility manager) will follow up with (Oklahoma) DEQ later today. (Oklahoma) DEQ has used GIS (Geographic Information System) to identify seven other licensed facilities that are near the storm track, and are not considered as having as much concern. We (Oklahoma DEQ) contacted all of them by phone this morning and confirmed that all is well. Notified the R4DO (Miller) and NMSS via email.

ENS 5275314 May 2017 21:27:00On May 14, 2017 at time 1823 (CDT), Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station notified St. Charles Parish Emergency Services via 911 of a fire in the Generation Support Building (GSB), the Hahnville, Luling and Killona Fire Departments were dispatched. The GSB is an Administrative and Engineering Building outside the Protected Area and on the Owner Controlled Area. The fire was reported out at 1841. No personnel were injured due to the fire. The fire appeared to be from an external building exhaust fan. There was no internal or structural damage to the building. There was no radiological release. No Safety Related Systems were required to function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5275214 May 2017 16:09:00At 0730 (CDT) on 5/14/2017, a visitor was working in the Protected Area (PA) on the turbine building roof and discovered a blue 12 ounce can of beer in their cooler. This was discovered when the visitor was removing items from their cooler into a larger community cooler. The visitor immediately notified their escort of the prohibited item. The escort then notified Security of the event. Security took possession of the item and the individual was escorted offsite. The individual stated when they packed their cooler at home they thought they had picked up a blue can of soda and did not notice it was a blue can of beer. This event is being reported per 10CFR26.719(b). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5274911 May 2017 18:11:00A can of alcohol (16.9 ounce foreign beer) was discovered unopened in an administration building refrigerator. Site security took possession of the can of alcohol. The owner of the can of alcohol is unknown. This licensee is making this 24 hour notification in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(1). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5274811 May 2017 15:24:00On Wednesday May 10, 2017 at approximately (1700 EDT), the Reactor Operator (RO) that was signed in on the reactor console logbook completed a ('key on') checklist in preparation for a routine reactor startup. The RO left the control room and brought the log book to the reactor bridge for the Designated Senior Reactor Operator (DSRO) to sign off for the ('key on') startup. The RO immediately realized his mistake concerning the procedural requirement for a reactor operator to be present in the control room at all times when the reactor is not secured (procedure OP-103), and returned to the control room. The DSRO followed the RO to the control room and observed that the reactor key was in the on position, the control rods were all fully inserted, and reactor power was at residual levels. The reactor was shutdown, but was not secured. The DSRO determined that this constituted a violation of procedure OP-103 and could be a Reportable Occurrence as defined under Technical Specification 1.2.24 h. The DSRO reviewed Technical Specification (TS) 6.6.2, Action to be Taken in the Event of a Reportable Occurrence. The DSRO determined that under TS 6.6.2a that reactor conditions had been returned to normal by the presence of the licensed operator in the control room. The DSRO then signed the Key On checklist authorization for reactor startup and the reactor was started. The DSRO spoke with the Manager of Engineering and Operations (MEO) by telephone about this matter at approximately 1800 on May 10, 2017. The MEO concurred that procedure OP-103 was violated and would be reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The DSRO and MEO agreed to discuss this matter with the Director, Nuclear Reactor Program and the Reactor Health Physicist on May 11, 2017. The MEO stated on May 11, 2017 that TS 6.1.3a, the specification implemented by procedure OP-103, was not met. It was agreed that required notifications to NRC would be made by (1700) on May 11, 2017 to meet the 24 hour notification requirement.
ENS 5299326 September 2017 15:39:00

An endocrinologist specified a therapy dose of 20 milliCuries of I-131. An authorized dose directive was incorrectly written for 30 milliCuries of I-131. The patient was administered the initially determined dose of 20 milliCuries of I-131. Medical personnel determined that there was no impact on the patient. Hospital supervision notified the on-site Authorized User, the Radiation Safety Officer and the Medical Physicist. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1345 EDT ON 9/27/17 FROM ANDRE VANTERPOOL TO RICHARD L. SMITH * * *

The actual event date was May 1, 2017, and the discovery date was September 25, 2017, at approximately 1500 MDT. Notified R4DO (Proulx) and NMSS Events Notification (via email).

ENS 527201 May 2017 11:30:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile: KY RHB (Kentucky Radiation Health Branch) Inspector, Christopher Keffer, was performing a routine health and safety inspection of the licensee when the RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) discovered that a stored device was missing. According to the RSO, the laboratory where the device was stored was cleaned out the week before; it is currently believed that the device has been thrown away and is now in a landfill. The sealed source identification number is NR-536-D-808-B associated with a Perkins Elmer Clarus Model 500. The source is a Ni-63, 15 microCurie source. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5274611 May 2017 12:16:00The following information was received from the State of New Jersey via facsimile: Notifications: Phone call was made to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) Bureau of Environmental Radiation on 5/10/17. The event occurred on 4/26/17. Event Description: PADEP (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection) staff notified NJDEP staff of a package that was transported by a (New Jersey) pharmacy from a (Pennsylvania) nuclear medicine office. It appears that the package was accompanied by an inaccurate bill of lading and package label/(Transport Index). and brought to the licensee's (Somerset, New Jersey) facility. Investigation is ongoing.
ENS 5268618 April 2017 10:17:00The following information was received from the State of New Jersey via facsimile: The RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) for this cardiology office called to report a lost/missing Cs-137 dose calibrator vial source. Control of this facility was recently transferred to a medical center. When the new RSO visited the cardiology office to become familiar with it, it was discovered that the Cs-137 source was missing. The source, as listed on the cardiology office's inventory, contained 199.04 uCi (microCuries) of activity as of its calibration date of 9/1/2005. The decayed source would contain approximately 152.2 uCi (microCuries) of activity as of the date of this notification. The manufacturer and model # of the source were not immediately available. The RSO will follow-up with a written report within 30 days. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5267311 April 2017 14:28:00The following information was received from the State of Utah via email: (University) Radiological Health personnel responded to an incident involving a damaged tritium exit sign at the University Guest House. It was determined the damaged exit sign was leaking tritium and the licensee notified the (Utah) Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control. This incident report is the initial notification of the NRC Operations Center. Utah Event Report: UT170003
ENS 5277831 May 2017 07:50:00This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT). The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5265531 March 2017 19:14:00On March 31, 2017 at 1155 hours (EDT), with the reactor at 97% core thermal power and steady state conditions, operators inadvertently caused water level to rise in the Pressure Suppression Pool (TORUS). Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was restoring normal system valve line-ups after performing flushing of the suction piping of the Core Spray system in accordance with station procedures. During the process of restoring the appropriate valve line-ups, water was inadvertently transferred to the TORUS from the Condensate Storage Tank. The cause of the event is understood. The Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.A.5 was entered. The LCO AS was exited at 1540 when TORUS water level was restored to the limits specified in LCO's 3.7.A.1.b and 3.7.A.1.m. Because the TORUS was declared inoperable, PNPS is providing an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This was a case of the water level in the TORUS being above the TS limit. The TORUS was potentially available to provide cooling to the reactor if required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Plymouth County.
ENS 5265230 March 2017 21:58:00At 1630 PDT on March 30, 2017, a non-work related fatality occurred on the Diablo Canyon Power Plant property. The individual's work location was outside of the Protected Area. The fatality was not related to the health and safety of the public. Specifically, a contractor for Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) was found in the Security Training Building unresponsive. The individual was promptly attended to by Diablo Canyon personnel. The individual was subsequently pronounced dead by the San Luis Obispo County Paramedics. PG&E has not observed any heightened public, media, or government concerns as a result of the fatality. Because the fatality is unrelated to Diablo Canyon Power Plant industrial or radiological health and safety, no news release is planned. Because the fatality was not work related, nor the result of an accident, no notification to other government agencies was made at the time. However, PG&E will make a notification to the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Thus this ENS notification is in response to a notification to another government agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and Resident Inspector have been notified.
ENS 5265431 March 2017 16:15:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile: On 3/28/2017 the licensee left a Cs-137 brachytherapy sealed source at (address provided). On 3/30/2017 the licensee discovered the source was not in its shielded container and immediately determined the location of the source and took steps to retrieve and secure it. This event is actively being investigated by the licensee. Kentucky Event: KY170003 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)
ENS 5255516 February 2017 13:03:00On February 15, 2017 at 1515, it was discovered by corporate Fitness for Duty (FFD) personnel that an unescorted access reactivation feature in the security database (Illuminate) does not reset the flag to include an individual in the random FFD pool due to a database coding error. The Illuminate database was implemented fleet-wide 1/3/17. Review by corporate FFD personnel found one individual currently badged at Clinton Power Station was affected by the coding error. The individual was not in the FFD random pool from 1/3/17 until 2/15/17. Corporate security personnel found no other individuals to be affected by this issue. Affected individual was added to the FFD random pool. Corporate security personnel notified all Exelon sites of the issue. Sites were notified that the ability to use the re-activation feature in Illuminate would be removed from use by site personnel. Pending removal, a daily query would be run in the database to assure the re-activation feature had not been used by site personnel. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5243715 December 2016 11:47:00

On December 15, 2016, at 1010 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.044 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4. 1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5243214 December 2016 15:10:00

On December 14, 2016, at 1314 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.07 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5243314 December 2016 16:12:00On 12/13/2016 at approximately 1500 (PST), the AREVA Nuclear Criticality Safety Staff was notified that an administrative IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) control had not been performed in the ELO raffinate treatment process. The ELO raffinate treatment process requires the sampling of a favorable geometry process tank (IROFS 306) that is discharged to one of two sets of favorable geometry quarantine tanks. When one of the two sets of quarantine tanks is full, the input is diverted to the other set of tanks and the set that is full is recirculated and sampled for U (Uranium) concentration (IROFS 307). When both sample results have been confirmed to be acceptable the discharge valve on the transfer line may be unlocked and the raffinate solution transferred to a filter press. Sampling of the process tank was completed as required, however; the quarantine tank transfer line was unlocked and contents were pumped to the filter press without completing the required independent sampling of the quarantine tank. AREVA is conservatively reporting this plant condition under 10CFR70 Appendix A, because an accident sequence that could result in accidental nuclear criticality may not have remained highly unlikely in the absence of IROFS 307. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.
ENS 523568 November 2016 17:36:00At 1331 (CST) on November 8, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 manually tripped from 32% reactor power. The plant was ramping down to remove the main generator from service due to an unrelated issue. 1A SGFP did not respond to control Steam Generator (SG) level as expected when the miniflow was opened per procedure. SG levels lowered due to lower feed flow and the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted and Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) auto started as expected. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed to minimize the cool-down. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Relief Valves. All other systems responded as expected. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The failure of the 1A SGFP control is under investigation. Unit 2 was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There is no primary to secondary leakage.
ENS 523517 November 2016 16:50:00

The following was excerpted from information received from the State of New Jersey by email: Event Narrative: On November 7, 2016, during the six-month shutter checks, the pneumatically operated shutter on the Vega source holder Phillips 66-Bayway Tag # PBL002 (source capsule S/N 0321CG) failed to close when tested. Several attempts were made wherein the shutter position indicator seemed to move slightly. It was concluded that the issue was not a failure of the air system controlling the pneumatic shutter actuator. The manufacturer was contacted to assess the problem. Root cause(s) and contributing factors: The source remained in the holder attached to the vessel in its normal operating position. The integrity of the source holder remains intact so there should be no exposures. Source/Radioactive Material/Devices: radioactive level gauge Isotope and activity; manufacturer, model and serial number, leak test results as applicable: The source is a 50 mCi Cs-137 solid sealed source, S/N 0321CG. The last leak test was 10/19/15. The equipment is an Ohmart/Vega model SH-F1A source holder mounted to a vessel. New Jersey Case Number: 161107162023

  • * * UPDATE FROM ED TRUSKOWSKI TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1323 EST ON 12/1/2016 * * *

The following update was received from the State of New Jersey via email: Vega serviced the unit on November 11, 2016, with lubrication. It was considered to work properly after service. Phillips 66 notified NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) on November 30, 2016, that a new unit will be purchased to replace the old unit. Event status is 'closed'. Notified R1DO (Bower) and NMSS_Events_Notification via email.

ENS 524107 December 2016 09:15:00

Agilent Technologies is a manufacturer of a part containing an electron capture detector (ECD) that fits into a gas chromatograph. The ECD contains an embedded sealed source (Ni-63; 15 milliCuries) and is manufactured in Shanghai, China and is transferred into the United States through the JFK Airport Worldwide Flight Services Warehouse. When the licensee's Philadelphia truck shipping service attempted to retrieve the two ECD sources at the JFK warehouse, the sources were discovered missing. The warehouse was searched without success. The ECD source serial numbers are U30355 and U30356. The model number is 62397AECD. Agilent Technologies holds an NRC license and is located at 2850 Centerville Road, Wilmington, DE 19808.

  • * * UPDATE ON 1/27/17 AT 1457 EST FROM DAVID BENNETT TO DONG PARK * * *

As a corrective action, the licensee has changed warehouse operations to a different warehouse used to receive devices manufactured in China. Notified R1DO (Welling) and NMSS Events Notification via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 523599 November 2016 17:50:00

The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received by SOR: Pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21, this letter notifies the NRC of a Part 21 condition. Irradiation testing performed since 1984 did not take into account all of the uncertainties associated with reported doses of gamma radiation to nuclear test specimens for qualification testing. SOR contracted services with lsomedix in 1992 for the radiation aging that was performed per SOR nuclear qualification report 9058-102 Revision 1. Although SOR imposed Part 21 reporting requirements, lsomedix did not include SOR as part of their Part 21 notification. The Part 21 was brought to SOR's attention through an inquiry by a nuclear power station. SOR requested a conference with Steris lsomedix which occurred on November 3, 2016. The teleconference confirmed that the subject radiation aging test results report would be affected by the Steris lsomedix Part 21. As a result, corrections are underway per qualification test report 9058-102 regarding the uncertainty calculations. SOR does not have the capability to perform further evaluations to determine if a safety hazard exists as the specific customer application is unknown. The end user must confirm for each application that the qualified life dose + accident dose + 10% of accident dose is less than or equal to the corrected values. SOR is currently identifying all customers potentially affected by this deviation. At the conclusion of this activity, SOR will notify the customers and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MELANIE DIRKS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1455 EST ON 12/2/16 * * *

The following is an excerpt of an updated Part 21 received via email: Corrections are now complete to test report 9058-102 regarding the uncertainty calculations. The calculations changed from 8% uncertainty to 9.6% uncertainty for the minimum irradiation aging. SOR does not have the capability to perform further evaluations to determine if a safety hazard exists as the specific customer application is unknown. The end user must confirm for each application that the qualified life dose + accident dose + 10% of accident dose is less than or equal to the above noted values. Should you have any additional questions regarding this matter, please contact: Linda Coutts Inside Sales Representative Email: lcoutts@sorinc.com Tel 91.3�-956�-3071 Charles Lautner Customer Service Manager Email: clautner@sorinc.com Tel 913-956-3070 Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Stoedter), R4DO (Haire), NMSS_Events_Notification, and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.

ENS 523548 November 2016 11:44:00In accordance with 10CFR52.99(c)(2), V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (Seismic Qualification of Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on February 29, 2016 (reference ML16060A344 and ML16060A345). On November 2, 2016, it was determined that modifications to the RCP switchgear cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. The modification involved an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Switchgear cabinet which function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously seismically qualified for use in the RCP switchgear cabinet assembly. The additional components have now undergone seismic qualification testing for use in the RCP switchgear. The Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP switchgear will be revised based on the results of the testing to confirm the switchgear withstands seismic design basis loads. The revised testing report has been completed on November 8 2016. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 523487 November 2016 12:28:00The following information was received by email: On November 2, (2016), the registrant's representative reported (to the State of Illinois) that a generally licensed gauge under their control had failed to operate as designed. A Gamma Instruments model GR100 device exhibited signs of the shutter not closing properly. A contractor was notified and repairs affected. The gauge was subsequently returned to service with no additional engineering issues noted. Procedures at the plant were modified such that the area around the gauge is now cleaned following each shift. The fixed gauge serial number was 930706, and the sealed source was 37 GBq of Am-241. Illinois Event: IL 16010
ENS 5226928 September 2016 14:57:00

The following was excerpted from an email received from WECTEC LLC: Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. The two flanges identified with deviations on Passive Core Cooling System pipe spools for the Vogtle Unit 3 AP1000r project had incorrect raised-face dimensions. This appears to have been caused by the two flanges being transposed due to an inadvertent fabrication error that occurred at the pipe spool supplier's facilities (CB&I Laurens). The error was subsequently discovered after delivery to the fabrication facility (Aecon Industrial). This error resulted in conditions where the two flanged connections would not have met the design configuration. If the flanged connections had been assembled in the delivered configuration, it is not known if system integrity and operability would have been maintained during operation. The incorrect configuration could have also led to subsequent failure after installation and operation. Hydrostatic testing of these connections is required, but had not yet been performed because the condition was discovered prior to the assembly and testing of these portions of the system. The condition is being corrected prior to the performance of that hydrostatic testing, therefore it is not known if the flanges in the incorrect configuration would have been able to pass hydrostatic testing. Due to the possibility that system integrity and operability could have been impacted by the use of the incorrect flanges, it has been conservatively concluded that this condition should be reported under 10 CFR Part 21. This conservative conclusion is based on the possibility that the Passive Core Cooling System could have been adversely impacted by the identified deviations, if the deviations had been left uncorrected. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. . . . The flange configuration was corrected and the Q223 Mechanical Module was delivered to the Vogtle Unit 3 site on September 23, 2016. A corrective action report has been entered into the Westinghouse/WECTEC system to further evaluate the circumstances that led to the identified deviations.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID DURHAM TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL AT 1535 EDT ON 3/15/17 * * *

WECTEC LLC determined that additional pipe spools with incorrect flange configurations were fabricated for V.C. Summer Unit 3 and Vogtle Unit 4. None of the pipe spools were installed in either of the facilities. Corrective actions have been taken to prevent re-occurrence. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and Part 21 group via email.

ENS 5226627 September 2016 22:27:00

On September 27, 2016 at 1644 (EDT), damaged ductwork was identified in the secondary containment boundary associated with reactor building zone 3 (Units 1 and 2) recirculation plenum. The size of the hole in the secondary containment boundary was determined to be 22.5 square inches. Due to exceeding allowable total leakage in the current secondary containment isolation configuration, a violation of SR 3.6.4.1.5 (occurred). Action to establish a tested configuration with sufficient inleakage margin to restore compliance with SR 3.6.4.1.5 was completed September 27, 2016 at 2115 hrs. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev 3, Section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1444 EST ON 11/23/2016 FROM MANU SIVARAMAN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Following the 8 hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on September 27, 2016 (EN 52266), further engineering analysis determined that the as-found tear in the Zone 3 ductwork did not impact the ability of Secondary Containment to perform its safety function and that Secondary Containment was not inoperable as a result of the condition. To support the determination, a drawdown test was conducted in a limiting configuration (i.e. least inleakage margin). No substantial change in drawdown testing results were observed over the last three tests. These tests spanned over seven years. Additionally, repairs were promptly made to the affected area. As a result, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Dwyer).

ENS 5226828 September 2016 13:51:00

Maintenance was being performed on a Berthold moisture analyzer in a coke bin vessel because a moisture tube inside of the vessel was damaged. Two maintenance technicians took the source holder off the vessel and then proceeded to work on the vessel. The source holder was placed nearby the work area and the source was not able to be fully retracted back into the gauge during the maintenance evolution. Maintenance then re-mounted the source holder back onto the vessel. The licensee contacted the manufacturer in order to investigate the maintenance evolution and assist estimating dosage to the two technicians. The licensee contacted Region 4 (Janine Katanic). The licensee investigation continues.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1115 EDT ON 09/30/16 FROM DAVE MATYUS TO S. SANDIN * * *

On 09/29/16 Berthold Technologies was onsite to assist in the investigation. A leak test was performed and the contractors involved were interviewed. The information will be provided to the Berthold RSO in order to estimate the dose received. NRC R4 (Dykert) was also present to observe the investigation. The licensee does not anticipate receiving the results until next week. Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Events Notification by email.

ENS 5226326 September 2016 16:14:00

The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email: On September 23, 2016 at 1300 CDT, the licensee contacted the Department (Arkansas Department of Health) reporting that during operations on September 22, 2016, the licensee discovered that the shutter on a Vega Americas Model BAL density gauge would not open. The gauge contains 300 milliCuries of Krypton-85. The gauge was replaced with a spare gauge and has been placed in a secure storage area and radiation exposure is maintained at less than 2 mR/hr. The licensee is contacting the manufacturer to request repair or disposal of the gauge. In accordance with RH-1502.f.2 (10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)) the malfunctioning shutter is reportable within 24 hours. The State of Arkansas is awaiting a written report from the licensee. The State's event number is AR-2016-011.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1021 EST ON 12/12/2017 FROM STEVE MACK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following update was received via e-mail: The licensee stated that the shutter solenoid was 24 years old and had been in continuous service over that time. The shutter failed to open on September 22, 2016 and the gauge was removed from service and placed in storage. On November 28, 2017, the manufacturer took possession of the gauge for disposal. The Department considers this event to be CLOSED. Notified the R4DO (Deese) and NMSS Events Notification (E-mail).

ENS 5225319 September 2016 21:40:00

At 1550 (CDT) on September 19, 2016, Dresden received the Methyl Iodide Penetration test results for the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREVS) charcoal. The test results did not meet technical specification acceptance criteria. This results in the inoperability of CREVS. CREVS is a single train system and therefore is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) is required to operate during a design basis accident to maintain Main Control Room habitability. This places unit 2 and unit 3 in a 7 day LCORA (Limiting Condition of Operation Required Action) per Tech Spec 3.7.4 Required Action A.1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1635 EDT ON 03/23/17 FROM HENRY WATERS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 52253 made on September 19th, 2016, for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. After further evaluation and testing, it has been determined that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) charcoal would have fulfilled its safety function given the Methyl Iodide Penetration test results. The initial tests were performed with a 2 inch bed depth due to a difference in batches used in each charcoal filter, but testing at a 4 inch bed depth is the correct testing methodology for Dresden's configuration. At a 4 inch bed depth, the test results met the Technical Specification acceptance criteria with significant margin. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and the ENS report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).

ENS 5225119 September 2016 14:30:00EVENT DESCRIPTION: It was determined at approximately 6 AM today (Eastern) that an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with a Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) exhaust system was not operating as required. An FMO scrubber exhaust system blower was determined to be not operating and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The safety function of the scrubber exhaust system is to limit the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and its byproducts to the environment in the unlikely event of an accidental airborne release in a process area. Other upstream controls remained available and reliable and prevented significant quantities of UF6 and its byproducts from being released into the scrubber exhaust system. There was no release of material and at no time was an unsafe condition present. The Dry Conversion Process has been shutdown. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: At no time was an unsafe condition present SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was shutdown. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. There was no offsite release of UF6 as a result of the IROF failure. The licensee will inform the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5224919 September 2016 13:19:00The following information was received from the State of Illinois by email: The licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Agency (Illinois Emergency Management Agency) on September 16, 2016 to advise that while a licensed contractor was conducting calibration of sensors, the shutter failed on an older KayRay fixed gauge. The gauge is mounted on a process line in a remote location that is normally not accessible. Workers were putting the gauge back into service when it appeared that a shear pin broke on the lever that controls the shutter position. The area was cleared of workers and radiation measurements performed. Those measurements showed the shutter was not completely closed. No exposures to workers were noted. Arrangements are being made with a specifically licensed contractor to make repairs to the gauge as soon as can be managed. Fixed gauge is manufactured by KayRay/Sensall; Model 7063P; Serial Number S98L2001; Sealed Source Gauge (.331 Ci of Cs-137). Illinois Event: IL 16006
ENS 5224616 September 2016 16:26:00The following information was received by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: The licensee called the Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) to report a fixed fill level gauge stuck in the open position. The gauge is a Berthold LB7400 Series gauge, Model LB7440, and contains a 150 mCi Cs-137 source (S/N:1476). The gauge is mounted to a liquid holding tank which was emptied and was scheduled for routine cleaning. Before cleaning of the tank could begin, the gauge shutter was attempted to be put into the closed position. When attempting to close the shutter, the handle broke off and left the gauge stuck in the open position. Cleaning was not able to be performed and no one was able to enter the tank. The gauge remains in the installed position and is in an inaccessible area with safety controls in place to prevent access. The manufacturer was contacted and will be servicing the gauge 09/27/16 thru 09/28/16 by either repairing or replacing the shielding as necessary. The Agency continues to investigate and considers this event to be open. Manufacturer of gauge notified and will respond to assess the device; repair or replacement as necessary.
ENS 5224315 September 2016 16:10:00The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email: On 9/12/2016 at approximately 1500 CDT, a portable gauge was struck by a private vehicle at a jobsite. This is preliminary information, and (The Oklahoma Environmental Agency) has not received a full report yet from the licensee. There does not appear to be any leakage or exposures from this incident. Licensee: Oklahoma Department of Transportation (OK-15794-01) Reported by: Larry Hawkins, ODOT RSO Device: Troxler Model 4640 Isotope: 8 mCi Cesium-137 Location: Intersection of Highways 183 & 152, Cordell, OK Description: Licensee reports that worker was using the gauge to take surface density measurements on an asphalt highway. The gauge shield was open, but the rod was not extended. A vehicle travelling approximately 25 mph ignored warnings, 'straddled' the highway centerline, and struck the gauge. The driver who struck the gauge left the scene after discovering what had happened. The licensee reports that there was no contamination found on the highway or the gauge. The gauge sustained damage to the case and circuit board. The licensee stated that debris was cleared from the shield area and then the shield was closed. The gauge was shipped to Troxler. The licensee is waiting on leak test results, and will submit an incident report to the DEQ (Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality). NMED Item Number: OK160005
ENS 5225019 September 2016 13:33:00The following information was received from the State of Illinois by email: The radiation safety officer, (RSO) at GE Healthcare, called to advise that a package of I-125 seeds which had been given to (a common carrier) to deliver to Sydney, Australia had not reached their destination by the desired date. The package is 6x6x6 inches box of 'excepted package - limited quantity' which contains 10 sealed sources with a total activity of 6.8 milliCi (actual) in a box calibrated for Saturday, 8/27/16, at noon. The RSO has been in touch with (common carrier) since September 3, 2016 when GE's customer service became concerned while routinely performing package tracking. (The common carrier) last had positive tracking for this package in San Francisco, CA on August 28th. (The common carrier) is still conducting visual surveys in San Francisco and Sydney in an attempt to locate the box and has no evidence to indicate the materials have been delivered to an outside entity. Surveys conducted at O'Hare Airport in Chicago where the package was initially offered for transport were negative. (The common carrier) reports that it is still conducting searches and has put a 'world wide tracer' into effect to locate the material as it still believes it is within their delivery system. Illinois Event: IL 16007 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5220326 August 2016 10:34:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile: Notifications: On August 25, 2016, the Department (Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection) was notified that a licensee had a cobalt-60 (Co-60) source rod that became bent and unusable during installation into a gauge at a work location. This is reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). Event Description: During the process of installing a Co-60 source rod and moving it from a transfer shield to a gauge and industrial process mold, the licensee observed difficulty in getting the source rod to insert into the mold. Using a remote handling device, the Co-60 source was partially removed from the transfer shield and briefly (about 30 seconds) inspected. It was noted that the rod was partially bent. The rod was immediately retracted into the fully shielded position in the transfer shield. The transfer shield containing the Co-60 rod was then taken to a designated storage area where it is secured from unauthorized access. The calculated dose to the workers was estimated to be 0.44 millirem. No exposures over regulatory limits occurred. Radionuclide: Co-60; Manufacturer: Berthold Technologies; Source Model: P 2608-100; Gauge Model: LB 300 ML; Source Serial Number: 1766-10-13; Activity: 3.8 milliCuries ACTIONS: The rod has been securely stored and placed out of service until repairs or return can be accomplished by a licensed service provider. The Department has scheduled a reactive inspection. More information will be provided when available. Pennsylvania Event: PA160024
ENS 5218817 August 2016 21:30:00At 1826 (CDT), Operators identified that off-site 161 kV power source predicted post-trip voltage was below the operability limit of 161.3 kV. (Operators) entered AOP-31, 161 kV Grid Malfunctions, Section 1, 161 kV Grid Instability, and declared House Service Transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4 inoperable. (Operators) entered Technical Specification 2.7(2)c. Per Technical Specification 2.7(2)c, 'Both house service transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4 (4.16kV) may be inoperable for up to 72 hours. The loss of the 161kV incoming line renders both transformers inoperable. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone within 4 hours after inoperability of both transformers.' Per OPPD (Omaha Public Power District) Transmission, grid conditions are currently stable. OPPD Transmission has successfully raised predicted post-trip 161 kV voltage with all predicted voltages meeting or exceeding operability requirement of 161.3 kV as of 1834. Current post-trip predicted voltage is 162.2 kV as of 2029. Lowest observed actual voltage was 163.7 kV. The 161 kV line and transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4 remained available at all times. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5218717 August 2016 17:46:00At 1722 (EDT) on 8/17/16, a Past Operability Evaluation (POE) determined the configuration of the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) flow controllers that existed prior to 0420 on 8/6/16 constituted an Unanalyzed Condition due to not meeting single failure criteria. This POE examined the condition where EGTS may auto-swap from the flow control path in A-Auto to the Standby flow control path upon the start of a Design Basis Event (DBE). The intended design of the EGTS swap over flow control path in Auto to Standby was to detect and respond to an actual failure of the A-Auto flow control path. The unnecessary auto-swap to Standby could prevent the EGTS train configured in Auto from performing its required safety function during a DBE. The POE performed a detailed calculation to determine the release effects due to the failure of the redundant trains of EGTS controllers. These calculations concluded that failure of both trains of EGTS controllers would not result in exceeding the 10CFR100 limits, however this condition was unanalyzed and failed to meet single failure criteria. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition due to a system required to meet the single failure criterion does not do so. This condition had no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5218616 August 2016 15:49:00

The following information was received from the State of New Jersey by email: Event Narrative: During a walkthrough of the facility, the night shift RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) discovered that an ABB Industrial Systems, Ltd model LS100 fixed measuring gauge had fallen off of a coal feeder to which it was attached. The area, which is not normally accessed by staff, was cordoned. Readings were taken directly on top of the device, and measured 0.5 to 1.0 mR/h. The device does not have a shutter mechanism. The direct beam was surrounded with lead that was available for shielding. Root cause(s) and contributing factors: Vibration from coal feeder caused the metal mounting bracket to shear. Semiannual preventative maintenance did not identify the issue. Scaffolding is required to reach the gauge for maintenance, which makes it difficult to do more regularly. Isotope and activity; manufacturer, model and serial number: Ra-226, 0.5 mCi, ABB Industrial Systems, Ltd model LS100, serial number R868. New Jersey Incident Number: C612607

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOE POWER TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1357 EDT ON 09/14/2016 * * *

The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email: On September 14, 2016, a 30-day written report from BL England Generating Station was received by NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection). This report outlined the corrective actions and the current status of the gauge. As a corrective step, BL England updated their maintenance schedule to include more frequent checks of their gauges. The device has been secured on a lead plate, and staged in a labeled 55-gallon steel drum to be disposed of at a later date when disposal of other site sources is scheduled. It will remain in storage under lock and key until that time. The licensee's next inspection will include a review of the implanted changes. This incident can be closed. NMED incident Number: 160359. Notified R1DO(Noggle) and NMSS Events Resource via email.

ENS 5218215 August 2016 21:13:00

While at a construction jobsite at Kenai Airport, a technician using a Troxler moisture density gauge observed a large equipment grader approaching in reverse mode. The technician retreated from the area and the gauge was run over by the grader. Personnel roped off the damaged gauge area and proceeded to monitor for any contamination. The gauge is a Troxler, Model 3440; S/N 37310; Sources: Cs-137 (8 mCi) and Am-241/Be (44 mCi).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERYN JONES TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/16/2016 AT 1348 EDT * * *

The licensee placed the damaged gauge into an over pack container loaded with sand and transported the damaged gauge to a local office permanent storage facility. The storage area is barricaded and is being monitored. The licensee is consulting with the manufacturer for final damaged gauge disposition. Notified the R4DO (Proulx) and NMSS Events via email.

ENS 5218516 August 2016 15:50:00The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) irradiator has several Cs-137 sources used to calibrate instruments. During a calibration process, a 3.6 Ci source did not return to its shielded position. The event occurred in a portion of the building where such events are expected, therefore there were no health or safety consequences to employees, public or the environment. Licensee corrective actions include manually installing a lead plug into the beam port (opening) of the irradiator. The licensee is contacting the manufacturer in order to assist with troubleshooting and repairs. The irradiator (Model 81-12; JL Shepherd; S/N 7132) is currently in a safe and stable configuration. It is noted that the irradiator is NOT a Part 36 irradiator.
ENS 5218115 August 2016 17:48:00On Monday, August 15, 2016 at 1552 (EDT), with the reactor at (about) 70 percent core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) entered a 24-hour shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement (LCO-AS) for Salt Service Water (SSW) inlet temperature exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit in TS 3.5.B.4. The LCO-AS was subsequently exited at 1651 hours when the temperature of SSW trended to below the TS limit. Under certain design conditions, the SSW system is required to provide cooling water to various heat exchangers such as the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) and Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW) systems. When the inlet temperature to these supplied loads exceeds the 75 degrees F limit established in the TS, the SSW system is conservatively declared inoperable until the temperature trends below this value. This condition existed for approximately 60 minutes. The SSW temperature is being closely monitored and trended on a continuous basis. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee will be notifying the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5218015 August 2016 15:32:00This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. The Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service on 08/15/2016 at 1030 (EDT) for a scheduled facility upgrade project, which will improve the overall functionality of the facility. The duration of the upgrade is expected to be 26 days. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as the TSC will be unavailable for greater than 72 hours. In the event of an emergency, McGuire's alternate TSC will be used while the TSC is upgraded. During this period, the alternate TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified that the TSC will be unavailable during the upgrade and to report to the alternate TSC in the event of an emergency. This upgrade does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5217915 August 2016 14:10:00This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 12, 2016, at 1704 CDT, the shift operating crew entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both trains of Essential Services Chilled Water being inoperable. Essential Services Chilled Water Loop A had previously been declared inoperable for maintenance on August 11, 2016. On August 12, 2016, at 1704, the shift operating crew noted that Loop B Essential Services Chilled Water outlet temperature exceeded the allowed TS limit of 42 degrees Fahrenheit. Essential Chiller AB was subsequently aligned to Loop B and TS 3.0.3 was exited on August 12, 2016 at 1802 when outlet temperature was verified less than or equal to 42 degrees Fahrenheit. On August 15, 2016, subsequent review of this event determined that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident' due to both Essential Services Chilled Water Loops being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521565 August 2016 13:58:00On 8/5/2016 at 1014 (CDT), the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was notified by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) of a notice of violation for exceeding the drinking water limit for carbon tetrachloride in the drinking water well that supplies the Security Access Facility. Additionally the MDH will be notifying the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency regarding the violation. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other offsite government agencies. There was no impact to the health and safety of the general public as a result of this issue. The drinking fountains in the Security Access Facility have been isolated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521524 August 2016 17:54:00This is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/4/16 at 1100 EDT. Repairs are complete. If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to the Alternate TSC in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521503 August 2016 21:38:00On August 3, 2016 at approximately 1300 CDT during review of NFPA 805 requirements, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown (FSS) procedures do not consider the potential for fire-induced failure of the 4kV Shutdown Board under-voltage trip functions for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) power supply alignments. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where a required EDG's 4kV loads would not trip on an undervoltage condition. Current procedures and timeline analysis do not consider operator actions that could be necessary to manually strip the 4kV Safe Shutdown (S/D) board prior to subsequent EDG restart. As such, a subsequent restart, manual or automatic, of the EDG under these conditions, with its associated loads still connected to the 4kV S/D board, could potentially over load the EDG on restart. This notification is to report a condition involving a deficiency in FSS procedures affecting restoration of power to safe shutdown busses under certain postulated fire scenarios. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to implement FSS procedures in response to a postulated fire in 6 fire areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas and this deficiency has been added to the current fire protection impairment plan. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5212426 July 2016 06:37:00

A moisture-density gauge (Troxler - Model 3440, Serial Number 34924) was stolen from a technician's vehicle. The vehicle trunk was broken into, the lockdown chains were cut, and the entire gauge was removed. This model Troxler typically contains 8 mCi Cesium-137 and 40 mCi Americium-241:Beryllium. The licensee has notified local law enforcement and an investigation continues.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF SEMANCIK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1702 EDT ON 7/26/2016 * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received from the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, Radiation Division (CDEEPRD) via telephone: At 1637 EDT, CDEEPRD received a call from the Connecticut State Police, informing them that the Troxler moisture-density gauge reported stolen this morning, had been located and recovered. It was reported that the gauge was recovered in an intact condition, outside its storage container. Details of how the gauge was located are unknown at this time. Details concerning suspect(s) are unknown at this time. CDEEPRD has an inspector en route to survey the gauge. If the gauge checks out as undamaged, it will be returned to the licensee at that time. Notified R1DO (Welling). Notified via E-mail only - NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB.(Tucker).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF SEMANCIK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1813 EDT ON 7/26/2016 * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received from CDEEPRD via telephone: An individual attempted to pawn the moisture-density gauge at a pawn shop in Bridgeport, CT. Pawn shop personnel immediately notified the Bridgeport Police Department. Officers arrived on the seen and arrested the individual who was attempting to pawn the gauge. CDEEPRD performed a leak test on the moisture-density gauge. The gauge passed the leak test. The gauge was then turned over to licensee personnel. The moisture-density gauge was not in its storage box when brought into the pawn shop. The licensee placed the gauge in another storage box which they possessed. Notified R1DO (Welling). Notified via E-mail only - NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB.(Tucker). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5209115 July 2016 10:27:00The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email: Detail: The project manager for a newly constructed apartment complex ordered exit signs to be installed. The distributor (LEI Companies) ordered them from a local supplier (Gexpro). The distributor is unable to locate the exit signs. It is unknown as to what occurred with the signs not being installed at the apartment complex nor being returned to their company. Exit signs are reported as lost. Manufacturer: SRB Technologies, Winston-Salem, NC; Model # BX-10-WH; Serial # C121961, C121962, C121963, C121964, and C121965; Date Shipped: 4-16-15. Designated for: Denizen Apartments, Denver, CO. Ordered through Gexpro, Denver, CO by LEI Companies. Event Description: Gexpro reported the exit signs were picked up by an employee of LEI Companies and were not returned. LEI Companies has documentation to return them, however, no record of exit signs being returned has been located. Denizen Apartments never received nor had exit signs installed. Colorado Event: CO16-I16-12 NMED: C160006 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5211722 July 2016 11:10:00The following information was received by email: Event Description: On July 14, 2016, 3M Corporate Health Physics was notified by laboratory personnel that a static eliminator could not be located during a semiannual physical inventory. The static eliminator is an NRD model P-2001 with an initial activity of 9.56 mCi on September 1, 2015 (activity on July 21, 2016 was 1.89 mCi). The room was recently renovated and the contents of the room were moved to another building with some contents moved to a 3M Distribution Center. Both buildings and the distribution center were searched, but the source was not located. 3M Corporate Health Physics notified the Minnesota Department of Health on July 21, 2016 of the missing static eliminator. Minnesota Event: MN160002 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 520696 July 2016 21:33:00In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Duke Energy is notifying the NRC of a report made to the Department of Transportation concerning the identification of removable contamination in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits. This report was made at 1807 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). On July 6, 2016, an EnergySolutions 3-60B Transportation Package was received onsite. As a result of receipt surveys, Brunswick Health Physics personnel confirmed removable surface contamination on the transportation package in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits. The package was shipped as UN2910, Radioactive material, excepted package-limited quantity of material, 7, and was consigned as a non-exclusive use shipment. Surveys identified mixed beta/gamma contamination ranging from approximately 2500 to 4500 dpm/100 sq cm on the surface of the transportation package. All other smears taken on the cask raincover, trailer bed and tires were less than minimum detectable activity for removable contamination. The transportation package is located in a radiological controlled area and access is controlled by Radiation Protection. Surveys have confirmed that the contamination is limited to the surface of the cask. In addition, no personnel contamination events have been attributed to the contamination found on the transportation package. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. The safety significance of this condition is minimal. There is no indication of onsite or personnel contamination as a result of this event. The transportation package is controlled in a radiological controlled area and access is controlled by Radiation Protection. The originator of the empty cask arriving at the site (Westinghouse-Pittsburgh) was notified of the contamination. The cask is used for control rod blades and local power range neutron monitoring string shipping.
ENS 520686 July 2016 16:48:00The following information was received from the State of Tennessee via email: A licensee reported a generally licensed device as missing. Further details will be reported as the information becomes available. The specifics on the device are as follows: Manufacturer- Industrial Dynamics, Model-FT-50B, Serial-113439, Isotope-Am-241, Activity-100 mCi. State Event Report ID No.: TN-16-098 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 520645 July 2016 20:01:00On July 5, 2016, at 1640 Eastern Daylight Savings Time (EDT) the Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to apparent failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump after the 'HPCI Aux Oil Pump Motor Overload' control room annunciator was received. Failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump prevents the HPCI system from performing its design safety function. As such, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this condition is minimal. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. Troubleshooting activities are in progress. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected.
ENS 5204727 June 2016 22:14:00

A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol following a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. This information will be sent to the NRC Region 4 Office as San Onofre no longer has a resident.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/18/2018 AT 1308 EDT FROM TIM CUSICK TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

In the event report, the individual was described as a contract supervisor, thus meeting the reporting threshold. (the violation of the FFD policy was that he failed a for-cause test for alcohol). Recently, an NRC review of SONGS' 2016 Annual Fitness for Duty report found that SONGS described that test failure as 'not reportable' and that the labor category was 'Maintenance (Craft).' After reviewing the data, Access Authorization confirmed that the individual was a Union Maintenance Foreman (not a supervisor). The event was not reportable." SONGS will be notifying NRC Region 4. Notified R4DO (O'KEEFE) and FFD E-mail Group.

ENS 5204526 June 2016 23:08:00

The United States Coast Guard reported an oil sheen in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent. Investigation by station personnel has not determined the source. The circulating water pumps were secured to mitigate the potential source. The United States Coast Guard response Center, and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, FEMA.

  • * * UPDATE ON 06/27/2016 AT 02:52 FROM DUSTIN SCURLOCK TO DAN LIVERMORE * * *

The source of the oil sheen has been identified. The source, main turbine lubricating oil, has been stopped and cleanup efforts are underway. Notified R1DO (Gray), DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.

ENS 5204425 June 2016 18:30:00At 1407 (CDT), during power ascension to 100 percent, turbine control valves closed unexpectedly causing reactor protection trip signals that in turn caused a reactor scram. Reactor scram, turbine trip ONEPs (Off Normal Event Procedure), and EP2 (Emergency Procedure for Level Control) were entered. Reactor water level was stabilized at 36 inches narrow range on startup level and reactor pressure stabilized at 935 psig using bypass valves. No other safety system actuations occurred and all systems performed as designed. All control rods inserted. Reactor level is maintained by feedwater. Normal electrical shutdown configuration is through offsite electrical power sources. The Safety Relief Valves lifted, then closed. The plant is stable at normal level and pressure and remains in Mode 3. The event is under licensee investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5204324 June 2016 19:45:00

On 06/24/2016 at 1511(CDT), an unexpected trip of a Fuel Building ventilation supply fan occurred followed by an exhaust fan trip and secondary containment differential pressure became positive.

At 1512 (CDT), the standby fuel building ventilation fans auto started and secondary containment differential pressure was restored to Technical Specification required conditions. Secondary containment was declared INOPERABLE when Technical Specification-required differential pressure was not being maintained and LCO 3.6.4.1 Action A.1 was entered and exited for the given time period. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) - 8 was entered due to Secondary containment differential pressure reading positive (greater than 0 inches of water). This loss of secondary containment is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The cause of the fuel building supply fan trip is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

ENS 5204224 June 2016 16:06:00At 1215 (EDT) on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available. Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215 (EDT), Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 (EDT). The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 (EDT) and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 (EDT), a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time (duration) to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours. The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
ENS 5203823 June 2016 19:46:00The following information was received by the State of Washington via email: The operator of a portable moisture-density gauge temporarily left the gauge unattended at a construction site in Redmond, Washington, and the gauge was run over by the wheel of a roller. The top of the gauge handle was broken off, but both radioactive sources are in safe condition inside the body of the gauge. The gauge operator is maintaining security around the damaged gauge, and has called a nuclear gauge calibration and servicing company to come to the construction site to assess the scene, package the gauge for transport to a safe location, and conduct radiation surveys to verify that there is no radioactive contamination of the construction site and the roller equipment, and to verify that the radioactive sources are undamaged and inside the gauge case. The portable gauge is a Campbell Pacific Nuclear; Model MC-1-DR; Serial Number MD51008063; Sources-Cs-137 (.010 Ci), Am/Be (.050 Ci). Washington Item Number: WA160002
ENS 5203723 June 2016 17:13:00The following information was received from the State of Texas by email: On June 23, 2016, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) that a radiography camera had failed to lock in position after retracting the source. The ball stop moved about 3/16 of an inch causing the camera to not lock in position after the source was retracted into position. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) obtained the following information about this component failure. The camera was a delta 880 source serial number S7340 at an activity of 52.6 curies. No overexposures were reported to the RSO. An investigation into this event is being conducted by the RSO. The camera has been secured and is located at one of the licensee's sites. Updates will be provided as obtained in accordance with SA300. Texas Incident: I-9415
ENS 5203623 June 2016 11:45:00The following was received by email: Per your request, I'm sending this email as a follow-up to my telephonic notification to your office that occurred earlier today (re: 10 CFR 20.2201). We're reporting the apparent loss (presently unknown whereabouts) of an aggregate quantity of approximately 95 mCi of Ni-63 housed in the following seven generally licensed devices (GLDs): - 3 ea. x Smiths Detection SABRE 2000s (up to 15 mCi Ni-63 ea.) - 2 ea. x Smiths Detection SABRE 4000s (up to 15 mCi Ni-63 ea.) - 2 ea. x GE VaporTracers (up to 10 mCi Ni-63 ea.) - 19 May 2016: Tinker AFB installation RSO attempted to schedule semiannual swipe sample collection for May 2016. The unit possessing/using GLDs indicated that the GLDs had been transferred. Installation RSO advised unit to present documentation. - 23 May 2016: Unit reported to installation RSO that they were still looking for paperwork. - 13 Jun 2016: After an exhaustive search of records and information management systems, neither the installation RSO or the unit found any documentation for GLD transfer. - 16 Jun 2016: Installation RSO notified the unit commander; continues to investigate. - 20 Jun 2016: Installation RSO notified the USAF Radioisotope Committee Secretariat by telephone and then by email to report situation. The above report of a possible lost or missing source involves sources not specifically licensed under the MML (Master Material License). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5196025 May 2016 19:26:00The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma by email: Approximately (1300 CDT) today, (Oklahoma was) notified by Advanced Inspection Technologies (AIT) (OK-27588-02) that a radiography truck belonging to them had been involved in a collision with a tractor/trailer truck at (1118 CDT) today at mile marker 178 on I-44 near Stroud, OK. The driver of the radiography truck was killed and the truck partially burned. At the time it was carrying a 30 Ci Ir-192 source and a 25 Ci Ir-192 source. The truck was taken to the Oklahoma Highway Patrol facility in Stroud where (Oklahoma personnel) arrived at about (1400 CDT). The darkroom, where the cameras were stored (QSA Model 880s), was partially burned but had not been opened. Initial surveys of the exterior indicated the cameras, which were normally secured near the darkroom door, had been thrown forward and come to rest just behind the cab. Shortly after (Oklahoma personnel) arrived, the AIT RSO arrived and the darkroom door was forced open. The cameras were recovered and surveys indicated the shielding was intact. Wipe tests of each were also collected. One camera was damaged but the sources were secure inside each (camera). The cameras have been returned to the AIT facility in Sand Springs, OK and will be returned to QSA for repair or disposal.
ENS 5194923 May 2016 15:36:00A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5193115 May 2016 12:34:00

Unit 2 experienced RCS Leakage, potentially pressure boundary leakage, or Unidentified Leakage greater than 10 gpm for (greater than) 15 minutes. Reactor Vessel Flange Temperature High Leakoff alarm was received. This met threshold for declaration of an Unusual Event at 1118 CDT per MU6. Unit 2 is currently in MODE 3. Investigation is in progress to identify specific leakage location. The plant is stable, leakage indicates about 32 gpm and the startup has been stopped. There is no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC,. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICARDO ROSAS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/15/16 AT 1626 EDT * * *

At 1459 CDT, the conditions under MU6 are no longer met. The site has terminated the Unusual Event. In addition, a press release will be made of this event. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3 pending further evaluation. The leak stopped when a loop drain isolation valve was closed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local authorities. Notified the R3DO (Duncan), NRR EO (Morris), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and DHS NICC. Notified the FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 5192813 May 2016 20:02:00

At 1200 (CDT) May 13, 2016, while the plant was operating at 100% power, it was brought to the attention of the River Bend Station Main Control Room staff that an existing design inadequacy could prevent both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) from performing its design function. Under certain specific conditions, the installed Masterpact breakers may not close to allow energization of the filter train exhaust fans. A start signal (reactor level 2, drywell pressure 1.68 psid, annulus high radiation, annulus low flow) combined with a trip signal within a certain time differential, could result in a failure of the breakers to close. As a result of this condition, both Standby Gas Trains were declared inoperable, which required entry into LCO 3.6.4.3 Condition C (requires entering Mode 3 in 12 hours). Declaring both trains of Standby Gas Treatment System inoperable resulted in loss of the safety function since a system that has been declared inoperable is one in which the capability has degraded to the point where it cannot perform with reasonable expectation or reliability. The Standby Gas Treatment System (GTS) limits release to the environment of radioisotopes, which may leak from the primary containment, ECCS systems, and other potential radioactive sources to the secondary containment under accident conditions. At 1240 (CDT) May 13, 2016, one division of GTS, GTS 'A', was manually started from the Main Control Room. This action prevents the breaker failure mode, restored the operability of one train and restored the safety function of the GTS system. LCO 3.6.4.3 Condition A (restore Operability in 7 days) is currently entered for Standby Gas Train 'B'. During the 40 minutes of inoperability, both trains of Standby Gas remained available. At no time was the health or safety of the public impacted. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event that could have caused a loss of safety function to control the release of radioactive material. The Senior NRC Resident was notified.

  • * * UPDATED AT 1341 EDT ON 05/17/16 FROM DAN PIPKIN TO RICHARD SMITH * * *

Further review has determined that the design inadequacy discussed in EN #51928 could adversely effect the ability of the main control building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system to perform its design safety function, based upon a particular sequence of events occurring within a short window of time (approximately 75 milliseconds). River Bend has implemented compensatory actions to ensure operability of the main control building HVAC system. The Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. Notified the R4DO (Miller).

ENS 5192312 May 2016 19:23:00

The following information was a licensee received facsimile; Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply. On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation. The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4): (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 (ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect. Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers. -The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'. Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor. (iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics Fort Worth, Texas 76118 (iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed.

PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load. NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies. Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close. PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close. (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016. The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition. (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part. Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers. PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style River Bend - Issue identified for NT style Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated. Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified. (vii) The corrective action which bas been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition. Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time. The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism. Please contact NLI with any questions or comments. Sincerely, Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/13/16 AT 1153 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list. Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON 7/13/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following information was received via facsimile: Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016. Additional facility identified as impacted: St. Lucie - Issue identified For additional information contact: Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics 7410 Pebble Drive Fort Worth, Texas 76118 Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1907 EDT ON 9/22/16 FROM TRACY BOLT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation. Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers: PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style River Bend - Issue identified for NT style Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. St. Lucie - This issue has been identified. Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Hatch - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NLI). This issue has not been identified. Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Wolf Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 has been revised. The solution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly. The part numbers are: 847323 (100-130VAC/DC) 847324 (200-240VAC/DC) Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NLI technical bulletin TB-12-007. Notified the R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Jeffers), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).

ENS 518993 May 2016 01:50:00

At 2229 (CDT) on 05-02-2016, River Bend Station declared the High Pressure Core Spray system INOPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.9, Condition E (Declare High Pressure Core Spray System and Standby Service Water System Pump 2C inoperable immediately) due to Division 1 Control Room Air Conditioning System HVK-CHL1C being INOPERABLE due to a trip of the chiller on high inboard bearing temperature. Actions taken to exit the LCO: Alternated divisions of Control Room Air Conditioning System to Division 2 HVK-CHL1D in service and Division 1 HVK-CHL1A in standby. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/22/16 AT 1137 EDT FROM JACK MCCOY TO DONG PARK * * *

Supplement: An operability evaluation has been performed based on system operating procedures in place at the time of this event, and on calculations regarding heat-up rates of the spaces served by the main control room air conditioning system. Operating procedures already in place on May 2 specified the operator actions required to restore the air conditioning system to service following the unanticipated trip of a chiller. The normal shift complement was on duty at the time of the event, and could have provided an adequate number of operators to accomplish this task. The operability evaluation made no new assumptions regarding availability of operators. The manual actions to be performed for the start of an alternate chiller following a trip of an in-service chiller system have been determined to require 2.15 hours, based on ANSI 58.8 guidance. (ANSI/ANS 58.8, Time Response Design Criteria for Nuclear Safety Related Operator Actions, provides the industry guidance In this regard.) Calculations of building heat-up rates have demonstrated that the loss of the air conditioning system can be sustained for 19 hours before temperatures in the rooms containing the Division 3 electrical equipment that support operability of the HPCS system exceed their maximum allowable ambient value. Based on the conclusions of the operability evaluation, the trip of the 'C' HVK chiller on May 2 had no actual adverse effect on the ability of the electrical distribution systems in the main control building to support the safety function of the HPCS system. Event Notification No. 51899 is hereby withdrawn. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Rollins).

ENS 5204124 June 2016 13:20:00The following information was excerpted from a received licensee fax: On April 26, 2016, ABB confirmed a customer complaint regarding a 60Q relay received with an internal short circuit. The cause was determined to be a manufacturing deviation from specification. Records show a total of 53 suspect relays were provided to 2 customers (Prairie Island and Tennessee Valley Authority). Based on the nature of the deviation, any installed relay would have failed upon application of power in the relay. Therefore, the primary concern is that any relay, either in storage or installed with no power applied, may have this defect and will create a system malfunction upon power application. If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support at (954) 752-6700.
ENS 5187722 April 2016 00:03:00Missing fire barrier between Fire Area (FA) 59 and 85. During a walk down of fire barriers for the NFPA 805 project, it was determined that the fire barrier between Fire Area 59 (Unit 1) and 85 (common) is not a rated barrier due to unsealed penetrations in the barrier. Evaluation FPEE 12-006 evaluated the acceptability of the barrier being unrated based on separation of safe shutdown equipment however a review of equipment credited for Appendix R safe shutdown identified that the redundant credited Appendix R equipment is on either side of the fire barrier which is not 3 hour rated. The conclusion of the FPEE is therefore no longer valid. Fire Hazard Analysis Drawings Do Not Match Boundary Description. The plant layout in F5 Appendix F, Rev. 28, Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), does not agree with the boundary description in the FHA for the Unit 1 and 2 Containment Annulus fire areas, Fire Area (FA) 68 and 72. The layout should but does not show the fire area boundary between the annulus and adjacent fire areas, FA 60 and 75 on 735 (foot) and 61A on 755 (foot), as an Appendix R boundary. The annulus airlock doors are 3-hour fire rated and the airlock is constructed of concrete thick enough to qualify as a 3 hour fire barrier however, there are penetrations in the barrier that are not sealed with fire rated materials or inspected as required by the Fire Protection Program. Therefore, this is an unanalyzed condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5187220 April 2016 01:52:00On April 19th, 2016 at 2159 (EDT), Secondary Containment became inoperable due to failure to meet Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.6.4.1.1) on Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inoperability was caused when Reactor Building differential pressure was discovered to be less than Technical Specification requirements (-0.25 inches of water gauge). Secondary Containment was restored April 19, 2016 at 2222 by adjusting intake louvers in accordance with off normal operating procedure ON-RBHVAC-201. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5192011 May 2016 17:37:00The following information was received by email: On 4/13/16 CPN Model MC Series gauge was left in marked licensee vehicle parked outside technician's home in Columbus at end of work day, reportedly properly secured in vehicle with two independent locking devices. Gauge contains 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am-241:Be sources. Technician found gauge missing when came out to go to work on 4/14/16. Technician claims RSO was notified, RSO does not recall. No police report was filed and no report was made to ODH (Ohio Department of Health) at that time. On 5/10/16, gauge was found in vacant lot during separate police investigation. Police called fire department HAZMAT unit. Transport case was not locked, but gauge rod was locked. Licensee was identified by paperwork in the transport case. Licensee was contacted by fire department to retrieve gauge. Licensee RSO took possession of gauge and returned it to office in Columbus. On 5/11/16 licensee reported theft and recovery of gauge to ODH. ODH investigators visited site to determine cause of incident and reasons for lack of notifications. Ohio Item Number: OH160003 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5186111 April 2016 15:37:00The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. At approximately 2335 (MST) on April 10, 2016, while performing planned routine visual examinations of Unit 1 components in the Containment Building, engineering personnel identified white residue on the piping instrument nozzle for the reactor coolant system (RCS) 2B cold leg resistance temperature detector, 1JRCET121Y. The white residue was dry and no active leakage was noted on the instrument nozzle. Preliminary chemical analysis for radionuclide and boron content of the white residue determined the existence of boron and the isotopic content was consistent with RCS fluid. At 0535 (MST) on April 11, 2016, it was determined the residue resulted from RCS pressure boundary leakage, based on results of the chemical analysis and additional examination of the piping and instrument nozzle by qualified engineering personnel. Technical Specifications Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no RCS pressure boundary leakage and therefore, the discovery of leakage from the instrument nozzle represents a degradation of a principal safety barrier. This notification is being made for a degraded condition pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The unit has been shut down for its 19th refueling outage since 4/9/16 at 0000. The NRC resident inspectors have been informed of this condition.
ENS 5183831 March 2016 12:45:00On March 31, 2016 at 0603 (EDT), with Susquehanna Unit 1 in its 19th Refueling and Inspection Outage, Unit 1 received a valid isolation signal. Preliminary investigation indicates the isolation signal was the result of a human performance error. The systems affected by the isolation signal responded as designed for the current shutdown plant conditions. This isolation of multiple primary containment isolation systems is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, section 3.2.6 as a system actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5184031 March 2016 16:12:00On 3/31/2016 at approximately 0342 CDT, a worker within the Protected Area self-reported a can of beer had been packed in the worker's lunchbox. The worker reported after opening the can and taking a sip it was discovered to be a beer. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1). The worker notified Security who immediately escorted the worker from the Protected Area and disposed of the beer. The worker is not an Operator or a Supervisor. The investigation of this event is in progress. The public health and safety are not impacted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5184231 March 2016 20:03:00The following excerpted information was received from the State of Washington by email: Event Narrative: The Washington Department of Health received a call today (3/31/2016) at noon from the RSO of the licensee, to report a stolen gauge from their conex unit at their SeaTac location. The RSO first noticed the missing gauge (the only one stored at this facility) when he went to check it out at 1030 PDT this morning. There was no indication of it being checked out by other users, and the RSO called the other users to make sure. The RSO also noticed the broken lock on the conex door. The licensee's contractor called police for this incident as well as other containers that had been broken into. More information to come. Make/Model/Serial Number- Troxler 3440, SN 31182. Isotopes/Activity - Cesium 137/0.37 GBq and Americium 241 Beryllium/1.85 GBq THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5183931 March 2016 14:07:00

The following information was received from the State of Ohio by email: On March 30, 2016 at approximately (1250 EDT) the Bureau of Environmental Health and Radiation Protection (BEHRP) received a phone call from licensee's RSO that an industrial radiography crew working on a water tank construction job in Groveport, Ohio had a source stuck in the guide tube of a QSA Model 880D camera and were unable to retrieve the back into the camera. The source in use was 75 Curies of Iridium-192. The incident occurred at approximately (1225 EDT). The stuck source was discovered after a shot time had ended and the radiography crew attempted to crank the source back in to the camera. The radiography crew conducted surveys of the area and moved boundaries out 2 mR/hr or less. The cause of the stuck source was due to a magnetic stand becoming dislodged during radiography operations, which fell onto the guide tube, crimping it, and preventing retraction of the source.

  • * * UPDATE:FROM STEPHEN JAMES TO VINCE KLCO ON 3/31/2016 AT 1631 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *

A BEHRP inspector was immediately dispatched to the job-site and arrived there at approximately (1320 EDT). The inspector met with the licensee's customer and reviewed the actions taken by the radiography crew to establish new barriers and prevent access to the site. The licensee's trained retrieval personnel dispatched to the site arrived a short time later. After a thorough review of the incident and work area, the licensee's response team was able to retrieve the source, which was completed at approximately (1600 EDT) that afternoon. The maximum dose received by any individual involved in the recovery effort was 50 mR. The camera and guide tube will be returned to manufacturer for repair. QSA Global Camera,Serial Number-D8042; Source Serial Number-29222G. Ohio Event- OH160002 Notified the R3DO (Pelke) and the NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5184131 March 2016 17:58:00The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email: The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment - Radioactive Materials Unit was notified on March 25, at (1041 MDT) of a misadministration that occurred on the evening of March 24, 2016. The licensee is Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center. A patient was given approximately 70% of the prescribed SIR-Spheres dose due to a clogged catheter. The investigation is ongoing and a corrective action has not yet been determined. Colorado Report: CO16-M16-02 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5180920 March 2016 23:51:00During a planned Unit 1 shutdown for a refueling outage, a 0.5 gpm 'pressure boundary leak' was identified on a 1 inch pipe connected to the '1A' RHR-Shutdown Cooling return line by the drywell leak inspection team during a drywell inspection at approximately 15% power. The leak exceeded the TS 3.4.3.2 'Operational Leakage' LCO of no pressure boundary leakage. TS action 'a' was entered which requires to be in at least Hot Shutdown within 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the next 24 hours. Therefore, the event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant's TS. The event is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) due to an event that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. TS 1.28 defines Pressure Boundary Leakage as leakage through a nonisolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall; therefore, the leak is a 'pressure boundary leak' as defined in TS. The licensee notified the NRC resident Inspector.
ENS 5179517 March 2016 08:02:00

On March 17, 2016, at 0115 (EDT), Watts Bar Unit 1 (WBN1) entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of both trains of the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). TS LCO 3.7.12 Condition B was also entered at this time due to the inoperability of both trains of the Auxiliary Gas Treatment System (ABGTS). The train B EGTS and train B ABGTS had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance, when at 0115, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor became inoperable. On March 17, 2016, at 0133, the train A Auxiliary Air Compressor was declared OPERABLE, and TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B were exited. The auxiliary air system supports the EGTS by providing a safety grade air supply. When train A auxiliary air became inoperable, the supported train A EGTS and ABGTS became inoperable, creating a condition where both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were unavailable. In the event of an accident, the EGTS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel and the ABGTS establishes a negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE). Filters in these system mitigate the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment. WBN1 remained in Mode 1 at 100% power and no safety functions were required during the event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1518 EDT ON 04/19/16 FROM BRIAN MCILNAY TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event report no. 51795 made on 3/17/16 at 0802 (EDT). Previously, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported a loss of the Emergency and Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment Systems (EGTS/ABGTS) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1). Both trains of EGTS and ABGTS were declared INOPERABLE when the train A auxiliary air system cooling water supply bypass valve was isolated, prior to completing the requisite post maintenance testing following repairs to the normal cooling water supply solenoid valve. Upon recognition, WBN1 operations personnel declared the train A auxiliary air system INOPERABLE, resulting in inoperability of Train A EGTS and ABGTS and forcing entry into TS LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) 3.0.3 (from TS LCO 3.6.9 EGTS) and 3.7.12 Condition B for ABGTS. At the time the condition was recognized, train B EGTS and train B ABGTS were INOPERABLE for scheduled maintenance. Subsequently, TVA completed the post maintenance testing of the train A auxiliary air system ERCW (Emergency Raw Cooling Water) normal supply solenoid valve and determined that the valve, while not fully qualified at the time, was in fact operable and capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.7.12 Condition B was not necessary and the event is no longer reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 517809 March 2016 04:01:00

Watts Bar Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event at 0342 EST based on a fire greater than 15 minutes in the turbine building - 2B Hotwell pump motor. The fire was extinguished by 0401 EST, at the time of notification. Unit 2 is currently shutdown in Mode 5 making preparations for startup. No offsite assistance was requested. All personnel are accounted for and there are no personnel injuries reported. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA OPS, FEMA National Watch (email), DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0512 ON 03/09/16 FROM BRIAN McILNAY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0508 EST based on verification that the fire was out and that the fire response team had been secured. The licensee notified the State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Suggs), NRR EO (Morris) and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA OPS, FEMA National Watch (email), DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (email).

ENS 5167823 January 2016 19:48:00At 1703 (EST) on 1/23/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kv Bus 3, off-site power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of 34.5kV Bus 3 resulted from feeder breaker L102 opening. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-18 automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event. The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator. Restoration of offsite power to operable status is currently being pursued. The Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic. Both units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the L102 feeder breaker opening resulting in the 34.5 kv Bus 3 loss of power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5181322 March 2016 11:07:00The following report was excerpted from an Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality via email: On January 22, 2016 the RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) reported that a package received by the University of Oklahoma Health Science Center pharmacy (OK-03176-04MD) was found to have 2,118,858 cpm of removable contamination. The outside of the package was surveyed at 30 mR/hr, the reading at 1 meter was 0.12 mR/hr. The contaminant was identified as Tc-99m and was confined to the outside of the package. The package contained a number of empty unit dose syringes in lead pigs and had been returned from HCA Health Services of Oklahoma which administers the University of Oklahoma Medical Center. The package was transported by the pharmacy. Refer to NRC Event #51661.
ENS 5164612 January 2016 11:14:00Event Report per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii) On January 11, 2016, Callaway determined a violation of two provisions of the site Fitness For Duty policy were committed offsite by a non-licensed supervisory employee. Unescorted access for the employee has been denied. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5155820 November 2015 21:49:00On (11/20/2015 at 1808) CST it was noted that the MET tower (both primary and backup) was offline and not communicating with the Plant Management Information System(PMIS). This results in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities with respect to meteorological conditions and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Communications technicians responded to the plant and the MET Tower communications were restored to PMIS on (11/20/2015 at 1937). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5155620 November 2015 14:56:00The following information was received from the State of Arizona by facsimile: At approximately (0800 MST), November 20, 2015, the Agency (Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency) was informed that the Licensee had a Campbell-Pacific Model MC-3, Serial Number MC310700331, portable moisture- density gauge stolen from a truck at an apartment parking lot. The theft occurred before (0500 MST), November 20, 2015. The gauge was the only thing stolen from the truck which had expensive tools in it. The sources were Cs-137, 10 millicuries and Am-241:Be, 50 millicuries. The Agency continues to investigate the event. The AZ Governor's Office, U.S. NRC, the States of CA, CO, NV, and NM are being notified of this event (by the Agency)." Arizona First Notice: 15-025 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5155419 November 2015 19:10:00A review of operations log data revealed the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool temperature was allowed to drift approximately two degrees below the accepted analyzed temperature of 68 degrees F. The Extent of Condition is under review and the number of instances has not been fully determined. It is possible Unit 3 may have also been affected. As described in the San Onofre UFSAR, Section 9.1.2.3 'Design Basis for Fuel Storage and Handling,' one of the conditions assumed in meeting the design basis, is as follows: the most adverse delta-k (reactivity change) was analyzed for a pool temperature range from 68 degree F to 160 degree F. Although the temperature decrease is considered unlikely to have a significant impact on the results of the analysis, it is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) as an unanalyzed condition because there is at this time no analysis of record for the reduced temperature condition. There were and continue to be no observed, abnormal effects from the temperature drop below 68 degrees F, and no impact on the health or safety of plant personnel of the public. Re-analysis is in progress and is expected to demonstrate that the criticality acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.68 were met at all times. The licensee notified the Regional NRC Contact.
ENS 515239 November 2015 09:10:00

On Monday, November 9, 2015 at 0800 (EST), planned routine maintenance was initiated on the Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) ventilation system. The planned maintenance is to replace the charcoal filters and test the HVAC trains. All other TSC/OSC functions remain available. Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable as a result of the ventilation system not being available. Existing Emergency Procedures direct the responsible Emergency Plant Manager to relocate the TSC/OSC staff to the designated alternate location. The affected Emergency Response Organization facility leads have been informed. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts will be notified. This notification to the USNRC Operations Center is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/9/15 AT 1750 EST FROM KENNETH GRACIA TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1730 EST on Monday, November 9, 2015, the TSC/OSC ventilation system was restored to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Arner).

ENS 5162830 December 2015 13:16:00This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the Emergency AC electrical power systems, due to invalid start of an emergency diesel generator (EDG). On November 6, 2015, at 0815 (CST), EDG A received a fast start signal inadvertently. Maintenance Fix-It-Now (FIN) personnel, working in the vicinity of the relay panel, made incidental contact with one of the relays in the Diesel Generator Logic Relay Panel which initiated the engine start. The engine started and obtained rated speed and voltage in single unit mode. This was not a valid initiation of EDG A. Operations personnel responded to the EDG actuation by ensuring that the engine was shut down and placed in standby condition in accordance to plant operating instructions. The plant conditions at the time of the EDG A initiation would not have actuated the EDG; therefore, the actuation of EDG A was invalid. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 1101730. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
ENS 514649 October 2015 21:59:00At 1800 (CDT) on October 9, 2015 a polling test was initiated in Saint Johns Parish to test the circuitry of the installed sirens. During the polling test no sirens are expected to sound as it is only a circuitry test. Siren number SJ39 inadvertently sounded for 15 to 20 minutes, and no others. Saint Johns Parish notified the parish residents that the sounding of the siren was inadvertent via a Parish wide cable television channel and a press release. A contract vendor has disabled the siren and will troubleshoot and repair starting on October 12, 2015. All remaining sirens within Saint Johns Parish remain operational and capable of being activated when required. 0% of the population is affected by the loss of this siren due to siren overlap. Time to repair and restore siren SJ39 to service is still being investigated. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514505 October 2015 08:41:00Braidwood Unit 2 was performing a planned plant shutdown for refueling outage A2R18. In accordance with plant shutdown procedures while in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at approximately 15% power, operators attempted to start the Start Up Feedwater (SFWP) pump and the pump immediately tripped on Phase A Overcurrent. The 2A Motor Driven Feedwater pump (MDFWP) was manually started to maintain Steam Generator Water Level during the shutdown and subsequent plant cooldown. While in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at (550 Degree-F), the 2A MDFWP was manually secured due to pump inboard journal bearing temperature exceeding its (200 Degree-F) operating limit. At 0105 (CDT) an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal was generated on low Steam Generator level (36.3%) and both the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFP) auto-started. Also at 0105 (CDT) a Reactor Protection System (RPS) Reactor trip signal was received due to low Steam Generator level (36.3%) with the reactor not critical. Both Auxiliary Feedwater trains operated as designed with the Main Steam Dumps in service and the Main Condenser providing the heat sink. All systems operated as designed with the exception of the SFWP and the MDFWP described above. The plant is currently stable in Mode 5 with both AFPs secured. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for automatic actuation of the (1) RPS Reactor Trip with the reactor not critical and (6) Auxiliary Feedwater System, 8 hour notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5140617 September 2015 21:32:00A miniature alcohol bottle, containing trace amounts of liquid, was discovered inside the protected area. Site security took possession of the bottle and removed it from the protected area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5140718 September 2015 11:59:00The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On September 18, 2015, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was informed by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect at a temporary field site (Galveston, Texas). The RSO stated the crew was working inside a vessel using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 52.9 curie Iridium-192 source. The device fell from a distance of 30 feet and hit the floor of the vessel. The source was in the fully shielded position when the device fell. The radiographers noted the guide tube had a small kink in it and replaced the guide tube. The radiographers tested the source by cranking the source out, but when they attempted to retract the source, the drive cable did not stop at the rear outlet of the camera. The radiographers contacted their supervisor and performed a dose rate survey at their barrier. The dose rate was 1 millirem per hour. An individual qualified in source recovery was able to remove the source from the guide tube and place it in a source changer for storage. The RSO stated their inspection of the source drive cable found the connecter on the drive cable had separated from the drive cable. The RSO stated all equipment involved in the event will be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. No individual received an over exposure as a result of this event. No member of the general public received an exposure due to this event. The licensee is conducting an investigation into the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9339
ENS 5140517 September 2015 16:24:00At 1220 (EDT) on 9/17/2015, both doors of a Secondary Containment airlock were reported to be simultaneously open for approximately five seconds during the normal passage of personnel. The brief time that the doors were simultaneously open constitutes an inoperable condition of Secondary Containment. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the time period that the doors were open. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5140818 September 2015 15:34:00When requested by the NRC, the licensee was unable to locate a 15 mCi Ni-63 source. The source was used in a Perkin-Elmer gas chromatograph electron capture detector. The licensee noted that the device may have been decommissioned, but a fire at their facility effectively destroyed all records that could be used to located the source. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 514525 October 2015 09:58:00The following information was received by the State of Ohio via facsimile: A patient had a prostate volume study done on 7/24/15 at Mount Carmel St. Ann's (MCSA). The mass that was observed on the ultrasound is in the location of a typical prostate and takes the shape of a typical prostate. Implant (I-125) procedure was performed on 8/21/15. During the implant, ultrasound guidance was used when placing the seeds and the images that were seen matched what was taken at the time of the volume study on 7/24/15. A CT (Computerized Axial Tomography) scan was taken on 9/23/15 for post implant study to verify the seed placement and target coverage. The post implant study was performed on 10/1/15 and revealed that the prostate that is visible by CT is not adequately covered by the seeds, and that the seeds may be in the rectum. The images were reviewed further and there is a mass located between the rectum and the prostate. This is what is believed to have been visualized on the ultrasound, and what was treated in the OR (Operating Room). The licensee is still investigating to determine whether this tissue is part of the prostate, possibly rectum, or something else altogether. The patient has been scheduled for an MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) to better visualize the tissues in this area. What is known at this time is that a large part of the prostate was not treated, the coverage to the intended target organ is below 80%, and this is being treated as a medical event. The licensee will submit a complete report when the analyses are finalized. ODH (Ohio Department of Health) intends to send an investigator to the licensee for follow-up. This NMED record will be updated as more information becomes available. Ohio Incident: OH150010 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 514515 October 2015 10:00:00This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Unit 2, Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. At 1919 EDT on August 7, 2015, during planned performance of a Unit 2 containment vent, the Train B CVI actuated due to an invalid Hi Rad signal from 2-RM-90-131, Containment Vent Radiation Monitor. In addition to the Train B CVI alarm, unexpected alarms were received for 2-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Radiation Monitor and 2-RM-90-112, Upper Containment Radiation Monitor instrument malfunctions as they isolated for the CVI and 2-RM-90-131 Hi Rad alarm. Prior to the invalid Hi Rad alarm, all radiation monitors were stable at their normal values. All required automatic actuations occurred as designed. Upon investigation, the cause of the invalid Hi Rad alarm was due to an exposed shield wire at the 2-RM-90-131 detector. Preventative maintenance had been performed the week prior to the CVI and it is believed the damage occurred at that time. Control Room Operators performed Annunciator Response actions and verified by diverse indications that the subject condition was an invalid Hi Rad signal. There were no indications of degraded reactor coolant system parameters or fuel failure. Applicable Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) were entered and the radiation monitors declared inoperable. No Emergency Response criteria were applicable with the subject radiation monitors inoperable. Radiological surveys performed in the vicinity of 2-RM-90-131 verified no abnormal radiological conditions. Radiation Monitor 2-RM-90-131 was removed from service, the shield wire was repaired and returned to service with no issues. Radiation Monitors 2-RM-90-106 and 2-RM-90-112 were tested and returned to service. The applicable TS LCOs were exited. At the time of the event, plant conditions for a Hi Rad alarm did not exist; therefore, the CVI was invalid. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5123616 July 2015 04:41:00This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 2332 (CDT), on 07/15/2015, the meteorological tower computer system software failed which resulted in a loss of meteorological data to the plant. Proceduralized compensatory measures for dose assessment include use of National Weather Service followed by historically determined default values. Information Technology personnel reported to the plant and successfully reset the software. Meteorological data to the plant was restored at 0216 (CDT) on 07/16/2015. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5123215 July 2015 01:04:00

At 0004 (CDT) on Wednesday, July 15, 2015, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency ventilation system will be removed from service for planned maintenance activities. During the maintenance, the TSC Ventilation will be shut down. The TSC air filtration fan and dampers will be non-functional, rendering the TSC HVAC accident mode non-functional. This maintenance is scheduled to minimize out of service time. The planned TSC ventilation outage is scheduled to be completed in approximately 24 hours. Contingency plans are in place so that if an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing Emergency Planning (EP) procedures and checklists. If radiological or environmental conditions require TSC facility evacuation during ventilation system restoration; the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff in accordance with station procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS PRELLWITZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1733 EDT ON 7/17/2015 * * *

At 1347 CDT on July 17, 2015, Dresden TSC Ventilation was restored. The Dresden TSC Ventilation is Functional at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Orth).

ENS 5123315 July 2015 10:50:00The following information was received by the State of Ohio via email: On July 14, 2015, the licensee reported that the intended delivery of Y-90 SirSpheres went to the small bowel instead of the right lobe of the liver during a procedure that morning. The intervention physician felt that the dose delivery was not going where it should be going and discontinued the treatment. Scanning the patient identified that the Y-90 microspheres were delivered to the small bowel. The original prescribed dose to the right lobe of the liver was 78 Gy with 20.5 mCi. The delivered dose of 36 Gy with 7.79 mCi went to the small bowel instead of the liver right lobe. The patient was notified at the time of the event. The interventional physician was the referring physician and AU (Authorized User). Ohio Report: OH150007 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 512138 July 2015 21:53:00

This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportability manual SAF 1.10, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On July 8th 2015 at 1837 (CDT), it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System Supply Fan belts had failed, resulting in loss of ventilation for the facility. Repairs were not completed within the time required had the TSC needed to be staffed. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO (Emergency Response Organization) activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The licensee has notified the (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector of the issue.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TODD CASAGRANDE TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1510 EDT ON 7/11/15 * * *

After repairs were completed, the TSC Ventilation was restarted on 7/9/15 at 0625 EDT for a maintenance run, the TSC Ventilation was restored to operable status at 1500 EDT on 07/11/2015. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 512118 July 2015 15:37:00Indian Point Unit 3 was manually tripped at 1427 EDT due to lowering steam generator water levels. At 1425 EDT, #31 condensate pump tripped, causing the lowering water levels. There were no immediate complications on the trip and the unit is stable in Mode 3. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as expected and is in service. All rods inserted and decay heat is being rejected to the condensers. Offsite electrical power is in service. Unit 2 is stable at 100% power. The licensee plans on issuing a press release. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 512027 July 2015 16:07:00

On 7/7/2015 at approximately 1435 EDT, the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment Pressure Boundary was not met when vacuum could not be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of water gauge for approximately 41 seconds. As part of post-maintenance testing for the non-safety related Reactor Building HVAC Center Exhaust Fan, the fan was started while the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment system was also in operation. Shortly after the fan was started, operators observed degrading vacuum in secondary containment and subsequently secured the center exhaust and supply fans. Vacuum continued to degrade momentarily after the fans were secured, and then returned to a Technical Specification allowable value. Subsequent inspections discovered that the affected fan was operating in the reverse direction. This is believed to have caused Secondary Containment pressure to increase. Since vacuum could not be maintained with the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment system operating, the plant operated in an unanalyzed condition. The cause of the reverse rotation is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/7/2015 AT 2153 EDT* * *

Based on plant configuration at the time of the event and further review of the Fermi 2 UFSAR, the plant did not operate in an unanalyzed condition. The Reactor Building HVAC fans would have tripped, as designed, upon receipt of a safety-related Standby Gas Treatment actuation signal during the time of the event. Therefore, the fans' pressurizing effect on secondary containment would have ceased within the time limits assumed in the existing accident analysis. The reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) remains valid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Stone).

ENS 512037 July 2015 16:20:00The following information was received from the State of Texas by email: On July 7, 2015, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services-Radiation Branch) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that the shutter on a Ronan GS-400 level gauge containing a 50 millicurie cesium - 137 source was stuck in the open position. The stuck shutter was discovered during the start up of a system component. Open is the normal position for the shutter. The gauge does not possess an exposure risk to any individuals. The manufacturer has been contacted and will replace the gauge. Additional information on this event will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9324
ENS 512047 July 2015 17:01:00The following information was received from the State of Mississippi by email: Location of Incident: Brandon, Mississippi, I-20 exit ramp 56 construction. Description of Incident: July 3, 2015 at approximately (1630 CDT), a Humboldt Model 5001 portable nuclear moisture density gauge, Serial Number 3339, was run over by a heavy equipment truck while on a jobsite. The gauge was severely damaged, but the sources remained intact and in shielded position. DRH (Mississippi Division of Radiological Health) was notified and provided with a survey measurement of 8mR/hr at the surface of the damaged gauge. The RSO was able to safely load the fragmented gauge back into its approved transport case and return it to the MDOT (Mississippi Department of Transportation) storage facility. DRH personnel visited the MDOT storage facility and observed an 8mR/hr surface survey reading with an NDS ND-2000 survey meter, serial number 24562, calibration date 7-1-2015. Leak test wipes were taken from both sources and sent for analysis by the licensee. The measured activity was well below the regulatory upper limit of .005 microcuries. Wipe analysis was received 7-7-2015. Gauge is being returned to the manufacturer for disposal. Radioisotopes: Cs-137(11 mCi); Am-241/Be(44 mCi). Radiation measurements taken by the Mississippi Division of Radiological Health: 8 mR/hr at surface; Less than 1 mR/hr at 1 meter. Mississippi Event: MS-15001
ENS 5118025 June 2015 14:18:00

The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email: Event date and time: On 06/25/2015 (at 0930 CDT, the licensee Radiation Safety Officer) called the Radiation Section of LDEQ (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality) to report a lost/missing radiography camera. The camera was to be loaded on a rig truck and (to) be transported to a temporary site. The crew and site RSO had been looking for the camera since it was discovered missing at 0830 (CDT). A radiography exposure device was left on the bumper of a rig truck and not secured in the vault/overpack on the truck. The crew left the yard on Highway LA #30 and headed to I-10 and then East on I-10. About 5 miles down I-10, the crew remembered that they had not secured the camera in the rig truck. They stopped and found the camera missing. They backed tracked I-10 to LA # 30 and back to the office. They did not locate the missing camera. The LA State Police was notified in addition to LDEQ. The Radiation Section (of LDEQ) was notifying the staff and dispatching a Radiation (Environmental Scientist) individual to respond. The media put out an alert of the missing camera. Homeland Security, QSA Global, and the Ascension Parish Sheriff responded and were aiding in locating the lost camera. They were combing the area on ATVs and utilizing sensitive radiation detection instruments. At about 1130 (CDT) the LDEQ was given an update by (the licensee Radiation Safety Officer) which only includes responding agencies and the Site RSO for contact. About 1150 (CDT) the NRC Region IV was notified of the incident (Latisha Hanson) and given a preliminary notification and told the (NRC Operations Center) was being notified. Event Location: A rig truck was dispatched from TIS at 37568 Hwy # 30, Gonzales, LA down LA #30 to Interstate-10. The rig went east on I-10 for about 5 miles when the crew remembered that the camera had not been secured in the rig. The crew check the back of the rig and backed tracked the I-10 to LA #30 route. The camera was not located. Notifications were made. Event type: Loss of control over an exposure device. A QSA 880 Delta exposure device S/N 4586. The exposure device was loaded with about 30 Ci of Ir-192, QSA source Model # 84-9. The Category II, Quantity of Concern was released or lost into the general public. The radioactive exposure device was released into the general public by the two individuals not following the TIS's (Team Industrial Services) Radiation Safety Procedures or the IC (Increased Controls) Security Procedures. The exposure device was released to the general public unsupervised and not in direct control of an authorized company representative. Event description: The equipment was a QSA 880 Delta exposure device S/N D4586. The source was about 30 Ci of Ir-192, model # 84-9. At this time LDEQ consider this incident still open and updates will be given when available. Transport Vehicle: This was a TIS company crew truck being dispatched to a temporary jobsite. Media attention: News Media was alerted and reporting agencies were notified. Louisiana Event: LA150010 Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, FDA(email), Nuclear SSA (email) FEMA National Watch Center (email), DNDO-JAC (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

  • * * UPDATE ON 06/29/2015 AT 1356 EDT FROM JOE NOBLE TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email: The exposure device was recovered at about 7:00pm (CDT) on 06/25/2015. Device QSA/AEA Technologies, Model Delta 880, S/N 4586 Source QSA/AEA Technologies, Model A424-9, S/N 166306; 48.2 Ci Ir-192 Recovered (approximately) 1.5 (Miles) on LA 61 east of US I-10 east. It was on the side of the road in a wet-muddy ditch area. (The device was found) by backtracking the trucks GPS device. A health and safety survey was conducted and the shielding appeared to be intact. The exposure device was loaded on to another Team Industrial vehicle, blocked and braced, and returned to the vault at the highway LA-30 address. The device and source were leak tested and analysis was performed on the test. A QSA Global representative stated it appears the device (DU) and the Ir-192 source were not leaking or compromised. With the exception of corrective actions and enforcement issues the department, LDEQ (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality), considers this incident closed. Notified R4DO(O'Keefe), IRD MOC(Grant), ILTAB (Wray), and NMSS Events Resource (via email). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, FDA(via email), Nuclear SSA (via email) FEMA National Watch Center (via email), DNDO-JAC (via email).

ENS 511275 June 2015 09:27:00The licensee nuclear medicine technologist ordered a package containing radioisotopesTc-99m and Xenon for a patient. The package was delivered by an offsite nuclear pharmacy to the Indiana University Health- Ball Memorial Hospital. When the technician surveyed the package, the surface contamination exceeded specified limits and nominally measured about 14,000 dpm. The package was quarantined and the vendor/shipper was notified concerning the surface contamination. The package was placed in a gamma camera and the indicated camera spectrum indicates Xenon package contamination. The Radiation Safety Officer has ordered the package to remain quarantined. No personnel contamination resulted from this event.
ENS 5107315 May 2015 21:03:00A South Texas Project Offsite Emergency Notification siren was (inadvertently) going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's office notified the Emergency Response organization at the station that a siren had actuated during a severe thunderstorm moving through the area. Station personnel are addressing the issue with the siren. The Matagorda County Sheriffs office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 510415 May 2015 00:48:00The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On May 4, 2015 at 0320, seismic monitoring (SM) system force balance accelerometer R0006 was determined to be non-functional due to an emergent equipment failure. On May 4,2015, at approximately 1600, further review of this equipment failure and the related impact to the capability of the SM system determined that this was a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability. This specific accelerometer functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification for emergency action level HA1.1, Natural or Destructive Phenomena affecting Vital Areas. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for HA1.1 event classification with accelerometer R0006 out of service. Maintenance to correct the condition is in-progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.
ENS 510353 May 2015 00:05:00Loss of assessment capability due to unplanned removal from service of a radiation monitor due to process flow monitor indication failing hi. The normal and hi range ventilation vent process radiation monitors (3HVR*RE10A/B are out of service. This condition was discovered during control room rounds. The condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures are in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State and Local authorities.
ENS 5100824 April 2015 00:15:00This notification is being reported to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of an on-site fatality of a contract employee. In addition, the contracting company plans to notify the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of a fatality per 29 CFR 1904.39. At approximately 1717 CDT on 4/23/15, a 911 call was received in the Control Room regarding a contract employee who was found unresponsive and unattended in a temporary break room set up on the Turbine Deck during the Unit 1 refueling outage. Resuscitation by first responders and paramedics from a nearby town was unsuccessful. Resuscitation efforts were suspended at 1750. The Houston County Sheriff's Office was notified at approximately 1800 and they responded to the site at 1822. The county coroner was notified and arrived on site at 1850. (Farley Nuclear Plant) received notification at approximately 2035 that the contractor company intended to notify OSHA. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 remains in Mode 6 and Unit 2 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.
ENS 5100423 April 2015 05:25:00On April 23, 2015 DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to an uncontrolled cooldown due to two (2) failed open steam dump valves. The cause of the failure is still under investigation. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) Tech Spec Required Shutdown, as a four (4) hour report; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report; and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), as an eight (8) hour report. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 continues to be supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam generator Power Operated Relief Valves due to steam dump valves being manually isolated. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. There is no indication of primary to secondary leakage and there is no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5100924 April 2015 09:22:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email: The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported on April 23, 2015 that, on the morning of April 22, 2015, the licensee mistakenly administered to a patient the wrong radioactive drug, a 118 mCi Tc-99m bulk dose instead of the prescribed 12.9 mCi Tc-99m Sestamibi dose, at the licensee's Baystate Franklin Medical Center facility. The wrong radioactive drug administered was reported by the licensee's RSO to have resulted in 5.6 rem effective dose equivalent to the patient, a reportable medical event in accordance with 105 CMR 120.594(A)(1)(b)1. The licensee's RSO reported that the patient and the referring physician have been notified and that the RSO did not expect any harm to the patient. The RSO reported the cause included that proper procedures were not followed. The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) plans to perform a special inspection and considers this event to be open. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5100122 April 2015 01:58:00On April 21, 2015 at 2258 (EDT), Secondary Containment became inoperable requiring a Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 entry for failure to meet SR 3.6.4.1.1 on Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inoperability was caused by Zone 3 differential pressure lowering to less than 0.25 (inches Water Column) when Zone III fans tripped during 30mph wind gusts. Fans were restarted and differential pressure restored to greater than 0.25 (inches Water Column) at 2314 hrs. April 21, 2015. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5100022 April 2015 00:18:00

The following information was received by the State of Texas via email: On April 21, 2015 at 2209 (CDT) hours, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was contacted by Andrews County Emergency Management (ACEM). They informed the Agency that an accident had occurred 12 miles south of Andrews, Texas, on highway 385, which involved a radiography truck. The Agency contacted ACEM chief who stated he was at the scene of a three vehicle accident which included a truck from Desert NDT. The driver was killed in the accident and the truck cab had separated from the frame. He stated the dark room had separated from the truck bed. He stated a person from the Andrews County WCS (Waste Control Specialist) was there and had performed a radiation survey and measured a dose rate of 15 millirem 10 feet from the truck. He stated the licensee had been contacted. He stated they had taken care of the survivors and had backed out of the area until the licensee's radiation safety officer arrived on the scene. He stated they had not seen the shipping papers, only the radiation symbol on the truck. I asked him to have the licensee contact the Agency as soon as they arrived on site. The licensee's (Desert NDT) RSO arrived at the scene at 2223 hours and contacted the Agency. He stated his priority was to locate the source. He agreed to call the Agency as soon as he had control of the source. At 2240, the RSO contacted the Agency and stated he had control of the source. The iridium source was inside a INC 100 radiography camera and the RSO believed the activity was between 20 and 26 curies. He stated the camera did not appear to be damaged. He stated the dark room had separated from the truck and split into two pieces. The camera was located still in its transport box in a section of the darkroom. He stated the dose rate on contact with the camera was 16 millirem an hour and 0.4 millirem at 1 foot. The dose rate at 1 meter was not distinguishable from background. He stated no individual at the scene would have received an exposure to radiation that would have exceeded any limits. The RSO stated he was taking the source back to the licensee's office for storage. The RSO stated they would send the exposure device to the manufacturer for inspection. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9305

  • * * UPDATE FROM ARTHUR TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/22/15 AT 1014 EDT * * *

The following information was received by the State of Texas via email: The licensee's corporate radiation safety officer contacted the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) and informed them that two radiographers were killed in this event. He stated the source activity was only 13 curies. He stated that local law enforcement in Andrews, Texas will not release any details of the accident until their investigation is completed. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Notified the R4DO (Drake), IRD MOC (Gott) and the NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5098615 April 2015 16:02:00The following information was excerpted from a Commonwealth of Massachusetts facsimile: A radiation source was detected in a trash load at the Roxbury Transfer Station (RTS) by radiation detectors at the transfer station entrance. The RTS consultant performed a survey to separate the radiation source from the remainder of the trash. The consultant transported radioactive trash to Atlantic Nuclear (MA license #56-0477) to perform isotope identification. Atlantic Nuclear' s analysis indicates the radiation source contains about 90 microCuries of Ra-226. A dose rate of 15 millirem/hour was measured at about 1 inch from the object. The consultant separated the single object from the trash bag. The source is stored at Atlantic Nuclear and is waiting for proper disposal. The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) continues to investigate and considers this event to be open. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5098314 April 2015 11:44:00

A medical event involving Y-90 microspheres (TheraSpheres) occurred at approximately 1000 EDT on 4/14/15. The prescribed dosage was 34.6 mCi and the delivered dosage was 25.5 mCi. This equates to a 26.3 percent underdose. The patient was notified by the authorized user following treatment and before discharge on 4/13/15. The referring physician was notified by the authorized user via electronic mail at 1149 EDT on 4/13/15. The initial hypothesis on cause may have been related to difficult access to an anatomical region in the liver, resulting in the need to use lower than normal pressure on the syringe used for microsphere delivery. All established administration procedures were followed. A written report to the appropriate NRC offices will follow within 15 days.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MACK RICHARD TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/14/15 AT 1515 EDT * * *

The following information was excerpted from the licensee email: The reason for this retraction is based upon discussions with the Authorized User (AU) who performed the Y-90 treatment and additional questions raised and clarifications made by the NRC Region III Office. During that discussion, the AU indicated that he utilized a lower syringe pressure than normal to prevent reflux of the Y-90 microspheres which would have resulted in a less than optimal treatment. The AU acknowledged that the amount administered was acceptable, given the need to use the lower syringe pressure and that he will modify the written directive to appropriately reflect a change in the written directive based upon those circumstances. Notified the R3DO (McCraw) and NMSS Events Notification via email. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

ENS 511174 June 2015 11:18:00This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the Train B Phase A Containment Isolation at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. At 1320 EDT on April 12, 2015, during planned performance of the Containment Isolation Train-A, Phase A Isolation Testing and Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) Cleanup System Test, the main control room received several Train-B annunciators. Upon investigation, it was determined that an invalid signal to the Train-B Solid State Protective System (SSPS) actuated the Train B, Phase A Containment Isolation. The invalid isolation signal was the result of a human performance error during the performance of the Phase A Isolation Test surveillance procedure. Operations personnel responded to the SSPS initiation, testing was aborted, ensured that all equipment operated as designed and restored affected systems in accordance with plant procedures. Approval to restart testing was obtained. All prerequisites were met and testing of the SSPS Train-A, Phase A Isolation was completed satisfactorily. As part of the prerequisite test alignment of the Train-A, Phase A, Unit 2 had entered a planned 7 day action for EGTS being inoperable. During the test when the Train-B of Phase A actuated, the suction dampers for Unit 1 supply to EGTS were closed per plant procedures. This prevented Train-B EGTS from aligning to Unit 1 and allowed Train-B of EGTS to remain operable for Unit 2. An SSPS Phase A signal can be generated automatically by a Safety Injection Signal (SIS) or manually. At the time of the event, plant conditions for an SIS did not exist; therefore, the Phase A actuation was invalid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 509617 April 2015 15:45:00

A loss of Main Generator Load which caused a Reactor Trip on Units 1 & 2. A switchyard voltage transient from a highline occurred, which caused an undervoltage condition on both units' safety related 4KV buses. Unit 1 is on normal heat removal to the condenser. Unit 2 is on auxiliary feedwater and normal condenser bypass valves for temperature control. An Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) actuation occurred on Unit 2. The (Unit 2) 2B emergency diesel generator did not start and load on its respective 24-4 KV bus. The 24-4KV Bus was repowered from the alternate feeder breaker. Cause of the emergency diesel failure to start is under investigation. All safety functions are met for both units. All control rods fully inserted. The site is in a normal shutdown electrical configuration powered from offsite. The site plans to stay in Mode 3 pending restart. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local authorities. A press release is planned.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JAY GAINES TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0129 EDT ON 4/9/2015 * * *

During post trip review, it was determined that the 21 saltwater pump had to be manually started. With the failure of 2B emergency diesel generator, there were no saltwater pumps running for approximately 12 minutes. Additional troubleshooting determined the 2A emergency diesel generator sequencer did not automatically start 21 saltwater pump. The 2B emergency diesel generator was returned to service on 4/8/2015 at 1730 (EDT). The loss of saltwater (pump) and emergency diesel generator is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is also an unanalyzed condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas), IRD MOC (Grant), NRR EO (Morris).

ENS 509482 April 2015 17:29:00Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) has completed a review of seismic monitor performance at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) over the past 3 years. The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency action levels (EAL) HA1.1 (Seismic Event Greater Than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by 'OBE Exceedance' alarm on Seismic Monitoring Panel) or HU1.1 (Earthquake felt in plant as indicated by Valid 'Event' alarm on Seismic Monitoring Panel). Contrary to that requirement, this review identified 6 unplanned instances where the seismic monitor was non-functional that were not previously reported, and 3 planned instances where the seismic monitor was non-functional for greater than 24 hours that were not previously reported. Since there was no compensatory measure that could be credited when the seismic monitor was non-functional, an emergency classification at the ALERT or UNUSUAL EVENT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation for a seismic event. The seismic monitor is currently functional, however it was determined to be non-functional on the following dates: Unplanned out of service: 1. August 14, 2012 2. November 16, 2012 3. November 18 2012 4. November 21, 2012 5. December 5, 2012 6. January 16, 2013 Planned greater than 24 hour out of service: 1. December 14, 2012 2. September 3, 2014 3. September 30, 2014 The unplanned non-functional conditions of the seismic monitor have been corrected and were entered into the NSPM Corrective Action Program. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery. Corrective actions are in progress to address the missed reporting of seismic monitor unavailability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 509451 April 2015 18:53:00At 1210 CDT the transformer supplying power to the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) stopped working due to the failure of a capacitor bank. The EOF is located adjacent to OPPD's (Omaha Public Power District) North Omaha facility, approximately 17 miles south of Fort Calhoun Station. The event caused a small grass fire which was quickly extinguished. The local fire department was called. The backup emergency diesel generator for the EOF started and supplied power to the facility, as designed. With the EOF diesel operating, the facility is able to function as required during emergency conditions. At 1440 CDT the EOF emergency diesel generator stopped running. At 1545 CDT the Conference Operations (COP) network phone system failed. The COP network is the primary emergency notification system between OPPD, state and county agencies. It is used to provide initial and updated notifications and for general information flow between these agencies. Alternate means of communication have been established (commercial lines) and a dedicated communicator is stationed in the control room to ensure that we can facilitate communication should the need arise. Power to the EOF was restored at 1713 CDT. At time 1720 CDT the COP tested as normal. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5091723 March 2015 11:16:00At approximately 0605 EDT on March 23, 2015, the Oconee Nuclear Station main control room and Security received an emergency call for an employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue. Site first responders were dispatched in conjunction with a request for off-site medical assistance. The individual was transported by ambulance to the Oconee Medical Center and was pronounced dead at 0717 EDT. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area) and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not been determined. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi) for situations related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) was notified at 0920 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified Pickens County, South Carolina and Oconee County Emergency Managements.
ENS 5091421 March 2015 04:15:00At 0030 CDT, on March 21, 2015, both doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock were opened concurrently by two separate individuals. The doors being open at the same time caused a failure to meet SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.4.1.2 to verify that either the outer door(s) or the inner door(s) in each Secondary Containment access opening are closed. The identified condition caused Secondary Containment to be considered inoperable per TS LCO (Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation) 3.6.4.1. Upon discovery, immediate action was taken to close the doors. The doors were open concurrently for a momentary amount of time. The action to close the door allowed SR 3.6.4.1.2 to be met, and restored Secondary Containment to an operable status. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5090319 March 2015 10:51:00At 0702 EDT on March 19, 2015, Fermi 2 received an automatic scram due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function of Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale. The plant had recently transitioned to Single Loop Operation after securing the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Pump due to loss of normal and emergency cooling water supply. The lowest reactor water level was 134 inches above top of active fuel. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal band by the Feedwater and Control Rod Drive Systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor pressure is being maintained via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and Main Condenser. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level 3 isolation occurred. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All off-site power sources were available throughout the event. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and in a stable condition. Investigation into the cause of the event is ongoing. This event is being reported under the four hour Non-Emergency reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5107517 May 2015 11:28:00

MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

The following information was received by facsimile:

This report is being provided as an interim report in accordance with 10CFR 21.21.

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Adam Mohr; President, Fabrication and Manufacturing; CB&I; One CB&I Plaza; 2103 Research Forest Drive; The Woodlands, TX; 77380.

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

This is an interim report. The deviations being evaluated pertain to deficiencies identified within the Measuring and Test Equipment program at Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) Laurens, 366 Old Airport Road, Laurens, SC.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

This is an interim report. The construction activities for the V.C. Summer (Units 2 and 3) and Vogtle AP1000r (Units 3 and 4) nuclear projects, which include procurement of the piping assemblies, are being performed by CB&I Power, 128 S. Tryon St., Charlotte, NC 28202.

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

This is an interim report. The evaluations of vendors and previously performed calibrations is under evaluation and equipment in question is being re-calibrated by an approved lab and evaluated for extent of condition. Additionally, causal analysis is being performed that is expected to provide relevant information pertaining to the cause of the deviations and if any quality assurance breakdowns may have occurred that could have produced a defect. Evaluation of the condition is expected to be completed by June 26, 2015.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

The discovery date of the deviations that require evaluation is March 18, 2015, based on the nonconformance reports and C/PAR that identify the deviations. Evaluation of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 was not able to be completed within the 60 day evaluation period. Additional time is needed to collect additional data pertaining to the identified nonconformances, perform causal analysis, and complete the evaluation.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured. or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

No basic components have been determined to fail to comply or contain a defect. This is an interim report.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

No basic components have been determined to fail to comply or contain a defect. This is an interim report.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity. Or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

None at this time.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

Not applicable."

ENS 5088213 March 2015 08:43:00

On March 13, 2015 at 0100 (CDT), it was identified that fuel assembly QAD224 was mis-oriented 180 degrees at core location 51-40. The intended orientation was (southeast). However the assembly was identified as being (northwest). This issue was identified during the core verification process. In the current core configuration, there is not a bounding analysis that assures adequate Shutdown Margin. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * EVENT RETRACTION FROM RICK MOON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1051 EDT ON 4/7/15 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on March 13, 2015 (ENS 50882). An evaluation has determined that Shutdown Margin was met with the mis-oriented fuel bundle. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as a degraded or unanalyzed condition was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Skowkowski).

ENS 5088313 March 2015 11:17:00A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5087811 March 2015 09:30:00At (0621 EDT) on 3/11/2015, Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor/turbine automatically tripped. Following the reactor trip, all safety-related equipment operated as designed. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically initiated as expected from the Feedwater Isolation Signal. Unit 1 is currently being maintained in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP, approximately 547 F and 2235 psig, with auxiliary feedwater supplying decay heat removal via the steam generators and condenser steam dumps. The immediate cause of the trip was a Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation negative rate signal, caused by a malfunction in the rod control system. There was no associated work in progress related to this and all systems were normally aligned. Current Temperature and Pressure - temperature is 547 degrees F and stable, pressure is 2235 psig and stable. There is no indication of any primary/secondary leakage. All rods are inserted. Electrical alignment is normal, supplied from Off-Site power. There is no operational impact to Unit 2. Unit 2 continues to operate in Mode 1 at 100%. There was no impact on public health and safety. Post-trip investigation is in progress and planned restart timeline has not yet been determined. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 508603 March 2015 15:18:00Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 0837 (EST) on 03/03/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 2 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified. The licensee notified the State of New York.
ENS 5084121 February 2015 21:35:00The Millstone site stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, failed and was declared inoperable at 1950 EST on February 21, 2015. Repairs are in progress. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off-site response capability, or off-site communications capability. The Instrument and Controls Department is conducting troubleshooting and repair. The cause of the radiation monitor failure was sample pump failure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State and Local authorities.
ENS 5084623 February 2015 17:05:00

The following information was received by facsimile: (The Curtiss-Wright) letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in Socket (PIN: GB-1 A-5) sold separately or supplied as part of a GRAYBOOT 'A (GB-1A) Connector Kit. There is one affected lot of Sockets (Lot#: 092413). The potential defect is that the socket was not zone annealed which will possibly affect the ability to crimp the socket onto the wire conductor. Zone annealing is specified for the crimp barrel to return the crimp barrel to a soft condition to counteract the effects of previous heat treating required to develop spring tension in the socket tines that mate with the pin contact. The nine affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified by February 24, 2015 and supplied with the information we have at this time. 1. Vattenfall- Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, P.O. 4500301916 2. Vattenfall- Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, P.O. 4500301916 3. Decon International (HK) Ltd., P.O. DIL00590 4. Ringhals AB, P.O. 641511-090 5. Dremel Inc., P.O. 13-040 6. Bruce Power L.P., P.O. 00185336 7. Kanata Electronic Services Limited, P.O. 34513 8. Meggitt Safety Systems Inc., P.O. 104057 9. Meggitt Safety Systems Inc., P.O. 104345 Based on our recent in-house testing of socket Lot #: 092413, the defective sockets appear to be more difficult to crimp than sockets that have been zone annealed. Some of the Lot #: 092413 sockets showed cracking or bending under magnification. We did not have any sockets actually break apart during the crimping process. All the test specimens crimp barrels remained intact. If a severe fracture had occurred at the time of crimping we believe it would have been very noticeable to the technician installing the contact. Once crimped, the socket appears to function well by conducting electricity and exhibiting acceptable electrical resistance. Many of these sockets from Lot #: 092413 may already be installed. Customers will need to determine if replacing the sockets is required. All customers listed may choose to replace already installed sockets. It is requested that any uninstalled sockets be returned for replacement. All customers requesting replacement sockets should contact Bambi Rhoades at brhoades@curtisswright.com or by phone at 256-924-7424 for arrangements or Jim Tumlinson, contact information listed below. Send all defective sockets to QualTech NP; 120 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customer can contact Cindy Tidwell at ctidwell@curtisswright.com or by phone at (256) 924-7436 for help with international or freight collect shipping instructions. Ship all defective sockets collect to UPS Account No. 35254E. Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once our report of the recent testing complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting (Jim Tomlinson; Office Phone: (256) 924-7429; email:jtomlinson@curtisswright.com).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1304 EST ON 11/23/2015 FROM BAMBI RHOADES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via fax: This letter provides for the formal close out of notification QTHuntsville 10CFR21-2015-01. The initial notification was made on February 20, 2015 (NRC Event# 50846). All customers were notified and received the test data. All customers were given the opportunity to receive replacement sockets, as they deemed necessary. These replacement parts have been delivered. All actions have been completed. To prevent reoccurrence in the future, the following internal documents have been revised. The procurement and dedication guidelines for both the original GRAYBOOT and GRAYBOOT 'A' connectors were revised. GRAYBOOT 'A' Report No.: SAIC-TR-l038.2-03 currently at Revision P, dated July 16, 2015. GRAYBOOT Report No.: EGS-TR-880708-01 currently at Revision Y, dated July 16, 2015. Both the reports above now contain additional destructive testing as well as visual inspection under magnification to provide more reasonable assurance that the annealing is acceptable. Also, additional training was conducted at our sub-supplier and additional requirements have been added to our purchase orders to prevent any reoccurrence . Based on the above information and corrective actions, this part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this further, please contact Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office). 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com. Notified the R2DO (Ernstes) and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).

ENS 5083820 February 2015 13:14:00The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On February 20, 2015, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee that on February 19, 2015, one of its radiography crews working at a remote field site (near Kennedy, Texas) was unable to retract a 31.9 Curie Iridium 192 source into a QSA 880D exposure device. The radiographers were examining a pipe on a pipe pad with the collimator being held in place with a magnetic stand. As the radiographer began to retract the source after a shot, the stand fell and struck the source guide tube crimping the tube to a point where the source could not be moved. The radiographers stopped work in the area and moved their boundaries to prevent exposures to members of the general public. The radiographers contacted their radiation safety officer (RSO), but he was located 8 hours from the work site. The RSO contacted the licensee's office in Corpus Christi, Texas and the RSO from that location responded to the event. The Corpus Christi RSO is (at the location) to perform source retrieval. The event occurred at 1630 (CST) and the source was retracted at 2400 (CST). No over exposures occurred and no member of the general public received any additional exposure from this event. The guide tube has been removed from service for inspection. The dosimetry badges for the individuals involved in the event have been sent to the licensee's processor for reading. The licensee is investigating the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. On February 20, 2015, the licensee agreed to send the source involved in this event to the manufacturer for inspection. Texas Incident: I-9281
ENS 5080210 February 2015 11:35:00The following was received from the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection via email: A crew working near Cambridge, Ohio this morning experienced a source disconnect on a QSA Model 880D camera containing 60.5 Curies of Iridium-192, which occurred at 9:26 AM EST. The disconnect was discovered after a shot, when the crew's survey instrument indicated that the source was still exposed after the guide cable had been fully retracted. The cause for the source disconnect has not yet been determined. The area has been secured, roped off, and is under constant surveillance by the radiography crew. Two Acuren supervisors trained in source recovery are enroute from their Akron office. The customer has been advised and is cooperating in keeping all personnel away from the area. There has been no exposure to workers or members of the public from the disconnect. An ODH (Ohio Department of Health) Investigator is enroute to the site to observe recovery options. The QSA Global Camera (Model: 880D; Serial number: 4192) contained an Ir-192 source of 60.5 Ci (Serial number:13665G)
ENS 5080010 February 2015 01:25:00

On October 14, 2013 a calculation for the containment internal structural analysis was revised and accepted by the station. This calculation limited the Safety injection tank level to 74%. On October 16, 2013 Safety injection tank level was raised to 100% for approximately 13 hours in preparations for plant start-up. While the plant was safely in a cold shutdown condition, this represents a reportable unanalyzed condition. This issue is of a historical nature and does not question the current operability of any plant systems or structures. This was self identified during a Fort Calhoun calculation review. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MICHAEL PEAK TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2335 EDT ON 3/12/15 * * *

Following review of the reported event, attendant calculations and associated documentation, engineering personnel determined that the condition described in event notification EN50800 did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition. Revision 1 of a calculation for the containment internal structural analysis demonstrated that when the safety injection tanks 'B' and 'D' are 100% filled in an outage condition, approximately a 10% safety margin is maintained. This revision was the calculation of record at the time the safety injection tank levels were raised above 74%, in October, 2013. Revision 2 of the calculation was completed to remove excess conservatism and to provide a closer representation of available margin. In addition, margin was also improved by limiting tank level to 74%. However, improving margin by limiting tank level to 74% does not result in an unanalyzed condition when tank level is 100%, as adequate margin remains. Therefore this event is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Okeefe).

ENS 507979 February 2015 11:05:00The Unit 2 Stack High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-8168) was removed for service for planned maintenance. There is no significant effect of this planned maintenance on the plant. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut and Waterford township.
ENS 507947 February 2015 07:37:00On 2/6/15 at 2300 (CST) the Division 1 Reactor Water Cleanup (RT) system differential flow instrument was declared inoperable due to erratic indication. The Division 1 RT differential flow instrument was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 Action D.1. At time 2355 Division 2 RT differential flow instrument failed downscale and was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 Action D.1 and also Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 Action E.1 (entered due to Division 1 RT differential flow already inoperable). Since this condition renders the Leakage Detection System incapable of performing its safety function, it is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Division 1 RT differential flow was declared Operable at time 0036 on 2/7/15. Division 2 RT differential flow was restored to Operable at time 0225 on 2/07/2015. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified.
ENS 5083720 February 2015 11:30:00The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email: (The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality has) been notified by Globe X-Ray Services (OK-15194-02) that one of their assistant radiographers received a reported dose of 5.083 R for the month of January, 2015. The assistant has been suspended and stated that he dropped his badge at some point during the monitoring period but did not report it until now. Landauer reported that the reading was 'inconclusive'. Investigation is ongoing.
ENS 5077328 January 2015 11:38:00

The Comanche Peak Primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be unavailable during planned maintenance on the EOF ventilation system. On January 28, 2015, CPNPP (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) began planned work to improve the reliability of the EOF ventilation system. The EOF will be unavailable for approximately three weeks. During the time the primary EOF is unavailable, the affected ERO members will respond to the Backup EOF in Granbury, Texas for any declared emergency event. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time the primary EOF is unavailable. The extended unavailability of the primary EOF is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when the primary EOF availability is restored.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/11/2015 AT 1811 EDT FROM BRIAN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The availability of the Comanche Peak Primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has been restored following planned maintenance on the EOF ventilation system. On January 28, 2015, CPNPP (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) began planned work to improve the reliability of the EOF ventilation system. The unavailability of the primary EOF was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report serves as a follow-up to Event Number 50773. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R4DO (Okeefe) was notified.

ENS 5077228 January 2015 08:56:00At 0535 CST on 1/28/15, control room staff identified that valve EJHV8716A, RHR A To SIS (Safety Injection System) Hot Leg Recirc Loops 2&3 (isolation valve), had been closed per clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 to support maintenance on the A RHR system. Closing valve EJHV8716A placed Wolf Creek in TS 3.0.3. At 0550 CST on 1/28/15, power was restored to valve EJHV8716A and the valve was opened, allowing the unit to exit from TS 3.0.3. Subsequent reviews of clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 identified that valve EJHV8809A had been energized and closed per direction of the clearance order. TS 3.0.3 was reentered at 0635 CST due to discovery of this condition. At 0650 CST, valve EJHV8809A was opened and deenergized allowing exit from TS 3.0.3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5074721 January 2015 13:05:00The following information was received by email: On January 21, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) that on January 20, 2015, during the process of closing fixed nuclear gauge shutters at its facility in order to perform detector calibrations, it discovered that the shutter on one of its Ohmart-Vega SH-F2 gauges, containing a 500 millicurie cesium-137 source, would not close. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position and the failure does not pose a risk of exposure to any person. The licensee is coordinating to have repairs made. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I 9269
ENS 5074419 January 2015 14:24:00

The missile door (door 33012) protecting Class 1E Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses NB01/NB02 switchgear rooms was discovered misaligned on its hinge and stuck partially open and not capable of being closed. The missile door has since been repaired and closed. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.9, 'Distribution Systems- Operating,' was declared not met and Condition F entered when the immediate operability determination identified that buses NB01 and NB02 were inoperable. Condition F of TS 3.8.9 requires immediate entry into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 1100 CST and subsequently exited when the missile door was repaired at 1118 CST. The unit was in and still is in MODE 1 at 100% power. No actions were initiated to commence a unit shut down. The NRC resident inspector was contacted regarding this event. All systems functioned as expected.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM TRAVIS ROHLFING TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1458 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *

The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: An engineering evaluation concluded that the weather conditions during the period of the event did not result in the threat of a tornado. Given that the weather during the event would not have presented a valid threat of a tornado, the stuck open missile door would not have prevented the ESF busses and the DGs (Diesel Generators) from performing their specified safety function. The ESF busses and the DGs were considered OPERABLE but degraded. This is analogous to Example 4 in RIS 2001-09, 'Control of Hazard Barriers', with the exception that this event did not occur as a result of planned maintenance or a plant modification. As such, this event has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford).

ENS 5074520 January 2015 15:19:00The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via email: Event Date and Time: 01/16/2015, around (1515 CST) a radiography crew was working at the ExxonMobil Refinery on Scenic Highway, Baton Rouge, LA. The event was reported (about 1645 CST) on January 17, 2015, by a phone call from (an individual) who represented himself as the Corporate RSO. He stated he drove down on January 17, to evaluate and investigate this incident. He reported this incident appears to be a Human Error Potential Excessive Exposure. Event Location: ExxonMobil Refinery 4999 Scenic Highway. Baton Rouge, LA 70805. A temporary jobsite for Acuren Inspection. Event type: This is a potential excessive exposure involving a radiographer attempting to breakdown a radiography exposure setup. He attempted to disconnect the guide tube from the exposure device and the source was not locked in the shielded position. It was noticed that the locking device was red after the guide tube was handled to disconnect it from the exposure device. Notifications: LA DEQ (Department of Environmental Quality), Assessment, Radiation by direct phone call to our after hours answering system. The notification came in around (1645 CST) on January 17, 2015. Event Description: The radiography crew was making exposures on lower level equipment at the ExxonMobil Refinery. The crew was utilizing (about) 38 Ci of Ir-192. The crew attempted to breakdown/disconnect the equipment after the exposures. The guide tube would not disconnect. The 2nd hand of the crew manipulated the drive cable that returned the source into the shielded position. A quarter turn on the crank shielded the source. The radiographer and his equipment were checked. His pocket dosimeter was off scale, but he claims his Alarm Rate Alarm meter did not alarm. A second check of the Alarm Rate Meter revealed the unit did alarm, but it was a weak alarm. Estimated dose calculations were done for his whole body and extremities. His whole-body estimated dose was 3.3 Rads and his extremity dose was estimated at 206 Rads to his hands. These were calculated on a one minute exposure where a .5 minute is more realistic. The exposed radiographer was taken to Core Occupational Medicine for examination, x-rays and blood work. He is being monitored and examined every other day. At this time he has been asymptomatic for an excessive radiation exposure. The Licensee is conducting reenactments. This incident is not considered closed by the Department (LA DEQ). The investigation findings will be updated when they become available. The equipment was all QSA equipment loaded with 38 Ci Ir-192. This appears to be an operator error exposure. The source is secure from removal and unnecessary exposure. This event is not closed and additional investigation and evaluation will continue. The source is in a safe shielded position and no threat to workers or the general public. Transport vehicle description : N/A This was at a temporary job site inside the ExxonMobil Refinery located in Baton Rouge, LA. License Numbers: LA-7072-L01, AI 126755 Louisiana Event Number: LA1500002
ENS 5074620 January 2015 15:44:00

The following information was received by email: Event Description: A specific licensee reported the loss (potential theft) of two generally licensed tritium (H-3) exit signs. The signs had been removed from installation and are missing from the storage location. The licensee became aware of the missing material on 1/14/2015, however, it is possible the material was missing for approximately one month. The devices were last seen by licensee staff in mid-December 2014. Specific details about the device model and activity have not yet been provided, potentially up to 15 Ci H-3 per device. An NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) inspector will visit the site to investigate the incident. New Jersey Event: #C545467

  • * * UPDATE FROM JAMES MCCULLOUGH TO JEFF HERRERA ON 2/9/15 AT 1638 EST * * *

The following update was received from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email: The College of New Jersey (TCNJ) reported the loss or possible theft of two radioluminescent exit signs. The signs had been removed from installation and were placed into storage. The signs were discovered to be missing from the storage location on 1/14/2015. However, TCNJ stated that it was possible the signs had been missing for approximately one month. The signs were last seen by TCNJ in mid-December 2014. Each sign contained approximately 137 GBq (3.7 Ci) of H-3. A New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection inspector visited the site on 1/21/2015 and determined the most likely scenario was accidental disposal. The licensee submitted a full report in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:28-6.1 (10 CFR 20.2201). The missing signs were not located. Although there was no evidence of contamination, the licensee estimated a dose of 8.5 mrem if the signs had been broken. NJDEP tracked the event as Incident # C545467 and Investigation #: 507375-INV15001. Corrective Actions: Commitment to increased security should they be in possession of other sources. (The College of New Jersey) reports no inventory of generally licensed devices. Device Number: 1 Device/Equipment: RADIOLUMINESCENT EXIT SIGN

Model Number:  LE

Manufacturer: SAFETY LIGHT CORP Serial Number: 201864 Device Number: 2 Device/Equipment: RADIOLUMINESCENT EXIT SIGN

Model Number:  LE

Manufacturer: SAFETY LIGHT CORP

Serial Number:  201865

Notified R1DO(Powell), NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5073212 January 2015 23:17:00At 1939 (EST) on January 12, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 when secondary containment was declared inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being above the Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement of -0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. This condition is related to sustained high winds. At 1956 on January 12, 2015 the differential pressure was restored, the secondary containment was declared operable and the Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 exited. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident'. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 5073112 January 2015 13:37:00The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On January 12, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) that during routine fixed nuclear gauge inspections and shutter checks, it discovered that the shutter on one of its Ronan Model SA1-C5 gauges, containing a 300 millicurie cesium-137 source (SN: 6409GK), was stuck in the open position. (The event occurred at the licensee site located in Evadale, Texas.) This gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position. The gauge is mounted on a vessel that the licensee does not enter. There is no risk of exposure to any individual. The licensee is contacting the manufacturer to schedule repair. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9266
ENS 507186 January 2015 17:18:00In accordance with 29 CFR 1904.39(a)(2), notification was made to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration regarding the in-patient hospitalization of an individual while in the owner controlled area. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State of Ohio and local authorities The individual employee is currently under medical treatment and is not contaminated.
ENS 507153 January 2015 14:14:00At 0538 (CST) on 01/03/2015, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. The 25KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related support equipment and did not result in an impact to plant/unit operation. Meter and Relay technicians are performing ongoing investigation of the cause of the breaker trip. A similar incident occurred 01/02/2015 at 0314 (CST). Reference (NRC) EN# 50713. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 507142 January 2015 16:45:00

At 0925 (EST) on 1/2/2015, Engineering personnel identified a gas void in each of two Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) discharge lines which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg HHSI flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. The voids were vented and Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was exited at 1032. The testing for gas voids conducted on 1/2/2015 was a follow-up to a gas void found in one Unit 4 HHSI line on 12/26/2014. On 12/26/14, TS 3.0.3 was entered at 1020 and exited at 1048 after the gas void was vented. After further review, the 12/26/2014 event was also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Engineering evaluation will be performed for both events to determine the specific impact of the gas voids on HHSI system function. Cause evaluation is being conducted to determine the source of the gas and any needed corrective actions. Unit 3 was verified to not have this voiding issue. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN BLOOM TO VINCE KLCO AT 1120 EDT ON 3/11/15 * * *

On 1/2/2015 at 1645 (EST), Event Notification 50714 reported to the NRCOC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center) gas voids detected on 12/26/2014 and 1/2/2015 in Unit 4 cold leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) piping which exceeded procedural gas accumulation acceptance criteria. Subsequent analysis has determined that if a HHSI pump started with the measured gas voids present, the resulting system conditions would not have impacted the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) and therefore its safety related function would not be impaired. The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flow path to the RCS had been operable with the voids present, Technical Specification (TS) requirements were met, and entry into TS 3.0.3 was not required. The HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4. Therefore, the immediate notification to the NRCOC on 1/2/2015 at 1645 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).

ENS 507132 January 2015 11:43:00At 0314 (CST) on 01/02/2015, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution Systems caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation. An investigation by Meter and Relay Technicians revealed no abnormal conditions/damaged equipment. The supply breaker was re-closed at 0915 on 01/02/2015. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers and proper operation was verified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 507121 January 2015 22:02:00

During (surveillance) checks of Control Room doors, a boundary door did not latch after being accessed until the door was opened and closed. This is being reported as it could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The door is currently closed and latched. The door was in this condition for between 5 and 10 seconds.

The licensee notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Town of Waterford and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY THOMAS CLEARY TO JEFF ROTTON ON 01/08/2015 AT 1539 EST * * *

Upon further review, Millstone Power Station Unit 2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because even with the control room door latch degraded, the control room door and its closing mechanism would still be able to maintain the control room envelope's boundary intact. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 50712 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson).

ENS 5060913 November 2014 11:58:00The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On November 13, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Branch) that on November 12, 2014, at approximately (1500 CST) it was notified by local law enforcement that one of its industrial radiography cameras had been found on the side of a road approximately 3 miles from the licensee's facility. The licensee determined that the SPEC 150 camera containing a 38 Curie Iridium-192 source had fallen from one of its trucks at approximately (1245 CST) while in route to a temporary job site. The camera had not been secured inside the truck before it left the licensee's facility but had been left on the tailgate. The licensee retrieved the camera and there was no apparent damage to the device. There are no known exposures resulting from this event. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA- 300. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA and EPA. Notified FDA, NuclearSSA and DNDO-JAC via email. Texas Incident: I-9251 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5056825 October 2014 13:42:00The normal and high range ventilation process radiation monitors (3HVR*RE 10 A/B) were removed from service for preplanned maintenance for greater than 72 hours. The radiation monitors will be returned to service following maintenance and completion of operational testing. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut and Waterford township..
ENS 5056724 October 2014 20:59:00The normal range Supplemental Leakage Collection and Release System (SLCRS) was removed from service due to a sample pump failure. Compensatory sampling and monitoring is being established per the Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Following the sample pump repairs and restoration, the Radiation Monitor will be returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut and Waterford township.
ENS 5053314 October 2014 07:37:00

This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 manual reactor trip. The trip was initiated when the in service train of CCW cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps was lost due to a loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer (SUT). The control room team manually tripped the reactor then tripped all three reactor coolant pumps as required by station procedure. There was a line of severe thunderstorms with lightning passing through the plant site at the time of loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer. The 2B emergency diesel generator was out of service for maintenance therefore there was a loss of the 'B' train emergency power 4160V electrical bus ('B' train LOSP (Loss of Offsite Power)). 'A' train emergency power remained energized from offsite sources. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature. At 0433 (CDT), 2B Reactor Coolant Pump was re-started when support conditions were re-established. Heat sink is adequate using the 2A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Unit 2 'B' train power was restored by starting the 2C emergency diesel generator at 0523 (CDT). This restored power to the Digital Rod Position Indication system, and control rod K-8 in control bank 'C' indicated full out, and all other control rods fully inserted. An emergency boration is in progress to compensate for the stuck rod. Additionally, the reactor trip resulted in a valid actuation of the Aux Feedwater system which is an eight hour non-emergency report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the transient, one primary PORV momentarily opened, then reseated. Decay heat is being directed to the atmospheric relief valves with no indicated primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2125 EDT ON 10/15/2014 FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Digital rod position indication troubleshooting was conducted on 10/14/2014 and confirmed all control rods, including control rod K-8, fully inserted following the reactor trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ayres), NRR EO (Davis) and IRD (Gott).

ENS 5053214 October 2014 01:30:00

During the plant response to the trip of the B Recirculating water pump, reactor water level rose to the HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) high water level trip setpoint as indicated on the associated instrumentation. With this high water level trip actuated, the HPCI high drywell pressure initiation signal would not have allowed the HPCI system to perform its intended safety function if required. If the HPCI system received the low water level initiation signal, the system would have been able to perform Its intended safety function. This high water level signal was actuated from 1935 (EDT) until reset at 1940 (EDT). This is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v). The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY DAVID CALLAN TO JEFFREY HERRERA AT 1404 EDT ON 12/08/14 * * *

Further review has determined that the condition was not a result of procedural errors/inadequacies, equipment failures, or design / analysis inadequacies. Plant systems responded as per design when the HPCI system high water level trip actuated when reactor vessel water level rose to the HPCI high water level trip setpoint. HPCI initiation has two logics: one for low-low vessel water level and the other for a high drywell pressure. A vessel low-low water level is an indication that reactor coolant is being lost with a need for HPCI injection for core cooling. High drywell pressure could indicate a line break in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary inside the drywell. The HPCI level instrumentation is designed to shut down the HPCI system upon high water level to prevent HPCI turbine damage due to gross moisture carryover and will re-initiate HPCI if vessel water level drops to the initiation water level setpoint. A HPCI high drywell pressure initiation signal, above setpoint, would have made up the logic for HPCI initiation and as per design, HPCI would have injected at the vessel low low level setpoint without operator action to reset the trip. In this instance, the trip was reset as prescribed by station procedures. HPCI was capable of performing its safety function after the high water level trip reset either by operator action or instrumentation (low low level initiation). The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Rogge).

ENS 5044310 September 2014 11:55:00This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. At approximately 0453 EDT on September 10, 2014, a fire alarm in an area near the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) triggered an automatic shutdown of the TSC ventilation system. The system was restored at 0755 EDT. The alternate TSC was available at all times. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5032430 July 2014 13:27:00On July 30, 2014, at (0940 CDT), with the plant operating at 100% power, a review of an engineering analysis of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) determined that the UHS had been in an unanalyzed condition that degraded plant safety. This condition was the result of a design basis deficiency for the UHS that did not account for the adverse effects of system leakage on compliance with the 30-day inventory required by Regulatory Guide 1.27. The system design basis requires that 30-day inventory be maintained, with the assumption that no replenishment of the UHS occurs for the entire duration of the postulated event. In support of the development of the engineering analysis, compensatory measures have been implemented which provide adequate assurance that the UHS will perform its design safety function. Corrective actions to restore full compliance with design basis requirements are in development. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that degraded the safety function of the UHS. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5032330 July 2014 12:06:00The following information was received from the State of Texas by facsimile: On July 29, 2014, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee that a Humboldt Scientific Inc. model 5001 moisture density gauge containing a 10 millicurie Cesium-137 and a 40 millicurie Americium-241 source was damaged at a field site. The technician had placed the device at a sample location and extended the cesium source into the inspection hole. The area had been compacted and the technician did not believe there was any heavy equipment in the area he was working. While waiting for the results of the sample, the technician received an email. The technician needed his glasses to read the email so he walked 70 feet to his truck to get his glasses. While at the truck, the device was run over by a soil compactor (steam roller). The technician went to the gauge and restricted access to the area. He then contacted his Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The licensee's RSO contacted a service provider (SP) who responded with the RSO to the scene. The device case was severely damaged, but the licensee was able to return the Cesium source to the shielded position and secure it in position. The SP's technician verified the Americium source was still in the device. The SP's technician surveyed the device and did not find any abnormal dose rates. The SP took the damaged device to their facility for disposal. No individual received any significant additional exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9216
ENS 5045212 September 2014 12:05:00The following information is provided as 60 day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of Division 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX) and an invalid actuation signal for Division 1 Containment Isolation Group 12. This event occurred on July 26, 2014, at 1648 CDT. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) this notification is made via telephone. (a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were: On July 26th, during lightning strikes on the switchyard grid system, the Division 1 SX (Shutdown Service Water) auto-started as a result of momentary loss of power to the Low Pressure Auto Start Relay. A lightning strike causing voltage transients also caused a Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation signal affecting DIV 1 Hydrogen monitor. (b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial. Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, for Division 1 SX and Group 12 Containment Isolation signal, the systems responded as expected for existing plant conditions. For group 12 isolation, (Containment Monitoring) 1CM011/12/47 and 48 valves closed from their normally open position. For DIV 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX), the start of the Shutdown Service Water (SX) pump and alignment of valves operated as expected. The actuation was considered a complete Division 1 SX and Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation actuation. Containment Isolation Signals: The following Group 12 valves closed and associated shunt trips occurred on a loss of power to (Radiation Monitors) 1RIX-PR001A/1C: 1CM011, 1CM012, 1CM047, and 1CM048. (c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully. Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, Division 1 SX and Containment Isolation signals started and functioned successfully. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5031226 July 2014 10:44:00(A Honeywell) employee with dust in his right eye reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's work boots, 331,597 dpm/100 sq.cm. The plant nurse allowed the employee to return to work following treatment. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the entire course of the event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and Region 2 (David Hartland via email).
ENS 5030324 July 2014 07:44:00

On July 24, 2014 at 0800 EDT, the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring Computer System will be inoperable and unavailable due to pre-planned maintenance to implement an upgrade to the system. Alternate methods for monitoring are being utilized. The Radiation Monitor Computer System is expected to be restored to available status at approximately 1700 EDT on July 24, 2014. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update will be provided once the Radiation Monitoring Computer System has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATED PROVIDED BY TIM KUDO TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1708 EDT ON 7/24/2014 * * *

The Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring Computer System has been restored to an operable status as of July 24, 2014 at 1650 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO(Musser)

ENS 5028418 July 2014 08:28:00

The following information was received from Velan Inc by facsimile: SUBJECT NOTIFICATION: 2 INCH BONNETS, VELAN PART NUMBER 8943-014 On May 16, 2014 (Velan) received notification from Westinghouse Electric Co. (WES) that 2 bonnets supplied by Velan to WES in early 2013 for installation at Comanche Peak exhibited the following issues: - The bonnets were intended to be exact replacements for the bonnets built to drawing E73-020 Rev E (OEM is Velan) except for material change to SA-182 FXM-19. Bonnets were visually inspected when received at site. No issues were noted; both bonnets appeared to be identical. - In April 2013, Unit 1 bonnet was installed in valve 1-8109. No issues were noted with the installation. The new bonnet was put into service. -In April 2014, Unit 2 installation was scheduled to begin. After the disassembly of the valve, the old and new bonnets were compared. It was noted that the backseat dimensions are different between the 2 bonnets. The increase in backseat diameter on the new bonnet would cause the stem to not backseat. The decision was made to re-install the old bonnet and send the new bonnet back to the OEM, Velan. On June 10, 2014 the bonnet, identified in the last bullet above, arrived at Velan Plant 2. The review by the (Velan) Evaluation Committee was finalized on July 17 and concluded that: -Four similar bonnets were delivered to WES on three different occasions in 1988 and early 90's -The stem head diameter is 01.312 (inches) so, when opening, the stem may pass through the stem bore of the bonnet and not seat on the backseat. -On opening, if the limit switches on the actuator do not function, the stem may enter the packing chamber. The packing may be deformed and a leak may develop. Stem travel is limited by the disc contacting the bonnet and/or the end of the stem thread stopping on the actuator drive nut. -If the actuator and packing flange nuts are removed, there is the potential for the stem to blow out of the valve. -The packing chamber depth will result in more packing being installed in the valve. This may result in a higher packing friction load on the actuator when operating and reduce the actuator margin. -The smaller packing chamber will not affect safety. A different diameter packing may be required. The gland bushing diameter (01.744 inches) is less than the packing chamber diameter and will work correctly. These bonnets were fabricated against ASME Sec. Ill for installation in Class 2 systems. Not knowing exactly the nature of the application we cannot determine if the (above identified) potential issues may pose a significant safety hazard and therefore we have informed WES by way of a similar letter.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM VICTOR APOSTOLESCU TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1435 EDT ON 07/28/2014 * * *

Reporting Organization/Supplier who made the original event report on 07/18/2014 reported to the NRC Operations Center that the Event Notification posted has a typographical error regarding the Velan, Inc part number described in the report. The original documentation provided was concerning Velan Part Number 8943-014 which was mistakenly transcribed as 6943-014 in the original report. This error has been corrected in this updated report. Notified R4DO (Okeefe) and Part 21 Group via email.

ENS 502617 July 2014 22:12:00

On July 7, 2014 at approximately (2040 EDT), an issue was discovered with currently removed Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRVs) that calls the operability of the currently installed EMRVs into question. Based on this new information, all 5 of the currently installed EMRVs were conservatively declared inoperable. With the potential of 5 EMRVs inoperable a Technical Specification shutdown is required under Technical Specification 3.4.b, whereby reactor pressure shall be reduced to 110 psig or less within 24 hours. This event is immediately reportable under: 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'" The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and issue a press release.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1745 EDT ON 7/11/2014 FROM CHARLES SPAGNUOLO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The original concern and July 7, 2014 EN (report) was caused by abnormal wear found on removed Electromatic Relief Valve actuators. However, on July 8, 2014, upon completion of in situ testing as well as visual examination of the installed EMRV actuators, it was determined that the 5 currently installed EMRVs were fully operable and capable of performing their safety function. Therefore, Oyster Creek is retracting the notifications made under 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State will be notified. The licensee will be issuing a press release. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).

ENS 5023628 June 2014 14:53:00At 1215 PM CDT on June 28, 2014, Xcel Energy notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer that approximately 1000 dead fish of assorted species were discovered in the site's discharge canal. The fish perished due to rising temperatures in the discharge canal caused by an orderly shutdown of Cooling Towers as directed by procedure for response to flooding of the Mississippi River. The discharge canal is a body of water with a barrier from the Mississippi River. The Mississippi River temperature across the site has only risen 0.9F which is well within the permit limit of the maximum of 5F. There is no impact to the availability of safety systems or safety system performance. This condition has no impact to public health and safety. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector (and local authorities).
ENS 5023527 June 2014 20:33:00At approximately 1535 Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Emergency Planning Supervisor received a notification from an offsite DCPP employee that one of the emergency plan sirens had inadvertently actuated. The DCPP Shift Manager was notified of the situation by approximately 1545 PDT. The County of San Luis Obispo was notified of the inadvertent actuation of the single siren. At approximately 1550 PDT the County of San Luis Obispo sent out a county wide alert stating, 'Civil Emergency in this area until (1610) PDT prepare for action'. At approximately 1600 PDT the County of San Luis Obispo sent out another county wide alert stating, 'An early warning system siren was sounded in error. There is no emergency.' Field technicians have been sent out to the siren location and will shut the siren off. The cause of the inadvertent actuation of the siren is not known at this time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the County of San Luis Obispo.
ENS 5023427 June 2014 16:21:00On June 27, 2014, at approximately 1131 hours EDT, it was determined that an individual who is licensed under Part 10 CFR Part 55 to operate a power reactor was in violation of the FENOC (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company) Fitness for Duty policy. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii) . The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5023026 June 2014 15:29:00A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to both the McGuire and Oconee plants has been restricted. The NRC Resident Inspectors at both the McGuire and Oconee sites have been notified.
ENS 5023227 June 2014 12:56:00Notified by the licensee that three tritium exit signs were improperly disposed of as trash. The signs were manufactured by SRBT with an estimated source strength of 20 Ci for each sign. The licensee noticed the missing signs following an equipment inventory taken after a renovation. The licensee determined that the three signs were mixed with general construction debris and sent to a landfill. The licensee investigation is continuing. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5022826 June 2014 12:28:00

The following information was received by facsimile from the State of Oregon: Event Description: OR Radiation Protection Services (RPS) was notified by facsimile on June 24, 2014 at 0813 (PDT), by Schnitzer Steel Industries, 12005 N. Burgard Way (Portland, Oregon) of one cesium-137 fixed gauge received in a truckload of scrap from Idaho that triggered their site entry detectors. RPS personnel investigated, found the gauge housing to be severely crushed, shutter damaged and partially open. One side of housing is split but compressed together. Identification plate still attached and mostly legible and given as follows: Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear; Model: 5197; Gauge housing serial number: B7951; Source: Cesium-137; Activity: Currently 65 mCi according to Thermo Fisher Scientific. Gauge is being stored in secured metal bin in restricted and remote area on company site. Highest exposure reading at bin surface measured at 1.48 mR/hour. Schnitzer personnel reported 60,000 microR/hour (60 mR/hour) at approximately 4 inches from split side of gauge housing surface when first discovered. Schnitzer personnel (one person) used shovel and 4 foot steel rod with hook to move gauge from truck to storage bin on June 23rd. Estimated dose to company person from reconstruction of gauge move is 1.50 mrem based on a 6/25/14 exposure measurement. No other company employees received a dose from this device and RPS personnel did not receive any appreciable dose. RPS personnel took contamination wipes of gauge housing and found no evidence of exterior contamination after analysis. The manufacturer, now Thermo Fisher Scientific, was contacted and found the gauge was originally sold to a Martell, California company, Wheelabrator Martell, Inc., on August 23, 1996. Thermo added the last contact for leak test services was December, 1999. RPS is currently investigating further to trace gauge history since 1999 as well as location in Idaho where truck originated. The gauge will not be returned to the manufacturer according to Thermo and classified as waste. A waste broker will be contacted by Schnitzer for packaging and disposal. RPS will be monitoring this process. Oregon State Incident: OR-14-0028.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DARYL LEON TO VINCE KLCO VIA EMAIL ON 6/27/14 AT 1336 EDT * * *

State of Oregon provided clarification of source activity and exposure estimate. Notified the R4DO (Allen) and FSME Resources via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 501714 June 2014 09:38:00

The following information was received by the State of Texas by email: On June 3, 2014, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) received notice that the licensee had a damaged Berthold LB300ML gauge (S/N 10004). The gauge had been hit with molten steel and damage had been done to attachment points ('ears') for a locking mechanism and carrying handle. No damage to the 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source (S/N 1374-07-11) or the gauge shutter occurred. The gauge is scheduled for repair on June 5, 2014. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9198

  • * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL ON 6/24/14 AT 0959 EDT * * *

On June 23, 2014, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) received a written report from the licensee stating the gauge shutter was not damaged during this event. The licensee stated they were able to close the shutter at the time of the event. The gauge was placed in a locked storage box. The manufacturer has completed repairs to the gauge and the gauge has been returned to service. The licensee stated no additional exposure was received by their employees or members of the general public.

"Additional information will be provided in accordance  with SA-300.

Notified R4DO (Allen) and FSME Events Resource email.

ENS 5014628 May 2014 16:39:00The following information was received from the State of Louisiana by facsimile: Event Location: The radiography crew was at the MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY REFINERY, 4663 West Airline Highway, Garyville, LA, St. John the Baptist Parish. The crew was in the refinery to do radiography weld testing. The weather for the day was stormy and raining. The crew was in the vehicle waiting out the weather when a tornado ripped the darkroom off of the company vehicle and took the camera and source with the darkroom. Event type: The lost/found gamma camera is an AMERSHAM, MODEL 880 DELTA, S/N4045 exposure device housing 39 Ci of Ir-192 AEA Technology sources, Model #A424-9, S/N # 1040C. The camera was located within the refinery boundary and appeared to be undamaged and the source remained in the shielded area. The camera was surveyed and only background radiation levels were detected. The camera was then transported to QSA Global on Langley Dr. in Baton Rouge, LA for leak tests, radioactive source and DU (Depleted Uranium) mechanical evaluation. (QSA Global) stated the device would be disassembled for the evaluation. If the results of the evaluation are negative, the equipment will be removed from service. The leak test results for radiation and DU were negative for removable contamination. Notifications: LDEQ (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality) was notified of the lost/found radiography source in a QSA Global, Amersham Delta 880 gamma camera/source holder housing a 39 Ci Ir-192 source. The source exposure device was located within the refinery boundary. After a field evaluation, the exposure device was moved to QSA Global in Baton Rouge, LA for a professional mechanical evaluation. The results of the evaluation will determine if this equipment will be returned to service or remain out of service. Event Description: On May 28, 2014, (a senior trainer and business ops manager) called LDEQ and reported that a radiography crew dispatched to the Marathon Refinery in Garyville, LA had been hit by a tornado on the jobsite. The incident was at the Marathon Refinery, 4663 West Airline Highway in Garyville, LA. The tornado ripped the darkroom off of the truck with the gamma camera in the darkroom. After the storm had passed, the crew and the Marathon RSO surveyed the area in an attempt to locate the radiography source. The source and exposure device were located, field test/inspected for damage and radioactive contamination. When the equipment was deemed safe, it was transferred to QSA Global for a professional mechanical evaluation. ALL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL APPEAR TO BE SAFE AND UNHARMED. LDEQ CONSIDERS THIS EVENT CLOSED. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5024030 June 2014 15:33:00Originally, an Ionscan 400, S/N 10586, was sent to Smith Detection for repair in October 2011. From that time until May 2014, Security Forces personnel believed that the device was still at Smith Detection awaiting repair. In May 2014, (The Air Force) was able to determine that according to Smith Detection records, following repair, the device had been returned to Lackland AFB in October 2012. Security Forces has no record of receiving the device and no notification that the device had been shipped. Thorough searches of Security Forces storage and use areas have been conducted without finding the device. One theory is that the device was sent to an old address for Security Forces. The building at that address has been searched without finding the device. Ionscan 400 contains a NI-63 source with an activity of 15 milliCi. The Ionscan 400 serial number is 10586. The sealed source and device registry number (SS&DR) associated with the Ionscan 400 is NR-0163-D-801-G. The device is used to screen passengers for hazardous material. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Region IV (Cook). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 500876 May 2014 09:26:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia: The licensee discovered a shutter stuck in the open position during a routine test of a fixed gauge on May 5, 2014. The gauge is a Ronan Engineering Model SA1, serial number M-7299. It is used as a low-level indicator in a pre-dryer vessel and contains a 26.9 milliCurie (decay corrected) cesium-137 source. The licensee indicated that using unusual force to try to close the shutter would likely damage the actuator rod mechanism. The shutter is kept in the open position during operations and does not pose an additional radiation exposure to personnel. The licensee performs radiation surveys at one foot from the gauge surface during routine tests. The maximum reported result for this gauge was 300 microR per hour. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to repair the gauge. The Agency (Virginia Radioactive Materials Program) will continue to monitor the situation until the shutter is repaired. Virginia Event: VA-2014-004
ENS 5011816 May 2014 16:15:00The following information was received from the State of Nevada by email: (A Common Carrier) misdelivered an Ir-192 source for 645 North Arlington Avenue, Suite 120, Reno, NV 89503. The address was correct, but the source was inadvertently delivered to the Main Hospital receiving at 235 West Sixth Street, Reno, NV 89503. The source bucket was then delivered to the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) - at the correct address. Once received by the RSO, the delivering employee was contacted and questioned about length of contact and it was estimated that 2 mrem of dose was received for 10 minutes of contact. The employee as well as the Director for the receiving department were contacted and told to refuse shipment of anything with a radioactive label and to call the RSO immediately. The shipper (Varian) was contacted and they filed a formal complaint with (the Common Carrier). Nevada Event: NV140011 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf