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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 537197 November 2018 17:28:00The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky by email: On 11/6/2018, a former licensee (formerly licensed as Wickliffe Paper Co.) reported discovery of a nuclear gauging device (TN (Texas Nuclear) model 5036 originally containing 200 mCi assayed 12/94) that it was unaware it possessed. The license was terminated on August 9, 2016 and at that time, the former licensee provided information related to the disposition of all devices the licensee was aware it possessed. License termination was due to plant closure. During engineering surveys to assess plant conditions for restart, personnel discovered the device still mounted on plant equipment. The former licensee is taking steps to have the device transferred to a licensed manufacturer for disposal. There is no reason to believe any individuals received any exposure at levels which would exceed the regulatory limits." Kentucky Event: KY180004 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 537165 November 2018 11:26:00The following information was received via email: When conducting the annual reconciliation, Karcher North America, INC. reported eleven lost static eliminators. Static Eliminators: Model: P-2021 8101. Isotope/units: PO-210, 10 mCi ea. Serial Numbers: A2JZ217, A2KH719, A2CP799, A2DM543, A2DT589, A2DU443, A2DU444, A2EZ668, A2GS233, A2JD061, A2JD062. Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO180027 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 537207 November 2018 15:44:00The following information was received by the State of Florida: At noon (on 11/7/18), (Akumin) called (the State of FL Bureau of Radiation Control) to report that both Akumin Hollywood and Akumin Aventura View ordered F-18 Fluciclovine, and received packages that were labeled as F-18 Fluciclovine, but were subsequently notified by their radiopharmaceutical vendor PET NET Solutions-Ft Lauderdale, on Thursday, November 1, 2018 that due to a 'batch error,' the packages actually contained F-18 FDG (Fludeoxyglucose). Three patients were reported as receiving the incorrect radiopharmaceutical. Activity reported as approximately 10 mCi. Florida Incident: FL18-137 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5370530 October 2018 16:33:00

Replacement camera sources were properly delivered by the common carrier to St. Mary's Hospital located in Jefferson City, Missouri. The sources were received by the Biomed Hospital Imaging Specialist and placed in the biomed office. Currently, the package containing the sources is missing. The licensee investigation continues. Sources are two Gd-153 (10 mCi each) and two Co-57 (0.5 microCi each).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 10/31/2018 AT 1425 EDT FROM KEN WOHLT TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

This event is being retracted. The sources were discovered to be delivered to SSM Hospital's biomed office instead of nuclear medicine. The sources were secured and in control of the SSM Hospital at all times. There were no exposures to personnel. The licensee notified NRC Region 3 (Warren). Notified R3DO (Stoedter) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5370028 October 2018 21:44:00

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. At 1435 CDT on October 28, 2018, troubleshooting of the Seismic Monitoring Panel resulting from the receipt of Control Room annunciator 47023-0603 (Seismic Monitor Panel) determined that the '(Operational Basis Earthquake) OBE Exceedance' alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel will not alarm and determined the panel is non-functional. The Seismic Monitoring Panel system functions to provide indication that the OBE threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2.1. Station personnel are monitoring the seismic recorders for event alarms on a 15 minute frequency due to alarm function failure. The station is developing repair plans for restoration of the alarm function. This event does not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5369526 October 2018 12:11:00A patient was prescribed 200 mCi of Lutetium-177. Due to dose administration issues, a delivered dose of 135 mCi was received by the patient. The licensee notified the NRC Region 3 contact (Gattone). A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 536465 October 2018 09:52:00

EN Revision Text: MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES EXCEEDED PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA At 0520 (CDT), on October 05, 2018, it was discovered that a Primary Containment local leak rate test performed on Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) exceeded its acceptance criteria.

During Mode 1, 2, and 3, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 requires MSIV leakage for a single MSIV line to be less than or equal to 106 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) when tested at 29 psig and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 requires the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths to be less than or equal to 212 scfh when tested at 29 psig.

As-found for the 'C' MSIV line leakage results were unquantifiable and gave a (minimum) path value greeter than 160 scfh. This leakage rate lead to Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits to be exceeded. This event is being reported as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the Primary Containment Isolation Valves leakage limits for MSIVs were exceeded. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 2320 EDT ON 10/24/2018 FROM THOMAS FORLAND TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 5, 2018 at 0520 CDT (EN# 53646). Subsequent evaluation concluded that overall as-found 'C' MSIV leakage rate was not at a level that exceeded the surveillance requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits and thus the Primary Containment Isolation Valve leakage rate limits for the MSIVs were not exceeded. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Drake).

ENS 536434 October 2018 07:57:00

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN LOWE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1408 EDT ON 10/19/2018 * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5362626 September 2018 23:25:00

On September 26, 2018 at 1908 CDT. an automatic scram was received on U1 following main generator 345 kV output breaker 7-8 trip with 345 kV output breaker 6-7 already opened for maintenance on line 0401. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and Group Ill isolations (expected response). Reactor pressure rose to approximately 1083 psig, and the 3B and 3C low set relief valves opened briefly to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level and reactor pressure have been restored to their normal bands. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with reactor pressure being controlled on the turbine bypass valves. The cause and details of the event are under investigation.

Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)." All control rods inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5362326 September 2018 15:10:00At 0946 CDT on 9/26/2018, a disruption in power to the offsite 138 kV line and the subsequent trip of the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) Static VAR Compensator (SVC) resulted in a degraded voltage signal on the Division 1- 4.16 kV safety bus. The degraded voltage signal resulted in a trip of the ERAT feed to the bus, blocking closure of the 345 kV Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) feed to the bus and auto start of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The Division 1 EDG successfully started and re-energized the Division 1- 4.16 kV bus as designed. The unit is stable with the Division 1 EDG carrying the Division 1- 4.16 kV bus. The Ameren Transmission System Operator in St. Louis, MO informed the station that they had received a report that a 138 kV to 13.8 kV transformer at Clinton Route 54 substation was on fire and the South feed to the Tabor substation cycled as a result of this fault. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector have been notified.
ENS 5362526 September 2018 21:43:00

On 9/26/2018 at 1530 EDT, it was discovered that the HPCI system was inoperable due to a blown fuse in the 10C617 Panel, E21-F15A. Therefore, this condition Is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The blown fuse also impacts 'A' channel Residual Heat Removal (RHR) subsystem and 'A' Core Spray (CS) subsystem. These Emergency Core Cooling subsystems have been declared inoperable. Remaining Emergency Core Cooling subsystems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain OPERABLE.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local authorities.

ENS 5361924 September 2018 14:06:00On September 22, 2018, at approximately 0050 (CDT), Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Security was contacted by a site assigned contractor that they had located what appeared to be drug paraphernalia inside the Protected Area. Local Law Enforcement was contacted and responded to DAEC. The Linn County Sheriff's office took the items into evidence for testing to determine if there was any presence of a controlled substance. On September 24, 2018, at 1013, the Linn County Sheriff's office notified DAEC that the items tested positive for the presence of a controlled substance. Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719. DAEC Site security is working with NextEra Corporate security regarding the investigation into this incident. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5366916 October 2018 10:12:00The Clorox Company discovered a missing fixed gauge containing radioactive material. The gauge was a Filtec, model FT-2 containing 100 microCuries of Americium-241. Gauge S/N: 105382; Source S/N: 1786. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5360915 September 2018 15:45:00

EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SITE CONDITIONS PREVENTING PLANT ACCESS A hazardous event has resulted in on site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles due to flooding of local roads by Tropical Storm Florence. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSCOK TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/28/2018 AT 1414 EDT * * *

On 9/18/2018 at 1400 EDT, the Unusual Event at Brunswick was terminated due to the ability to transport personnel to the site. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie), NRR EO (Miller) and the IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

ENS 5366011 October 2018 09:39:00

The following information was received by from ABB INC by facsimile: 1. This letter provides a notification of a defect associated with dry type transformer serial # 24-26458. The failure was caused by the breakdown of layer to layer insulation within the 4160 volt winding due to dielectric stress. Deterioration of the insulation resulted in an internal fault within the bravo phase 4160 volt winding, triggering a ground fault trip shutdown of equipment. This failure was reported by Exelon's Clinton Nuclear Station and it is the only known reported occurrence of safety related transformer failure caused by the breakdown of layer to layer insulation. Information is provided as specified in 10 CFR 21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4). 2. Notifying individual: Joey Chandler, Plant Manager, ABB ((PGTR) Power Grids Transformer Division, US), 171 Industry Drive, Bland, VA 24315. 3. Identification of the Subject component: ABB P/N 24-26458 dry type transformer. This transformer is used for stepping down voltage and was intended for providing power to safety related electrical equipment. 4. Nature of the deviation: The Exelon Clinton Nuclear Generating Station shut down due to a ground fault alarm on the 4160 volt side of the stepdown transformer that provides power to numerous safety-related components at the plant. Subsequent troubleshooting of the problem revealed that the dry-type transformer supplying 480 volt power had dielectrically failed due to apparent internal fault within the Bravo phase. Further investigation of this failure revealed an operational voltage design stress on the Nomex 410 insulation between the 4160 volt winding's layers of conductor of greater than recommended by the manufacturer (DuPont) for a 40 year design life. At the time of failure, the subject transformer had been in operation for approximately 33.5 years and had progressed 37 years and two months into its intended 40 year life given the 10/1980 ship date. ABB has no knowledge of any adverse operational variances over the course of the approximate 33.5 year life of operation to be able to assess or comment on this potential impact in terms of life. 5. The function of this dry type transformer is to step voltage down from 4160 volts to 480 volts while providing transfer of power to safety related components. Exelon's Clinton Nuclear Power Station has identified this transformer's power transfer to feed safety related equipment. An interruption of this transfer in power would result in a loss of power to the safety related equipment downstream and could potentially result in a compromise in safety. 6. ABB was notified of this transformer failure on 12/9/2017. This notification was delayed while the failure was being investigated. This investigation is documented in report: Exelon Clinton Failure Analysis_26458_011218 rev5.doc.pdf dated 09/10/2018. 7. Corrective actions include:

  a. Reviewed and verified current electrical engineering safety related design standard for allowable design stress on insulation per DuPont's recommendation for 40 year life. (Complete.)
  b. Reviewed the material used for transformer 24-26458. Found only affected safety related product to be isolated to Clinton Nuclear Station, though records may be incomplete as these records have been archived for over 35 years. (Complete.)
  c. Re-trained all involved personnel of the 10 CFR 21 reporting requirements, and the need to provide an interim report within 60 days of discovery. 
  d. ABB worked directly with Clinton Nuclear to ensure all transformers of respective design was replaced with new transformers following ABB's Technical Evaluation for Nuclear 1E Transformer, Rev. 18 which documents operational design stresses be less than or equal to 30 volts / mil of Nomex 410 insulation between layer to layer of conductor for 40 year life.

8. Recommendation: Because of the possible existence of additional affected transformers, ABB (PGTR) cannot determine the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any other licensee's facility. Licensees are requested to evaluate any Gould-Brown Boveri/ITE dry type transformer with the following nameplate identification below. Transformers associated with this identification are recommended to be replaced. kVA: 750AA/ 1000 FA

HV: 4160 Delta Connected
LV: 480 Wye Connected
Class: AA/ FA
Type: Vent
Frequency: 60 Hz
Temp Rise: 80 degrees C
Date of Manufacture: 10/1988 and older models

Questions concerning this notification should be directed to the Quality Manager (Rick Kinder) at the ABB transformer plant in Bland, VA at (276) 688 -3325.

ENS 535771 September 2018 10:43:00While filling up a licensee company truck at a gas station located in Ripley, West Virginia, an individual stole the company truck and its associated radiography camera (QSA 880; S/N 677846;108 Ci; Iridium-192 source). The licensee notified LLEA (West Virginia State Police) and the vehicle was recovered. The licensee inspected the properly secured equipment and observed no impact to the radiography camera. The licensee stated there was no radiological impact to the public or employees. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5354913 August 2018 12:05:00

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On August 12, 2018 at approximately 1135 (CDT)., the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) that one of its radiography crews had experienced a source disconnect. The event occurred on August 11, 2018, at approximately 1200 (CDT) at a temporary job site near Whitsett, TX. The device involved was an INC IR-100 (SN: 6792) containing a 91 curie iridium-192 source (SN: ZH0109). The crew had set up the device and performed a procedure shot and everything functioned properly. They performed the first shot of the job and the source would not retract into the device--it felt as though it had stuck on something. After a second unsuccessful attempt, the source was cranked back out into the collimator, boundaries set, and an authorized person came to the site and performed the retrieval. The drive cable and source were both new. There was no observable cause for the failure. The device and associated equipment will be sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. Per readings from all three individuals' self-reading pocket dosimeters, there were no overexposures. The source retriever's dosimetry badge is being sent for processing. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/13/18 AT 1559 EDT * * *

The following update information was received from the State of Texas via email: Clarification: The source assembly (never disconnected) from the drive cable. (The licensee was) unable to retract it back into the exposure device. Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email. Texas Incident: I-9606

ENS 535373 August 2018 14:10:00At 0940 EDT on August 3, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 535352 August 2018 16:46:00The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email: On 07/26/2018, (the) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for ExxonMobil Chemical Co. (ExMCo) reported a multi-source gauge failure to the Department (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality), LDEQ by e-mail. On 07/25/2018 during routine annual maintenance and pm (preventative maintenance) checks it was discovered the level/density gauge had several shutters stuck in the open position. Three sources would not retract into the shielded position. However, the remaining four sources are functioning properly. The gauge is a Berthold Technologies USA multi-source device, Model LB 300 IS, utilizing AEA Technologies, Model CKC.P4 sources. There are seven (nominal) 50 mCi Co-60 sources in the device. The sources involved in this malfunction are source #1 s/n 1369-08-02, source #2 s/n 1370-08-02, and source #6 s/n 1374-08-02. All three sources will not retract into the shielded position. The device has a SS&D Registration # TN-1031-D-801-S. Only one device was manufactured and is no longer being manufactured. The manufacturer is Berthold Technologies GmbH & Co. KG, D-75323 Bad Wildbad Germany. The Berthold Model LB300 IS level density gauge is installed on G-Line High Pressure Reactor Vessel, V5300 and G-Line high pressure separator production line. ExMCo engineers and Flowmaster/Berthold engineers & service company have been contacted to fix the problem by repairing the source holders or replace the device with other comparable technology. Event type: The gauge is installed on processes and does not pose a health and safety threat to the general public or the ExMCo employees. The gauge will remain on the operational process until the repair is made to the device. This is considered an equipment failure for reporting requirements. Event Location: ExxonMobil Chemical Co. Baton Rouge Plastics Plant 11675 Scotland Avenue, (Hwy 19) Baton Rouge, LA 70807, Event description: Shutters stuck in the open position or difficult to operate shutters were detected on a level/density gauge installed on processes at ExMCo. A service company has been contacted to make the repair or replace the device. The Department will be provided a final report with corrective actions. The Department was notified and the incident was reported to the NRC Operation Center. The report to the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 30.50 (b) (2) and required by LAC 33:XV.341.B.2.b. Louisiana Event: LA 180015
ENS 5352224 July 2018 00:57:00The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS (Emergency Notification System) or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2. On July 23, 2018, at approximately 1631 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Unit 2 control room experienced an unplanned loss of Steam Generator #1 steam line monitor (RU-139), channels A and B. This monitor is used to assess dose projections for Main Steam line exhaust while in Modes 1-4 and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Conditions 'RS1' and' RG1' and Emergency Action Levels (EALs) 'RS1.2' and 'RG1.2'. The PVNGS Emergency Plan does have two additional EALs that can be assessed for each Initiating Condition. The loss of this monitor constitutes a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.