Welcome to www.kanterella.com Wiki site! The goal of this site is to apply semantic elements to Nuclear information.
If you would like to discuss this site or if you have cool ideas please visit the Community page.
An Adams import was set up so that new correspondence will be imported periodically. If we can add context then we could better organize the letters into relevant groups. Ie groups around project codes.
Plants undergo inspections by the NRC. A series of pages have been uploaded representing the findings that resulted from those inspections. This is a good data set because it helps show a practical interpretation of regulation. In other words, who knows what it really means but this is how it was done wrong.
One of the bigger events for a plant is a Scram. The occurrence of which are reported to the NRC via the ENS system. By extracting that information you can get lists of data. Please see the main page Scram.
Recently Mapping has been incorporated to the wiki. Mostly its about plant locations and can show corporate owner icons. It is feasible to overlay a set of data with locations (ie you can see where ENS occurred on a Map).
First successfully integrated database is the Emergency Notification System. It is a database which holds all the short-term notifications made by nuclear power plants (10 CFR 50.72). If you visit the Emergency Notification System you can see how digitizing the ENS can lead to a variety of customized reports and notifications.
Since Yesterday: 08-06-2020
|ENS 54820||Peach Bottom||Reactor Protection System|
Primary Containment Isolation System
|This report is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an automatic actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. Because the actuation was invalid, this 60-day telephone notification is being made instead of a written LER (licensee event report), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1).
On 06/08/2020, at approximately 0424 EDT, a trip of the Unit 3 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) MG-Set resulted in a partial activation of the primary containment isolation system and inboard containment isolation valves closed in multiple systems. All affected Group III containment isolation valves were verified to be closed. It was determined that the normal power supply for the Unit 3 'A' RPS had failed. Power was transferred from the normal to the alternate source and the RPS 'A' channel was reset. Investigation determined that the 3A RPS MG Set motor contactor coil winding had failed due to an internal short circuit. The motor contactor has been replaced. The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation.The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.