Difference between revisions of "ML20137A168"

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#REDIRECT [[IR 05000263/1997002]]
 
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{{Adams
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| number = ML20137A168
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| issue date = 03/11/1997
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| title = Insp Rept 50-263/97-02 on 970109-0219.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Engineering
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| author name =
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| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
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| addressee name =
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| addressee affiliation =
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| docket = 05000263
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| license number =
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| contact person =
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| document report number = 50-263-97-02, 50-263-97-2, NUDOCS 9703200218
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| package number = ML20137A159
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| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
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| page count = 20
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}}
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See also: [[see also::IR 05000263/1997002]]
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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:- _ . _. _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . __ . _. _ _ . _ . . __ _
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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1
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REGION lli
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3
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,
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Docket No: 50-263
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License No: DPR-22
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Report No: 50-263/97002(DRP)
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!
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Licensee: Northern States Power Company
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4
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Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station
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Location: 414 Nicollet Mall
  +
Minneapolis, MN 55401
  +
Dates: January 9 - February 19,1997
  +
Inspectors: A. M. Stone, Senior Resident inspector
  +
J. Lara, Resident inspector
  +
Approved by: J. Jacobson, Chief, Projects Branch 4
  +
Division of Reactor Projects
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i
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9703200218 970311
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PDR ADOCK 05000263 ,
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!
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O PDR ~
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- . - - - - . - - -- - -- . .- . . . - - .-.-- - .
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4
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.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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'
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!.
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i Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
  +
NRC Inspection Report 50-263/97002(DRP) l
  +
.
  +
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and
  +
'
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plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
  +
Ooerations
  +
>
  +
- Operations shift management failed to ensure testing was conducted under suitable
  +
i environmental conditions. Frigid air from opened turbine building doors negatively ,
  +
l sffected plant equipment. Several opportunities to avoid the freezing event were l
  +
-
  +
overlooked. (Section 01.2)
  +
! - Operations personnel responded well to the low condenser vacuum conditions.
  +
! Good team work and communications were noted. (Section 01.2)
  +
i
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- Minimum staffing in the control room area was not maintained on one occasion for
  +
;
  +
a brief period of time. This was an isolated incident. (Section 08.4)
  +
3
  +
Maintenance
  +
!
  +
) - With one exception, maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted in a
  +
'
  +
professional manner. (Section M1.1)
  +
l
  +
' - An artificial sense of urgency to conduct a surveillance test may have resulted in
  +
several careless minor personnel errors. Use of a work order to document
  +
! surveillance activities was considered a weakness. (Section M1.2)
  +
- The material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. The operators
  +
interviewed were knowledgeable of the discrepant conditions. (Section M2.1)
  +
Enaineerino
  +
-' The control room emergency filtration treatment system test did not adequately
  +
ensure all technical specification required areas were tested and is considered an
  +
unresolved item. (Section E1.1)
  +
- A system engineer and safety assessment person identified additional areas which
  +
were not tested. This finding demonstrated a good questioning attitude.
  +
(Section E1.1)
  +
- The licensee's investigation into the cause of the apparent check valve back
  +
leakage was thorough. (Section E2.2)
  +
2
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.
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. . .=- . -- _- . - .- - -. .- . - . - . . -.
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.
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.
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l
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f
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4 s
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. A scram discharge volume surveillance test 0006 did not adequately verify
  +
i .
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compliance with technical specifications due to untimely corrective actions. Minor
  +
discrepancies in calculations were identified; however, these did not affect
  +
immediate operability. (Section E3.1)
  +
- The acceptance criteria for the mechanical reactor building to torus vacuum
  +
breakers test was not supported by a formal calculation; however, was later
  +
demonstrated as appropriate. (Section E3.2)
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l
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;
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,
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l
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I
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l
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l
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l
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-
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- - - - -- - =. - - . - . . - . - . . - _ _ - . -. . - . - - - - - _-
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4
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>.
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.
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Report Details
  +
:*
  +
Summary of Plant Statyg
  +
. The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent power for the entire inspection report
  +
: period. .
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;
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3
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1. Operations '
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]
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>
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,
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1
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j 01 Conduct of Operations
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,
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{ !
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( 01.1 General Comments (71707) !
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1
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.
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l
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: Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ,
  +
! ongoing pisnt operations. In' general, the conduct of operations was acceptable- l
  +
j specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
  +
i
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: With one exception as noted below. sperator performance during routine and
  +
surveillance activities was excellent. Operators were knowledgeable of expected
  +
j plant conditions and adhered to procedures. Discrepancies were promptly
  +
j
  +
'
  +
identified, communicated to operations management, and resolved satisfactorily. 1
  +
For example, operations personnel promptly declared the #14 emergency service !
  +
! water system inoperable when backleakage was suspected through two check l
  +
! valves during a surveillance activity. The condition was promptly reported per I
  +
'
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10 CFR 50.72.
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i
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l 01.2 Decreased Condenser Vacuum Condition Durina Surveillance Testina
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!
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{ a. Insoection Scone (71707 and 93702)
  +
l ,
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'
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! On January 7,1997, the licensee conducted a control room emergency filtration
  +
,
  +
treatment test. The test required the turbine building railroad doors to be open for
  +
j an extended period of time. This resulted in freezing in some nearby instrument
  +
j lines and led to a rapid decrease in condenser vacuum. The activities leading to this
  +
: event are discussed in Sections M1.2 and E1.1. This discussion focuses on
  +
j operations personnel performance.
  +
i
  +
; The following documents were reviewed:
  +
!
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- Test 0466-1, " Control Room Emergency Filtration Treatment System"
  +
,
  +
. Procedure C.4-F, " Rapid Power Reduction"
  +
!
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- Procedure C.4-B.5.1.2.A, " Control of Neutron Flux Oscillations"
  +
+ Procedure C.4-B.6.3.A, " Decreasing Condenser Vacuum"
  +
i + Annunciator Procedure 5-B-46, " Condenser Low Vacuum"
  +
<
  +
- Condition Report (CR) 97000068, " Lessons Learned During Performance of
  +
0466-1
  +
.!
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l
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2
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4
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.I
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4
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_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __
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-
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_ - --e-
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. - - . . . _ . _ . - - - _ _ - - .. - . ..
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j- .
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!- l
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; l
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i
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b. Observations and Findinas 1
  +
!' System engineering and operations personnel performed test 0466-1 to gather
  +
7
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l additional information on control room envelope pressures under various ventilation J
  +
; configurations. No pre-job brief was conducted since the procedure and associated 1
  +
l work orders were considered routine. The operations shift management was aware
  +
3
  +
that the test required the turbine building railroad doors to be opened; however, did
  +
4
  +
not know how long this condition would exist. About an hour into the test,
  +
; operators noticed that the motor bearing temperatures for the condensate pumps
  +
i were trending downward. The outside temperature was about 2*F and the frigid !
  +
air entering the turbine building was affecting plant equipment.
  +
I Shift management notified the superintendent of operations that the opened doors
  +
l were impacting plant equipment. The system engineer later met with the
  +
? superintendent of operations and discuased the option of temporarily stopping the ,
  +
test at a convenient point to allow operators to close the doors. However, a firm l
  +
l decision to stop the test was not made. The system engineer completed a portion l
  +
! of the test and then asked the shift manager if testing should continue. After 1
  +
'
  +
j further discussions, it was agreed to proceed since the engineer anticipated
  +
! completing the test within 45 minutes. The shift manager directed the plant
  +
!
  +
operators to perform additional tours in the turbine building to identify any freezing
  +
l concerns. The shift supervisor also toured the turbine building. j
  +
; 1
  +
I About 30 minutes later, the hydrogen water chemistry system experienced a high
  +
I oxygen concentration spike. (The licensee later determined that this was caused by
  +
a lack of offgas flow.) Minutes later the railroad doors were ordered closed. A
  +
hotwell high-high level annunciator was received; although, actual hotwell level was
  +
decreasing. Reactor power was immediately reduced. A half scram signal from
  +
low condenser vacuum was received and the shift manager immediately dispatched
  +
an operator to open the mechanical vacuum pump suction valves to help restore
  +
vacuum. The operators reset the half scram signal as the condenser vacuum
  +
appeared to improve. However, minutes later, another half scram for low
  +
condenser vacuum was received and operators immediately implemented procedure
  +
C.4-F for rapid power reduction. Power had been reduced to about 25 percent ,
  +
before the half scram signal was reset. The lowest vacuum conditions observed !
  +
during this event was about 23.1 inches mercury. The automatic scram setpoint
  +
was 23 inches mercury vacuum.
  +
!
  +
The inspectors were in the control room at the time of this event. Good
  +
communication and teamwork were noted. Shift management maintained a good
  +
overview of activities and ensured appropriate procedures were available and
  +
adhered to. Status briefings were informative.
  +
In January 1996, frigid air caused instrument lines to freeze in the intake building
  +
when a hatch to the outside was opened during maintenance activities.
  +
Engineering and operations personnel were familiar with this event but did not apply
  +
the lessons learned to the current situation. The opened turbine building railroad
  +
doors dramatically reduced the inside turbine building ambient temperature which
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5
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.
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. - . . ..- -- -. . . . . -- - - -.- . _ . . - - - - - - . _ ..__.
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7 .
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J
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a
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i*
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!
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negatively affected plant equipment. Failure to conduct surveillance test 0466-1
  +
'
  +
under suitable environmental conditions is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
  +
2 Criterion XI, " Test Control," and is considered a Violation (50-263/97002-01(DRP)).
  +
.
  +
c. Conclusions
  +
,
  +
Operations shift management failed to ensure testing was conducted under suitable
  +
j environmental conditions. Frigid air from opened turbine building doors negatively
  +
, affected plant equipment. Several opportunities to avoid the freezing event were
  +
overlooked.
  +
I Operations personnel responded well to the low condenser vacuum conditions. I
  +
Good team work and communications were noted.
  +
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
  +
l
  +
O2.1 Plant Eauioment and System Walkdowns I
  +
'
  +
In addition to routine plant inspections, the inspectors used Inspection Procedure
  +
! 71707 to walk down selected portions of the #12 emergency diesel generator, high
  +
i pressure coolant injection, and condensate and feedwater systems. No operability
  +
; concerns were identified. Minor discrepancies were discussed with operations and
  +
i engineering personnel and were resolved promptly. The inspectors had no further
  +
i concerns.
  +
*
  +
, 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700) 1
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l
  +
i
  +
I 08.1 (Closed) Violation (50-263/94009-01): Numerous Examples of Failure to Follow I
  +
l Procedures. The inspectors verified that corrective actions associated with each
  +
! example were completed. The licensee also performed a generic review of the
  +
; procedure adherence problems and contracted another organization to gain insights
  +
i on common root causes. This third party review was completed in February 1995.
  +
l Corrective actions irnplemented as a result included plant manager coaching
  +
j sessions with management and increased expectation on reporting minor errors.-
  +
{
  +
The inspectors noted that personnel performance during the 1996 refueling outage
  +
1 had improved. No significant performance issues were identified. The licensee has
  +
; made adequate progress in this area; therefore, this item is closed.
  +
! 08.2 (Closed) Insoection Follow-un item (50-263/94013-01): Minor Errors in Emergency
  +
i Operating Procedures (EOP). The licensee identified numerous typographical errors
  +
j in the emergency operating procedure flow charts after transferring the charts to a
  +
i' different drawing system. The discrepant drawings were corrected. Procedure
  +
C.5-GM-08 of the EOP Generation Manual will be revised to require character-by-
  +
;
  +
character review of major changes to EOP flow charts.
  +
08.3 (Onen) Licensee Event Report (50-263/96-013. Revision 01: Failure to Comply with
  +
, Technical Specification Requirement to Verify that the Control Room Ventilation
  +
:
  +
System Maintains A Positive Pressure with Respect to Adjacent Areas. This event
  +
1
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j 6
  +
f
  +
e
  +
  +
_
  +
.
  +
-1
  +
.
  +
.
  +
is discussed in Section E1.1 and is the subject of an unresolved item. The
  +
'
  +
condition was identified in August 1996; however, the operations committee did
  +
not conclude that the event was reportable until December 1996. The licensee
  +
conducted training to re-emphasize literal technical specification (TS) compliance. ,
  +
Failure to submit a licensee event report within 30 days constituted a licensee- l
  +
identified violation, the severity level of which will be determined subsequent to the
  +
evaluation of the significance of the event discussed in Section E1.1. Therefore,
  +
this is considered an Unresolved item (50-263/97002-02(DRP)).
  +
l
  +
08.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/97-002, Revision 01: No Licensed Senior !
  +
Operator in the Control Room / Shift Supervisor's Office. On January 16, the shift I
  +
manager inadvertently stepped outside of the control room / shift supervisor's office I
  +
area for about 10 seconds. At that time, the shift manager was fulfilling the role of
  +
the senior licensed operator; therefore, was required to stay in this controlled
  +
space. The safety significance of this event was negligible since the shift manager
  +
was within hearing distance of the common annunciator board and quickly I
  +
recognized the error. The licensee implemented additional administrative controls to l
  +
aid shift management. This error was licensee identified and swift corrective I
  +
actions were implemented. Failure to maintain staffing in accordance with TS l
  +
Table 6.1.1 constituted a violation constituted a licensee-identified violation and is l
  +
considered a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NfiQ
  +
Enforcement Policy (50-263/97002-03(DRP)).
  +
11. Maintenance
  +
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
  +
M1.1 General Comments
  +
a. Insoection Scone (62703)
  +
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work orders (WO) and
  +
surveillance activities:
  +
WO 9602520, Replace capacitor in power supply for recirculation seal
  +
instrument
  +
WO 9703255, Tune inlet pressure controllers
  +
+ WO 9703282, investigate / Repair area radiation monitor B-1 ,
  +
. WO 9703401, investigate, clean, repair valves ESW-13 and ESW-14 i
  +
Test 0006, Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram Test and l
  +
Calibration Procedure
  +
Test 0026, APRM-Recirculation Flow Instrumentation Calibration ;
  +
Test 0034, Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Permissive
  +
Sensor
  +
Test 0037, APRS - Low Pressure Core Cooling Pumps Discharge
  +
Pressure Interlock Instrument Test and Calibration
  +
7
  +
I
  +
  +
. __ _ _ . . __ ._ ._ _ __. __.- _ _ . _ _ . . _ - _ _ .. . _ ___-
  +
,-
  +
:
  +
; !
  +
. 1
  +
i Test 0051, Main Steam Line High Flow Group I isolation Instrument
  +
j'
  +
e Test 0081,
  +
Test and Calibration Procedure
  +
Peripheral Rod Scram (60 Day) Testing !
  +
'
  +
Test 0143, Drywell-Torus Monthly Vacuum Breaker Check and I
  +
[ Instrument Air System Valve Exercise
  +
; Test 0145-1, Standby Gas Treatment "A" Train Testing l
  +
' Test 0255-08-IA-1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Operability l
  +
; Testing l
  +
Test 0255-10-IA-4, Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Mechanical j
  +
Exercise
  +
Test 0255-11-lA-6, #14 Emergency Service Water (ESW) Quarterly Testing
  +
Test 0255-24-IA-1, Post Accident Sample System Excess Flow Check '
  +
' Valve Inservice Test
  +
Test 0397, Safety Relief Valve Low-Low Set Quarterly Test
  +
Test 1252, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Room Sump Pump
  +
Surveillance Procedure
  +
b. Observations and Findinas
  +
With one exception, the inspectors found the work performed under these activities
  +
to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work
  +
package present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors
  +
and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were
  +
present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation
  +
control measures were in place. The inspectors also verified that redundant
  +
equipment remained operable during the maintenance activities and that operations
  +
personnel documented entries into applicable TS limiting condition for operations.
  +
Review of work-related condition reports identified no significant trends. However,
  +
condition report 9700265 documented a quality control inspector's concem
  +
regarding the installation of concrete expansion bolts. This concern displayed a
  +
questioning attitude and identified a generic problem in understanding quality
  +
assurance requirements for bolt installation.
  +
M1.2 Personnel Errors Durina Control Room Emeroency Filtration Treatment (EFT) Testina
  +
a. Insoection Scone (61726)
  +
The inspectors reviewed the work planning and execution associated with the
  +
January 7 control room / EFT building testing. This event is also discussed in
  +
Sections 01.2 and E1.1. This discussion focuses on maintenance and surveillance
  +
aspects of the event. The following documents were reviewed or referenced:
  +
Test 0466-1, Revisions 13 and 14, " Control Room Emergency Filtration
  +
Treatment System"
  +
4 AWi-02.02.05, " Temporary Change Process"
  +
4 AWi-04.03.01, " Plant Surveillance Program"
  +
8
  +
  +
_ _ _ _. . __ _. _ . . - .. .._ .._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _.._ __ _. ___
  +
i
  +
a
  +
i
  +
i-
  +
'.
  +
; 4 awl-04.04.03, " Bypass Control" l
  +
*
  +
4 AWi-04.05.07, " Procedure implementation"
  +
'
  +
4 AWi-04.07.02, " Flagging and Submittal Processes for Operations
  +
1 Committee Review" J
  +
i 4 AWi-08.01.01, " Fire Prevention Practices" !
  +
! WO 9703205, Perform Additional d/p Monitoring during Test 0466-1
  +
l WO 9603121, Install Temporary d/p indicators
  +
4 Jumper Bypass 97-001
  +
l
  +
CR 97000068, " Lessons Learned During Performance of 0466-1"
  +
l
  +
i
  +
L b. Observations and Findinas
  +
I
  +
j As discussed in Section 01.2, on January 7, the licensee conducted a control room
  +
e emergency filtration treatment test. The test required the turbine building railroad
  +
:
  +
' doors to be opened for an extended period of time. This resulted in freezing of
  +
j some instrument lines and led to a rapid decrease in condenser vacuum.
  +
I
  +
i The inspectors interviewed several individuals and noted that an artificial urgency to
  +
i conduct the tost existed. Some operations and engineering personnel believed the
  +
'
  +
test fulfilled a regulatory requirement or was required prior to submitting a licensee 1
  +
j event report for this issue. This sense of urgency contributed to several minor 1
  +
4
  +
personnel errors including:
  +
1
  +
j - The system engineer and operations crew did not conduct a pre-job or
  +
; infrequent evolution briefing. The surveillance was considered routine,
  +
-
  +
although, a work order added steps to the surveillance.
  +
- Control room operators logged a fire watch on a high energy line break
  +
tracking form.
  +
- The system engineer failed to notify the shift supervisor when a door was
  +
momentarily blocked open. A placard on the door clearly stated this
  +
expectation.
  +
- The system engineer placed a Tygon tube under a fire door without notifying
  +
operations personnel. A continuous fire watch for this area was performed
  +
but not logged.
  +
The inspectors were also concerned with the licensee's use of a work order to
  +
document the results of the surveillance. System configuration was established
  +
using steps in test 0466-1. The test required measuring differential pressures
  +
between the administration building, turbine building, and second floor of the EFT
  +
building with respect to the control room. As discussed in Section E1.1, this
  +
surveillance test did not document differential pressures from all areas adjacent to
  +
the control room and EFT building envelope. The system engineer was in the
  +
process of revising test 0466-1; however, a decision was made, with the
  +
9
  +
.
  +
- . - - w y ,r -- -~w
  +
  +
._ _ . . .. . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _...-._._. __ _ _ _. _ _ _. ._ _
  +
'
  +
.
  +
A
  +
4
  +
!
  +
!.
  +
!
  +
' concurrence of the operations committee, to perform the test and document the
  +
'
  +
results in a work order. The system engineer provided tables in WO 9703205 to
  +
document this information. The inspectors were concerned that acceptance criteria
  +
for these new areas discussed in the WO was not clearly defined.
  +
t
  +
! For one system configuration, the second floor of the EFT building was found at a
  +
! negative pressure with respect to the outside and was documented as step 65 in
  +
,
  +
the WO. Step 66 in the surveillance test required operators to verify the pressure
  +
i readings in the previous step were positive. An asterisk on step 66 identified this i
  +
'
  +
8
  +
step as a TS requirement. The system was not declared inoperable since this
  +
i
  +
volume in question did not have an associated TS. However, acceptance criteria
  +
i should have been established using system information discussed in the updated '
  +
,
  +
safety analysis report (USAR). This practice of using a work order to document
  +
i surveillance activities was considered a weakness. !
  +
i
  +
}. c. Conclusions
  +
An artificial sense of urgency to conduct a surveillance test contributed to several
  +
,
  +
minor personnel errors. Use of a work order to document surveillance activities
  +
j was considered a weakness.
  +
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
  +
I
  +
!
  +
l M2.1 Current Material Conditions and imoact on Operations Personnel
  +
The inspectors conducted control room and plant inspections and interviewed '
  +
l
  +
operations personnel to assess the material condition of plant equipment. During
  +
this period, the following conditions were found:
  +
- Service water leak in RCIC system room cooler. Water sprayed onto the
  +
RCIC condensate and vacuum pumps and caused various grounds to occur.
  +
Operations personnel declared RCIC inoperable. The licensee repaired the
  +
leaking room cooler coil and performed maintenance on the affected pumps.
  +
The RCIC system was subsequently declared operable.
  +
- Anoarent unreviewed safety auestion concernina the desian basis for the
  +
RHR system. This issue was the subject of an apparent violation as
  +
discussed in inspection Report (50-263-96009). The licensee determined
  +
that the RHR system was operable.
  +
- Thirteen containment oinina penetrations were suscentible to over
  +
oressurization. This condition was identified during the licensee's review of
  +
Generic Letter 96-06, " Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment
  +
Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions." Engineering analysis for
  +
three penetrations showed tha ASME Code allowables would be exceeded
  +
for piping during the proposed accident conditions. However, using Generic
  +
Letter 91-18, the licensee determined the associated systems remained
  +
operable. This condition was reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72. Long
  +
10
  +
  +
. . - . . - ~ . .. .
  +
. -. - . . - . . -
  +
-.- - - - ..
  +
.
  +
'
  +
i
  +
i
  +
,
  +
'
  +
term corrective actions included installing permanent pressure relieving
  +
-
  +
devices and implementing administrative controls to drain lines during normal
  +
operation or for maintenance purposes. The inspectors verified the
  +
; operators were aware of this issue and that the administrative controls were
  +
{ implemented.
  +
4
  +
; c. Conclusions
  +
The material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. The operators
  +
; interviewed were knowledgeable of the discrepant conditions.
  +
;
  +
] M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700)
  +
i
  +
5
  +
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/94016. Revision 01: False High Reactor
  +
Pressure During Testing Causes A Partial Containment isolation. This event was
  +
i the subject of a Non-Cited Violation discussed in Section 3.1.5 of Inspection
  +
l Report 50-263/94011. Procedure 0255-20-ID-1 was revised to require operators
  +
'
  +
to verify that shutdown cooling valves were closed.
  +
t
  +
M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/94017. Revision 01: High Pressure Coolant
  +
i injection isolates on High Steam Flow During Test at Lower Than Norma! .'ressure.
  +
; This event was the subject of a Non-Cited Violation discussed in Section 3.1.5 of
  +
i inspection Report 50-263/94011. The licensee revised procedure 0255-06-IA-1 as
  +
l stated in the LER.
  +
i
  +
! M8.3 (Closed) Unresolved item (50 263/96012-01): Test caused freezing conditions in
  +
! the turbine building. This event is the subject of a violation discussed in
  +
i Section 01.2.
  +
!
  +
T
  +
111. Engineerina
  +
.E1 Conduct of Engine,ering
  +
E1.1 Adeauacy of Control Room and Envelone Pressure Testina
  +
; a. Insoection Scone (37551 and 61726)
  +
i
  +
l The inspectors reviewed the requirements to perform pressure testing of the control
  +
d room and EFT building. The following documents were reviewed:
  +
i
  +
:
  +
-
  +
TS 4.17.B.2.b(3)
  +
- USAR Sections 12.3.1.6 and 6.7.2
  +
'
  +
- Test 0466-1, Rev.13, " Control Room Emergency Filtration Treatment
  +
System," completed August 15,1996
  +
' - Test 0466-1, Rev.14, " Control Room Emergency Filtration Treatment
  +
System /' completed August 22,1996
  +
I
  +
i 11
  +
4
  +
i
  +
. . - _.
  +
  +
. .- - - . - - - . - . - - - -. -
  +
*
  +
l .
  +
i.
  +
'
  +
.
  +
Safety Evaluation Report dated May 30,1989, with respect to Amendment
  +
No.65
  +
i -
  +
CR 97000110, "CRV-EFT System Did Not Pressure EFT Building to the
  +
j Outside with "A" CRV and "B" EFT Running"
  +
i -
  +
CR 96001855, " Pressure Differential between Control Room and Adjacent
  +
l Spaces"
  +
:.
  +
3 b. Observations and Findinas
  +
TS Comoliance: Technical specification 4.17.B.2.b.(3) required a positive pressure
  +
; be maintained in the control room with respect to adjacent areas. This TS became
  +
j_ effective on May 30,1989. At that time, the licensee fulfilled this requirement by
  +
j comparing control room to the turbine and administrative buildings pressures. On
  +
;_ August 8,1996, a system engineer identified that portions of the heating and
  +
j ventilation room, reactor building, and cable spreading room were also adjacent to
  +
; the control room but had not been previously tested. On August 15 and 22,
  +
! additional testing was completed which verified compliance with this TS. On
  +
January 7,1997, safety assessment personnel identified that the floor of the
  +
; recirculation motor-generator set room was also adjacent to the top six inches of
  +
: the control room ceiling. Testing later proved TS compliance. Therefore, it
  +
j appeared that TS compliance was not demonstrated until January 7,1997.
  +
!
  +
l USAR Comoliance: The licensee identified a discrepancy between the requirements
  +
l of the TS surveillance and the USAR description. Technical specification
  +
i 4.17.B.2.b.(3) required a positive pressure be maintained in the control room with
  +
j respect to adjacent areas while USAR Section 12.3.1.6 stated that the control
  +
i room and emeroency filtration treatment buildina were maintained at a positive
  +
l pressure. It appears that preoperational testing in 1989 verified positive pressure
  +
d
  +
with respect to five locations adjacent to the control room and EFT building. On
  +
January 7,1997, to satisfy the USAR condition, the licensee verified this design
  +
1 feature for the seven areas determined to be adjacent to the EFT building. All areas
  +
, were found acceptable except one. The licensee found that with the "A" CRV and
  +
i "B" EFT operating, the second floor of the EFT building could not maintain a
  +
i positive pressure with respect to the outside. Instrument and control personnel
  +
; verified the pressure instrumentation was within calibration. No problems were
  +
l identified during an inspection of the outside EFT building wall. This wall was a
  +
l_ solid, one and one-half foot thick, reinforced concrete wall with no penetrations.
  +
'
  +
The licensee concluded the EFT system was operable since no pathways existed for
  +
; in-leakage through the wall; infiltration was not feasible. In addition, the licensee
  +
j questioned the test configuration and the validity of the negative reading. On
  +
'
  +
February 14, the test was repeated using a static pressure sensor secured to the
  +
i roof of the building. The inspectors observed this test and noted that the volume
  +
; pressure was slightly positive. Therefore, it appears that USAR compliance was
  +
not verified until February 14,1997.
  +
!
  +
l
  +
!
  +
i 12
  +
i
  +
i
  +
  +
.- ..- - - _ - . . - . . -
  +
.
  +
.
  +
c. Conclusions
  +
,
  +
it appears that the licensee did not adequately ensure compliance with TS
  +
requirements or USAR design description since 1989 until the successful
  +
completion of all testing in February 1997. This is considered an Unresolved
  +
item (50-263/97002-04(DRP)) pending further NRC evaluation.
  +
A system engineer and safety assessment person identified additional areas which
  +
were not tested. This finding demonstrated a good questioning attitude.
  +
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
  +
E2.1 Results of USAR Review
  +
While parforming the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed
  +
the applicable portions of the USAR that related to the areas inspected. The
  +
following discrepancies were identified:
  +
- USAR Section 10.3.6.3.2 stated that in case of an internal flooding event
  +
affecting RHR and CS corner rooms, two sump pumps powered from
  +
independent essential motor control centers were installed. The inspectors
  +
identified that the two sump pumps were powered from the same motor
  +
control center. A review of the original USAR section and electrical prints
  +
showed that the current USAR statement was incorrect. This is an
  +
Inspection Follow-up Item (50-263/97002-05) pending an USAR change.
  +
- Surveillance test for reactor building to torus vacuum breakers were
  +
acceptable but did not correlate to USAR 5.2.2.5.4.
  +
E2.2 Investiaation of Annarant Emeroency Service Water Check Valve Failures
  +
a. Insoection Scone (37551 and 61726)
  +
On January 27, during a routine emergency service water operability test, check
  +
valves ESW-13 and -14 were declared inoperable when back leakage was
  +
suspected. The inspectors reviewed test 0255-11-lll-4, "#14 ESW pump and valve
  +
operability test" and observed subsequent troubleshooting and testing.
  +
b. Observations and Findinas
  +
Check valves ESW-13 and -14 were located in the service water (SW) to
  +
emergency service water (ESW) crosstie piping and prevented ESW flow from being
  +
diverted into the SW piping. An upstream manual valve, SW-10, was closed and a
  +
drain line opened in accordance with test 0255-11-111-4 to verify the check valves'
  +
integrity. Operators observed water flowing from this drain line which indicated the
  +
check valves were not shut as expected. Operators placed a " danger" card on the
  +
SW-10 valve to maintain it in the closed position. With this valve closed, the #14
  +
ESW system remained operable.
  +
13
  +
  +
- . . - - - - - . . . . - - . - . - - . - - - . . - - . _ - - . - . . . - - . - . - . . . . - - - -
  +
i . I
  +
b' j
  +
.
  +
i.
  +
i l
  +
The system engineer developed a testing plan to determine whether the water
  +
-
  +
observed was backflow through the check valves or caused by leakage past the
  +
SW-10 valve. The operators re-performed the surveillance test and observed no
  +
water through the drain line. The system engineer created testing guidance to
  +
change the system configuration; however, no leakage was observed durir.;, i%
  +
subsequent test. No discrepancies were noted during the check valves internals
  +
inspection. After another test, the check valves were declared operable.
  +
The licensee concluded that the SW 10 valve was not fully closed during the
  +
original test. No flow was observed on subsequent testing because the operator
  +
moved the handwheel in the closed direction when placing the " danger" card on it.
  +
The licensee believed this action stopped the leakage past the SW-10 valve seat.
  +
!
  +
c. Conclusions .
  +
The licensee's investigation into the cause of the apparent check valve back l
  +
leakage was thorough. 1
  +
E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation
  +
E3.1 Technical Review of Scram Discharae Volume Surveillance Test 0006
  +
a. Insoection Scone (61726 and 37551)
  +
The inspectors reviewed the documents listed below to verify the technical
  +
adequacy of a scram discharge volume test. This review also verified TS and USAR ;
  +
compliance.
  +
The following documents were reviewed:
  +
- TS 3.1.A, Table 3.1.1, Table 3.2.3, Bases 3.1, and Bases 3.2
  +
- USAR Sections 3.5.3.2.2.4, 3.5.3.3.3.5, 7.6.1.2.9.g, 7.6.1.2.6, and
  +
7.6.1.4
  +
- Operations Manual B.1.3-01
  +
- Test 0006, Revision 15, " Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Hi Level Scram
  +
Test"
  +
- Calculation CA 88-018, "SDV Limit Switch Setting and Free Volume
  +
Calculation
  +
- Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&lD), M-119
  +
b. Observations and Findinas
  +
The purpose of surveillance test 0006 was to verify the initiation of a scram or rod
  +
block from increasing SDV water level. The surveillance setpoints were defined in
  +
calculation CA 88-018. The inspectors verified that the as-found and as-left
  +
acceptance criteria was consistent with TS 3.1,3.2 and their respective TS bases. ,
  +
However, the following discrepancies were identif; d:
  +
14
  +
. _ . _
  +
-.
  +
.. - - .
  +
  +
_ _ . _. _. . . _ _ _ . - _. . _ . _ _. __ _ . _ _ . ._ _ _ . - _ _ . _ _
  +
. .
  +
.
  +
J
  +
i. *
  +
! - Step 60 of the test indicated that 33.25 inches in the west SDV tank
  +
;- corresponded to 26 gallons of water. The inspectors calculated that this
  +
tank level was about 27.9 gallons. This discrepancy was minor as the value
  +
corresponded to an alarm setpoint.
  +
; - Calculation 88-018 and P&lD M-119 indicated that 61 control rod drives
  +
discharged into the west SDV; however, Operations Manual B.1.3-01
  +
,
  +
reported only 60.
  +
4
  +
The system engineer concurred with the inspectors' findings. However, during
  +
'
  +
further review, the system engineer determined that another calculation, CA-93-
  +
l 079, was performed in October 1993 when the licensee determined that the lower l
  +
?
  +
portion of the SDV was modeled incorrectly in CA-88-018. This discrepancy was
  +
;'
  +
documented in nonconformance report (NCR) 93-268. CA-93-079 showed that the
  +
; level switches could be set 0.32 to 0.35 gallons nonconservatively. This resulted
  +
i- in incorrect as found and as-left setpoints defined in the surveillance. The system
  +
i engineer reviewed test results since 1992 and found no instances where the actual
  +
values were outside of TS allowables.
  +
<
  +
l The inspectors had the following concerns:
  +
j - The documentation accompanying CA 93-079 clearly stated that the
  +
j surveillance procedure needed revision; however, NCR 93-268 documented
  +
no corrective ac'. ions were required. The NCR was closed in
  +
December 1993. )
  +
- The inspectors identif ed that CA 93-079 assumed an incorrect length for a ,
  +
i section of the west SUV. This error, however, had a conservative outcome. l
  +
4
  +
; - CA 93-079 was not defined in the surveillance procedure as a design
  +
! reference.
  +
4
  +
The licensee initiated CR 97000423 to document the concerns and associated
  +
corrective actions.
  +
The licensee identified the modeling discrepancy in 1993; however, did not revise
  +
the test procedure in a timely manner. Although no actual values were found
  +
outside of TS allowables, the procedure would not prevent incorrect settings.
  +
Failure to take timely corrective actions is a Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,
  +
Criterion XVI (50-263/97002-06).
  +
c. Conclusions
  +
Surveillance test 0006 did not adequately verify compliance with technical
  +
specifications due to untimely corrective actions. Minor discrepancies in
  +
calculations were identified; however, these did not affect immediate operability.
  +
15
  +
  +
._ _ _ _._. _ _ ._._ _.___ _ __. - _ _ _ _ . _____ _ _ ~ .._ _ __ _ ______ _ _ _ ___ _ _
  +
-
  +
-
  +
,
  +
'
  +
.
  +
1*
  +
4
  +
c
  +
.
  +
E3.2 Technical Review of Test 0255-10-IA-4. Reactor Buildina to Torus Vacuum Breaker .
  +
'.f Mechanical Exerqing
  +
:
  +
; a. Insoection Scone (37551 and 61726)
  +
The inspectors reviewed test 0255-10-IA-4, " Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum
  +
.
  +
Breaker Mechanical Exercise," to verify various operational and design features
  +
such as compliance with TS 3/4.7.A.3 and USAR Section 5.2.
  +
j b. Observations and Findinas
  +
1
  +
i. USAR Section 5.2.2.5.4 described the suppression chamber vacuum relief system
  +
! as consisting of two vacuum breaker valves in series in each of two lines. One of
  +
! each valve pair was an air-operated valve controlled from a differential pressure
  +
! switch signal. The second valve in each line was a self-activating swing check
  +
l valve designed to begin opening at a negative pressure differential of 0.25 psi and
  +
4 full open with a negative pressure differential of 0.5 psi. The acceptance criteria in
  +
test 0255-10-IA-4 specified the breakaway torque be less than 325 in-Ibs and the
  +
! maximum torque for the full open position be less than 650 in-lbs. An additional
  +
step required that the measured breakaway torque and maximum opening torques
  +
j be less than 1963.2 in-Ibs in order to meet ASME Section XI requirements.
  +
!
  +
j The inspectors questioned the system engineer as to the basis for the acceptance
  +
!
  +
criteria and the correlation to the pressure differenticia discussed in the USAR.
  +
] Based on the discussions, it appeared no formal engineering calculation to correlate
  +
j the measured torque values to the USAR values existed. It shousd be noted that
  +
j the TS requirements did not specifically identify surveillance requirements for the
  +
j swing check valves and only identified the requirements for the pressure switch
  +
controlled vacuum breaker. The licensee initiated CR 97000306 to document the
  +
{ lack of a formal calculation for the test acceptance criteria for DWV-8-1 and
  +
i
  +
3
  +
DWV-8-2. The inspectors observed that the measured torque values were well
  +
! below the 325 and 650 in-Ib limits. Preliminary calculations performed by the
  +
{
  +
licensee indicated that the measured torque values were acceptable to meet the
  +
design and operating requirements for the vacuum breakers.
  +
} c. Conclusions
  +
!
  +
:
  +
The acceptance criteria for the mechanical reactor building to torus vacuum
  +
i breakers test was not supported by a formal calculation; however, was later
  +
i demonstrated as appropriate.
  +
l E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues 92700)
  +
i
  +
i E8.1 (Onen) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/94004. Revision 01: Electrical Storm
  +
;
  +
Disables Plant Equipment on Two Occasions. The licensee committed to modify a
  +
4 pressure transmitter, PT-7495A and a radiation monitor, RM-17-453B to make
  +
1 these instruments less sensitive to electrical storms. Two surge suppressors were
  +
j installed on PT-7495A and B in 1995. However, no changes were made to RM-17-
  +
t
  +
I 16
  +
4
  +
4
  +
  +
_ _ _ _ . _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
  +
,
  +
f
  +
i ..
  +
l
  +
!
  +
'
  +
i
  +
: 4538. This LER remains open pending modification to the radiation monitor or
  +
. licensee justification that a change was not needed.
  +
4'
  +
!, IV. Plant Suonort
  +
4 ,
  +
4 R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controis (71750)
  +
i
  +
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the
  +
areas of radiological protection and chemistry controls using Inspection Procedure 71750.
  +
No discrepancies were noted.
  +
P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Activities (71750)
  +
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the
  +
area of emergency preparedness using inspection Procedure 71750. Notifications to the
  +
NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 were made in a timely manner. No discrepancies were
  +
noted.
  +
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP
  +
P4.1 Events Related to Recent Railway Shloments
  +
During this period, the licensee reported via 10 CFR 50.72 two incidents involving
  +
railway shipments. The first incident occurred on January 22 when a signpost
  +
overhanging from a bridge ripped into the top of a shipment box containing the old I
  +
I
  +
high-pressure turbine rotor. The rotor had been wrapped in plastic which was not
  +
damaged during this event. Radiation protection personnel dispatched to the
  +
incident confirmed no spread of contamination. The second incident occurred on
  +
January 26 when a trainmaster noticed that the doors of a C-van were open. The
  +
doors had been damaged during a train car connecting process. The C-van
  +
contained about 40,000 pounds of contaminated stainless steel turbine diaphragms. j
  +
The packages containing the diaphragms were not damaged and there was no i
  +
spread of cc,atamination. The licensee dispatched personnel to the scene and
  +
received additional support from a nearby nuclear utility. Regional inspectors
  +
reviewed both events and had no concerns with licensee performance.
  +
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750) ;
  +
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the
  +
areas of security and safeguards activities using inspection Procedure 71750. No
  +
discrepancies were noted.
  +
17
  +
.
  +
  +
-. . .
  +
. . . . - ~ - _ . - . . . - -_. . - - - . -
  +
o .
  +
l
  +
,
  +
'.
  +
; F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance
  +
F4.1 lanition of Foreian Material Durina Weldina Activities
  +
,
  +
j
  +
i '
  +
! On January 16, a small fire started when a cotton glove was ignited by sparks I
  +
during welding activities in the radwaste building. The continuous fire watch
  +
;
  +
extinguished the fire with a portable fire extinguisher and plant fire brigade
  +
response was not required. The cotton glove had been wedged in between air
  +
ducts and was, therefore, not readily visible prior to welding. No equipment )
  +
damage occurred in the immediate and surrounding areas of this small fire. The '
  +
3 licensee planned to discuss this event in future training classes,
  +
j
  +
V. Management Meetinas
  +
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
  +
.
  +
On February 19,1997, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of
  +
licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
  +
1
  +
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
  +
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
  +
:
  +
4
  +
+
  +
l
  +
4
  +
l
  +
I
  +
i j
  +
-
  +
I
  +
i
  +
4
  +
18
  +
l
  +
  +
- - - . - ~ . - - . . - - _ . - . .- - - - . - . . . - . - - . - - . _ . . . - - -
  +
*
  +
:
  +
.
  +
'
  +
*
  +
1
  +
.
  +
'
  +
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
  +
: .
  +
i
  +
3
  +
Licensee
  +
i
  +
3
  +
M. Wadley, Vice President Nuclear
  +
: W. Hill, Plant Manager
  +
} M. Hammer, General Superintendent Maintenance
  +
{ K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection
  +
i L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment
  +
j M. Onnen, General Superintendent Operations
  +
i E. Reilly, Superintendent Plant Scheduling
  +
l C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering
  +
;
  +
'
  +
W. Shamla, Manager Quality Services
  +
J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection
  +
i
  +
'L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security
  +
B. Day, Training Manager
  +
.
  +
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
  +
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering j
  +
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing l
  +
Problems !
  +
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
  +
IP 62703: Maintenance Observations
  +
IP 71707: Plant Operations
  +
IP 71750: Plant Support i
  +
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
  +
'
  +
Facilities
  +
IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
  +
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
  +
Ooened
  +
50-263/97002-01 VIO Inadequate test control - environmental conditions
  +
50 263/97002-02 URI Failure to Submit a LER within 30 Days
  +
50-263/97002-03 NCV Failure to Maintain Staffing in Accordance with TS
  +
50 263/97002-04 URI Adequacy of CR/ EFT ventilation testing
  +
50-263/97002-05 IFl RHR room sump pump USAR statement discrepancy
  +
50 263/97002-06 VIO Failure to Take Timely Corrective Actions
  +
19
  +
.
  +
  +
- . . . _ - - - . - - . . - - - - - - -
  +
,
  +
.
  +
,
  +
Closed
  +
4
  +
!
  +
50-263/94009-01 VIO Numerous Examples of Failure to Follow Procedures -
  +
50-263/94013-01- IFl Minor Errors in Emergency Operating Procedures
  +
50-263/94016-00 LER False High Reactor Pressure During Testing Causes A Partial
  +
Containment isolation
  +
50-263/94017-00 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection isolates on High Steam Flow
  +
During Test at Lower Than Normal Pressure
  +
50-263/96012-01 URI Test Caused Freezing Conditions in the Turbine Building
  +
50-263/97002-00 LER No Licensed Senior Operator in the Control Room / Shift
  +
Supervisor's Office
  +
1
  +
i
  +
Discussed
  +
!
  +
50-263/94004-00 LER Electrical Storm Disables Plant Equipment on Two Occasions
  +
50-263/96013-00 LER Failure to Comply With Tech Spec Requirement to Verify That
  +
the Control Room Ventilation System Maintains a Positive
  +
Pressure with Respect to Adjacent Areas i
  +
l
  +
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
  +
ASME American Society of Mcchanical Engineers
  +
AWI Administrative Work Instruction
  +
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
  +
CR Condition Report
  +
CRV Control Room Ventilation
  +
EFT Emergency Filtration Treatment
  +
EOP Emergency Operating Procedures
  +
EP Emergency Preparedness <
  +
ESW Emergency Service Water
  +
IFl Inspection Followup item
  +
LER Licensee Event Report
  +
NCR Nonconformance Report i
  +
NCV Non-Cited Violation i
  +
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  +
P&lD Piping and instrument Diagram
  +
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
  +
RHR Residual Heat Removal
  +
SDV Scram Discharge Volume
  +
SW Service Water
  +
TS Technical Specification
  +
URI Unresolved item
  +
USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report
  +
VIO Violation
  +
WO Work Order
  +
20
  +
_ _
  +
}}

Latest revision as of 02:10, 1 July 2020

Insp Rept 50-263/97-02 on 970109-0219.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Engineering
ML20137A168
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/11/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137A159 List:
References
Download: ML20137A168 (20)


See also: IR 05000263/1997002

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION lli

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Docket No: 50-263

License No: DPR-22

Report No: 50-263/97002(DRP)

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Licensee: Northern States Power Company

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Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Location: 414 Nicollet Mall

Minneapolis, MN 55401

Dates: January 9 - February 19,1997

Inspectors: A. M. Stone, Senior Resident inspector

J. Lara, Resident inspector

Approved by: J. Jacobson, Chief, Projects Branch 4

Division of Reactor Projects

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9703200218 970311

PDR ADOCK 05000263 ,

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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i Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

NRC Inspection Report 50-263/97002(DRP) l

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This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and

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plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.

Ooerations

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- Operations shift management failed to ensure testing was conducted under suitable

i environmental conditions. Frigid air from opened turbine building doors negatively ,

l sffected plant equipment. Several opportunities to avoid the freezing event were l

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overlooked. (Section 01.2)

! - Operations personnel responded well to the low condenser vacuum conditions.

! Good team work and communications were noted. (Section 01.2)

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- Minimum staffing in the control room area was not maintained on one occasion for

a brief period of time. This was an isolated incident. (Section 08.4)

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Maintenance

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) - With one exception, maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted in a

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professional manner. (Section M1.1)

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' - An artificial sense of urgency to conduct a surveillance test may have resulted in

several careless minor personnel errors. Use of a work order to document

! surveillance activities was considered a weakness. (Section M1.2)

- The material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. The operators

interviewed were knowledgeable of the discrepant conditions. (Section M2.1)

Enaineerino

-' The control room emergency filtration treatment system test did not adequately

ensure all technical specification required areas were tested and is considered an

unresolved item. (Section E1.1)

- A system engineer and safety assessment person identified additional areas which

were not tested. This finding demonstrated a good questioning attitude.

(Section E1.1)

- The licensee's investigation into the cause of the apparent check valve back

leakage was thorough. (Section E2.2)

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. A scram discharge volume surveillance test 0006 did not adequately verify

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compliance with technical specifications due to untimely corrective actions. Minor

discrepancies in calculations were identified; however, these did not affect

immediate operability. (Section E3.1)

- The acceptance criteria for the mechanical reactor building to torus vacuum

breakers test was not supported by a formal calculation; however, was later

demonstrated as appropriate. (Section E3.2)

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Report Details

Summary of Plant Statyg

. The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent power for the entire inspection report

period. .

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1. Operations '

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j 01 Conduct of Operations

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( 01.1 General Comments (71707) !

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Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ,

! ongoing pisnt operations. In' general, the conduct of operations was acceptable- l

j specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.

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With one exception as noted below. sperator performance during routine and

surveillance activities was excellent. Operators were knowledgeable of expected

j plant conditions and adhered to procedures. Discrepancies were promptly

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identified, communicated to operations management, and resolved satisfactorily. 1

For example, operations personnel promptly declared the #14 emergency service !

! water system inoperable when backleakage was suspected through two check l

! valves during a surveillance activity. The condition was promptly reported per I

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10 CFR 50.72.

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l 01.2 Decreased Condenser Vacuum Condition Durina Surveillance Testina

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{ a. Insoection Scone (71707 and 93702)

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! On January 7,1997, the licensee conducted a control room emergency filtration

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treatment test. The test required the turbine building railroad doors to be open for

j an extended period of time. This resulted in freezing in some nearby instrument

j lines and led to a rapid decrease in condenser vacuum. The activities leading to this

event are discussed in Sections M1.2 and E1.1. This discussion focuses on

j operations personnel performance.

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The following documents were reviewed

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- Test 0466-1, " Control Room Emergency Filtration Treatment System"

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. Procedure C.4-F, " Rapid Power Reduction"

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- Procedure C.4-B.5.1.2.A, " Control of Neutron Flux Oscillations"

+ Procedure C.4-B.6.3.A, " Decreasing Condenser Vacuum"

i + Annunciator Procedure 5-B-46, " Condenser Low Vacuum"

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- Condition Report (CR) 97000068, " Lessons Learned During Performance of

0466-1

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b. Observations and Findinas 1

!' System engineering and operations personnel performed test 0466-1 to gather

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l additional information on control room envelope pressures under various ventilation J

configurations. No pre-job brief was conducted since the procedure and associated 1

l work orders were considered routine. The operations shift management was aware

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that the test required the turbine building railroad doors to be opened; however, did

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not know how long this condition would exist. About an hour into the test,

operators noticed that the motor bearing temperatures for the condensate pumps

i were trending downward. The outside temperature was about 2*F and the frigid !

air entering the turbine building was affecting plant equipment.

I Shift management notified the superintendent of operations that the opened doors

l were impacting plant equipment. The system engineer later met with the

? superintendent of operations and discuased the option of temporarily stopping the ,

test at a convenient point to allow operators to close the doors. However, a firm l

l decision to stop the test was not made. The system engineer completed a portion l

! of the test and then asked the shift manager if testing should continue. After 1

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j further discussions, it was agreed to proceed since the engineer anticipated

! completing the test within 45 minutes. The shift manager directed the plant

!

operators to perform additional tours in the turbine building to identify any freezing

l concerns. The shift supervisor also toured the turbine building. j

1

I About 30 minutes later, the hydrogen water chemistry system experienced a high

I oxygen concentration spike. (The licensee later determined that this was caused by

a lack of offgas flow.) Minutes later the railroad doors were ordered closed. A

hotwell high-high level annunciator was received; although, actual hotwell level was

decreasing. Reactor power was immediately reduced. A half scram signal from

low condenser vacuum was received and the shift manager immediately dispatched

an operator to open the mechanical vacuum pump suction valves to help restore

vacuum. The operators reset the half scram signal as the condenser vacuum

appeared to improve. However, minutes later, another half scram for low

condenser vacuum was received and operators immediately implemented procedure

C.4-F for rapid power reduction. Power had been reduced to about 25 percent ,

before the half scram signal was reset. The lowest vacuum conditions observed !

during this event was about 23.1 inches mercury. The automatic scram setpoint

was 23 inches mercury vacuum.

!

The inspectors were in the control room at the time of this event. Good

communication and teamwork were noted. Shift management maintained a good

overview of activities and ensured appropriate procedures were available and

adhered to. Status briefings were informative.

In January 1996, frigid air caused instrument lines to freeze in the intake building

when a hatch to the outside was opened during maintenance activities.

Engineering and operations personnel were familiar with this event but did not apply

the lessons learned to the current situation. The opened turbine building railroad

doors dramatically reduced the inside turbine building ambient temperature which

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negatively affected plant equipment. Failure to conduct surveillance test 0466-1

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under suitable environmental conditions is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

2 Criterion XI, " Test Control," and is considered a Violation (50-263/97002-01(DRP)).

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c. Conclusions

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Operations shift management failed to ensure testing was conducted under suitable

j environmental conditions. Frigid air from opened turbine building doors negatively

, affected plant equipment. Several opportunities to avoid the freezing event were

overlooked.

I Operations personnel responded well to the low condenser vacuum conditions. I

Good team work and communications were noted.

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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O2.1 Plant Eauioment and System Walkdowns I

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In addition to routine plant inspections, the inspectors used Inspection Procedure

! 71707 to walk down selected portions of the #12 emergency diesel generator, high

i pressure coolant injection, and condensate and feedwater systems. No operability

concerns were identified. Minor discrepancies were discussed with operations and

i engineering personnel and were resolved promptly. The inspectors had no further

i concerns.

, 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700) 1

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I 08.1 (Closed) Violation (50-263/94009-01): Numerous Examples of Failure to Follow I

l Procedures. The inspectors verified that corrective actions associated with each

! example were completed. The licensee also performed a generic review of the

procedure adherence problems and contracted another organization to gain insights

i on common root causes. This third party review was completed in February 1995.

l Corrective actions irnplemented as a result included plant manager coaching

j sessions with management and increased expectation on reporting minor errors.-

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The inspectors noted that personnel performance during the 1996 refueling outage

1 had improved. No significant performance issues were identified. The licensee has

made adequate progress in this area; therefore, this item is closed.

! 08.2 (Closed) Insoection Follow-un item (50-263/94013-01): Minor Errors in Emergency

i Operating Procedures (EOP). The licensee identified numerous typographical errors

j in the emergency operating procedure flow charts after transferring the charts to a

i' different drawing system. The discrepant drawings were corrected. Procedure

C.5-GM-08 of the EOP Generation Manual will be revised to require character-by-

character review of major changes to EOP flow charts.

08.3 (Onen) Licensee Event Report (50-263/96-013. Revision 01: Failure to Comply with

, Technical Specification Requirement to Verify that the Control Room Ventilation

System Maintains A Positive Pressure with Respect to Adjacent Areas. This event

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is discussed in Section E1.1 and is the subject of an unresolved item. The

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condition was identified in August 1996; however, the operations committee did

not conclude that the event was reportable until December 1996. The licensee

conducted training to re-emphasize literal technical specification (TS) compliance. ,

Failure to submit a licensee event report within 30 days constituted a licensee- l

identified violation, the severity level of which will be determined subsequent to the

evaluation of the significance of the event discussed in Section E1.1. Therefore,

this is considered an Unresolved item (50-263/97002-02(DRP)).

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08.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/97-002, Revision 01: No Licensed Senior !

Operator in the Control Room / Shift Supervisor's Office. On January 16, the shift I

manager inadvertently stepped outside of the control room / shift supervisor's office I

area for about 10 seconds. At that time, the shift manager was fulfilling the role of

the senior licensed operator; therefore, was required to stay in this controlled

space. The safety significance of this event was negligible since the shift manager

was within hearing distance of the common annunciator board and quickly I

recognized the error. The licensee implemented additional administrative controls to l

aid shift management. This error was licensee identified and swift corrective I

actions were implemented. Failure to maintain staffing in accordance with TS l

Table 6.1.1 constituted a violation constituted a licensee-identified violation and is l

considered a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vil of the NfiQ

Enforcement Policy (50-263/97002-03(DRP)).

11. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a. Insoection Scone (62703)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work orders (WO) and

surveillance activities:

WO 9602520, Replace capacitor in power supply for recirculation seal

instrument

WO 9703255, Tune inlet pressure controllers

+ WO 9703282, investigate / Repair area radiation monitor B-1 ,

. WO 9703401, investigate, clean, repair valves ESW-13 and ESW-14 i

Test 0006, Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram Test and l

Calibration Procedure

Test 0026, APRM-Recirculation Flow Instrumentation Calibration ;

Test 0034, Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Permissive

Sensor

Test 0037, APRS - Low Pressure Core Cooling Pumps Discharge

Pressure Interlock Instrument Test and Calibration

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i Test 0051, Main Steam Line High Flow Group I isolation Instrument

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e Test 0081,

Test and Calibration Procedure

Peripheral Rod Scram (60 Day) Testing !

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Test 0143, Drywell-Torus Monthly Vacuum Breaker Check and I

[ Instrument Air System Valve Exercise

Test 0145-1, Standby Gas Treatment "A" Train Testing l

' Test 0255-08-IA-1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Operability l

Testing l

Test 0255-10-IA-4, Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Mechanical j

Exercise

Test 0255-11-lA-6, #14 Emergency Service Water (ESW) Quarterly Testing

Test 0255-24-IA-1, Post Accident Sample System Excess Flow Check '

' Valve Inservice Test

Test 0397, Safety Relief Valve Low-Low Set Quarterly Test

Test 1252, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Room Sump Pump

Surveillance Procedure

b. Observations and Findinas

With one exception, the inspectors found the work performed under these activities

to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work

package present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors

and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were

present whenever required by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation

control measures were in place. The inspectors also verified that redundant

equipment remained operable during the maintenance activities and that operations

personnel documented entries into applicable TS limiting condition for operations.

Review of work-related condition reports identified no significant trends. However,

condition report 9700265 documented a quality control inspector's concem

regarding the installation of concrete expansion bolts. This concern displayed a

questioning attitude and identified a generic problem in understanding quality

assurance requirements for bolt installation.

M1.2 Personnel Errors Durina Control Room Emeroency Filtration Treatment (EFT) Testina

a. Insoection Scone (61726)

The inspectors reviewed the work planning and execution associated with the

January 7 control room / EFT building testing. This event is also discussed in

Sections 01.2 and E1.1. This discussion focuses on maintenance and surveillance

aspects of the event. The following documents were reviewed or referenced:

Test 0466-1, Revisions 13 and 14, " Control Room Emergency Filtration

Treatment System"

4 AWi-02.02.05, " Temporary Change Process"

4 AWi-04.03.01, " Plant Surveillance Program"

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4 awl-04.04.03, " Bypass Control" l

4 AWi-04.05.07, " Procedure implementation"

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4 AWi-04.07.02, " Flagging and Submittal Processes for Operations

1 Committee Review" J

i 4 AWi-08.01.01, " Fire Prevention Practices" !

! WO 9703205, Perform Additional d/p Monitoring during Test 0466-1

l WO 9603121, Install Temporary d/p indicators

4 Jumper Bypass97-001

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CR 97000068, " Lessons Learned During Performance of 0466-1"

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L b. Observations and Findinas

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j As discussed in Section 01.2, on January 7, the licensee conducted a control room

e emergency filtration treatment test. The test required the turbine building railroad

' doors to be opened for an extended period of time. This resulted in freezing of

j some instrument lines and led to a rapid decrease in condenser vacuum.

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i The inspectors interviewed several individuals and noted that an artificial urgency to

i conduct the tost existed. Some operations and engineering personnel believed the

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test fulfilled a regulatory requirement or was required prior to submitting a licensee 1

j event report for this issue. This sense of urgency contributed to several minor 1

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personnel errors including:

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j - The system engineer and operations crew did not conduct a pre-job or

infrequent evolution briefing. The surveillance was considered routine,

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although, a work order added steps to the surveillance.

- Control room operators logged a fire watch on a high energy line break

tracking form.

- The system engineer failed to notify the shift supervisor when a door was

momentarily blocked open. A placard on the door clearly stated this

expectation.

- The system engineer placed a Tygon tube under a fire door without notifying

operations personnel. A continuous fire watch for this area was performed

but not logged.

The inspectors were also concerned with the licensee's use of a work order to

document the results of the surveillance. System configuration was established

using steps in test 0466-1. The test required measuring differential pressures

between the administration building, turbine building, and second floor of the EFT

building with respect to the control room. As discussed in Section E1.1, this

surveillance test did not document differential pressures from all areas adjacent to

the control room and EFT building envelope. The system engineer was in the

process of revising test 0466-1; however, a decision was made, with the

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' concurrence of the operations committee, to perform the test and document the

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results in a work order. The system engineer provided tables in WO 9703205 to

document this information. The inspectors were concerned that acceptance criteria

for these new areas discussed in the WO was not clearly defined.

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! For one system configuration, the second floor of the EFT building was found at a

! negative pressure with respect to the outside and was documented as step 65 in

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the WO. Step 66 in the surveillance test required operators to verify the pressure

i readings in the previous step were positive. An asterisk on step 66 identified this i

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step as a TS requirement. The system was not declared inoperable since this

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volume in question did not have an associated TS. However, acceptance criteria

i should have been established using system information discussed in the updated '

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safety analysis report (USAR). This practice of using a work order to document

i surveillance activities was considered a weakness. !

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}. c. Conclusions

An artificial sense of urgency to conduct a surveillance test contributed to several

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minor personnel errors. Use of a work order to document surveillance activities

j was considered a weakness.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

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l M2.1 Current Material Conditions and imoact on Operations Personnel

The inspectors conducted control room and plant inspections and interviewed '

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operations personnel to assess the material condition of plant equipment. During

this period, the following conditions were found:

- Service water leak in RCIC system room cooler. Water sprayed onto the

RCIC condensate and vacuum pumps and caused various grounds to occur.

Operations personnel declared RCIC inoperable. The licensee repaired the

leaking room cooler coil and performed maintenance on the affected pumps.

The RCIC system was subsequently declared operable.

- Anoarent unreviewed safety auestion concernina the desian basis for the

RHR system. This issue was the subject of an apparent violation as

discussed in inspection Report (50-263-96009). The licensee determined

that the RHR system was operable.

- Thirteen containment oinina penetrations were suscentible to over

oressurization. This condition was identified during the licensee's review of

Generic Letter 96-06, " Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment

Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions." Engineering analysis for

three penetrations showed tha ASME Code allowables would be exceeded

for piping during the proposed accident conditions. However, using Generic

Letter 91-18, the licensee determined the associated systems remained

operable. This condition was reported as required by 10 CFR 50.72. Long

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term corrective actions included installing permanent pressure relieving

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devices and implementing administrative controls to drain lines during normal

operation or for maintenance purposes. The inspectors verified the

operators were aware of this issue and that the administrative controls were

{ implemented.

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c. Conclusions

The material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. The operators

interviewed were knowledgeable of the discrepant conditions.

] M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700)

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M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/94016. Revision 01: False High Reactor

Pressure During Testing Causes A Partial Containment isolation. This event was

i the subject of a Non-Cited Violation discussed in Section 3.1.5 of Inspection

l Report 50-263/94011. Procedure 0255-20-ID-1 was revised to require operators

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to verify that shutdown cooling valves were closed.

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M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/94017. Revision 01: High Pressure Coolant

i injection isolates on High Steam Flow During Test at Lower Than Norma! .'ressure.

This event was the subject of a Non-Cited Violation discussed in Section 3.1.5 of

i inspection Report 50-263/94011. The licensee revised procedure 0255-06-IA-1 as

l stated in the LER.

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! M8.3 (Closed) Unresolved item (50 263/96012-01): Test caused freezing conditions in

! the turbine building. This event is the subject of a violation discussed in

i Section 01.2.

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111. Engineerina

.E1 Conduct of Engine,ering

E1.1 Adeauacy of Control Room and Envelone Pressure Testina

a. Insoection Scone (37551 and 61726)

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l The inspectors reviewed the requirements to perform pressure testing of the control

d room and EFT building. The following documents were reviewed:

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TS 4.17.B.2.b(3)

- USAR Sections 12.3.1.6 and 6.7.2

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- Test 0466-1, Rev.13, " Control Room Emergency Filtration Treatment

System," completed August 15,1996

' - Test 0466-1, Rev.14, " Control Room Emergency Filtration Treatment

System /' completed August 22,1996

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Safety Evaluation Report dated May 30,1989, with respect to Amendment

No.65

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CR 97000110, "CRV-EFT System Did Not Pressure EFT Building to the

j Outside with "A" CRV and "B" EFT Running"

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CR 96001855, " Pressure Differential between Control Room and Adjacent

l Spaces"

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3 b. Observations and Findinas

TS Comoliance: Technical specification 4.17.B.2.b.(3) required a positive pressure

be maintained in the control room with respect to adjacent areas. This TS became

j_ effective on May 30,1989. At that time, the licensee fulfilled this requirement by

j comparing control room to the turbine and administrative buildings pressures. On

_ August 8,1996, a system engineer identified that portions of the heating and

j ventilation room, reactor building, and cable spreading room were also adjacent to

the control room but had not been previously tested. On August 15 and 22,

! additional testing was completed which verified compliance with this TS. On

January 7,1997, safety assessment personnel identified that the floor of the

recirculation motor-generator set room was also adjacent to the top six inches of
the control room ceiling. Testing later proved TS compliance. Therefore, it

j appeared that TS compliance was not demonstrated until January 7,1997.

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l USAR Comoliance: The licensee identified a discrepancy between the requirements

l of the TS surveillance and the USAR description. Technical specification

i 4.17.B.2.b.(3) required a positive pressure be maintained in the control room with

j respect to adjacent areas while USAR Section 12.3.1.6 stated that the control

i room and emeroency filtration treatment buildina were maintained at a positive

l pressure. It appears that preoperational testing in 1989 verified positive pressure

d

with respect to five locations adjacent to the control room and EFT building. On

January 7,1997, to satisfy the USAR condition, the licensee verified this design

1 feature for the seven areas determined to be adjacent to the EFT building. All areas

, were found acceptable except one. The licensee found that with the "A" CRV and

i "B" EFT operating, the second floor of the EFT building could not maintain a

i positive pressure with respect to the outside. Instrument and control personnel

verified the pressure instrumentation was within calibration. No problems were

l identified during an inspection of the outside EFT building wall. This wall was a

l_ solid, one and one-half foot thick, reinforced concrete wall with no penetrations.

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The licensee concluded the EFT system was operable since no pathways existed for

in-leakage through the wall; infiltration was not feasible. In addition, the licensee

j questioned the test configuration and the validity of the negative reading. On

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February 14, the test was repeated using a static pressure sensor secured to the

i roof of the building. The inspectors observed this test and noted that the volume

pressure was slightly positive. Therefore, it appears that USAR compliance was

not verified until February 14,1997.

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c. Conclusions

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it appears that the licensee did not adequately ensure compliance with TS

requirements or USAR design description since 1989 until the successful

completion of all testing in February 1997. This is considered an Unresolved

item (50-263/97002-04(DRP)) pending further NRC evaluation.

A system engineer and safety assessment person identified additional areas which

were not tested. This finding demonstrated a good questioning attitude.

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.1 Results of USAR Review

While parforming the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed

the applicable portions of the USAR that related to the areas inspected. The

following discrepancies were identified:

- USAR Section 10.3.6.3.2 stated that in case of an internal flooding event

affecting RHR and CS corner rooms, two sump pumps powered from

independent essential motor control centers were installed. The inspectors

identified that the two sump pumps were powered from the same motor

control center. A review of the original USAR section and electrical prints

showed that the current USAR statement was incorrect. This is an

Inspection Follow-up Item (50-263/97002-05) pending an USAR change.

- Surveillance test for reactor building to torus vacuum breakers were

acceptable but did not correlate to USAR 5.2.2.5.4.

E2.2 Investiaation of Annarant Emeroency Service Water Check Valve Failures

a. Insoection Scone (37551 and 61726)

On January 27, during a routine emergency service water operability test, check

valves ESW-13 and -14 were declared inoperable when back leakage was

suspected. The inspectors reviewed test 0255-11-lll-4, "#14 ESW pump and valve

operability test" and observed subsequent troubleshooting and testing.

b. Observations and Findinas

Check valves ESW-13 and -14 were located in the service water (SW) to

emergency service water (ESW) crosstie piping and prevented ESW flow from being

diverted into the SW piping. An upstream manual valve, SW-10, was closed and a

drain line opened in accordance with test 0255-11-111-4 to verify the check valves'

integrity. Operators observed water flowing from this drain line which indicated the

check valves were not shut as expected. Operators placed a " danger" card on the

SW-10 valve to maintain it in the closed position. With this valve closed, the #14

ESW system remained operable.

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The system engineer developed a testing plan to determine whether the water

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observed was backflow through the check valves or caused by leakage past the

SW-10 valve. The operators re-performed the surveillance test and observed no

water through the drain line. The system engineer created testing guidance to

change the system configuration; however, no leakage was observed durir.;, i%

subsequent test. No discrepancies were noted during the check valves internals

inspection. After another test, the check valves were declared operable.

The licensee concluded that the SW 10 valve was not fully closed during the

original test. No flow was observed on subsequent testing because the operator

moved the handwheel in the closed direction when placing the " danger" card on it.

The licensee believed this action stopped the leakage past the SW-10 valve seat.

!

c. Conclusions .

The licensee's investigation into the cause of the apparent check valve back l

leakage was thorough. 1

E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation

E3.1 Technical Review of Scram Discharae Volume Surveillance Test 0006

a. Insoection Scone (61726 and 37551)

The inspectors reviewed the documents listed below to verify the technical

adequacy of a scram discharge volume test. This review also verified TS and USAR ;

compliance.

The following documents were reviewed:

- TS 3.1.A, Table 3.1.1, Table 3.2.3, Bases 3.1, and Bases 3.2

- USAR Sections 3.5.3.2.2.4, 3.5.3.3.3.5, 7.6.1.2.9.g, 7.6.1.2.6, and

7.6.1.4

- Operations Manual B.1.3-01

- Test 0006, Revision 15, " Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Hi Level Scram

Test"

- Calculation CA 88-018, "SDV Limit Switch Setting and Free Volume

Calculation

- Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&lD), M-119

b. Observations and Findinas

The purpose of surveillance test 0006 was to verify the initiation of a scram or rod

block from increasing SDV water level. The surveillance setpoints were defined in

calculation CA 88-018. The inspectors verified that the as-found and as-left

acceptance criteria was consistent with TS 3.1,3.2 and their respective TS bases. ,

However, the following discrepancies were identif; d:

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! - Step 60 of the test indicated that 33.25 inches in the west SDV tank

- corresponded to 26 gallons of water. The inspectors calculated that this

tank level was about 27.9 gallons. This discrepancy was minor as the value

corresponded to an alarm setpoint.

- Calculation 88-018 and P&lD M-119 indicated that 61 control rod drives

discharged into the west SDV; however, Operations Manual B.1.3-01

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reported only 60.

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The system engineer concurred with the inspectors' findings. However, during

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further review, the system engineer determined that another calculation, CA-93-

l 079, was performed in October 1993 when the licensee determined that the lower l

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portion of the SDV was modeled incorrectly in CA-88-018. This discrepancy was

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documented in nonconformance report (NCR)93-268. CA-93-079 showed that the

level switches could be set 0.32 to 0.35 gallons nonconservatively. This resulted

i- in incorrect as found and as-left setpoints defined in the surveillance. The system

i engineer reviewed test results since 1992 and found no instances where the actual

values were outside of TS allowables.

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l The inspectors had the following concerns:

j - The documentation accompanying CA 93-079 clearly stated that the

j surveillance procedure needed revision; however, NCR 93-268 documented

no corrective ac'. ions were required. The NCR was closed in

December 1993. )

- The inspectors identif ed that CA 93-079 assumed an incorrect length for a ,

i section of the west SUV. This error, however, had a conservative outcome. l

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- CA 93-079 was not defined in the surveillance procedure as a design

! reference.

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The licensee initiated CR 97000423 to document the concerns and associated

corrective actions.

The licensee identified the modeling discrepancy in 1993; however, did not revise

the test procedure in a timely manner. Although no actual values were found

outside of TS allowables, the procedure would not prevent incorrect settings.

Failure to take timely corrective actions is a Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,

Criterion XVI (50-263/97002-06).

c. Conclusions

Surveillance test 0006 did not adequately verify compliance with technical

specifications due to untimely corrective actions. Minor discrepancies in

calculations were identified; however, these did not affect immediate operability.

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E3.2 Technical Review of Test 0255-10-IA-4. Reactor Buildina to Torus Vacuum Breaker .

'.f Mechanical Exerqing

a. Insoection Scone (37551 and 61726)

The inspectors reviewed test 0255-10-IA-4, " Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum

.

Breaker Mechanical Exercise," to verify various operational and design features

such as compliance with TS 3/4.7.A.3 and USAR Section 5.2.

j b. Observations and Findinas

1

i. USAR Section 5.2.2.5.4 described the suppression chamber vacuum relief system

! as consisting of two vacuum breaker valves in series in each of two lines. One of

! each valve pair was an air-operated valve controlled from a differential pressure

! switch signal. The second valve in each line was a self-activating swing check

l valve designed to begin opening at a negative pressure differential of 0.25 psi and

4 full open with a negative pressure differential of 0.5 psi. The acceptance criteria in

test 0255-10-IA-4 specified the breakaway torque be less than 325 in-Ibs and the

! maximum torque for the full open position be less than 650 in-lbs. An additional

step required that the measured breakaway torque and maximum opening torques

j be less than 1963.2 in-Ibs in order to meet ASME Section XI requirements.

!

j The inspectors questioned the system engineer as to the basis for the acceptance

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criteria and the correlation to the pressure differenticia discussed in the USAR.

] Based on the discussions, it appeared no formal engineering calculation to correlate

j the measured torque values to the USAR values existed. It shousd be noted that

j the TS requirements did not specifically identify surveillance requirements for the

j swing check valves and only identified the requirements for the pressure switch

controlled vacuum breaker. The licensee initiated CR 97000306 to document the

{ lack of a formal calculation for the test acceptance criteria for DWV-8-1 and

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DWV-8-2. The inspectors observed that the measured torque values were well

! below the 325 and 650 in-Ib limits. Preliminary calculations performed by the

{

licensee indicated that the measured torque values were acceptable to meet the

design and operating requirements for the vacuum breakers.

} c. Conclusions

!

The acceptance criteria for the mechanical reactor building to torus vacuum

i breakers test was not supported by a formal calculation; however, was later

i demonstrated as appropriate.

l E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues 92700)

i

i E8.1 (Onen) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/94004. Revision 01: Electrical Storm

Disables Plant Equipment on Two Occasions. The licensee committed to modify a

4 pressure transmitter, PT-7495A and a radiation monitor, RM-17-453B to make

1 these instruments less sensitive to electrical storms. Two surge suppressors were

j installed on PT-7495A and B in 1995. However, no changes were made to RM-17-

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4538. This LER remains open pending modification to the radiation monitor or

. licensee justification that a change was not needed.

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!, IV. Plant Suonort

4 ,

4 R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controis (71750)

i

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the

areas of radiological protection and chemistry controls using Inspection Procedure 71750.

No discrepancies were noted.

P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Activities (71750)

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the

area of emergency preparedness using inspection Procedure 71750. Notifications to the

NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 were made in a timely manner. No discrepancies were

noted.

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP

P4.1 Events Related to Recent Railway Shloments

During this period, the licensee reported via 10 CFR 50.72 two incidents involving

railway shipments. The first incident occurred on January 22 when a signpost

overhanging from a bridge ripped into the top of a shipment box containing the old I

I

high-pressure turbine rotor. The rotor had been wrapped in plastic which was not

damaged during this event. Radiation protection personnel dispatched to the

incident confirmed no spread of contamination. The second incident occurred on

January 26 when a trainmaster noticed that the doors of a C-van were open. The

doors had been damaged during a train car connecting process. The C-van

contained about 40,000 pounds of contaminated stainless steel turbine diaphragms. j

The packages containing the diaphragms were not damaged and there was no i

spread of cc,atamination. The licensee dispatched personnel to the scene and

received additional support from a nearby nuclear utility. Regional inspectors

reviewed both events and had no concerns with licensee performance.

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750) ;

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the

areas of security and safeguards activities using inspection Procedure 71750. No

discrepancies were noted.

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F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance

F4.1 lanition of Foreian Material Durina Weldina Activities

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! On January 16, a small fire started when a cotton glove was ignited by sparks I

during welding activities in the radwaste building. The continuous fire watch

extinguished the fire with a portable fire extinguisher and plant fire brigade

response was not required. The cotton glove had been wedged in between air

ducts and was, therefore, not readily visible prior to welding. No equipment )

damage occurred in the immediate and surrounding areas of this small fire. The '

3 licensee planned to discuss this event in future training classes,

j

V. Management Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

.

On February 19,1997, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of

licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

1

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection

should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee

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M. Wadley, Vice President Nuclear

W. Hill, Plant Manager

} M. Hammer, General Superintendent Maintenance

{ K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection

i L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment

j M. Onnen, General Superintendent Operations

i E. Reilly, Superintendent Plant Scheduling

l C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering

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W. Shamla, Manager Quality Services

J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection

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'L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security

B. Day, Training Manager

.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering j

IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing l

Problems !

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62703: Maintenance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support i

IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

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Facilities

IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Ooened

50-263/97002-01 VIO Inadequate test control - environmental conditions

50 263/97002-02 URI Failure to Submit a LER within 30 Days

50-263/97002-03 NCV Failure to Maintain Staffing in Accordance with TS

50 263/97002-04 URI Adequacy of CR/ EFT ventilation testing

50-263/97002-05 IFl RHR room sump pump USAR statement discrepancy

50 263/97002-06 VIO Failure to Take Timely Corrective Actions

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50-263/94009-01 VIO Numerous Examples of Failure to Follow Procedures -

50-263/94013-01- IFl Minor Errors in Emergency Operating Procedures

50-263/94016-00 LER False High Reactor Pressure During Testing Causes A Partial

Containment isolation

50-263/94017-00 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection isolates on High Steam Flow

During Test at Lower Than Normal Pressure

50-263/96012-01 URI Test Caused Freezing Conditions in the Turbine Building

50-263/97002-00 LER No Licensed Senior Operator in the Control Room / Shift

Supervisor's Office

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Discussed

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50-263/94004-00 LER Electrical Storm Disables Plant Equipment on Two Occasions

50-263/96013-00 LER Failure to Comply With Tech Spec Requirement to Verify That

the Control Room Ventilation System Maintains a Positive

Pressure with Respect to Adjacent Areas i

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ASME American Society of Mcchanical Engineers

AWI Administrative Work Instruction

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR Condition Report

CRV Control Room Ventilation

EFT Emergency Filtration Treatment

EOP Emergency Operating Procedures

EP Emergency Preparedness <

ESW Emergency Service Water

IFl Inspection Followup item

LER Licensee Event Report

NCR Nonconformance Report i

NCV Non-Cited Violation i

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

P&lD Piping and instrument Diagram

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RHR Residual Heat Removal

SDV Scram Discharge Volume

SW Service Water

TS Technical Specification

URI Unresolved item

USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

VIO Violation

WO Work Order 20

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