Difference between revisions of "ML20133F626"
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|From:||Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S|
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
|Download: ML20133F626 (6)|
See also: IR 05000389/1985017
I . p2 [rtg UNITED STATES * o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [[\ - g p j REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W. *i 'e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 %...../ Report Nos.: 50-335/85-17 and 50-389/85-17 Licensee: Florida Power and. Light Company .3250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name: St. Lucie l'and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 11 - July 8, 1985 Inspection at St. cie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors: ^ _ h , kr Crle1Uhk,~5enior Res13ent Inspector 9-77 1r5 R. ~V.' Date signed _+ - Soc 9-l7- TS H.~E. Bibb,7 esident Inspettor Date Signed Approved by: m I S. A. Elrod, Section Chier ~ k., 7-l 7 P5 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This inspection involved 171 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of Technical Specification (TS) compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance (QA) practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities. Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified (Paragraph 8). .
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, REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees *K. Harris, St. Lucie Site Vice President *D. A. Sager, Plant Manager J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent T. A. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent *L. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor *C. F. Leppla, Instrument and Control (I&C) Supervisor P. L. Fincher, Training Supervisor *C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting) 'E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor (Acting) H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics (HP) Supervisor J. G. West, Security Supervisor J. Barrow, Fire Preventien Coordinator J. Scarola, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Electrical C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Mecha!! cal *N. G. Roos, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel. * Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview ' The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 9,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. 3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed - Unit 2) Violation 50-389/85-10-01 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter L-85-253 dated July 1, 1985, and confirmed that proper and adequate measures had been. taken to prevent a similar occurrence in future operations. 4. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection. .
2 5. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2) The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, that equipment was properly tagged, that operations personnel were aware of plant conditions and that plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established; critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures; excess equipment or material was stored properly; and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts. The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ECCS systems. , Valve, breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly l verified both locally and in the control room. During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the diesel generators and component cooling water systems to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. 6. Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2) The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in ' accordance with approved licensee procedures. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. 1 7. Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2) l During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
. * . 3 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. 8. Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and comporents were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements. The following items were considered during this review; limiting conditions for operations were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional testing and/or calibra- tions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and * radiological controls were implemented as required. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment. On June 26, 1985, operations personnel started to perform Operating , ' Procedure (0P)-2-0400053, Engineered Safeguards Relay Test, a sub group relay test required semi-annually by Table 4.3-2 of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Upon initiation of the test for Group 1 Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Group 2 Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), several electrical loads which operations personnel did not anticipate losing were stripped from the emergency bus. Notable of these were the following: a. 2A control element assembly (CEA) drive motor generator set. b. Non-essential loads on 480 Vac motor control centers 2AS, 2A6 and 2A8. c. 2A main feedwater regulating valve shifted into manual. d. Letdown stop valve closed. e. Reactor regulating system number 1. f. Automatic data system display. , g. Boron dilution system, h. Safety assessment system. i. Digital safety injection tank undication. J. Component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps 2A1 and 2B2. k. Reactor auxiliary building fan HVE-10A. Immediate operator action taken was to recover the loss of level in the 2A steam generator caused by the feed regulating valve closing as a result of the controller going into manual, with the controller demand set for minimum. A reactor trip on low steam generator level was narrowly averted. Subsequent review of control wiring diagrams 1011 and 401 indicated that a recent plant modification performed in 1984 per plant change / modification (PC/M)-015-283 could account for the unexpected load losses. This PC/M was performed in response to NRC Regulatory Guides 1.63 and 1.75, and it added redundant overcurrent devices to electrical distribution systems. Completion of the PC/M did not reflect in the engineered safeguards procedure that certain relays could no longer be tested at power without major plant perturbations. This is a violation of QA instructions which
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4 require that activities affecting safety-related systems shall be documented .in instructions, procedures and drawings (Violation 50-389/85-17-01). 9. Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2) The following licensee event reports (LER) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that TS were being met and that the public health and safety were of upmost consideration. The following LERs are considered closed: Unit 1: 335/85-06 Unit 2: 389/85-06* *In-Depth Review Performed On May 16, 1985, I&C personnel were troubleshooting a problem with subgroup 11 Control Element Assemblies (CEAs). With subgroup 11 on the maintenance bus, I&C personnel proceeded to remove one of the subgroup 11 driver circuit cards located in the subgroup logic cabinet. A subgroup 12 driver card was pulled by mistake. When a test card was inserted in place of the removed card, the upper gripper coils for shutdown CEAs 52 and 54 were deenergized. At 1:24 p.m., both CEAs dropped to full insertion. This caused local alarm lights to energize. The I&C personnel immediately realized what happened, replaced the subgroup 12 driver card and promptly informed the control room operators of the situation. The operators had commenced the immediate actions of OP 2-0110030, CEA Off-normal Operation and Realignment. Turbine power was reduced to match reactor power and plant parameters were stabilized at approximately 90 percent power. Upon learning the case of the dropped CEAs, the control room operators immediately commenced CEA recovery. Withdrawal of CEAs 52 and 54 began at 1:25 p.m. and at 1:50 p.m., both CEAs were realigned within shutdown group A. Power remained at 90 percent until 2:40 p.m. when reactor engineering released the core for normal full power operations. The unit returned to full power at 5:30 p.m. On May 27, 1985, at approximately 12:25 a.m., an inadvertent actuation of the 18 containment spray pump occurred. The unit was at full power during the entire event. A routine surveillance of cycling the containment spray flow control valves was being conducted. The train A flow control valve test was completed and preparations were being made to cycle the train B flow control valve. However, prior to cycling the flow control valve, the associated containment spray pump breaker control switch must be switched from " auto" to "stop". It was during this step that the switch was rotated in the wrong direction (" Auto" to " Start"), thus causing the IB containment spray pump to start. Having realized the error, the reactor controls . -n.-_. w, . . . _ - - _ . .
. . * . . 5 operator (RCO) immediately rotated the switch to stop. The total run time of the pump was 0.9 seconds as read from the sequence of events recorder. Because of the short time interval involved, no appreciable system pressure change was observed. Furthermore, the corresponding spray header flow control valve was fully shut. Because of these two factors, no spray header ' low actually occurred. With the pump secured, the RC0 checked the containment spray header pressures. Trains A and B header pressures were equal and normal. Shift personnel concluded that the pump run time was too brief to increase the header pressure and that it was safe to continue with the surveillance. The surveillance was completed and the system returned to normal. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. 10. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2) 'The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting
interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza- tion of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions. The inspector also verified that access control and badging was proper and that procedures were being followed. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. 11. Surveillance Observations During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that selected TS surveillance requirements were being accomplished as required. Typical of > . these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and ac and dc electrical sources. The inspectors verified that:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instru- mentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management 4 personnel. Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. . m- - --,s--