Difference between revisions of "ML20133F626"

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Insp Repts 50-335/85-17 & 50-389/85-17 on 850611-0708. Violation Noted:Unit 2 Plant Mods to Prevent Testing of Relays Not Implemented,Resulting in Plant Transient
ML20133F626
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/17/1985
From: Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133F573 List:
References
Download: ML20133F626 (6)


See also: IR 05000389/1985017

Text

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             p2 [rtg                                   UNITED STATES
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                      o                      NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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                                                          REGION 11
                                                  101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
        *i            'e                           ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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           Report Nos.:      50-335/85-17 and 50-389/85-17
           Licensee:     Florida Power and. Light Company
                        .3250 West Flagler Street
                         Miami, FL 33102
           Docket Nos.:      50-335 and 50-389                      License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16
           Facility Name:        St. Lucie l'and 2
           Inspection Conducted: June 11 - July 8, 1985
           Inspection at St.         cie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida
           Inspectors:
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                                  Crle1Uhk,~5enior Res13ent Inspector
                                                                                        9-77 1r5
                         R. ~V.'                                                        Date signed
                                         _+ -           Soc                             9-l7- TS
                         H.~E. Bibb,7 esident Inspettor                                 Date Signed
          Approved by:                        m I
                           S. A. Elrod, Section Chier ~
                                                         k.,                           7-l 7 P5
                                                                                        Date Signed
                           Division of Reactor Projects
                                                         SUMMARY
          Scope:     This inspection involved 171 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of
          Technical Specification (TS) compliance, operator performance, overall plant
          operations, quality assurance (QA) practices, station and corporate management
          practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security
          procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities.
          Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified (Paragraph 8).
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                                       REPORT DETAILS
      1.  Persons Contacted
          Licensee Employees
         *K. Harris, St. Lucie Site Vice President
         *D. A. Sager, Plant Manager
          J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
          T. A. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent
         *L. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor
          R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
         *C. F. Leppla, Instrument and Control (I&C) Supervisor
          P. L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
         *C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)
         'E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor (Acting)
          H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics (HP) Supervisor
          J. G. West, Security Supervisor
          J. Barrow, Fire Preventien Coordinator
          J. Scarola, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Electrical
          C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Mecha!! cal
         *N. G. Roos, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
          Other licensee employees contacted included technicians,          operators,
          mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
         * Attended exit interview
      2.  Exit Interview
  '
          The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 9,1985, with
          those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The licensee did not identify       as
          proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors
          during this inspection.
      3.  Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
          (Closed - Unit 2) Violation 50-389/85-10-01
          The inspector reviewed the licensee's response letter L-85-253 dated July 1,
          1985, and confirmed that proper and adequate measures had been. taken to
          prevent a similar occurrence in future operations.
      4.  Unresolved Items
          Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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  5.    Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
        The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection
        interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, that
        equipment was properly tagged, that operations personnel were aware of plant
        conditions and that plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.            The
        inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly
        established; critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with
        procedures; excess equipment or material was stored properly; and
        combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During
        tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks,
        piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve
        and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component
        positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration
        dates.   Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
        The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ECCS systems.         ,
        Valve, breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly        l
        verified both locally and in the control room.       During the inspection
        period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas
        of the diesel generators and component cooling water systems to verify that
        the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability
        and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory.
        Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
   6.   Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
        The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift
        logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces and
        records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs
        and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and
        equipment tagout records.      The inspectors routinely observed operator
        alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator
        performance and response actions were observed and evaluated.            The
        inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting
        interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable
        level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in
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        accordance with approved licensee procedures.
        Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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   7.   Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)                            l
        During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with
        selected limiting conditions for operations (LCO) and results of selected
        surveillance tests.      These verifications were accomplished by direct
        observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions
        and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with
        selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they
        happened.

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             Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
         8.  Maintenance Observation
              Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and
              comporents were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
              accordance with requirements. The following items were considered during
              this review; limiting conditions for operations were met; activities were
              accomplished using approved procedures; functional testing and/or calibra-
              tions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service;
              quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
              qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and
  *
              radiological controls were implemented as required.      Work requests were
              reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that
              priority is assigned to safety-related equipment.
              On June 26, 1985, operations personnel started to perform Operating            ,
            ' Procedure (0P)-2-0400053, Engineered Safeguards Relay Test, a sub group
              relay test required semi-annually by Table 4.3-2 of the Unit 2 Technical
              Specifications.    Upon initiation of the test for Group 1 Safety Injection
              Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Group 2 Containment Isolation Actuation Signal
              (CIAS), several electrical loads which operations personnel did not
              anticipate losing were stripped from the emergency bus.       Notable of these
              were the following:
              a.    2A control element assembly (CEA) drive motor generator set.
              b.   Non-essential loads on 480 Vac motor control centers 2AS, 2A6 and 2A8.
              c.    2A main feedwater regulating valve shifted into manual.
              d.    Letdown stop valve closed.
              e.    Reactor regulating system number 1.
              f.   Automatic data system display.
     ,        g.    Boron dilution system,
              h.    Safety assessment system.
              i.    Digital safety injection tank undication.
              J.    Component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps 2A1 and 2B2.
              k.    Reactor auxiliary building fan HVE-10A.
              Immediate operator action taken was to recover the loss of level in the 2A
              steam generator caused by the feed regulating valve closing as a result of
              the controller going into manual, with the controller demand set for
              minimum. A reactor trip on low steam generator level was narrowly averted.
              Subsequent review of control wiring diagrams 1011 and 401 indicated that a
              recent plant modification performed in 1984 per plant change / modification
              (PC/M)-015-283 could account for the unexpected load losses. This PC/M was
              performed in response to NRC Regulatory Guides 1.63 and 1.75, and it added
              redundant overcurrent devices to electrical distribution systems.
              Completion of the PC/M did not reflect in the engineered safeguards
              procedure that certain relays could no longer be tested at power without
              major plant perturbations. This is a violation of QA instructions which
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                                      require that activities affecting safety-related systems shall be documented
                                     .in instructions, procedures and drawings (Violation 50-389/85-17-01).
                                  9.  Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)
                                      The following licensee event reports (LER) were reviewed for potential
                                      generic impact, to detect trends and to determine whether corrective actions
                                      appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also
                                      reviewed as they occurred to determine that TS were being met and that the
                                      public health and safety were of upmost consideration. The following LERs
                                      are considered closed:
                                      Unit 1: 335/85-06
                                      Unit 2:   389/85-06*
                                      *In-Depth Review Performed
                                      On May 16, 1985, I&C personnel were troubleshooting a problem with
                                      subgroup 11 Control Element Assemblies (CEAs). With subgroup 11 on the
                                      maintenance bus, I&C personnel proceeded to remove one of the subgroup 11
                                      driver circuit cards located in the subgroup logic cabinet. A subgroup 12
                                      driver card was pulled by mistake. When a test card was inserted in place
                                      of the removed card, the upper gripper coils for shutdown CEAs 52 and 54
                                      were deenergized. At 1:24 p.m., both CEAs dropped to full insertion. This
                                      caused local alarm lights to energize.          The I&C personnel immediately
                                      realized what happened, replaced the subgroup 12 driver card and promptly
                                      informed the control room operators of the situation.        The operators had
                                      commenced the immediate actions of OP 2-0110030, CEA Off-normal Operation
                                      and Realignment. Turbine power was reduced to match reactor power and plant
                                      parameters were stabilized at approximately 90 percent power.
                                      Upon learning the case of the dropped CEAs, the control room operators
                                      immediately commenced CEA recovery. Withdrawal of CEAs 52 and 54 began at
                                      1:25 p.m. and at 1:50 p.m., both CEAs were realigned within shutdown
                                      group A. Power remained at 90 percent until 2:40 p.m.            when reactor
                                      engineering released the core for normal full power operations. The unit
                                      returned to full power at 5:30 p.m.
                                      On May 27, 1985, at approximately 12:25 a.m., an inadvertent actuation of
                                      the 18 containment spray pump occurred. The unit was at full power during
                                      the entire event. A routine surveillance of cycling the containment spray
                                      flow control valves was being conducted. The train A flow control valve
                                      test was completed and preparations were being made to cycle the train B
                                      flow control valve. However, prior to cycling the flow control valve, the
                                      associated containment spray pump breaker control switch must be switched
                                      from " auto" to "stop". It was during this step that the switch was rotated
                                       in the wrong direction (" Auto" to " Start"), thus causing the IB containment
                                      spray pump to start.       Having realized the error, the reactor controls
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                   operator (RCO) immediately rotated the switch to stop. The total run time
                   of the pump was 0.9 seconds as read from the sequence of events recorder.
                   Because of the short time interval involved, no appreciable system pressure
                   change was observed. Furthermore, the corresponding spray header flow
                   control valve was fully shut. Because of these two factors, no spray header
                   ' low actually occurred.
                   With the pump secured, the RC0 checked the containment spray header
                   pressures. Trains A and B header pressures were equal and normal. Shift
                   personnel concluded that the pump run time was too brief to increase the
                   header pressure and that it was safe to continue with the surveillance. The
                   surveillance was completed and the system returned to normal.
                   Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
             10.   Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
                  'The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting

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                   interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
                   facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-
                   tion of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates,
                   doors and isolation zones in the proper conditions.      The inspector also
                   verified that access control and badging was proper and that procedures were
                   being followed.
                   Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
             11.   Surveillance Observations
                   During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that selected TS
                   surveillance requirements were being accomplished as required.       Typical of
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   .               these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant
                   chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room
                   ventilation and ac and dc electrical sources. The inspectors verified that:

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                   testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instru-
                   mentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met;
                   removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; test
                   results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
                   individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the
                   testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
4                  personnel.
                   Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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