Difference between revisions of "ML20133A599"

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Enforcement Conference Rept 50-293/85-25 on 850827 Re Findings of Special Insps 50-293/85-21 & 50-293/85-24, Including Concerns of Timely Corrective Action for Abnormal Surveillance Test Findings & Degraded Vital Area Barrier
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/12/1985
From: Keimig R, Mcbride M, Galen Smith, Lester Tripp
Shared Package
ML20133A584 List:
Download: ML20133A599 (4)

See also: IR 05000293/1985021


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Report No.: 50-293/85-25

Docket No.: 50-293

License No.: DPR-35 Category C

Licensee: Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear

25 Braintree Hill Office Park

Braintree, Massachusetts 02184

Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Meeting At: NRC Region I, King of Prussia, PA

Meeting Date: A ust 2 , 1985

Prepared By: . 6

Mc ri M , Resident Inspector /Date

R) 9fix -

G Smith Physical Security Inspector ' D a t'e

Approved By: .f .



6(. . Tripg(Chief actor Projects Section 3A / Date

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/R.Keimig, fief, eguards Section, NMSS ' Date

Meeting Summary:

An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

on August 27, 1985 to di'scuss the findings of two Special Inspections, Nos. 50-

293/85-21 and 50-293/85-24. The first special inspection concerned two instances

where timely corrective actions were not taken for abnormal surveillance test

findings. The second special inspection concerned the identification of a degraded

vital area barrier. The adequacy of secondary containment, licensed operator

staffing, and environmental qualification of plant equipment were also discussed.

The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted about two hours.



8510020244 850918

PDR ADOCK 0 % DR 293


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1. Participants

a. Boston Edison Company

W. Harrington, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

A. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear

C. Mathis, Nuclear Operations Manager

E. Ziemianski, Nuclear Operations Support Manager

M. Brosee, Chief Maintenance Engineer

b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

T. Muriey, Regional Administrator

R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects

T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

E. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch 3

J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch

L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operatians Branch

L. Tripp, Chief, Projects Section 3A

R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section ,

M. McBride, Resident Inspector, Pilgrim C

G. Meyer, Project Engineer

G. Smith, Safeguards Specialist

R. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist ~

A. Shropshire, Acting Enforcement Coordinator

2. Security Concerns

At the start of the conference, Mr. Martin summarized Region I's understanding

of the circumstances relative to the licensee's identification of a degraded

vital area barrier on August 1-3, 1985, which led to NRC Inspection No. 50-

293/85-24 on August 6-8, 1985. The inspection was conducted to review the

licensee's actions taken after finding two openings in the barrier. That re-

active inspection identified two additional openings in the same barrier even

though the licensee had inspected the barrier and declared it to be sound.

These additional openings resulted in an apparent violation of NRC require-

ments. Mr. Martin expressed concern that the corrective actions and inspec-

tions, initiated by the licensee relative to the first two openings identified,

were not adequate to identify the two additional openings found by the in-

spector. Mr. Martin also expressed concern regarding the effectiveness of

the licensee's control over contractors, since the first opening identified

by the licensee apparently resulted from a contractor removing a portion of

the vital area barrier for installation of fire protection piping. Neither

the licensee nor the contractor assured that the barrier was replaced.

The licensee stated that the BECo Security Plan committed to meet the intent

of 10 CFR 73.2, and did not consider the 96 square inch criterion identified

in NUREG-0908 as hard and fast guidance. Mr. Martin stated that 10 CFR 73.2

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defines a barrier as free from any openings that would lessen the integrity

of the barrier and that the 96 square inch criterion was less restrictive than I

10 CFR 73.2 and used primarily for NRC inspection purposes. The licensee in-

dicated that the inspection performed by BECo after the first two openings

were identified was not adequate inasmuch as it did not identify the two ad-

ditional openings identified by the inspector. To prevent recurrence, dis-

cussions were held with security personnel, plant supervisors and construction

personnel to emphasize security awareness and that fliers were passed out to

contractor personnel for the same purpose. Mr. Martin questioned the adequacy

of the corrective action already initiated and the lack of action on BECo's

part to improve the inspection process. The licensee representatives stated

that additional options were available, but hadn't yet been thoroughly con-


Dr. Murley requested the licensee to submit in writing and within seven days

the specific corrective actions which will be implemented to prevent recur-

rence of the problems discussed during the meeting. Dr. Murley stated that

the licensee's submittal would be considered in determining the appropriate

enforcement action. Mr. Harrington agreed to Dr. Murley's request.

3. Surveillance Testina Concerns

The inadequacies identified in inspection 50-293/85-21 were then discussed.

The licensee indicated that failure to submit Failure and Malfunction Reports

(F&MRs) on two occasions caused corrective actions to be delayed for two ab-

normal surveillance test finding,s. In both cases, this resulted in violations

of Technical Specification regtirements. The licensee also indicated that

the F&MR reports are used to initiate assessments of events with potential

safety significance and must be filled out within one hour after an abnormal

test finding is noted.

The licensee indicated that personnel did not fully understand the purpose

of the reports and that classroom training sessions on the F&MR program for

all onsite groups were being developed. In the interim, all maintenance de-

partment personnel have been instructed on the importance of initiating F&MRs.

The licensee plans to conduct a' course on technical specification require-

ments for the Maintenance Department.


peared to adequately address Nix concerns.

4. Adequacy of Secondary Containment

The adequacy of secondary containment in light of marginal secondary contain-

ment leakage test results during March 1985 and recently noted secondary con-

tainment ventilation damper failures were discussed. The licensee indicated

that no cause of the marginal leakage test had been identified and suggested

that high wind conditions during the March 1985 test may have caused excessive

building leakage. However, following the enforcement conference, the Resident

Inspector reviewed the leakage test records and noted that winds were less

_ . . . . . .


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strong during the March 1985 test (6 mph) than during an October 1984 test

(10 mph). The secondary containment leakage was considerably lower during

the October test despite the higher wind speed. The licensee subsequently

indicated that the wind speed effect discussed at the enforcement conference

was speculation and not based on test data. The licensee further indicated

that a review of older tests following the conference had indicated that wind i

speed and building leakage were not correlated.

The licensee indicated that maintenance during this cycle on secondary con-

tainment dampers had been reviewed and that only a small number of dampers 1

had been found inoperable during surveillance tests. The licensee stated that

a secondary containment leakage test would be conducted at the beginning of

the next three to five day outage during this fuel cycle. Subsequently, such

a test was run on September 1, 1985. It indicated that secondary containment ;

leakage was still within acceptance criteria. !


5. Other Topics

The licensee indicated that an ongoing shortage of licensed operators was

causing the on-duty operators to routinely work large amounts of overtime.

Corrective actions were discussed which should substantially increase the

number of licensed operators on shift by 1987.

The licensee also indicated that most plant equipment should be environmentally

qualified by the November 30, 1985 deadline,








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